Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 1390e1398

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp

Fuzzy fault tree analysis for re and explosion of crude oil tanks
Daqing Wang a, *, Peng Zhang b, Liqiong Chen a
a
School of Petroleum Engineering, Southwest Petroleum University, 610500 Chengdu, PR China
b
School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Southwest Petroleum University, 610500 Chengdu, PR China

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Crude oil tank re and explosion (COTFE) is the most frequent type of accident in petroleum reneries,
Received 9 January 2013 oil terminals or storage which often results in human fatality, environment pollution and economic loss.
Received in revised form In this paper, with fault tree qualitative analysis technique, various potential causes of the COTFE are
16 March 2013
identied and a COTFE fault tree is constructed. Conventional fault tree quantitative analysis calculates
Accepted 28 August 2013
the occurrence probability of the COTFE using exact probability data of the basic events. However, it is
often very difcult to obtain corresponding precise data and information in advance due to insufcient
Keywords:
data, changing environment or new components. Fuzzy set theory has been proven to be effective on
Crude oil tank
Fire and explosion
such uncertain problems. Hence, this article investigates a hybrid approach of fuzzy set theory and fault
Fuzzy fault tree analysis tree analysis to quantify the COTFE fault tree in fuzzy environment and evaluate the COTFE occurrence
Occurrence probability probability. Further, importance analysis for the COTFE fault tree, including the FusselleVesely impor-
Importance analysis tance measure of basic events and the cut sets importance measure, is performed to help identifying the
weak links of the crude oil tank system that will provide the most cost-effective mitigation. Also, a case
study and analysis is provided to testify the proposed method.

2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Recent years see sustainable economic growth of China, while the
turbulence in international crude oil market has stimulated Chinas
need for much larger strategic oil reserves. More and more large-
scale crude oil storage tanks have been designed and constructed
presently. Although most companies follow strict engineering
guidelines and standards for the construction, material selection,
design and safe management of storage tanks and their accessories,
there is always the possibility of re or explosion for various causes.
According to statistics, the crude oil tank re and explosion (COTFE)
is the most frequent type of accident in petroleum reneries, oil
terminals or storage (Fan, 2005). Besides China, yearly losses due to
the COTFE are substantial all over the world (Chang & Lin, 2006).
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a systematic approach to estimate safety
and reliability of a complex system, qualitatively as well as quantita-
tively. FTA can be applied both to an existing system and a system in
designation. For system in design, FTA can provide an estimate of the
failure probability and contributors using generic data and also can be
used as a supporting tool of a performance-based design. In an existing
system, FTA can identify weaknesses, evaluate possible upgrades,
monitor and predict behavior. For those merits, FTA technique has
been extensively used in many elds, such as nuclear power, electric
* Corresponding author. Tel.: 86 13658001455.
E-mail address: wdqmnn@126.com (D. Wang).
power, chemical process, oil and gas transmission, etc (Dong & Yu,
2005; Prugh, 1992; Sadiq, Saint-Martin, & Kleiner, 2008).
In traditional FTA, the failure probabilities of the basic events
(BEs) are expressed by exact values (Dong & Yu, 2005; Ferdous,
Khan, Sadiq, Amyotte, & Veitch, 2009; Sadiq et al., 2008). Howev-
er, in reality, the vagueness nature of a system, the working envi-
ronment of a system, and the lack of sufcient statistical inference,
all raise difculties in the estimation of occurrence probabilities of
components or BEs (Dong & Yu, 2005; Liang & Wang, 1993; Pan &
Yun, 1997). And this makes quantitative analysis of a fault tree of a
system questionable by conventional methods. In order to handle
inevitable imprecise failure information in diversied real applica-
tions, many researches have taken the uncertain situations into
consideration. Fuzzy set theory has been proven to be effective on
solving problems where there are no sharp boundaries and precise
values, while it is also efcient (Onisawa, 1990; Suresh, Babar, & Raj,
1996; Zadeh, 1965). Chen (1994) and Mon and Cheng (1994) carried
out system reliability analysis by using fuzzy set theory. Dong and Yu
(2005) applied fuzzy theory to estimate the failure probabilities of
BEs. Tanaka, Fan, Lai, and Toguchi (1983), Pan et al. (2007), Suresh
et al. (1996), and Miri Lavasani, Wang, Yang, and Finlay (2011)
implemented fuzzy theory into the FTA technique for certain sys-
tem safety assessment. In this paper, the imprecise failure data of
BEs of the COTFE fault tree are replaced with fuzzy numbers and an
approach of fuzzy based fault tree analysis (FFTA) is introduced to
estimate the probability of occurrence of the COTFE. Further, the

0950-4230/$ e see front matter
2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jlp.2013.08.022
1391

Flexible

X43
connection pipe
rupture
Electric leakage
X22

nearby

Oil leakage
High degree

X42
corrosion of
current

OR
Electrified tank wall
Stray

X21
OR

railway
Poor seal around

X41
Cathodic manhole
X20

protection
explosive range
mixtures within Gauge hatch Tank wall broken

X39

X40
Vapor-air often open by external force
Other non-explosion

OR
A
X19

proof electrical Breathing

D. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 1390e1398

X38
equipments valve open by
breakdown
apparatus sparks

Non-explosion
X18

proof monitor Tank top

X37
Electrical

or detector unattended
OR

Oil spill

AND
Audio-visual or

Operational
Wrong valve

X36
X17

photographic Ground rod opened

X15

error
equipment

OR
damaged

Fig. 1. Schematics of the COTFE fault tree.

