CANGCO V.
MANILA RAILROAD attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons
FACTS::
Jose Congo, a clerk of Manila Railroad Company, with a monthly rate of P25
and lives in San Mateo, Rizal located along the line of the defendant railroad.
He was entitled of a pass that he uses for his transportation to the office free
of charge. During the incident, the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second
class-car where he was riding and, making, his exit through the door, took his
position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his
right hand for support.
On the side of the train station a cement platform which begins to rise
with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and
extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the
length of several coaches. As the train slowed down another passenger got
off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to
rise from the level of the ground. When the train had preceded a little farther
the plaintiff Jose Congo stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in
contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from
under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from
the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was
badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from
the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full
stop. The accident occurred between 7-8pm and the station was dimly
lighted by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform
where the accident occurred were difficult to discern especially to a person
emerging from a lighted car.
The presence of a sack of melons on the platform is found in the fact
that it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot
had been brought to the station for the shipment to the market. They were
contained in numerous sacks which has been piled on the platform in a row
one upon another and was so placed of melons and the edge of platform;
and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot
alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the
platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is
readily to be credited. The injuries which plaintiff had received were very
serious. He was operated and amputated twice due to unsatisfactory
previous operation which resulted to amputating his member higher up near
the shoulder. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum of
P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in
connection with the process of his duration.
Congo then instituted a proceeding in the CFI of Manila to recover
damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence
of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of
melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to
the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing
the trial judge, found the FACTS: substantially as above stated, and drew
therefrom his conclusion to the effect that, although negligence was
were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars,
nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting
from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. Judgment was
rendered in favour of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N the defendant company was liable for the damages caused by
their employees?
2. Who has the burden of proof to show negligence?
3. W/N plaintiff is contributory negligent to the incident?
RULING:
1. The SC ruled that it cannot be doubted that the employees of the railroad
company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in
the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he
alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal
cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the
defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless
recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant
is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage
which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by
reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance.
That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal
viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its
servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by
proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article
1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu,
but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of
expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa
contractual.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-
contractual culpa based upon negligence, it is necessary that there shall
have been some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and that the
last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is
in complete accord with the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol.
12, p. 611) that the liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of
the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or
superiority existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and
the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the
negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents, when such acts or
omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is not
based upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection
or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this
regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his
contract.
 2. The position of a natural or juridical person, who has undertaken by
contract to render service to another, is wholly different from that to which
article 1903 relates. When the sources of the obligation upon which plaintiff's
cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof
rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence if he does not his action fails.
But when the FACTS: averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant
for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to
perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings
whether the breach of the contract is due to wilful fault or to negligence on
the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract
and of its non-performance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication,
the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and
leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was
direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by
proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
3. as to the issue of contributory negligence of the plaintiff. In this
particular instance, that the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is
shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the
place where he stepped from it. Thousands of people alight from trains under
these conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the
company has kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no
reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in
alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to perform
its duty to provide a safe alighting place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is
that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as
follows: The test by which to determine whether the passenger has
been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train is
that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an
ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger,
would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed
by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or
should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of
ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury."
(Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in
Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809), we may say that the test is this; Was
there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he
alighted from the train which would have admonished a person of average
prudence that to get off the train under the conditions then existing was
dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his
failure so to desist was contributory negligence.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff in this case the following circumstances are to be noted: The
company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the
roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car
to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the
platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping
off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also
assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight.
Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigour and agility of young
manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train
was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble
person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing
such act that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or
recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger is
circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should
be considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less
capable than men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the
nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs.
Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it
was his daily custom to get on and off the train at this station. There could,
therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the
step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he
was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking
to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by
imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was
earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and that the injuries he has suffered
have permanently disabled him from continuing that employment. Defendant
has not shown that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His
expectancy of life, according to the standard mortality tables, is
approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a fair
compensation for the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability is
the sum of P2, 500, and that he is also entitled to recover of defendant the
additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services, and other
incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.
The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby
rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3, 290.25, and for the costs of both
instances. So ordered.
Calalas v. CA
G.R. No. 122039. May 31, 2000.
