PART I - PRELIMINARY TITLE; HUMAN RELATIONS, PERSONALITY, DOMICILE

Article 2 of NCC, as amended Laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.

Art. 5. Rules and regulations. Labor Code - The Department of Labor and other government agencies
charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the
necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective 15 days
after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation.

Sec. 3(1) & 4, Ch. 2, Book VII, Administrative Code of 1987 -

SECTION 3. Filing.(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3)
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which
are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
against any party or persons.

SECTION 4. Effectivity.In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent
with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above
provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to
public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement
accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to
persons who may be affected by them.

BSP Circular 799 interest rate - Sec. 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money,
goods, or credits and the rate allowed judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate
of interest, shall be 6% per annum.

NMSMI vs Department of Defense

GR 187587, 5 June 2013
697 SCRA 359

FACTS:

Pres. Garcia reserved parcels of land for a military reservation now named as Fort Bonifacio via
Proclamation 423. Pres Marcos issued Proclamation No. 208 amending Proc No. 423 excluding certain
parts of of Fort Bonifacio and reserving it for Libingan ng mga Bayani. He issued Proclamation No. 2476
further amending 423 to exclude Lower and Upper Bicutan and Signal Village. A handwritten addendum
in the Proclamation states that P.S. This includes Western Bicutan. However such addendum was not
published in the Official Gazette. Pres. Aquino issued Proclamation 172 reiterated Proc. No. 2476 but
this time excluded Lot 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan. Members of Nagkakaisiang Maralita ng Sitio
Masigasig , Inc. filed a petition in the Commission in Settlement of Land Problems and declare Western
Bicutan from public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation 2476.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land in Western Bicutan is alienable and disposable land.

HELD:
No. Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as
published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect. Article 2 of the Civil Code
expressly provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the
law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a
different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the laws publication
in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with.

COJUANGCO, JR vs. REPUBLIC

GR 180705, 27 November 2012
686 SCRA 472

FACTS:

An agreement was entered by the Philippine Coconut Admin (PCA) and Eduardo Cojuangco. It is
an agreement allowing Cojuangco the Acquisition of a Commercial bank for the benefit of the Coconut
Farmers of the Philippines. Section 1 of PD No. 755 incorporated, by reference the said agreement,
executed by PCA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the agreement being referenced in PD 755 can be accorded the status of a law.

HELD:
No. It bears to stress at this point that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement referred to above in
Section 1 of P.D. 755 was not reproduced or attached as an annex to the same law. And it is well-settled
that laws must be published to be valid. In fact, publication is an indispensable condition for the
effectivity of a law. Taada v. Tuvera said as much:
Publication of the law is indispensable in every case.
The publication, as further held in Taada, must be of the full text of the law since the purpose
of publication is to inform the public of the contents of the law. Mere referencing the number of the
presidential decree, its title or whereabouts and its supposed date of effectivity would not satisfy the
publication requirement. In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference,
Section 1 of P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the decree. Neither
was a copy thereof attached to the decree when published. We cannot, therefore, extend to the said
Agreement the status of a law.

SEC vs. GMA NETWORK

GR 164026, 23 December 2008
575 SCRA 113

FACTS:

GMA filed in the SEC an application for the amendment of it Articles of Incorporation. The
amendment applied for include, among others, the change in the corporate name and the extension of
its corporate term. SEC used the SEC Memorandum Cicular No.2 , Series of 1994, as the basis for
assessing the filing fee for the extension of GMAs corporate term. GMA contends that the used of SEC
Memo. Circular No. 2 is not valid. The Court of Appeals declared Memorandum Circular No. 2 as invalid
and ineffective for not having been published in accordance with the law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 2 is legally invalid.
HELD:
Yes. he questioned memorandum circular is invalid as it does not appear from the records that it
has been published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Executive Order No.
200, which repealed Art. 2 of the Civil Code, provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided." Administrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation. The questioned memorandum circular, furthermore, has not been filed with the Office of
the National Administrative Register of the University of the Philippines Law Center as required in the
Administrative Code of 1987

Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.

Art. 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal
partnership gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter
shall be of supplementary application. The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided
in Article 256.

Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Art 40. FC. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

AM 02-10-11 RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF

VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

CAROLINO vs. SENGA

GR 189649, 20 April 2015
756 SCRA 55

FACTS:
Jeremias Carolino retired from the AFP in Nov. 29, 1976, pursuant to RA 340. He was receiving
his monthly retirement payment until it was withheld in March 2005. He was informed that his loss of
Filipino citizenship caused the deletion of his name in the alpha list of the AFP Pensioners Payroll
pursuant to PD No. 1638. Carolino contends his retirement was based on RA 340 and it does not provide
that the loss of Filipino citizenship would terminate ones retirement benefits. The RTC rendered a
judgment in favor of Carolino. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. CA ruled that PD 1638 which
was signed in 1979 effectively repealed RA 340.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Carolino is entitled to receive his pension.

HELD:
Yes. PD No. 1638 was signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos on September 10, 1979.
Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, it is provided that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. It is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless
the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions; that all statutes are to be
construed as having only prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to
give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used;
and that every case of doubt must be resolved against retrospective effect. These principles also apply
to amendments of statutes.PD No. 1638 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactive
application, nor the same may be implied from its language. In fact, Section 36 of PD No. 1638 clearly
provides that the decree shall take effect upon its approval.

Secondly, it has been held that before a right to retirement benefits or pension vests in an
employee, he must have met the stated conditions of eligibility with respect to the nature of
employment, age, and length of service. Undeniably, petitioner's husband had complied with the
conditions of eligibility to retirement benefits as he was then receiving his retirement benefits on a
monthly basis until it was terminated. Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility
requirements, he acquires a vested right to the benefits that is protected by the due process clause.
"A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some particular person or
persons as a present interest" The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. "A
state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent
repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate
exercise of the police power"

ROTAIRO vs ALCANTARA
GR 173632, 29 September 2014
736 SCRA 584

FACTS:
Rovira Alcantara filed a case for the recovery of possession of a parcel of land owned by her
father Victor and Alfredo Ignacio who mortgaged the property to Pilipnas Bank and Trust. Two years
after a portion of the property was sold to Ambrosio Rotairo and constructed his house in the said
property. In the meantime Alcantara and Ignacio defaulted in their loan. The property was then sold to
Rovira in a Deed of Absolute Sale. The RTC ruled that PD 957 is applicable in this case and ruled in favor
of Rotairo. The CA reversed the decision stating that PD 957 is not applicable in the case since the
mortgage was made prior to the sale to Rotairo.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PD 957 has a retroactive effect.

HELD:
Yes. The specific terms of P.D. No. 957 provide for its retroactive effect even to contracts and
transactions entered into prior to its enactment. In particular, Section 21 of P.D. No. 957. What the CA
overlooked is that Section 21 requires the owner or developer of the subdivision project to complete
compliance with its obligations within two years from 1976.The two-year compliance provides the
developer the opportunity to comply with its obligation to notify the buyers of the existence of the
mortgage, and consequently, for the latter to exercise their option to pay the instalments directly to the
mortgagee. Rovira is not a purchaser in good faith. When the party has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser
has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably
prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation, he cannot find solace in
the protection afforded by a prior registration. Neither can such person be considered an innocent
purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith.
 DUEAS vs SANTOS SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS
GR 149417, 4 June 2004
431 SCRA 76

FACTS:

Gloria Duenas Santos is the daughter of Cecilio Santos who divided his 2.2 hectares land into
smaller lots to form Santos Subdivision. The Santos Subdv. Homeowners Assocition submitted a
resolution asking the petitioner an open space for recreational and other community activities in
accordance with PD 957 as amended by PD 1216. HLURB opined that the requirement is not applicable
to Santos Subdivision. Petitioner alleged that she is not a party to the transactions and that it was her
father who owned and developed the subdivision. HLURB Board decreed that there was no basis to
compel the petitioner since the approved plan in 1966 did not provide for space and there was no law
requiring the same at that time. The CA reversed the ruling of HLURB.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PD 1216 has retroactive application.

HELD:

No. The principal concern in this case Section 31 of PD No 957, an amendment introduced by PD
1216. The Court examined the text of PD 1216 and nowhere does it find any clause or provision
expressly providing its retroactive application. Basic is the rule that no statue, decree, ordinance, rule or
regulation shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated.

ISIDRO ABLAZA vs REPUBLIC

GR 158298 4 June 2004
431 SCRA 76

FACTS:
Ablaza filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage in the RTC of Masbate
between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. He alleged that the marriage was void
ab initio since it was celebrated without a valid license. He insisted that being the surviving brother, he is
entitled to one-half of the real properties of Cresenciano before his death therefore making him a real
party in interest. RTC and CA both dismissed the action for he is not a party to the marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner may file an action for the declaration of absolute nullity of the
marriage.

HELD:
Yes. Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and
those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to
marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule
that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December
26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate
the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no
application to the petitioner.

It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be
construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a
marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval, the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited
by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action
must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. Here, the petitioner alleged
himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he
claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely
affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir
under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the
conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code

MICHAEL GUY vs CA
GR 163707, 15 September 2006
502 SCRA 151

FACTS:
Sima Wei died intestate leaving an estate valud at 10M. Minors Karen and Kamille Wei,
represented by their mother filed a petition for letters of administration. They alleged that they are the
duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei. Petitioner contends that they should have
established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of
the Family Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are barred by prescription.

HELD:
No. Before the Family Code took effect, the governing law on actions for recognition of
illegitimate children was Article 285 of the Civil Code. We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo that illegitimate
children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died
during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from
attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family
Code. Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be
brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or
special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. It is clear therefore that
the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private
respondents in proving their filiation.
 BERNABE vs. ALEJO
GR 140500, 21 January 2002
374 SCRA 180

FACTS:
Fiscal Ernesto bernabe fathered a son with his secretary, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina
Alejo. The son was born on Sept 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Carolina, in bahelf of Adrian
filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared as an acknowledged illegitimate son. The petitioner
contends that the action is barred by prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action is barred by prescription.

HELD:

No. the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to its
enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:

"ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."

The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrians right to an action for recognition,
which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the
Family Code. Our answer is affirmative. A vested right is defined as "one which is absolute, complete
and unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in
itself and not dependent upon a contingency x x x."

Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition
for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair
or take Adrians right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its
enactment.

OFELIA TY vs. CA
GR 127406, 27 November 2000
346 SCRA 86

FACTS:
Edgardo Reyes married Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony and subsequently did a church
wedding in 1977. The first marriage was declared null and void for lack of marriage license and the
second was void ab initio for lack of consent. However, before a decree was issued declaring their
marriage was void, Reyes married Ofelia Ty in 1979. In 1991, Reyes filed a petition praying that his
marriage with Ofelia be declared null and void because the decree annulling his marriage to Anna Maria
was not rendered when he married Ofelia.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the second marriage of Edgar to Ofelia is valid.

HELD:
Yes. Since the marriage took place before the promulgation in Wiegl and the effectivity of the
Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence at that time. Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private
respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found
in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license
and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second
marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondents second marriage to petitioner
is valid. Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the
present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held
in Jison v. Court of Appeals,25the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of
vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is
patent.

Republic vs. Miller

GR# 125932 / APR. 21, 1999
306 5CRA 183

FACTS:
On July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, a verified petition to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag. At the
hearing on September 1988, respondents adduced evidence showing that, they are both American
citizens and they were childless on account of a medical problem of the wife. That they maintains their
residence at Angeles City. That minor Michael Madayag is the legitimate son of Marcelo S. Madayag, Jr.
and Zenaida Magno. Born on July 14, 1987, at San Fernando, La Union, the minor has been in the
custody of respondents since the first week of August 1987. Poverty and deep concern for the future of
their son prompted the natural parents who have no visible means of livelihood to have their child
adopted by respondents. They executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption by
respondents.
On May 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for adoption. In due time, the
Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic, interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. As heretofore
stated, the Court of Appeals certified the case to this Court.

ISSUE: WON the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the prohibition under the Family
Code.

