THIRD DIVISION personal use the amount of TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED

EIGHTY FIVE PESOS (P2,785.00) representing the remittance of

the Municipality of Cabatuan to the Provincial Government of
CENITA M. CARIAGA, G.R. No. 180010 Isabela as the latters share in the real property taxes collected, which
Petitioner, amount was not received by the Provincial Government of Isabela,
Present: to the damage and prejudice of the government in the amount
aforestated.
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - BRION, CONTRARY TO LAW.[1] (underscoring supplied)
BERSAMIN,
ABAD,* and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. The two other Informations in the second and third criminal cases, Nos. 1294
Respondent. and 1295, contain the same allegations except the malversed amounts which
Promulgated: are P25,627.38 and P20,735.13, respectively.[2]
July 30, 2010
Branch 20 of the Cauayan RTC, by Joint Decision of June 22,
x--------------------------------------------------x 2004,[3] convicted petitioner in the three cases, disposing as follows:

DECISION WHEREFORE, finding the accused CENITA M.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In issue in the present petition for review is one of jurisdiction.
By Resolutions of May 28, 2007 and September 27, 2007, the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 29514, People of the Philippines v. Cenita
Cariaga, dismissed the appeal of Cenita Cariaga (petitioner) for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter.
Petitioner, as the municipal treasurer of Cabatuan, Isabela with a Salary Grade
of 24, was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City in Isabela
with three counts of malversation of public funds, defined under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The Information in the first case, Criminal Case No. 1293, reads:
That on or about the year 1993 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto in the Municipality of Cabatuan, Province of
Isabela, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, [C]ENITA M. CARIAGA, a public officer,
being the Municipal Treasurer of Cabatuan, Isabela, and as such is
accountable for taxes, fees and monies collected and/or received by
her by reason of her position, acting in relation to her office and
taking advantage of the same, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, misappropriate and convert to her
CARIAGA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MALVERSATION for which she is charged in the three (3) separate
informations and in the absence of any mitigating circumstance,
hereby sentences her to suffer:
1. In Crim. Case No. Br.20-1293, an indeterminate penalty
of from FOUR (4) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION
CORRECCIONAL as minimum to SEVEN (7) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR as maximum
and its accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a
fine of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty Five (P2,785.00)
Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Cost
against the accused.
2. In Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1294, an indeterminate
penalty of from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION
MAYOR as minimum to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as
maximum and to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and to pay a fine of Twenty Five Thousand Six
Hundred Twenty Seven (P25,627.00) Pesos. She is ordered to
indemnify the Provincial Government of Isabela Twenty Five
Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Seven (P25,627.00) Pesos, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Cost against the
accused.
 3. In Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1295, an indeterminate
penalty of from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION
MAYOR as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as
maximum, and to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine of Twenty Thousand Seven Hundred
Thirty (P20,730.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency. The bailbonds are cancelled. Costs against the
accused.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, through counsel, in time filed a Notice of Appeal, stating that he
intended to appeal the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals.
By Resolution of May 28, 2007,[4] the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners
appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that it is the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction thereon. Held the appellate court:
Concomitantly, jurisdiction over the offense is vested with
the Regional Trial Court considering that the position of Municipal
Treasurer corresponds to a salary grade below 27.Pursuant to Section
4 of [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No.
8249], it is the Sandiganbayan, to the exclusion of all others,
which enjoys appellate jurisdiction over the offense. Evidently,
the appeal to this Court of the conviction for malversation of public
funds was improperly and improvidently made. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by Resolution of
September 27, 2007.[5] Hence, the present petition for review, petitioner defining the
issues as follows:
I. WHETHER . . ., CONSIDERING THE CLEAR AND
GRAVE ERROR COMMITTED BY COUNSEL OF
[PETITIONER] AND OTHER EXTRA-ORDINARY
CIRCUMSTANCES, THE APPEAL OF [PETITIONER]
WRONGFULLY DIRECTED TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS BE DISMISSED OUTRIGHTOR BE
ENDORSED AND TRANSMITTED TO THE
SANDIGANBAYAN WHERE THE APPEAL SHALL
THEN PROCEED IN DUE COURSE.
II. WHETHER . . ., IN CONSIDERATION OF
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IN A CRIMINAL CASE, NEW
TRIAL BE GRANTED TO THE PETITIONER TO BE
UNDERTAKEN IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN
(ALTERNATIVELY IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT)
SO THAT CRUCIAL EVIDENCE OF PETITIONERBE
ADMITTED.[6]
Petitioner, now admitting the procedural error committed by her former
counsel, implores the Court to relax the Rules to afford her an opportunity to fully
ventilate her appeal on the merits and requests the Court to endorse and transmit the
records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan in the interest of substantial justice.
Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of
Appeals. x x x.
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals
shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be
dismissed outright. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That appellate jurisdiction in this case pertains to the Sandiganbayan is
clear. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,[7] as amended by Republic Act No.
8249, so directs:[8]
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxxx
In cases where none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and
PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal
circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein
provided. x x x (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied).
While the negligence of counsel generally binds the client, the Court has made
exceptions thereto, especially in criminal cases where reckless or gross negligence of
counsel deprives the client of due process of law; when its application will result in
outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or where the interests of justice so
require. [12] It can not be gainsaid that the case of petitioner can fall under any of these
exceptions.

