5) RODOLFO M. BERNARDO vs. ATTY. ISMAEL F.
not the sole measure in allowing a petition for
MEJIA
Adm. Case No. 2984 August 31, 2007
FACTS:
On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused
his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the following
administrative offenses:
1) misappropriating and converting to his personal
use part of the money entrusted to him for
payment of real estate taxes on property belonging
to Bernardo,
2) falsification of certain documents, to wit: (a) a
special power of attorney purportedly executed in
his favor by Bernardo; (b) a deed of sale; and (c) a
deed of assignment purportedly executed in
Bernardos favor
3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without
funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained
from Bernardo in the amount of P50,000.00, and
thereafter, replacing said check with others known
also to be insufficiently funded.
On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc declared
the respondent, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, guilty of all the
charges against him and imposes on him the penalty of
DISBARMENT.
On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he
be allowed to reengage in the practice of law. However,
the Supreme Court En Banc denied his petition.
ISSUE:
WON Mejias petition for reinstatement may be granted.
HOLDING: YES
Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of
Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion
of the Court. The action will depend on whether or not
the Court decides that the public interest in the orderly
and impartial administration of justice will continue to be
preserved even with the applicants reentry as a
counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate
for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a
person of good moral character, a fit and proper person
to practice law. The Court will take into consideration
the applicants character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for
which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the
disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement.
In this case, fifteen years has passed since Mejias
disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly take the
bases for Mejias disbarment, it also cannot close its
eyes to the fact that Mejia is already 71 years old. While
the age of the petitioner and the length of time during
which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are
reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the
rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no
other transgression has been attributed to him, and he
has shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his
lesson from this experience, and his punishment has
lasted long enough.
Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to
discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show
compassion when the penalty imposed has already
served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as
disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct
offenders.
6) GSIS, vs. HON. VICENTE PACQUING & ATTY.
MARIO ANACLETO BAEZ, JR.
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1831 February 2, 2007
FACTS:
In 1971, Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (Bengson)
borrowed P4,250,000 from petitioner Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), secured by real estate
and chattel mortgages. When Bengson defaulted in the
payment of the amortizations, petitioner extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgaged properties and sold them at
public auction where it emerged as the highest bidder.
In 1977, Bengson filed an to annul the extrajudicial
foreclosure. The trial court then declared the foreclosure
void and directed petitioner to restore to Bengson the
foreclosed properties, pay damages and costs of suit.
Subsequently, Judge Vicente A. Pacquing directed
petitioner to pay Bengson the equivalent value of the
foreclosed properties and P31 million as costs of suit.
This order became final on April 24, 1995.
Petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment with
the court a quo stating that its counsel, Atty. Rogelio
Terrado, went on AWOL and never informed it of
respondent judges order. This petition, however, was
dismissed.
When petitioner failed to return the foreclosed
properties, respondent judge issued an alias writ of
execution ordering petitioner to pay Bengson the P31
million costs of suit. Pursuant thereto, respondent Atty.
Mario Anacleto Baez, acting as sheriff of Branch 26,
executed the writ and levied on petitioners shares of
stock in San Miguel Corporation (SMC) worth P6.2
million. The garnished shares were later sold at public
auction with Bengson as the only bidder.
Petitioner moved to quash the writ on the ground that
its funds and properties were exempt from garnishment,
levy and execution under Section 39 of RA
8291. Respondent judge denied the motion stating that
only funds and properties that were necessary to
maintain petitioners actuarial solvency, like
contributions of GSIS members, were exempt from
garnishment, levy and execution under RA 8291.
Petitioner filed this administrative complaint against Hon.
Pacquing for ignorance of the law, bias and partiality,
and for violation of RA 8291. In its complaint, petitioner
alleged that the respondents refused to take cognizance
of Section 39, RA 8291. Respondent judge refused to
await an authoritative and definitive resolution of the
issues on the exemption of GSISs funds and properties
from execution or the issue of whether GSIS is entitled
to a relief from judgment of his P31 million peso costs of
suit.
The Court referred the complaint to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), it found nothing in the
records to support petitioners accusations against both
respondents. According to the OCA, even assuming that
respondent judge erred in interpreting RA 8291, such
error did not constitute gross ignorance of the law. It
also failed to prove malice, fraud, dishonesty or bad
faith on the part of respondent judge in issuing the
assailed alias writ of execution. On petitioners
allegations against respondent Atty. Baez, the OCA
likewise found no reason to hold him liable for failing to
defer the execution of the writ. The OCA then
recommended the dismissal of petitioners complaint
against respondents.
ISSUE:
WON the administrative case filed against the
respondents shall prosper.
HOLDING: NO
For a judge to be administratively liable for ignorance of
the law, the acts complained of must be gross or patent.
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, such acts must
not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence
but also motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice or
dishonesty.
We hold that respondent judge was neither biased nor
partial against petitioner when he issued the alias writ of
execution. Petitioners assertion that respondent judge
precipitately issued the alias writ is not supported by the
records. On the contrary, the records indicate that the
writ was issued more than three years from the finality
of the order directing petitioner to pay Bengson P31
million as costs of suit. Its issuance was not all tainted
with undue haste. In the exercise of his judicial
discretion, respondent judge believed that the issuance
of the alias writ had become forthwith a matter of right
following the finality of said order. The rule is that once
a judgment becomes final, the winning party is entitled
to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof becomes
a courts ministerial duty.
Assuming, that respondent judge erred in issuing the
alias writ, his act would still not merit administrative