HELD:

The issue is not new. This Court has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt under the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right
which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.
Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the
right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the
time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force.
As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the
law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully
disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of the action.
Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effective of the Family Code,
although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the
law prevailing before the Family Code.
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be
of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the
person of the adopter, as well as childless couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and
give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parent
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.

ATIENZA vs. JUDGE BRILLANTES

A.M MTJ 92-706, 29 March 1995
243 SCRA 32

FACTS:
A complaint for gross immorality and appearance of impropriety was filed by Atienca. Lupo
Atienza alleges he lives with Yolanda de Castro and they have two children. One evening he saw Judge
Brillantes sleeping on his bed. He was informed by the house boy that Brillantes is cohabiting with de
Castro. He filed the complaint alleging that Judge Brillantes was married to one Zenaida Ongkiko. Judge
Brillantes denies having been married to Ongkiko although admits having five children. He alleges that
although they went through a marriagce ceremony, it was not valid for the lack of a valid marriage
license. He claims that when he married De Castro in 1991, he believed he was single because his first
marriage was solemnized without a license. Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the
Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was
governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and
governed by the Family Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code should apply.

HELD:
Yes. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family
Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a
rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of
Article 40 to his case. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws
is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a
general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.

SEC vs LAIGO
GR 188639, 2 September 2015
768 SCRA 633

FACTS:
SEC issued the corresponding Rules on the Registration and Sale of Pre-Needs Plans to govern
the pre-need industry prior to the enactment of RA 9829 otherwise known the Pre-Need Code of the
Philippines. Legacy, a pre-need company, was not able to pay its obligations. Judge Laigo issued a ruling
on the peitiotn for involuntary insolvency of Legacy. SEC contends that Judge Laigo gravely abused his
discretion in treating the trust fund as part of the insolvency estate of Legacy. It argues that the trust
fund should redound exclusively to the benefit of the plan holders, who are the ultimate beneficial
owners. Further, the SEC is of the position that Section 52 of the Pre-Need Code should be given
retroactive effect for being procedural in character.

ISSUE:
Whether Section 52 of the Pre-Need Code be given retroactive effect.
HELD:
Yes. It must be stressed that the primary protection accorded by the Pre-Need Code to the plan
holders is curative and remedial and, therefore, can be applied retroactively. The rule is that where the
provisions of a statute clarify an existing law and do not contemplate a change in that law, the statute
may be given curative, remedial and retroactive effect. As stressed by the Court in Fabian v. Desierto, If
the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to
appeal, it may be clarified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. A reading of the Pre-Need Code immediately
shows that its provisions operate merely in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of the right of the
planholders to exclusively claim against the trust funds as intended by the legislature. No new
substantive right was created or bestowed upon the plan holders. Section 52 of the Pre-Need Code only
echoes and clarifies the SRCs intent to exclude from the insolvency proceeding trust fund assets that
have been established "exclusively for the benefit of plan holders." It was precisely enacted to foil the
tactic of taking undue advantage of any ambiguities in the New Rules. Any doubt or reservation in this
regard has been dispelled by the Pre- Need Code. Section 57 thereof provides that "[a]ny pre-need
company who, at the time of the effectivity of this Code has been registered and licensed to sell pre-
need plans and similar contracts, shall be considered registered and licensed under the provision of
this Code and its implementing rules and regulations and shall be subject to and governed by the
provisions hereof xxx."

Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines.

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order 227)

FORT BONIFACIO DEVT. CORP. VS CIR

GR 175707 , 19 November 2014
740 SCRA 640

FACTS:
In May 1996, petitioner commenced developing the Global City, and since October 1996, had
been selling lots to interested buyers.18 At the time of acquisition, value-added tax (VAT) was not yet
imposed on the sale of real properties. Republic Act No. 7716(the Expanded Value-Added Tax [E-VAT]
Law),19 which took effect on January 1, 1996, restructured the VAT system by further amending
pertinent provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 100 of the old NIRC was so
amended by including "real properties" in the definition of the term "goods or properties," thereby
subjecting the sale of "real properties" to VAT. What petitioner seeks to be refunded are the actual VAT
payments made by it in cash, which it claims were either erroneously paid by or illegally collected from
it.25 Each Claim for Refund is based on petitioners position that it is entitled to a transitional input tax
credit under Section 105 of the old NIRC, which more than offsets the aforesaid VAT payments. On
December 2, 2009, petitioner submitted a Supplement to its Memorandum dated November 6,
2008,stating that the said case is intimately related to the cases of Fort Bonifacio Development
Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 158885, and Fort Bonifacio Development
Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue," G.R. No. 170680, which were already decided by this
Court, and which involve the same parties and similar facts and issues.
ISSUE:
Whether or not FBDC is entitled to transitional input tax credit.

HELD:
Yes. The issues here have already been passed upon and resolved by this Court En Banc twice, in
decisions that have reached finality, and we are bound by the doctrine of stare decisis to apply those
decisions to these consolidated cases, for they involve the same facts, issues, and even parties. Under
the doctrine of stare decisis, "when this Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a
certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are
substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the same. Stare decisis
simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those
that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds
from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases
ought to be decided alike.

PLDT vs. Abigail Razon Alvarez and Vernon Razon

G.R. No. 179408 March 5, 2014
J. Brion

Facts: PLDTs ACP Detection Division regularly visits foreign countries to conduct market research on
various prepaid phone cards offered abroad that allow their users to make overseas calls to PLDT
subscribers in the Philippines at a cheaper rate and in order to prevent network fraud. The ACPDD
bought The Number One prepaid card that is principally marketed in the UK for Filipinos residing
therein. During a test call placed at the PLDT ACPDD office, the receiving phone reflected a PLDT
telephone number belonging to subscriber Abigail Razon Alvarez with an address at Paranaque City.
According to PLDT, if an ordinary and legitimate call had been made, the screen of the caller ID would
not reflect a local number or any number at all. Subsequently, on 6 November 2003 and 19 November
2003, PLDTs Quality Control Division together with the PNP conducted an ocular inspection to herein
respondents addresses. They have noticed that PLDT telephone lines were connected to several pieces
of equipment namely several routers. As a consequence, on 3 December 2003, a consolidated
application for search warrant was filed before the RTC by Police Superintendent Cruz for the crimes of
theft and violation of PD 401. In turn, the respondents filed a motion to quash to said warrants on the
following grounds: (a) RTC had no authority to issue search warrants which were enforced in Paranaque
City; (b) the enumeration of the items to be searched and seized lacked particularity; and (c) there was
no probable cause for the crime of theft. Said motion was denied by the RTC. On appeal, the CA granted
the respondents petition for certiorari. It quashed the search warrants issued by the RTC for the reason
that these warrants were based on non-existent crimes as pronounced by the SC in the Laurel case.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in quashing the search warrants by relying on the Laurel case based
on the doctrine of stare decisis.

Ruling: Yes. With the Court En Bancs reversal of the earlier Laurel ruling, then the CAs quashal of these
warrants would have no leg to stand on. This is the dire consequence of failing to appreciate the full
import of the doctrine of stare decisis that the CA ignored. Under Article 8 of the Civil Code, the
decisions of this Court form part of the countrys legal system. While these decisions are not laws
pursuant to the doctrine of separation of powers, they evidence the laws' meaning, breadth, and scope
and, therefore, have the same binding force as the laws themselves. Hence, the Courts interpretation of
a statute forms part of the law as of the date it was originally passed because the Courts construction
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carries into effect.

Article 8 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere
to precedents and not to unsettle established matters) that enjoins adherence to judicial precedents
embodied in the decision of the Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be
followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis, in turn, is based on
the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled
and closed to further argument. The doctrine of (horizontal) stare decisis is one of policy, grounded on
the necessity of securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions.

In the field of adjudication, a case cannot yet acquire the status of a decided case that is deemed
settled and closed to further argument if the Courts decision is still the subject of a motion for
reconsideration seasonably filed by the moving party. Under the Rules of Court, a party is expressly
allowed to file a motion for reconsideration of the Courts decision within 15 days from notice. Since the
doctrine of stare decisis is founded on the necessity of securing certainty and stability in law, then these
attributes will spring only once the Courts ruling has lapsed to finality in accordance with law. In Ting v.
VelezTing, we ruled that:

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by
this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined
and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.

In applying Laurel despite PLDTs statement that the case is still subject of a pending motion for
reconsideration, the CA legally erred in refusing to reconsider its ruling that largely relied on a non
formal ruling of the Court. While the CAs dutiful desire to apply the latest pronouncement of the Court
in Laurel is expected, it should have acted with caution, instead of excitement, on being informed by
PLDT of its pending motion for reconsideration; it should have then followed the principle of stare
decisis. The appellate courts application of an exceptional circumstance when it may order the quashal
of the search warrant on grounds not existing at the time the warrant was issued or implemented must
still rest on prudential grounds if only to maintain the limitation of the scope of the remedy
of certiorari as a writ to correct errors of jurisdiction and not mere errors of judgment.

Benjamin Ting vs. Carmen Velez-Ting

G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009
J. Nachura

Facts: Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting got married on 26 July 1975. They begot 6 children. Then
on 21 October 1993, after being married for 18 years, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC
Cebu for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity as stated under
Article 36 of the Family Code. On 9 Januray 1998, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Carmen,
thereby declaring the said marriage null and void. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC,
stating that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically
incapacitated at the time of the marriage since the expert witness that was presented by Carmen was
based only on theories and not on established fact which is contrary to guidelines provided in the case
of Rep. of the Phils. vs. CA and Molina and Santos vs. CA. Consequently, Carmen filed a Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case since
the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle
of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the
prescribed period. Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance with the
prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a
petition for certiorari with this Court. In a Resolution dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the
petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmens motion for reconsideration. On review, the CA decided
to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision reversing
its first ruling and sustaining the trial courts decision.
Issue: Whether or not the CA violated the rule of stare decisis when it did not follow the procedure laid
down in the cases of Santos and Molina.

Ruling: Yes. The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has
been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is
a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues necessary for two simple reasons: economy and
stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.

To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed

in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare
decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca, and
again in Antonio v. Reyes. In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a law
by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling
of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)

Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
stipulated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a)

Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed
by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

Article 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural
persons is the place of their habitual residence.

Article 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other provision does not fix the domicile
of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to be the place where their legal representation is
established or where they exercise their principal functions.

Art. 26. FC. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

RULE 103: Change of Name

Section 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court
of First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court.

Section 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by
the person desiring his name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for
at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.

Section 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court,
by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and
shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3)
successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published in the province, as the court shall
deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor
within four (4) month after the last publication of the notice.

Section 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition.
The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of
the Republic.

Section 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that
such order has been published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court
shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such
name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the petition.

Section 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall
be furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated,
who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.

RULE 108: Cancellation Or Correction Of Entries In The Civil Registry

Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Court of First Instance
of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births: (b) marriage; (c) deaths;
(d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination
of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
Section 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.

Section 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order,
fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

Section 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under
the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

Section 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceeding is brought may make
orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the
rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

Section 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall
be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.

CIVIL REGISTER
Article 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in
the civil register. (325a)

Article 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13)
civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16)
changes of name. (326a)

Article 409. In cases of legal separation, adoption, naturalization and other judicial orders mentioned in
the preceding article, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued the decree to ascertain
whether the same has been registered, and if this has not been done, to send a copy of said decree to
the civil registry of the city or municipality where the court is functioning. (n)

Article 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be
considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. (n)

Article 411. Every civil registrar shall be civilly responsible for any unauthorized alteration made in any
civil register, to any person suffering damage thereby. However, the civil registrar may exempt himself
from such liability if he proves that he has taken every reasonable precaution to prevent the unlawful
alteration. (n)

Article 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order. (n)

Article 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special
laws. (n)
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.

Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the
absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.

Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under article 191.

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or
their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

Doctrine of Processual Presumption - The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the
proponent thereof, otherwise, such law shall be presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the
forum.

Rule 132: Presentation of Evidence

Section 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a)
of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct
copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under
the seal of such court.