Moreover, a more thorough review and appreciation of the evidence for the
Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of a person being prosecution and defense as well as a proper application of the imposable penalties in the
deprived of liberty due to a procedural lapse militates against the Courts dispensation of present case by the Sandiganbayan would do well to assuage petitioner that her appeal is
justice, the Court grants petitioners plea for a relaxation of the Rules. decided scrupulously.

For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
justice, such that any rigid and strict application thereof which results in technicalities CR No. 29514 are SET ASIDE. Let the records of the cases be FORWARDED to the
tending to frustrate substantial justice must always be avoided.[9] Sandiganbayan for proper disposition.

In Ulep v. People,[10] the Court remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan when The Presiding Judge of Branch 20, Henedino P. Eduarte, of the Cauayan City
it found that Regional Trial Court is WARNED against committing the same procedural error, under
pain of administrative sanction.
x x x petitioners failure to designate the proper forum for
her appeal was inadvertent. The omission did not appear to be a SO ORDERED.
dilatory tactic on her part. Indeed, petitioner had more to lose had
that been the case as her appeal could be dismissed outright for
lack of jurisdiction which was exactly what happened in the CA.

The trial court, on the other hand, was duty bound to

forward the records of the case to the proper forum, the
Sandiganbayan. It is unfortunate that the RTC judge concerned
ordered the pertinent records to be forwarded to the wrong court, to
the great prejudice of petitioner. Cases involving government
employees with a salary grade lower than 27 are fairly common,
albeit regrettably so. The judge was expected to know and should
have known the law and the rules of procedure. He should have
known when appeals are to be taken to the CA and when they
should be forwarded to the Sandiganbayan. He should have
conscientiously and carefully observed this responsibility specially
in cases such as this where a persons liberty was at stake. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

