Quirante v iac 31 jan1989 counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's
FACTS:
Dr. Indalecio Casasola had a contract with a building contractor named
Norman Guerrero
Philippine American General Insurance Co. Inc. (Philamgen) acted as
bondsman for Guerrero. In view of Guerrero's failure to perform his part of
the contract within the period specified, Dr. Casasola, thru his counsel, Atty.
John Quirante, sued both Guerrero and Philamgen
Philamgen filed a cross-claim against Guerrero for indemnification
RTC: in favor of Dr. Indalecio Casasola by rescinding the contract
ordering Guerrero and Philamgen to pay actual damages of P129,430, moral
damages of P50,000, exemplary damages of P40,000 and attorney's fees
of P30,000 ordering Guerrero alone to pay liquidated damages of P300/day from
December 15, 1978 to July 16, 1979 and ordering Philamgen to pay Dr.
Casasola the amount of the surety bond equivalent to P120,000.
Petition to quash the writ of execution and to compel the trial court to give due
course to the appeal was dismissed
In the mean time, Dr. Casasola died leaving his widow and several children as
survivors
Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his attorney's
fees
According to him, there was an oral agreement between him and the late
Dr. Casasola that in case of recovery of the surety bond - P30K and in
case of damages excess of the surety bond, divided equally bet. the heirs,
Atty. Quirante and Atty. Cruz.
RTC: granted the motion for confirmation
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Quirante can claim attorney's fees
HELD: NO. present recourse is hereby AFFIRMED
attorney's fees may be asserted either in:
the very action in which the services in question have been rendered -as in this
case
the Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount were less than the
minimum prescribed by law for the jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory
that the right to recover attorney's fees is but an incident of the case in which
the services of counsel have been rendered
rests on the assumption that the court trying the case is to a certain degree
already familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyer's services
The rule against multiplicity of suits will in effect be served
a separate action
2 Kinds of Attorney's fees
1. item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code wherein the
award is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his
fees by execution
2. claims are based on the contract for professional services, with the attorney as
the creditors and the clients as the debtors
It is further observed that the supposed contract alleged by petitioners as the
basis for their fees provides that the recovery of the amounts claimed is subject
to certain contingencies
We are of the considered view that the orderly administration of justice dictates
that such issue be likewise determined by the court a quo inasmuch as it also
necessarily involves the same contingencies in determining the propriety and
assessing the extent of recovery of attorney's fees by both petitioners herein. The
court below will be in a better position, after the entire case shall have been
adjudicated
We, therefore, take exception to and reject that portion of the decision of the
respondent court which holds that the alleged confirmation to attorney's fees
should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto, since it is also premised
on the eventual grant of damages to the Casasola family, hence the same
objection of prematurity obtains and such a holding may be pre-emptive of
factual and evidentiary matters that may be presented for consideration by the
trial court.
Manila electric company v ramoy 4 march 2008
FACTS: In the year 1987, the National Power Corporation (NPC) filed with the
MTC Quezon City a case for ejectment against several persons allegedly illegally
occupying its properties in Baesa, Quezon City. among the defendants in the
ejectment case was Leoncio Ramoy, one of the plaintiffs in the case at bar. On
April 28, 1989 the MTC rendered judgment for MERALCO to demolish or
remove the building and structure they built on the land of the plaintiff and to
vacate the premises. On June 20, 1999 NPC wrote to MERALCO requesting the
immediate disconnection of electric power supply to all residential and
commercial establishments beneath the NPC transmission lines along Baesa,
Quezon City.
In a letter dated August 17, 1990 MERALCO requested NPC for a joint survey to
determine all the establishments which are considered under NPC property. In due
time, the electric service connection of the plaintiffs was disconnected. During the
ocular inspection ordered by the Court, it was found out that the residence of the
plaintiffs-spouses was indeed outside the NPC property.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it found MERALCO negligent
when it disconnected the subject electric service of respondents.
(2) WON the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it awarded moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees against MERALCO under the
 circumstances that the latter acted in good faith in the disconnection of the electric
services of the respondents.
RULING:
(1) No. The Court agrees with the CA that under the factual milieu of the present
case, MERALCO failed to exercise the utmost degree of care and diligence
required of it, pursuant to Articles 1170 & 1173 of the Civil Code. It was not
enough for MERALCO to merely rely on the Decision of the MTC without
ascertaining whether it had become final and executory. Verily, only upon finality
of the said Decision can it be said with conclusiveness that respondents have no
right or proper interest over the subject property, thus, are not entitled to the
services of MERALCO.
(2) No. MERALCO willfully caused injury to Leoncio Ramoy by withholding from
him and his tenants the supply of electricity to which they were entitled under the
Service Contract. This is contrary to public policy because, MERALCO, being a vital
public utility, is expected to exercise utmost care and diligence i the performance of
its obligation. Thus, MERALCOs failure to exercise utmost care and diligence in the
performance of its obligation to Leoncio Ramoy is tantamount to bad faith. Leoncio
Ramoy testified that he suffered wounded feelings because of MERALCOs actions.
Furthermore, due to the lack of power supply, the lessees of his four apartments on
subject lot left the premises. Clearly, therefore Leoncio Ramoy is entitled to moral
damages in the amount awarded by the CA. Nevertheless, Leoncio is the sole person
entitled to moral damages as he is the only who testified on the witness stand of his
wounded feelings. Pursuant to Article 2232 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages
cannot be awarded as MERALCOs acts cannot be considered wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent. Since the Court does not deem it proper to award
exemplary damages in this case then the CAs award of attorneys fees should likewise
be deleted, as pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code of which the grounds were
not present.
