3. The latecomer firm
the part
id up their knowledge about products
velop, deploy and improve the skills
‘of their workforces (Dodgson 1991 p. 23).
rately measure oF indeed to distin-
3.1 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
‘This chapter develops a simple analytical framework for assessing the expe-
in electronics in subsequent chapters. A set of
the nature of Intecomer firms and how East , 4
arguments are put forward as
Asian companies were able to close much of the gap in electronics technol-
in effect. The leaming process is often &
iosyncratic in nature, cumulative in effect and
oth knowledge and experi-
wercome their barriers to entry, Iatecomer
neously on two fronts: export marketing
‘ogy. The chapter holds that
firms would need to progress si
sally costly and often difficult to
‘central to incremental technical change and corporate
10W tech
the manvfacture of
simple goods to the design and development of complex electronics for 7
export markets,
‘entered international markets and, in
apanese market leaders.
3.2. DEFINING TECHNOLOGY AND LEARNING up with Western
LATECOMERS, LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS
h learning has been central to technological progress (Fransman and
le analysis of how firms in latecomer countries deploy
lassic works on pat-
many studies have
ization? However,
the contribution of firms,
‘for acquiring technology are
is therefore useful to define @
ts marketing and technological
0 omer firm is defined as & man
company (existing or potential) which faces two sets of
vantages in atempting to compete in export markels. The fist34 Innovation in East Asia The latecomer firm 35
ecomers do not have leader and follower advantages because they are
fst choloically and isolated from advanced users. However, latecom-
substantial cost advantages over leaders and followers, and this can
art of their initial market entry strategy. The overall challenge con-
logical in character. Located in a developing country, a latecomer firm is
dislocated from the main intemational sources of technology and R&D. It
operates in isolation from the world centres of science and innovation and ig
boohind technologically, lacking in research, development and enginecring
capabuty Its surroundin, technological inrastructure is poor ‘and implement corporate strategies
developed. Local univer so be weak technologically and other and technological barriers to
i poorly equipped. “ id then to acquire technolo rease export sales.
Normally, access to technology and a healthy surrounding national system
of innovation is assumed to be essential for corporate competitiveness (Nel-
son and Rosenberg I suceeed in international markets, the latecome.
fim must overcomo its tchnological disadvantages. 24
The second disadvantage concerns international markets and demanding 4
users, To add to its technological dffcu!
from the mainstream international market
mostly located in the advanced countries,
‘Typically the firm will confront underdeveloped, small local markets and
unsophisticated users. Many studies show the importance of user-producer
linkages and clustering to innovation and industrial development* To suc,
» TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION CHANNELS
ner learning of foreign technology has become embedded in « varoty
wolve foreign firms in contractual
i return for a particular service, such as low-cost production
¢ channels, presented in Tabl ed through time as latecomers
‘0 acquire complex tect! 1 compete nearer the technol-
Wier, The channels, some of which overlap, apply to lesser or greater
to each ofthe dragons Together, they engbled latecomers to acquire
pehnology and enter export markets.
o
jw
ceed, the latecomer firm has to devise ways of overcoming market barriers
entry and then to forge the user-producer linkages which stimulate techno-
logical advance. Based in a developing country, the latecomer has to develop
outside the major international clusters of innovative suppliers and users.
* | Latecomer firms are cleanly different from leaders. Technology loaders
generate new products and processes to gain leadership advantages in the
marketplace. Unlike @ latecomer, a leader typically has a substantial R&D
department capable of generating new innovations and contributing to the
firms” competitive advantage, A leader may also enjoy strong and useful
connections with universities and other pars of the surrounding technolog-
cal infrastructure (e.g. IBM and Inte! in the US). Through their capabilities,
leaders contribute directly to the technological and scientific frontier in their
field
Latecomer firms are also distinct from technology followers.‘ Followers
may be behind the lesders, but like leaders they are connected directly into
the advanced markets in which they compete. Indeed, in some circumstances,
fast followers may have advantages over leaders. They will have substantial
technological resources to learn rapidly from the leader's experience, to
Bible 3.1 Mechanisms of foreign technology acquisition by latecomer
eign direct investment (FDI)
pment manufecture (OEM)
‘and manufactare (ODM)
‘While the overall contribution of FDI to capital formation in SouthKorea and Taiwan was * plant visits by foreign engineers and visits by Koreans 10 overseas factories
es 1990 p. 1; Dahiman and Sananikone
proportionately large share of electronics
the TNCs gave rise 10 a Schumpeterian
on the pat of local fins. In some cases,
ly goods under sub-contracting relation-
ships. Several ¢ gained direct access to waining and
engineering support under joint ventures, including Samsung Flectronies and
‘OEM (a specific form of sub-contracting) evolved out of the joi
‘ons of buyers and latecomer suppliers and became the most important
‘ghannel for export marketing during the 1980s. Under OEM, the latecomer
eds finished produto he precise speifieation of foreign TNC. The
E brand name, though ts
capacity than a joint venture where often the senior partner trains the I
‘comer to manufacture. In Taiwan, between 1952 and 1988 the gove
icensing agreements (mostly in electronics 4
uses (DahIman and Sananikone 1990
including formal technology transfer
p. 78).
