1)MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (Environmental Law)

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

GR No. 171947-48
December 18, 2008

FACTS:

The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had
fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants
(public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up
Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and
other forms of contact recreation.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water
Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited
only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila
Bay.

APPLICABLE LAWS:

PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.

Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state will
adversely affect its best u sage, the government agencies concerned shall take
such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to
meet the prescribed water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It
shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean - up water
pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up
operations and expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged against the
persons and/ or entities responsible for such pollution.
HELD:

(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned
ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations
when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to
act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality
has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage.
Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for specific pollution incidents only.
The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it
is well -nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution
incident.

(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While
the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making
process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to
be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what
other judicial discipline describes as continuing mandamus , the Court may, under
extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its
decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.

NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized

in the rules of procedure for environmental cases.

20 days Temporary restraining order

2) Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Taon Strait v. Secretary

Angelo Reyes
G.R. No. 180771 (April 21, 2015)
Supreme Court of the Philippines

Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the legality of Service Contract
No. 46 (SC-46) awarded to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX). The service
contract allowed JAPEX to conduct oil exploration in the Taon Strait during which it
performed seismic surveys and drilled one exploration well. The first petition was brought
on behalf of resident marine mammals in the Taon Strait by two individuals acting as
legal guardians and stewards of the marine mammals. The second petition was filed by
a non-governmental organization representing the interests of fisherfolk, along with
individual representatives from fishing communities impacted by the oil exploration
activities. The petitioners filed their cases in 2007, shortly after JAPEX began drilling in
the strait. In 2008, JAPEX and the government of the Philippines mutually terminated the
service contract and oil exploration activities ceased. The Supreme Court consolidated
the cases for the purpose of review.

In its decision, the Supreme Court first addressed the important procedural point of
whether the case was moot because the service contract had been terminated. The Court
declared that mootness is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts in resolving a case. Id., p. 12. Due to the alleged grave constitutional violations
and paramount public interest in the case, not to mention the fact that the actions
complained of could be repeated, the Court found it necessary to reach the merits of the
case even though the particular service contract had been terminated. Id.

Reviewing the numerous claims filed by the petitioners, the Supreme Court narrowed
them down to two: 1) whether marine mammals, through their stewards, have legal
standing to pursue the case; and 2) whether the service contract violated the Philippine
Constitution or other domestic laws. Id., p. 11.

As to standing, the Court declined to extend the principle of standing beyond natural and
juridical persons, even though it recognized that the current trend in Philippine
jurisprudence moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in
environmental cases. Id., p. 15. Instead, the Court explained, the need to give the
Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow
any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental
laws. Id., p. 16-17.

The Court then held that while SC-46 was authorized Presidential Decree No. 87 on oil
extraction, the contract did not fulfill two additional constitutional requirements. Section
2 Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires a service contract for oil exploration and
extraction to be signed by the president and reported to congress. Because the JAPEX
contract was executed solely by the Energy Secretary, and not reported to the Philippine
congress, the Court held that it was unconstitutional. Id., pp. 24-25.
In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract violated the National Integrated
Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which generally prohibits exploitation
of natural resources in protected areas. In order to explore for resources in a protected
area, the exploration must be performed in accordance with an environmental impact
assessment (EIA). The Court noted that JAPEX started the seismic surveys before any
EIA was performed; therefore its activity was unlawful. Id., pp. 33-34. Furthermore, the
Tanon Strait is a NIPAS area, and exploration and utilization of energy resources can
only be authorized through a law passed by the Philippine Congress. Because Congress
had not specifically authorized the activity in Taon Strait, the Court declared that no
energy exploration should be permitted in that area. Id., p. 34.

3) WILFREDO MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS

ASSOCIATION, GR No. 189185, 2016-08-16

Facts:

After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to
impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities
within Davao City

The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its
members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and
Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the
constitutionality of the ordinance

They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power;
violated the equal protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without due
process of law; and lacked publication pursuant] to Section 511[6] of Republic Act No.
7160
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No.
0309-07 valid and constitutional

The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power[13] under the
General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code;[14] that the ordinance, being
based on a valid classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that
aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of pesticides application because it
exposed the residents to a higher degree of health risk caused by aerial drift;[15] and that
the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality, and could be invalidated only
upon a clear showing that it had violated the Constitution.

On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of
the RTC.[22] It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional
for being unreasonable and oppressive;

The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting the public
and the environment against the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand, and the
imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of all forms of substances, on the other.

Issues:

whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal
protection grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of
police power: (a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao
City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to other modes
of pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-
meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao City.

Ruling:

The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao Cityenacted Ordinance No. 0309-07under its

corporate powers... the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an
issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. It is under this
milieu that the questioned ordinance should be appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks
due to their exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the
ordinance. The City of Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will
promote the general welfare, specifically the health of its constituents. Such authority
should not be construed, however, as a valid license for the City of Davao to enact any
ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-defined line separates
authority to enact legislations from the method of accomplishing the same.