Arrester
Excessive

X35
Mobile faults
Deflector
X16

OR

X14
loading
damaged
explosive range

telephone
mixtures within
Vapor-air

Air terminal

X13
Imperfect
A

Without installing damaged

earth

OR

X12
lightning protection
facilities
Lightning
sparks

AND
Tank fire and

Lightning

X11
explosion

Lightning
stroke induction High oil flow
AND

X32
OR
velocity
Lightning invasion

X10
along pipelines Rough inner

X31
Friction between wall of pipeline

X34
Direct lightning fiber and human

X9
X8
Lighter
sources

Human body
Ignition

flash

electrostatic
body Oil lashing against

X30
discharge
OR

metal materials

AND
Operator close

X33
X7
Match
to a conductor Floating metal

X29
Open debris on oil surface
fires
Vehicles without

OR

X6
flame arresters
Friction between

X28
accumulation
sparks

Electrostatic
splashing oil and air

Static

OR
B
X5
Fire work

OR
Not enough

operational

X27
Measuring
standing time

error
sparks

X4
Static

OR
Smoking

electrostatic
B

discharge
Oil tank
Non-standard

X26
AND
apparatus
Wearing iron

X3

grounding
nail-shoes Broken

X25
Bad

OR
ground wire

Impact
sparks
Collision of metal tools

OR

X2
and tank wall during Non-standard

X24
maintenance operation ground resistance
Using Without installing
non-explosion

X23
X1
anti-static
proof tools grounding device
1392 D. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 1390e1398
proposed approach is used to perform importance analysis of the
COTFE fault tree in order to help decision maker determine whether
and where to take preventive or corrective action on the crude oil
tank system in the risk management process.
2. Traditional FTA of COTFE
2.1. Construction of COTFE fault tree
FTA is a deductive method for identifying ways in which hazards
can lead to accidents. The approach starts with a top undesired
event and work backwards towards the various scenarios that can
cause the accident. In a fault tree, the top, intermediate and basic
events are connected together by logic gates. The gates show re-
lationships of input events needed for the occurrence of a fault at
the output of the gate. AND gates combine input events, all of which
must exist simultaneously for the output to occur. OR gates also
combine input events, but any one is sufcient to cause the output.
In present paper, the COTFE accident is considered as the top event
(TE). Two intermediate events must occur together for the COTFE:
ignition sources and vapor-air mixtures within explosive range, so
they must be connected to the TE by an AND gate. Various ignition
sources may exist in the tank park: impact sparks, static sparks, open
res, lighting sparks, electrical apparatus sparks and stray current.
Any one of them could ignite an explosive mixture if contacted, so
these must be connected by an OR gate. Also there are many causes
that can lead to the explosive mixtures, such as oil spill, gauge hatch
often open, breathing valve open by breakdown or oil leakage. Next,
consider these sub-events as the new intermediate events, and then
each of them will be substituted by the lower events. Continue
developing the fault tree until its all branches have been terminated
by basic or undeveloped events. Finally, a complete fault tree of the
COTFE is constructed as shown in Fig. 1. The proposed fault tree in-
cludes 43 BEs that contribute to the occurrence of the COTEF accident.
2.2. Evaluation of COTFE fault tree
After the COTFE fault tree is fully drawn, both qualitative and
quantitative evaluation can be performed. The aim of qualitative
analysis of a fault tree is to nd out the minimal cut sets (MCSs). The
MCSs relate the TE directly with the basic event causes and a MCS is the
smallest combination of BEs which if they all fail will cause the occur-
rence of the undesired event. The MCSs are very useful for determining
the various ways in which a top undesired event could occur. In this
study, the MCSs of the COTFE fault tree are obtained by using the
combination of Fussell-Vesely algorithm and the rules of Boolean
algebra (Fussell & Vesely, 1972; Wang, 1999). The proposed fault tree
yields 392 MCSs for just 43 BEs, including 90 MCSs of order 2, 234 MCSs
of order 3 and 68 MCSs of order 4. The MCSs equation is as follows:
T MCS1 MCS2 . MCSN
XXX X Since each expert may have a different opinion about the same
Xm Xk Xn X37 X33 X34 Xn X37
m k n n
! 0
XXX XXX
Xs Xr Xn X37 @ Xm Xk Xj
s r n m k j
XX X XXX
Xi Xn X37 X33 X34 Xj
i n j s
XX
Xi Xj
i j
where 1  i  8 and 16  i  22, 38  j  43, 26  k  32,
23  m  25, 35  n  36, 12  r  15, 9  s  11; N is the serial
number of MCS, 1  N  392; X represents BE.
The aim of quantitative analysis of a developed fault tree is to
provide a measure of the probability of occurrence of the TE and the
major faults contributing to the TE. The quantitative evaluation re-
quires the gathering of exact failure data of BEs for input to the fault
tree. However, for the COTFE fault tree, it is difcult to have a precise
estimation of the BE probability due to insufcient data; in fact many
BEs of the COTFE fault tree may not have quantitative data at all due
to its inherent uncertainty and imprecision. Therefore, it is not
possible to assign a single value of probability to each BE. In order to
overcome such limitations in traditional FTA, a fuzzy based
approach is developed and discussed in the following sections.
3. Fuzzy based FTA of COTFE
3.1. Fuzzy numbers to dene probabilities of the BEs
The concept of fuzzy set theory was introduced by L.A Zadeh
(1965) to deal with uncertain or vague information. A fuzzy set
dened on a universe of discourse (U) is characterized by a mem-
bership function, m(x), which takes values from the interval [0, 1]. A
membership function provides a measure of the degree of simi-
larity of an element in U to the fuzzy subset. Fuzzy sets are dened
for specic linguistic variables. Each linguistic term can be repre-
sented by a triangular, trapezoidal or Gaussian shape membership
function. The selection of a membership function essentially de-
pends on the variable characteristics, available information and
experts opinion. Here, triangular fuzzy numbers (TFNs) and trap-
ezoidal fuzzy numbers (ZFNs) are employed for their simplicity and
efciency to quantify the probabilities of the BEs. The triangular
representation shows the fuzzy possibility of a BE can be denoted
by a triplet (a1, a2, a3) and the corresponding membership function
is written as (Wang, 1997):
8
>
> 0 ; x  a1
<
x  a1 =a2  a1 ; a1  x  a2
mA~ x (2)
> a3  x=a3  a2
>
:
; a2  x  a3
0 ; x  a3
A ZFN denoted by a quadruple (a1, a2, a3, a4) is dened as
follows:
8
>
> 0 ; x  a1
>
>
< x  a1 =a2  a1 ; a1  x  a2
mA~ x 1 ; a2  x  a3 (3)
>
>
> a4  x=a4  a3
> ; a3  x  a4
:
0 ; x  a4
3.2. Aggregation of fuzzy numbers of the BEs
BE according to his/her experience and expertise in the relevant
eld, in order to achieve agreement among experts conicted
views, the fuzzy numbers assigned by different experts should be
aggregated to a single one. A consistency aggregation method (Wei,
Qiu, & Wang, 2001) is proposed in this paper. This methodology is a
1
revised version of the Hsu and Chens algorithm (Hsu & Chen, 1996),
Xs Xr Xj A which overcomes the assumed restriction that the opinions of all
r j experts represented by fuzzy numbers should have a common
intersection. The proposed method is described as follows:
~ ;A
(1) Calculate the similarity degree sA ~ of the opinions A
~ and A
~
i j i j
(1)
of a pair of experts Ei and Ej.
 D. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 1390e1398 1393

