11/28/2016 G.R.No.

167291

RepublicofthePhilippines
SupremeCourt
Manila


SECONDDIVISION


PRINCE TRANSPORT, INC. and MR. G.R.No.167291
RENATOCLAROS,
Petitioners, Present:

CARPIO,J.,Chairperson,
NACHURA,
versus PERALTA,
ABAD,and
_____________,**JJ.

DIOSDADO GARCIA, LUISITO
GARCIA, RODANTE ROMERO, REX Promulgated:
BARTOLOME, FELICIANO GASCO,
JR., DANILO ROJO, EDGAR
SANFUEGO, AMADO GALANTO,
EUTIQUIO LUGTU, JOEL January12,2011
GRAMATICA, MIEL CERVANTES,
TERESITA CABANES, ROE DELA
CRUZ, RICHELO BALIDOY, VILMA
PORRAS, MIGUELITO SALCEDO,
CRISTINA GARCIA, MARIO
NAZARENO, DINDO TORRES,
ESMAEL RAMBOYONG, ROBETO*
MANO, ROGELIO BAGAWISAN,
ARIEL SNACHEZ, ESTAQULO
VILLAREAL, NELSON MONTERO,
GLORIA ORANTE, HARRY TOCA,
PABLITO MACASAET and RONALD
GARCITA
Respondents.
xx

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/january2011/167291.htm 1/15
11/28/2016 G.R.No.167291

DECISION

PERALTA,J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
[1] [2]
prayingfortheannulmentoftheDecision andResolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
datedDecember20,2004andFebruary24,2005,respectively,inCAG.R.SPNo.80953.The
[3]
assailedDecisionreversedandsetasidetheResolutionsdatedMay30,2003 andSeptember
[4]
26,2003 oftheNationalLaborRelationsCommission(NLRC)inCANo.02905901, while
thedisputedResolutiondeniedpetitioners'MotionforReconsideration.

The present petition arose from various complaints filed by herein respondents charging
petitionerswithillegaldismissal,unfairlaborpracticeandillegaldeductionsandprayingforthe
awardofpremiumpayforholidayandrestday,holidaypay,serviceleavepay,13thmonthpay,
moralandexemplarydamagesandattorney'sfees.

Respondents alleged in their respective position papers and other related pleadings that they
were employees of Prince Transport, Inc. (PTI), a company engaged in the business of
transportingpassengersbylandrespondentswerehiredeitherasdrivers,conductors,mechanics
orinspectors,exceptforrespondentDiosdadoGarcia(Garcia),whowasassignedasOperations
Manager in addition to their regular monthly income, respondents also received commissions
equivalentto8to10%oftheirwagessometimeinOctober1997,thesaidcommissionswere
reducedto7to9%thisledrespondentsandotheremployeesofPTItoholdaseriesofmeetings
to discuss the protection of their interests as employees these meetings led petitioner Renato
Claros,whoisthepresidentofPTI,tosuspectthatrespondentsareabouttoformaunionhe
made known to Garcia his objection to the formation of a union in December 1997, PTI
employees requested for a cash advance, but the same was denied by management which
resultedindemoralizationontheemployees'rankslater,PTIaccededtotherequestofsome,
butnotall,oftheemployeestheforegoingcircumstancesledrespondentstoformaunionfor
their mutual aid and protection in order to block the continued formation of the union, PTI
causedthetransferofallunionmembersandsympathizerstooneofitssubcompanies,Lubas
Transport(Lubas)despitesuchtransfer,thescheduleofdriversandconductors,aswellastheir
companyidentificationcards,wereissuedbyPTIthedailytimerecords,ticketsandreportsof
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/january2011/167291.htm 2/15
11/28/2016 G.R.No.167291

therespondentswerealsofiledatthePTIofficeand,allclaimsforsalariesweretransactedat
the same office later, the business of Lubas deteriorated because of the refusal of PTI to
maintain and repair the units being used therein, which resulted in the virtual stoppage of its
operationsandrespondents'lossofemployment.
Petitioners,ontheotherhand,deniedthematerialallegationsofthecomplaintscontendingthat
hereinrespondentswerenolongertheiremployees,sincetheyalltransferredtoLubasattheir
own request petitioners have nothing to do with the management and operations of Lubas as
wellasthecontrolandsupervisionofthelatter'semployeespetitionerswerenotawareofthe
existenceofanyunionintheircompanyandcametoknowofthesameonlyinJune1998when
they were served a copy of the summons in the petition for certification election filed by the
union that before the union was registered on April 15, 1998, the complaint subject of the
present petition was already filed that the real motive in the filing of the complaints was
because PTI asked respondents to vacate the bunkhouse where they (respondents) and their
respectivefamilieswerestayingbecausePTIwantedtorenovatethesame.