Foreign and local buyers were also an important source of technotogy and
ly sold their goods to large buying houses from Japan and the US. 4
‘cent to 100 per cent of the
also to be contrasted with own-design manufacture (OI
yy Johnstone (1989 pp. 50-1). The nature and comple
fem evolved considerably during the early 1980s, Acc
sang, Anam, RIP and other firms analysed in this study, many of the
onic systems purchased under OEM were designed and specified, as
‘manufactured, by the local firm rather than the TNC. In 1988 and
this system began to be called ODM in Taiwan. At the time of this
arch the term ODM was not used by South Korean or Hong Kong firms.
ef, they too claimed that in many cases equivalent progress had taken
to the US. This led to a stream of Japanese
Korea and Singapore. Many US retail co
jloomingdales, Marcor and Sears Roebui
‘many firms to expand their production capacity and
eed forward export orders. Wortzel and Wortzel "3
,, show how some NIE exporters progressed front 3
Jet ODM the latecomer carries out some of all of the product design
yers and setting up marketing offices at home and abroad.
latecomers into export markets and supplied technol- 4
Often from local offices, they provided latecomers with,
‘some cases the buyer
ier cases the buyer is
Foreign buyers
ogy in various f
information on product designs as well as advice on quality and cost account-
ing procedures. The largest buyers visited factories frequently and supervized
by the Intecomer frm with is own knowled
‘The goods are then sold under the TNCs or buye
‘ODM signifies the intemalzation of system design skills, and some-
‘omplex production technologies and component design abilities on
of the ltecomer.
"A study by Rhee et al. (1984) shows that around 50 per cent of firms in
South Korea (from a sample of 113) benefited directly from buyers through 338 “Innovation in East Asia The larecomer firm 39
1992 to develop flash memory chips and with Texas Instruments
‘make semiconductors in Portugal in 1993 (Fortune 3 May 1993 p. 28).
ym up, each of the foreign technology channels in Table 3.1 were
yy latecomer firms to learn skills and overcome barriers to entry
xt mahets. Most of the mechanisms wore dual purpose, providing,
‘ODM offers a mechanism for letecomer firms to capture more ofthe val
added while still avoiding the risk of launching own-brand products. Und
carly forms of OEM, the latecomer was confined to value-added related:
assembly services. Under ODM the local company adds val
‘engineering and proguct design. ODM indicates an advance in wehnolo
competence, although it is applied mainly to incremental (follower)
rather than leadership product innovations based on R&D.
However, as the country chapters show, the OEM system bas se
isadvantages. Strategically, the latecomer partner is often subordinated.
the decisions ofthe buyer, and often dependent on the foreign company
technology and components as well as market channels. The TNC
‘imposes restrictions on the activities ofthe OEM su
distribution outlets, the post-manufacturing value
ai to couple technological and market opportunities,
Us a8 a focusing device for technological learning. Over
this coupling process has resulted in a substantial,
evative capacity on the part of many latecomers.
fi5. THE SIMPLE MODEL
jg noted above, Wortzel and Wortzel
g scheme to show that NIE exporter
asive rm aecaly tevit 0 cap
Kong) as well as Thailand
which systematically
East Asia. Their study
a, Taiwan and Hor
‘one of the only
cing strategies of
‘more restrictive clauses on OEM and licensing were renegotiated. For exam
ple, marketing restrictions on products were often set asid
South Korean firms could sell
some cases 10 jsify investments in automation techaology For thei par
‘TNCs continued to benefit from low-cost capacity expansion, ena
development. Howev
mnulated marketing ski
Beet increasingly sophisticated customer needs and to cepture more of the
cally trained Taiwanese re
‘750 in 1989 and more than
‘complex tnarketing functions. Spurred on by the prospect of growth
As latecomer firms grew in size and competence, overseas investments
the firm fesrns how to conduct its own sales and
became another means of acquiring foreign technology. Companies such as
Samsung and Hyundai purchased several high firms to acquire
skilled engineers and equipment. Strategic partner joint ventures on
1a more equal footing) also enabled latecomers 1 weir technological
capabilities by developing a new product or process jointly with a foreign
‘company. Samsung, for example, jointed an eight year agreement with Toshibe
firm will have developed its own brand design
P and will organize its own sales either directly to customers overseas or
B through distributors, No longer is it dependent on the distribution channels oflished well-known brand names in some areas. ACER and Tatung of Taiwan
ilso manufactured own-brand goods. Nevertheless, most latecomers remained
‘bekind the leaders, dependent om foreign buyers and TNCs for marketing
Table 3.2 Stages of marketing and technology assimilation 4
‘Marketing stages ‘Technology stages
1. Passive importer-pult basic production
‘Cheap labour assembly the West, Cal-Comp produced roughly 80 per cent
Dependent on buyers for ulators under OEM (Cowley 1991 p. 25)
distribution
Incremental process changes for LATECOMER TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING
2
quality and speed
righthand column of Table 3.2 adds @ technology dimension to the
ing model, suggesting how Iatecomé
3. Fall production skills
Process innovation a
‘Stars overseas marketing Product design capability 4
‘Markets own designs +
4. Begins R&D for products and