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GM in China
INTRODUCTION

In July 1994, when the Chinese authorities initiated the task of making China’s automotive
sector as one of the country’s strongest industries, the market had opened up for the foreign
companies.1 However, the foreign car companies were required to qualify few pre-conditions:
they were required to first invest in the components industry and transfer the technology to
the Chinese partner in a joint venture, where the share of the foreign partner would not
exceed 50%.2 General Motors (GM), in an effort to gain access to the Chinese automotive
market, invested in technical assistance projects, which facilitated technology-transfer to
the Chinese automotive sector. By 1996, GM had set up a number of joint ventures to
manufacture auto components in China. Eventually, GM got the permission and so, set up
a manufacturing unit investing between $1billion and $2 billion to manufacture mid-sized
cars in China.3
However, by 1996, the sales in the Chinese car market had been declining steadily, mainly
due to the smuggling of cars into China, mostly from North Korea.4 GM, however, continued
with its expansion plans, as it felt that the Chinese market had a lot of potential. Between
1997 and March 2004, GM set up a number of joint ventures to manufacture different
models (Exhibit I). The models manufactured by GM in China were the variants of Buick,
Chevrolets and mini vehicles like Sunshine and LZW6360. GM China also brought in other
models like Opel, Cadillac and Saab to China in the form of imports.
GM faced a number of problems in China; however, its optimism about China’s potential in
the car market paid-off. The passenger car sector in China grew by 76% in 2003 over 2002.
Industry sales totalled to 1.97 million units in 2003 compared with 1.12 million in 2002.5 The
country was fast developing into the fourth-largest automotive market in the world after
the US, Japan, and Germany.6 Global Insight Inc. had forecasted that Mainland China
would become the world’s second largest automotive market by 2013. GM China’s sales
increased by 46.4% in 2003, compared to the previous year.7 The company was also able to
maintain a steady stream of earnings over the years in China. In 2003, it tripled its
earnings to $437 million as compared to $142 million in the previous year.8 GM’s earnings
for Asia-Pacific region, which totalled to $577 million in 2003, constituted majority of
the company’s earnings.

1
Peters Tim, et al., “The Chinese Auto Industry General Motors and Ford Motors 1994 to 1999”, www.vwa.unisg.ch
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Bailey John, “China’s auto industry prepares for more competition”, www.financeasia.com, March 25th 2004
6
Ibid.
7
Blanchard Ben, “UPDATE 3 – Chasing VW, GM and China agree 4th plant”, www.forbes.com, February 26th 2004
8
“China triples earnings to $437 mln in 2003”, http://www.gminsidenews.com/forums/showthread.php?t=4217,
March 15 th 2004

This case study was written by Sandeep Chaurasia under the direction of T Phani Madhav, IBSCDC. It is
intended to be used as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective
handling of a management situation. The case was compiled from published sources.

© 2004, IBSCDC.
No part of this publication may be copied, stored, transmitted, reproduced or distributed in any form or
medium whatsoever without the permission of the copyright owner.