Norma Del Socorro vs. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem

G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
J. Peralta

Facts: Norma Del Socorro and Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsen contracted marriage in Holland on 25
September 1990. They begot a son named Roderico Norjo Van Wilsem. However, on 19 July 1995, said
marriage was severed by virtue of a divorce decree issued by the Court of Holland. As a result, Norma
and her son went back to the Philippines. It was alleged by the petitioner that respondent made a
promise to provide a monthly support for their son but the latter failed to do so. Subsequently, an
information was filed before the RTC Cebu against the respondent on the ground of RA 9262 (VAWC).
On 19 February 2010, said court dismissed the case stating that facts alleged in the information do not
constitute to the respondent since he is an alien. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, this time
reiterating Article 195 of the Family Code which she alleged RA 9262 applies to all persons in the
Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligors nationality. On 1
September 2010, the motion was denied by the court. Petitioner directly filed her appeal before the SC
raising pure questions of law and the latter took cognizance of it on the ground of Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.

Issue: Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under RA 9262.

Ruling: No. Petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from
respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of
nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the
Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies
to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to
the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as
well as the consequences of his failure to do so.

However, it cannot be gainsaid, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son under
Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. In
international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden
of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While
respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to
support his son, he never proved the same.

In view of respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of
processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or
internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been
properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law,
which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance
therewith.

Orion Savings Bank vs. Shigekane Suzuki

G.R. No. 205487 November 12, 2014
J. Brion

Facts: Shigekane Suzuki, a Japanese national, agreed to buy a condominium unit from Yung Sam Kang, a
Korean national. The former made a reservation fee by issuing check in the amount of P100,000.00 and
subsequently issued another for the purchase price of the unit amounting to P2,700,000.00. A Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed and soon after Suzuki took possession of the unit. However, Kang failed to
deliver to Suzuki the titles of the unit and of the parking lot which prompted the latter to verify the
status of the properties. He found out that subject properties were still registered with Cityland Pioneer
and that the condominium unit was mortgaged with herein petitioner bank. Consequently, Suzuki
executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim to Orion but this was denied by the latter. On 27 January 2004,
Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before the RTC Mandaluyong. On 29 June
2009, the RTC ruled in favor of Suzuki. On appeal, the CA modified the ruling but nevertheless ruled that
Suzuki has vested rights over the subject properties.
Issue: Whether or not the Deed of Sale should be declared null and void by reason that under the
Korean law, any conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the consent of both spouses.

Ruling: No. Property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national law of the
spouses. However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the
foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot
take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum.

To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to
prove the South Korean law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached a "Certification
from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification,
does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it
was properly authenticated by the seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132.

Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption

comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.

Edelina T. Ando vs. DFA

G.R. No. 195432 August 27, 2014
C.J. Sereno

Facts: Edelina Ando contracted marriage with Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese national, at Candaba,
Pampanga. However, on 16 September 2004, Kobayashi obtained a divorce decree from Japan thereby
severing his marital ties with Edelina. Believing that she is capacitated to remarry, Edelina married
Masatomi Y. Ando on 13 September 2005 which was solemnized in Sta. Rita, Pampanga. Subsequently,
Edelina applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to indicate her surname with her husband
Masatomi Ando but she was told by the DFA that the same cannot be issued to her until she can prove
by competent court decision that her marriage with Masatomi is valid until otherwise declared. On 29
October 2010, Edelina filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC. Said court, however,
dismissed the case for the reason that Edelina had no cause of action and for failure to comply with
Article 13 of the Family Code. Subsequently, Edelina filed an Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration but
the same was denied.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in denying her petition on the ground that it has no cause of action.

Ruling: No. With respect to her prayer to compel the DFA to issue her passport, petitioner incorrectly
filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC. She should have first appealed before the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, since her ultimate entreaty was to question the DFAs refusal to issue a passport to
her under her second husbands name.

In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be issued a Philippine passport under her
second husbands name. Should her application for a passport be denied, the remedies available to her
are provided in Section 9 of R.A. 8239. She should have filed an appeal with the Secretary of the DFA in
the event of the denial of her application for a passport, after having complied with the provisions of
R.A. 8239.

With respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage as valid, petitioner should have
filed, instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first husband. In
Garcia v. Recio, we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of
the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven and like any other fact.

David Noveras vs. Leticia Noveras

G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014
J. Perez

Facts: On 3 December 1988, David and Leticia married in Quezon City. Afterwards, they decided to
reside in the USA where they eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot 2 children
namely Jena and Jerome. They acquired several properties located in the Philippines specifically in
Sampaloc, Manila and in Aurora Province. However, due to the fact that David had an extra marital
affair, Leticia filed for a divorce before the Superior Court of California. Said court granted to Leticia the
custody of her two children, as well as all the couples properties in the USA. On 8 August 2005, Leticia
filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. On 8
December 2006, the RTC recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal
and personal status are those of the USA. The trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one
for liquidation of the absolute community of property regime with the determination of the legitimes,
support and custody of the children, instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal property.
With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime as absolute
community of property because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the solemnization
of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance
with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take
judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their national law. The trial
court held that as the instant petition does not fall under the provisions of the law for the grant of
judicial separation of properties, the absolute community properties cannot be forfeited in favor of
Leticia and her children. The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements
she is praying for considering that she already acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on
the principle of equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine properties to David, subject to the
payment of the childrens presumptive legitimes. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial
courts Decision by directing the equal division of the Philippine properties between the spouses.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the marital
ties between the parties.

Ruling: Yes. The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment
that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a
party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to
prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented. Even if we
apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts did with respect to the property
regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin with,
divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the
divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus
erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.
 Soledad L. Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
J. Bersamin

Facts: Atty. Luna was a partner in a law firm at the time he was living with his first wife, herein
intevenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna. However, after almost 2 decades of marriage, they got
separated and decided to live apart from each other and agreed to separate their properties. On 12
January 1976, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of First
Circumscription of the CFI of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. On the same date, Atty. Luna
contracted another marriage, this time with Soledad. Sometime in 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law
firm and bought a condominium unit in Makati City in order to be used as an office space for the said
firm. In 1992, the law firm was dissolved and the condominium unit was taken over by Atty. Lunas son
from his first marriage. A complaint was filed by Soledad against the heirs of Atty. Luna for which the
subject of the complaint was the 25/100 pro-indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit. On 27
August 2010, the RTC ruled that the shares were acquired solely by Atty. Luna. On appeal, the CA the
modified the RTCs decision and declared that the pro-indiviso shares are part of the conjugal property
of Atty. Luna and Eugenia since it was acquired during the subsistence of their marriage.

Issue: Whether or not the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner
entitled the latter to any rights in property.

Ruling: No. The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the
Philippines on 10 September 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish
Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to
the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant to
the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio having
remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on 12 July 1997 terminated their marriage. Absolute
divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of
absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if either or both of
the spouses are residing abroad.

Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their
marriage on 10 September 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the
time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not
entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. The mere execution of the
Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per se dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of
gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still required under Article 190 and
Article 191 of the Civil Code.

Soledad was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds were
used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contention in this case
proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply
as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and
wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio.
 Republic of the Philippines vs. Merlinda Olaybar
G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014
J. Peralta

Facts: Merlinda Olaybar requested from the NSO a Certificate of No Marriage as one of the
requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend. Upon receipt thereof, she found out that she was
already married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that
she did not know the alleged husband. In order to solve her predicament, she filed a Petition of
Cancellation of Entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. During trial, it was found out that the
signature appearing on the marriage certificate was not hers. On 5 May 2009, the RTC rendered a
decision in favor of Merlinda Olaybar. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said decision on
the ground that granting said petition is in effect declaring the said marriage void ab initio. On 25 August
2009, the RTC denied the motion.

Issue: Whether or not granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wifes portion of the alleged
marriage contract is in effect declaring the said marriage void ab initio.

Ruling: No. Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected
through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the
error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." An appropriate adversary suit or
proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been
fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the
opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.

A petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act
No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage,
we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the
opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the
nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such
marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.

Minoru Fujiki vs. Maria Paz, et al.

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
J. Carpio

Facts: On 23 January 2004, Minoru Fujiki and Maria Paz Galela Marinay contracted marriage. Said
marriage did not sit well with the petitioners parents, ergo, Fujiki could not bring Marinay to Japan.
Fujiki went back to Japan and eventually lost contact with Marinay. Sometime in 2008, Marinay
contracted another marriage, this time with Shinichi Maekara. They moved to Japan and resided
therein. Allegedly, Marinay suffered physical abuse from Maekara, therefore, she left him and contacted
Fujiki. Consequently, Fujiki helped Marinay to obtain a divorce decree from a family court in Japan in
order to severed Marinays marital ties with Maekara on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC a Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment or Decree of Absolute Nullity
of Marriage praying that foreign judgment be recognized by the said court, that the marriage of
Maekara and Marinay be declared null and void under Article 35 and 41 of the Family Code and to order
the Local Civil Registrar to annotate the said foreign judgment. RTC dismissed the petition by citing A.M
No. 02-11-10-SC. On the other hand, the OSG disagreed with the trial courts decision. It declared that
Fuijiki is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Maekara and
Marinay void on the ground of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling: Yes. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for
Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution
of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law."

Merope Enriquez Vda. De Catalan vs. Louella A. Catalan-Lee

G.R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012
J. Sereno

Facts: Orlando Catalan, a naturalized American citizen married herein petitioner after he obtained a
divorce decree from his first marriage. On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate. On 28 February
2005, petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for issuance of letters of administration and to be
appointed as administratix of Orlandos estate. On the other hand, herein respondent alleged that
petitioner was not considered to be qualified as administratix for the reason that a bigamy case was
pending against her which was filed by Felicitas Amor, Orlandos first wife. She alleged that petitioner
contracted a subsequent marriage when she was still married to one Eusebio Bristol. On 6 August 1998,
the RTC acquitted petitioner. On 26 June 2006, the trial court denied petition for the issuance of letters
of administration. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court for the reason that having a
bigamy case filed against her, she is an uninterested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B.
Catalan.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in not appreciating petitioners acquittal of her bigamy case,
therefore, making her entitled to be appointed as administratix of late Orlandos estate.

Ruling: Yes. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In
this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Foreign marital laws are not among those matters that
judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be
exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlandos divorce
under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there
is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the
fact of divorce.

Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the
preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of
administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the
deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Gerbert Corpuz vs. Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas and the Solicitor General
G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
J. Brion

Facts: Gerbert Corpuz acquired Canadian citizenship. He then married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas on 18 January
2004 in the Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commitments, he went back to Canada. After
some time, he went back to the Philippines only to find out that Daisylyn was having an affair with
another man. Subsequently, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed for a petition for divorce. On 8
December 2006, he obtained a divorce decree. After 2 years, he met another Filipina. Desirous to marry
his fiance, Gerbert went back to the Philippines and registered his Canadian divorce decree before the
Pasig City Civil Registrar. He was informed that he has first to file a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce with the RTC. He complied with the NSOs directive and filed the same. Said court denied
Gerberts petition concluded that he was not the proper party to institute the action because he is a
Canadian citizen, that it should be Daisylyn who should avail of the remedy as embodied under Article
26 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right
to petition to court of this jurisdiction for recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

Ruling: No. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code;
the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse." The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by
clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to
have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.

However, we qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree
itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according
to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot vs. CA

G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008
J. Velasco, Jr.

Facts: Vincente and Rebecca were married on 20 April 1979. Based on the marriage certificate, Rebecca
is an American citizen. On 27 November 1982, Rebecca gave birth to Josephine Alexandra. However,
sometime in 1996, their marital relationship turned sour and as a result they decided to obtain a divorce
decree before the CFI Sto. Domingo in Dominican Republic. On 21 March 2001, Rebecca filed a petition
for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. She sought for the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendent lite for her and for her daughter, Alix.
On 8 June 2001, Vicenete filed a motion for dismiss. The trial court granted Rebeccas petition support
pendete lite. On the other hand, on appeal, the CA denied Rebeccas petition for the reason that it has
no cause of action for having their marriage already declared void.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing her petition on the ground that she is an American
citizen when she obtained her divorce decree.

