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GARCIA ET AL.

VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 10:58 AM
G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993 [Initiative and Referendum; Recall proceeding]

FACTS:
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some mayors, vice-mayors and
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province constituted
themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. They
issued Resolution No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall proceedings. COMELEC scheduled the recall
election for the gubernatorial position of Bataan.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul the
Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural
requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code 1991). They pointed out the
most fatal defect of the proceeding followed by the PRAC in passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure
to send notices of the meeting to 65 members of the assembly.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall proceedings.
2) Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to
the political minority to equal protection of the law.

RULING:
1) No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and
exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for
any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
through a system of decentralization witheffective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By
this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of
recall as its discernment dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be
chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it
wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation
by direct action of the people. The legislative records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this
alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the
difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.

2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the
municipalities and component cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the
provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned to political parties. No significance is given to the
political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level
includes all the elected officials in the province concerned. Considering their number, the greater
probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides that
the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the people. The members
of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of their political parties but as representatives of the
people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences in political
party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence of opposition
parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted
cannot be faulted for discriminating against local officials belonging to the minority.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a preparatory
recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. We held that notice to all the members of
the recall assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a
qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and in a public
place. Needless to state, compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no
valid resolution of recall which can be given due course by the COMELEC.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V POEA


Posted by kaye lee on 5:21 PM
G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988 [Non delegation of legislative power; subordinate legislation]

FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a complaint for charges
against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the
POEA which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned the
validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It
contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with
such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the
principle, is not subject to delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of non-delegation of powers.

RULING:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. ...
"The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration
(POEA)."

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What
can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be.
The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be
abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems,
the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the
authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling
in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is
effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have
the force and effect of law.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

Free Telephone Workers Union


vs Minister of Labor
In 1981, there was an ongoing labor dispute between the Free Telephone Workers Union
(the Union) and the Philippine Long Distance Company. Eventually, the Minister of Labor
(Blas Ople) assumed jurisdiction over the issue pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code.
The Union assailed the provisions of Article 264 as it averred that it is an undue delegation
of power by Congress to the Minister of Labor. They averred that by granting discretion to
the Minister of Labor to whether or not refer a labor dispute for compulsory arbitration to the
National Labor Relations Commission, it also effectively granted the Minister to make or
unmake the law on free collective bargaining.
ISSUE: Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: No. In the first place, this issue is not yet ripe for adjudication as the Minister of
Labor was yet to take on the entirety of the case. There is still no ground to rule that there is
an unconstitutional application of the law.
The Union failed to make out a case of undue delegation of legislative power. There could
be, however, an unconstitutional application. For while the Constitution allows compulsory
arbitration, it must be stressed that the exercise of such competence cannot ignore the
basic fundamental principle and state policy that the state should afford protection to labor.
But as to whether or not there is an unconstitutional application of the law, that is yet to be
determined since the Minister of Labor has not yet made a factual determination of the labor
dispute in issue.
There is no undue delegation in this case. The law in issue is complete and it set a sufficient
standard. The law cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to strikes or lockouts
adversely affecting the national interest.

TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ [152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164;


31 July 1987]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture


and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational
Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and
from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility foradmission, from proceeding with
accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as
scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said petition
on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously
scheduled.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as
the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:

"SECTION 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the
standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for
registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the
practice of medicine in the Philippines."

The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its
functions as specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:

"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized


college of medicine;

x x x

(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and
keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from
said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the
operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;

Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical


schools:

"Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student who
has not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense
involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a
bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to
a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good
moral character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts;
and (d)birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any
college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other
entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture
and Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniformadmission test
called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement
for issuance of a certificate of eligibility foradmission into medical schools of the
Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to
state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument
toward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical
schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the
country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on
the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education
after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT
rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as
presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance
of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges.

Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.

Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain
minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the
Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.

The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable


power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important
interests and needs in a word, the public order of the general community.
An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety
and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a
legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only
issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable
relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition
for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health
and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is
perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the
practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type:
the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of
medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body
of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process
of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to
those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of
maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical
schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic
development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to
prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated
objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools"
and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are
entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the
ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to
recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies
and minds for disease or trauma.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the
respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

People vs Dacuycuy
173 SCRA 90 (1989)
Petitioner: People of the Philippines
Respondent: Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy, Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio
M. Zanoria

Facts:
On April 4, 1975, private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval, and Cirilio M.
Zanoria, public school officials from Leyte were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang,
Leyte for violating Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers). The
respondents pleaded not guilty and petitioned for certeriori and prohibition with preliminary
injuction before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VII alleging that:
a. The Municipal Court of Hindang has no jurisdiction over the case due to the correctional nature
of the penalty of imprisonment (as state in Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 4670) prescribed for the offense
b. Section 32 of R.A. No. 4670 is unconstitutional because, (1) the term of imprisonment is unfixed
and may run toreclusion perpetua; and (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the
duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter
were the legislative department of the Government.
On March 30, 1976, the petition was transferred to Branch IV where the respondent Judge, Judge
Dacuycuy ruled that R.A. No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside
of the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts.

Issue:
Whether or not Repbulic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional.
Whether or not the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case.

Held:
Yes, Republic Act No. 4760 is unconstitutional.
Section 32 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power by
vesting in the court the responsibility of imposing a duration on the punishment of imprisonment,
as if the courts were the legislative department of the government.

Yes, the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over the case.
Republic Act. No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, considers crimes punishable by fine
of not more than Php 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of municipal courts.

Decision:

The decision and resolution of respondent Judge (Judge Dacuycuy) are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is hereby ordered to be
remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.

Francisco Tatad et al vs
Secretary of Energy
Considering that oil is not endemic to this country, history shows that the government has
always been finding ways to alleviate the oil industry. The government created laws
accommodate these innovations in the oil industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil
Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180. This law allows that any person or entity may import
or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic
source, lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market
such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the
Department of Energy. Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among
others, that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7%
tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against
prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries
and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on
unrefined crude products and 7% on refined crude products.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC declared the unconstitutionality of RA 8180 because it violated Sec 19 of Art
12 of the Constitution. It violated that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which
is contrary to free competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is
operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex
stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the
lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing
refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense
benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep
in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New
players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building
refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build
refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their
product cost by 4%. They will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4%
tariff differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to invest in refineries
puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to attract new players and they cannot be
attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the
league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle
dream.
RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the new
players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the established oil
companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being observed by the latter

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