The slapdash work of petitioners former counsel and the trial courts apparent
ignorance of the law effectively conspired to deny petitioner the remedial measures to
question her conviction.[11]
Republic of the Philippines opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2)
SUPREME COURT Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the amount due under the
Manila judgment. Upon these grounds the Surety prayed the Court not only to deny the motion
for execution against its counter-bond but also the following affirmative relief : "to
EN BANC relieve the herein bonding company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question"
(Id. p. 54) The Court denied this motion on the ground solely that no previous demand
had been made on the Surety for the satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter the
G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968 necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the
plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counterbond. On the date set
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, for the hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Surety's counsel, granted the latter
vs. a period of five days within which to answer the motion. Upon its failure to file such
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA answer, the Court granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was
BAGUIO, defendants, issued.
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding
company and defendant-appellant. Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was
issued without the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of
F. S. Urot and G. A. Uriate for plaintiffs-appellees. the Rules of Court. As the Court denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of
Carlos J. Cuizon for defendants Gavino Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio. Appeals from such order of denial and from the one denying its motion for
Villaluz Law Office, Velasco Law Office, Pages and Soberano for defendant-appellant reconsideration (Id. p. 97). Its record on appeal was then printed as required by the Rules,
Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc. and in due time it filed its brief raising therein no other question but the ones covered by
the following assignment of errors:
DIZON, J.:
I. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in issuing its order dated November 2,
On July 19, 1948 barely one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 1957, by holding the incident as submitted for resolution, without a summary
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog hearing and compliance with the other mandatory requirements provided for in
commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.
spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of
P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until II. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in ordering the issuance of execution
the whole obligation is paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of against the herein bonding company-appellant.
attachment was issued by the court against defendants' properties, but the same was soon
dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and III. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in denying the motion to quash the
Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the Surety, on the 31st of the same month. writ of execution filed by the herein bonding company-appellant as well as its
subsequent motion for reconsideration, and/or in not quashing or setting aside
After being duly served with summons the defendants filed their answer in which, after the writ of execution.
making some admissions and denials of the material averments of the complaint, they
interposed a counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by the plaintiffs. Not one of the assignment of errors it is obvious raises the question of lack of
jurisdiction, neither directly nor indirectly.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and, after the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of Appeals, on December 11,
the Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ having been 1962, decided the case affirming the orders appealed from.
returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against
the Surety's bond (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 46-49), against which the Surety filed a written
On January 8, 1963 five days after the Surety received notice of the decision, it filed a
motion asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of January 10 of the same year.
Two days later the Surety filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging
substantially that appellees action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on
July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that
date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already
become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction
of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or the amount of
the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of
First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. Upon these
premises the Surety's motion prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its decision and to
dismiss the case. By resolution of January 16, 1963 the Court of Appeals required the
appellees to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so. Whereupon, on May
20 of the same year, the Court resolved to set aside its decision and to certify the case to
Us. The pertinent portions of its resolution read as follows:
It would indeed appear from the record that the action at bar, which is a suit
for collection of money in the sum of exactly P1,908.00 exclusive of interest,
was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19,
1948. But about a month prior to the filing of the complaint, more specifically
on June 17, 1948, the Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect, depriving the Court of
First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand,
exclusive of interest, is not more than P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A.
No. 296.)
We believe, therefore, that the point raised in appellant's motion is an
important one which merits serious consideration. As stated, the complaint was
filed on July 19, 1948. This case therefore has been pending now for almost 15
years, and throughout the entire proceeding appellant never raised the question
of jurisdiction until after receipt of this Court's adverse decision.
There are three cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court which may be
worthy of consideration in connection with this case, namely: Tyson Tan, et al.
vs. Filipinas Compaia de Seguros, et al., G.R. No. L-10096, March 23, 1956;
Pindangan Agricultural Co., Inc. vs. Jose P. Dans, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-
14591, September 26, 1962; and Alfredo Montelibano, et al. vs. Bacolod-
Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-15092, September 29, 1962, wherein the
Honorable Supreme Court frowned upon the 'undesirable practice' of
appellants submitting their case for decision and then accepting the judgment,
if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.
Considering, however, that the Supreme Court has the "exclusive" appellate
jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in
issue" (See. 1, Par. 3[3], Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended), we have no
choice but to certify, as we hereby do certify, this case to the Supreme
Court.1wph1.t
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as
amended, let the record of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court.
It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of
P1,908.00 only an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts
in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect
about a month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule
that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law,
and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case,
the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the
facts and circumstances of the present case which shall forthwith be set forth We
are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this
late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its
active participation.
As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on
July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on
January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.
It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was exclusively against the
Sibonghanoy spouses the Surety became a quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when
it filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court of
origin (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-19). Since then, it acquired certain rights and assumed
specific obligations in connection with the pending case, in accordance with sections 12
and 17, Rule 57, Rules of Court (Bautista vs. Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885; Kimpang & Co. vs.
Javier, 65 Phil. 170).
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter-bond the Surety not
only filed a written opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an
additional affirmative relief that it be relieved of its liability under the counter-bond
upon the grounds relied upon in support of its opposition lack of jurisdiction of the
court a quo not being one of them.
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the counter-bond, the
Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or
opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition,
the Surety filed the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for
different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record,
and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy
which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike
the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of
the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative
relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate
or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the
case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question
whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the
parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such
conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated obviously
for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed.
715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in
Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has
affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution
of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) to the effect that we frown upon the
"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse as
well as in Pindagan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26,
1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young
Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26,
1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July
31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the
Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to
sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and
compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and
unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have
become persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the
decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on December 11, 1962 as follows:
In Civil Case No. R-660 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which was a
suit for collection of a sum of money, a writ of attachment was issued against
defendants' properties. The attachment, however, was subsequently discharged
under Section 12 of Rule 59 upon the filing by defendants of a bond
subscribed by Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs.
The writ of execution against defendants having been returned totally
unsatisfied, plaintiffs moved, under Section 17 of Rule 59, for issuance of writ
of execution against Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. to enforce the
obligation of the bond. But the motion was, upon the surety's opposition,
denied on the ground that there was "no showing that a demand had been made,
by the plaintiffs to the bonding company for payment of the amount due under
the judgment" (Record on Appeal, p. 60).
Hence, plaintiffs made the necessary demand upon the surety for satisfaction
of the judgment, and upon the latter's failure to pay the amount due, plaintiffs
again filed a motion dated October 31, 1957, for issuance of writ of execution
against the surety, with notice of hearing on November 2, 1957. On October 31,
1957, the surety received copy of said motion and notice of hearing.
It appears that when the motion was called on November 2, 1957, the surety's
counsel asked that he be given time within which to answer the motion, and so
an order was issued in open court, as follows:1wph1.t hearing required by Section 17 of Rule 59, which reads;
As prayed for, Atty. Jose P. Soberano, Jr., counsel for the Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc., Cebu Branch, is given until Wednesday,
November 6, 1957, to file his answer to the motion for the issuance
of a writ of execution dated October 30, 1957 of the plaintiffs, after
which this incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open court, this 2nd day of November, 1957, at Cebu City,
Philippines.
(Sgd.) JOSE M. MENDOZA
Judge
(Record on Appeal, pp.
64-65, emphasis ours)
Since the surety's counsel failed to file any answer or objection within the
period given him, the court, on December 7, 1957, issued an order granting
plaintiffs' motion for execution against the surety; and on December 12, 1957,
the corresponding writ of execution was issued.
On December 24, 1957, the surety filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution on the ground that the same was "issued without the requirements of
Section 17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court having been complied with," more
specifically, that the same was issued without the required "summary hearing".
This motion was denied by order of February 10, 1958.
On February 25, 1958, the surety filed a motion for reconsideration of the
above-stated order of denial; which motion was likewise denied by order of
March 26, 1958.
From the above-stated orders of February 10, 1958 and March 26, 1958
denying the surety's motion to quash the writ of execution and motion for
reconsideration, respectively the surety has interposed the appeal on hand.
The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash
the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary
"Sec. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon
bond. If the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part,
the surety or sureties on any bond given pursuant to the provisions of
this role to secure the payment of the judgment shall become finally
charged on such bond, and bound to pay to the plaintiff upon
demand the amount due under the judgment, which amount may be
recovered from such surety or sureties after notice and summary
hearing in the same action." (Emphasis ours)
Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in
which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a
procedure by which a question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least
possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial
proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified
or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon
him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the
rights of the parties" (Ibid., pp. 793-794); and as to the extent and latitude of
the hearing, the same will naturally lie upon the discretion of the court,
depending upon the attending circumstances and the nature of the incident up
for consideration.
In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for
execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration.
In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called,
and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days
within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without
filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that
it was deprived of its day in court.
It is argued that the surety's counsel did not file an answer to the motion "for
the simple reason that all its defenses can be set up during the hearing of the
motion even if the same are not reduced to writing" (Appellant's brief, p. 4).
There is obviously no merit in this pretense because, as stated above, the
record will show that when the motion was called, what the surety's counsel
did was to ask that he be allowed and given time to file an answer. Moreover,
it was stated in the order given in open court upon request of the surety's
counsel that after the four-day period within which to file an answer, "the
incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution"; and counsel apparently
 agreed, as the order was issued upon his instance and he interposed no
objection thereto.

