G.R. No.

179987 September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both
assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of
Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated
in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence
their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).

Antecedents

The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig,
Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square
meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than
30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.1

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), which reads:

This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as
surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of
249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No.
20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2

After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans application for
land registration, disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the
name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting
Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.3

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan
had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA
declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession
prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR
certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15,
1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing
Malabanans period of possession.

Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CAs
decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit)
remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard,
Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and
disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the
Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out
that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for
registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a
mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and
declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.

The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument
that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable
land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that
the property had been "converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the
application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified
as agricultural land of the public domain.

As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to
establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the
part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as
alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the
State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic
v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable
opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest
had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that
consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the
application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for
almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable
by the State.

The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the
application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.

Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the
interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It
reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Ruling

We deny the motions for reconsideration.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different

classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.

Classifications of land according to ownership

Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership.11Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b)
belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or
although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of
the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the
State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country
from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the
public domain belong to the State.15This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.16

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown
to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the
public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically,
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing
land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution
adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral,
but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses
to which they may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is
done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department.22

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be
alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public
domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of
the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil
Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands
classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or
disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is
necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands
under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public
land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public
land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby
effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion
must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive
Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the
President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and
not otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease; and

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the
land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise
classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it
excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of
Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant
must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession

and occupation of the property subject of the application;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership;

4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier;
and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.

Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands
of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have
been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply.
Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the
Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable
as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the
requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or
reclassification of a public land as agricultural.

The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable
agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any
possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It
observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere
judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent
be respected.

We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite
possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should
best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession
and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of
June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law
as written by the legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress
prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as
agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or incomplete title is
derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the
character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of
the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.

Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine,
corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already
converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of
possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the
application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute
the presumption that the land is inalienable.

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which
prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicants possession
and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical,
open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant,
but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in
order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31

If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to
unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation
thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear
in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when
Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33in order to liberalize stringent requirements
and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly
residential lands, subject to area limitations.34

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting such
land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and
registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against the
State.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of
the public domain, namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership
are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable
through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land
Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be
classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
applicants possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the
owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the
land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private
property.37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer

intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from
the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or
lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the
modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is
a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that
property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying
the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered
ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and
disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as
no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth. 1wphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's
Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179990 October 23, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
DIOSDADA I. GIELCZYK, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

The present petition is one for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The Republic of the
Philippines petitioner) challenges the Decision1 dated September 21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
CA) in CA-GR. CV No. 70078, affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court RTC) of Mandaue
City, Branch 56, which granted the application of Diosdada I. Gielczyk (respondent) for the original
registration of title of Lot Nos. 3135-A and 3136-A of Plans Csd-072219-004552 and Csd-072219-
004551, both situated in Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu. The petitioner prays that the Court annuls the
CA Decision dated September 21, 2007 in CA-GR. CV No. 70078, and that it should dismiss Land
Registration Commission (LRC) Case No. N-452 for utter lack of merit.3

Antecedent Facts

On July 17, 1995, the respondent sought the registration under her name of the lands denominated
as Lot No. 3135-A and Lot No. 3136-A of Plans Csd-072219-004552 and Csd-072219-004551. Both
lands were situated in Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu.

In her verified application in LRC Case No. N-452, the respondent claimed that she is the owner of
the two parcels of land, which are situated, bounded and specifically described in Plans Csd-
072219-004552 and Csd-072219-004551,4 to wit:

TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS

Lot 2007, Cad. 545-D, identical to lot

3135-A, Csd-072219-004552
(Luisa Ceniza)

A parcel of land (lot 20047, Cad.545-D, identical to lot 3135-A, Csd-072219-004552), being a portion
of lot 3135, Cad. 545-D (new), situated in the Barrio of Jugan, Municipality of Consolacion, Province
of Cebu, Island of Cebu. Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2 by lot 20048 (identical to lot 3135-B,
Csd-072219-004552), on the SE., along line 2-3 by Camino Vicinal Road, on the SW., along line 3-4
by lot 3126, on the NW., along line 4-1 by lot 3136, All [sic] of Cad. 545-D (New). Beginning at a
point marked "1" on plan being S. 83 deg. 17E., 1878.69 m. from BLLM No. 1, Consolacion, Cebu.

thence S. 61 deg. 20E., 40.69 m. to point 2;

thence S. 26 deg. 14W., 57.80 m. to point 3;

thence N. 61 deg. 26W., 38.40 m. to point 4;

thence N. 23 deg. 59E., 58.02 m. to point of the

beginning. Containing an area of TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE (2,285)
SQUARE METERS, more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on
the ground as follows; points 1 and 2 by P.S. cyl. conc. mons. 15x40 cms. and the rest are old P.S.
cyl. conc. mons 15x60 cms. Bearings Grid; date of original survey July 14, 1987-November 11,
1987, and that of the subdivision survey executed by Geodetic Engineer Norvic S. Abella on
November 12, 1993 and approved on May 24, 1994.5

TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS

Lot 20045, Cad. 545-D, identical to

Lot 3136-A, Csd-072219-004551
(Constancio Ceniza)

A parcel of land (lot 20045, Cad.545-D, identical to lot 3136-A, Csd-072219-004551), being a portion
of lot 3136, Cad. 545-D (New), situated in the Barrio of Jugan, Municipality of Consolacion, Province
of Cebu, Island of Cebu. Bounded on the SE., along line 1-2 by lot 3135, on the SW., along line 2-3-
4 by lot 3126, on the NW., along line 6-1 by lot 20046, All [sic] of Cad. 545-D (New), on the NE.,
along line 6-1 by lot 20046 (identical to lot 3136-B, Csd-072219-004551). Beginning at a point
marked "1" on plan being S. 83 deg. 17E., 1878.69 m. from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Consolacion, Cebu.

thence S. 23 deg. 59W., 58.02 m. to point 2;

thence N. 65 deg. 10W., 41.39 m. to point 3;

thence N. 35 deg. 15W., 2.55 m. to point 4;

thence N. 20 deg. 43E., 44.05 m. to point 5;

thence N. 20 deg. 44E., 12.48 m. to point 6:

thence S. 65 deg. 37E., 46.79 m. to point of the

beginning. Containing an area of TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TEN (2,610) SQUARE
METERS, more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the
ground as follows; points 1 and 6 by P.S. cyl. conc. mons. 15x40 cms. and the rest are old P.S. cyl.
conc. mons 15x60 cms. Bearings Grid; date of original survey July 14, 1987-November 11, 1987,
and that of the subdivision survey executed by Geodetic Engineer Norvic S. Abella on November 19,
1993 and approved on May 26, 1994.6

The respondent further alleged the following: (a) that the said parcels of land were last assessed for
taxation at 2,400.00; (b) that to the best of her knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage nor
encumbrance of any kind affecting said land, nor any person having interest therein, legal or
equitable; (c) that she had been in open, complete, continuous, and peaceful possession in the
concept of an owner over said parcels of land up to the present time for more than 30 years,
including the possession of her predecessors-in-interest; (d) that she acquired title to said land by
virtue of the deeds of absolute sale; and (e) that said land is not occupied.7

The respondent, as far as known to her, also alleged that the full names and complete addresses of
the owners of all lands adjoining the subject land are the following:

ADJOINING OWNERS OF LOT 3135-A:

 North - Lot 3135-B owned by Mrs. Luisa Ceniza
Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu

East - Municipal Road

c/o Municipal Mayor
Consolacion, Cebu

South - Lot 3126 owned by Mr. Rene Pepito

Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu

West - Lot 3136-A owned by the applicant.

ADJOINING OWNERS OF LOT 3136-A:

North - Lot 3136-B, owned by Mr. Constancio Ceniza

Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu

East - Lot 3135-A, owned by the applicant;

South - Lot 3126, owned by Mr. Rogelio M. Pepito

Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu

West - Lot 3138, owned by Mr. Miguel Hortiguela Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu8

To prove her claim, the respondent submitted the following pieces of evidence:

(a) Approved plans of Lot Nos. 3135-A and 3136-A;9

(b) Approved technical descriptions of the same lots;10

(c) Certification from the Chief, Technical Services Section, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7, Central Visayas Lands Management Services in lieu
of surveyors certificates;11

(d) Latest tax declarations of the lots;12

(e) Latest tax clearance of the same lots;13

(f) Deeds of Sale in favor of the respondent;14

(g) Certifications from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO),
Cebu City, that the lots are alienable and disposable;15 and

(h) Certification from the Chief, Records Section, DENR, Region 7, Cebu City that the same
lots are not subject to public land application.16

Furthermore, when the respondent testified in court, her testimony sought to establish the following:

(i) That the respondent acquired Lot No. 3136-A (which is identical to Lot 20045, and is
situated in Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu, with an area of 2,610 sq m), and Lot No. 3135-A
 (which is identical to Lot 20047, and is situated in Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu, with an area of
2,285 sq m) through purchase from Constancio Ceniza and Luisa Ceniza respectively;17

(ii) That the respondent was never delinquent in paying the taxes for the said lots. In fact the
following tax declarations were issued for Lot No. 3136-A: Tax Dec. No. 01258 for the year
1948; Tax Dec. No. 012459 for the year 1965; Tax Dec. No. 20846 for the year 1980; Tax
Dec. No. 29200 for the year 1981; Tax Dec. No. 04210 for the year 1985; and Tax Dec. No.
13275 for the year 1989; while the following tax declarations were issued for Lot No. 3135-A:
Tax Dec. No. 01670 for the year 1948; Tax Dec. No. 012931 for the year 1965; Tax Dec. No.
021294 for the year 1968; Tax Dec. No. 25146 for the year 1973; Tax Dec. No. 01411 for the
year 1974; Tax Dec. No. 20849 for the year 1980; Tax Dec. No. 04208 for the year 1985;
Tax Dec. No. 13274 for the year 1989;18

(iii) That the said parcels of land are alienable and disposable and are not covered by
subsisting public land application;19

(iv) That the respondent and her respective predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
of Lot No. 3135-A and Lot No. 3136-A for more than 40 years in the concept of an owner,
exclusively, completely, continuously, publicly, peacefully, notoriously and adversely, and no
other person has claimed ownership over the same land;20 and

