You are on page 1of 10
3. The latecomer firm the part id up their knowledge about products velop, deploy and improve the skills ‘of their workforces (Dodgson 1991 p. 23). rately measure oF indeed to distin- 3.1 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ‘This chapter develops a simple analytical framework for assessing the expe- in electronics in subsequent chapters. A set of the nature of Intecomer firms and how East , 4 arguments are put forward as Asian companies were able to close much of the gap in electronics technol- in effect. The leaming process is often & iosyncratic in nature, cumulative in effect and oth knowledge and experi- wercome their barriers to entry, Iatecomer neously on two fronts: export marketing ‘ogy. The chapter holds that firms would need to progress si sally costly and often difficult to ‘central to incremental technical change and corporate 10W tech the manvfacture of simple goods to the design and development of complex electronics for 7 export markets, ‘entered international markets and, in apanese market leaders. 3.2. DEFINING TECHNOLOGY AND LEARNING up with Western LATECOMERS, LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS h learning has been central to technological progress (Fransman and le analysis of how firms in latecomer countries deploy lassic works on pat- many studies have ization? However, the contribution of firms, ‘for acquiring technology are is therefore useful to define @ ts marketing and technological 0 omer firm is defined as & man company (existing or potential) which faces two sets of vantages in atempting to compete in export markels. The fist 34 Innovation in East Asia The latecomer firm 35 ecomers do not have leader and follower advantages because they are fst choloically and isolated from advanced users. However, latecom- substantial cost advantages over leaders and followers, and this can art of their initial market entry strategy. The overall challenge con- logical in character. Located in a developing country, a latecomer firm is dislocated from the main intemational sources of technology and R&D. It operates in isolation from the world centres of science and innovation and ig boohind technologically, lacking in research, development and enginecring capabuty Its surroundin, technological inrastructure is poor ‘and implement corporate strategies developed. Local univer so be weak technologically and other and technological barriers to i poorly equipped. “ id then to acquire technolo rease export sales. Normally, access to technology and a healthy surrounding national system of innovation is assumed to be essential for corporate competitiveness (Nel- son and Rosenberg I suceeed in international markets, the latecome. fim must overcomo its tchnological disadvantages. 24 The second disadvantage concerns international markets and demanding 4 users, To add to its technological dffcu! from the mainstream international market mostly located in the advanced countries, ‘Typically the firm will confront underdeveloped, small local markets and unsophisticated users. Many studies show the importance of user-producer linkages and clustering to innovation and industrial development* To suc, » TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION CHANNELS ner learning of foreign technology has become embedded in « varoty wolve foreign firms in contractual i return for a particular service, such as low-cost production ¢ channels, presented in Tabl ed through time as latecomers ‘0 acquire complex tect! 1 compete nearer the technol- Wier, The channels, some of which overlap, apply to lesser or greater to each ofthe dragons Together, they engbled latecomers to acquire pehnology and enter export markets. o jw ceed, the latecomer firm has to devise ways of overcoming market barriers entry and then to forge the user-producer linkages which stimulate techno- logical advance. Based in a developing country, the latecomer has to develop outside the major international clusters of innovative suppliers and users. * | Latecomer firms are cleanly different from leaders. Technology loaders generate new products and processes to gain leadership advantages in the marketplace. Unlike @ latecomer, a leader typically has a substantial R&D department capable of generating new innovations and contributing to the firms” competitive advantage, A leader may also enjoy strong and useful connections with universities and other pars of the surrounding technolog- cal infrastructure (e.g. IBM and Inte! in the US). Through their capabilities, leaders contribute directly to the technological and scientific frontier in their field Latecomer firms are also distinct from technology followers.‘ Followers may be behind the lesders, but like leaders they are connected directly into the advanced markets in which they compete. Indeed, in some circumstances, fast followers may have advantages over leaders. They will have substantial technological resources to learn rapidly from the leader's experience, to Bible 3.1 Mechanisms of foreign technology acquisition by latecomer eign direct investment (FDI) pment manufecture (OEM) ‘and manufactare (ODM) ‘While the overall contribution of FDI to capital formation in South Korea and Taiwan was * plant visits by foreign engineers and visits by Koreans 10 overseas factories es 1990 p. 1; Dahiman and Sananikone proportionately large share of electronics the TNCs gave rise 10 a Schumpeterian on the pat of local fins. In some cases, ly goods under sub-contracting relation- ships. Several ¢ gained direct access to waining and engineering support under joint ventures, including Samsung Flectronies and ‘OEM (a specific form of sub-contracting) evolved out of the joi ‘ons of buyers and latecomer suppliers and became the most important ‘ghannel for export marketing during the 1980s. Under OEM, the latecomer eds finished produto he precise speifieation of foreign TNC. The E brand name, though ts capacity