License to use for the Class of 2012,

Semester I, IBS Hyderabad.
Course: Marketing Management – I
 COM0027

2 GM IN CHINA

THE CHINESE MARKET AND THE COMPETITION

In the 1990s, the Chinese passenger car market was highly regulated due to the government
control over production volumes, prices and the models that could be manufactured and
sold.9 The government wanted to reserve the mass market for the local players, and the
foreign manufacturers were forced to manufacture vehicles that were too expensive for the
average customer.
By the year 2000, the major problems being faced by foreign players in the Chinese automotive
industry, apart from the fact that the government had the final say in all decisions that were
made in the industry, were that the consumer understanding was very limited and there
were dealers looking to make money by hook or crook.10 Such problems led to a slowdown
of the market, with prices that most Chinese customers were unable to afford.
Mostly foreign players that have entered the market through joint ventures (Exhibit II),
dominated the Chinese car market from 1995 onwards. These foreign players held a major
portion of the market, while around 120 domestic manufacturers accounted for the rest of
the market. Among the local manufacturers, First Automotive Works Group (FAW) and
Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), were the two largest companies and
provided the main competition for the foreign players.
Of the foreign players, Volkswagen (Exhibit III), which entered the Chinese market in 1985,
dominated the market. Toyota (Exhibit IV), with its 9% market share and with a plan to
launch popular models like Crown, Corolla, Land Cruiser and Land Cruiser Prado, also
posed a serious threat to GM.11
By 2003, Mainland China had emerged as a key manufacturing region for the major global
players and as the third largest producer of commercial vehicles behind the US and Japan
with a production of 4.4 million units in 2003.12 This production capacity of China was
expected to grow over the years and most of the players in China intended to increase their
existing production levels (Exhibit V).
Even though foreign players dominated the Chinese auto industry, they had no competition
from some domestic manufacturers like SAIC, FAW, and Dongfeng Motor Corp. (Dongfeng).
SAIC, based at the Eastern region of Mainland China, had a total car production that
exceeded 800,000 units in 2003.13 FAW was based at Jilin province, Northeast Mainland
China. The company manufactured trucks, buses, and passenger cars. It held a major joint
venture with Volkswagen that had a yearly capacity upto 330,000 units.14 Dongfeng, based

9
Thornton Emily and Roberts Dexter, “Beijing Gives Foreign Auto Makers The Green Light”, www.businessweek.com,
July 19th 1999
10
Webb Alyssa, “GM Retools in China”, www.businessweek.com, October 25th 2000
11
“Toyota plans new models for China”, www.chinadaily.com.cn, August 21st 2003
12
“China’s auto industry prepares for more competition”, op.cit.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
 COM0027

GM IN CHINA 3

at Hubei province, Central Mainland China, was the third largest auto manufacturer in
China. The company produced about 470,300 autos in 2003.15 Dongfeng had a major joint
venture with Citroen, a French automotive manufacturer.
Analysts opined that when China would eventually join the World Trade Organisation
(WTO), prices would fall and then the cars would become affordable to the common man.
Also the tariffs on imported cars were expected to fall from 70% to 80% of the list price to 43%
to 50%, making such cars more affordable for the Chinese customers.16 This relaxation of
tariffs in the Chinese car market was expected to be extremely beneficial to the customers, as
it was expected that the array of choices would increase and the prices would fall. However,
it was expected to make life very difficult for the car manufacturers as this was expected to lead
to heightened competition.

GM’S JOINT VENTURES IN CHINA

Leveraging on its extensive global resources to deliver the best combination of technology,
customer care and innovation, GM entered China to manufacture automobiles, auto
components, set up R&D centre, extend financial services and provide after sales services.
To penetrate the Chinese market, GM entered into a number of joint ventures with domestic
manufacturers. The company felt that the knowledge of the domestic industry as well as the
distribution channels of the domestic partners would come handy for GM’s operations. GM’s
first major joint venture in China was with SAIC in June 1997; a 50-50 joint venture that formed
the Shanghai General Motors (SGM) (Exhibit VI). Mass production at SGM started in 1999
with Buick sedan, based on the model produced in Oshawa, Canada. The Completely Knocked
Down (CKD) kits were shipped from Tilsonburg, Canada, to SGM in large quantities. In 2003,
the sales of Buick sedan increased by 81.6% over the previous year.17
In April 1997, GM felt the need to focus on R&D and formed a $50 million 50-50 joint venture
with SAIC to form the Pan Asia Technical Automotive Center (PATAC).18 PATAC was the
first joint venture for automotive engineering and design centre in the Asia Pacific region.19
Among its achievements was the reengineering of the Buick Regal, Buick Excelle and other
products for Shanghai GM.
In order to expand their portfolio in China, GM entered into another joint venture with the
Shanghai-based van manufacturer, Jinbei Automobile, to form the Jinbei GM Automotive
Co., Ltd. in 1998. In the joint venture, GM had 50% stake ($ 230 million), while Jinbei
Automobile had a 25% stake. The remaining 25% was jointly held by the Liaoning
Development Group, Liaoning Energy General Co. and the Shenyang Automotive Industry
Asset Management Co.20 The objective of this venture was to start the production of the
variants of the sports utility vehicle, Chevrolet Blazer.
15
“China’s auto industry prepares for more competition”, op.cit.
16
Roberts Dexter and Webb Alysha, “Chinese Buyers: In the Driver’s Seat”, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/
feb2002/nf2002024_2258.htm?chan=search, February 4th 2002
17
“Transportation”, www.shanghai.gc.com
18
“GM in China”, www.gmchina.com
19
“Transportation”, op.cit.
20
“GM, SAIC merge plans”, http://my.tdctrade.com, August 3rd 2004
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4 GM IN CHINA