Subsequently,thecomplaintsfiledbyrespondentswereconsolidated.

[5]
OnOctober25,2000,theLaborArbiterrenderedaDecision, thedispositiveportionofwhich
readsasfollows:

WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrendered:

1.DismissingthecomplaintsforUnfairLaborPractice,nonpaymentofholidaypayand
holidaypremium,serviceincentiveleavepayand13thmonthpay

DismissingthecomplaintofEdgardoBeldaforrefundofboundaryhulog
2. Dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondents Prince
Transport,Inc.and/orPrinceTransportPhils.Corporation,RobertoBuenaventura,RoryBayona,
AileeAvenue,NerissaUy,MarioFeranilandPeterBuentiempo

3. Declaring that the complainants named below are illegally dismissed by Lubas
Transport ordering said Lubas Transport to pay backwages and separation pay in lieu of
reinstatementinthefollowingamount:

ComplainantsBackwagesSeparationPay
(1)DiosdadoGarciaP222,348.70P79,456.00
(2)FelicianoGasco,Jr.203,350.0054,600.00
(3)PablitoMacasaet145,250.0013,000.00
(4)EsmaelRamboyong221,500.0030,000.00
(5)JoelGramatica221,500.0060,000.00
(6)AmadoGalanto130,725.0029,250.00
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/january2011/167291.htm 3/15
11/28/2016 G.R.No.167291

(7)MielCervantes265,800.0060,000.00
(8)RobertoMano221,500.0050,000.00
(9)RoedelaCruz265,800.0060,000.00
(10)RicheloBalidoy130,725.0029,250.00
(11)VilmaPorras221,500.0070,000.00
(12)MiguelitoSalcedo265,800.0060,000.00
(13)CristinaGarcia130,725.0035,100.00
(14)LuisitoGarcia145,250.0019,500.00
(15)RogelioBagawisan265,800.0060,000.00
(16)RodanteH.Romero221,500.0060,000.00
(17)DindoTorres265,800.0050,000.00
(18)EdgarSanfuego221,500.0040,000.00
(19)RonaldGacita221,500.0040,000.00
(20)HarryToca174,300.0023,400.00
(21)AmadoGalanto130,725.0017,550.00
(22)TeresitaCabaes130,725.0017,550.00
(23)RexBartolome301,500.0030,000.00
(24)MarioNazareno221,500.0030,000.00
(25)EustaquioVillareal145,250.0019,500.00
(26)ArielSanchez265,800.0060,000.00
(27)GloriaOrante263,100.0060,000.00
(28)NelsonMontero264,600.0060,000.00
(29)RizalBeato295,000.0040,000.00
(30)EutiquioLugtu354,000.0048,000.00
(31)WarlitoDickensomn295,000.0040,000.00
(32)EdgardoBelda354,000.0084,000.00
(33)TitaGo295,000.0070,000.00
(34)AlexLodor295,000.0050,000.00
(35)GlendaArguilles295,000.0040,000.00
(36)ErwinLuces354,000.0048,000.00
(37)JesseCelle354,000.0048,000.00
(38)RoyAdorable295,000.0040,000.00
(39)MarlonBangcoro295,000.0040,000.00
(40)EdgardoBangcoro354,000.0036,000.00

4. OrderingLubasTransporttopayattorney'sfeesequivalenttoten(10%)ofthetotal
monetaryawardand

6.Orderingthedismissaloftheclaimformoralandexemplarydamagesforlackmerit.
[6]
SOORDERED.