(v) That the respondent is a Filipino Citizen and that despite her marriage to an American
national, she has retained her Filipino citizenship.21

The petitioner filed an opposition dated September 18, 1995 to the respondents application for
registration of title, alleging among others:

1) That neither the respondent nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since
June 12, 1945 or prior thereto;22

(2) That the muniments of title and/or the tax declarations and tax payment receipts of the
respondent attached to or alleged in the application do not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or of their open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of an
owner since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto; and that said muniments of title do not appear to
be genuine and the tax declarations and/or tax payment receipts indicate the pretended
possession of the respondent to be of recent vintage;23

(3) That the respondent can no longer avail of the claim of ownership in fee simple on the
basis of Spanish title or grant since she has failed to file an appropriate application for
registration within the period of six months from February 16, 1976 as required by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892. From the records, the petitioner further alleged that the
instant application was filed on July 7, 1995;24

(4) That the parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public domain belonging to the
petitioner and that the said parcel is not subject to private appropriation.25

On November 3, 1999, the RTC rendered its Decision26 in favor of the respondent, the dispositive
portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing undisputed facts supported by oral and documentary
evidence, the Court finds and so holds that the applicant has registrable title over subject lots, and
the same title is hereby confirmed. Consequently, the Administrator, Land Registration Authority is
hereby directed to issue Decree of Registration and Original Certificate of Title to Lots 3135-A and
3136-A [sic], both situated at Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu in the name of the applicant DIOSDADA I.
GIELCZYK, 44 years old, Filipino, married to Philip James Gielczyk, American national, resident of
No. 4 Noel St., UHV, Paranaque, Metro Manila, as her exclusive paraphernal property.

Upon finality of this judgment, let a corresponding decree of registration and original certificate of title
be issued to subject lot in accordance with Sec. 39, PD 1529.

SO ORDERED.27

Not convinced of the RTCs decision, the petitioner filed an appeal dated August 5, 2002 before the
CA, which was also denied on September 21, 2007,28 the dispositive portion of which provides:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED in its entirety.29

Thus, the petitioner filed the present Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
raising the sole issue:

Issue

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN UPHOLDING THE RULING OF

THE TRIAL COURT THAT RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT SHE AND HER
PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, COMPLETE, CONTINUOUS,
NOTORIOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND PEACEFUL POSSESSION OVER THE LANDS SUBJECT OF
THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION FOR A PERIOD OF OVER 40 YEARS
THROUGH MERE TAX DECLARATIONS AND IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF WHEN THE
SUBJECT LOTS WERE DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN.30

Our Ruling

It must be noted that the respondent did not file any comment on the petition despite efforts to notify
her and her counsel of record. Thus, in the Resolution31 dated March 30, 2011, this Court resolved to
dispense with the respondents comment and shall decide the instant petition based on available
records.

After a thorough study of the records, the Court resolves to grant the petition.

The respondent failed to completely prove that there was an expressed State declaration that the
properties in question are no longer intended for public use, public service, the development of the
national wealth and have been converted into patrimonial property, and to meet the period of
possession and occupation required by law.

Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 or The Property Registration Decree enumerates the persons who may
apply for the registration of title to land, to wit:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

In the assailed decision granting the respondents application for registration of title, the CA
explained that the RTCs decision was based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 and not on Section
14(1) of the same decree.32 The CA said:

However, a judicious scrutiny of the attendant facts would reveal that the assailed decision of the
RTC was based not on PD No. 1529, Section 14(1), but under Section 14(2) of said issuance. The
pertinent portion of the decision is quoted as follows:

"From the documentary evidence presented and formally offered by the applicant, the Court is
convinced that she and her predecessors-in-interest has (sic) been in open, complete, continuous,
notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession over the lands herein applied for registration of title, for
a period of over 40 years, in the concept of an owner and that applicant has registrable title over
same lots in accordance with Sec. 14, PD 1529."

A closer scrutiny will show that the questioned decision was based on PD No. 1529, Section 14(2).

In the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Naguit, it was ruled that:

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude
the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which
commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."

"Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. There is a consistent
jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private
property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. With
such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under
Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through
prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than
June 12, 1945, and such possession being been [sic] open, continuous and exclusive, then the
possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree."

In the instant case, applicant-appellee was able to present tax declarations dating back from 1948.
Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one
in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual, or at the least
constructive, possession. They constitute proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests, not only ones
sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property, but it also announces his adverse claim
against the State and all other interested parties, including his intention to contribute to the needed
revenues of the Government. All told, such acts strengthen ones bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.33 (Citations omitted)

The Court agrees with the CAs finding that the RTCs grant of the respondents application for
registration of title was based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 and not on Section 14(1) of the
same decree. As the CA, citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and
Naguit,34 correctly explained, an applicant may apply for registration of title through prescription
under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, stating that patrimonial properties of the State are susceptible
of prescription and that there is a rich jurisprudential precedents which rule that properties classified
as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and
exclusive possession of at least 30 years.35

In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,36 the Court further clarified the difference between Section
14(1) and Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The former refers to registration of title on the basis of
possession, while the latter entitles the applicant to the registration of his property on the basis of
prescription. Registration under the first mode is extended under the aegis of the P.D. No. 1529 and
the Public Land Act (PLA) while under the second mode is made available both by P.D. No. 1529
and the Civil Code. Moreover, under Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by Republic Act No.
1472, the 30-year period is in relation to possession without regard to the Civil Code, while under
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the 30-year period involves extraordinary prescription under the Civil
Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137.37

Indeed, the foregoing jurisprudence clearly shows the basis of the respondents application for
registration of title. However, the petitioner argued that the respondent failed to show proof of an
expressed State declaration that the properties in question are no longer intended for public use,
public service, the development of the national wealth or have been converted into patrimonial
property. It pointed out that the certification which the respondent submitted did not indicate when
the lands applied for were declared alienable and disposable.38

On this point, the Court cannot completely agree with the petitioner. Indeed, the respondent
attempted to show proof as to when the subject lands were declared alienable and disposable. While
the RTC and the CA failed to cite the evidence which the respondent submitted, the Court cannot, in
the name of substantial justice and equity, close its eyes to the September 23, 2004

Certification issued and signed by Fedencio P. Carreon (Carreon), OIC, CENRO, which the
respondent attached in her Appellees brief in the CA,39 as a supplement to her earlier submissions,
particularly Annex "G" and Annex "G-1" or the June 28, 1995 Certifications issued by Eduardo M.
Inting, CENRO.40

Carreons Certification is reproduced here:

Republic of the Philippines

Department of Environment and Natural Resources
COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICE
Cebu City
23 September 2004

CENRO, Cebu City, Lands Verification

CONSTANCIO CENIZA ET AL (Consolacion, Cebu)

CERTIFICATION

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that per projection conducted by Forester Restituto A. Llegunas a tract of land lots
3135 and 3136, Cad 545-D(New) containing an area of FIFTEEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
EIGHTY SEVEN (15,687) square meters[,] more or less, situated at Jugan, Consolacion, Cebu as
shown and described in the sketch plan at the back hereof as prepared by Geodetic Engineer
Aurelio Q. Caa for CONSTANCIO CENIZA ET AL was found to be within Alienable and Disposable
Block I of Land Classification Project No. 28 per L. C. Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified
under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063 dated September 1, 1965. (Emphasis Supplied)

This is to certify further that the subject area is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Watershed Reservation per
Presidential Proclamation No. 1074 dated Sept. 2, 1997.

This certification is issued upon the request of Mr. Constancio Ceniza for the purpose of ascertaining
the land classification status only and does not entitle him preferential/priority rights of possession
until determined by competent authorities.

FEDENCIO P. CARREON
OIC, Community Environment
& Natural Resources Officer

However, following our ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,41 this CENRO
Certification by itself is insufficient to establish that a public land is alienable and disposable. While
the certification refers to Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063 dated September 1, 1965, the
respondent should have submitted a certified true copy thereof to substantiate the alienable
character of the land. In any case, the Court does not need to further discuss whether the
respondent was able to overcome the burden of proving that the land no longer forms part of the
public domain to support her application for original land registration because of other deficiencies in
her application.

Indeed, the respondent failed to meet the required period of possession and occupation for purposes
of prescription. From the time of the declaration on September 1, 1965 that the properties in
question are purportedly alienable and disposable up to the filing of the application of the respondent
on July 17, 1995, the respondent and her predecessors-in-interest had possessed and occupied the
said properties for only 29 years and 10 months, short of two months to complete the whole 30-year
possession period.

Granting por arguendo that the respondent and her predecessors-in-interest had possessed and
occupied the subject lots since 1948, the Court cannot still tack those years to complete the 30-year
possession period since the said lots were only declared alienable and disposable on September 1,
1965. In Naguit, we ruled that for as long as the land was declared alienable and disposable, the
same is susceptible of prescription for purposes of registration of imperfect title.42 In Lim v.
Republic,43 we further clarified that "while a property classified as alienable and disposable public
land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of at least 30 years, public dominion lands become patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable but also with an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public use, public
service or the development of national wealth. And only when the property has become patrimonial
can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run."44

While the subject lots were supposedly declared alienable or disposable on September 1, 1965
based on the Certifications of the CENRO, the respondent still failed to complete the 30-year period
required to grant her application by virtue of prescription.

The respondent failed to present specific acts of ownership to substantiate her claim of open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession in the concept of an owner.

The petitioner contends that the respondent failed to present specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the latters claim of open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse possession in
the concept of an owner. Here, the Court agrees with the petitioners argument.

In Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo, Aklan v. Municipality of Buruanga, Aklan,45 the Court ruled that
for an applicant to ipso jure or by operation of law acquire government grant or vested title to a lot,
he must be in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lot.46 In
the said case, the Court clarified what it actually meant when it said "open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation," to wit:

The petitioner submits that even granting arguendo that the entire Lot 138 was not assigned to it
during the Spanish regime or it is not the owner thereof pursuant to the Laws of the Indies, its open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of Lot 138 since 1894 and for many
decades thereafter vests ipso jure or by operation of law upon the petitioner a government grant, a
vested title, to the subject property. It cites Subsection 6 of Section 54 of Act No. 926 and
Subsection b of Section 45 of Act No. 2874.