   Y
n
s A ~ EVi =EVj ;
~ ;A EVi  EVj
(4)
~ c ANDFp
P ~1 ; p
~ 2 ; .; p
~n ~i
p
i j EVj =EVi ; EVj  EVi i1
!
Y
n Y
n Y
n Y
n
where sA~ ;A
~ [0,1] is the similarity function; A ~ and A~ are two ai1 ; ai2 ; ai3 ; ai4 (11)
i j i j
standard fuzzy numbers, respectively; EVi and EVj separately i1 i1 i1 i1
represent the expectancy evaluation for A ~ or A~ . The EV of a trap-
i j
ezoidal fuzzy number A ~ a ; a ; a ; a is dened as: Y
n
1 2 3 4
~ c ORFp
P ~1 ; p ~ n 1Q
~2 ; .; p 1Qp
~i
  h    i
~ 1 E A
EV A ~ E A
~ (5)
i1
2 Y
n Y
n
1 1  ai1 ; 1  1  ai2 ; (12)
i1 i1

where E (A) (a1 a2)/2, E (A) (a3 a4)/2. !
Yn Yn
1 1  ai3 ; 1  1  ai4
(2) Construct the consensus matrix M and calculate the average i1 i1
agreement degree A(Ei) of the experts. Q
where denotes fuzzy multiplication; Q denotes fuzzy
0 1
/ subtraction.
B 1 s12 / s1n C For triangular fuzzy number (ai1, ai2, ai3):
B
M @ s21 1 s C (6)
1 12 A !
sn1 sn2 1 Y
n Y
n Y
n Y
n
/ ~ c ANDFp
~1 ; p
~2 ;:::; p
~n ~i
P p ai1 ; ai2 ; ai3 (13)
~ ;A~ , if i j, then sij 1. A(Ei) is dened as: i1 i1 i1 i1
where sij sA i j

X
n   Y
n
1 ~ ;A
~ ~ c ORFp
P ~1 ; p ~ n 1Q
~ 2 ; :::; p 1Qp
~i
AEi sij A i j (7)
n i1
isj !
j 1 Y
n Y
n Y
n
1 1  ai1 ; 1  1  ai2 ; 1  1  ai3
(3) Calculate the relative agreement degree (RAD) of each expert. i1 i1 i1

X
n (14)
RADi AEi = AEi (8) ~ TE ) can be calculated
Hence, the fuzzy possibility of the COTFE (P
i1
using the following equation:
(4) The aggregation weight (wi) of each expert Ei is the combina- n  
Y
tion of the RADi and the importance degree (EIDi) of experts Ei. ~ TE 1 
P ~
1P ci
i1
h     i
wi a$EIDi 1  a$RADi 1 ~
1P ~ ~
i 1; 2; .; n (9) c1 5 1  P c2 5.5 1  P cn (15)

where a (0a  1) is a relaxation factor which shows the impor- where p ~c1 ; p
~c2 ; .; p ~ TE
~cn denote the fuzzy possibilities of all MCSs; P
P
tance EIDi over RADi; EIDi (0  EIDi  1 and EIDi 1) can be is the fuzzy COTFE possibility.
determined by using Delphi method (Dong & Yu, 2005) or analytic
hierarchy process (Bryson & Mobolurin, 1994).
3.4. Defuzzication of the fuzzy COTFE possibility
(5) The aggregation result of the experts opinions can be obtained
as follows: To provide a useful outcome for decision making, the fuzzy pos-
sibility of the COTFE must be rst mapped to crisp possibility score
(CPS) through defuzzication. A number of defuzzication methods
X
n
(Ross, 2004; Wang, 1997) are available, including mean max mem-
~j
p ~ ij
wi 5p j 1; 2; .; m (10)
bership, centroid method, weighted average method, center of
i1
largest area, center of sums and so on. In this paper, the center of area
~j is the aggregated fuzzy number of BEj; p
where p ~ij is the fuzzy defuzzication technique (Miri Lavasani et al., 2011; Wang, 1997) is
adopted for its simplicity and usefulness. Defuzzication of TFN A ~
number of BEj assigned by expert Ei; m is the number of experts; n is
the number of BEs; wi is a weighting factor of the expert Ei. a1 ; a2 ; a3 can be obtained by the following expression:
Za2 Za3
3.3. The fuzzy COTFE possibility estimation Z x  a1 a3  x
xdx xdx
xmA~ xdx a2  a1 a3  a2
To minimize the error due to uncertainty in BE probability * a1 a2
PTE Z
data, the present algorithm uses fuzzied possibility data of BE for Za2 Za3
mA~ xdx x  a1 a3  x
quantication of a fault tree. Fuzzy arithmetic operations rules dx dx
a2  a1 a3  a2
(Liang & Wang, 1993; Tanaka et al., 1983) are employed to esti- a1 a2
mate the fuzzy possibility of the MCSs and the same for the 1
COTFE. a1 a2 a3 (16)
3
~1 ; p
Giving the fuzzy possibilities for all BEs, p ~2 ; .; p
~n , the fuzzy
possibilities of the MCSs (P ~ c ) are estimated using following * is the defuzzied output; x is the output variable.
where PTE
expressions. For trapezoidal fuzzy number (ai1, ai2, ai3, ai4): Defuzzication of ZFN A~ a ; a ; a ; a is:
1 2 3 4
1394 D. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 1390e1398

Za2 Za3 Za4 MCS importance is estimated by calculating the ratio of the MCS
x  a1 a4  x
xdx xdx xdx probability to the COTFE probability. The calculation is performed
a2  a1 a4  a3
* a1 a2 a3 as follows:
PTE
Za2 Za3 Za4
x  a1 a4  x j
PMCS
dx dx dx IjCS (21)
a2  a1 a4  a3 PTE
a1 a2 a3

1 a4 a3 2  a4 a3  a1 a2 2 a1 a2 j
where IjCS is the CS-I index of the jth MCS; PMCS is the occurrence
$ (17)
3 a4 a3  a2  a1 probability of the jth MCS.