TheLaborArbiterruledthatpetitionersarenotguiltyofunfairlaborpracticeintheabsenceof
evidence to show that they violated respondents right to selforganization. The Labor Arbiter
also held that Lubas is the respondents employer and that it (Lubas) is an entity which is
separate,distinctandindependentfromPTI.Nonetheless,theLaborArbiterfoundthatLubasis
guiltyofillegallydismissingrespondentsfromtheiremployment.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/january2011/167291.htm 4/15
11/28/2016 G.R.No.167291

RespondentsfiledaPartialAppealwiththeNLRCpraying,amongothers,thatPTIshouldalso
beheldequallyliableasLubas.

InaResolutiondatedMay30,2003,theNLRCmodifiedtheDecisionoftheLaborArbiterand
disposedasfollows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Decision appealed from is SUSTAINED subject to the modification that
ComplainantAppellantEdgardoBeldadeservesrefundofhisboundaryhulogintheamountof
P446,862.00 and that ComplainantsAppellants Danilo Rojo and Danilo Laurel should be
includedinthecomputationofComplainantsAppellantsclaimasfollows:

ComplainantsBackwagesSeparationPay
41.DaniloRojoP355,560.00P48,000.00
42.DaniloLaurelP357,960.00P72,000.00

Asregardsallotheraspects,theDecisionappealedfromisSUSTAINED.

[7]
SOORDERED.


[8]
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the NLRC denied it in its Resolution
datedSeptember26,2003.

Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorariwith the CA assailing the Decision
andResolutionoftheNLRC.

On December 20, 2004, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision which granted
respondents'petition.TheCAruledthatpetitionersareguiltyofunfairlaborpracticethatLubas
isamereinstrumentality,agentconduitoradjunctofPTIandthatpetitionersactoftransferring
respondents employment to Lubas is indicative of their intent to frustrate the efforts of
respondents to organize themselves into a union.Accordingly, the CA disposed of the case as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the subject
decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one ENTERED finding the
respondentsguiltyofunfairlaborpracticeandorderingthemtoreinstatethepetitionerstotheir
formerpositionswithoutlossofseniorityrightsandwithfullbackwages.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/january2011/167291.htm 5/15
11/28/2016 G.R.No.167291

With respect to the portion ordering the inclusion of Danilo Rojo and Danilo Laurel in the
computation of petitioner's claim for backwages and with respect to the portion ordering the
refundofEdgardoBelda'sboundaryhulogintheamountofP446,862.00,theNLRCdecisionis
affirmedandmaintained.

[9]
SOORDERED.


[10]
PetitionersfiledaMotionforReconsideration,buttheCAdenieditviaitsResolution dated
February24,2005.

Hence,theinstantpetitionforreviewoncertioraribasedonthefollowinggrounds:

A
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GIVING
DUECOURSETOTHERESPONDENTS'PETITIONFORCERTIORARI

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RESPECTED THE FINDINGS OF
THELABORARBITERANDAFFIRMEDBYTHENLRC

2.ONLYONEPETITIONEREXECUTEDANDVERIFIEDTHEPETITION
3.THECOURTOFAPPEALSSHOULDNOTHAVEGIVENDUECOURSETOTHE
PETITION WITH RESPECT TO RESPONDENTS REX BARTOLOME, FELICIANO
GASCO,DANILOROJO,EUTIQUIOLUGTU,ANDNELSONMONTEROASTHEY
FAILEDTOFILEANAPPEALTOTHENLRC

B
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONERS
PRINCETRANSPORT,INC.ANDMR.RENATOCLAROSANDLUBASTRANSPORTARE
ONE AND THE SAME CORPORATION AND THUS, LIABLE IN SOLIDUM TO
RESPONDENTS.




C
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF RESPONDENTS TO THEIR PREVIOUS
POSITION WHEN IT IS NOT ONE OF THE ISSUES RAISED IN RESPONDENTS'
[11]
PETITIONFORCERTIORARI.


Petitioners assert that factual findings of agencies exercising quasijudicial functions like the
NLRC are accorded not only respect but even finality that the CA should have outrightly
dismissed the petition filed before it because in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/january2011/167291.htm 6/15
11/28/2016 G.R.No.167291

Rules of Court it is not within the province of the CA to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence
uponwhichtheNLRCbaseditsdetermination,theinquirybeinglimitedessentiallytowhether
or not said tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.PetitionersassertthattheCAcanonlypassuponthefactualfindingsoftheNLRCif
they are not supported by evidence on record, or if the impugned judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts which circumstances are not present in this case. Petitioners also
emphasizethattheNLRCandtheLaborArbiterconcurredintheirfactualfindingswhichwere
based on substantial evidence and, therefore, should have been accorded great weight and
respectbytheCA.