Ruling: No. There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her
divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective
repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her American
citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this
American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may
still be, a holder of an American passport. The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a
Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that
status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996
judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata
effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum
between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony.
In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. Consequent to
the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's obligation under the
Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to Rebecca.

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code,
providing as follows

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second
paragraph of Art. 26, to wit:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and
 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente
and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid divorce
proceedings.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III

G.R. No. 154380; October 5, 2005
Quisumbing, J.:p (First Div.)

FACTS:

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ
in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,
Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the
United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had
been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife
had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child
by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted
the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied. The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is
not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a
petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that
governs respondents situation.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Orbecido can remarry after his wife, a naturalized American citizen, obtained a divorce
in the United States

HELD:

YES. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according
to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the
letter of the law.

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage
that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife
subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced"
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file
either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and
tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the
parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a
sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse
would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 145226; February 06, 2004
Quisumbing, J.:p (Second Div.)

FACTS:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a
period of four years (from 1974-1978). After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost
contact with each other. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work
there. Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both
agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On
September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. Lucia filed
with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by
the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago in Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
The following year, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint sought the declaration of
nullity of Morigos marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information filed by the City Prosecutor
of Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. Morigo contended that he, in good faith, relied
on the validity of the divorce decree obtained by his former wife from the Ontario Court.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Morigo committed the crime of bigamy

HELD:
NO. The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and
Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by
the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is
void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and
that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents
and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the
date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never
married."

The elements of bigamy have been laid down in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis as follows:

1. The offender has been legally married;

2. The first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
3. He contracts a subsequent marriage; and
4. The subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in
this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the
two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The
mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs
no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR v. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ & HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-
SALONGA G.R. No. 142820; June 20, 2003
Quisumbing, J.:p (Second Div.)

FACTS:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent
Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was
subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born
Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively. However,
in 1996, the private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC
of Makati City. Her husband, on the other hand, filed for a divorce decree in 1997 in Hamburg-
Blankenese, which was granted.

In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the trial court had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a decree of divorce had already been
promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private respondent. Judge Guevara-Salonga
issued an order granting petitioners motion to dismiss. Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of
custody of children and the distribution of the properties between petitioner and private respondent.
The motion was opposed by the private respondent, and in September 30, 1999, the respondent judge
issued the assailed order partially setting aside her order dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling
the issues of property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her order dated September
30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated July 14, 1999; and
2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained
jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree
from a German court.

HELD:
1. NO. It is clear from the Section 3 and Section 7, Rule 37 of the Rules of Civil Procedure that a judge
can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality. Considering that private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the trial court's decision
of July 14, 1999 can still be modified. Moreover, in Saado v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the
court could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever
circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and
circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has
become final and executory and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it. There are even more compelling reasons to do so when, as in this case,
judgment has not yet attained finality.

2. NO. The Court has consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in
our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. In this case,
the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not been challenged by
either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court recognized said
decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the
present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and
Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment,
such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Rules of Court.

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with
regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the
German court were summary. As to what was the extent of private respondents participation in the
proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear.

GRACE J. GARCIA v. REDERICK RECIO

G.R. No. 138322; October 2, 2001
Panganiban, J.:p (Third Div.)

FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in 1987. They lived
together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian
citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship". Later on, petitioner a Filipina and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution
of their marriage. After dividing their conjugal assets in accordance with Australian law, petitioner filed a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had a
prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned
of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997. In his Answer, respondent averred
that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent
dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by
a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in
1994.

In 1998, the respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia
because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down. The trial court declared the marriage dissolved
on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven; and
2. Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.

HELD:
1. NO. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of
the divorce decree is insufficient. Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in
evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the
Family Code. On the other hand, respondent argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public
document a written official act of an Australian family court.

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
his office. The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not
been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible,
subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the
judge.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent
was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in
1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil
rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states,
don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his
allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.

2. NO. Respondents contention that the Australian divorce decree admitted to evidence has already
established his legal capacity to marry is untenable, because he presented an interlocutory decree - a
conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and
board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected.

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads: "1. A party to a
marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died)
commits the offence of bigamy."

This quotation bolsters the contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence
on this matter.

To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to
establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and
admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant
for a marriage license.

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner. Based on the records submitted, the Court cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. The Court
agrees with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso
facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
capacity to contract the second marriage. Hence, the case is REMANDED to the lower court.

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL v. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, HON. LUIS C. VICTOR,

and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
Regalado, J.:p (Second Div.)

FACTS:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent
Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. The couple lived together for
some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born. They eventually
separated.

Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany in January 1983. He claimed that
there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982. Petitioner, on
the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila on January 23, 1983. The German court promulgated a decree of divorce
on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner.
The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the
divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by
the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.

In June 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chia
and Jesus Chua. Two complaints for adultery were filed against the petitioner, who filed a motion in
both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. As a
consequence, the judge in the second case suspended proceedings. On the other hand, respondent
judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in the first adultery case to April 6, 1987. Before such
scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of
proceedings until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of
Justice. The court directed the arraignment of petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of
not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered
by respondent judge as direct contempt. Later, she entered a plea of not guilty.

Petitioner then filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition anchored on the main ground
that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense
that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify
as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the
criminal complaint."

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over the adultery case

HELD:
NO. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except
upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established that
compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. While in point of
strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the
requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint
which starts the prosecutory proceeding and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to
try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person who
can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the
crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. It is
significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the
aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In
other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of
the filing of the criminal action. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Private respondent, being no
longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
 ALICE REYES VAN DORN v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. and RICHARD UPTON
G.R. No. L-68470; October 8, 1985
Melencio-Herrera, J.:p (First Div.)

FACTS:
Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States. They
were married in Hong Kong in 1972. After the marriage, they established their residence in the
Philippines. They begot two children but still, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982.
After the divorce, the petitioner got married also in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn.

In 1983, Upton filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, the
Galleon Shop, is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an
accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court
below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is
located in the Philippines, so the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because
of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no
community of property

HELD:
YES. For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations
between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact
in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who
appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private
respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the
understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations. There can be no
question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is
binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner.
Article 19. (Abuse of Rights) Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Article 22. (Unjust Enrichment). Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any
other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just
or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

Article 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to the fault or
negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was
benefited.

Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense,
shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth,
physical defect, or other personal condition.

Article 1724. The contractor who undertakes to build a structure or any other work for a stipulated
price, in conformity with plans and specifications agreed upon with the land-owner, can neither
withdraw from the contract nor demand an increase in the price on account of the higher cost of labor
or materials, save when there has been a change in the plans and specifications, provided:
(1) Such change has been authorized by the proprietor in writing; and
(2) The additional price to be paid to the contractor has been determined in writing by both parties.

Article 2142 (Quasi-contracts). Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical
relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense
of another.

Article 2154 (Solutio Indebiti). If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was
unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.

Article 2164 (Other Quasi-Contracts). When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give
support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it
appears that he gave it out of piety and without intention of being repaid.

Article 2176 (Quasi-delicts). Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
 CARLOS A. LORIA v. LUDOLFO P. MUOZ, JR.
G.R. No. 187240; October 15, 2014
Leonen, J.:p (First Div.)

FACTS:

Ludolfo P. Muoz, Jr. has been engaged in construction and in August 2000, Carlos Loria visited the
former in his office in Albay. He invited Muoz to advance P2,000,000.00 for a subcontract of
a P50,000,000.00 river-dredging project in Guinobatan. Loria represented that he would make
arrangements such that Elizaldy Co, owner of Sunwest Construction and Development Corporation,
would turn out to be the lowest bidder for the project. Elizaldy Co would payP8,000,000.00 to ensure
the projects award to Sunwest. After the award to Sunwest, Sunwest would subcontract 20%
or P10,000,000.00 worth of the project to Muoz. Since Muoz had known Loria for five years, Muoz
accepted Lorias proposal.

On October 2000, Muoz requested Allied Bank to release P3,000,000.00 from his joint account with his
business partner, Christopher Co, to a certain Grace delos Santos (delos Santos). Loria then obtained the
money from delos Santos. Later, P1,800,000.00 of the P3,000,000.00 was returned to Muoz. On
January 10, 2001, Loria collected Muozs P800,000.00 balance. After deducting Lorias personal loans
from Muoz, Muoz issued a check to Loria for P481,800.00. Loria acknowledged receiving this amount
from Muoz.

The project to dredge the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers in Guinobatan was subjected to public
bidding and it was awarded to the lowest bidder, Sunwest Construction and Development Corporation.
Sunwest allegedly finished dredging the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers without subcontracting
Muoz. With the project allegedly finished, Muoz demanded Loria to return his P2,000,000.00. Loria,
however, did not return the money. Thus, Muoz first charged Loria and Elizaldy Co with estafa, but the
same was dismissed. Muoz then filed the complaint for sum of money. Loria answered Muozs
complaint. He admitted receiving P481,800.00 from Muoz but argued that the complaint did not state
a cause of action against him. The trial court ruled in favor of Muoz and ordered Loria to return
the P2,000,000.00 on the ground of unjust enrichment to Muoz as actual damages with 12% interest
from the filing of the complaint until the amounts full payment, as well as damages, costs, and
attorneys fees.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Loria was liable for P2,000,000.00 to Muoz

HELD:
YES. Under Article 22 of the Civil Codeof the Philippines, "every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him." There is unjust
enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money orproperty of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience." The principle of unjust enrichment has two conditions. First, a person must have been
benefited without a real or valid basis or justification. Second, the benefit was derived at another
persons expense or damage.

In this case, Loria received P2,000,000.00 from Muoz for a subcontract of a government project to
dredge the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers in Guinobatan, Albay. However, contrary to the parties
agreement, Muoz was not subcontracted for the project. Nevertheless, Loria retained
the P2,000,000.00.
Thus, Loria was unjustly enriched. He retained Muozs money without valid basis or justification. Under
Article 22 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Loria must return the P2,000,000.00 to Muoz.

Contrary to Lorias claim, Section 6 of the Presidential Decree No. 1594 does not prevent Muoz from
recovering his money. Under Section 6 of the Presidential Decree No. 1594, a contractor shall not
subcontract a part or interest in a government infrastructure project without the approval of the
relevant department secretary. A subcontract, therefore, is void only if not approved by the department
secretary.

In this case, it is premature to rule on the legality of the parties agreement precisely because the
subcontract did not push through. No actual agreement was proven in evidence. The Secretary of Public
Works and Highways could have approved the subcontract, which is allowed under Section 6 of the
Presidential Decree No. 1594.

At any rate, even assuming that there was a subcontracting arrangement between Sunwest
Construction and Development Corporation and Muoz, this court has allowed recovery under a void
subcontract as an exception to the in pari delicto doctrine.

SPOUSES TEODORICO and PACITA ROSETE v. FELIX and/or MARIETTA BRIONES, SPOUSES JOSE
and REMEDIOS ROSETE, AND NEORIMSE and FELICITAS CORPUZ
G.R. No. 176121; September 22, 2014
Del Castillo, J.:p (Second Div.)

FACTS:

In 1987, the National Housing Authority (NHA) conducted a census survey of a lot in Estrada St., Malate,
Manila, and the NHA awarded the subject lot to petitioner Teodorico P. Rosete. The herein respondents
objected to the award, claiming that the award of the entire lot to Teodorico was erroneous. In 1990, a
Declaration of Real Property was filed and issued in Teodoricos name, and in 1991, he made full
payment of the value of the subject lot in the amount of P43, 472.00. He likewise paid the real property
taxes thereon.