FACTS:
Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, a college freshman at the Siliman University, took
a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas.
Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," at the rear end of the
vehicle. Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing
so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva
bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured
and confinement in the hospital. Her attending physician certified she would
remain on a cast for a period of three months and would have to ambulate in
crutches during said period. Sunga filed a complaint for damages against
Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage. Calalas, on the other
hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the
Isuzu truck. The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party
defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of
the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of
another case, filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-depict, the
same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the
damage to his jeepney. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the
lower court was reversed and dismissed the third-party complaint against
Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. Hence this
petition.
Issues:
(1)Whether or not the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the
accident negates the liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the
common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers.
(2) Whether or not that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by
Salva was a caso fortuito.
(3) Whether or not the award of moral damages to Sunga is supported
evidence.
Held:
(1) Finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's
jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate
cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence
of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in
actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The
doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by
law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the
function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as
contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil
Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with
regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence
in cases of death or injury to passengers.
(2) This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped
while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. The jeepney was not
properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the
broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a
diagonal angle and that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the
allowed seating capacity of the jeepney. Petitioner should have foreseen the
danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the
highway.
(3) In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since
there was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad
faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga's contention that
petitioner's admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to
assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission
of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to
the hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight
of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena
that he was the one at fault for the accident.
Air France v Carrascoso (Torts)
AIR FRANCE V CARRASCOSO September 28, 1966 AIR FRANCE,
petitioner, vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that
left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent,
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane
ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in
"first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced
plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the
words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the
Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his
"first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body. After
some commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. CFI Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist
class for the portion of the trip Bangkok- Rome, these various amounts with
interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid;
plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket
from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all
other respects", with costs against petitioner.
Air France contends that respondent knew that he did not have confirmed
reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class
protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no
guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend
upon the availability of first class seats.
ISSUE:
Is Carrascoso entitled to damages?
RULING:
Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a
first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him
from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist
class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right
thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of
course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood
in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior
purpose."
For the wilful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer,
must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a
public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally,
could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be
treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin
and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a
tort". The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his
wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air
carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
Philippine National Railways (PNR) vs.CA (GR L-55347, 4 October 1985)
Facts:
On 10 September 1972, at about 9:00 p.m. Winifredo Tupang, husband of
Rosario Tupang, boarded Train 516 of the Philippine National Railways at
Libmanan, Camarines Sur, as a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to
some mechanical defect, the train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for
repairs, taking some two hours before the train could resume its trip to
Manila. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena, Quezon,
Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in his death. The train did not stop
despite the alarm raised by the other passengers that somebody fell from the
train. Instead, the train conductor, Perfecto Abrazado, called the station
agent at Candelaria, Quezon, and requested for verification of the
information. Police authorities of Lucena City were dispatched tithe Iyam
Bridge where they found the lifeless body of Winifredo Tupang. As shown by
the autopsy report, Winifredo Tupang died of cardio-respiratory failure due to
massive cerebral haemorrhage due to traumatic injury. Tupang was later
buried in the public cemetery of Lucena City by the local police authorities.
Upon complaint filed by the deceaseds widow, Rosario Tupang, the then CFI
Rizal, after trial, held the PNR liable for damages for breach of contract of
carriage and ordered it to pay Rosario Tupang the sum of P12,000.00 for the
death of Winifredo Tupang, plus P20,000.00 for loss of his earning capacity,
and the further sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages, andP2,000.00 as
attorneys fees, and cost. On appeal, the Appellate Court sustained the
holding of the trial court that the PNR did not exercise the utmost diligence
required bylaw of a common carrier. It further increased the amount
adjudicated by the trial court bordering PNR to pay the Rosario Tupang an
additional sum of P5,000,00 as exemplary damages. Moving for
reconsideration of the above decision, the PNR raised for the first time, as a
defense, the doctrine of state immunity from suit. The motion was denied.
Hence the petition for review.
Issue:
WON there was contributory negligence on the part of Tupang.