As part of its plan to increase the size of its distribution network in China, GM set up the
GM Warehousing and Trading (Shanghai) Co. Ltd., in Shanghai’s Waigaoqiao Free Trade
Zone in 1999. GM invested $3.2 million in the venture. GM also set up a wholly owned parts
distribution center in August 1999.21 It was established to ensure the quick delivery of
genuine GM parts from AC Delco, GM’s US-based automotive parts subsidiary to customers
in Mainland China.
GM was able to build up a strong distribution network in China, especially that of Shanghai
GM (SGM). By January 2001, SGM had a distribution network of 76 sales outlets and 62
authorised after sales service centres across China.22 SGM’s well-established network in
China, provided customers with high quality products and after sales service. SGM also
became the first Chinese automaker to adopt a distribution system in which the retailer sold
cars to the customer and developed a relationship to handle the services and other needs
of the customers.
In 2001, GM set its eyes on the mini-vehicle segment of China’s automotive industry. This
interest was due to the fact that the size of this market segment was 110,000 mini vehicles in
2000 and the company forecasted the market sales to be at least 120,000 mini vehicles in
2001.23 For this, GM established another joint venture in South China’s, Guangxi Zhuang
Autonomous Region. The venture was formed by SAIC, GM and Liuzhou Wuling Automotive
Co., Ltd. and was called the SAIC-GM-Wuling Automobile Corporation Ltd. (Wuling) joint
venture.24 This joint venture produced Sunshine, LZW6360 and the Chevrolet Spark, which
was derived from GM Daewoo’s Matiz. By 2004, the joint venture evolved with an extensive
network of over 400 retailers in 29 provinces and municipalities, and over 400 after sales
service centres across China.25
After finding that car finance was a largely untapped market in China, GM saw a sales driver
in the car finance sector. This led to General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC)
planning its entry in China in 2001. Its purpose was to explore the opportunities to bring to
China the latest automotive financing schemes. At that time only 12% of the private car
sales were financed in China, as against 80% in the West.26 However, GM felt that with
China ready to enter the WTO, the situation would change due to the expected relaxation
of government rules and policies, which would make the obtaining of licenses for financing
companies easier.
In October 2003, GM became the first foreign automaker to apply for a license to handle
vehicle financing in China.27 The company’s financing subsidiary, GMAC, along with its
21
“GM in China”, op.cit.
22
“More Than 15,000 Chinese Place Deposits For Buick Sail”, http://www.autointell.com/News-2001/February-2001/
February-07-02-p5.htm, February 7th 2001
23
Webb Alysha, “A Chinese Minivan Maker with a U.S Buddy”, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/apr2001/
nf2001049_328.htm?chan=search, April 9th 2001
24
“Transportation”, op.cit.
25
“GM in China”, op.cit.
26
“GM Aims at Joint Venture in Chinese Car Financing”, http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Oct/20963.htm, October 2001
27
“GM to offer financing in China”, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2003/11/16/2003076090, November 16th 2003
 COM0027