This contention is likewise not persuasive.

One of the important requisites for the application of the pertinent provisions of Act No. 926 and Act
No. 2874 is the "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation" of the land
by the applicant. Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of
such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. The phrase "possession
and occupation" was explained as follows:

It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and occupation." Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with
the order [sic]. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession.
When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious,
the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for one to qualify under paragraph (b) of the
aforesaid section, his possession of the land must not be mere fiction. As this Court stated, through
then Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel, in Lasam v. The Director of Lands:

x x x Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid down by us in Ramos v. Director of Lands .
But it should be observed that the application of the doctrine of constructive possession in that case
is subject to certain qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that among these
qualifications is "one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference to the
portion actually in possession of the claimant." While, therefore, "possession in the eyes of the law
does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be
said that he is in possession," possession under paragraph 6 of Section 54 of Act No. 926, as
amended by paragraph (b) of Section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal claim. The
mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over
an immense tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be
constructive, is not a mere fiction. x x x.

xxxx

Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the
adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own
use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by
the public or the people in the neighborhood.

Use of land is adverse when it is open and notorious.

Indisputably, the petitioner has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of Lot 138-B since 1894 as evidenced by the church structure built thereon. However, the
record is bereft of any evidence that would tend to show that such possession and occupation
extended to Lots 138-A and 138-C beginning the same period. No single instance of the exercise by
the petitioner of proprietary acts or acts of dominion over these lots was established. Its
unsubstantiated claim that the construction of the municipal building as well as the subsequent
improvements thereon, e.g., the rural health center, Buruanga community Medicare hospital [sic],
basketball court, Rizal monument and grandstand, was [sic] by its tolerance does not constitute
proof of possession and occupation on its (the petitioners) part. Absent the important requisite of
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereon since 1894, no
government grant or title to Lots 138-A and 138-C had vested upon the petitioner ipso jure or by
operation of law. Possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal claim.47 (Citations
omitted and emphasis supplied)

In sum, a simple claim of "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation"
does not suffice. An applicant for a grant or title over a lot must be able to show that he has
exercised acts of dominion over the property in question. The applicants possession must not be
simply a nominal claim where he only plants a sign or symbol of possession. In other words, his
possession of the property must be patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine; it should
be uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; it should demonstrate exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and it should be
conspicuous, which means generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood.48

The Court held in Cruz v. Court of Appeals, et al.,49 that therein petitioners were able to show clear,
competent and substantial evidence establishing that they have exercised acts of dominion over the
property in question. These acts of dominion were the following:

(a) they constructed permanent buildings on the questioned lot;

(b) they collected rentals;

(c) they granted permission to those who sought their consent for the construction of a
drugstore and a bakery;
 (d) they collected fruits from the fruit-bearing trees planted on the said land;

(e) they were consulted regarding questions of boundaries between adjoining properties; and

(f) they religiously paid taxes on the property.50

However, in the present petition, the respondent failed to specifically show that she and her
predecessors-in-interest had exercised acts of dominion over the subject lots. Admittedly, the
respondents best evidence to prove possession and ownership were tax declarations and receipts
issued in her name or the names of her predecessors-in-interest, but these tax declarations and
receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or right of possession over a piece of land. "Well
settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of
the right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence.

The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of
the applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in- interest does not necessarily prove
ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership."51

In the instant case, the respondent failed to show that she or her predecessors-in-interest have
exercised acts of dominion over the said parcels of land. In fact, it was only the respondent who
testified to substantiate her allegations in the application. She did not present anyone else to support
her claim of "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation." Unfortunately,
her testimony simply made general declarations without further proof, to wit:

DIRECT EXAMINATION:

Q - Mrs. Gielczyk, are you the same Diosdada Gielzcyk, the applicant in this case?

A - Yes.

Q - Are you familiar with Lots No. 3135 and 20045, both of Consolacion, Cebu?

A - Yes.

Court:

Excuse me, You can answer in English? You dont need an interpreter?

A - Yes, Your Honor.

Atty. Germino:

Who is the owner of these lots?

A - I am the one.

Q - How large is 20047?

A - It has an area of 2,286 square meters.

Q - How much is the assessed value of Lot 20047?

A - I do not think, 430.00 per square meters is the assessed value reflected in the document.
Court:

Is that reflected in the tax declaration?

Atty. Germino:

Yes, Your Honor.

Court:

Then the tax declaration would be the best evidence.

Atty. Germino:

Q - Do you know if there are other persons who are interested whatsoever over the lots you have
mentioned?

A - No sir.

Atty. Germino:

Q - Are there liens and encumbrances affecting the lots?

A - No, sir.

Q - Who is in possession of these lots?

A - I am in possession.

Court:

Physically? I thought you are residing in Manila?

A - Because my family is living there in Consolacion and I always come home every month. I have
my parents and brothers there.

Court:

The same property?

A - Near my parents house,Your Honor.

Court:

Proceed.

Atty. Germino:
Q - How long have you been in possession of the lots?

A - Including my predecessors-in-interest, for over a period of 40 years.

Q - What is the nature of your possession?

A - Adverse against the whole world, continous [sic], peaceful, open and uninterrupted.

Q - How did you acquire Lot 20047?

A - I purchased it from Luisa Ceniza.

Q - Do you know how did Luisa Ceniza acquire the same?

A - She inherited it from her father Remigio Ceniza.

Q - Do you have a deed of sale in your favor?

A - Yes, I have.52

xxxx

Atty. Germino:

Q - You said that includ[i]ng your predecessors-in-interest, your possession including your
predecessors-in-interest has been for over forty (40) years. Do you have the tax declaration of Lot
20047 since 1948 until the present?

A - Yes.

Q - Showing to you tax declaration No. 01670 in the name of the heirs of Remigio Ceniza covering
land in Consolacion for the year 1948, please examine and tell the court whether that is the tax
declaration of Lot 20047 for the year 1948?

A - Yes, this is the one.

xxxx

Atty. Germino:

Q - Showing to you tax declaration No. 012931 in the name of heirs of Remigio Ceniza for the year
1965, please examine the same and tell the Honorable court what relation has that to the tax
declaration of lot 20047 for the year 1965?

A - This is the same.

xxxx

Atty. Germino:
Q - Showing to you tax declaration No. 021294 in the name of Luisa and Constancio Ceniza for the
year 1968, please examine and tell the court whether that is the tax declaration of Lot 20047 for the
year 1968?

A - Yes, this is the same.

xxxx

Atty. Germino:

Q - Showing to you tax declaration No. [no number was indicated in the TSN] in the name of Luisa
Ceniza for the year 1963 tell the court whether that is the tax declaration for the year 1973? A - Yes,
this is the one.53

In the continuance of her testimony, the respondent added no further information for this Court to
conclude that she indeed exercised specific acts of dominion aside from paying taxes. She testified
thus:

xxxx

Atty. Germino:

Q - Mrs. Gielczyk, one of the last lot subject to [sic] your petition is Lot 20045, how large is this lot?

A - 2,610 square meters.

Q - How much is the assess value of this lot?

A - 970.00

Q - Who is in possession of this lot?

A - I am the one.

Q - How long have you been in possession?

A - Including my predecessors-in-interest is [sic] over a period of 40 years.

COURT: (to witness)

Q - Personally, how long have you been in possession of this property?

A - If I remember right, 1985.

ATTY. GERMINO:

Q - How did you acquire lot 20045?

A - I purchased it from Constancio Ceniza.

Q - Do you have a deed of sale in your favor?

A - Yes.

COURT:

We are talking about 3136-A?

ATTY. GERMINO:

Yes, we are through with Lot 3135?

COURT:

This is 3136-A equivalent to Lot 20045. Proceed.

ATTY. GERMINO:

I am showing to you a deed of absolute sale by Constancio Ceniza over lot 3136-A acknowledged
before Notary Public Marino Martillano, as Doc. No. 2637 book 4, series of 1988, please examine
this document and tell the Court if that is the deed of sale?

A - Yes.

xxxx

Q - Are you not delinquent in the payment of taxes for lot 3136-A?

A - No, sir.

Q - Do you have a tax clearances [sic]?

A - Yes, I have.

Q - I am showing to you tax clearance issued by the municipal treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu, is
that the tax clearance you referred to?

A - Yes, sir.

ATTY. GERMINO:

We ask your Honor the tax clearance be marked as double "C".

COURT: Mark it.

xxxx

COURT: (to witness)

Q - You said that including your predecessor-in-interest, your possession of the land applied for is
more than 40 years, do you have a Tax Declaration of lot 3136-A from 1948 until the present? A -
Yes.

Q - I am showing to you a bunch of Tax Declaration, 6 in all, from the (sic) year 1948, 1965, 1980,
1981, 1985 and 1989, please examine this Tax Declaration and tell us whether these are the Tax
Declarations of Lot 3136-A from 1948 until the present in your name?

A - These are the ones.

ATTY. GERMINO:

We ask that the Tax Declaration in bunch be marked as Exhibit double "F" and the succeeding Tax
Declaration to be marked as double "FF-1" up to double "F-5".

COURT:

Mark it.54

The respondents cross-examination further revealed that she and her predecessors-in-interest have
not exercised specific acts of dominion over the properties, to wit:

COURT:

Cross-examination?

FISCAL ALBURO:

May it please the Honorable Court.

COURT:

Proceed.

FISCAL ALBURO:

Q - Mrs. Gielczyk, how many lots are involved in this petition?

A - 2 portions.

Q - How did you acquire this lot [sic]?

A - I purchased it [sic] from Constancio Ceniza.

Q - When was that?

A - If I remember right in 1985 or 1986.

Q- In other words, you srarted [sic] possessing the property since 1985, until the present?
A- Yes.

Q- But you are not in actual occupant [sic] of the property because you are residing in Paranaque?

A- But I have a cousin in Consolacion.

Q- But you are not residing in Consolacion?

A- I used to go back and forth Cebu and Manila.

Q- Who is in charge of your property in Consolacion?

A- My brothers.

Q - In other words, your property is being taken cared of by your brothers?

A - Yes.

FISCAL ALBURO:

That is all, your Honor.

ATTY. GERMINO:

No redirect, your Honor.

COURT: (to witness) By the way, where do you stay often?

A - Usually in Manila.

Q - Who takes care of the property in Mandaue City?