3.5. Convert crisp possibility score (CPS) into probability value (PV) 4. A case study

In traditional FTA the nal result is an exact probability value. In The COTFE accident erupted in Hunan oil depot (Fan, 2005),
fuzzy based FTA, however, the output is crisp possibility score (CPS) which result in four people died and two injured, is selected here
because the occurrence probability of each BE is represented by as a case study. The proposed fuzzy based FTA is performed to
fuzzy numbers. There is inconsistency between the real probability evaluate the occurrence probability of the COTFE accident. And
data and the possibility score. This issue can be solved by trans- the implementation of the proposed approach also provides an
forming the CPS into the form of probability of occurrence. The opportunity to reinvestigate the causes of accident, which is
following conversion function (Onisawa, 1988, 1990) is proposed: helpful to prevent or reduce the occurrence of such accidents in
( the future. One of the other aims of the study is to compare the
1
10m ; CPSs0 results obtained by the fuzzy FTA with the results reached by
PV (18)
0; CPS 0 traditional FTA.
Considering the COTFE as an undesired top event, the COTFE
where tree has been constructed as shown in Fig. 1. Once the fault tree has
been developed, it can be evaluated to identify the possible basic
 1 causes (or BEs) and pathways (minimum combination of BEs) that
1  CPS 3
m  2:301 (19) would lead to the undesired event. As previously concluded,
CPS
quantitative analysis shows there are 43 BEs and 392 MCSs in the
* CPS, P COTFE tree. Subsequently, using the failure probability data of the
and PTE TE PV; PTE is the probability of occurrence of the
CCOTFE. BEs, those pathways can be further evaluated to estimate the COTFE
occurrence probability and nd out the most vulnerable pathways
and BEs.
3.6. Importance analysis of the COTFE fault tree

At the time of decision making process, it is useful to have the
events sorted according to some criteria. This ranking is enabled by
importance analysis. In this study, the importance analysis of the
COTFE fault tree is carried out based on the investigation of the
importance measures of the BEs and the MCSs in the proposed tree.
3.6.1. FusselleVesely importance of BEs
The FusselleVesely importance (FV-I) is employed to evaluate
the contribution of each BE to the occurrence probability of the
COTFE. This importance measure is sometimes called the top
contribution importance. It provides a numerical signicance of all
the BEs in the COTFE fault tree and allows them to be prioritized.
The FV-I of a BE is calculated by the following equation (Vinod,
Kushwaha, Verma, & Srividya, 2003):
xi 0
PTE  PTE
IxFVi
PTE
xi 0
where IxFVi is the FV-I index of ith BE; PTE is the occurrence prob-
ability of the COTFE by setting the probability of ith BE to 0. Deci-
sion makers use this importance index to improve the safety
features of the analyzed crude oil tanks.
3.6.2. Cut sets importance
Cut sets importance (CS-I) is used to evaluate the contribution of
each MCS to the TE occurrence probability. This importance mea-
sure provides a method for ranking the impact of each MCS and
identifying the most likely path that leads to the TE. In order to
measure the CS importance, the output fuzzy possibility of each
MCS of the COTFE fault tree needs to be converted into a probability
value using the methods described in Section 3.4e3.5. Then the
4.1. Fuzzy-based approach
4.1.1. Fuzzy numbers dening probabilities of BEs
Due to lack of the precise probability data of BEs of the COTFE
tree, the approach synthesizing the fuzzy set theory and experts
linguistic judgments is proposed to quantify the occurrence pos-
sibilities of the BEs. In this study, three experts, including a reli-
ability analyst and two senior eld engineers, are invited to
perform the assessments. In order to capture experts linguistic
notions of probabilities for the BEs, a seven level linguistic rating
scale, i.e. {Very Low (VL), Low (L), Mildly Low (ML), Medium (M),
Mildly High (MH), High (H) and Very High (VH)}, has been pro-
posed. Then, the linguistic expressions are transformed into fuzzy
numbers using a numerical approximation system as shown in
Fig. 2 (Chen, Hwang, & Hwang, 1992). The result of the expert
judgments for all the BEs is shown in Table 1.
(20)
4.1.2. Aggregating fuzzy numbers assigned by different experts
Aggregation provides an agreement among the conicted
knowledge provided by different experts. Here the proposed con-
sistency aggregation method is adopted to achieve it. In addition,
for the ease of analysis, the TFNs dening the BE probabilities
should rst be converted into the corresponding ZFNs; for example,
a TFN (a1, a2, a3) can be expressed as a ZFN (a1, a2, a2, a3). Then,
according to Eqs. (4)e(10), the aggregated fuzzy possibility values
for each BEs involved in COTFE tree are obtained (see Table 1),
which will be taken as the input data for fuzzy COTFE probability
calculation. As an example, the detailed aggregation calculations
for BE36 are given in Table 2, which include the calculations such as
~ ;A
similarity degree sA ~ , average agreement degree A(Ei), relative
i j
agreement degree (RAD), aggregation weight (wi), etc.
 D. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 1390e1398 1395

estimated, which is also a continuous ZFN (0.523, 0.897, 0.995,

Very Low Low Mildly Low Medium Mildly High High Very High
1.0 1.000). Obviously, the fuzziness of the COTFE event is determined
Membership function,

by that of the BEs. And the information about the real state of the
0.8
crude oil tank system is revealed sufciently when such fuzzy
0.6 description is reserved.
0.4
4.1.4. Defuzzifying fuzzy possibility of the COTFE
0.2 The result obtained above is a fuzzy variable, which needs to be
further converted into a crisp possibility score (CPS) by defuzzica-
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 tion. The CPS is a single crisp numeric value, which represents the
Possibility, p most likely score that an event may occur (Dong & Yu, 2005). Here,
the centre of area defuzzication method Eq. (17) is adopted to
Fig. 2. Fuzzy numbers represent linguistic value.
achieve it. The crisp defuzzed result (as shown in Fig. 3) allows
displaying the percentage contribution of the COTFE fuzzy possibility
4.1.3. Estimating fuzzy possibility of the COTFE number in fuzzy set representing fuzzy possibility range. The CPS
Quantitative analysis of the COTFE tree attempts to calculate value of the COTFE is 0.833 and belongs to two sets: High (H) with the
occurrence probability of the top event. In this study, the proba- membership degree of 67% and Very High (VH) in 33%. The result
bilities for all BEs are represented in a form of ZFNs, so calculations makes the decision-making in risk assessment more convenient.
of the fuzzy possibility of the COTFE and the MCSs must follow the
fuzzy arithmetic operation rules (Liang & Wang, 1993; Tanaka et al., 4.1.5. Converting CPS of the COTFE into a probability value
1983). According to Eqs. (11)e(15) and the fuzzy possibilities of the In order to ensure compatibility between the CPS and the exact
BEs in Table 1, the fuzzy possibility of occurrence of the COTFE is probability data obtained from sufcient statistical inference, the

Table 1
Fuzzy possibility values and FV-I measures for BEs in fuzzy COTFE FTA.

BE Description Linguistic judgments of experts Aggregation of fuzzy numbers FV-I measure

Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Index Ranking

X1 Using non-explosion proof tools L VL L (0.065, 0.130, 0.165, 0.265) 0.0634 9

X2 Collision of metal tools and tank wall during L VL L (0.073, 0.147, 0.173, 0.273) 0.0711 8
maintenance operation
X3 Wearing iron nail-shoes VL VL VL (0.000, 0.000, 0.100, 0.200) 0.0017 35
X4 Smoking ML L ML (0.167, 0.267, 0.333, 0.433) 0.1536 5
X5 Fire work M L M (0.319, 0.419, 0.419, 0.519) 0.2873 2
X6 Vehicles without ame arresters L VL VL (0.030, 0.059, 0.130, 0.230) 0.0298 15
X7 Match L L VL (0.064, 0.128, 0.164, 0.264) 0.0623 10
X8 Lighter ML L L (0.136, 0.236, 0.273, 0.373) 0.1279 6
X9 Direct lightning ash VL VL L (0.034, 0.068, 0.134, 0.234) 0.0204 20
X10 Lightning invasion along pipelines L VL VL (0.040, 0.080, 0.140, 0.240) 0.0238 18
X11 Lightning induction VL L VL (0.037, 0.074, 0.137, 0.237) 0.0288 16
X12 Without installing lightning protection facilities L VL VL (0.030, 0.059, 0.130, 0.230) 0.0045 34
X13 Air terminal damaged ML L L (0.138, 0.238, 0.277, 0.377) 0.0182 21
X14 Deector damaged M L L (0.213, 0.313, 0.313, 0.413) 0.0261 17
X15 Ground rod damaged L L ML (0.132, 0.232, 0.265, 0.365) 0.0117 26
X16 Mobile telephone VL L VL (0.035, 0.070, 0.135, 0.235) 0.0346 14
X17 Audio-visual or photographic equipment VL VL VL (0.000, 0.000, 0.100, 0.200) 0.0017 35
X18 Non-explosion proof monitor or detector VL VL VL (0.000, 0.000, 0.100, 0.200) 0.0017 35
X19 Other non-explosion proof electrical equipments L VL L (0.065, 0.130, 0.165, 0.265) 0.0634 9
X20 Cathodic protection VL VL VL (0.000, 0.000, 0.100, 0.200) 0.0017 35
X21 Electried railway VL VL VL (0.000, 0.000, 0.100, 0.200) 0.0017 35
X22 Electric leakage nearby L VL VL (0.040, 0.080, 0.140, 0.240) 0.0396 13
X23 Without installing anti-static grounding device L VL VL (0.038, 0.076, 0.138, 0.238) 0.0131 23
X24 Non-standard ground resistance VL VL L (0.034, 0.068, 0.134, 0.234) 0.0119 25
X25 Broken ground wire ML L L (0.132, 0.232, 0.265, 0.365) 0.0414 12
X26 Non-standard apparatus L VL L (0.026, 0.051, 0.126, 0.226) 0.0067 32
X27 Not enough standing time L VL VL (0.038, 0.076, 0.138, 0.238) 0.0095 27
X28 Friction between splashing oil and air L VL VL (0.030, 0.059, 0.130, 0.230) 0.0077 31
X29 Floating metal debris on oil surface VL VL L (0.026, 0.051, 0.126, 0.226) 0.0067 32
X30 Oil lashing against metal materials L VL VL (0.038, 0.076, 0.138, 0.238) 0.0095 28
X31 Rough inner wall of pipeline VL L VL (0.037, 0.074, 0.137, 0.237) 0.0094 29
X32 High oil ow velocity L VL L (0.065, 0.130, 0.165, 0.265) 0.0158 22
X33 Operator close to a conductor VL L VL (0.037, 0.074, 0.137, 0.237) 0.0015 36
X34 Friction between ber and human body L VL VL (0.030, 0.059, 0.130, 0.230) 0.0015 36
X35 Excessive loading VL L L (0.062, 0.124, 0.162, 0.262) 0.0089 30
X36 Wrong valve opened VL L ML (0.089, 0.147, 0.221, 0.321) 0.0121 24
X37 Tank top unattended L VL L (0.065, 0.130, 0.165, 0.265) 0.0212 19
X38 Breathing valve kept open since broke down M L ML (0.250, 0.350, 0.386, 0.486) 0.3811 1
X39 Gauge hatch often open ML L ML (0.171, 0.271, 0.341, 0.441) 0.2768 3
X40 Tank wall broken by external force VL VL VL (0.000, 0.000, 0.100, 0.200) 0.0046 33
X41 Poor seal around manhole ML L L (0.136, 0.236, 0.273, 0.373) 0.2262 4
X42 High degree corrosion of tank wall L VL VL (0.030, 0.059, 0.130, 0.230) 0.0539 11
X43 Flexible connection pipe rupture ML L L (0.060, 0.120, 0.160, 0.260) 0.1044 7
1396 D. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 1390e1398