GM IN CHINA 5

Chinese partner Shanghai Automotive Group Finance Co., applied to China Banking
Regulatory Commission, to get a permission to become a financing authority for car finance
in China. However, no timeframe for the application process was revealed.
By March 2004, GM had about 10,000 employees in China and had also set up a few other
joint ventures. GM invested over $2 billion in China and had a combined manufacturing
capacity of 530,000 vehicles – which were sold under the Buick, Chevrolet and Wuling
brands. Thus, GM and its joint ventures offered one of the widest portfolios of products
among the foreign manufacturers in China.28

THE PROBLEMS

Even though GM had set a game plan of entering into a number of joint ventures in China
to have a presence across all segments of the Chinese automotive industry, they still had to
deal with a number of problems in China. One of the main problems was the poor performance
of its joint venture with Jinbei. It was the sole unprofitable venture among all of the motors’
joint ventures in China. In the first half of 2003, Jinbei GM recorded a loss of 32.7 million
Yuan, or $3.9 million.29 It sold only 3,289 Blazers in 2003, which was about 10% of its
capacity of 30,000 units a year.30
The main problems being faced by the venture were its weak distribution network and the
fact that the products it manufactured had a very limited appeal in the Chinese market.31 In
October 2003, SAIC was considering to take over Liaoning province’s share in Jinbei GM to
address these problems.32 However, in February 2004, it was GM that signed an agreement
to sell half of its 50% stake in Jinbei to SAIC, its main Chinese partner. The other 50% of the
venture held by four smaller shareholders would be taken over by Shanghai GM Co. GM
said that the managers from Shanghai GM would oversee day-to-day operations of the
venture.33
Another problem faced by GM was that negotiators of the Chinese joint venture partners
had a reputation for being tough. This was proved by the deals GM made in China and also
by the large amounts that they spent in setting up and maintaining facilities, like the $800
million they spent on the Shanghai plant.34 Though the Shanghai plant added a few pieces
of automation in the welding areas, the amount of automation at the plant was still far below
the automation standards of GM’s other plants in the US and Europe. The Jinbei GM plant,
with only one robot, also had a low level of automation. This led to the two plants using
twice as many workers as compared to similar Western facilities. This high level of staffing,
28
“GM in China”, op.cit.
29
“Chinese partner raises stake in unprofitable Jinbei-GM venture”, www.iht.com
30
Ibid.
31
Blanchard Ben, “UPDATE 1 - GM’s sales surge in accelerating China car market”, www.forbes.com, October 16th 2003
32
Ibid.
33
“GM’s Chinese Joint Venture Partner Buying Into Struggling SUV Venture in China”, http://www.theautochannel.com/
news/2004/02/26/182301.html, February 26th 2004
34
Eisenstein Paul, “China: GM’s Next Big Thing?”, http://www.thecarconnection.com/index.asp?article=3869&n=156,
175&sid=175, July 7th 2001
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6 GM IN CHINA

however, reflected the Chinese government’s interest in keeping as many citizens as possible
employed at a time, when the rapid switch to capitalism was causing massive displacement
across the country. The company’s officials admitted that they invested more than necessary
amount in the facility, which could produce merely 100,000 minivans and sedans annually.35
The problems at this plant also forced the company to give up the production of two new
Sport Utility Vehicles – Ahoe and Trailblazer in China.36