A - My brothers because there are coconut trees and some fruits and he watched it [sic].

Q - Who is using the coconut trees and the fruits? A - Just for consumption, there are few
coconuts.55 (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing testimony of the lone witness (the applicant-respondent herself), the Court can
deduce that, besides intermittently paying the tax dues on Lot No. 3135-A, the respondent did not
exercise acts of dominion over it. Neither can the Court give credence to the respondents claim that
her predecessors-in-interest had exercised dominion over the property since the respondent failed to
present any witness who would substantiate her allegation. The pieces of documentary evidence,
specifically the tax declarations and the deeds of absolute sale, can neither be relied upon because
the same revealed no indication of any improvement that would have the Court conclude that the
respondent exercised specific acts of dominion. For instance, the deed of absolute sale simply said
that the improvements on Lot No. 3135-A consisted of two (2) coconut trees, one (1) mango tree,
one (1) caimito tree and one (1) jackfruit tree.56 The tax declarations have not shown any indication
supporting the respondents claim that she exercised specific acts of dominion.57
As to Lot No. 3136-A, the deed of absolute sale showed that there were 14 coconut trees, eight (8)
jackfruit trees, and a residential building, which was actually possessed by the vendor Constancio
Ceniza. Moreover, it was only in Tax Declaration Nos. 29200, 04210 and 13275 where it was
declared that a residential building has been built in Lot No. 3136-A.58 And based on the records,
Tax Declaration No. 29200, where the residential building was first indicated, is dated 1981. It may
be said then that it was only in 1981 when the respondents predecessors-in-interest exercised
specific acts of dominion over Lot No. 3136-A, the period of which consists barely of 14 years. Thus,
the respondent has not completed the required 30 years of "open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation."

Clearly, from the pieces of documentary and testimonial evidence, and considering that the
respondent did not present any other witness to support her claim, the Court has no other recourse
but to declare that she has not presented the premium of evidence needed to award her title over
the two parcels of land.

Finally, the Court cannot end this decision without reiterating the final words of former Associate
Justice Dante O. Tinga in the case of Malabanan59. Justice Tinga correctly pointed out the need to
review our present law on the distribution of lands to those who have held them for a number of
years but have failed to satisfy the requisites in acquiring title to such land. Justice Tinga eloquently
put the matter before us, thus:

A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines established in this
decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of todays ruling cannot be discounted.
1wphi1

For, every untitled property that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The social
implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to
the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without comment.

The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied to
long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common among the so-called "Third World"
countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system and the reality
on the ground. The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of
these public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have proven unattractive due
to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said properties. Judicial
confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive means to
regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even
that system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.

There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held residential
lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled and made productive
idle lands of the State with their hands. They have been regarded for generation by their families and
their communities as common law owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of according
them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law
itself considered such lands as property of the public dominion.

It could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and
formalize the settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands of the public domain before the
problem becomes insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the
standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the
requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.

Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only of that
individual, but also to the person s family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood
are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering
problem.60 (Citation omitted and emphasis supplied)

Indeed, the Court can only do as much to bring relief to those who, like herein respondent, wish to
acquire title to a land that they have bought. It is for our lawmakers to write the law amending the
present ones and addressing the reality on the ground, and which this Court will interpret and apply
as justice requires.

WHEREFORE in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is GRANTED and the
Decision dated September 21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70078 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186639 February 5, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
EMMANUEL C. CORTEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul and set aside the Decision2 dated February 17, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 87505. The CA affirmed the Decision3 dated February 7, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 68, in LRC Case No. N-11496.

The Facts

On February 28, 2003, respondent Emmanuel C. Cortez (Cortez) filed with the RTC an
application4 for judicial confirmation of title over a parcel of land located at Barangay (Poblacion)
Aguho, P. Herrera Street, Pateros, Metro Manila. The said parcel of land has an area of 110 square
meters and more particularly described as Lot No. 2697-B of the Pateros Cadastre. In support of his
application, Cortez submitted, inter alia, the following documents: (1) tax declarations for various
years from 1966 until 2005; (2) survey plan of the property, with the annotation that the property is
classified as alienable and disposable; (3) technical description of the property, with a certification
issued by a geodetic engineer; (4) tax clearance certificate; (5) extrajudicial settlement of estate
dated March 21, 1998, conveying the subject property to Cortez; and (6) escritura de particion
extrajudicial dated July 19, 1946, allocating the subject property to Felicisima Cotas Cortez
mother.

As there was no opposition, the RTC issued an Order of General Default and Cortez was allowed to
present his evidence ex-parte.

Cortez claimed that the subject parcel of land is a portion of Lot No. 2697, which was declared for
taxation purposes in the name of his mother. He alleged that Lot No. 2697 was inherited by his
mother from her parents in 1946; that, on March 21, 1998, after his parents died, he and his siblings
executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate over the properties of their deceased parents and
one of the properties allocated to him was the subject property. He alleged that the subject property
had been in the possession of his family since time immemorial; that the subject parcel of land is not
part of the reservation of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and is, in
fact, classified as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development (BFD).

Cortez likewise adduced in evidence the testimony of Ernesto Santos, who testified that he has
known the family of Cortez for over sixty (60) years and that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the subject property since he came to know them.

On February 7, 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision,5 which granted Cortez application for
registration, viz:

WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious, the Court DECLARES, CONFIRMS, and
ORDERS the registration of the applicants title thereto.
As soon as this Decision shall have become final and after payment of the required fees, let the
corresponding Decrees be issued in the name of the applicant, Emmanuel C. Cortez.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General, Land Registration
Authority, Land Management Bureau, and the Registry of Deeds of Rizal.

SO ORDERED.6

In granting Cortez application for registration of title to the subject property, the RTC made the
following ratiocinations:

From the foregoing, the Court finds that there is sufficient basis to grant the relief prayed for. It
having been established by competent evidence that the possession of the land being applied for by
the applicant and his predecessor-in-interest have been in open, actual, uninterrupted, and adverse
possession, under claim of title and in the concept of owners, all within the time prescribed by law,
the title of the applicant should be and must be AFFIRMED and CONFIRMED.7

The Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed to the CA, alleging that the RTC erred in granting the application for registration despite
the failure of Cortez to comply with the requirements for original registration of title. The petitioner
pointed out that, although Cortez declared that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in
possession of the subject parcel of land since time immemorial, no document was ever presented
that would establish his predecessors-in-interests possession of the same during the period
required by law. That petitioner claimed that Cortez assertion that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, adverse, and continuous possession of the subject property for more than
thirty (30) years does not constitute well-neigh incontrovertible evidence required in land registration
cases; that it is a mere claim, which should not have been given weight by the RTC.

Further, the petitioner alleged that there was no certification from any government agency that the
subject property had already been declared alienable and disposable. As such, the petitioner claims,
Cortez possession of the subject property, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or
possessory rights.

On February 17, 2009, the CA, by way of the assailed Decision,8 dismissed the petitioners appeal
and affirmed the RTC Decision dated February 7, 2006. The CA ruled that Cortez was able to prove
that the subject property was indeed alienable and disposable, as evidenced by the
declaration/notation from the BFD.

Further, the CA found that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
and exclusive possession of the subject property for more than 30 years, which, under Section 14(2)
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 15299, sufficed to convert it to private property. Thus:

It has been settled that properties classified as alienable and disposable land may be converted into
private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years. Such
property now falls within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2) of PD 1529, over
which title by prescription can be acquired. Thus, under the second paragraph of Section 14 of PD
1529, those who are in possession of alienable and disposable land, and whose possession has
been characterized as open, continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the right to
register their title to such land despite the fact that their possession of the land commenced only
after 12 June 1945. x x x

xxxx
While it is significant to note that applicant-appellees possession of the subject property can be
traced from his mothers possession of the same, the records, indeed, show that his possession of
the subject property, following Section 14(2) [of PD 1529], is to be reckoned from January 3, 1968,
when the subject property was declared alienable and disposable and not way back in 1946, the
year when he inherited the same from his mother. At any rate, at the time the application for
registration was filed in 2003, there was already sufficient compliance with the requirement of
possession. His possession of the subject property has been characterized as open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of an owner.10 (Citations omitted)

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue

The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision
dated February 7, 2006, which granted the application for registration filed by Cortez.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

At the outset, the Court notes that the RTC did not cite any specific provision of law under which
authority Cortez application for registration of title to the subject property was granted. In granting
the application for registration, the RTC merely stated that "the possession of the land being applied
for by [Cortez] and his predecessor-in-interest have been in open, actual, uninterrupted, and adverse
possession, under claim of title and in the concept of owners, all within the time prescribed by
law[.]"11 On the other hand, the CA assumed that Cortez application for registration was based on
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. Nevertheless, Cortez, in the application for registration he filed with
the RTC, proffered that should the subject property not be registrable under Section 14(2) of P.D.
No. 1529, it could still be registered under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No.
141), or the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 107312 in relation to Section 14(1) of P.D. No.
1529. Thus, the Court deems it proper to discuss Cortez application for registration of title to the
subject property vis--vis the provisions of Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.

Applicants for original registration of title to land must establish compliance with the provisions of
Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529, which pertinently provides that:

Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision
of existing laws.

xxxx
After a careful scrutiny of the records of this case, the Court finds that Cortez failed to comply with
the legal requirements for the registration of the subject property under Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D.
No. 1529.

Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to
public land acquired under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by P.D. No. 1073. "Under
Section 14(1) [of P.D. No. 1529], applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first,
that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second,
that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier."13

The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of
the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, Cortez adduced in evidence a survey plan
Csd-00-00063314 (conversion-subdivision plan of Lot 2697, MCadm 594-D, Pateros Cadastral
Mapping) prepared by Geodetic Engineer Oscar B. Fernandez and certified by the Lands
Management Bureau of the DENR. The said survey plan contained the following annotation:

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Project No. 29, classified as alienable & disposable by the
Bureau of Forest Development on Jan. 3, 1968.