Respondents, on the other hand, aver that the CA neither exceeded its jurisdiction nor
committed error in reevaluating the NLRCs factual findings since such findings are not in
accordwiththeevidenceonrecordandtheapplicablelaworjurisprudence.

TheCourtagreeswithrespondents.

ThepoweroftheCAtoreviewNLRCdecisionsviaapetitionforcertiorariunderRule65of
theRulesofCourthasbeensettledasearlyasthisCourtsdecisioninSt.MartinFuneralHomes
[12]
v. NLRC. In said case, the Court held that the proper vehicle for such review is a special
civilactionforcertiorariunderRule65ofthesaidRules,andthatthecaseshouldbefiledwith
theCAinstrictobservanceofthedoctrineofhierarchyofcourts.Moreover,itisalreadysettled
thatunderSection9ofBatasPambansaBlg.129,asamendedbyRepublicActNo.7902,the
CApursuanttotheexerciseofitsoriginaljurisdictionoverpetitionsforcertiorariisspecifically
[13]
giventhepowertopassupontheevidence,ifandwhennecessary,toresolvefactualissues.
Section9clearlystates:

xxxx

TheCourtofAppealsshallhavethepowertotrycasesandconducthearings,receiveevidence
andperformanyandallactsnecessarytoresolvefactualissuesraisedincasesfallingwithinits
originalandappellatejurisdiction,includingthepowertograntandconductnewtrialsorfurther
proceedings.xxx


However,equallysettledistherulethatfactualfindingsoflaborofficials,whoaredeemedto
have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/january2011/167291.htm 7/15
11/28/2016 G.R.No.167291

respectbutevenfinalitybythecourtswhensupportedbysubstantialevidence,i.e.,theamount
ofrelevantevidencewhichareasonablemindmightacceptasadequatetojustifyaconclusion.
[14]
But these findings are not infallible. When there is a showing that they were arrived at
[15]
arbitrarilyorindisregardoftheevidenceonrecord,theymaybeexaminedbythecourts.
TheCAcangrantthepetitionforcertiorariifitfindsthattheNLRC,initsassaileddecisionor
[16]
resolution, made a factual finding not supported by substantial evidence. It is within the
jurisdiction of the CA, whose jurisdiction over labor cases has been expanded to review the
[17]
findingsoftheNLRC.

Inthiscase,theNLRCsustainedthefactualfindingsoftheLaborArbiter.Thus,thesefindings
aregenerallybindingontheappellatecourt,unlesstherewasashowingthattheywerearrivedat
arbitrarilyorindisregardoftheevidenceonrecord.Inrespondents'petitionforcertiorariwith
the CA, these factual findings were reexamined and reversed by the appellate court on the
groundthattheywerenotinaccordwithcredibleevidencepresentedinthiscase.Todetermine
iftheCA'sreexaminationoffactualfindingsandreversaloftheNLRCdecisionareproperand
withsufficientbasis,itisincumbentuponthisCourttomakeitsownevaluationoftheevidence
[18]
onrecord.

Afterathoroughreviewoftherecordsathand,theCourtfindsthattheCAdidnotcommiterror
inarrivingatitsownfindingsandconclusionsforreasonstobediscussedhereunder.

Firstly, petitioners posit that the petition filed with the CA is fatally defective, because the
attached verification and certificate against forum shopping was signed only by respondent
Garcia.

TheCourtdoesnotagree.

While the general rule is that the certificate of nonforum shopping must be signed by all the
plaintiffsinacaseandthesignatureofonlyoneofthemisinsufficient,theCourthasstressed
that the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administrationofjustice,shouldnotbeinterpretedwithsuchabsoluteliteralnessastosubvertits
[19]
own ultimate and legitimate objective. Strict compliance with the provision regarding the

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/january2011/167291.htm 8/15
11/28/2016 G.R.No.167291

certificate of nonforum shopping underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification
[20]
cannotbealtogetherdispensedwithoritsrequirementscompletelydisregarded. Itdoesnot,
however,prohibitsubstantialcompliancetherewithunderjustifiablecircumstances,considering
[21]
especiallythatalthoughitisobligatory,itisnotjurisdictional.