Held:
PNR has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and
to observe extraordinary diligence in doing so.Death or any injury suffered by
any of its passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in
the performance of its obligation under the contract of carriage.PNR failed to
overthrow such presumption of negligence with clear and convincing
evidence, inasmuch as PNR does not deny,(1) that the train boarded by the
deceased Winifredo Tupang was so overcrowded that he and many other
passengers had no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the
coaches of the train, (2) that the train did not even slow down when it
approached the Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the time, and (3) that
neither did the train stop, despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a
person had fallen off the train at Iyam Bridge. While PNR failed to exercise
extraordinary diligence as required by law, it appears that the deceased was
chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open
platform between the coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and
tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to
avoid falling off from the speeding train. Such contributory negligence, while
not exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the
amount adjudicated as moral damages. The Supreme Court modified the
decision of the appellate court by eliminating therefrom the amounts of
P10,000.00 and P5,000.00
(1) Concept of Negligence PNR (petitioners) vs. Ethel Bunty (respondents),
G.R. No. 169891, November 2, 2006
Doctrine/s:
(a) Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do.
(b) The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are
negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the
other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence
caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss
but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss.
(c) Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to
compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person.
Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages must
nevertheless be somehow proportional to and in approximation of the
suffering inflicted.
(d) Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to
compensate a party for an injury or loss he suffered. They arise out of a
sense of natural justice, aimed at repairing the wrong done. To be
recoverable, they must be duly proved with a reasonable degree of certainty.
A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork as to the fact
and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they
have suffered, and on evidence of the actual amount thereof.
Legal Provisions: Article 2176, RA 386: Whoever, by act or omission, causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
Facts: Ethel Bruntys late daughter, Rhonda Brunty, an American citizen,
visited Philippines sometime in January 1980 and prior to her departure, she
and her Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia, travelled to Baguio City aboard
a Mercedes Benz sedan with plate number FU 799, driven by Rodolfo L.
Mercelita. It was about 12:00 midnight, January 25, 1980. By then, PNR
Train No. T-71, driven by Alfonso Reyes, was on its way to Tutuban, Metro
Manila4 as it had left the La Union station at 11:00 p.m., January 24, 1980.
By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda, Garcia and Mercelita were already approaching the
railroad crossing at Barangay Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac. Mercelita, driving at
approximately 70 km/hr, drove past a vehicle, unaware of the railroad track
up ahead and that they were about to collide with PNR Train No. T-71.
Mercelita was instantly killed when the Mercedes Benz smashed into the
train; the two other passengers suffered serious physical injuries. A James
Harrow brought Rhonda to the Central Luzon Doctors Hospital in Tarlac,
where she was pronounced dead after ten minutes from arrival. Garcia, who
had suffered severe head injuries, was brought via ambulance to the same
hospital. He was transferred to the Manila Doctors Hospital, and later to the
Makati Medical Center for further treatment.
Ethel Brunty sent a demand letter to PNR to ask indemnity for the death of
her daughter, but PNR did not respond. As a result, she and Garcia filed a
complaint in the RTC Manila (later tried by Br. 20, Manila RTC). They alleged
that it was PNRs failure to provide necessary equipment at the railroad
crossing in Brgy. Rizal, Moncada. Tarlac which was proximate and direct
cause of Garcias injuries and the death of Rhonda. Meanwhile, contrary to
Brunty and Garcias allegations, PNR stated that it was not negligent in
selection and supervision of its employees (using the diligence of a good
father doctrine) and it was Mercelitas negligence which was the immediate
and proximate of the accident. It also stated that it had the right of way, and
has no legal duty to put a bar or red light signal at the crossing. Moreover, it
had adequate, visible, and clear warning signs strategically posted on the
sides of the road before the railroad crossing.
The Manila RTC granted via its decision on 21 May 1990 what Brunty and
Garcia asked and as stated in the decisions fallo, PNR was to pay:
1. Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) Philippine Currency, for the death of
Rhonda Brunty formerly a resident of 1595 Ashland Avenue, Des Plaines,
Illinois, U.S.A.;
2. One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) Philippine Currency for moral and
actual damages due the heirs of Rhonda Brunty;
3. Seventy-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty Pesos (P72,760.00)
Philippine Currency for damages sustained by the Mercedes Benz;
4. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) Philippine Currency as and for
attorney's fees, and;
5. Costs of suit.
PNR appealed the Manila RTCs decision to the Court of Appeals. However,
the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the lower trial court, but did
not consider Mercelita guilty of contributory negligence:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED with PARTIAL MODIFICATIONS, increasing the death indemnity
award from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, and deleting the award for damages
sustained by the Mercedes Benz.