However, Cortez reliance on the foregoing annotation in the survey plan is amiss; it does not
constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the subject property remains
part of the inalienable public domain. In Republic of the Philippines v. Tri-Plus Corporation,15 the
Court clarified that, the applicant must at the very least submit a certification from the proper
government agency stating that the parcel of land subject of the application for registration is indeed
alienable and disposable, viz:

It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law
is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable
and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or
statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for
are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was
certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the
technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with
the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from
the proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable
and disposable.16 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Similarly, in Republic v. Roche,17 the Court declared that:

Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In
this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land classification status
issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and
disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or
PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts
must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable
or disposable land of the public domain. She submitted only the survey map and technical
description of the land which bears no information regarding the lands classification. She did not
bother to establish the status of the land by any certification from the appropriate government
agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites for registration of title under
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.18 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

The annotation in the survey plan presented by Cortez is not the kind of evidence required by law as
proof that the subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Cortez failed to present a certification from the proper government agency as to the classification of
the subject property. Cortez likewise failed to present any evidence showing that the DENR
Secretary had indeed classified the subject property as alienable and disposable. Having failed to
present any incontrovertible evidence, Cortez claim that the subject property forms part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain must fail.

Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that Cortez likewise failed to establish the
same. Cortez failed to present any evidence to prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest have
1wphi1

been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
property since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Cortez was only able to present oral and documentary
evidence of his and his mothers ownership and possession of the subject property since 1946, the
year in which his mother supposedly inherited the same.

Other than his bare claim that his family possessed the subject property since time immemorial,
Cortez failed to present any evidence to show that he and his predecessors-in-interest indeed
possessed the subject property prior to 1946; it is a mere claim and not factual proof of possession.
"It is a rule that general statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of
possession are unavailing and cannot suffice. An applicant in a land registration case cannot just
harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the application but must impress thereto the facts and
circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the land."19

Further, the earliest tax declaration presented by Cortez was only in 1966. Cortez failed to explain
why, despite his claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
subject property since time immemorial, it was only in 1966 that his predecessors-in-interest started
to declare the same for purposes of taxation.

That Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property for
fifty-seven (57) years at the time he filed his application for registration in 2003 would likewise not
entitle him to registration thereof under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.

Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 sanctions the original registration of lands acquired by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws. "As Section 14(2) [of P.D. No. 1529] categorically provides,
only private properties may be acquired thru prescription and under Articles 420 and 421 of the Civil
Code, only those properties, which are not for public use, public service or intended for the
development of national wealth, are considered private."20
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,21 the Court however clarified that lands of the public domain
that are patrimonial in character are susceptible to acquisitive prescription and, accordingly, eligible
for registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, viz:

The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private
persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that "[a]ll things
which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription," and that property of the State
or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription."

There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under the Civil
Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires possession in
1wphi 1

good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10)
years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of
the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such
a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisitesgood faith and just title. The
ascertainment of good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article
1127 of the Civil Code, provisions that more or less speak for themselves.22 (Citation omitted and
emphasis ours)

The Court nevertheless emphasized that there must be an official declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for the development
of national wealth before it can be acquired by prescription; that a mere declaration by government
officials that a land of the public domain is already alienable and disposable would not suffice for
purposes of registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The Court further stressed that the
period of acquisitive prescription would only begin to run from the time that the State officially
declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public use, public service, or for
the development of national wealth. Thus:

Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any duly
authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public domain. Would
such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property
of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and
disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things
within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides
that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial
property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those
property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as
the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth."

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article
420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.23 (Emphasis supplied)

In Republic v. Rizalvo,24 the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in Malabanan, viz:

On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his claim
of ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is
jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring
ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the
moment the State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. x x x.25 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)

Accordingly, although lands of the public domain that are considered patrimonial may be acquired by
prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, before acquisitive prescription could commence,
the property sought to be registered must not only be classified as alienable and disposable; it must
also be declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public use, public service or the
development of the national wealth. Thus, absent an express declaration by the State, the land
remains to be property of public dominion.26

The Court finds no evidence of any official declaration from the state attesting to the patrimonial
character of the subject property. Cortez failed to prove that acquisitive prescription has begun to run
against the State, much less that he has acquired title to the subject property by virtue thereof. It is
of no moment that Cortez and his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject
property for 57 years at the time he applied for the registration of title thereto. "[l]t is not the
notorious, exclusive and uninterrupted possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable
public land for the mandated periods that converts it to patrimonial. The indispensability of an official
declaration that the property is now held by the State in its private capacity or placed within the
commerce of man for prescription to have any effect against the State cannot be overemphasized. "27

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated February 17, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87505, which affirmed
the Decision dated February 7, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68, in LRC
Case No. N-11496, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for Registration of
Emmanuel C. Cortez in LRC Case No. N-11496 is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164408 March 24, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ZURBARAN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

An application for original registration of land of the public domain under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 must show not only that the land has previously been declared
alienable and disposable, but also that the land has been declared patrimonial property of the State
at the onset of the 30-year or 10-year period of possession and occupation required under the law
on acquisitive prescription. Once again, the Court applies this rule-as clarified in Heirs of Mario
Malabanan v. Republic1 in reviewing the decision promulgated on June 10, 2004,2whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) granted the petitioner's application for registration of land.

Antecedents

On May 28, 1993, respondent Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation filed in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in San Pedro, Laguna an application for original registration covering a 1,520
square meter parcel of land situated in Barrio Banlic, Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna,
denominated as Lot 8017-A of Subdivision Plan CSD-04-006985-D, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao
Cadastre,3 alleging that it had purchased the land on March 9, 1992 from Jane de Castro Abalos,
married to Jose Abalos, for 300,000.00; that the land was declared for taxation purposes in the
name of its predecessor-in-interest under Tax Declaration No. 22711; that there was no mortgage or
encumbrance of any kind affecting the land, nor was there any other person or entity having any
interest thereon, legal or equitable, adverse to that of the applicant; and that the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of
the land in the concept of an owner.

Attached to the application were several documents, namely: (1) tracing cloth plan as approved by
the Land Management Division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR);
(2) blue print copies of the tracing cloth plan; (3) copies of the technical description; (4) copies of Tax
Declaration No. 2711; and (5) copies of the Deed of Sale dated March 9, 1992.

The Republic, represented by the Director of Lands, opposed the application, arguing that the
applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945; that the muniments of title and tax
declaration presented did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition
of the land; and that the land was a portion of the public domain, and, therefore, was not subject to
private appropriation.4

The RTC directed the Land Management Bureau, Manila; the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of Los Baos, Laguna; and the Land Management Sector and Forest
Management Bureau, Manila, to submit a status report on the land, particularly, on whether the land
was covered by a land patent, whether it was subject of a previously approved isolated survey, and
whether it was within a forest zone.5

In his memorandum to the DENR, Region IV (Lands Forestry Sector), and the Provincial Prosecutor
of Laguna, a copy of which was furnished the trial court, CENRO Officer Arnulfo Hernandez stated
that the land had been "verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable land under Land
Classification Project No. 23-A of Cabuyao, Laguna, certified and declared as such pursuant to the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, under Forestry Administrative Order No. A-
1627 dated September 28, 1981 per BFD Map LC-3004." Attached to the memorandum was the
inspection report declaring that "the area is surrounded with concrete fence, three (3) buildings for
employees residence;" that the land was acquired through sale before the filing of the application;
that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had been in "continuous, open and peaceful
occupation" of the land, and that "no forestry interest is adversely affected."6

CENRO Land Management Inspector/Investigator Rodolfo S. Gonzales reported that: (1) the land
was covered by a survey plan approved by the Regional Land Director/Land Registration Authority
on May 25, 1988 pursuant to PD No. 239 dated July 9, 1975; (2) it consisted of 22,773 square
meters and was located in Barangay Banlic, Cabuyao, Laguna; (3) the area was entirely within the
alienable and disposable area; (4) it had never been forfeited in favor of the government for non-
payment of taxes, and had not been confiscated in connection with any civil or criminal cases; (5) it
was not within a previously patented property as certified to by the Register of Deeds, Calamba,
Laguna; and (6) there was no public land application filed for it by the applicant or any other persons
as per verification from the records unit of his office. The report further stated that a verification at
the Office of the Municipal Assessor showed that: (1) the land was declared for the first time in 1960
under Tax Declaration No. 6712 in the name of Enrique Hemedez with an area of 23,073 square
meters; (2) it was now covered by Tax Declaration No. 2253 issued in the name of the respondent;
(3) the real property taxes had been paid since 1968; and (4) it had not been earmarked for public or
quasi-public purposes per information from the District Engineer.

After inspection, it was also found that (1) the land was residential; (2) the respondent was in the
actual occupation and possession of the land; and (3) the land did not encroach upon an established
watershed, riverbank/bed protection, creek, right-of-way or park site or any area devoted to general
use or devoted to public service.7

A certification was issued by the Records Management Division of the Land Management Bureau
stating that it had no record of any kind of public land applications/land patents covering the parcel of
land subject of the application.8

The respondent presented Gloria P. Noel, its Vice President and Treasurer, who testified that the
respondent had purchased the land from Jane de Castro Abalos on March 9, 1992 for 300,000.00;
that the land had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of Abalos under Tax Declaration
No. 22711; that after the sale, a new Tax Declaration had been issued in the name of the
respondent, who had meanwhile taken possession of the land by building a fence around it and
introducing improvements thereon; that the respondent had paid the real property taxes thereon
since its acquisition; that the respondents possession had been continuous, open and public; and
that the land was free from any lien or encumbrance; and that there was no adverse claimant to the
land.9

Engr. Edilberto Tamis attested that he was familiar with the land because it was a portion of Lot No.
8017 of Subdivision Plan Cad-455-D of the Cabuyao Cadastre, owned by Corazon Tapalla who had
acquired it from the Hemedez family; that Tapalla had sold a portion of Lot No. 8017 to Abalos and
the remaining portion to him; and that he had witnessed the sale of the land to the respondent.10

The respondents final witness was Armando Espela who declared that he was a retired land
overseer residing in Barangay Banlic from birth; that he was familiar with the land which was part of
a bigger parcel of land owned by the Hemedez family; that his father, Toribio Espela, with his
assistance, and one Francisco Capacio worked on the land since 1960; that the entire landholding
had originally been sugarland, but was later on subdivided, sold, and resold until it ceased to be
agricultural land; that, in 1982, the land was sold to Corazon Tapalla who hired him as the overseer;
that as the overseer, he fenced and cleared the area; that he was allowed to use the grassy portion
for grazing purposes; that in 1987, Tapalla sold part of the land to Abalos and the remaining portion
to Engr. Tamis; that he continued to oversee the land for the new owners; that Abalos then sold her
portion to the respondent in 1992; that since then, the respondent took possession of the land, and
he then ceased to be the overseer; that the possession by the Hemedez family and its successors-
in-interest was open, continuous, public and under claim of ownership; and that he did not know any
person who claimed ownership of the land other than those he and his father served as overseers.11

Decision of the RTC

On May 12, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision, holding that the respondent and its predecessors-
in-interest had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership even prior to 1960 and, accordingly,
granted the application for registration, viz:

WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the evidence submitted by the applicant, this Court hereby
orders the confirmation and registration of title of the land described as Lot 8017-A of subdivision
plan Csd-04-006985-D, being a portion of Lot 8017 of subdivision plan Cad-455-D, Cabuyao
Cadastre situated at Barangay Banlic, Cabuyao, Laguna with an area of 1,520 square meters to be
entered under the name of the applicant Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation, a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with office address at 33 M.
Viola St., San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City by the Land Registration Authority. After the
decision shall become final, let an order for the issuance of a decree of title be issued in favor of said
applicant.