It is also urged that although according to Section 17 of Rule 59, supra, there
is no need for a separate action, there must, however, be a separate judgment
against the surety in order to hold it liable on the bond (Appellant's Brief, p.
15). Not so, in our opinion. A bond filed for discharge of attachment is, per
Section 12 of Rule 59, "to secure the payment to the plaintiff of any judgment
he may recover in the action," and stands "in place of the property so released".
Hence, after the judgment for the plaintiff has become executory and the
execution is "returned unsatisfied" (Sec. 17, Rule 59), as in this case, the
liability of the bond automatically attaches and, in failure of the surety to
satisfy the judgment against the defendant despite demand therefor, writ of
execution may issue against the surety to enforce the obligation of the bond.

UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with
costs against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

Reyes, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133289. December 23, 1999]
LICERIO A. ANTIPORDA, JR., ELITERIO RUBIACO, VICTOR GASCON and
CAESAR TALIA petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA,
HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON. CATALINO CASTAEDA,
JR. in their capacity as Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order to restrain the respondent Justices of the First Division of
the Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 24339 and from
enforcing the warrants for the arrest of the accused named therein (herein petitioners) or
to maintain the status quo until further orders from this Court.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Accused Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., Eliterio Rubiaco, Victor Gascon, and Caesar
Talla were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Elmer Ramos in an Information
dated September 18, 1997. It was filed with the First Division of the Sandiganbayan
comprised of the Honorable Francis E. Garchitorena, Edilberto E. Sandoval, and
Catalino Castaeda, Jr. The Information reads as follows:
That on or about September 1, 1995, in the Municipality of Sanchez Mira, Province of
Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Eliterio
Rubiaco, Caesar Talla, Vicente Gascon and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., armed with guns,
conspiring together and helping one another, by means of force, violence and
intimidation and without legal grounds or any authority of law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away one Elmer Ramos from his
residence in Marzan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan against his will with the use of a Maroon
Tamaraw FX motor vehicle.
CONTRARY TO LAW[1]
On November 10, 1997, the Court issued an order giving the prosecution
represented by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero Agcaoili thirty (30) days within which to
submit the amendment to the Information.The said order is quoted in full as follows:
ORDER
This morning, the prosecution represented by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero Agcaoili
appeared in response to this Courts Order of clarification on the propriety of proceeding
with the Information as it stands.
On her own, Prosecutor Agcaoili informed the Court that there were inadequacies in the
allegations in the Information for which reason she would beg leave to amend the
same. The Court for its part expressed anxiety as to the Courts jurisdiction over the case
considering that it was not clear whether or not the subject matter of the accusation was
office related.
For this purpose, Prosecutor Agcaoili is given thirty (30) days within which to submit
the amendment embodying whatever changes she believes are appropriate or necessary
in order for the Information to effectively describe the offense herein charged. Within
the same period, Prosecutor Agcaoili shall submit an expansion of the recommendation
to file the instant Information against the accused before this Court indicating thereon
the office related character of the accusation herein so that the Court might effectively
exercise its jurisdiction over the same.
SO ORDERED.[2]
The prosecution on even date complied with the said order and filed an Amended
Information, which was admitted by the Sandiganbayan in a resolution dated November
24, 1997.[3] The Amended Information thus reads:
That on or about September 10, 1997, at Sanchez Mira, Cagayan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Licerio Antiporda, Jr., being the
Municipal Mayor of Buguey, Cagayan in the exercise of his official duties as such and
taking advantage of his position, ordered, confederated and conspired with Juan
Gallardo, Barangay Captain of San Lorenzo, Buguey, Cagayan (now deceased) and
accused Eliterio Rubiaco, barangay councilman of San Lorenzo, Buguey, Cagayan,
Vicente Gascon and Caesar Talla with the use of firearms, force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and abduct
the victim Elmer Ramos without any authority of law from his residence at Marzan,
Sanchez Mira, Cagayan against his will, with the use of a Maroon Tamaraw FX motor
vehicle and subsequently bring and detain him illegally at the residence of accused
Mayor Licerio Antiporda, Jr. for more than five (5) days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
 Accused then filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion dated November 16, 1997 praying
that a reinvestigation of the case be conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest be
deferred.[5]
An order dated November 26, 1997 was penned by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero-
Agcaoili recommending the denial of the accuseds Urgent Omnibus Motion[6] was
approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto on January 9, 1998.[7]
The accused thereafter filed on March 5, 1998 a Motion for New Preliminary
Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance and/or Recall Warrant of Arrest Issued. [8] The
same was denied in an order given in open court dated March 12, 1998 "on the ground
that there was nothing in the Amended Information that was added to the original
Information so that the accused could not claim a right to be heard separately in an
investigation in the Amended Information. Additionally, the Court ruled that 'since none
of the accused have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court, the accused
are not in a position to be heard on this matter at this time' (p. 245, Record)."[9]
Subsequently, the accused filed on March 24, 1998 a Motion to Quash the
Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.[10]
On March 27, 1998, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order, to wit:
"The Motion to Quash filed in behalf of the accused by Atty. Orlando B. Consigna is
ignored, it appearing that the accused have continually refused or otherwise failed to
submit themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court. At all events there is an Amended
Information here which makes an adequate description of the position of the accused
thus vesting this Court with the office related character of the offense of the accused.
"SO ORDERED."[11]
A motion for reconsideration was filed on April 3, 1998 by the accused wherein it
was alleged that the filing of the Motion to Quash and the appearance of their counsel
during the scheduled hearing thereof amounted to their voluntary appearance and
invested the court with jurisdiction over their persons.[12]
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused in
its resolution dated April 24, 1998.[13]
Hence, this petition filed by Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., Eliterio Rubiaco, Victor
Gascon, and Caesar Talla.
The petitioners pose the following questions for the resolution of this Court.
a) CAN THE SANDIGANBAYAN, WHICH HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE ORIGINAL
INFORMATION, SUBSEQUENTLY ACQUIRE SUCH
JURISDICTION BY THE SIMPLE EXPEDIENT OF AMENDING
THE INFORMATION TO SUPPLY, FOR THE FIRST TIME,
JURISDICTIONAL FACTS NOT PREVIOUSLY AVERRED IN THE
ORIGINAL INFORMATION? and
b) COROLLARILY, CAN THE AMENDED INFORMATION BE
ALLOWED WITHOUT CONDUCTING ANEW A PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION FOR THE GRAVER OFFENSE CHARGED
THEREIN?
The petition is devoid of merit.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice,
that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose
of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties.[14]
Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 provides
for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxx
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to
their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine
of P6,000.00. Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph
where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court.
The Sandiganbayan exercises not only civil but also criminal jurisdiction. Criminal
jurisdiction, as defined in the case of People vs. Mariano[15], is necessarily the authority
to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment for it.
The case of Arula vs. Espino[16]enumerates the requirements wherein a court
acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case, to wit:
To paraphrase: beyond the pale of disagreement is the legal tenet that a court acquires
jurisdiction to try a criminal case only when the following requisites concur: (1) the
offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of, (2) the offense
must have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction, and (3) the person charged
with the offense must have been brought in to its forum for trial, forcibly by warrant of
arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the court.
The petitioners argue that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case because the original information did not allege that one of the
petitioners, Licerio A. Antiporda, Jr., took advantage of his position as mayor of Buguey,
Cagayan to order the kidnapping of Elmer Ramos. They likewise assert that lacking
jurisdiction a court can not order the amendment of the information. In the same breath,
they contend however that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the persons of the
accused.
They question the assumption of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan over their case
yet they insist that said court acquired jurisdiction over their motion to quash. The
petitioner can not have their cake and eat it too.
In the aforementioned case of Arula vs. Espino[17]it was quite clear that all three
requisites, i.e., jurisdiction over the offense, territory and person, must concur before a
court can acquire jurisdiction to try a case.
It is undisputed that the Sandiganbayan had territorial jurisdiction over the case.
And we are in accord with the petitioners when they contended that when they
filed a motion to quash it was tantamount to a voluntary submission to the Courts
authority. They cite the case of Layosa vs. Rodriguez[18] in support of their
contention. For therein, it was ruled that the voluntary appearance of the accused at the
pre-suspension hearing amounted to his submission to the courts jurisdiction even if no
warrant of arrest has yet been issued.
To counter this contention of the petitioners the prosecution adverted to case of de
los Santos-Reyes vs. Montesa, Jr.[19] which was decided some 28 years after the Layosa
case. In this more recent case, it was held that:
xxx the accused xxx have no right to invoke the processes of the court since they have
not been placed in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of their liberty by reason
or as a consequence of the filling of the information. For the same reason, the court had
no authority to act on the petition.
We find that the case of Layosa and de los Santos-Reyes are not inconsistent with
each other since both these cases discussed the rules on when a court acquires
jurisdiction over the persons of the accused, i.e., either through the enforcement of
warrants of arrest or their voluntary submission to the court.
The only difference, we find, is that the de los Santos-Reyes case harped mainly on
the warrant of arrest angle while the Layosa case dealt more on the issue of voluntary
submission ruling, that the appearance at the hearing through a lawyer was a submission
to the courts jurisdiction.
Having discussed the third requirement we now come to the question of whether or
not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged.
We answer in the negative. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan
did not mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only
after the same was filed that the prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional
fact was omitted therein.
However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration
and/or reinvestigation dated June 10, 1997[20] filed with the same court, it was they who
challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in
their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work connected, which is
hereunder quoted, as follows:
Respondents (petitioners herein) have thoroughly scanned the entire records of the
instant case and no where is there any evidence to show that the Honorable Prosecution
Office of the Province of Cagayan have been authorized by the Office of the Honorable
Ombudsman to conduct the Preliminary Investigation much less had the former office
been authorized to file the corresponding Information as the said case, if evidence
warrants, fall exclusively with the jurisdiction of the Honorable Sandiganbayan
notwithstanding the presence of other public officers whose salary range is below 27 and
notwithstanding the presence of persons who are not public officers.
It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.[21]
We therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because of
estoppel and it was thus vested with the authority to order the amendment of the
Information.
Rule 110, Section 14 of the Rules of Court provides thus:
Section 14. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or
form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and
during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when other words, the amendment may be made before the Sandiganbayan without surprising
the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused. the petitioner or prejudicing his substantive rights.[24] (Underscoring Supplied)

xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
Petitioner prayed that a reinvestigation be made in view of the Amended
Information. SO ORDERED.
We hold that the reinvestigation is not necessary anymore. A reinvestigation is Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
proper only if the accuseds substantial rights would be impaired. In the case at bar, we
do not find that their rights would be unduly prejudiced if the Amended Information is
filed without a reinvestigation taking place. The amendments made to the Information
merely describe the public positions held by the accused/petitioners and stated where the
victim was brought when he was kidnapped.
It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial,
and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged
with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a
trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the persons accused in jeopardy. It is not
the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence; it is for the
presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. [22]
The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already and we see
no cogent nor compelling reason why a reinvestigation should still be conducted.
As an aside, an offense is considered committed in relation to office when it is
intimately connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in
the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. [23]
In the case of Cunanan vs. Arceo, it was held that:

... the absence in the information filed on 5 April 1991 before Branch 46 of the RTC of
San Fernando, Pampanga, of an allegation that petitioner had committed the offense
charged in relation to his office is immaterial and easily remedied. Respondent RTC
judges had forwarded petitioners case to the Sandiganbayan, and the complete records
transmitted thereto in accordance with the directions of this Court set out in
the Asuncion case: x x x As if it was originally filed with [the Sandiganbayan]. That
Information may be amended at any time before arraignment before the Sandiganbayan,
and indeed, by leave of court at any time before judgment is rendered by
the Sandiganbayan, considering that such an amendment would not affect the juridical
nature of the offense charged (i.e., murder), the qualifying circumstances alleged in the
information, or the defenses that petitioner may assert before the Sandiganbayan. In
Republic of the Philippines arraigned by the said court and entered her not-guilty plea on December 23, 1964. The
SUPREME COURT said court thereafter conducted a full dress trial de novo with extensive hearings on
Manila October 11, 1965, December 9, 1965, December 29, 1965, August 11, 1966, October 4,
1966 and January 5, 1967, on which last date the trial court declared the reception of
EN BANC evidence closed.

The trial court thereafter rendered its decision of January 30, 1967, wherein like the
municipal court it rejected as not worthy of credence the accused's defense of alibi that
she was in Manila on the day of the commission of the offense and took a moderate view
G.R. No. L-37642 October 22, 1973 of her defamatory remarks, finding her guilty merely of slight slander and imposing a
P50.00 fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and payment of costs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, The trial court however sentenced the accused to indemnify the offended party in the
vs. amount of P500.00 by way of civil liability.
FELIZA CASUGA Y MUNAR, accused-appellant.
The accused filed a motion for reconsideration praying for acquittal and for reduction of
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio the civil liability to P100.00. The trial court in its reasoned order of February 8, 1967
A. Torres and Solicitor Alicia V. Sempio-Diy for plaintiff-appellee. denied reconsideration, rejecting the belated objection raised for the first time by
accused as to the proceedings being invalid because the private prosecutor conducted the
Jose A. Salomon for accused-appellant. examination of the witnesses on three hearing days, notwithstanding his announcement
later withdrawn that the offended party would file a separate civil case and ruling
correctly that since the government prosecutors were present at the hearings, the
prosecution of the case remained under their control and the private prosecutor's
presence and participation which were then not objected to were "of no particular
TEEHANKEE, J.: importance."

The Court herein affirms the judgment of conviction for slight slander as rendered by the
La Union court of first instance after trial de novo on an appeal by the accused-appellant
from an adverse original judgment of the municipal court of San Fernando, La Union.
The Court thus reaffirms the principle that while the jurisdiction of a court may be
challenged at any time, sound public policy bars a party such as appellant from so doing
belatedly and challenging the jurisdiction of the court of first instance after having
expressly procured that jurisdiction herself and speculating on the fortunes of litigation.
Accused-appellant was originally charged on July 9, 1964 with grave slander in the
municipal court of San Fernando, La Union for having uttered defamatory words in
calling the offended party, Erlinda Munar, an unmarried woman and a distant relative,
the paramour of somebody. The municipal court rejected her defense of alibi and per its
decision of September 8, 1964 sentenced her to pay a fine of P20.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. 1
The accused thereafter filed her notice of appeal directly to the Supreme Court "solely on
a question of law, to wit: that there was no legal basis for the judgment of conviction
because the proceedings were null and void as the private prosecutor had no legal
personality to represent, or present evidence for, the prosecution in view of the
reservation of the civil action, as borne out by the records." 2
Notwithstanding that the trial court ordered the record elevated to this Court, its clerk
forwarded the records to the Court of Appeals where the parties filed their briefs. Then
Solicitor-General, now a member of this Court, Justice Antonio P. Barredo noted this
oversight in the People's brief filed on February 14, 1968, and further prayed that since
the appeal was solely on questions of law that the same be certified to this Court. This
was eventually done in the appellate court's resolution of September 19, 1973,
transmitted to this Court on October 10, 1973, forwarding the case to this Court as
raising pure questions of law.

Accused-appellant filed an appeal directly to the La Union court of first instance and The original sole question of law raised by accused-appellant that private prosecutor for
filed the P100. appeal bond as fixed by the municipal court. She was duly re- the offended party had no legal personality to conduct the examination of some
witnesses and that his participation rendered null and void the proceedings is manifestly
without merit. Aside from the fact that accused's objection brought up only in her motion
for reconsideration was too late, the objection had no valid basis since the private
prosecutor had withdrawn the reservation to file a separate civil case and prosecution of
the case remained at all times under the control of the government prosecutors.
As to the additional question of jurisdiction raised for the first time by the accused-
appellant only in her brief on appeal that the crime of grave slander 3 of which she was
charged comes within the area of concurrent jurisdiction of municipal courts of
provincial capitals or city courts and courts of first instance, and that the judgment of the
La Union court of first instance to which she had expressly appealed the municipal
court's conviction should be deemed null and void for want of jurisdiction as her appeal
should have been directly to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court 4, this question is
foreclosed by the doctrine of estoppel enunciated by the Court that "after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for
the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court." As restated in Crisostomo vs.
Reyes and a number of subsequent cases, the principle decrees that "While the
jurisdiction of a tribunal may be challenged at any time, sound public policy bars the
petitioners from so doing after their having procured that jurisdiction themselves,
speculating on the fortunes of litigation." " 5
As specifically applied to criminal cases, the Court in Vera vs. People 6 refused to set
aside the judgment of conviction of the petitioners-accused as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals on the ground that the therein accused were barred from raising too late the
question of nullity of the trial court's judgment which was promulgated to the accused
only after the presiding judge's retirement when he was no longer the judge of the said
court. The Court again stressed therein the rationale for its doctrine whereby a party is
precluded from raising what would otherwise be a decisive jurisdictional question only
after an adverse decision had been rendered by the very court whose jurisdiction has
been invoked by a party to obtain affirmative relief and a final adjudication on the merits
and whose jurisdiction the party would now spurn. As stated in Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy 7 to sanction such conduct would result in revolting inequity and unfairness,
with the nullification of all the proceedings had over an extended period of time 20 years
in that case and almost 10 years in the case at bar.
As the People's brief puts it, an appellant cannot be permitted to experiment with the
court - the court of first instance in the case of herein appellant by submitting herself
to its jurisdiction and after the experiment has proved unsuccessful for her with the
rendition of an adverse decision to raise for the first time its lack of jurisdiction. As
restated by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion in Francisco vs. City of Davao, the ends of
justice would not be served if such belated jurisdictional questions were to be entertained
and the proceedings nullified when the court's jurisdiction had been invoked all the
time by the party who would now belatedly question its jurisdiction because of its
adverse decision.
Sound public policy and the interests of a just, orderly, efficient and inexpensive
administration of justice, whereby justice and fairness are accorded both to plaintiff and
defendant, to the offended party as well as to the accused, properly raise a barrier against
a party who would speculate on the fortunes of litigation and in the event of an adverse
decision challenge the jurisdiction of the very tribunal whose jurisdiction he or she has
invoked and procured at the expenditure of so much time, expense and effort on the part
of the litigants and of the State. A graphic illustration of the soundness of this policy and
doctrine is the present case where appellant would set at naught a mere judgment
imposing a P50. fine and P 500. civil liability upon her rendered after protracted
and extensive hearings conducted by the lower court in a case which has been pending
for almost ten years now since its inception and in the language of Sibonghanoy would
compel the offended party "to go up (her) Calvary once more."
As a matter of substantial justice, both the municipal court and the court of first instance
in the case at bar had dealt with the criminal charge of grave slander against the accused-
appellant as if it were one of slight slander punishable with a penalty of arresto mayor or
a fine not exceeding P200.00 and both courts imposed merely a fine well below the
maximum of P200.00. In this context, the municipal court can be said to have properly
exercised exclusive original jurisdiction and the court of first instance to have properly
exercised appellate jurisdiction as invoked by the accused-appellant herself and she
cannot now be allowed to question for the very first time here the very jurisdiction
invoked by her, especially where she has raised no question whatever as to the
correctness in fact and in law of the penalty and civil liability imposed upon her by the
lower court's judgment.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs.
Makalintal, Actg. C. J., Zaldivar, Fernando, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ.,
concur.
Castro, J., concurs in the result.
Barredo, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines 3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE
SUPREME COURT forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents Jose
Manila "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and
accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2
FIRST DIVISION
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon,
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer
OCON, Petitioners, Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness
vs. protection program.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand
DECISION Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and
SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila
convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case
the 18 December 2002 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted
its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B.
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the
assailed Orders, the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21, Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25
2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against
2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and
36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
Order dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the
then acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan; In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence
of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that,
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be
REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State
Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; and Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case
and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he
ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He
likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21
September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the
reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad,
but the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001
and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to
enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the
Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16
October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a
temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the
criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order
dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners.
On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondents cash bond evidenced by
O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order
while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in
Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt
of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001
dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said
motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondents
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the
petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City,
as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following
assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and
setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001,
September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases
numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the
Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on
the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his
person to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active
Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines,
and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein
petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket
of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City,
Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against
herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein having become final and
executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over
the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of
Appeals ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the
jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired
either through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary
appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the
court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the
processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764,
November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed in the custody of the law
before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon
and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or
otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to
complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of
arrest."4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over
the person of the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore,
petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required before the
court can act on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over
their person was already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of
applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The
outright dismissal of the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado
vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack
of probable cause without the accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of
Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of
arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs.
Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case transferred from the
Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of
probable cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by
their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over
his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a
motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction
thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of
bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule
the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the
judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon
the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by
the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished
either by arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while jurisdiction over the person of the accused
is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of
the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a
person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the
warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes
custody after his trial has commenced. 11Being in the custody of the law signifies
restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him
to become obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over
the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of Appeals should not
have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to
bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our
pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have
diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had
jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the application for bail. 13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we
clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago,
seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings,
constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the
applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he
purpose of bail is to secure ones release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one
who is free. Thus, bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who
is in the custody of law." The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it
discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused
could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction
of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements
therefor. 17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief
constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of ones person to the
jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the
avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance.
These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal
are included; 18 (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of
arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would
constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a
consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the
submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a
warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the
person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading
seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of
the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases
involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even
though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a
person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit
himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the
accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon
seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in
the custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted
various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to
have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these
cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack
of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the
ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further
proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accuseds Motion to Suspend
Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that
they filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent
judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to
defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for
certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we
directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court
even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications
for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting
of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who
can afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for the
commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the
quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very
rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is
because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or
not he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can
easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after personally
examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant
continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any
day and at any time of the day and night.22Furthermore, the continued absence of the
accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is
indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise
incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights
enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights, 23 demanding
that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the
Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad.
Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the
petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor
because of a subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his
doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the city. Second,
after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, he dismissed the
criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different
accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining
order against further proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda
appealed the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge
Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said
appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of
comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper."24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge
Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants
of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the
assistant prosecutors resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for
review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the
pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutors resolution is not a ground to
quash the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the
filing of the information in court against them on the ground that they still have the right
to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly,
the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been
quashed as premature on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in
order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the
question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted
constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule
112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query
or issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular
Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe"
Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been
violated by Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting
evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we
find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners
is apparent from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the determination of
probable cause was based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a
separate determination personally made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity
could be drawn from the order since it expressly and clearly showed that it was based
only on the fiscals certification.28
Petitioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order contains no such indication
that he relied solely on the prosecutors certification. The Joint Order even indicated the
contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to
determine the existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x
x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutors certification was accompanied by
supporting documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v.
Inting.31 The supporting documents are the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and
Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
 8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge
Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however,
focused on the substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In
failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal
is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was given after almost two years in the
custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by someone who
rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in
exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it was given
during the election period amidst a "politically charged scenario where "Santiago City
voters were pitted against each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side
and former City Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR Secretary
Heherson Alvarez on the other."32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the
findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not
within the province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb 33:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than
not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause
demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify
x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand
trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a
summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with
different accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that
there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutors resolution before the
Secretary of Justice. However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors
resolution, Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the
petitioners on the basis of the following explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch
41, Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda the
mastermind and with him and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators, the
October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops of murder,
certainly makes his sworn Statements a "narration of falsehood and lies" and that
because of the decision acquitting said officers "who were likewise falsely linked by said
Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel
Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is
without probable value." This Court agrees with the defenses views. Indeed, of what use
is Maderals statements when the Supreme Court rejected the prosecutions evidence
presented and adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to
turn state witness in these two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted to,
the probative value of his statements is practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18,
2001, praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the
latest decision of the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leao, et
al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused therein and in effect disregarding all the
evidence presented by the prosecution in that case. Accordingly, the two (2)
informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our
decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when
the evidence of the prosecution in the Leao case was presented. A decision, even of this
Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of
criminal case against different accused for the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad
is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision in Leao was based on reasonable
doubt. We never ruled in Leao that the crime did not happen; we just found that there
was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since the prosecution in that
case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the
criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel
Maderal. The accused in Leao furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliaos
son, whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent
Tuliao before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leao,
"it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured
statements and therefore the same is without probable value."35 On the contrary, if we
are to permit the use of our decision in Leao, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable
doubt actually points to the probability of the prosecutions version of the facts therein.
Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghads dismissal of the informations two days
after we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order
prohibiting him from further proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after
the informations were dismissed. While the dismissal of the case was able to beat the
effectivity date of the temporary restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the
informations (days after this Courts resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad)
creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders
set aside by the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not
recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed
Judge Anghad to issue apparently new warrants of arrest.36 According to the petitioners,
it was an error for the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a personal
determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of
arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge
Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof
should not be allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in this case
where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly,
the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan, 37 which
issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals likewise declared the
proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of
proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside
by the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghads order quashing the warrants of arrest had
been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of
arrest based on a determination of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible
for them to do so. The records of the preliminary investigation had been available to the
Court of Appeals, and are also available to this Court, allowing both the Court of
Appeals and this Court to personally examine the records of the case and not merely rely
on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts
v. Court of Appeals, the determination of probable cause does not rest on a subjective
criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable cause of
the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can
also overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before
arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed
a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No.
36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had become final and
executory. According to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated
November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private
respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the
private respondent before the Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page
of the assailed Decision, only the following Orders issued by Judge Anghad were
questioned by private respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the
assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon
the validity or nullity of the Joint Order of November 14, 2001. 38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court.
The Court of Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to them in our 19
November 2001 Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around three
weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the 14 November 2001
Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with this Court a Motion to Cite
Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully
committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we
referred said motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referral of
respondent Tuliaos petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt
places the 14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the Court of
Appeals. In claiming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the
14 November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much
more serious than grave abuse of discretion.
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of
the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases
within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise
directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from
transfer of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the
criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer;

Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15
November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001
Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal
cases upon the respondent Tuliaos filing of a bond in the amount of P20,000.00.
Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as
disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of
indirect contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of
respondent,39 the prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just
and equitable under the premises should be construed to include a prayer for the
nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not
constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has
not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed. 40
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to
this Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said
compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on
said cases with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants
of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P.
Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with
the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby
LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in
his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding
with the case, we hold that the number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are
enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further
resolve to follow the case of People v. SPO1 Leao,41 by transferring the venue of
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of Manila, pursuant to Article
VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the
Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and
raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,