Table 2 Table 3
The aggregation calculations for the BE36. The CS-I ranking of top 50 MCSs in fuzzy COTFE FTA.
~
A VL (0, 0, 0.1, 0.2) EV(1) 0.0750 MCSs CS-I MCSs CS-I
1
~
A L (0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.3) EV(2) 0.2000
2
~ Index Ranking Index Ranking
A 3 ML (0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5) EV(3) 0.3500
X5X38 2.300E-03 1 X8X43 1.083E-05 26
S12 2.6667 A(E1) 3.6667 X5X39 1.229E-03 2 X16X39 1.023E-05 27
S13 4.6667 A(E2) 1.6190 X4X38 7.521E-04 3 X6X39 8.217E-06 28
S21 2.6667 A(E3) 2.6190 X5X41 6.165E-04 4 X4X42 7.421E-06 29
S23 0.5714 RAD1 0.4639 X4X39 4.088E-04 5 X22X41 5.118E-06 30
S31 4.6667 RAD2 0.2048 X8X38 4.007E-04 6 X5X40 4.217E-06 31
S32 0.5714 RAD3 0.3313 X8X39 2.126E-04 7 X16X41 4.089E-06 32
X4X41 1.955E-04 8 X6X41; X8X42 3.243E-06 33
EID1 0.38 w1 0.42 X8X41 9.897E-05 9 X3X38; X17X38; 2.912E-06 34
EID2 0.32 w2 0.26 X18X38; X20X38;
EID3 0.30 w3 0.32 X21X38
X5X43 7.895E-05 10 X3X39; X17X39; 1.664E-06 35
~ 36 0:089; 0:147; 0:221; 0:321 X18X39; X20X39;
p
X21X39
X2X38 7.563E-05 11 X2X43 1.507E-06 36
X1X38; 5.928E-05 12 X4X40 1.487E-06 37
CPS must be converted into the form of probability data. This can be X19X38
achieved by using Eqs. (18) and (19). The corresponding probability X7X38 5.703E-05 13 X1X43; X19X43 1.152E-06 38
of occurrence for the COTFE is 4.514  102. X2X39 3.862E-05 14 X7X43 1.103E-06 39
X1X39; 3.033E-05 15 X3X41; X8X40; 5.941E-07 40
X19X39 X17X41; X18X41;
4.1.6. Importance measure for the COTFE fault tree X20X41; X21X41
An important aim of many reliability and risk analyses is to X7X39 2.918E-05 16 X22X43 4.401E-07 41
identify the most important BEs and MCSs from a reliability or risk X22X38 2.433E-05 17 X2X42 4.233E-07 42
X5X42 2.410E-05 18 X11X15X38 4.004E-07 43
viewpoint so that they can be given priority for improvements. The
X4X43 2.338E-05 19 X16X43 3.497E-07 44
most crucial BEs in the COTFE fault tree for causing the occurrence X16X38 1.956E-05 20 X1X42; X19X42 3.282E-07 45
of the COTFE can be justied through FV importance (FVeI) mea- X2X41 1.663E-05 21 X7X42 3.153E-07 46
sures. Using Eq. (20), The FV-I indexes of all BEs in the COTFE tree X6X38 1.561E-05 22 X6X43 2.762E-07 47
are calculated and ranked as shown in Table 1. The result helps to X1X41; 1.290E-05 23 X11X15X39 1.852E-07 48
X19X41
conclude that particular attention must be given to the events X38,
X22X39 1.264E-05 24 X22X42 1.346E-07 49
X5, X39, X41, X4, X6, X43, X2, {X1; X19} and X7 as these BEs have X7X41 1.238E-05 25 X16X42 1.092E-07 50
the greatest potential to cause the COTFE accident.
The MCS represents the smallest collection of BEs whose failures
are necessary and sufcient to result in the COTFE accident. The valve kept open since broke down occur simultaneously) has
most crucial MCSs for the undesired COTFE event can be measured maximum probability of occurrence for this COTFE accident, which
by ranking of their CS-I index. Here, the MCS X4X38 is taken as an corresponds to the ofcial investigation results. In addition, it can be
example to illustrate the calculation procedure of the CS-I index. seen that these weakest MCSs are mainly composed of the top ve
First, the fuzzy possibility of the MCS X4X38 is calculated based on BEs by their FV-I values. The ranking results together open up the
fuzzy arithmetic operations Eq. (11), which is also a fuzzy number critical importance of the BEs including X38 (Breathing valve kept
of (0.042, 0.093, 0.128, 0.210). Next, the CPS of X4X38 is estimated open since broke down), X5 (Fire work), X39 (Gauge hatch often
as 0.120 by the deffuzication technique of Eq. (17). Then, this FPS is open), X41 (Poor seal around manhole), X4 (Smoking) and X43
substituted into Eq. (18) and (19) to calculate PV and the PV of (Flexible connection pipe rupture). Such results can help decision-
X4X38 is 3.395  105. Finally, using Eq. (21), the CS-I index of maker take the targeted preventive measures, such as more
X4X38 is 7.521  104. The CS-I indexes of other MCSs are calcu- strictly management regulation, security check and maintenance, to
lated using the same procedures and the results of ranking top 50 eliminate or mitigate the identied safety deciencies, and hence
MCSs are provided in Table 3. prevent or reduce the occurrence of such COTFE accidents.
As shown in Table 3, the MCSs ranked the top ten crucial con-
tributions to the COTFE probability are X5X38, X5X39, X4X38,
4.2. Traditional-based approach
X5X41, X4X39, X8X38, X8X39, X4X41, X8X41 and X5X43 respec-
tively. This reveals that these MCSs are the weakest links of the crude
During the process of the traditional FTA of the COTFE, due to
oil tank system. The path MCS X5X39 (Fire work and Breathing
absence of accurate probability data for BEs, the generic data are
used to roughly estimate of the COTFE occurrence probability. In
general, BE generic probability data can be derived from reliability
Very Low Low Mildly Low Medium Mildly High High Very High
data handbook (SINTEF Industrial Management, 2002), expert
Membership function,

1.0
judgments and statistical data in oil depots. These probability data
are used in single-point form and are inherently uncertainty and
0.67
imprecise. In this case study, the probability data for some of the
0.5
BEs could hardly be obtained from reliability data handbook or
0.33
statistical data, such as the BEs X4, X7, X16, X32, X37, etc. Hence, in
order to ensure the consistency among all the BE probabilities and
reasonable comparison with the fuzzy-based approach, the generic
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.833 data for the BEs in the COTFE fault tree are also obtained from
Possibility, p
expert judgments, but each BE probability data is represented by a
Fig. 3. Fuzzy possibility of the COTFE event on fuzzy scale. single possibility score as shown in Table 4.
 D. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 1390e1398 1397