SO ORDERED.12

Judgment of the CA

The Republic appealed, arguing that the issue of whether the applicant and its predecessors-in-
interest had possessed the land within the required length of time could not be determined because
there was no evidence as to when the land had been declared alienable and disposable.

On June 10, 2004, the CA promulgated its judgment affirming the RTC, and concluded that the
reports made by the concerned government agencies and the testimonies of those familiar with the
land in question had buttressed the court a quos conclusion that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive, and adverse
possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership even prior to 1960.13

Issue

Hence, the Republic appeals the adverse judgment of the CA upon the following ground:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED

THE TRIAL COURTS GRANT OF THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION DESPITE
THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THAT RESPONDENT AND ITS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST
HAVE COMPLIED WITH THE PERIOD OF POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION REQUIRED BY
LAW.14
The Republic contends that the respondent did not establish the time when the land covered by the
application for registration became alienable and disposable;15 that such detail was crucial because
the possession of the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest, for the purpose of determining
whether it acquired the property by prescription, should be reckoned from the time when the land
was declared alienable and disposable; and that prior to the declaration of the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, it was not susceptible to private ownership, and any
possession or occupation at such time could not be counted as part of the period of possession
required under the law on prescription.16

The respondent counters that whether it established when the property was declared alienable and
disposable and whether it complied with the 30-year required period of possession should not be
entertained anymore by the Court because: (a) these issues had not been raised in the trial court
and were being raised for the first time on appeal; and (b) factual findings of the trial court, especially
when affirmed by the CA, were binding and conclusive on this Court. At any rate, the respondent
insists that it had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession of the property
for the prescribed period of 30 years as evidenced by the fact that the property had been declared
for taxation purposes in 1960 in the name of its predecessors-in-interest, and that such possession
had the effect of converting the land into private property and vesting ownership upon the
respondent.17

In reply, the Republic asserts that it duly opposed the respondents application for registration; that it
was only able to ascertain the errors committed by the trial court after the latter rendered its
decision; and that the burden of proof in land registration cases rested on the applicant who must
prove its ownership of the property being registered. The Republic maintains that the Court had the
authority to review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts when the conclusion reached
was not supported by the evidence on record, as in this case.18

Ruling

The petition for review is meritorious.

Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates those who may file an application for registration of land
based on possession and occupation of a land of the public domain, thus:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision
of existing laws.

xxxx

An application for registration under Section14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 must establish the following
requisites, namely: (a) the land is alienable and disposable property of the public domain; (b) the
applicant and its predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership; and (c) the applicant
and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the land since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. The Court has clarified in Malabanan19 that under Section14(1), it is not necessary that the
land must have been declared alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945, or earlier, because the
law simply requires the property sought to be registered to be alienable and disposable at the time
the application for registration of title is filed. The Court has explained that a contrary interpretation
would absurdly limit the application of the provision "to the point of virtual inutility."

The foregoing interpretation highlights the distinction between a registration proceeding filed under
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 and one filed under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. According to
Malabanan:

Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles
registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the
aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section
14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.20

In other words, registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 is based on possession and
occupation of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
without regard to whether the land was susceptible to private ownership at that time. The applicant
needs only to show that the land had already been declared alienable and disposable at any time
prior to the filing of the application for registration.

On the other hand, an application under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 is based on acquisitive
prescription and must comply with the law on prescription as provided by the Civil Code. In that
regard, only the patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription pursuant to the
Civil Code.21 For acquisitive prescription to set in, therefore, the land being possessed and occupied
must already be classified or declared as patrimonial property of the State. Otherwise, no length of
possession would vest any right in the possessor if the property has remained land of the public
dominion. Malabanan stresses that even if the land is later converted to patrimonial property of the
State, possession of it prior to such conversion will not be counted to meet the requisites of
acquisitive prescription.22 Thus, registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 requires that the
land had already been converted to patrimonial property of the State at the onset of the period of
possession required by the law on prescription.

An application for registration based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 must, therefore, establish the
following requisites, to wit: (a) the land is an alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property of
the public domain; (b) the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
land for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title, or for at least 30 years, regardless of good
faith or just title; and (c) the land had already been converted to or declared as patrimonial property
of the State at the beginning of the said 10-year or 30-year period of possession.

To properly appreciate the respondents case, we must ascertain under what provision its application
for registration was filed. If the application was filed under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, the
determination of the particular date when the property was declared alienable and disposable would
be unnecessary, inasmuch as proof showing that the land had already been classified as such at the
time the application was filed would be enough. If the application was filed under Section 14(2) of
P.D. No. 1529, the determination of the issue would not be crucial for, as earlier clarified, it was not
the declaration of the land as alienable and disposable that would make it susceptible to private
ownership by acquisitive prescription. Malabanan expounds thereon, thus Would such lands so
declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the public
dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable
lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the
commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that
patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."
It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial
property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those
property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as
the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains
property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth."

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article
420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.23

The respondents application does not enlighten as to whether it was filed under Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The application alleged that the respondent and its predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of the property in
the concept of an owner, but did not state when possession and occupation commenced and the
duration of such possession. At any rate, the evidence presented by the respondent and its
averments in the other pleadings reveal that the application for registration was filed based on
Section 14(2), not Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. The respondent did not make any allegation in its
application that it had been in possession of the property since June 12, 1945, or earlier, nor did it
present any evidence to establish such fact. 1wphi 1

With the application of the respondent having been filed under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the
crucial query is whether the land subject of the application had already been converted to
patrimonial property of the State. In short, has the land been declared by law as no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth?

The respondent may perhaps object to a determination of this issue by the Court for the same
reason that it objects to the determination of whether it established when the land was declared
alienable and disposable, that is, the issue was not raised in and resolved and by the trial court. But
the objection would be futile because the issue was actually raised in the trial court, as borne out by
the Republic's allegation in its opposition to the application to the effect "that the land is a portion of
the public domain not subject to prescription." In any case, the interest of justice dictates the
consideration and resolution of an issue that is relevant to another that was specifically raised. The
rule that only theories raised in the initial proceedings may be taken up by a party on appeal refers
only to independent, not concomitant, matters to support or oppose the cause of action.24

Here, there is no evidence showing that the land in question was within an area expressly declared
by law either to be the patrimonial property of the State, or to be no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth. The Court is left with no alternative but to deny
the respondent's application for registration.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision promulgated on June 10, 2004; and DISMISSES the respondent's application for
original registration of Lot 8017-A of Subdivision Plan CSD-04-006985-D, Cad. 455-D, of the
Cabuyao Cadastre.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 210252 June 16, 2014

VILMA QUINTOS, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact FIDEL I. QUINTOS, JR.; FLORENCIA I.

DANCEL, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact FLOVY I. DANCEL; and CATALINO L.
IBARRA, Petitioners,
vs.
PELAGIA I. NICOLAS, NOLI L. IBARRA, SANTIAGO L. IBARRA, PEDRO L. IBARRA, DAVID L.
IBARRA, GILBERTO L. IBARRA, HEIRS OF AUGUSTO L. IBARRA, namely CONCHITA R.,
IBARRA, APOLONIO IBARRA, and NARCISO IBARRA, and the spouses RECTO CANDELARIO
and ROSEMARIE CANDELARIO,Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 challenging the
Decision1 and Resolution2of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 98919 dated July 8, 2013
and November 22, 2013, respectively. The challenged rulings affirmed the May 7, 2012 Decision3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac that petitioners and respondents are
co-owners of the subject property, which should be partitioned as per the subdivision plan submitted
by respondent spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario.

The Facts

As culled from the records, the facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and Catalino Ibarra, and respondents Pelagia Nicolas,
Noli Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra, David Ibarra, Gilberto Ibarra, and the late Augusto Ibarra
are siblings. Their parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners of the subject
property, a 281 sqm. parcel of land situated along Quezon Ave., Poblacion C, Camiling, Tarlac,
covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 318717.

By 1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica had already passed away, leaving to their ten (10)
children ownership over the subject property. Subsequently, sometime in 2002, respondent siblings
brought an action for partition against petitioners. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-52
and was raffled to the RTC, Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac. However, in an Order4 dated March 22,
2004, the trial court dismissed the case disposing as follows:

For failure of the parties, as well as their counsels, to appear despite due notice, this case is hereby
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

As neither set of parties appealed, the ruling of the trial court became final, as evidenced by a
Certificate of Finality5it eventually issued on August 22, 2008.

Having failed to secure a favorable decision for partition, respondent siblings instead resorted to
executing a Deed of Adjudication6 on September 21, 2004 to transfer the property in favor of the ten
(10) siblings. As a result, TCT No. 318717 was canceled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 390484 was
issued in its place by the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac in the names of the ten (10) heirs of the Ibarra
spouses.

Subsequently, respondent siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share over the property in favor of their
co-respondents, the spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario. By virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale7 dated April 17, 2007 executed in favor of the spouses Candelario and an Agreement of
Subdivision8 purportedly executed by them and petitioners, TCT No. 390484 was partially canceled
and TCT No. 434304 was issued in the name of the Candelarios, covering the 7/10portion.