sanction absent malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not
simply connote poor or flawed judgment; it imports a
dishonest purpose, moral obliquity or conscious doing of
a wrong. Moreover, the party who alleges partiality must
prove it with clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner
failed in that aspect.
Regarding the accusations against respondent Atty.
Baez, the Court finds no basis to hold him liable for
executing the assailed writ at that time. Atty. Baez
merely carried out a ministerial duty. He had no
discretion to implement the writ or not.
7) ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, vs. ATTY. LEONARD
DE VERA
A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006
FACTS:
An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed
before the State Bar of California. It arose from an
insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius
Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986.
Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father
of Julius who was given authority by the son to control
the case because the latter was then studying in San
Diego California) for the release of the funds in
settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in
settlement of the case which he then deposited to his
personal account.
The Hearing referee in the said administrative case
recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended from the
practice of law for three years. Subsequently, Atty. de
Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation
was accepted by the Supreme Court of California.
Thereafter, Zoilo Antonio Velez filed a complaint for the
suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty.
Leonard de Vera based on the ground of respondent's
alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension
order rendered against him by the State Bar of California.
Complainant averred that the respondent, in
appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client,
was found to have performed an act constituting moral
turpitude.
ISSUE:
WON respondent Atty. De Vera committed malpractice.
HOLDING: YES
Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:
 SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Moreover, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all
money and properties of his client that may come into
his possession. Accordingly, he shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand
the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated
the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client.
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to
them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are
guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal
profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may
be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice
of law.
In this case, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's
allegation in the latter's memorandum that he (de Vera)
received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that
he deposited said amount in his personal account and
not in a separate trust account and that, finally, he
spent the amount for personal purposes. Atty. de Vera
insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he
misappropriated his client's funds as the latter's father
(the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same. By
insisting that he was authorized by his client's father and
attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has
impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own
personal use. Absent any proof that he was authorized
by the elder Willlis, his constitutes more than substantial
evidence of malpractice.
Therefore, the Court ordered the suspension of Atty.
Leonard de Vera from the practice of law for TWO (2)
YEARS.
8) CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO
MACABATA
A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007
FACTS:
The case is a disbarment case against respondent on the
ground of gross immorality. It was alleged that
sometime in December 2004, complainant seek for legal
advice from petitioner regarding her collectibles from a
travel company. Respondent sent Demand Letter and
sometime in February 2005, they met at Zensho
Restaurant to discuss the possibility of filing complaint
against the travel company because the latter failed to
settle the accounts. After the dinner, respondent sent
complainant home and while she is about to step out of
the car, respondent held her arm and kissed her on the
cheek and embraced her very tightly.
The two met again to finalize the draft for the complaint
and while on their way home after the said meeting the
respondent stopped his car and forcefully held her face
and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her
breast. Cynthia succeeded in resisting his criminal
attempt and immediately managed to get out of the car.
Thus she decided to refer the case to another lawyer.
Subsequently, she filed this complaint for disbarment
against respondent Atty. Macabata, charging the latter
with Gross Immorality.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent committed acts are grossly
immoral which would warrant the disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.
HOLDING: NO
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON I A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
In Bar Matter No. 1154, good moral character was
defined as what a person really is, as distinguished from
good reputation, or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is held
by the public in the place where he is known. Moral
character is not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral
character has four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to
protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of
lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to
protect errant lawyers from themselves.

The SC held that lawyers are expected to abide the

tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar
but all throughout their legal career as lawyers belong to
an exclusive and honored fraternity. Lawyers are called
upon to safeguard the integrity of the legal profession
and should adhere to the unwaveringly to the highest
standard of morality.

In herein case, the respondent admitted to the act of

kissing the complainant on the lips as evidenced as well
of his asking for apology from complainant in his text
message.

The Court explained that acts of kissing or beso-beso on

the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and
camaraderie, forms of greetings, casual and customary.
The acts of respondent, though, in turning the head of
complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are
distasteful. However, such act, even if considered
offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly
immoral.

Regardless of the fact that the respondent admitted that

he kissed the complainant, the Court held that this was
not accompanied by malice because the respondent
immediately asked for forgiveness after sensing the
annoyance of the respondent after texting him. Thus the
Court held that this is not grossly immoral nor highly
reprehensible which will warrant disbarment or
suspension. But the Court reprimanded respondent to be
more prudent and cautious.

Moreover, complainants bare allegation that respondent

made use and took advantage of his position as a lawyer
to lure her to agree to have sexual relations with him,
deserves no credit. The burden of proof rests on the
complainant, and she must establish the case against
the respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof, disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to
compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary
power.