Briones v macabagdal 3 august 2010
Facts:
Respondents spouses purchased a land from Vergon Realty located in a subdivision
in Las Pinas (Lot 2R) with a registered TCT. Vergon on the other hand owns the
adjacent land (Lot 2S).
In 1984, after obtaining the building permit and approval of Vergon, Jose
Macabagdal constructed a house on Lot 2R which they thought was Lot 2S. After
being informed of the mix up, spouses immediately demanded for demolition of the
house constructed. Jose, refused. Spouses then filed an action to recover ownership
and possession of the said land in RTC Makati.
Jose, insisted that the lot which they constructed their house was the lot which was
consistently pointed to them by the Vergon's agents over the 7-year period of paying
the lot. They interposed the defense of being buyers in good faith and impleaded
indemnity from Vergon because of the warranty against eviction, in case the suit is
decided against them.
RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. Defendants were ordered to demolish their house
and vacate the premises and return the possession of the lot to the spouses with
damages. Defendants counterclaim as well as the 3rd-party complaint were
dismissed for lack of merit and with no cause of action. On appeal, CA affirmed the
RTC. Saying that, there was no basis that the error was Vergon's fault and that they
cannot invoke the defense of a purchaser in good faith for wrongful occupation of the
land.
Thus, this petition.
Issue: In the main, it is petitioners' position that they must not bear the damage alone.
Petitioners insist that they relied with full faith and confidence in the reputation of
Vergon's agents when they pointed the wrong property to them. Even the President
of Vergon, Felix Gonzales, consented to the construction of the house when he
signed the building permit. Also, petitioners are builders in good faith.
Held: Petition is partly meritorious.
RTC erred in out rightly ordering petitioners to vacate the subject property or to pay
respondent spouses the prevailing price of the land as compensation. Article 527[14]
of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the
mistake was done by petitioners in bad faith, the latter should be presumed to have
built the house in good faith (Art. 448).
The builder in good faith can compel the landowner to make a choice between
appropriating the building by paying the proper indemnity or obliging the builder to
pay the price of the land. The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that
accords with the principle of accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal
and not the other way around. However, even as the option lies with the landowner,
the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for
instance, compel the owner of the building to remove the building from the land
without first exercising either option. It is only if the owner chooses to sell his land,
and the builder or planter fails to purchase it where its value is not more than the
value of the improvements, that the owner may remove the improvements from the
land. The owner is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell
his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
Moreover, petitioners have the right to be indemnified for the necessary and useful
expenses they may have made on the subject property. Articles 546 and 548 of the
Civil Code provide,
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same
right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having the
option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value
which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
ART. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the
possessor in good faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has
embellished the principal thing if it suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in
the possession does not prefer to refund the amount expended.
Consequently, the respondent-spouses have the option to appropriate the house on
the subject land after payment to petitioners of the appropriate indemnity or to oblige
petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is considerably more than the
value of the structures, in which case petitioners shall pay reasonable rent.
As to the liability of Vergon, petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to show
negligence on Vergon's part. It is the plaintiff who has to prove by a preponderance
of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of
the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages
incurred.
Bank of America vs. phil racing club 30 july 2009
Facts:
1. Plaintiff PRCI is a domestic corporation which maintains a current account with
petitioner Bank of America. Its authorized signatories are the company President and
Vice-President. By virtue of a travel abroad for these officers, they pre-signed checks
to accommodate any expenses that may come up while they were abroad for a
business trip. The said pre-signed checks were left for safekeeping by PRCs
accounting officer. Unfortunately, the two (2) of said checks came into the hands of
one of its employees who managed to encash it with petitioner bank. The said check
was filled in with the use of a check-writer, wherein in the blank for the 'Payee', the
amount in words was written, with the word 'Cash' written above it.
2. Clearly there was an irregularity with the filling up of the blank checks as both
showed similar infirmities and irregularities and yet, the petitioner bank did not try to
verify with the corporation and proceeded to encash the checks.
3. PRC filed an action for damages against the bank. The lower court awarded actual
and exemplary damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court's decision and
held that the bank was negligent. Hence this appeal. Petitioner contends that it was
merely doing its obligation under the law and contract in encashing the checks, since
the signatures in the checks are genuine.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can be held liable for negligence and thus
should pay damages to PRC
Both parties are held to be at fault but the bank has the last clear chance to prevent
the fraudulent encashment hence it is the one foremost liable .
1. There was no dispute that the signatures in the checks are genuine but the presence
of irregularities on the face of the check should have alerted the bank to exercise
caution before encashing them. It is well-settled that banks are in the business
impressed with public interest that they are duty bound to protect their clients and
their deposits at all times. They must treat the accounts of these clients with
meticulousness and a highest degree of care considering the fiduciary nature of their
relationship. The diligence required of banks are more than that of a good father of a
family.
2. The PRC officers' practice of pre-signing checks is a seriously negligent and
highly risky behavior which makes them also contributor to the loss. It's own
negligence must therefore mitigate the petitioner's liability. Moreover, the person
who stole the checks is also an employee of the plaintiff, a cleck in its accounting
department at that. As the employer, PRC supposedly should have control and
supervision over its own employees.
3. The court held that the petitioner is liable for 60% of the total amount of damages
while PRC should shoulder 40% of the said amount.