THE ROAD AHEAD FOR GM

GM had a total investment of $1.52 billion in the Sino-US joint ventures. The investment in
China paid off, as it created a win-win situation for both GM and the Chinese auto industry.37
Shanghai GM set a record for the Chinese auto industry, when it produced its first Buick,
just 23 months after the formation of the joint venture. Since 1999, GM launched at least one
new model every year with its low-cost ‘Sail’ model catering specifically to the needs of the
Chinese customers.38
Shanghai GM was a major contributor to GM’s success in China as it was able to increase
its sales, mainly due to the success of its Buick Regal and Buick Excelle models by 81.6% in
2003, compared to that of 2002.39
Other partnerships also had an influential role to play in GM’s fortunes in China. SAIC-GM-
Wuling recorded an increase in the sales by 22.8% in 2003, with the level of sales rising to
180,188 units for the mini-vehicle joint venture40 with the Chevrolet Spark mini-vehicle,
particularly enjoying a great amount of success. Pan Asia Automotive Centre (PATAC)
also added to the success of GM in China by successfully re-engineering the Buick Excelle
for Shanghai GM, which sold over 36,000 models in 2003.41 It also introduced a concept
vehicle in China in April 2003 called the Kunpeng CAV, which specifically catered to the
typical Chinese mini-vehicle buyer, but was very different from the conventional mini-
vehicle design in China.42
Even Jinbei GM, the unprofitable joint venture of GM in China, was able to add the three-litre
Chevrolet Blazer SUV to its Blazer line-up, inspite of its continued losses in the overall sales
of Blazers in 2003 increasing by 2.9% over the previous year.43
For the first quarter of 2004, GM China recorded an increase in the earnings of about 24%
over the first quarter earnings of 2003. This helped GM’s global automotive earnings to
increase from $546 million to $611 million in the previous year, inspite of the lower production
in North America and Europe, which had earlier been the major markets for GM.44
35
“China: GM’s Next Big Thing?”, op.cit.
36
“General Motors Drops Plans to Build Two SUV Models in China”, www.automobilemag.com
37
“GM Investment in China Successful”, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/wto/t36936.htm, February 15th 2002
38
Ibid.
39
“CHINA: Investment gains help big jump in Shanghai Automotive Q1 net profit”, www.just-auto.com, April 21st 2004
40
“GM sales in China rises 46% in 2003”, http://www1.cei.gov.cn/ce/doc/cenk/200403171880.htm, January 8th 2004
41
“GM Celebrates Another Record Year in China Sells 386,710 Vehicles”, http://www.gmchina.com/chinese/news/
ctl?action=press_body&press_id=281, January 5th 2004
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
44
“GM – Earnings: Hist Earnings”, http://www.gm.com/company/investor_information/earnings/hist_earnings/04_q1/
index.html, April 20th 2004
 COM0027

GM IN CHINA 7

The growing market for imported cars in China provided a great opportunity for GM. The
company announced in 2003 that it intended to export its cars to China’s vast market. The
Chinese government had authorised the granting of trading and distribution rights in 2002,
that were required by the WTO. In 2003, the sale of imported vehicles in China stood at
2,045 units, mainly due to the success of the imported Opel and Saab models. GM was also
able to introduce Europe’s most popular mid-size sedan, Opel Vectra in March 2003 and
also signed an agreement in November 2003 for the roll out of Cadillac luxury vehicles in
China for 2004.45 By 2005, GM was expected to export thousands of Cadillacs, Buicks and
other GM vehicles valued at $1.3 billion.46
GM China took up the initiative of bringing out a hydrogen fuel car and hoped that they
would be able to enlist the Government of China in helping them to promote these cars. The
alternative fuel cars were scheduled to be put to test on a racing circuit, on the outskirts of
Beijing on November 18th 2004, but would be commercially possible only by 2010.47 Though
people in Mainland China had just started buying regular cars, GM was banking on China
jumping straight into alternative fuel cars, if special hydrogen filling stations were set up
alongside new gas stations.
GM also had major expansion plans for its Shanghai GM and SAIC-GM-Wuling joint
ventures.48 This was expressed by the company’s Asia-Pacific president, Fredrick
Henderson, who predicted that, by 2008, China would overtake Japan as the Asia’s largest
automotive market.49 Thus, GM’s focus on China would continue to grow over the years, as
China moves towards becoming the dominant player in the Asian automotive industry.