However, in 1994, the NHA informed Teodorico that after consideration of the objections raised by the
Rosetes, the Corpuzes and the Brioneses, the original award of 152 square meters in his favor has been
cancelled and instead, the subject lot will be subdivided to all the parties, with the excess to be allotted
as an easement for a pathwalk. NHA likewise informed Teodorico that his payments shall be adjusted
accordingly, but his excess payments will not be refunded; instead, they will be applied to his co-
awardees amortizations. His co-awardees shall in turn pay him, under pain of cancellation of their
respective awards. While the respondents appealed to the Office of the President (OP-Case no. 5902),
Teodorico filed an undated letter to the case and sought a reconsideration of the decision to cancel the
award, not to question the area of the lot awarded to him, but to pray that the respondents refund him
for the purchase price and real estate taxes that he paid earlier. The OP issued its decision in Case no.
5902 and dismissed the same for being filed out of time.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, claiming that the respondents are not entitled to a portion
of the lot because they were mere lessees, not owners, therein. Teodorico also prayed for the CA to
order the NHA to allocate the lot on an as is, where is basis. However, since the decision of the Office
of the President has already reached finality, it can no longer be reviewed by the CA. Teodorico then
contended that the decision in Case no. 5902 should not be binding against him, since he was not a
party to the case.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Teodorico is entitled to reimbursement of the value of the lot and the corresponding
real estate taxes

HELD:
NO. Sad to say, this Court cannot order a refund of Teodorico's overpayments. First of all, NHA - the
recipient of the overpayment - cannot be ordered to make a refund, since Teodorico never prayed to
recover from it; in all his submissions - from the NHA, the OP, the CA, and all the way up to this Court -
he consistently sought reimbursement only from his co-awardees, not the NHA. Secondly, the specific
amount of overpayment is not fixed or determinable from the record; this being the case, it cannot be
determined how much exactly each of Teodorico's co-awardees owes him. Thirdly, this Court is not a
trier of facts; it cannot go out of its way to determine and analyze from the record what should be
returned to Teodorico, nor can it receive evidence on the matter. Suffice it to state that petitioners are
indeed entitled to be indemnified for paying for the value of the subject lot and the real property taxes
thereon over and above what was awarded to them, pursuant to Article 1236 of the Civil Code, which
states that "[w]hoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if
he paid without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the
payment has been beneficial to the debtor." They may also recover from the NHA, applying the principle
of solutio indebiti.

DR. FILOTEO A. ALANO v. ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO

G.R. No. 175540; April 7, 2014
Peralta, J:p (Third Div.)

FACTS:
Arnelito Logmao was brought to the East Avenue Medical Center (EAMC) by two sidewalk vendors, who
allegedly saw the former fall from the overpass near the Farmers Market in Cubao, Quezon City. The
patients data sheet identified the patient as Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong. However,
the clinical abstract stated that the patient is Angelito [Logmao]. At the NKI, the name Angelito [Logmao]
was recorded as Angelito Lugmoso. As Lugmoso had no relatives around, Jennifer B. Misa, Transplant
Coordinator, was asked to locate his family by enlisting police and media assistance. Misa verified the
identity of Lugmoso and she was furnished by EAMC a copy of the patients date sheet which bears the
name Angelito Lugmoso. She then contacted several radio and television stations to request for air time
for the purpose of locating the family of Angelito Lugmoso.

Dr. Ona was later informed that Lugmoso had been pronounced brain dead by the doctors attending to
the patient. Upon learning that Lugmoso was a suitable organ donor and that some NKI patients
awaiting organ donation had blood and tissue types compatible with Lugmoso, Dr. Ona inquired from
Jennifer Misa whether the relatives have been found. Since the search was unsuccessful, Dr. Ona
requested Dr. Filoteo A. Alano, Executive Director of NKI, to authorize the removal of specific organs
from the body of Lugmoso for transplantation purposes.

Dr. Alano issued to Dr. Ona a Memorandum that states that if all reasonable efforts to locate the
relatives or next of kin of the said deceased patient have been exerted in accordance with the provisions
of Republic Act No. 349 as amended and P.D. 856, permission and/or authority is hereby given to the
Department of Surgery to retrieve and remove the kidneys, pancreas, liver and heart of the said
deceased patient and to transplant the said organs to any compatible patient who maybe in need of said
organs to live and survive. Since none of Lugmosos relatives appeared, a medical team removed the
heart, kidneys, pancreas, liver and spleen of Lugmoso. The medical team then transplanted the organs
to two patients, while Dr. Antonio R. Paraiso made arrangements with La Funeraria Oro for the
embalmment of the cadaver of Lugmoso good for a period of fifteen (15) days to afford NKI more time
to continue searching for the relatives of the latter.

Later on, the NKI issued a press release announcing its successful double organ transplantation. Aida
Doromal, a cousin of plaintiff, heard the news aired on television that the donor was an eighteen year
old whose remains were at La Funeraria Oro. As the name of the donor sounded like Arnelito Logmao,
Aida informed plaintiff of the news report. Upon receiving the news from Aida, plaintiff and her other
children went to La Funeraria Oro, where they saw Arnelito inside a cheap casket. Plaintiff then filed
with the court a quo a complaint for damages against Dr. Alano et. al. in connection with the death of
Arnelito. Plaintiff alleged that defendants conspired to remove the organs of Arnelito while the latter
was still alive and that they concealed his true identity. The lower court found only Dr. Alano liable for
quasi-delict, and ordered the petitioner to pay the respondent damages.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not respondent's sufferings were brought about by petitioner's alleged negligence in
granting authorization for the removal or retrieval of the internal organs of respondent's son who had
been declared brain dead

HELD:
NO. A careful reading of the Memorandum shows that petitioner instructed his subordinates to "make
certain" that "all reasonable efforts" are exerted to locate the patient's next of kin, even enumerating
ways in which to ensure that notices of the death of the patient would reach said relatives. It also clearly
stated that permission or authorization to retrieve and remove the internal organs of the deceased was
being given ONLY IF the provisions of the applicable law had been complied with. Such instructions
reveal that petitioner acted prudently by directing his subordinates to exhaust all reasonable means of
locating the relatives of the deceased. He could not have made his directives any clearer.

Furthermore, the doctors and personnel of NKI disseminated notices of the death of respondent's son to
the media and sought the assistance of the appropriate police authorities as early as March 2, 1988,
even before petitioner issued the Memorandum. Thus, there can be no cavil that petitioner employed
reasonable means to disseminate notifications intended to reach the relatives of the deceased. If
respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her son's death because the notices did not properly
state the name or identity of the deceased, fault cannot be laid at petitioner's door. The trial and
appellate courts found that it was the EAMC who recorded the wrong information regarding the
deceased's identity to NKI. The NKI could not have obtained the information about his name from the
patient, because as found by the lower courts, the deceased was already unconscious by the time he
was brought to the NKI.

RAUL H. SESBREO v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS et. al

G.R. No. 160689; March 26, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:p (First Div.)

FACTS:
VECO was a public utility corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and
petitioner was a customer of VECO. On May 11, 1989, the Violation of Contracts (VOC) Team of
defendants-appellees Constantino and Arcilla and their PC escort, Balicha, conducted a routine
inspection of the houses at La Paloma Village, Labangon, Cebu City, including that of Sesbreo, for illegal
connections, meter tampering, seals, conduit pipes, jumpers, wiring connections, and meter
installations. After Sesbreos maid unlocked the gate, they inspected the electric meter and found that
it had been turned upside down. With Chuchie Garcia, Peter Sesbreo and one of the maids present,
they removed said meter and replaced it with a new one. At that time, Sesbreo was in his office and no
one called to inform him of the inspection. The VOC Team then asked for and received Chuchie Garcias
permission to enter the house itself to examine the kind and number of appliances and light fixtures in
the household and determine its electrical load. Afterwards, Chuchie Garcia signed the Inspection
Division Report, which showed the condition of the electric meter on May 11, 1989 when the VOC Team
inspected it. Sesbreo alleged that there was nothing routine or proper at all with what the VOC Team
did on May 11, 1989 in his house. Their entry to his house and the surrounding premises was effected
without his permission and over the objections of his maids. Furthermore, they searched the house and
its rooms without his permission or a search warrant, and forced a visitor to sign two documents,
making her appear to be his representative or agent. Afterwards, he found that some of his personal
effects were missing, apparently stolen by the VOC Team when they searched the house.

The court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the testimonies of the witnesses were
inconsistent as to the material points. Furthermore, the court ruled that it was highly unlikely for the
VOC Team to fabricate charges that Sesbreo was guilty of theft of electricity, since the VOC Team and
the petitioner have never met before the incident. The ruling was affirmed by the CA, which stated that
the petitioner only file charges to save face, because the VOC Team exposed the petitioner as a cheat
and thief.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the petitioner was entitled to damages for abuse of rights under Article 32 of the Civil
Code

HELD:
NO. Anent the inspection of the garage where the meter was installed, the respondents assert that the
VOC team had the continuing authority from Sesbreo as the consumer to enter his premises at all
reasonable hours to conduct an inspection of the meter without being liable for trespass to dwelling.
The authority emanated from paragraph 9 of the metered service contract entered into between VECO
and each of its consumers. Said paragraph 9 clothed the entire VOC team with unquestioned authority
to enter the garage to inspect the meter. The members of the team obviously met the conditions
imposed by paragraph 9 for an authorized entry. Firstly, their entry had the objective of conducting the
routine inspection of the meter. Secondly, the entry and inspection were confined to the garage where
the meter was installed. Thirdly, the entry was effected at around 4 oclock p.m., a reasonable hour.
And, fourthly, the persons who inspected the meter were duly authorized for the purpose by VECO.

Sesbreo insists so, citing Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the clause guaranteeing the right
of every individual against unreasonable searches and seizures. He further states that a violation of this
constitutional guaranty rendered VECO and its VOS team liable to him for damages by virtue of Article
32 (9) of the Civil Code.

The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is intended as a restraint against the
Government and its agents tasked with law enforcement. It is to be invoked only to ensure freedom
from arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of State power. It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors
decided to enter the main premises only after finding the meter of Sesbreo turned upside down,
hanging and its disc not rotating. The circumstances justified their decision, and their inspection of the
main premises was a continuation of the authorized entry. There was no question then that their ability
to determine the unbilled electricity called for them to see for themselves the usage of electricity inside.
Not being agents of the State, they did not have to first obtain a search warrant to do so.

To stress, the concept of abuse of rights prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or in
bad faith; otherwise, he may be liable to another who suffers injury. The rationale for the concept is to
present some basic principles to be followed for the rightful relationship between human beings and the
stability of social order.
 CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAEZ v. SHIRLEY G. QUIONES
G.R. No. 175822; October 23, 2013
PERALTA, J.:p (Third Div.)

FACTS:
Respondent, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu-Lapu City, bought a pair of black
jeans worth P 2,098.00 from Guess USA Boutique in Robinsons Department Store in Cebu City. She paid
for the jeans and was issued a receipt for her payment. However, she was followed by a Guess
employee, saying that she has not yet paid for her purchase. She showed the receipt to the employee,
but the latter still insisted that they talk about it at the office of Cebu Pacific in the said mall.

The Guess employees allegedly subjected her to humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and
repeatedly demanded payment for the black jeans. On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly
gave a letter to the Director of Cebu Pacific Air narrating the incident, and another letter was allegedly
prepared and was supposed to be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinsons, but both refused to
receive it. Respondent also claimed that the Human Resource Department (HRD) of Robinsons was
furnished said letter and the latter in fact conducted an investigation for purposes of canceling
respondents Robinsons credit card. Respondent further claimed that she was not given a copy of said
damaging letter. With the above experience, respondent claimed to have suffered physical anxiety,
sleepless nights, mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock and
social humiliation. She thus filed the Complaint for Damages.

In their Answers, Petitioners and the other defendants admitted the issuance of the receipt of payment.
They claimed, however, that instead of the cashier (Hawayon) issuing the official receipt, it was the
invoicer (Villagonzalo) who did it manually. They thought that the item was already paid by the
respondent. Realizing the mistake, Villagonzalo rushed outside to look for respondent and when he saw
the latter, he invited her to go back to the shop to make clarifications as to whether or not payment was
indeed made. Instead, however, of going back to the shop, respondent suggested that they meet at the
Cebu Pacific Office. Villagonzalo, Hawayon and Ybaez thus went to the agreed venue where they talked
to respondent. They pointed out that it appeared in their conversation that respondent could not recall
whom she gave the payment. They emphasized that they were gentle and polite in talking to
respondent and it was the latter who was arrogant in answering their questions. The RTC dismissed the
complaint; However, on appeal, the CA ruled in favor of Quinones and ordered the petitioners to pay
damages.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Quinones is entitled to moral damages

HELD:
YES. Respondents complaint against petitioners stemmed from the principle of abuse of rights provided
for in the Civil Code on the chapter of human relations. Respondent cried foul when petitioners allegedly
embarrassed her when they insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans she purchased from their
shop despite the evidence of payment which is the official receipt issued by the shop. The issuance of
the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify from respondent whether she indeed
made payment if they had reason to believe that she did not. However, the exercise of such right is not
without limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in the performance of duty causing
damage or injury to another is actionable under the Civil Code.

Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of
legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to
prejudice another. Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the
individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of another. Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and
intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.

Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether she paid or not. The
Guess employees were able to talk to respondent at the Cebu Pacific Office. The confrontation started
well, but it eventually turned sour when voices were raised by both parties. As aptly held by both the
RTC and the CA, such was the natural consequence of two parties with conflicting views insisting on
their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that respondent was in possession of the item purchased
from the shop, together with the official receipt of payment issued by petitioners, the latter cannot
insist that no such payment was made on the basis of a mere speculation. Their claim should have been
proven by substantial evidence in the proper forum.

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY
G.R. No. 179736 ; June 26, 2013
DEL CASTILLO, J.:p (Second Div.)

FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Mandaue, Cebu;, while
respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) adjacent to the property of
petitioners. Respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on their lot
but in 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary
Injunction/TRO wherein Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit
and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners
property. The court denied Aldos application for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its
allegations; so in order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally
set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing
petitioners property; that respondents, through their employees and without the consent of
petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners on-going construction; and that the acts of respondents
violate petitioners right to privacy. Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the
video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents claimed that they did not install the video surveillance
cameras, nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners construction. They also
clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.

The RTC granted the TRO and ordered the respondents to remove the cameras they installed. The
respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, which the latter granted on
the ground that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion because
petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ. The CA explained that the
right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property
subject of the controversy is not used as a residence.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there was a violation of the petitioners right to privacy

HELD:
YES. The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as "the right to be
free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such
a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities." Simply put, the right to privacy is "the
right to be let alone."
The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and protects them against the States abuse of
power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. Article
26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individuals right to privacy and provides a legal
remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals.

This provision recognizes that a mans house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or
even restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the
residence of another without the consent of the latter." The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers
residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil
law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of anothers
residence." This does not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law
covers also "similar acts." A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded
therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x

Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his
house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them
access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers residence," therefore, covers places, locations,
or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by
society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the
application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

In resolving the case, the Court used the reasonable expectation of privacy test. In this day and age,
video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and safety of
everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be
affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of anothers residence
or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act
No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

G.R. No. 202791 June 10, 2013

PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
LEANDRO LEGASPI, Respondent.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: GRANTED. Respondent Leandro Legaspi is ORDERED to return the excess
amount of payment in the sum of US$29,452.00 to petitioner Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.

FACTS: Respondent Leandro Legaspi (respondent) was employed as Utility Pastry on board the vessel
"Azamara Journey" under the employment of petitioner Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.
(petitioner). Respondents employment was covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
wherein it was agreed that the company shall pay a maximum disability compensation of up to
US$60,000.00 only. While on board the vessel, respondent suffered "Cardiac Arrest S/P ICD Insertation."
He was checked by the ships doctor and was prescribed medications. On November 14, 2008,
respondent was repatriated to receive further medical treatment and examination. On May 23, 2009,
the company designated physician assessed his condition to be Disability Grade 2. Not satisfied,
respondent filed a complaint for full and permanent disability compensation against petitioner before
the Labor Arbiter (LA).

LABOR ARBITER: awarded US$80,000.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment as permanent
disability compensation - which is based on the ITF Cruise Ship Model Agreement for Catering
Personnel, not on the CBA. The LA also ordered complainants employer, PTC to pay complainant jointly
and severally in the amount of US$1,320.00 or its peso equivalent as sick wages, and 10% attys fees.
[TOTAL: US$81,320.00]

Not satisfied, petitioner appealed the LA decision before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).

NLRC: On September 5, 2010, the NLRC issued the Entry of Judgment stating that its resolution affirming
the LA decision had become final and executory.

On October 22, 2010, during the hearing on the motion for execution before the NLRC, petitioner
agreed to pay respondent US$81,320.00. The terms and conditions of said payment were embodied in
the Receipt of Judgment Award with Undertaking, wherein respondent acknowledged receipt of the said
amount and undertook to return it to petitioner in the event the latters petition for certiorari would
be granted, without prejudice to respondents right to appeal. It was also agreed upon that the
remaining balance would be given on the next scheduled conference.

On November 8, 2010, petitioner timely filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. In the meantime, on
March 2, 2011, the LA issued a writ of execution which noted petitioners payment of the amount of
US$81,320.00. On March 16, 2011, in compliance with the said writ, petitioner tendered to the NLRC
Cashier the additional amounts of US$8,132.00 as attorneys fees and P3,042.95 as execution fee.

CA: partially granted the petition for certiorari and modified the assailed resolutions of the NLRC,
awarding only US$60,000.00 pursuant to the CBA between Celebrity Cruise Lines and Federazione
Italianaa Transporti CISL.

Petitioner then filed its Manifestation with Motion to Amend the Dispositive Portion, submitting to the
CA the writ of execution issued by the LA in support of its motion. Petitioner contended that since it had
already paid the total amount of US$89,452.00, it was entitled to the return of the excess payment in
the amount of US$29,452.00. The CA denied petitioners motion citing the pronouncement in Career
Philippines Ship Management v. Geronimo Madjus where it was stated that the satisfaction of the
monetary award rendered the petition for certiorari moot. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but it was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN
RULING THAT PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED IN COLLECTING THE EXCESS PAYMENT IT MADE TO THE
RESPONDENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE RECEIPT OF JUDGMENT AWARD SIGNED BY THE
RESPONDENT?
HELD:
1. YES.
As the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represented a reasonable settlement, it is
binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind.
Respondent agreed to the stipulation that he would return the amount paid to him in the event
that the petition for certiorari would be granted. Since the petition was indeed granted by the
CA, albeit partially, respondent must comply with the condition to return the excess amount.

The Court finds that the Receipt of the Judgment Award with Undertaking was a fair and binding
agreement. It was executed by the parties subject to outcome of the petition. To allow now
respondent to retain the excess money judgment would amount to his unjust enrichment to the
prejudice of petitioner.
 Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of
or for property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable
obligation to account for them. To be entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by
mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconveyance.
Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution. There is unjust
enrichment when:

1. A person is unjustly benefited; and

2. Such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.

G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012

WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner,
vs.
AVELINA AMORES, Respondent.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: DENIED. Affirmed CA which also affirmed RTC. The foregoing rulings dissolved
the conjugal partnership of gains of Willem Beumer (petitioner) and Avelina Amores (respondent) and
distributed the properties forming part of the said property regime.

FACTS: Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After several
years, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared the nullity of their marriage in the Decision dated
November 10, 2000 on the basis of the formers psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36
of the Family Code. Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership
dated December 14, 2000 praying for the distribution of the described real properties claimed to have
been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage.

In defense, respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and
2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being
that she used her own personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds
and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of inheritance. She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and
petitioner attesting to the fact that she purchased Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using her
own money. Accordingly, respondent sought the dismissal of the petition for dissolution as well as
payment for attorneys fees and litigation expenses.

During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of
respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as
his disability benefit since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also
claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was
contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.

For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots came exclusively
from her personal funds, in particular, her earnings from selling jewelry as well as products from Avon,
Triumph and Tupperware. She further asserted that after she filed for annulment of their marriage in
1996, petitioner transferred to their second house and brought along with him certain personal
properties, consisting of drills, a welding machine, grinders, clamps, etc. She alleged that these tools and
equipment have a total cost of P500,000.00.

RTC: The parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. 22846, 21974, 21306, 21307,
23567 and 23575 are hereby declared paraphernal properties of respondent Avelina Amores due to the
fact that while these real properties were acquired by onerous title during their marital union, Willem
Beumer, being a foreigner, is not allowed by the constitution to acquire any private land in the
Philippines, except through inheritance.
Petitioner insisted that the money used to purchase the foregoing properties came from his own capital
funds and that they were registered in the name of his former wife only because of the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership. Thus, he prayed for reimbursement of one-half (1/2) of the value
of what he had paid in the purchase of the said properties, waiving the other half in favor of his
estranged ex-wife.

CA: affirmed RTC in toto, and stressed the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the constitutional
prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines." Hence, he cannot invoke equity to support his
claim for reimbursement.

ISSUE/S:
1. WHETHER PETITIONER MAY CLAIM REIBURSEMENT FOR THE PURCHASE PRICE USED IN
ACQUIRING THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTIES ON THE GROUND OF EQUITY DESPITE KNOWING
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST HIM?
HELD:
1. NO.

Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional
prohibition" and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered
the subject properties in the latters name. Clearly, petitioners actuations showed his palpable
intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no
reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioners claim for
reimbursement.

As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do
equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has
done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of
equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent,
or deceitful.

In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner
given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its
unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will
not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights,
creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of
the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to
recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an
illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. Indeed, one cannot salvage
any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.

Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust
enrichment. As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary
reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust
enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution, to wit: Futile, too, is
petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads:
 Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires
or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground,
shall return the same to him.

The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST"
(No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of
what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This
provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from
filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for
the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The
objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds
at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the
objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has
the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff."

G.R. No. 183026 November 14, 2012

NESTOR N. PADALHIN and ANNIE PADALHIN, Petitioners,
vs.
NELSON D. LAVINA, Respondent.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: DENIED. Affirmed CA.

FACTS: Lavia and Nestor were both Filipino diplomats assigned in Kenya as Ambassador and Consul
General, respectively. In the course of their stay in Kenya, the residence of Lavia was raided twice.
Prior to the raids, Bienvenido Pasturan (Pasturan) delivered messages to the Filipino household helpers
in the ambassadors residence instructing them to allow the entry of an officer who would come to take
photographs of the ivory souvenirs kept therein.

The first raid on April 18, 1996 was conducted while Lavia and his wife were attending a diplomatic
dinner hosted by the Indian High Commission. Lucy Ercolano Muthua, who was connected with the
Criminal Investigation Divisions Intelligence Office of Kenya and David Menza, an officer in the Digirie
Police Station in Nairobi, participated in the raid. Photographs of the first and second floors of Lavias
residence were taken with the aid of James Mbatia, Juma Kalama, Zenaida Cabando (Cabando), and
Edna Palao (Palao).

The second raid was conducted on April 23, 1996 during which occasion, the ambassador and his spouse
were once again not present and additional photographs of the residence were taken. On September
27, 1996, Lavia received an information from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in Manila that an
investigating team was to be sent to Nairobi to inquire into the complaints filed against him by the
employees of the Philippine Embassy in Kenya, on one hand, and his own complaint against the spouses
Padalhin, on the other. The investigating team was led by Rosario G. Manalo (Manalo) and had Franklin
M. Ebdalin (Ebdalin) and Maria Theresa Dizon (Dizon) as members. The team stayed in Kenya from April
20, 1997 to April 30, 1997. On April 29, 1997, the team entered Lavias residence unarmed with a
search warrant, court order or letter from the DFA Secretary. Lavia alleged that in the course of the
inspection, the team destroyed cabinet locks, damaged furniture and took three sets of carved ivory
tusks.

Subsequently, both Nestor and Lavia were recalled from their posts in Kenya.

On November 17, 1997, Lavia filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against Nestor and his
wife, petitioner Annie Padalhin (Annie) Palao, Cabando, Manalo, Ebdalin and Dizon. On July 6, 1998,
Lavia amended his complaint to include Pasturan as a defendant.
Lavias complaint alleged the following causes of action, to wit: (a) affront against his privacy and the
sanctity and inviolability of his diplomatic residence during the two raids conducted by the Kenyan
officials, supposedly instigated by Padalhin and participated by all the defendants as conspirators; (b)
infringement of his constitutional rights against illegal searches and seizures when the investigating
team sent by the DFA entered into his residence without a warrant, court order or letter from the DFA
Secretary and confiscated some of his personal belongings; and (c) bad faith, malice and deceit
exhibited by the defendants, including Padalhin, in conspiring on the conduct of the raids, engaging in a
smear campaign against him, and seizing without authority his personal effects. Lavia sought payment
of actual, moral, exemplary and nominal damages, attorneys fees and costs of suits.