Andrada v pilhino sales 23 feb. 2011
FACTS:
Respondent Pilhino sued Jose Andrada, Jr. and his wife, Maxima to recover a sum of
money. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which came to be
implemented against two trucks owned by Jose Andrada, Jr.
However, the Hino truck could not be transferred to Pilhinos name due to its having
been already registered in the name of petitioner Moises Andrada. Pilhino thus
instituted an action in the RTC to annul the deed of sale between Jose and Moises.
The RTC dismissed the case for all the respondents in that case, except for the
Spouses Moises and Clemencia. This was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pilhino should be held liable for the damages the
petitioners sustained from Pilhinos levy on execution upon the Hino truck.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
CIVIL LAW: Questions of fact
The CA found that Pilhino had acted in good faith in bringing Civil Case No.
21,898-93 to annul the deed of sale involving the Hino truck executed by Jose
Andrada, Jr. in favor of Moises Andrada, considering that Pilhino had believed that
the sale in favor of defendants-appellants [had been] resorted to so that Jose Andrada
[might] evade his obligations.
Petitioners insistence that abuse of rights was not established requires the
consideration and review of factual issues. Hence, this appeal cannot succeed, for an
appeal by petition for review on certiorari cannot determine factual issues. In the
exercise of its power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally
undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties
during the trial. Perforce, the findings of fact by the CA are conclusive and binding
on the Court.
DENIED.
Eastern shipping v ca 12 july 1994
FACTS
Two fiber drums were shipped owned by Eastern Shipping from Japan. The
shipment as insured with a marine policy. Upon arrival in Manila unto the custody of
metro Port Service, which excepted to one drum, said to be in bad order and which
damage was unknown the Mercantile Insurance Company. Allied Brokerage
Corporation received the shipment from Metro, one drum opened and without seal.
Allied delivered the shipment to the consignees warehouse. The latter excepted to
one drum which contained spillages while the rest of the contents was
adulterated/fake. As consequence of the loss, the insurance company paid the
consignee, so that it became subrogated to all the rights of action of consignee
against the defendants Eastern Shipping, Metro Port and Allied Brokerage. The
insurance company filed before the trial court. The trial court ruled in favor of
plaintiff an ordered defendants to pay the former with present legal interest of 12%
per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint. On appeal by defendants, the
appellate court denied the same and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE
(1) Whether the applicable rate of legal interest is 12% or 6%.
(2) Whether the payment of legal interest on the award for loss or damage is to be
computed from the time the complaint is filed from the date the decision appealed
from is rendered.
HELD
(1) The Court held that the legal interest is 6% computed from the decision of
the court a quo. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money,
is breached, an interest on the amount of damaes awarded may be imposed at the
discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty.
When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executor, the rate of legal interest shall be 12% per annum from such finality until
satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
forbearance of money.
The interest due shall be 12% PA to be computed fro default, J or EJD.
(2) From the date the judgment is made. Where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or EJ but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the
time the demand is made, the interest shll begin to run only from the date of
judgment of the court is made.
(3) The Court held that it should be computed from the decision rendered by the
court a quo.
Pan pacific v equitable 18 march 2010
Facts:
Pan Pacific Service Contractors, Inc. (Pan Pacific) is engaged in contracting
mechanical works on airconditioning system. On 24 November 1989, Pan Pacific,
through its President, Ricardo F. Del Rosario (Del Rosario), entered into a contract
of mechanical works (Contract) with respondent for P20,688,800. Pan Pacific and
respondent also agreed on nine change orders for P2,622,610.30. Thus, the total
consideration for the whole project was P23,311,410.30. The Contract stipulated,
among others, that Pan Pacific shall be entitled to a price adjustment in case of
increase in labor costs and prices of materials under paragraphs 70.1 and 70.2 of the
"General Conditions for the Construction of PCIB Tower II Extension" (the
escalation clause).
Pursuant to the contract, Pan Pacific commenced the mechanical works in the project
site, the PCIB Tower II extension building in Makati City. The project was
completed in June 1992. Respondent accepted the project on 9 July 1992.
In 1990, labor costs and prices of materials escalated. On 5 April 1991, in
accordance with the escalation clause, Pan Pacific claimed a price adjustment
of P5,165,945.52. Respondents appointed project engineer, TCGI Engineers, asked
for a reduction in the price adjustment. To show goodwill, Pan Pacific reduced the
price adjustment toP4,858,548.67.
On 28 April 1992, TCGI Engineers recommended to respondent that the price
adjustment should be pegged atP3,730,957.07. TCGI Engineers based their
evaluation of the price adjustment on the following factors:
1. Labor Indices of the Department of Labor and Employment.
2. Price Index of the National Statistics Offices
PD 1594 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations as amended, 15 March 1991.
Shipping Documents submitted by PPSCI.
Sub-clause 70.1 of the General Conditions of the Contract Documents.
Pan Pacific contended that with this recommendation, respondent was already
estopped from disclaiming liability of at least P3,730,957.07 in accordance with the
escalation clause.
Due to the extraordinary increases in the costs of labor and materials, Pan Pacifics
operational capital was becoming inadequate for the project. However, respondent
withheld the payment of the price adjustment under the escalation clause despite Pan
Pacifics repeated demands. Instead, respondent offered Pan Pacific a loan of P1.8
million. Against its will and on the strength of respondents promise that the price
adjustment would be released soon, Pan Pacific, through Del Rosario, was
constrained to execute a promissory note in the amount of P1.8 million as a
requirement for the loan. Pan Pacific also posted a surety bond. The P1.8 million was
released directly to laborers and suppliers and not a single centavo was given to Pan
Pacific.
Pan Pacific made several demands for payment on the price adjustment but
respondent merely kept on promising to release the same. Meanwhile, the P1.8
million loan matured and respondent demanded payment plus interest and penalty.
Pan Pacific refused to pay the loan. Pan Pacific insisted that it would not have
incurred the loan if respondent released the price adjustment on time. Pan Pacific
alleged that the promissory note did not express the true agreement of the parties.
Pan Pacific maintained that the P1.8 million was to be considered as an advance
payment on the price adjustment. Therefore, there was really no consideration for the
promissory note; hence, it is null and void from the beginning.
Respondent stood firm that it would not release any amount of the price adjustment
to Pan Pacific but it would offset the price adjustment with Pan Pacifics outstanding
balance of P3,226,186.01, representing the loan, interests, penalties and collection
charges. Pan Pacific refused the offsetting but agreed to receive the reduced amount
of P3,730,957.07 as recommended by the TCGI Engineers for the purpose of
extrajudicial settlement, less P1.8 million and P414,942 as advance payments.
On 6 May 1994, petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity/annulment of
the promissory note, sum of money, and damages against the respondent with the
RTC.
Issue: Whether the CA, in awarding the unpaid balance of the price adjustment, erred
in fixing the interest rate at 12% instead of the 18% bank lending rate.
Held:
Under Article 2209 of the Civil Code, the appropriate measure for damages in case
of delay in discharging an obligation consisting of the payment of a sum of money is
the payment of penalty interest at the rate agreed upon in the contract of the parties.
In the absence of a stipulation of a particular rate of penalty interest, payment of
additional interest at a rate equal to the regular monetary interest becomes due and
payable. Finally, if no regular interest had been agreed upon by the contracting
parties, then the damages payable will consist of payment of legal interest which is
6%, or in the case of loans or forbearances of money, 12% per annum. It is only
when the parties to a contract have failed to fix the rate of interest or when such
amount is unwarranted that the Court will apply the 12% interest per annum on a
loan or forbearance of money.
The written agreement entered into between petitioners and respondent provides for
an interest at the current bank lending rate in case of delay in payment and the
promissory note charged an interest of 18%.
To prove petitioners entitlement to the 18% bank lending rate of interest, petitioners
presented the promissory note prepared by respondent bank itself. This promissory
note, although declared void by the lower courts because it did not express the real
intention of the parties, is substantial proof that the bank lending rate at the time of
default was 18% per annum. Absent any evidence of fraud, undue influence or any
vice of consent exercised by petitioners against the respondent, the interest rate
agreed upon is binding on them.
Frias vs san diego sison 3 april 2007
On 7 Dec 1990, Bobie Rose Frias and Dr. Flora San-Diego Sison entered into a MOA
over Friasproperty
MOA consideration is 3M
Sison has 6 months from the date of contracts execution to notify Frias of her
intention to purchase the property with the improvements at 6.4M
Prior to this 6 month period, Frias may still offer the property to other persons,
provided that 3M shall be paid to Sison including interest based on prevailing
compounded bank interest + amount of sale in excess of 7M [should the property
be sold at a price greater than 7M]
In case Frias has no other buyer within 6 months from the contracts execution,
no interest shall be charged by Sison on the 3M
In the event that on the 6th month, Sison would decide not to purchase the
property, Frias has 6 months to pay 3M (amount shall earn compounded bank
interest for the last 6 months only)
3M treated as a loan and the property considered as the security for the mortgage
Upon notice of intention to purchase, Sison has 6 months to pay the balance of
3.4M (6.4M less 3M MOA consideration)
Frias received from Sison 3M (2M in cash; 1M post-dated check dated February 28,
1990, instead of 1991, which rendered the check stale). Frias gave Sison the TCT and
the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property. Sison decided not to purchase the
property, so shenotified Frias through a letter dated March 20, 1991 [Frias received it
only on June 11, 1991],and Sison reminded Frias of their agreement that the 2M Sison
paid should be considered as a loan payable within 6 months. Frias failed to pay this
amount.
Sison filed a complaintfor sum of money with preliminary attachment. Sison averred
that Frias tried to deprive her of the security for the loan by making a false report of
the loss of her owners copy of TCT, executing an affidavit of loss and by filing a
petition[1] for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy. RTC issued a writ of
preliminary attachment upon the filing of a 2M bond.
RTC found that Frias was under obligation to pay Sison 2M with compounded interest
pursuant to their MOA. RTC ordered Frias to pay Sison:
2M + 32% annual interest beginning December 7, 1991 until fully paid
70k representing premiums paid by Sison on the attachment bond with legal
interest counted from the date of this decision until fully paid
100k moral, corrective, exemplary damages [liable for moral damages because of
Frias fraudulent scheme]
100k attorneys fees + cost of litigation
CA affirmed RTC with modification32% reduced to 25%. CA said that there was
no basis for Frias to say that the interest should be charged for 6 months only. It said
that a loan always bears interest; otherwise, it is not a loan. The interest should
commence on June 7, 1991 until fully paid, with compounded bank interest prevailing
at the time [June 1991] the 2M was considered as a loan (as certified by the bank).