45
“GM Celebrates Another Record Year in China Sells 386,710 Vehicles”, op.cit.
46
“GM to Export Autos to China”, http://www.bizasia.com/trade_/ctm94/gm_export_autos_china.htm, November 12th 2003
47
“GM wants China to help promote new car”, http://english.people.com.cn/200311/19/eng20031119_128573.shtml,
November 19th 2003
48
“GM Celebrates Another Record Year in China Sells 386,710 Vehicles”, op.cit.
49
“Automaker predicts Japan will be outpaced in global sales”, http://msnbc.msn.com, October 19th 2003
 COM0027

8 GM IN CHINA

Exhibit I
GM’s Manufacturing and Design JVs in China
Joint Venture Year of Partner(s) Purpose
Name Formation
Shanghai GM 1997 Shanghai Automotive Industry Manufacturing the entire
(SGM) Corporation (SAIC) range of Buick products
Pan Asia Technical 1997 Shanghai Automotive Industry For automotive engineering
Automotive Center Corporation (SAIC) and design of GM’s various
(PATAC) models in China
Jinbei GM 1998 Jinbei Automobile, Liaoning Manufacturing the variants
Development Group, Liaoning of the Chevrolet Blazer SUV
Energy General Co and the
Shenyang Automotive Industry
Asset Management Co
SAIC-GM-Wuling 2001 SAIC, GM and Liuzhou Wuling To increase GM’s focus on
Automobile Automotive Co. the mini-vehicle market of
Corporation Ltd. China.
(Wuling)
SGM Dong Yue 2003 SGM, SAIC and GM China Production of the Buick
Motors Co. models in addition to those
of SGM.
Shanghai GM Dong 2004 SGM, SAIC and GM China Making engines for vehicles
Yue Automotive manufactured in China by
Powertrain Co. Ltd GM
Source: www.gmchina.com

Exhibit II
Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures

VW Audi VW GM
First Shanghai
Automotive Automotive
Toyota Works Group Mazda Industry Corp.
(FAW) (SAIC)
Daihatsu Daewoo

Chrysler BeijingMercedes
Chongqing
Automotive
Suzuki Chang’an Ford
Industry
Automobile
Holding Co.
Co. Ltd.
Hyundai (BAIC) MMC

GM Nissan Peugeot
MMC Brilliance Toyota
China Kia Dongfeng Citroen
Automotive Motor Co.
Renault Holdings Ltd. BMW
MMC Hyundai
MG Honda
Rover

Source: www.financeasia.com
 COM0027

GM IN CHINA 9

Exhibit III
Volkswagen in China
The Volkswagen Group entered China through two production joint ventures, Shanghai Volkswagen
and FAW Volkswagen. In addition, it was a majority shareholder in a gearbox joint venture in
Shanghai called Volkswagen Transmission (Shanghai) Co. Ltd. (VWTS). Volkswagen had over
16,000 employees in China, and sold over 2.7 million vehicles from 1985 to 2002 in this country.
The major models that it sold in China were Santana, Passat, Gol and Polo through Shanghai
Volkswagen and Jetta, Bora, Audi and Golf through FAW Volkswagen. Volkswagen was also
considering starting the production of its Skoda model at the Shanghai Volkswagen Joint Venture.
Compiled by the author from www.autointell-news.com and www.autoindex.org

Exhibit IV
Major Toyota Ventures in China
Name Of Venture Incorporated Capital Shareholders Purpose

Tianjin Toyota June 12, 2000 Approx. US$ Toyota: 50%, Tianjin Production of
Motor Co., Ltd. 100 million Automotive Xiali Co., Toyota’s new
(TTMC) Ltd.: 50% compact cars

Tianjin Toyota May 16, 1996 US$ 248 Toyota: 50%, Tianjin 1.3l/1.5l engines,
Motor Engine Co., million Automotive Industrial engine casting
Ltd. (TTME) (Group) Co., Ltd.: 50% components