Table 4 Since there is no repeated BEs among all MCSs, the possibility of
The generic data and FV-I measures for BEs in traditional COTFE FTA. occurrence of the COTFE is achieved as follows (Wang, 1999):
BE Expert judgment by a single Aggregated FV-I measures
possibility score possibility NG Y
score PTE W q
xi Gr i
(22)
Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Index Ranking r1

X1 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.115 0.1232 12

where PTE denotes the possibility of top event; NG represents the
X2 0.15 0.06 0.12 0.112 0.1177 13
X3 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.030 0.0323 42 number of all MCSs; r denotes the ordinal numbers of MCSs;
X4 0.26 0.15 0.24 0.219 0.2299 6 xi Gr represents the ith BE belongs to rth MCS; qi denotes the
X5 0.35 0.24 0.30 0.300 0.3284 4 possibility score of the ith BE. Using Eq. (22), the occurrence
X6 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.083 0.1138 14
possibility of the COTFE event is 0.850. Then, according to the
X7 0.14 0.16 0.06 0.122 0.1549 9
X8 0.25 0.16 0.15 0.191 0.2248 7
probability conversion formulas of Eqs. (18) and (19), the occur-
X9 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.071 0.0836 19 rence probability of the COTFE is obtained and the result is
X10 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.082 0.0922 16 5.141  102.
X11 0.05 0.15 0.06 0.085 0.0750 20 The importance of each BE is also measured based on their FV-I
X12 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.084 0.0460 34
index using Eq. (20) and results are also shown in Table 4. It shows
X13 0.26 0.16 0.14 0.192 0.0718 23
X14 0.40 0.16 0.14 0.245 0.0845 18 that the top ten critical BEs are X39, X38, X41, X5, X43, X4, X8, X42,
X15 0.20 0.20 0.35 0.245 0.0662 26 X7 and X25 respectively. The FV-I index of all the MCSs are also
X16 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.085 0.0906 17 calculated by Eq. (21) and the CS-I ranking of top 50 MCSs is listed
X17 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.034 0.0373 38
in Table 5. As shown in Table 5, the MCSs ranked the top ten leading
X18 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.029 0.0337 39
X19 0.16 0.06 0.12 0.116 0.1280 11
contributions to the COTFE probability are X5X38, X5X39, X4X38,
X20 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.035 0.0385 37 X5X41, X8X38, X4X39, X8X39, X4X41, X8X41 and X5X43 respec-
X21 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.037 0.0419 35 tively. According to the FV-I and FV-I ranking result by the
X22 0.15 0.05 0.08 0.097 0.1039 15 traditional-based approach, the most critical BEs which have to be
X23 0.16 0.05 0.06 0.095 0.0749 21
given utmost attention are X39, X38, X41, X5, X4 and X8.
X24 0.06 0.04 0.15 0.081 0.0746 22
X25 0.30 0.15 0.20 0.222 0.1433 10
X26 0.06 0.05 0.15 0.084 0.0327 41 4.3. Results and discussion
X27 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.091 0.0385 36
X28 0.16 0.05 0.03 0.086 0.0579 28
X29 0.04 0.05 0.15 0.076 0.0543 32
The calculations have been carried out by fuzzy-based
X30 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.077 0.0544 31 approach and traditional approach. Table 6 presents the nal
X31 0.05 0.15 0.04 0.079 0.0554 29 important results for comparison between the two approaches.
X32 0.12 0.05 0.16 0.110 0.0667 25 The results show that: 1) the occurrence probability value of the
X33 0.05 0.15 0.04 0.079 0.0327 40
COTFE by the fuzzy approach is about 12% lower than the value by
X34 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.084 0.0327 40
X35 0.05 0.15 0.12 0.103 0.0498 33 the traditional approach; 2) The fuzzy FTA provides the detailed
X36 0.05 0.12 0.28 0.141 0.0588 27 information about the contribution of linguistic rating scale (H
X37 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.116 0.0669 24 and VH) to the COTFE probability, whereas such information is
X38 0.38 0.14 0.25 0.264 0.4608 2 unknown from traditional FTA; 3) there is slight difference in the
X39 0.26 0.15 0.25 0.116 0.4712 1
X40 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.023 0.0548 30
most critical BEs and big difference in the ranking of these BEs.
X41 0.28 0.12 0.15 0.190 0.3952 3 The main reason for the differences mentioned above is that the
X42 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.085 0.2113 8 fuzzy FTA approach distributes all BE data uncertainty in the
X43 0.05 0.15 0.14 0.109 0.2469 5 whole triangular or trapezoidal region and thus attempts to
represent a more realistic scenario as compared to the traditional
approach. In reality, it is unreasonable to evaluate the occurrence
of each BE by using a single-point estimate without considering

Table 5
The CS-I ranking of top 50 MCSs in traditional COTFE FTA.