ISSUES & HOLDING Ratio only discusses topic of INTEREST (as per syllabus)
WON compounded bank interest should be limited to 6 months as contained in
the MOA. NO
WON Sison is entitled to moral damages. YES
WON the grant of attorneys fees is proper, even if not mentioned in the body of
the decision. NO
CA committed no error in awarding an annual 25% interest on the 2M even beyond
the 6-month stipulated period. In this case, the phrase for the last six months only
should be taken in the context of the entire agreement.
SC notes that the agreement speaks of two (2) periods of 6 months each (see FACTS
words in bold & underline). No interest will be charged for the 1st 6-month period
[while Sison was making up her mind], but only for the 2nd 6-month period after Sison
decided not to buy the property. There is nothing in the MOA that suggests that interest
will be charged for 6 months only even if it takes forever for Frias to pay the loan.
The payment of regular interest constitutes the price or cost of the use of money, and
until the principal sum due is returned to the creditor, regular interest continues to
accrue since the debtor continues to use such principal amount. For a debtor to
continue in possession of the principal of the loan and to continue to use the same after
maturity of the loan without payment of the monetary interest constitutes unjust
enrichment on the part of the debtor at the expense of the creditor.
CA DECISION AND RESOLUTION AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION
Award of attorneys fees deleted
[1] At first, Frias petition was granted, but it was eventually set aside, since RTC
granted Sisons petition for relief from judgment (as Sison was in possession of the
owners duplicate copy).
Keirulf v ca 13 march 1997
FACTS:
February 28, 1987 7:45 pm: Pantranco bus driven by Jose Malanum lost control
and swerved to the left flying over the center island occupying the east-bound
lane of EDSA. The front of the bus hit the front of the Isuzu pickup driven by
Legaspi smashed to pieces and inflicting physical injury to Legaspi and his
passenger Lucila Kierulf. Both were treated at the Quezon City General Hospital
The bus also hit and injured a pedestrian who was then crossing EDSA
Despite the impact, the bus continued to move forward and its front portion
rammed against a Caltex gasoline station, damaging its building and gasoline
dispensing equipment
RTC: proximate cause was the negligence of the defendant's driver. Pantranco
North Express, Incorporated to pay Lucila Kierulf, Victor Kierulf for the
damages of the Isuzu pick-up and Porfirio Legaspi
CA: Affirmed with modification by adding P25,000 attorney's fees and to pay
costs
ISSUE: W/N both Lucila should be awarded moral damages
HELD: YES. AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of moral damages to
Lucila and Legaspi is hereby INCREASED to P400,000.00 and P50,000.00
respectively; exemplary damages to Lucila is INCREASED to P200,000.00. Legaspi
is awarded exemplary damages of P50,000.00
Rodriguez case ruled that when a person is injured to the extent that he/she is no
longer capable of giving love, affection, comfort and sexual relations to his or
her spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and real personal loss. The loss is
immediate and consequential rather than remote and unforeseeable; it is personal
to the spouse and separate and distinct from that of the injured person. Victor's
claim for deprivation of his right to consortium, although argued before
Respondent Court, is not supported by the evidence on record.
The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in awarding
moral damages.
no "rude and rough" reception, no "menacing attitude," no "supercilious
manner," no "abusive language and highly scornful reference" was given
her
awarded only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite
the offender's knowledge of his or her social and financial standing
proper to award moral damages to Lucila for her physical sufferings, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety and wounded feelings
She sustained multiple injuries on the scalp, limbs and ribs. She lost all her
teeth. She had to undergo several corrective operations and
treatments. Despite treatment and surgery, her chin was still numb and
thick. She felt that she has not fully recovered from her injuries. She even
had to undergo a second operation on her gums for her dentures to fit. She
suffered sleepless nights and shock as a consequence of the vehicular
accident.
Exemplary damages are designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has
socially deleterious consequences, and its imposition is required by public policy
to suppress the wanton acts of an offender
discretion of the court
(1) They may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition,
among others, to compensatory damages, and cannot be recovered as a
matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of
compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant;
(2) the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temporate, liquidated
or compensatory damages; and
(3) the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the award
would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner."
exemplary damages awarded increased to P200,000
The fact of gross negligence duly proven, we believe that Legaspi, being
also a victim of gross negligence, should also receive exemplary damages
Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of
an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury and are not
meant to enrich complainant at the expense of defendant
Porfirio that he had been incapacitated for 10 months and that during said
period he did not have any income
P16,500 as compensation for loss of earning capacity for the period is
amply supported by the records and is demandable under Article 2205 of
the Civil Code
Lucila's claim of loss of earning capacity has not been duly proven
A party is entitled to adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss
actually suffered and duly proved
 Mere proof of Lucila's earnings consisting of her 1983 and 1984 income tax
returns would not suffice to prove earnings for the years 1985 and
1986. The incident happened on February 28, 1987.
An estimate, as it is categorized, is not an actual expense incurred or to be
incurred in the repair. The reduction made by respondent court is reasonable
considering that in this instance such estimate was secured by the complainants
themselves
in order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof
of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While no proof of
pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the
amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court it is nevertheless
essential that the claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of the factual
basis of damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts. This is so
because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the
category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury
suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she
has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action.
Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Since each case
must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances, there is no hard and fast
rule in determining the proper amount. The yardstick should be that the amount
awarded should not be so palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that
it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial
judge. Neither should it be so little or so paltry that it rubs salt to the injury
already inflicted on plaintiffs.