In the course of the trial, Nestor denied any involvement in the raids conducted on Lavias residence.
As counterclaims, he alleged that the suit filed by Lavia caused him embarassment and sleepless nights,
as well as unnecessary expenses which he incurred to defend himself against the charges. On the other
hand, Annie denied prior knowledge of and participation in the raids.

On February 24, 2000, the RTC, upon oral motion of Lavias counsel informing the court that a
settlement had been reached, dismissed the charges against Palao, Cabando, Manalo, Ebdalin and
Dizon. As a consequence, the RTC deemed it proper to no longer resolve the claims of Lavia relative to
the alleged seizure of his personal effects by the DFA investigating team. Lavia pursued his charges
against Nestor, Annie and Pasturan.

RTC: ordered Nestor to pay Lavia P500,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as nominal damages,
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, P150,000.00 as attorneys fees and litigation expenses, and costs of
suit for the formers participation in the raid conducted in the Ambassadors residence on April 18, 1996.

Both Lavia and Nestor filed their respective appeals to assail the RTC decision. Lavia ascribed error on
the part of the RTC when it absolved Annie and Pasturan from liability anent their supposed
participation in the raid conducted on April 18, 1996. Lavia likewise assailed as insufficient the amount
of exemplary and nominal damages imposed on Nestor by the RTC. Lavia also challenged the propriety
of the RTCs dismissal of his claims relative to the conduct of the second raid on April 23, 1996. On the
other hand, Nestor lamented that his participation in the April 18, 1996 raid was not proven by clear and
substantial evidence, hence, the award of damages made by the RTC in favor of Lavia lacked basis.

CA: denied the appeals of both Lavia and Nestor. The CA, however, reduced to P75,000.00 the award
of attorneys fees and litigation expenses made in Lavias favor. In affirming, albeit with modification,
the RTCs disquisition, the CA explained:

There is no doubt in our mind that defendant-appellant indeed participated in the first raid that
happened on April 18, 1997 based on the admission made by the defendant- appellant himself in his
affidavit dated October 10, 1997.

ISSUE/S:

1. WHETHER OR NOT NESTORS PARTICIPATION IN THE RAID CONDUCTED ON LAVIAS RESIDENCE

WAS PROVEN BY CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AS TO WARRANT THE AWARD OF MORAL,
EXEMPLARY AND NOMINAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES IN THE LATTERS FAVOR?

HELD:
1. YES.
 As already exhaustively discussed by both the RTC and the CA, Nestor himself admitted that he
caused the taking of the pictures of Lavina's residence without the latter's knowledge and
consent. Nestor reiterates that he did so sans bad faith or malice. However, Nestor's surreptitious
acts negate his allegation of good faith. If it were true that Lavina kept ivories in his diplomatic
residence, then, his behavior deserves condemnation. However, that is not the issue in the case at
bar. Nestor violated the New Civil Code prescriptions concerning the privacy of one's residence
and he cannot hide behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion.
Hence, the award of damages and attorney's fees in Lavina's favor is proper.

G.R. No. 174238 July 7, 2009

ANITA CHENG, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and TESSIE SY, Respondents.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: GRANTED. Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy
and Tessie Sy is hereby ordered REINSTATED.

FACTS: Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7, Manila against
respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy (Criminal Case No. 98-969952 against Tessie Sy and Criminal
Case No. 98-969953 against William Sy) for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) Check Nos.
171762 and 71860 for P300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both of which were dishonored upon
presentment for having been drawn against a closed account.

Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed against respondents two (2)
cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Branch 25, Manila (Criminal Case Nos. 341458-59).

RTC: On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the estafa cases for failure of the
prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. The Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 98-969952
contained no declaration as to the civil liability of Tessie Sy.3 On the other hand, the Order in Criminal
Case No. 98-969953 contained a statement, "Hence, if there is any liability of the accused, the same is
purely civil, not criminal in nature."4

MeTC: Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases in its
Order5 dated February 7, 2005 on account of the failure of petitioner to identify the accused
respondents in open court. The Order also did not make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of
accused respondents.

On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, a
complaint for collection of a sum of money with damages (Civil Case No. 05-112452) based on the same
loaned amount ofP600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and BP
Blg. 22 cases. The RTC dismissed the same for lack of jurisdiction ratiocinating that the civil action to
collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages was already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases
in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE/S:
1. WHETHER PETITIONERS ACTION TO RECOVER RESPONDENTS CIVIL LIABILITY BE ALSO
ALLOWED TO PROSPER SEPARATELY AFTER THE BP BLG. 22 CASES WERE DISMISSED?
HELD:
1. YES.

It is in this light that we find petitioners contention that she was not assisted by a private
prosecutor during the BP Blg. 22 proceedings critical. Petitioner indirectly protests that the public
prosecutor failed to protect and prosecute her cause when he failed to have her establish the
identities of the accused during the trial and when he failed to appeal the civil action deemed
impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases. On this ground, we agree with petitioner.

Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioners recourse pursuant to the prevailing
rules of procedure would have been to appeal the civil action to recover the amount loaned to
respondents corresponding to the bounced checks. Hence, the said civil action may proceed
requiring only a preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure to appeal within
the reglementary period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy to recover the civil
liability of respondents. However, due to the gross mistake of the prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 cases,
we are constrained to digress from this rule.

It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel. But this
rule admits of exceptions (1) where the counsels mistake is so great and serious that the client is
prejudiced and denied his day in court, or (2) where the counsel is guilty of gross negligence
resulting in the clients deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. Tested against
these guidelines, we hold that petitioners lot falls within the exceptions.

We take into consideration the trial courts observation when it dismissed the estafa charge in
Criminal Case No. 98-969953 that if there was any liability on the part of respondents, it was civil
in nature. Hence, if the loan be proven true, the inability of petitioner to recover the loaned
amount would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of respondents, as they may now
conveniently evade payment of their obligation merely on account of a technicality applied
against petitioner.

There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is derived
at the expense of or with damages to another. This doctrine simply means that a person shall not
be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at anothers expense. One condition for invoking
this principle of unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no other recourse based on
contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of law.

G.R. No. 167017 June 22, 2009

SERAFIN CHENG, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES VITTORIO and MA. HELEN DONINI, Respondents.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: PARTIALLY GRANTED. CA decision is modified.

FACTS: The subject of this petition is an oral lease agreement that went sour. Petitioner Serafin Cheng
agreed to lease his property located at 479 Shaw Blvd., Mandaluyong City to respondents, Spouses
Vittorio and Ma. Helen Donini, who intended to put up a restaurant thereon. They agreed to a monthly
rental of P17,000, to commence in December 1990.

Bearing an Interim Grant of Authority executed by petitioner, respondents proceeded to introduce

improvements in the premises. The authority read:
I, Serafin Cheng, of legal age and with office address at Room 310 Federation Center Building Muelle de
Binondo, Manila, owner of the building/structure located at 479 Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila,pursuant to a lease agreement now being finalized and to take effect December 1, 1990, hereby
grants VITTORIO DONINI (Prospective Lessee) and all those acting under his orders to make all the
necessary improvements on the prospective leased premises located at 479 Shaw Blvd., Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, and for this purpose, to enter said premises and perform, all such works and activities to
make the leased premises operational as a restaurant or similar purpose.

Manila, 31 October 1990.

However, before respondents business could take off and before any final lease agreement could be
drafted and signed, the parties began to have serious disagreements regarding its terms and conditions.
Petitioner thus wrote respondents on January 28, 1991, demanding payment of the deposit and rentals,
and signifying that he had no intention to continue with the agreement should respondents fail to pay.
Respondents, however, ignoring petitioners demand, continued to occupy the premises until April 17,
1991 when their caretaker voluntarily surrendered the property to petitioner.

Respondents then filed an action for specific performance and damages with a prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 67, docketed as
Civil Case No. 60769. Respondents prayed that petitioner be ordered to execute a written lease contract
for five years, deducting from the deposit and rent the cost of repairs in the amount of P445,000, or to
order petitioner to return their investment in the amount of P964,000 and compensate for their
unearned net income of P200,000 with interest, plus attorneys fees.

RTC: rendered its decision in favor of petitioner.

CA: recalled and set aside the RTC decision, and entered a new one ordering petitioner to pay
respondents the amount ofP964,000 representing the latters expenses incurred for the repairs and
improvements of the premises.

ISSUE/S:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUITY IN FAVOR OF
THE RESPONDENTS?

HELD:
1. YES.

Remarkably, in ruling that respondents were entitled to reimbursement, the CA did not provide any
statutory basis therefor and instead applied the principles of equity and unjust enrichment, stating:

It would be inequitable to allow the defendant-appellee, as owner of the property to enjoy

perpetually the improvements introduced by the plaintiffs-appellants without reimbursing them for
the value of the said improvements. Well-settled is the rule that no one shall be unjustly enriched or
benefitted at the expense of another.

Petitioner, however, correctly argued that the principle of equity did not apply in this case. Equity,
which has been aptly described as "justice outside legality," is applied only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. Positive rules prevail over all abstract
arguments based on equity contra legem. Neither is the principle of unjust enrichment applicable
since petitioner (who was to benefit from it) had a valid claim.
 G.R. No. 158086 February 14, 2008
ASJ CORPORATION and ANTONIO SAN JUAN, petitioners,
vs.
SPS. EFREN & MAURA EVANGELISTA, respondents.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: PARTIALLY GRANTED. CA decision is modified.

FACTS: Spouses Efren and Maura Evangelista, under the name and style of R.M. Sy Chicks, are engaged
in the large-scale business of buying broiler eggs, hatching them, and selling their hatchlings (chicks) and
egg by-products. For the incubation and hatching of these eggs, spouses Evangelista availed of the
hatchery services of ASJ Corp., a corporation duly registered in the name of Antonio San Juan.

Sometime in 1991, the spouses Evangelista delivered to ASJ Corp. various quantities of eggs at an agreed
service fee of 80 centavos per egg, whether successfully hatched or not. Initially, the service fees were
paid upon release of the eggs and by-products to the spouses Evangelista. But as their business went
along, the Evangelistas delays on their payments were tolerated by San Juan, who just carried over the
balance, as there may be, into the next delivery, out of keeping goodwill.

Sometime in 1993, San Juan refused to release the chicks and by-products due to the spouses
Evangelistas failure to settle accrued service fees. The parties tried to settle amicably their differences
before police authorities, but to no avail. Thus, the spouses Evangelista filed with the RTC an action for
damages based on San Juans retention of the chicks and by-products.

San Juans obligation to deliver the chicks and by-products corresponds to three dates: the date of
hatching, the delivery/pick-up date and the date of spouses Evangelistas payment. On several setting
reports, the spouses Evangelista made delays on their payments, but San Juan tolerated such delay.
When the spouses Evangelistas accounts accumulated because of their successive failure to pay on
several setting reports, San Juan opted to demand the full settlement of their accounts as a condition
precedent to the delivery. However, the spouses Evangelista were unable to fully settle their accounts.

Believing firmly that the total value of the eggs delivered was more than sufficient to cover the
outstanding balance, Maura promised to settle their accounts only upon proper accounting by San Juan.
San Juan disliked the idea and threatened to impound their vehicle and detain them at the hatchery
compound if they should come back unprepared to fully settle their accounts with him.

RTC: ruled in favor of the spouses Evengelista based on a finding that the retention of the chicks and by-
products was unjustified.
CA: affirmed the RTCs decision.

ISSUE/S:
1. WHETHER THE RETENTION OF THE CHICKS AND BY-PRODUCTS CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF
RIGHTS?

HELD:
1. YES.
San Juans act of withholding the chicks and by-products is entirely different from his
unjustifiable acts of threatening the spouses Evangelista. The retention had legal basis; the
threats had none.

The spouses Evangelistas offer to partially satisfy their accounts is not enough to extinguish
their obligation. Under Article 1248 of the Civil Code, the creditor cannot be compelled to
accept partial payments from the debtor, unless there is an express stipulation to that effect.
 More so, the spouses Evangelista cannot substitute or apply as their payment the value of the
chicks and by-products they expect to derive because it is necessary that all the debts be for the
same kind, generally of a monetary character. Thus, there was no valid application of payment
in this case.

It was the spouses Evangelista who violated the very essence of reciprocity in contracts,
consequently giving rise to San Juans right of retention.

This case is clearly one among the species of non-performance of a reciprocal obligation.
Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, wherein each party is a
debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the
simultaneous fulfillment of the other. From the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation,
delay by the other party begins. Since the spouses Evangelista are guilty of delay in the
performance of their obligations, they are liable to pay San Juan actual damages

Nonetheless, San Juans subsequent acts of threatening respondents should not remain
among those treated with impunity. Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, an act constitutes an
abuse of right if the following elements are present: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty;
(b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Here, while petitioners had the right to withhold delivery, the high-handed and oppressive
acts of petitioners, as aptly found by the two courts below, had no legal leg to stand on. We
need not weigh the corresponding pieces of evidence all over again because factual findings of
the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the appellate court, are binding and
conclusive and will not be disturbed on appeal.

We agree that petitioners conduct flouts the norms of civil society and justifies the award of
moral and exemplary damages. As enshrined in civil law jurisprudence: Honeste vivere, non
alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give
everyone his due.35 Since exemplary damages are awarded, attorneys fees are also proper.

G.R. No. 152411 September 29, 2004

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
PHILAB INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals isREVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150, is REINSTATED.

FACTS: Sometime in 1979, the University of the Philippines (UP) decided to construct an integrated
system of research organization known as the Research Complex. As part of the project, laboratory
equipment and furniture were purchased for the National Institute of Biotechnology and Applied
Microbiology (BIOTECH) at the UP Los Baos. Providentially, the Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation (FEMF)
came forward and agreed to fund the acquisition of the laboratory furniture, including the fabrication
thereof.

Renato E. Lirio, the Executive Assistant of the FEMF, gave the go-signal to BIOTECH to contact a
corporation to accomplish the project. On July 23, 1982, Dr. William Padolina, the Executive Deputy
Director of BIOTECH, arranged for Philippine Laboratory Industries, Inc. (PHILAB), to fabricate the
laboratory furniture and deliver the same to BIOTECH for the BIOTECH Building Project, for the account
of the FEMF. Lirio directed Padolina to give the go-signal to PHILAB to proceed with the fabrication of
the laboratory furniture, and requested Padolina to forward the contract of the project to FEMF for its
approval.

On July 13, 1982, Padolina wrote Lirio and requested for the issuance of the purchase order and down
payment for the office and laboratory furniture for the project.

Padolina informed Hector Navasero, the President of PHILAB, to proceed with the fabrication of the
laboratory furniture, per the directive of FEMF Executive Assistant Lirio. Padolina also requested for
copies of the shop drawings and a sample contract for the project, and that such contract and drawings
had to be finalized before the down payment could be remitted to the PHILAB the following week.
However, PHILAB failed to forward any sample contract.

Navasero promised to submit the contract for the installation of laboratory furniture to BIOTECH, by
January 12, 1983. However, Navasero failed to do so. In a Letter dated February 1, 1983, BIOTECH
reminded Navasero of the need to submit the contract so that it could be submitted to FEMF for its
evaluation and approval. Instead of submitting the said contract, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH an
accomplishment report on the project as of February 28, 1983, and requested payment thereon.
On July 1, 1984, PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH an Invoice for the final payment of laboratory furniture.
Representatives from BIOTECH, PHILAB, and Lirio for the FEMF, conducted a verification of the
accomplishment of the work and confirmed the same. FEMF failed to pay the bill.

President Marcos was ousted from office during the February 1986 EDSA Revolution.

PHILAB wrote President Corazon C. Aquino asking her help to secure the payment of the amount due
from the FEMF. Raul P. de Guzman, the Chancellor of UP Los Baos, wrote then Chairman of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Jovito Salonga, submitting PHILABs claim to be
officially entered as accounts payable as soon as the assets of FEMF were liquidated by the PCGG.

In the meantime, the PCGG wrote UP requesting for a copy of the relevant contract and the MOA for its
perusal.

Chancellor De Guzman wrote Navasero requesting for a copy of the contract executed between PHILAB
and FEMF. Navasero informed De Guzman that PHILAB and FEMF did not execute any contract
regarding the fabrication and delivery of laboratory furniture to BIOTECH.

Thereafter, PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against UP.

RTC: Dismissed the complaint without prejudice to PHILABs recourse against the FEMF.

CA: Reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and held that there was never a contract between
FEMF and PHILAB. Consequently, PHILAB could not be bound by the MOA between the FEMF and UP
since it was never a party thereto. It further ruled that, although UP did not bind itself to pay for the
laboratory furniture; nevertheless, it is liable to PHILAB under the maxim: No one should unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another.

ISSUE/S:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST
ENRICHMENT WHEN IT HELD THAT THE UNIVERSITY, AND NOT THE MARCOS FOUNDATION, IS
LIABLE TO PHILAB?

HELD:
1. YES.
 Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or
obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the
sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or unlawfully.

Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove
that another party knowingly received something of value to which he was not entitled and that
the state of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit.40 Unjust
enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for
property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation
to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud,
coercion, or request.41 Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a
prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.42

Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:

Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just
or legal ground, shall return the same to him. (Boldface supplied)

In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1)
that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the
enrichment of the defendant is without just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no
other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.

An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is
no other remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable
action under any other institution of positive law, that action must be resorted to, and the
principle of accion in rem verso will not lie.

G.R. No. 139789 July 19, 2001

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 139808 July 19, 2001
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: DENIED. At any rate, the case has been rendered moot by the death of subject.

FACTS: On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her
husband some years ago, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals1 for habeas corpus to have custody
of her husband in consortium.

On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for lack of
unlawful restraint or detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio. Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K.
Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her
husband Potenciano Ilusorio. This case was consolidated with another case filed by Potenciano Ilusorio
and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation rights
to his wife, asserting that he never refused to see her. On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the petition for
habeas corpus4 for lack of merit, and granted the petition5 to nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling giving
visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio.7

What is now before the Court is Erlinda's motion to reconsider the decision. Erlinda highlighted that her
husband suffered from various ailments. Thus, Potenciano Ilusorio did not have the mental capacity to
decide for himself. Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano be brought before the Supreme Court so that
we could determine his mental state.

ISSUE/S:
1. WHETHER ERLINDAS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GRANTED ON ACCOUNT OF
HER DESIRE TO HAVE HER HUSBANDS CUSTODY WHICH IS THE ENTIRE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS
PRESENT PETITION?

HELD:
1. NO.

She cannot subsequently deny that she wanted her husband to live with her.

We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose whether
to see his wife or not.

Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family
Code support her position that as spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live
together and care for each other. We agree.

The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity. The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.

Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having
separated from bed and board since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between
husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.

Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit
amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its
value as a sublime social institution.

G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and
JANE DOE, respondents. Mesm
G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, respondents.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. In G. R.
No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as
it gives visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.
FACTS: The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio is to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and its
resolution dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband, lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce consortium as the wife.
On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio is to annul that portion of the decision of the
Court of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitation rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and the
Court of Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights.

Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of
age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club.

On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a
period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons.
Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and at
Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in
Antipolo City.

Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio
Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).

On December 30, 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for
about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time,
their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug
prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence, Potencianos health deteriorated.

On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a petitionfor guardianship
over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor
eyesight and impaired judgment.

On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return
to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents refused petitioners demands to see and visit her husband and
prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.

CA: ordered, for humanitarian consideration and upon petitioners manifestation, respondents Erlinda
K. Ilusorio Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap, the administrator of Cleveland Condominium or anywhere in
its place, his guards and Potenciano Ilusorios staff especially Ms. Aurora Montemayor to allow visitation
rights to Potenciano Ilusorios wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all her children, notwithstanding any list limiting
visitors thereof, under penalty of contempt in case of violation of refusal thereof; and recalled the
previously issued writ of habeas corpus for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject of the
petition.

ISSUE/S:
1. MAY A WIFE SECURE A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS TO COMPEL HER HUSBAND TO LIVE WITH HER
IN CONJUGAL BLISS?

HELD:
1. NO.
Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the
extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one
entitled thereto.

As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention,or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled
thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not
merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid
has later become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.

The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the
grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action.The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely
nominal or moral.

The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render
him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition
but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.

As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios mental state, the Court of Appeals observed that he was of
sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the
court.

Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the
crucial choices revolve on residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he
made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively
belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented
from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true restraint
on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a
minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife
for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the
exercise of his right.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife.
Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs
or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the
man and womans free choice.
 G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner,
vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the
sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per
annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is DELETED.

FACTS: Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the first
semester of his last year, he failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he
was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student and on
February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade given him by Professor
Carlos Ortega which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the required fee. He
took the examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega submitted his
grade. It was a grade of five (5).

In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to deliberate on who
among the fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiff's name appeared in the
Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second
Semester (1987-1988).

The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, U.E., Recto Campus, during
the program of which he went up the stage when his name was called, escorted by her (sic) mother and
his eldest brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and his Tassel was turned from left to right, and he
was thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma.
His relatives took pictures of the occasion

He tendered a blow-out that evening which was attended by neighbors, friends and relatives who
wished him good luck in the forthcoming bar examination. There were pictures taken too during the
blow-out. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence without
pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in
Far Eastern University. Having learned of the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able to
take the bar examination.

Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he was
not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter's negligence. He prayed for an award
of moral and exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.

In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it never led respondent to
believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was included
in the tentative list of graduating students.
RTC: ordered UE to pay plaintiff the sum of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS
(P35,470.00) with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid, the amount of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees and the cost of suit.

CA: AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that defendant-appellee, in addition to the sum adjudged by the
lower court in favor of plaintiff-appellant, is also ORDERED to pay plaintiff-appellant the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for moral damages.
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner UE elevated the case to this Court on a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, arguing that it has no liability to respondent
Romeo A. Jader, considering that the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred
by the latter arose out of his own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned the result of
his removal exam.

ISSUE/S:
1. MAY AN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION BE HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES FOR MISLEADING A
STUDENT INTO BELIEVING THAT THE LATTER HAD SATISFIED ALL THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
GRADUATION WHEN SUCH IS NOT THE CASE?

HELD:
1. YES.

When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of education is

entered into between said institution and the student. The professors, teachers or instructors hired
by the school are considered merely as agents and administrators tasked to perform the school's
commitment under the contract. Since the contracting parties are the school and the student, the
latter is not duty-bound to deal with the former's agents, such as the professors with respect to the
status or result of his grades, although nothing prevents either professors or students from sharing
with each other such information. The Court takes judicial notice of the traditional practice in
educational institutions wherein the professor directly furnishes his/her students their grades. It is
the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and
information to each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the
requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who
will graduate. Although commencement exercises are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not
an ordinary occasion, since such ceremony is the educational institution's way of announcing to the
whole world that the students included in the list of those who will be conferred a degree during the
baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied all the requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to
the ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly inform the student of any problem
involving the latter's grades and performance and also most importantly, of the procedures for
remedying the same.

Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination,

particularly at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be
said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a
successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the
Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of
another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all
information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.

SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997

PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant,
vs.
SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a
lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.

FACTS: In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon
Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar
examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before he
could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she
had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill
his repeated promises to many her.

Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in
their teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as
Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime
in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. It was after the
child was born, complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes
the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or
thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter's birthdays. Her trust in him
and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another woman.
Hence, this petition.

IBP: Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in response to
complainant's opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that
respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

ISSUE/S:
1. WHETHER RESPONDENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO TAKE HIS OATH AS A LAWYER?

HELD:
1. YES.

Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the charge of gross
immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his
sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after
he passes the bar examinations.

We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of
respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant
and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not
constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the
act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that
is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree." It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.

We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man
and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid
of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was
born out of wedlock.