MCSs CS-I MCSs CS-I MCSs CS-I

Index Ranking Index Ranking Index Ranking

X5X38 1.192E-04 1 X5X42 3.441E-07 18 X16X41 1.734E-08 35

X5X39 5.472E-05 2 X1X39 3.424E-07 19 X6X41 1.416E-08 36
X4X38 2.851E-05 3 X2X39 2.976E-07 20 X7X43 4.272E-09 37
X5X41 2.644E-05 4 X4X43 2.286E-07 21 X19X43 2.844E-09 38
X8X38 1.483E-05 5 X7X41 1.940E-07 22 X1X43 2.626E-09 39
X4X39 1.215E-05 6 X16X38 1.589E-07 23 X2X43 2.201E-09 40
X8X39 6.099E-06 7 X19X41 1.380E-07 24 X22X43 6.955E-10 41
X4X41 5.466E-06 8 X6X38 1.324E-07 25 X7X42 6.102E-10 42
X8X41 2.655E-06 9 X1X41 1.291E-07 26 X19X42 3.924E-10 43
X5X43 1.483E-06 10 X22X39 1.190E-07 27 X21X38 3.821E-10 44
X7X38 1.397E-06 11 X2X41 1.114E-07 28 X1X42 3.600E-10 45
X19X38 1.028E-06 12 X8X43 9.685E-08 29 X2X42 2.973E-10 46
X1X38 9.683E-07 13 X16X39 5.070E-08 30 X16X43 2.377E-10 47
X2X38 8.478E-07 14 X4X42 4.553E-08 31 X20X38 2.079E-10 48
X7X39 5.045E-07 15 X22X41 4.252E-08 32 X6X43 1.865E-10 49
X19X39 3.649E-07 16 X6X39 4.181E-08 33 X17X38 1.618E-10 50
X22X38 3.562E-07 17 X8X42 1.796E-08 34
1398 D. Wang et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 1390e1398
Table 6
The important results for two approaches.
Fuzzy approach
The COTFE probability 4.514  102 (H 67%, VH 33%) 5.141  102
The most critical BEs X38
X5
X39
X41
X4
X43
the inherent uncertainty and imprecision a state has. Overall the
noteworthy attributes of the fuzzy FTA approach, including the
resilience towards lack of precision in the BE data and more
detailed probability information provided, conrm that the fuzzy
approach enables better probability assessment of the COTFE ac-
cident and more reliable identication of the most critical BEs,
and hence provides effective help for risk management and de-
cision making.
5. Conclusions
According to the results of this study, the following conclusions
are drawn:
(1) The fault tree of crude oil tank re and explosion (COTFE) is
constructed, and the qualitative analysis of the tree shows that
it totally includes 43 basic events and 392 minimal cut sets
possibly leading to the accident.
(2) The proposed approach which incorporates the fuzzy set the-
ory and the conventional FTA technique is demonstrated as a
viable and effective method for estimation of the COTFE
occurrence probability when encountered with basic data
uncertainty.
(3) The approach can be used to perform the importance analysis
of the COTFE fault tree which can provide valuable information
for decision maker to improve the safety performance of the
crude oil tank system.
Acknowledgments
Authors gratefully acknowledge the nancial support provided
by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No.
50974105) and the Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of
Higher Education of China (Grant No. 20105121110003).
References
Bryson, N., & Mobolurin, A. (1994). An approach to using the analytic hierarchy
Traditional
process for solving multiple criteria decision making problems. European
approach
Journal of Operational Research, 76(3), 440e454.
Chang, J. I., & Lin, C. C. (2006). A study of storage tank accidents. Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries, 19(1), 51e59.
X39 Chen, S. M. (1994). Fuzzy system reliability analysis using fuzzy number arithmetic
X38 operations. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 64(1), 31e38.
X41 Chen, S. J., Hwang, C. L., & Hwang, F. P. (1992). Fuzzy multiple attribute decision
X5 making: Methods and applications. New York: Springer-Verlag.
X4 Dong, Y. H., & Yu, D. T. (2005). Estimation of failure probability of oil and gas
X8 transmission pipelines by fuzzy fault tree analysis. Journal of Loss Prevention in
the Process Industries, 18(2), 83e88.
Fan, J. Y. (2005). Collection of oil tanks accident analysis. Beijing: China Petrochemical
Press.
Ferdous, R., Khan, F., Sadiq, R., Amyotte, P., & Veitch, B. (2009). Handling data un-
certainties in event tree analysis. Process Safety and Environment Protection,
87(5), 283e292.
Fussell, J. B., & Vesely, W. E. (1972). A new method for obtaining cutsets for fault
trees. Transactions of the American Nuclear Society, 15, 262e263.
Hsu, H. M., & Chen, T. C. (1996). Aggregation of fuzzy opinion under group decision
making. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 79(3), 279e285.
Liang, G., & Wang, J. M. (1993). Fuzzy fault tree analysis using failure possibility.
Microelectronics and Reliability, 33(4), 583e597.
Miri Lavasani, M. R., Wang, J., Yang, Z., & Finlay, J. (2011). Application of fuzzy fault
tree analysis on oil and gas offshore pipelines. International Journal of Materials
Science and Engineering, 1(1), 29e42.
Mon, D. L., & Cheng, C. H. (1994). Fuzzy system reliability analysis for components
with different membership functions. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 64(2), 145e157.
Onisawa, T. (1988). An approach to human reliability in man-machine systems
using error possibility. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 27(2), 87e103.
Onisawa, T. (1990). An application of fuzzy concepts to modelling of reliability
analysis. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 37(3), 267e286.
Pan, N., & Wang, H. (2007). Assessing failure of bridge construction using fuzzy fault
tree analysis. 4th International Conference on Fuzzy System and Knowledge Dis-
covery, 1(2), 96e100.
Pan, H., & Yun, Y. W. (1997). Fault tree analysis with fuzzy gates. Computers Indus-
trial Engineering, 33(3e4), 569e572.
Prugh, R. W. (1992). Computer-aided HAZOP and fault tree analysis. Journal of Loss
Prevention in the Process Industries, 5(1), 3e9.
Ross, J. T. (2004). Fuzzy logic with engineering applications. West Sussex, England:
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Sadiq, R., Saint-Martin, E., & Kleiner, Y. (2008). Predicting risk of water quality
failures in distribution networks under uncertainties using fault-tree analysis.
Urban Water Journal, 5(4), 287e304.
SINTEF Industrial Management. (2002). OREDA: Offshore reliability data handbook.
Trondheim, Norway: Det Norske Veritas (DNV).
Suresh, P. V., Babar, A. K., & Raj, V. V. (1996). Uncertainty in fault tree analysis: a
fuzzy approach. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 83(2), 135e141.
Tanaka, H., Fan, L. T., Lai, F. S., & Toguchi, K. (1983). Fault-tree analysis by fuzzy
probability. IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 32(5), 150e163.
Vinod, G., Kushwaha, H. S., Verma, A. K., & Srividya, A. (2003). Importance measures
in ranking piping components for risk informed in-service inspection. Reli-
ability Engineering & System Safety, 80(2), 107e113.
Wang, L. X. (1997). A course in fuzzy system and control. Upper Saddle River, N.J:
Prentice Hall PTR (London).
Wang, Y. H. (1999). Safety system engineering. Tianjin: Tianjin University Press.
Wei, C. P., Qiu, W. H., & Wang, X. Z. (2001). A new approach of group decision
making under fuzzy preference. Systems Engineering Theory and Practice, 7,
81e86.
Zadeh, L. A. (1965). Fuzzy sets. Information and Control, 8(3), 338e353.