In a number of cases, the Court has consistently held that when all the petitioners share a
commoninterestandinvokeacommoncauseofactionordefense,thesignatureofonlyoneof
[22]Inthe
theminthecertificationagainstforumshoppingsubstantiallycomplieswiththerules.
present case, there is no question that respondents share a common interest and invoke a
commoncauseofaction.Hence,thesignatureofrespondentGarciaisasufficientcompliance
with the rule governing certificates of nonforum shopping. In the first place, some of the
respondentsactuallyexecutedaSpecialPowerofAttorneyauthorizingGarciaastheirattorney
infactinfilingapetitionforcertiorariwiththeCA.[23]

The Court, likewise, does not agree with petitioners' argument that the CA should not have
given due course to the petition filed before it with respect to some of the respondents,
consideringthattheserespondentsdidnotsigntheverificationattachedtotheMemorandumof
Partial Appeal earlier filed with the NLRC. Petitioners assert that the decision of the Labor
Arbiterhasbecomefinalandexecutorywithrespecttotheserespondentsand,asaconsequence,
theyarebarredfromfilingapetitionforcertiorariwiththeCA.

Withrespecttotheabsenceofsomeoftheworkerssignaturesintheverification,theverification
requirementisdeemedsubstantiallycompliedwithwhensomeofthepartieswhoundoubtedly
havesufficientknowledgeandbelieftosweartothetruthoftheallegationsinthepetitionhad
signedthesame.Suchverificationisdeemedasufficientassurancethatthemattersallegedin
thepetitionhavebeenmadeingoodfaithoraretrueandcorrect,andnotmerelyspeculative.
Moreover, respondents' Partial Appeal shows that the appeal stipulated as complainants
appellants Rizal Beato, et al., meaning that there were more than one appellant who were all
workersofpetitioners.

In any case, the settled rule is that a pleading which is required by the Rules of Court to be
verified,maybegivenduecourseevenwithoutaverificationifthecircumstanceswarrantthe

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/january2011/167291.htm 9/15
11/28/2016 G.R.No.167291

[24]
suspensionoftherulesintheinterestofjustice. Indeed,theabsenceofaverificationisnot
jurisdictional, but only a formal defect, which does not of itself justify a court in refusing to
[25]
allow and act on a case. Hence, the failure of some of the respondents to sign the
verificationattachedtotheirMemorandumofAppealfiledwiththeNLRCisnotfataltotheir
causeofaction.

PetitionersalsocontendthattheCAerredinapplyingthedoctrineofpiercingthecorporateveil
withrespecttoLubas,becausethesaiddoctrineisapplicableonlytocorporationsandLubasis
not a corporation but a single proprietorship that Lubas had been found by the Labor Arbiter
andtheNLRCtohaveapersonalitywhichisseparateanddistinctfromthatofPTIthatPTIhad
nohandinthemanagementandoperationaswellascontrolandsupervisionoftheemployeesof
Lubas.

TheCourtisnotpersuaded.

Onthecontrary,theCourtagreeswiththeCAthatLubasisamereagent,conduitoradjunctof
PTI. A settled formulation of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is that when two
business enterprises are owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties, both law and
equitywill,whennecessarytoprotecttherightsofthirdparties,disregardthelegalfictionthat
[26]
these two entities are distinct and treat them as identical or as one and the same. In the
presentcase,itmaybetruethatLubasisasingleproprietorshipandnotacorporation.However,
petitioners attempt to isolate themselves from and hide behind the supposed separate and
distinct personality of Lubas so as to evade their liabilities is precisely what the classical
doctrineofpiercingtheveilofcorporateentityseekstopreventandremedy.

Thus,theCourtagreeswiththeobservationsoftheCA,towit:

As correctly pointed out by petitioners, if Lubas were truly a separate entity, how come that it
was Prince Transport who made the decision to transfer its employees to the former? Besides,
Prince Transport never regarded Lubas Transport as a separate entity. In the aforesaid letter, it
referred to said entity as Lubas operations. Moreover, in said letter, it did not transfer the
employeesitassignedthem.Lastly,theexistingfundsand201fileoftheemployeeswereturned
[27]
overnottoanewcompanybutanewmanagement.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/january2011/167291.htm 10/15
11/28/2016 G.R.No.167291

The Court also agrees with respondents that if Lubas is indeed an entity separate and
independent from PTI why is it that the latter decides which employees shall work in the
former?