Issue: Who was guilty of negligence between the people involved which
resulted in the unfortunate accident?
Held: The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the findings of the
Manila RTC and Court of Appeals. It held that PNR was indeed negligent by
not providing adequate, visible, clear warnings and safety equipment: (1)
absence of flag bars or safety railroad bars; (2) inadequacy of the installed
warning signals; and (3) lack of proper lighting within the area.
Actual damages were not awarded to respondents Brunty and Garcia, as
they failed to produce evidence for such. But moral damages were awarded
to Rhondas heirs:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated August 15, 2005 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The award of
actual damages is deleted, and in lieu thereof, temperate damages of
P25,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of Rhonda Brunty. The award of moral
damages is reduced to P500,000.00.
ILAO-ORETA vs. RONQUILLO GR No. 172406 | October 17, 2007 |
Carpio-Morales, J. | Petition for Review on Certiorari of a Decision of the CA
Petitioner:
Concepcion Ilao-Oreta
Respondent:
Spouses Eva Marie and Benedicto Noel Ronquillo
Facts:
Despite several years of marriage, Spouses Ronquillo is still childless.
They consulted Dr. Concepcion Ilao-Oreta, an obstetrician-gynaecologist-
consultant at St. Lukes and Chief of the Reproductive Endocrinology and
Infertility Section.
Eva Marie agreed to undergo a laparoscopic procedure where a laparoscope
would be inserted through her abdominal wall to get a direct view of her
internal reproductive organ in order to determine the real cause of her
infertility.
The procedure was scheduled on April 5, 1999 at 2 pm.
Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not arrive at the schedules time and no prior notice of its
cancellation was received by the Ronquillos.Dr. Ilao-Oreta was on her
honeymoon in Hawaii.
She estimated that she would arrive in Manila in the early morning of April5.
However, she failed to consider the time difference between Hawaii and
Philippines.
Ronquillos filed a complaint against. Ilao-Oreta and St. Lukes for
Breach of professional and service contract and for damages
RTC: awarded Eva Marie only actual damages upon finding that the doctors
failure to arrive on time was not intentional
CA: found Dr. Ilao-Oreta grossly negligent
Issue:
WON Dr. Ilao-Oreta was grossly negligent in not arriving on time for the
scheduled laparoscopy
Ratio:
Gross negligence
Implies a want or absence of or failure to exercises light care or diligence, or
the
Entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences
without exercising any effort to avoid them It is characterized by want of even
slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act,
not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences in so far as other persons may be affected
Records show that Dr- Ilao-Oreta
left an admitting order with her secretary
For one of the spouses to pick up,
Apprised Eva Marie of the necessary preparations for the procedure
And
Instructed the hospital staff to perform pre-operative treatments before
leaving for Hawaii
. These acts reflect an
Earnest intention to perform the procedure on the day and time scheduled
On realizing that she missed the scheduled procedure, Dr. Ilao-Oreta, upon
arrival in Manila, immediately called the hospital and asked the nurses about
Eva Marie. She also wanted to call the Ronquillosbut she didnt have their
number at that time. So the next morning, she went to her office to get the
Ronquillos contact number, which is written on Eva Maries chart, and called
them right away.
Noel admitted that indeed Dr. Ilao-Oreta called him up after she arrived in
Manila.
Although Dr. Ilao-Oretas act is not grossly negligent, she was negligent
when she scheduled to perform professional service at 2 pm without
considering the time difference between Philippines and Hawaii. Having
travelled to the US, where she obtained a fellowship in Reproductive
Endocrinology and Infertility, more than twice, she should have been mindful
of said difference.
The procedure to be conducted on Eva Marie was only elective in nature
thus the situation did not present any clear and apparent harm or injury that
even a careless person may perceive.
According to the SC, it bears noting that when Dr. Ilao-Oreta was scheduling
the date of her performance of the procedure, she had just gotten married
and was preparing for her honeymoon. It is
Common knowledge
That
Excitement attends its preparations
. Her negligence could thence
Partly attributed to human frailty which rules out its characterization as gross
Dispositive:
Petition is granted.