Tianjin Fengjin Dec. 25, 1995 Approx. 230 Toyota: 90%, Tianjin Machining and
Auto Parts Co., Ltd. million Yuan Automotive Industrial assembly of
(TFAP) (Group) Co., Ltd.: constant velocity
5.3%, Other local universal joints
company: 4.7%

Tianjin Toyota Feb. 27, 1997 Approx. 240 Toyota: 100% Constant
Forging Co., Ltd. million Yuan velocity
(TTFC) universal joint
castings; 400,000
sets/year for
Charade and for
export

Contd...
 COM0027

10 GM IN CHINA

Tianjin Jinfeng Auto July 29, 1997 140 million Toyota: 30%, Tianjin Steering
Parts Co., Ltd. Yuan Automotive Industrial components for
(TJAC) (Group) Co., Ltd.: 240,000
25.8%, Other local vehicles/year
company:44.2% including Charade
Propeller shaft
for 110,000
vehicles/year
including Hijet

Sichuan Toyota Nov. 10, 1998 US$ 67 Toyota: 45%, Toyota Small Bus Motor
Co., Ltd. million Tsusho Corp.: 5%, “Coaster”
(SCTM) Sichuan Luxing specially
Chechang: 50% developed for
China

Toyota Motor Feb. 1998 1.1 billion Toyota: 100% Technical

Technical Center yen consulting service
(China) Co., Ltd. for research,
(TTCC) development, and
local production
of vehicles and
automobile
components

Toyota Motor July 2001 US$ 30 Toyota: 100% Providing

(China) Investment million marketing
Co., Ltd. (TMCI) assistance for
advertising, sales,
and public
relations, training
of sales and
service
employees, etc.

Toyota Motor Dec. 5, 2001 US$ 2.5 TMCI: 100% Procurement and
Warehousing & million sales of imported
Trading (Shanghai) replacement
Co., Ltd. parts for Toyota
vehicles
Source: www.toyota.co.jp
 COM0027

GM IN CHINA 11

Exhibit V
Production Capacities of Car Manufacturers in Mainland China for 2003

Production Capabilities of Car Manufacturers in Mainland China

Planned capacity Existing capacity
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
General Motors Corp.

Honda Motor Co. Ltd.

Toyota Motor Corp./Daihatsu

Hyundai Motor Co./Kia

Domestic manufacturers
Nissan Motor Corp. Ltd.

Mitsubishi Motors Corp.

DaimlerChrysler AG

Fiat SpA
Volkswagen AG

Peugeot S.A.

Suzuki Motor Corp.

Ford Motor Co./Mazda

BMW AG

Ssangyong Motors

Source: www.financeasia.com

Exhibit VI
A Brief Overview of the Product Portfolio of Shanghai GM
• In April 1999, Shanghai GM began regular production of three models of midsize luxury sedans: the Buick Xin
Shi Ji (New Century), Buick GLX and Buick GL.
• In May 2000, Shanghai GM launched the driver-oriented Buick GS sedan and the first executive wagon made
in China, the Buick GL8.
• In August 2000, a sedan with a smaller engine, the Buick G, was added to the portfolio.
• In December 2000, Shanghai GM’s first small car, the Buick Sail, came off the production line.
• In October 2001, Shanghai GM began exporting the GL8-based Chevrolet Venture to the Philippines.
• In November 2001, Shanghai GM introduced the Buick S-RV recreational vehicle.
• In November 2002, Shanghai GM announced that it had secured a contract with GM’s CAMI joint venture in
Canada to export engines beginning in 2003.
• On December 26, 2002, the newest product from Shanghai GM, the Buick Regal midsize sedan, was
introduced.
• On April 19, 2003, Shanghai GM unveiled the Buick Excelle, its first lower-medium sedan, at Auto Shanghai 2003.

Source: www.gmchina.com