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause

A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local
government and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.[108] In order to
declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with the following
substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4)
it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.[109]In the State's exercise of police
power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfill the objectives of the Government.[110] A local government unit is
considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following
requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require the interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not
unduly oppressive.[111] The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.[112]Substantive
due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the
Government's action.[113] This means that in exercising police power the local
government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance
regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically serves a
legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to
achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance
must survive a due process challenge.

The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will
consume considerable time and financial resources given the topography and
geographical features of the plantations.[117] As such, the conversion could not be
completed within the short timeframe of three months. Requiring the respondents and
other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the three-
month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of
business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6
of the ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition
unduly deprives all agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their
property that amounts to taking without just compensation.

The position of the respondents is untenable.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[118] we have thoroughly explained that taking only
becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its
property

Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause

The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The guaranty equal protection secures every person within the State's
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the State's duly constituted
authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State governs
impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective.

Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things
without distinction,[120] nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it
is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate.[121] The guaranty of equal protection
envisions equality among equals determined according to a valid classification.[122] If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated differently from another.[123] In other word, a valid
classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes
of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all
members of the class.

In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately
applies herein. Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the reasonable
relationship between the means and the purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine
whether the means or the prohibition against aerial spraying is based on a substantial or
reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all persons or things similarly
situated with respect to the purpose of the law.

Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence
of drift causes inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the environment.
Given this justification, does the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification
must rest on substantial distinction?We answer in the negative.

The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the
conduct of any mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted
boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort
and alleged health risks to the community and to the environment.[141] A ban against
aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks to achieve.[142] In
the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because the classification
does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to
eliminate.[143] A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the
purpose or end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly
serves the intended purpose of the law.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for
their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL
4)Arigo vs Swift
Case Digest GR 206510 Sept 14, 2014
Facts:
In 2013, the USS Guardian of the US Navy ran aground on an area near the Tubbataha
Reefs, a marine habitat of which entry and certain human activities are prevented and
afforded protection by a Philippine law. The grounding incident prompted the petitioners
to seek for issuance of Writ of Kalikasan with TEPO from the SC.

Among those impleaded are US officials in their capacity as commanding officers of the
US Navy. As petitioners argued, they were impleaded because there was a waiver of
immunity from suit between US and PH pursuant to the VFA terms.

Petitioners claimed that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the
USS Guardian violated their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology
since these events caused and continue to cause environmental damage of such
magnitude as to affect other provinces surrounding the Tubbataha Reefs. Aside from
damages, they sought a directive from the SC for the institution of civil, administrative and
criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in
connection with the grounding incident. They also prayed for the annulment of some VFA
provisions for being unconstitutional.

Issue 1: W/N the US Government has given its consent to be sued through the VFA

No. The general rule on states immunity from suit applies in this case.

First, any waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction
and not to special civil actions such as for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan. Hence,
contrary to petitioners claim, the US government could not be deemed to have waived
its immunity from suit.

Second, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers
of the US Navy who have control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew.
Since the satisfaction of any judgment against these officials would require remedial
actions and the appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be
one against the US itself. Thus, the principle of State Immunity in correlation with the
principle of States as sovereign equals par in parem non habet non imperium bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by the court over their persons.

Issue 2: W/N the US government may still be held liable for damages caused to the
Tubbataha Reefs

Yes. The US government is liable for damages in relation to the grounding incident under
the customary laws of navigation.

The conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation
of RA 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the
ambit of Article 31 of the UNCLOS. While historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity
from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception
to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal
State regarding passage through the latters internal waters and the territorial sea.

Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy,
the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the traditional uses of
the oceans, which is codified in UNCLOS.

As to the non-ratification by the US, it must be noted that the US refusal to join the
UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS regime of deep seabed
mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by
mankind. Such has nothing to do with the acceptance by the US of customary
international rules on navigation. (Justice Carpio)

Hence, non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the
rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. It is
thus expected of the US to bear international responsibility under Art. 31 in connection
with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. ##

Other Issues
Claim for Damages Caused by Violation of Environmental Laws Must be Filed Separately
The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is improper considering that
it is the VFA which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating
Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.

As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction
and not to special civil actions. Since jurisdiction cannot be had over the respondents for
being immuned from suit, there is no way damages which resulted from violation of
environmental laws could be awarded to petitioners.