ROBERTO C. SICAM and AGENCIA de R.C. SICAM, INC. vs. SPOUSES
JORGE
G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007
FACTS: On different dates, Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of jewellery
with Agencia de R. C. Sicam located in Paraaque to secure a loan.
On October 19, 1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and took away
whatever cash and jewellery were found inside the pawnshop vault.
On the same date, Sicam sent Lulu a letter informing her of the loss of her
jewellery due to the robbery incident in the pawnshop. Respondent Lulu then
wrote back expressing disbelief, then requested Sicam to prepare the
pawned jewellery for withdrawal on November 6, but Sicam failed to return
the jewellery.
Lulu, joined by her husband Cesar, filed a complaint against Sicam with the
RTC of Makati seeking indemnification for the loss of pawned jewellery and
payment of AD, MD and ED as well as AF.
The RTC rendered its Decision dismissing respondents complaint as well as
petitioners counterclaim. Respondents appealed the RTC Decision to the CA
which reversed the RTC, ordering the appellees to pay appellants the actual
value of the lost jewellery and AF. Petitioners MR denied, hence the instant
petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: are the petitioners liable for the loss of the pawned articles in their
possession? (Petitioners insist that they are not liable since robbery is a
fortuitous event and they are not negligent at all.)
HELD: The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
YES
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation
requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.
Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or
avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have been
foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the
happening is not impossibility to foresee the same.
To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur:
(a) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure
of the debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of human will;
(b) It must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso
fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
(c) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfil obligations in a normal manner; and,
(d) The obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the
injury or loss.
The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on
him who invokes it. And, in order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from
liability, it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct
that may have occasioned the loss.
Sicam had testified that there was a security guard in their pawnshop at the
time of the robbery. He likewise testified that when he started the pawnshop
business in 1983, he thought of opening a vault with the nearby bank for the
purpose of safekeeping the valuables but was discouraged by the Central
Bank since pawned articles should only be stored in a vault inside the
pawnshop. The very measures which petitioners had allegedly adopted show
that to them the possibility of robbery was not only foreseeable, but actually
foreseen and anticipated. Sicams testimony, in effect, contradicts petitioners
defense of fortuitous event.
Moreover, petitioners failed to show that they were free from any negligence
by which the loss of the pawned jewellery may have been occasioned.
Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It does not
foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of herein petitioners.
Petitioners merely presented the police report of the Paraaque Police
Station on the robbery committed based on the report of petitioners
employees which is not sufficient to establish robbery. Such report also does
not prove that petitioners were not at fault. On the contrary, by the very
evidence of petitioners, the CA did not err in finding that petitioners are guilty
of concurrent or contributory negligence as provided in Article 1170 of the
Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the
tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
Article 2123 of the Civil Code provides that with regard to pawnshops and
other establishments which are engaged in making loans secured by
pledges, the special laws and regulations concerning them shall be
observed, and subsidiarily, the provisions on pledge, mortgage and
antichresis.
The provision on pledge, particularly Article 2099 of the Civil Code, provides
that the creditor shall take care of the thing pledged with the diligence of a
good father of a family. This means that petitioners must take care of the
pawns the way a prudent person would as to his own property.
In this connection, Article 1173 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of
that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of time and of the place.
When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2 shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in
the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be
required.
We expounded in Cruz v. Gangan that negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do; or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is want of
care required by the circumstances.
A review of the records clearly shows that petitioners failed to exercise
reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have
used in the same situation. Petitioners were guilty of negligence in the
operation of their pawnshop business. Sicams testimony revealed that there
were no security measures adopted by petitioners in the operation of the
pawnshop. Evidently, no sufficient precaution and vigilance were adopted by
petitioners to protect the pawnshop from unlawful intrusion. There was no
clear showing that there was any security guard at all. Or if there was one,
that he had sufficient training in securing a pawnshop. Further, there is no
showing that the alleged security guard exercised all that was necessary to
prevent any untoward incident or to ensure that no suspicious individuals
were allowed to enter the premises. In fact, it is even doubtful that there was
a security guard, since it is quite impossible that he would not have noticed
that the robbers were armed with calibre .45 pistols each, which was
allegedly poked at the employees. Significantly, the alleged security guard
was not presented at all to corroborate petitioner Sicams claim; not one of
petitioners employees who were present during the robbery incident testified
in court.