B.F. METAL vs. SPOUSES LOMOTAN and RICO UMUYON
FACTS:
1. Respondent Rico Umuyon was driving the owner-type jeep owned by Spouses
Lomotan.
a. The jeep was cruising at a moderate speed of 20 to 30 kmph.
b. Suddenly, at the opposite lane, the speeding ten-wheeler truck driven by Onofre
Rivera overtook a car by invading the lane being traversed by the jeep and
rammed into the jeep.
c. The jeep was a total wreck
d. Umuyon suffered an injury which entailed his hospitalization for 19 days.
e. Due to the injuries he sustained, Umuyon could no longer drive, reducing his
daily income fromP150 to P100
2. *RTC: Respondents instituted a separate and independent civil action for
damages against BF Metal Corporation and Rivera.
a. The complaint alleged that Riveras gross negligence and recklessness was the
immediate and proximate cause of the vehicular accident and that petitioner
failed to exercise the required diligence in the selection and supervision of
Rivera.
b. The complaint prayed for the award of actual, exemplary and moral damages
and attorneys fees in favor of respondents.
3. BF Metal and Rivera averred that:
a. Respondents were not the proper parties-in-interest to prosecute the action since
they were not the registered owner of the jeep.
b. the sole and proximate cause of the accident was the fault and negligence of
Umuyon.
c. Petitioner exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees.
4. During the trial, respondents presented:
a. The testimonies of Umuyon, SPO1 Rico Canaria, SPO4 Theodore Cadaweg and
Nicanor Fajardo, the auto-repair shop owner who gave a cost estimate for the
repair of the wrecked jeep.
b. Document showing the cost estimate of Pagawaan Motors, Inc. which pegged
the repair cost of the jeep at P96,000, and the cost estimate of Fajardo Motor
Works done which reflected an increased repair cost at P130,655.
c. A copy of the Decision in Criminal Case No. 4742 finding Rivera guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with physical injuries.
5. The court declared Rivera negligent
a. When he failed to determine with certainty that the opposite lane was clear
before overtaking the vehicle in front of the truck he was driving.
b. Also negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees when it failed to
prove the proper dissemination of safety driving instructions to its drivers.
6. *CA: Petitioner and Rivera appealed the decision
a. The court affirmed the RTCs finding that Riveras negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident and that petitioner was liable under Article
2180 of the Civil Code for its negligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees.
b. However, it modified the amount of damages awarded to respondents.
7. Motion for reconsideration denied by CA.
8. *SC: Only petitioner filed the instant petition, expressly stating that it is
assailing only the damages awarded by the appellate court
ISSUE#1: W/N the amount of actual damages based only on a job estimate should
be lowered
HELD: YES
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
Actual damages are such compensation or damages for an injury that will put the
injured party in the position in which he had been before he was injured. They
pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of
measurement. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof
of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be given only to claims which are duly
supported by receipts.
In the instant case, no evidence was submitted to show the amount actually spent for
the repair or replacement of the wrecked jeep. Spouses Lomotan presented two
different cost estimates to prove the alleged actual damage of the wrecked jeep.
Exhibit "B," is a job estimate by Pagawaan Motors, Inc., which pegged the repair
cost of the jeep at P96,000.00, while Exhibit "M," estimated the cost of repair
at P130,655.00. An estimate is competent to prove actual damages. Courts cannot
simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and
amount of damages.
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the best evidence to prove the value of the
wrecked jeep is reflected in Exhibit "I," the Deed of Sale showing the jeeps
acquisition cost at P72,000.00. However, the depreciation value of equivalent to 10%
of the acquisition cost cannot be deducted from it in the absence of proof in support
thereof.
ISSUE#2: W/N respondents also entitled to moral and exemplary damages
HELD: Only Spouses Lomotan are not entitled to moral damages
Petitioner argues that the award of moral damages was premised on the resulting
physical injuries arising from the quasi-delict; since only respondent Umuyon
suffered physical injuries, the award should pertain solely to him. Correspondingly,
the award of exemplary damages should pertain only to respondent Umuyon since
only him was entitled to moral damages.
In the case of moral damages, recovery is more an exception rather than the rule.
Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and
alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar harm
unjustly caused to a person. In order that an award of moral damages can be aptly
justified, the claimant must be able to satisfactorily prove that he has suffered such
damages and that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed in
Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. Then, too, the damages must be shown to
be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission. The claimant must establish
the factual basis of the damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant. In
fine, an award of moral damages would require, firstly, evidence of besmirched
reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant;
secondly, a culpable act or omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages
sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of the
instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil
Code. In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when an act or omission causes
physical injuries, or (b) where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, moral
damages may aptly be recovered. This rule also applies to breaches of contract where
the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. In culpa criminal, moral damages
could be lawfully due when the accused is found guilty of physical injuries,
lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest,
illegal search, or defamation.
Undoubtedly, petitioner is liable for the moral damages suffered by respondent
Umuyon. Its liability is based on a quasi-delict or on its negligence in the supervision
and selection of its driver, causing the vehicular accident and physical injuries to
respondent Umuyon. Rivera is also liable for moral damages to respondent Umuyon
based on either culpa criminal or quasi-delict. Since the decision in the criminal
case, which found Rivera guilty of criminal negligence, did not award moral
damages, the same may be awarded in the instant civil action for damages.
Jurisprudence show that in criminal offenses resulting to the death of the victim, an
award within the range ofP50,000.00 to P100,000.00 as moral damages has become
the trend. Under the circumstances, because respondent Umuyon did not die but had
become permanently incapacitated to drive as a result of the accident, the award
of P30,000.00 for moral damages in his favor is justified.
However, there is no legal basis in awarding moral damages to Spouses Lomotan
whether arising from the criminal negligence committed by Rivera or based on the
negligence of petitioner under Article 2180. Article 2219 speaks of recovery of moral
damages in case of a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries or quasi-
delicts causing physical injuries, the two instances where Rivera and petitioner are
liable for moral damages to respondent Umuyon. Article 2220 does speak of
awarding moral damages where there is injury to property, but the injury must be
willful and the circumstances show that such damages are justly due. There being no
proof that the accident was willful, Article 2220 does not apply.
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will
decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. In quasi-delicts, exemplary
damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.While the
amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that
he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.
To serve as an example for the public good, the Court affirms the award of
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to respondents. Because
exemplary damages are awarded, attorneys fees may also be awarded in consonance
with Article 2208 (1). The Court affirms the appellate courts award of attorneys
fees in the amount of P25,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58655
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of actual damages for the cost
of repairing the owner-type jeep is hereby REDUCED to P72,000.00 while the
moral damages of P30,000.00 is awarded solely to respondent Umuyon. All other
awards of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. full satisfaction.

People v lizano 27 april 2007
Facts:
Lizano was charged with three (3) counts of rape in three (3) separate Informations
to all of which he pleaded not guilty. Trial then proceeded.
AAA had been staying in her grandmothers house together with Lizano and his
wife, BBB. BBB is AAAs aunt.
AAA, only 11 at the time, was sleeping inside the house when appellant lay down
beside her and began undressing her while threatening to kill her, her grandmother
and aunt should she reveal his acts to anybody. Lizano took off this clothes, went on
top of AAA and inserted his inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her to feel
pain.
AAAs age was established by her birth certificate and testimony from her mother. A
medical clerk testified on the medical findings of the medico-legal which saw
superficial lacerations of the hymen.
Lizano testified for himself raising the defenses of denial and alibi. Lozano claims
that he was driving his tricycle the whole day. He recalled an incident where he
asked AAA to get a spare part of a tricycle in the living room. Unable to follow his
orders, appellant followed AAA inside the house. It was at that moment when his
wife, BBB, arrived and accused him of raping AAA. Lizano claims that BBB had
induced AAA to charge him with rape because of their frequent quarrels.
RTC found him guilty of 1 count of rape.
The CA affirmed the RTC in toto.
Note: at this point, the decision hasnt mentioned any moral damages yet or any kind
of penalty.
Issues: W/N the prosecution established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
In the rape cases, conviction or acquittal issue boils down to credibility. Findings of
fact of the trial court should not be disturbed on appeal since conclusions as to the
credibility of witnesses in rape cases hinge heavily on the sound judgment of the trial
court
The trial court observed: The private complainant AAA then an 11 years old [sic]
girl in a clear, convincing and straightforward manner testified on how the rape
occurred. Her clear account of the first incident of rape unequivocally show that she
was indeed raped by the accused Filomino Lizano.
During the trial, AAA recounted the rape incident and positively identified appellant
as the perpetrator. AAA was also consistent in her story when he first reported her
ordeal to the police and it was reduced to writing.
Lizanos main argument is premised on the delay of reporting the crime. The OSG
correctly points out that delay in reporting a rape incident does not impair the
credibility of the victim in the face of threats of death or physical violence. AAA
satisfactorily explained the delay. Appellant threatened to kill her, her grandmother
and aunt should she report the incident to anybody.
According to the SC, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for the rape of AAA, who was then under 12 years old. The SC affirmed the
award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Civil indemnity is automatically imposed upon the accused without need of proof
other than the fact of the commission of rape.
Moral damages is also automatically granted in rape cases without need of further
proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim
had actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award.
Occena v icamina 22 jan 1990
Facts: Eulogio Occena, herein petitioner, filed a criminal complaint for Grave Oral
Defamation against herein private respondent Cristina Vegafria for allegedly openly,
publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting words and statements: "Gago
ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas," which, freely
translated, mean: "You are a foolish Barangay Captain, ignoramus, traitor, tyrant,
Judas" and other words and statements of similar import which caused great and
irreparable damage and injury to his person and honor.
Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter
ensued, at which petitioner, without reserving his right to file a separate civil action
for damages actively intervened thru a private prosecutor.
After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral Defamation
and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages were awarded to petitioner in
view of the trial court's opinion that "the facts and circumstances of the case as adduced
by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of moral damages."
Disagreeing, petitioner sought relief from the Regional Trial Court.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the decision of the Municipal Trial Court constitutes the final
adjudication on the merits of private respondent's civil liability;
(2) Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the
remarks uttered by private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory.
Held:
We find merit in the petition.
(1) The decision of the Municipal Trial Court as affirmed by the Regional Trial Court
cannot be considered as a final adjudication on the civil liability of private respondent
simply because said decision has not yet become final due to the timely appeal filed
by petitioner with respect to the civil liability of the accused in said case. It was only
the unappealed criminal aspect of the case which has become final.
(2) Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses are governed by Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that "(E)very person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable," in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict, the
provisions for independent civil actions in the Chapter on Human Relations and the
provisions regulating damages, also found in the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, private respondent was found guilty of slight oral defamation and
sentenced to a fine of P50.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, but
no civil liability arising from the felonious act of the accused was adjudged. This is
erroneous. As a general rule, a person who is found to be criminally liable offends two
(2) entities: the state or society in which he lives and the individual member of the
society or private person who was injured or damaged by the punishable act or
omission. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those
felonies where no civil liability results because either there is no offended party or no
damage was caused to a private person. There is here an offended party,hence, we rule
that for the injury to his feelings and reputation, being a barangay captain, petitioner
is entitled to moral damages in the sum of P5,000.00 and a further sum of P5,000.00
as exemplary damages.
Abs cbn vs ca 21 jan 1999
FACTS:
Viva, through Del Rosario, offered ABS-CBN through its vice-president Charo
Santos-Concio, a list of 3 film packages or 36 titles from which ABS-CBN may
exercise its right of first refusal
Mrs. Concio informed Vic through a letter that they can only purchase 10 titles to be
schedules on non-primetime slots because they were very adult themes which the
ruling of the MTRCB advises to be aired at 9:00 p.m
February 27, 1992: Del Rosario approached ABS-CBN's Ms. Concio with a list
consisting of 52 original movie titles as well as 104 re-runs proposing to sell to ABS-
CBN airing rights for P60M (P30M cash and P30M worth of television spots) April
2, 1992: Del Rosario and ABS-CBN general manager, Eugenio Lopez III met
wherein Del Rosario allegedly agreed to grant rights for 14 films for P30M
April 06, 1992: Del Rosario and Mr. Graciano Gozon of RBS Senior vice-president
for Finance discussed the terms and conditions of Viva's offer to sell the 104 films,
after the rejection of the same package by ABS-CBN
April 07, 1992: Ms. Concio sent the proposal draft of 53 films for P35M which
Viva's Board rejected since they will not accept anything less than P60M
April 29, 1992: Viva granted RBS exclusive grants for P60M
RTC: Issued TRO against RBS in showing 14 films as filed by ABS-CBN.
RBS also set up a cross-claim against VIVA
RTC: ordered ABS-CBN to pay RBS P107,727 premium paid by RBS to the surety
which issued their bond to lift the injunction, P191,843.00 for the amount of print
advertisement for "Maging Sino Ka Man" in various newspapers, P1M attorney's
fees, P5M moral damages, P5M exemplary damages and costs. Cross-claim to
VIVA was dismissed.
ABS-CBN appealed. VIVA and Del Rosario also appealed seeking moral and
exemplary damages and additional attorney's fees.
CA: reduced the awards of moral damages to P2M, exemplary damages to P2M and
attorney's fees to P500,000. Denied VIVA and Del Rosario's appeal because it was
RBS and not VIVA which was actually prejudiced when the complaint was filed by
ABS-CBN
ISSUE:
1. W/N RBS is entitled to damages. -YES
2. W/N VIVA is entitled to damages. - NO
HELD: REVERSED except as to unappealed award of attorney's fees in favor of
VIVA Productions, Inc.
1. YES.
One is entitled to compensation for actual damages only for such pecuniary
loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. The indemnification shall
comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the
profits that the obligee failed to obtain. In contracts and quasi-contracts the
damages which may be awarded are dependent on whether the obligor acted
with good faith or otherwise, It case of good faith, the damages recoverable
are those which are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of
the obligation and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably
foreseen at the time of the constitution of the obligation. If the obligor acted
with fraud, bad faith, malice, or wanton attitude, he shall be responsible for
all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of
the obligation. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for
all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of, whether or not such damages has been foreseen or
could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. Actual damages
may likewise be recovered for loss or impairment of earning capacity in
cases of temporary or permanent personal injury, or for injury to the
plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit.
The claim of RBS for actual damages did not arise from contract, quasi-
contract, delict, or quasi-delict. It arose from the fact of filing of the
complaint despite ABS-CBN's alleged knowledge of lack of cause of
action. Needless to state the award of actual damages cannot be
comprehended under the above law on actual damages. RBS could only
probably take refuge under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
In this case, ABS-CBN had not yet filed the required bond; as a matter of
fact, it asked for reduction of the bond and even went to the Court of
Appeals to challenge the order on the matter, Clearly then, it was not
necessary for RBS to file a counterbond. Hence, ABS-CBN cannot be held
responsible for the premium RBS paid for the counterbond
Neither could ABS-CBN be liable for the print advertisements for "Maging
Sino Ka Man" for lack of sufficient legal basis.
Article 2217 thereof defines what are included in moral damages, while
Article 2219 enumerates the cases where they may be recovered, Article
2220 provides that moral damages may be recovered in breaches of contract
 where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. RBS's claim for
moral damages could possibly fall only under item (10) of Article 2219
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34, and 35.
The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation
because, being an artificial person and having existence only in legal
contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses, It cannot, therefore,
experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which call be experienced
only by one having a nervous system. A corporation may recover moral
damages if it "has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social
humiliation" is an obiter dictum. On this score alone the award for damages
must be set aside, since RBS is a corporation.
exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. They are recoverable in criminal cases as part of the civil liability
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances in
quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted with gross negligence and in contracts
and quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner
It may be reiterated that the claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not based on
contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict, Hence, the claims for moral and
exemplary damages can only be based on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil
Code.
There is no adequate proof that ABS-CBN was inspired by malice or bad
faith. If damages result from a person's exercise of a right, it is damnum
absque injuria.