G.R. No.
195670 December 3, 2012 The two houses are hereby declared to be co-owned by the petitioner and the
WILLEM BEUMER vs. AMORES
FACTS:
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980.
After several years, the RTC of Negros Oriental declared the nullity of their marriage
in the Decision dated November 10, 2000 on the basis of the formers psychological
incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. Consequently,
petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership dated December
14, 2000 praying for the distribution of the properties claimed to have been
acquired during the subsistence of their marriage. In defense, respondent averred
that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she
and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage.
During trial, petitioner testified that the properties were registered in the name of
respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from the
Dutch government as his disability benefit since respondent did not have sufficient
income to pay for their acquisition. He also claimed that the joint affidavit they
submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to Article
89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.
For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the
lots came exclusively from her personal funds, in particular, her earnings from
selling jewelry as well as products from Avon, Triumph and Tupperware.
On February 28, 2007, the RTC dissolved the parties conjugal partnership,
awarding all the parcels of land to respondent as her paraphernal properties; the
tools and equipment in favor of petitioner as his exclusive properties; the two (2)
houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties.
The personal properties, i.e., tools and equipment mentioned in the complaint
which were brought out by Willem from the conjugal dwelling are hereby declared
to be exclusively owned by the petitioner.
respondent since these were acquired during their marital union and since there is
no prohibition on foreigners from owning buildings and residential units. Petitioner
and respondent are, thereby, directed to subject this court for approval their
project of partition on the two houses aforementioned.
On appeal, petitioner insisted that the money used to purchase the foregoing
properties came from his own capital funds and that they were registered in the
name of his former wife only because of the constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership. Thus, he prayed for reimbursement of one-half (1/2) of the
value of what he had paid in the purchase of the said properties, waiving the other
half in favor of his estranged ex-wife.
CA affirmed. The CA stressed the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the
constitutional prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines." Hence, he
cannot invoke equity to support his claim for reimbursement.
ISSUE:
W/N the foreigner Beumer can seek reimbursement of the value of purchased
parcels of Philippine land in the petition for separation of his properties and his
wifes on the ground that he bought the parcels using his own disability fund
HELD: No.
It held petitioner cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is
clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition
against foreign ownership of Philippine land24 enshrined under Section 7, Article
XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be
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accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the
ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent,
or deceitful. In this case, petitioners statements regarding the real source of the
funds used to purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims:
While admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit that respondents
personal funds were used to purchase the properties he likewise claimed that his
personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these
inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the
Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant
reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the
subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established
that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly
which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that
violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no
obligations and produces no legal effect at all.
Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on the basis of
unjust enrichment. As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner
seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land,
the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the
Constitution.
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code.
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER
DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense
of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has
been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in
this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the
pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing
an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the money
he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of
Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between
the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the
defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it
is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage
of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff."
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign
citizenship. Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of
citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional
ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the
improvements built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on the properties
which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition.
Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national
patrimony and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect.
MULLER vs MULLER
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY; MULLER VS. MULLER
G.R. No. 149615, August 29,2006
Doctrine:
He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands.
Facts:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were
married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in
Germany at a house owned by respondents parents but decided to move and
reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had
inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the
proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of
P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The
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Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner, Elena Buenaventura
Muller.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and
maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.
On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The court granted said petition. It
also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal
partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those
acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo
property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the
respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because
the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution.
The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
decision of the RTC. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement
for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of
ownership to him. It ordered the respondent to REIMBURSE the petitioner the
amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of
P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house situated in Antipolo, Rizal.
Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.
Ruling:
No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.
Ratio Decidendi:
There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the Philippines.
Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property
despite a constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional
prohibition, he put the property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to
do indirectly what the fundamental law bars him to do directly.
With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement
on the ground of equity. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law
and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy,
cannot be done directly.
PHILIP MATTHEWS vs. BENJAMIN A. TAYLOR and JOSELYN C. TAYLOR
G.R. No. 164584 June 22, 2009
Facts:
1. On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin, a British subject, married Joselyn, a
17-year old Filipina.
2. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from
Diosa M. Martin a lot (Boracay property).
3. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin.
4. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds, constructed improvements
thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort
known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn.
5. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained
in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyns sister.
6. However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with
Kim Philippsen.
7. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a SPA in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the
latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract
with third parties with respect to their Boracay property.
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8. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee,
entered into an Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay property for a period
of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00.
9. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort
as Music Garden Resort.
10. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by
Joselyn without Benjamins consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration
of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner.
11. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and
improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was
Joselyns husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a
Filipino wife without the consent of her British husband is valid
2. Whether or not Benjamin is the actual owner of the property since he provided
the funds used in purchasing the same
Ruling:
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring
lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional
provision, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary
purpose of this constitutional provision is the conservation of the national
patrimony. Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands
of the public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least
sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public
or private lands in the Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized
exceptions. There is no rule more settled than this constitutional prohibition, as
more and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands
through another.
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and
petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring
private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to
be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired
sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he
provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing
that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for
his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject
property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any
event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent
lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was
merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To
sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the
constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this
would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as
he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right
that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
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