Furthermore, petitioner Sicams admission that the vault was open at the
time of robbery is clearly a proof of petitioners failure to observe the care,
precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demanded.
The robbery in this case happened in petitioners pawnshop and they were
negligent in not exercising the precautions justly demanded of a pawnshop.
NOTES:
We, however, do not agree with the CA when it found petitioners negligent
for not taking steps to insure themselves against loss of the pawned
jewelleries.
Under Section 17 of Central Bank Circular No. 374, Rules and Regulations
for Pawnshops, which took effect on July 13, 1973, and which was issued
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 114, Pawnshop Regulation Act, it is
provided that pawns pledged must be insured, to wit:
Sec. 17. Insurance of Office Building and Pawns- The place of business of a
pawnshop and the pawns pledged to it must be insured against fire and
against burglary as well as for the latter(sic), by an insurance company
accredited by the Insurance Commissioner.
However, this Section was subsequently amended by CB Circular No. 764
which took effect on October 1, 1980, to wit:
Sec. 17 Insurance of Office Building and Pawns The office
building/premises and pawns of a pawnshop must be insured against fire.
(Emphasis supplied).
Where the requirement that insurance against burglary was deleted.
Obviously, the Central Bank considered it not feasible to require insurance of
pawned articles against burglary.
The robbery in the pawnshop happened in 1987, and considering the above-
quoted amendment, there is no statutory duty imposed on petitioners to
insure the pawned jewellery in which case it was error for the CA to consider
it as a factor in concluding that petitioners were negligent.
Nevertheless, the preponderance of evidence shows that petitioners failed to
exercise the diligence required of them under the Civil Code.
David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he
was also able to learn some principles of mechanical engineering and
mechanical drawing from his dads office (his dad was a mechanical
engineer); he was also employed as a mechanical draftsman earning P2.50
a day all said, Taylor was mature well beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila
Electric power plant where they found 20-30 blasting caps which they took
home. In an effort to explode the said caps, Taylor experimented until he
succeeded in opening the caps and then he lighted it using a match which
resulted to the explosion of the caps causing severe injuries to his
companion and to Taylor losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the caps
exposed to children, they are liable for damages due to the companys
negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or
some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the
damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in
disposing off the caps which they used for the power plant, and that said
caps caused damages to Taylor. However, the causal connection between
the companys negligence and the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is
in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as he
even, in various experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode the
caps. It is from said acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature
both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to
sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman
thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout
that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence of record
leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character of the
cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by
him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His
attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts
to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his
endeavours brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of
the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any
reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might
be dangerous.
The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him
through his own fault, and that he cannot demand reparation therefor from
another.
JARCO MARKETING VS. CA
G.R. No. 129792 December 21, 1999
Lessons Applicable: Good Father of a Family (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
May 9 1983: Criselda and her 6 year-old daughter Zhieneth were
at the 2nd floor of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City.
While Criselda was signing her credit card slip at the
counter, she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud
thud. As she looked behind her, she saw Zhieneth's
body pinned by the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping
counter/structure. Zhieneth was crying and screaming
for help. Although shocked, Criselda was quick to ask
the assistance of the people around in lifting the counter
and retrieving Zhieneth from the floor. Zhieneth was
quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she
was operated on.
Next day: Zhieneth lost her speech and communicated by writing
on a magic slate.
14 days after: She died on the hospital bed. The cause of her
death was attributed to the injuries she sustained.
 After the burial of their daughter, Criselda demanded upon Jarco
Marketing the reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills
and wake and funeral expenses which they had incurred. But,
they refused to pay.
Criselda filed a complaint for damages
Jarco Marketing: answered with counterclaim and
denied any liability.
Criselda was negligent in exercising care and
diligence over her daughter by allowing her to
freely roam around in a store filled with
glassware and appliances. Zhieneth too, was
guilty of contributory negligence since she
climbed the counter, triggering its eventual
collapse on her. Petitioners also emphasized
that the counter was made of sturdy wood with a
strong support; it never fell nor collapsed for the
past fifteen years since its construction.