What is telling is the fact that in a memorandum issued by PTI, dated January 22, 1998,
[28]Inaddition,PTI,inits
petitionercompanyadmittedthatLubasisoneofitssubcompanies.
letters to its employees who were transferred to Lubas, referred to the latter as its New City
OperationsBus.[29]

Moreover, petitioners failed to refute the contention of respondents that despite the latters
transfer to Lubas of their daily time records, reports, daily income remittances of conductors,
scheduleofdriversandconductorswereallmade,performed,filedandkeptattheofficeofPTI.
Infact,respondentsidentificationcardsbearthenameofPTI.

It may not be amiss to point out at this juncture that in two separate illegal dismissal cases
involving different groups of employees transferred by PTI to other companies, the Labor
ArbiterhandlingthecasesfoundthatthesecompaniesandPTIareoneandthesameentitythus,
makingthemsolidarilyliableforthepaymentofbackwagesandothermoneyclaimsawardedto
[30]
thecomplainantstherein.

Petitioners likewise aver that the CA erred and committed grave abuse of discretion when it
orderedpetitionerstoreinstaterespondentstotheirformerpositions,consideringthattheissue
ofreinstatementwasneverbroughtupbeforeitandrespondentsneverquestionedtheawardof
separationpaytothem.

TheCourtisnotpersuaded.

[31]
Itisclearfromthecomplaintsfiledbyrespondentsthattheyareseekingreinstatement.

Inanycase,Section2(c),Rule7oftheRulesofCourtprovidesthatapleadingshallspecifythe
reliefsought,butmayaddageneralprayerforsuchfurtherorotherreliefsasmaybedeemed
justandequitable.Underthisrule,acourtcangrantthereliefwarrantedbytheallegationand
the proof even if it is not specifically sought by the injured party the inclusion of a general

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/january2011/167291.htm 11/15
11/28/2016 G.R.No.167291

prayer may justify the grant of a remedy different from or together with the specific remedy
[32]
sought,ifthefactsallegedinthecomplaintandtheevidenceintroducedsowarrant.

[33]
Moreover,inBPIFamilyBankv.Buenaventura, thisCourtruledthatthegeneralprayeris
broad enough to justify extension of a remedy different from or together with the specific
remedysought. Evenwithouttheprayerforaspecificremedy,properreliefmaybegrantedby
thecourtifthefactsallegedinthecomplaintandtheevidenceintroducedsowarrant. Thecourt
shallgrantreliefwarrantedbytheallegationsandtheproofevenifnosuchreliefisprayedfor.
Theprayerinthecomplaintforotherreliefsequitableandjustinthepremisesjustifiesthegrant
[34]Intheinstantcase,asidefromtheirspecific
ofareliefnototherwisespecificallyprayedfor.
prayerforreinstatement,respondents,intheirseparatecomplaints,prayedforsuchreliefswhich
aredeemedjustandequitable.

Astowhetherpetitionersareguiltyofunfairlaborpractice,theCourtfindsnocogentreasonto
departfromthefindingsoftheCAthatrespondentstransferofworkassignmentstoLubaswas
designed by petitioners as a subterfuge to foil the formers right to organize themselves into a
union. Under Article 248 (a) and (e) of the Labor Code, an employer is guilty of unfair labor
practiceifitinterfereswith,restrainsorcoercesitsemployeesintheexerciseoftheirrightto
selforganization or if it discriminates in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization.

Indeed,evidenceofpetitioners'unfairlaborpracticeisshownbytheestablishedfactthat, after
respondents' transfer to Lubas, petitioners left them high and dry insofar as the operations of
Lubas was concerned. The Court finds no error in the findings and conclusion of the CA that
petitionerswithheldthenecessaryfinancialandlogisticsupportsuchasspareparts,andrepair
and maintenance of the transferred buses until only two units remained in running condition.
Thisleftrespondentsvirtuallyjobless.

WHEREFORE,theinstantpetitionisDENIED.TheassailedDecisionandResolutionofthe
CourtofAppeals,datedDecember20,2004andFebruary24,2005,respectively,inCAG.R.SP
No.80953,areAFFIRMED.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/january2011/167291.htm 12/15
11/28/2016 G.R.No.167291

SOORDERED.



DIOSDADOM.PERALTA
AssociateJustice


WECONCUR:


ANTONIOT.CARPIO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson



ANTONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURAROBERTOA.ABAD
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice





________________________
AssociateJustice




ATTESTATION

IattestthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethe
casewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.



ANTONIOT.CARPIO
AssociateJustice
SecondDivision,Chairperson

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/january2011/167291.htm 13/15
11/28/2016 G.R.No.167291

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation,IcertifythattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultation
beforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.



RENATOC.CORONA
ChiefJustice

*ReferredtoasRobertoinsomepartsoftheSCandCArollo.
** DesignatedasanadditionalmemberinlieuofAssociateJusticeJoseCatralMendoza,perraffledated____________.
[1]
PennedbyAssociateJusticeJoseCatralMendoza(nowamemberofthisCourt),withAssociateJusticesGodardoA.Jacintoand
EdgardoP.Cruz,concurringrollo,pp.4449.
[2]
Id.at6162
[3]
Id.at.8598.
[4]
Id.at100102.
[5]
Id.at210233.
[6]Id.at230233.
[7]
Id.at9798.
[8]
Id.at100102.
[9]Id.at318.
[10]
Id.at6162.
[11]
Id.at2324.
[12]
356Phil.811(1998).
[13]
PICOPResourcesIncorporated(PRI)v.AnacletoTaeca,etal.,G.R.No.160828,August9,2010Maralitv.PhilippineNational
Bank,G.R.No.163788,August24,2009,596SCRA662,682683TriumphInternational(Phils.),Inc.v.Apostol,G.R.No.164423,
June16,2009,589SCRA185,197.
[14]
PhilippineVeteransBankv.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,G.R.No.188882,March30,2010.
[15]
Faeldoniav.TongYakGroceries,G.R.No.182499,October2,2009,602SCRA677,684.
[16]
EmcorIncorporatedv.Sienes,G.R.No.152101,September8,2009,598SCRA617,632.
[17]
Id.
[18]
TriumphInternational(Phils.),Inc.v.Apostol,supranote13,at198.
[19]
Juaban v. Espina, G.R. No. 170049, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 588, 603, citing Cua v. Vargas, 506 SCRA 374, 389390
(2006)Pacquingv.CocaCola,Philippines,Inc.,G.R.No.157966,January31,2008,543SCRA344,353.
[20]
Id.
[21]
Id.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/january2011/167291.htm 14/15
11/28/2016 G.R.No.167291

[22]
Id.
[23]
SeeSpecialPowerofAttorney,CArollo,p.22.
[24]
HeirsoftheLateJoseDeLuzuriagav.Republic,G.R.Nos.168848&169019,June30,2009,591SCRA299,313Woodridge
Schoolv.PeBenito,G.R.No.160240,October29,2008,570SCRA164,175LintonCommercialCo.,Inc.v.Hellera,G.R.No.
163147,October10,2007,535SCRA434,446.
[25]
SpicN'SpanServicesCorp.v.Paje,G.R.No.174084,August25,2010SariSariGroupofCompanies,Inc.v.PiglasKamao
(SariSariChapter),G.R.No.164624,August11,2008,561SCRA569,579580.
[26]
PantrancoEmployeesAssociation(PEAPTGWO)v.NLRC,G.R.Nos.170689and170705,March17,2009,581SCRA598,
613614.
[27]
Rollo,p.55.
[28]
CArollo,p.69.
[29]
Id.at87121.
[30]
SeeDecisionsinNLRCNCRCaseNos.00010043801,00030188201,00040210801,00040412901andNLRCNCR
CaseNo.0004021292001,id.at193256.
[31]
SeeAmendedComplaints,CArollo,pp.4568122136.
[32]
Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation v. Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 185066, October 2,
2009,602SCRA723,735736.
[33]
508Phil.423,436(2005).
[34]
Gutierrezv.Valiente,G.R.No.166802,July4,2008,557SCRA211,226.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/january2011/167291.htm 15/15