On June 1, 2009, petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against
respondents wherein they alleged that during their parents lifetime, the couple distributed their real
and personal properties in favor of their ten (10) children. Upon distribution, petitioners alleged that
they received the subject property and the house constructed thereon as their share. They likewise
averred that they have been in adverse, open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the
property for over four (4) decades and are, thus, entitled to equitable title thereto. They also deny
any participation in the execution of the aforementioned Deed of Adjudication dated September 21,
2004 and the Agreement of Subdivision. Respondents countered that petitioners cause of action
was already barred by estoppel when sometime in 2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the 7/10
undivided share of the respondent siblings. They point out that this is an admission on the part of
petitioners that the property is not entirely theirs. In addition, they claimed that Bienvenido and
Escolastica Ibarra mortgaged the property but because of financial constraints, respondent spouses
Candelario had to redeem the property in their behalf. Not having been repaid by Bienvenido and
Escolastica, the Candelarios accepted from their co-respondents their share in the subject property
as payment. Lastly, respondents sought, by way of counterclaim, the partition of the property.

Docketed as Civil Case No. 09-15 of the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac, the quieting of title case was
eventually raffled to Branch 68 of the court, the same trial court that dismissed Civil Case No. 02-52.
During pre-trial, respondents, or defendants a quo, admitted having filed an action for partition, that
petitioners did not participate in the Deed of Adjudication that served as the basis for the issuance of
TCT No. 390484, and that the Agreement of Subdivision that led to the issuance of TCT No. 434304
in favor of respondent spouses Candelario was falsified.9 Despite the admissions of respondents,
however, the RTC, through its May 27, 2012 Decision, dismissed petitioners complaint. The court
did not find merit in petitioners asseverations that they have acquired title over the property through
acquisitive prescription and noted that there was no document evidencing that their parents
bequeathed to them the subject property. Finding that respondent siblings were entitled to their
respective shares in the property as descendants of Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra and as co-
heirs of petitioners, the subsequent transfer of their interest in favor of respondent spouses
Candelario was then upheld by the trial court. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above-entitled case is hereby Dismissed.

Also, defendants-spouses Rosemarie Candelario and Recto Candelario are hereby declared as the
absolute owners of the 7/10 portion of the subject lot.

Likewise, the court hereby orders the partition of the subject lots between the herein plaintiffs and
the defendants-spouses Candelarios.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA, pleading the same allegations
they averred in their underlying complaint for quieting of title. However, they added that the partition
should no longer be allowed since it is already barred by res judicata, respondent siblings having
already filed a case for partition that was dismissed with finality, as admitted by respondents
themselves during pre-trial.

On July 8, 2013, the CA issued the assailed Decision denying the appeal. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 7, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of
Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, in Civil Case No. 09-15, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Similar to the trial court, the court a quo found no evidence on record to support petitioners claim
that the subject property was specifically bequeathed by Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra in their
favor as their share in their parents estate. It also did not consider petitioners possession of the
property as one that is in the concept of an owner. Ultimately, the appellate court upheld the finding
that petitioners and respondent spouses Candelario co-own the property, 30-70 in favor of the
respondent spouses.

As regards the issue of partition, the CA added:

x x x Since it was conceded that the subject lot is now co-owned by the plaintiffs-appellants, (with
3/10 undivided interest) and defendants-appellees Spouses Candelarios (with 7/10 undivided
interest) and considering that plaintiffs-appellants had already constructed a 3-storey building at the
back portion of the property, then partition, in accordance with the subdivision plan (records, p. 378)
undertaken by defendants-appellants [sic] spouses, is in order.10

On November 22, 2013, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant
petition.

Issues

In the present petition, the following errors were raised:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED RELEVANT AND

UNDISPUTED FACTS WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY
PETITIONERS CLAIM OF EQUITABLE TITLE.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE ORDER OF PARTITION
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COUNTERCLAIM FOR PARTITION, BASED ON THE
DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED IN 2007, IS BARRED BY LACHES.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS RENDERED A SUBSTANTIALLY FLAWED JUDGMENT

WHEN IT NEGLECTED TO RULE ON PETITIONERS CONTENTION THAT THE
COUNTERCLAIM FOR PARTITION IS ALSO BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT, DESPITE
ITS HAVING BEEN SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED AS ERROR AND PROPERLY ARGUED IN
THEIR BRIEF, AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY THE
DISMISSAL OF THE COUNTERCLAIM.

IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED PARTITION IN

ACCORDANCE WITH THE SUBDIVISION PLAN MENTIONED IN ITS DECISION, IN
CONTRAVENTION OF THE PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED IN RULE 69 OF THE RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.11
To simplify, the pertinent issues in this case are as follows:

1. Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership over the property;

2. Whether or not the respondents counterclaim for partition is already barred by laches or
res judicata; and

3. Whether or not the CA was correct in approving the subdivision agreement as basis for
the partition of the property.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious in part.

Petitioners were not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the property

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting
title to real property.12 For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must
concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or efficacy.13 In the case at bar, the CA correctly observed that petitioners
cause of action must necessarily fail mainly in view of the absence of the first requisite.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the determination of whether or not petitioners sufficiently
proved their claim of ownership or equitable title is substantially a factual issue that is generally
improper for Us to delve into. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that the
petition for review on certiorari "shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth."
In appeals by certiorari, therefore, only questions of law may be raised, because this Court is not a
trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial.14 Although there are exceptions15 to this general rule as eloquently
enunciated in jurisprudence, none of the circumstances calling for their application obtains in the
case at bar. Thus, We are constrained to respect and uphold the findings of fact arrived at by both
the RTC and the CA.

In any event, a perusal of the records would readily show that petitioners, as aptly observed by the
courts below, indeed, failed to substantiate their claim. Their alleged open, continuous, exclusive,
and uninterrupted possession of the subject property is belied by the fact that respondent siblings, in
2005, entered into a Contract of Lease with the Avico Lending Investor Co. over the subject lot
without any objection from the petitioners.16 Petitioners inability to offer evidence tending to prove
that Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra transferred the ownership over the property in favor of
petitioners is likewise fatal to the latters claim. On the contrary, on May 28, 1998, Escolastica Ibarra
executed a Deed of Sale covering half of the subject property in favor of all her 10 children, not in
favor of petitioners alone.17

The cardinal rule is that bare allegation of title does not suffice. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff
to establish his or her case by preponderance of evidence.18 Regrettably, petitioners, as such
plaintiff, in this case failed to discharge the said burden imposed upon them in proving legal or
equitable title over the parcel of land in issue. As such, there is no reason to disturb the finding of the
RTC that all 10 siblings inherited the subject property from Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra, and
after the respondent siblings sold their aliquot share to the spouses Candelario, petitioners and
respondent spouses became co-owners of the same.
The counterclaim for partition is not barred by prior judgment

This brings us to the issue of partition as raised by respondents in their counterclaim. In their answer
to the counterclaim, petitioners countered that the action for partition has already been barred by res
judicata.

The doctrine of res judicata provides that the judgment in a first case is final as to the claim or
demand in controversy, between the parties and those privy with them, not only as to every matter
which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other
admissible matter which must have been offered for that purpose and all matters that could have
been adjudged in that case.19 It precludes parties from relitigating issues actually litigated and
determined by a prior and final judgment.20 As held in Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian:21

It is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds
embodied in various maxims of the common law; the one, public policy and necessity, which makes
it to the interest of the state that there should be an end to litigation republicae ut sit finis litium;
the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause nemo
debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the
will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratitude identification of a litigious disposition on the
part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.22

The rationale for this principle is that a party should not be vexed twice concerning the same cause.
Indeed, res judicata is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural society, for not only
does it ward off endless litigation, it ensures the stability of judgment and guards against inconsistent
decisions on the same set of facts.23

There is res judicata when the following requisites are present: (1) the formal judgment or order must
be final; (2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a
consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (3) it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
(4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of
cause of action.24

In the case at bar, respondent siblings admit that they filed an action for partition docketed as Civil
Case No. 02-52, which the RTC dismissed through an Order dated March 22, 2004 for the failure of
the parties to attend the scheduled hearings. Respondents likewise admitted that since they no
longer appealed the dismissal, the ruling attained finality. Moreover, it cannot be disputed that the
subject property in Civil Case No. 02-52 and in the present controversy are one and the same, and
that in both cases, respondents raise the same action for partition. And lastly, although respondent
spouses Candelario were not party-litigants in the earlier case for partition, there is identity of parties
not only when the parties in the case are the same, but also between those in privity with them, such
as between their successors-in-interest.25

With all the other elements present, what is left to be determined now is whether or not the dismissal
of Civil case No. 02-52 operated as a dismissal on the merits that would complete the requirements
of res judicata.

In advancing their claim, petitioners cite Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear
on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action
for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the
complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the courts own motion, without
prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate
action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise
declared by the court.

The afore-quoted provision enumerates the instances when a complaint may be dismissed due to
the plaintiff's fault: (1) if he fails to appear on the date for the presentation of his evidence in chief on
the complaint; (2) if he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he
fails to comply with the Rules or any order of the court. The dismissal of a case for failure to
prosecute has the effect of adjudication on the merits, and is necessarily understood to be with
prejudice to the filing of another action, unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. Stated
differently, the general rule is that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an
adjudication on the merits and with prejudice to the filing of another action, and the only exception is
when the order of dismissal expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal is without
prejudice.26 In the case at bar, petitioners claim that the Order does not in any language say that the
dismissal is without prejudice and, thus, the requirement that the dismissal be on the merits is
present.

Truly, We have had the occasion to rule that dismissal with prejudice under the above-cited rule
amply satisfies one of the elements of res judicata.27 It is, thus, understandable why petitioners would
allege res judicata to bolster their claim. However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of
the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that
there is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet. Pertinent hereto is Article 494 of the Civil
Code, which reads:

Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding
ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years. Neither
shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law. No prescription shall run in favor of a co-
owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership. (emphasis supplied)

From the above-quoted provision, it can be gleaned that the law generally does not favor the
retention of co-ownership as a property relation, and is interested instead in ascertaining the co-
owners specific shares so as to prevent the allocation of portions to remain perpetually in limbo.
Thus, the law provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned
in common.

Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners under
Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To construe otherwise would diminish the
substantive right of a co-owner through the promulgation of procedural rules. Such a construction is
not sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled to require citation, that a substantive law
cannot be amended by a procedural rule.28 This further finds support in Art. 496 of the New Civil
Code, viz:

Article 496.Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial

proceedings. Partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court insofar as they are consistent with
1wphi1

this Code.
Thus, for the Rules to be consistent with statutory provisions, We hold that Art. 494, as cited, is an
exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that even if the order of dismissal for
failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be deemed to be without
prejudice.

This is not to say, however, that the action for partition will never be barred by res judicata. There
can still be res judicata in partition cases concerning the same parties and the same subject matter
once the respective shares of the co-owners have been determined with finality by a competent
court with jurisdiction or if the court determines that partition is improper for co-ownership does not
or no longer exists.

So it was that in Rizal v. Naredo,29 We ruled in the following wise:

Article 484 of the New Civil Code provides that there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Thus, on the one hand, a co-owner of an
undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of
dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. On the other
hand, there is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already
concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described.

Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner is obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and
his proper remedy is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, which he may bring
at anytime in so far as his share is concerned. Article 1079 of the Civil Code defines partition as the
separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong.
It has been held that the fact that the agreement of partition lacks the technical description of the
parties respective portions or that the subject property was then still embraced by the same
certificate of title could not legally prevent a partition, where the different portions allotted to each
were determined and became separately identifiable.

The partition of Lot No. 252 was the result of the approved Compromise Agreement in Civil Case
No. 36-C, which was immediately final and executory. Absent any showing that said Compromise
Agreement was vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress, the court cannot set aside a judgment based on
compromise. It is axiomatic that a compromise agreement once approved by the court settles the
rights of the parties and has the force of res judicata. It cannot be disturbed except on the ground of
vice of consent or forgery.

Of equal significance is the fact that the compromise judgment in Civil Case No. 36-C settled as well
the question of which specific portions of Lot No. 252 accrued to the parties separately as their
proportionate shares therein. Through their subdivision survey plan, marked as Annex "A" of the
Compromise Agreement and made an integral part thereof, the parties segregated and separately
assigned to themselves distinct portions of Lot No. 252. The partition was immediately executory,
having been accomplished and completed on December 1, 1971 when judgment was rendered
approving the same. The CA was correct when it stated that no co-ownership exist when the
different portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and separately
identifiable, even if not yet technically described. (emphasis supplied)

In the quoted case, We have held that res judicata applied because after the parties executed a
compromise agreement that was duly approved by the court, the different portions of the owners
have already been ascertained. Thus, there was no longer a co-ownership and there was nothing
left to partition. This is in contrast with the case at bar wherein the co-ownership, as determined by
the trial court, is still subsisting 30-70 in favor of respondent spouses Candelario. Consequently,
there is no legal bar preventing herein respondents from praying for the partition of the property
through counterclaim.

The counterclaim for partition is not barred by laches

We now proceed to petitioners second line of attack. According to petitioners, the claim for partition
is already barred by laches since by 1999, both Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra had already died
and yet the respondent siblings only belatedly filed the action for partition, Civil Case No. 02-52, in
2002. And since laches has allegedly already set in against respondent siblings, so too should
respondent spouses Candelario be barred from claiming the same for they could not have acquired
a better right than their predecessors-in-interest.

The argument fails to persuade.

Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
whichby the exercise of due diligencecould or should have been done earlier. It is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable period, warranting the presumption that
the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it.30 The principle is a
creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping upon ones
right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable
situation. As an equitable defense, laches does not concern itself with the character of the
petitioners title, but only with whether or not by reason of the respondents long inaction or
inexcusable neglect, they should be barred from asserting this claim at all, because to allow them to
do so would be inequitable and unjust to petitioners.31

As correctly appreciated by the lower courts, respondents cannot be said to have neglected to assert
their right over the subject property. They cannot be considered to have abandoned their right given
that they filed an action for partition sometime in 2002, even though it was later dismissed.
Furthermore, the fact that respondent siblings entered into a Contract of Lease with Avico Lending
Investor Co. over the subject property is evidence that they are exercising rights of ownership over
the same.

The CA erred in approving the Agreement for Subdivision

There is merit, however, in petitioners contention that the CA erred in approving the proposal for
partition submitted by respondent spouses. Art. 496, as earlier cited, provides that partition shall
either be by agreement of the parties or in accordance with the Rules of Court. In this case, the
Agreement of Subdivision allegedly executed by respondent spouses Candelario and petitioners
cannot serve as basis for partition, for, as stated in the pre-trial order, herein respondents admitted
that the agreement was a falsity and that petitioners never took part in preparing the same. The
"agreement" was crafted without any consultation whatsoever or any attempt to arrive at mutually
acceptable terms with petitioners. It, therefore, lacked the essential requisite of consent. Thus, to
approve the agreement in spite of this fact would be tantamount to allowing respondent spouses to
divide unilaterally the property among the co-owners based on their own whims and caprices. Such
a result could not be countenanced.

To rectify this with dispatch, the case must be remanded to the court of origin, which shall proceed to
partition the property in accordance with the procedure outlined in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98919 dated July 8, 2013 and
November 22, 2013, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the RTC, Branch 68 in Camiling, Tarlac for purposes of partitioning the subject
property in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.
Torrens System
What is land registration?

Land registration is a judicial or administrative proceeding whereby a persons claim of

ownership over a particular land is determined and confirmed or recognized so that such land
and the ownership thereof may be recorded in a public registry.

What is Torrens title?

Torrens title is the certificate of ownership issued by the land Register of Deeds, naming and
declaring the owner of the real property described therein, free from all liens and encumbrances
except such as may be expressly noted thereon or otherwise reserved by law. Its effect is that it
can be conclusive against the whole world, it is guaranteed to be indefeasible, unassailable, and
imprescriptible. The title once registered cannot be impugned, altered, changed, modified,
enlarged, or diminished except in some direct proceeding permitted by law.

What are the kinds of registration?

1. Original registrationis the first registration of the land whereby an Original Certificate of Title
is entered in the Registry of Property and a duplicate owners copy is issued to the owner by the
Register of Deeds. It can be further classified into:

a. Judicial registration which will be done through the courts. It may either be voluntary where it
instituted by the applicant under the provisions of Act 496 or PD 1529 or compulsory at the
instance of the State under provision of Act 2259 (Cadastral Act)

1. Voluntary -instituted by the applicant

2. Compulsory- at the instance of the State

b. Administrative registration wherein theacquisition of land patents to public agricultural lands

and registration thereof under Section 107 of CA No. 141 (The Public Land Act)

What is subsequent registration?

Subsequent registration is a process where the Original Certificate of Title is cancelled and
subsequently registered under a Transfer Certificate of Title in favor of the new owner in cases
of land conveyance such as sale, donation or assignment.

Who may apply for original registration of title?

According to Presidential Decree 1529 Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to
Registration of Property and for Other Purposes, or also known as Property registration Decree,
it has laid down the enumeration of who may apply for original registration of Title.

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of
accession or accretion under the existing laws.

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.

Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for
the original registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption
expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property
consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may
continue the proceedings.

A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by
him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.

What are the attributes and limitations on certificates of title and registered lands?

A. Free from liens and encumbrances

B. Incontrovertible and Indefeasible
C. Certificate of title not subject to Collateral Attack

What are the parts and information on the title?

Title Form Information- where the type of form, date of revision and serial number can be
found
Survey Information- where the parcel identity (lot, block, survey plan number), location,
adjoining parcels, tie point, tie line, bearings and distances from corner to corner and the area
and date of survey can be found
Registration Information- where the name of the Register of Deeds, title number, book number,
page number, place/time/date of registration, name and signature of registrar and historical
information (date and place of original registration, OCT No., Volume No., Page No., Decree
No., record/name of original owner, number of cancelled title for OCT) can be found
Ownership Information- where the name/s of all persons whose interest make up the full
ownership, citizenship, civil status, postal address

What is Homestead patent?

It is issued (by the Director Lands) over land not of the public domain is a nullity, devoid of
force and effect against the owner whose title is covered by an OCT or TCT.

What is the Registration of title under Act 3344?

Registration of untitled lands or lands with imperfect titles is ineffective against third persons.
That in case of double sale, the title registered under the Torrens System is superior than title
registered under Act 3344. Registration under the Torrens System, at the Registry of Deeds is
needed so that title shall be binding upon third parties.

What is a decree of registration?

It is issued by the administrator of LRA upon order of the court. It shall bind the land and quiet
title thereto the purpose of Torrens System. Land becomes registered only upon transcription
of the decree in the original registration book by the Register of Deeds and not on the date of
issuance of the decree. Certificate of title becomes indefeasible after ONE YEAR from issuance
of the decree.

What is an assurance fund?

Sec 95 of Property Registration Decree provides that a person who, without negligence on his
part sustain loss or damage or is deprived of land or any estate or interest therein in consequence
of the bringing of the land under the operation of Torrens System or arising after the original
registration of the land, through fraud or in consequence of any error, may bring an action in any
court of competent jurisdiction for the recovery of damages paid out of the Assurance Fund
within 6 years from the time the right to bring such action accrues.
The assurance fund is intended to relive innocent persons from the harshness of the doctrine that
a certificate of title is conclusive evidence of indefeasible title to the land.

What is the rule on conveyance of only a portion of a land?

The Register of Deeds shall not enter any new title in favor of the grantee until a plan indicating
the portions into which the land has been subdivided shall first be presented, together with the
technical descriptions thereof. Meantime, the deed of conveyance may be annotated at the
owners certificate.

References:

Cadastral Act, Act No. 2259

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988

Pea, N. Registration of Land Titles and Deeds. Quezon City: Rex Printing Company, Inc.
Presidential Decree No. 27, Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of
theOil, Transferring to Them the Ownership of the Land They Till and Providing the Instruments
and Mechanism Therefor

Property Registration Decree 1529, Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration
of Property and for Other Purposes

Public Land Act, Com. Act No. 141, Title and Application of the Act, Lands to Which It
Refers, and Classification, Delimitation and Survey Thereof for Concession