Maintained that it observed the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection,
supervision and control of its employees.
trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim
Proximate cause of the fall of the counter on Zhieneth
was her act of clinging to it.
CA: favoured Criselda judgment. It found that petitioners were
negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. The
counter was shaped like an inverted "L" with a top wider than the
base. It was top heavy and the weight of the upper portion was
neither evenly distributed nor supported by its narrow base.
Thus, the counter was defective, unstable and dangerous; a
downward pressure on the overhanging portion or a push from
the front could cause the counter to fall. Two former employees
of petitioners had already previously brought to the attention of
the management the danger the counter could cause. But the
latter ignored their concern.
ISSUE: W/N Jarco marketing was negligent or it was an accident
HELD: YES. CA affirmed
accident
pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or
negligence attaches to the defendant
a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening
an event happening without any human agency, or if
happening wholly or partly through human agency, an
event which under the circumstances is unusual or
unexpected by the person to whom it happens
occurs when the person concerned is exercising
ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person
and which could not have been prevented by any means
suggested by common prudence
negligence
omission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate
the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do
the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of
another person, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one
cannot exist with the other
Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for
Zhieneth, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to
have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. W
Without doubt, Panelo and another store supervisor were
personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable
counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the
situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and
patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have
done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably
failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father of
a family.
Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the
conclusive presumption that favours children below 9 years old
in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. In our
jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively
presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that
account, exempt from criminal liability. The same presumption
and a like exemption from criminal liability obtain in a case of a
person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is
shown that he has acted with discernment.
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to Zhieneth and
assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have
occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was
stable and sturdy.
Criselda too, should be absolved from any contributory
negligence.
Initially, Zhieneth held on to CRISELDA's waist, and only
momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch
when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise
moment, it was reasonable and usual for her to let go of
her child.
 Further, at the time Zhieneth was pinned down by the
counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and
the gift-wrapping counter was just 4 meters away - time
and distance were both significant.
US v. Pineda G.R. No. L-12858 January 22, 1918
Lessons Applicable: Experts and Professionals (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy of
a prescription obtained from Dr. Richardson, and which on other
occasions Santos had given to his horses with good results, at
Pineda's drug store for filling. (Santiago Pineda, the defendant,
is a registered pharmacist)
Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was prepared
and returned to Santos in the form of 6 papers marked Botica
Pineda
Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the
potassium chlorate which he had asked for, put two of
the packages in water the doses to two of his sick
horses.
Another package was mixed with water for another
horse, but was not used. The two horses, to which had
been given the preparation, died shortly afterwards.
Santos, thereupon, took the three remaining packages
to the Bureau of Science for examination. Drs. Pea and
Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science, on analysis found
that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but
barium chlorate.
At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also went to
the drug store of the defendant and bought potassium
chlorate, which when analysed was found to be barium
chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a
poison; potassium chlorate is not.)
Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy
on the horses, and found that death was the result of
poisoning
RTC: held Pineda liable
ISSUE: W/N Pineda should be liable for negligence
HELD: YES. The judgment of the lower court, sentencing the defendant to
pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the costs, is affirmed with the cost of this instance against the
appellant, without prejudice to any civil action which may be instituted
Every pharmacist shall be responsible for the quality of all drugs,
chemicals, medicines, and poisons he may sell or keep for sale;
and it shall be unlawful for any person whomsoever to
manufacture, prepare, sell, or administer any prescription, drug,
chemical, medicine, or poison under any fraudulent name,
direction, or pretense, or to adulterate any drug, chemical,
medicine, or poison so used, sold or offered for sale. Any drug,
chemical, medicine, or poison shall be held to be adulterated or
deteriorated within the meaning of this section if it differs from
the standard of quality or purity given in the United States
Pharmacopoeia.
The same section of the Pharmacy Law also contains
the following penal provision: "Any person violating the
provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished
by a fine of not more than five hundred dollar." The
Administrative Code, section 2676, changes the penalty
somewhat by providing that: Any person engaging in the
practice of pharmacy in the Philippine Islands contrary to
any provision of the Pharmacy Law or violating any
provisions of said law for which no specific penalty is
provided shall, for each offense, be punished by a fine
not to exceed two hundred pesos, or by imprisonment
for not more than ninety days, or both, in the discretion
of the court.