than a joint venture where often the senior partner trains the I ‘comer to manufacture. In Taiwan, between 1952 and 1988 the gove icensing agreements (mostly in electronics 4 uses (DahIman and Sananikone 1990 including formal technology transfer p. 78). Foreign and local buyers were also an important source of technotogy and ly sold their goods to large buying houses from Japan and the US. 4 ‘cent to 100 per cent of the also to be contrasted with own-design manufacture (OI yy Johnstone (1989 pp. 50-1). The nature and comple fem evolved considerably during the early 1980s, Acc sang, Anam, RIP and other firms analysed in this study, many of the onic systems purchased under OEM were designed and specified, as ‘manufactured, by the local firm rather than the TNC. In 1988 and this system began to be called ODM in Taiwan. At the time of this arch the term ODM was not used by South Korean or Hong Kong firms. ef, they too claimed that in many cases equivalent progress had taken to the US. This led to a stream of Japanese Korea and Singapore. Many US retail co jloomingdales, Marcor and Sears Roebui ‘many firms to expand their production capacity and eed forward export orders. Wortzel and Wortzel "3 ,, show how some NIE exporters progressed front 3 Jet ODM the latecomer carries out some of all of the product design yers and setting up marketing offices at home and abroad. latecomers into export markets and supplied technol- 4 Often from local offices, they provided latecomers with, ‘some cases the buyer ier cases the buyer is Foreign buyers ogy in various f information on product designs as well as advice on quality and cost account- ing procedures. The largest buyers visited factories frequently and supervized by the Intecomer frm with is own knowled ‘The goods are then sold under the TNCs or buye ‘ODM signifies the intemalzation of system design skills, and some- ‘omplex production technologies and component design abilities on of the ltecomer. "A study by Rhee et al. (1984) shows that around 50 per cent of firms in South Korea (from a sample of 113) benefited directly from buyers through 3 38 “Innovation in East Asia The larecomer firm 39 1992 to develop flash memory chips and with Texas Instruments ‘make semiconductors in Portugal in 1993 (Fortune 3 May 1993 p. 28). ym up, each of the foreign technology channels in Table 3.1 were yy latecomer firms to learn skills and overcome barriers to entry xt mahets. Most of the mechanisms wore dual purpose, providing, ‘ODM offers a mechanism for letecomer firms to capture more ofthe val added while still avoiding the risk of launching own-brand products. Und carly forms of OEM, the latecomer was confined to value-added related: assembly services. Under ODM the local company adds val ‘engineering and proguct design. ODM indicates an advance in wehnolo competence, although it is applied mainly to incremental (follower) rather than leadership product innovations based on R&D. However, as the country chapters show, the OEM system bas se isadvantages. Strategically, the latecomer partner is often subordinated. the decisions ofthe buyer, and often dependent on the foreign company technology and components as well as market channels. The TNC ‘imposes restrictions on the activities ofthe OEM su distribution outlets, the post-manufacturing value ai to couple technological and market opportunities, Us a8 a focusing device for technological learning. Over this coupling process has resulted in a substantial, evative capacity on the part of many latecomers. fi5. THE SIMPLE MODEL jg noted above, Wortzel and Wortzel g scheme to show that NIE exporter asive rm aecaly tevit 0 cap Kong) as well as Thailand which systematically East Asia. Their study a, Taiwan and Hor ‘one of the only cing strategies of ‘more restrictive clauses on OEM and licensing were renegotiated. For exam ple, marketing restrictions on products were often set asid South Korean firms could sell some cases 10 jsify investments in automation techaology For thei par ‘TNCs continued to benefit from low-cost capacity expansion, ena development. Howev mnulated marketing ski Beet increasingly sophisticated customer needs and to cepture more of the cally trained Taiwanese re ‘750 in 1989 and more than ‘complex tnarketing functions. Spurred on by the prospect of growth As latecomer firms grew in size and competence, overseas investments the firm fesrns how to conduct its own sales and became another means of acquiring foreign technology. Companies such as Samsung and Hyundai purchased several high firms to acquire skilled engineers and equipment. Strategic partner joint ventures on 1a more equal footing) also enabled latecomers 1 weir technological capabilities by developing a new product or process jointly with a foreign ‘company. Samsung, for example, jointed an eight year agreement with Toshibe firm will have developed its own brand design P and will organize its own sales either directly to customers overseas or B through distributors, No longer is it dependent on the distribution channels of lished well-known brand names in some areas. ACER and Tatung of Taiwan ilso manufactured own-brand goods. Nevertheless, most latecomers remained ‘bekind the leaders, dependent om foreign buyers and TNCs for marketing Table 3.2 Stages of marketing and technology assimilation 4 ‘Marketing stages ‘Technology stages 1. Passive importer-pult basic production ‘Cheap labour assembly the West, Cal-Comp produced roughly 80 per cent Dependent on buyers for ulators under OEM (Cowley 1991 p. 25) distribution Incremental process changes for LATECOMER TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING 2 quality and speed righthand column of Table 3.2 adds @ technology dimension to the ing model, suggesting how Iatecomé 3. Fall production skills Process innovation a ‘Stars overseas marketing Product design capability 4 ‘Markets own designs + 4. Begins R&D for products and

You might also like