In any case, the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan provides that a criminal case against a person
charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately. Hence, a ruling
on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to a US
personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would
be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

Challenging the Constitutionality of a Treaty Via a Petition for the Issuance of Writ of
Kalikasan is Not Proper

The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a
treaty by the US as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the US
government. The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a
matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions. A petition under the Rules
on Writ of Kalikasan is not the proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of its
provisions.
5) HON. RAMON JESUS PAJE, in his capacity as DENR Secretary v. Hon. Teodoro
Casino, et al.
G.R. No. 207257 February 3, 2015
Facts

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an Environmental

Compliance Certificate for a proposed coal-fired power plant at Subic, Zambales to be
implemented by RP Energy.
Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan
against RP energy, SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary on the ground
that actual environmental damage will occur if the power plant project is implemented and
that the respondents failed to comply with certain laws and rules governing or relating to
the issuance of an ECC and amendments thereto.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and invalidated the
ECC. Both the DENR and Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing error in invalidating
the ECC and its amendments, arguing that the determination of the validity of the ECC
as well as its amendments is beyond the scope of a Petition for a Writ of kalikasan; while
the latter claim that it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan.
Issues:
Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan; and
Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan
Ruling:
Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan because the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases)allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of
fact and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because of
the extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan.
Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such writ
is principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to
a balanced and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude
that transcends political and territorial boundaries.
A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the
issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but
must also provide a causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the defects
or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated
under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and the action re-
filed before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even
attempted relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the
perceived defects or irregularities in the issuance of the ECC.

6) INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF AGR-BIOTECH

APPLICATIONS INC. VS. GREENPEACE SOUTHEAST ASIA (PHILIPPINES) ET AL.
(G.R. NO. 209271, 26 JULY 2016, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.) (NOTE: THERE ARE OTHER
COMPANION CASES) (SUBJECT/S: SC RESOLVES ONLY ACTUAL
CONTROVERSIES; EXCEPTIONS RESOLUTION OF CASES RENDERED MOOT)
(BRIEF TITLE: INTERNATIONAL SERVICE VS. GREENPEACE)
Filed under: LATEST SUPREME COURT CASES
DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are GRANTED. The Decision dated
December 8, 2015 of the Court, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated May
17, 2013 and the Resolution dat.ed September 20, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 00013, is hereby SET ASIDE for the reasons above-explained. A new one
is ENTERED DISJ\r1ISSIN G the Petition for Writ of Continuing Mandamus and Writ of
Kalikasan with Prayer for the Issuance of a. Temporary Environmental Protection Order
(TEPO) filed by respondents Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), JUagsasaka at
Siyentipiko sa Pagpapaunladng Agrikultura, and others on the ground of mootness.

SO ORDERED.

SUBJECTS/DOCTRINES/DIGEST:
WHAT DOES THIS CASE INVOLVE?

IT INVOLVES NINE (9) MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION1 ASSAILING THE

DECISION DATED DECEMBER 8, 2015 OF THE COURT (DECEMBER 8, 2015
DECISION), WHICH UPHELD WITH MODIFICATION THE DECISION3 DATED MAY 17,
2013 AND THE RESOLUTION4 DATED SEPTEMBER 20, 2013 OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS (CA) IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 00013.

HOW DID THE SC RESOLVE THESE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION?

SC GRANTED THESE MOTIONS.

ON WHAT MAIN GROUND?

ON THE GROUND OF MOOTNESS.

THESE CASES STEMMED FROM RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR WRIT OF

KALIKASAN. THE WRIT BEING SOUGHT WAS MOOTED BY THE EXPIRATION OF
THE BIOSAFETY PERMITS ISSUED BY BUREAU OF PLANT INDUSTRY AND THE
COMPLETION OF THE BT TALONG FIELD TRIALS. THERE IS NO MORE FIELD TEST
TO ENJOIN.

ALSO, THERE IS NO PERCEPTIBLE BENEFIT TO THE PUBLIC THAT MAY BE

GAINED BY RESOLVING RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR WRIT OF KALIKASAN.

WHAT CONTROVERSIES CAN THE COURT ADJUDICATE?

AS A GENERAL RULE ONLY ACTUAL, ONGOING CONTROVERSIES. THIS RULE IS

PURSUANT TO SECTION 1, ARTICLE VIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.

IN OTHER WORDS, THE COURT IS NOT EMPOWERED TO DECIDE MOOT

QUESTIONS OR ABSTRACT PROPOSITIONS.

WHEN A CASE IS MOOT, IT BECOMES NON-JUSTICIABLE.

ARE THERE EXCEPTIONS TO THIS GENERAL RULE?

YES.

FIRST, WHEN THERE IS A GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION;

SECOND, WHEN THE EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER OF THE SITUATION AND THE
PARAMOUNT PUBLIC INTEREST ARE INVOLVED;

THIRD, WHEN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE RAISED REQUIRES FORMULATION

OF CONTROLLING PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE BENCH, THE BAR, AND THE
PUBLIC;

AND FOURTH, WHEN THE CASE IS CAPABLE OF REPETITION YET EVADING

REVIEW.