As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all
drugs and poisons which he sells. And finally it is provided that it
shall be unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under any
"fraudulent name." It is the one word "fraudulent" which has
given the court trouble. What did the Legislature intend to
convey by this restrictive adjective?
Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud, which the
appellant vigorously insists upon, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to convict any druggist of a violation of the law. The
prosecution would have to prove to a reasonable degree of
certainty that the druggist made a material representation; that it
was false; that when he made it he knew that it was false or
made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as
positive assertion; that he made it with the intention that it should
be acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser acted in
reliance upon it, and that the purchased thereby suffered injury.
Under one conception, and it should not be forgotten that the
case we consider are civil in nature, the question of negligence
or ignorance is irrelevant. The druggist is responsible as an
absolute guarantor of what he sells. Instead of caveat emptor, it
should be caveat venditor.
 MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and AURMELA GANZON vs. In cases where an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee,
RAUL DE LEON there instantly arises a presumption of law that there has been
G.R. No. 165622 [ October 17, 2008] negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection or
Facts: supervision of ones employees. This presumption may be rebutted by a
Respondent Raul T. De Leon, a judge, noticed that his left eye was clear showing that the employer has exercised the care and diligence of
reddish. He also had difficulty reading. On the same evening, he met a a good father of the family. Mercury Drug failed to overcome such
friend who happened to be a doctor, Dr. Charles Milla. The latter presumption.
prescribed the drugs Cortisporin Ophthalmic and Ceftin to relieve his Petitioners Mercury Drug and Ganzon have similarly failed to live up to
eye problems. Before heading to work the following morning, De Leon high standard of diligence expected of them as pharmacy professionals.
went to the Betterliving, Paraaque, branch of Mercury Drug Store They were grossly negligent in dispensing ear drops instead of the
Corporation to buy the prescribed medicines. He showed his prescribed eye drops to De Leon.
prescription to petitioner Aurmela Ganzon, a pharmacist assistant. At As a buyer, De Leon relied on the expertise and experience of Mercury
his chambers, De Leon requested his sheriff to assist him in using the Drug and its employees in dispensing to him the right medicine. This
eye drops. As instructed, the sheriff applied 2-3 drops on respondents Court has ruled that in the purchase and sale of drugs, the buyer and
left eye. Instead of relieving his irritation, respondent felt searing pain. seller do not stand at arms length. There exists an imperative duty on
He immediately rinsed the affected eye with water, but the pain did not the seller or the druggist to take precaution to prevent death or injury to
subside. Only then did he discover that he was given the wrong any person who relies on ones absolute honesty and peculiar learning.
medicine, Cortisporin Otic Solution. De Leon returned to the same
Mercury Drug branch, with his left eye still red and teary. When he
confronted Ganzon why he was given ear drops, instead of the
prescribed eye drops, she did not apologize and instead brazenly
replied that she was unable to fully read the prescription and it was her
supervisor who apologized and informed De Leon that they do not have
stock of the needed CortisporinOpthalmic. De Leon wrote Mercury
Drug, through its president, Ms. Vivian K. Askuna, about the days
incident. Instead, two sales persons went to his office and informed him
that their supervisor was busy with other matters. Having been denied
his simple desire for a written apology and explanation, De Leon filed a
complaint for damages against Mercury Drug.
Issue:
Whether or not the Mercury Drug and Ganzon are liable.
Ruling:
Yes. Mercury Drug and Ganzon cannot exculpate themselves from any
liability. As active players in the field of dispensing medicines to the
public, the highest degree of care and diligence is expected of them.
Likewise, numerous decisions, both here and abroad, have laid salutary
rules for the protection of human life and human health. In the United
States case of Tambar v. Conners, it was ruled that the profession of
pharmacy demands care and skill, and druggists must exercise care of
a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to practical
men. In other words, druggists must exercise the highest practicable
degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most exact and reliable
safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, so
that human life may not constantly be exposed to the danger flowing
from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicines.