Syria: inevitable descent into civil war?
o Irans extended political and material support to its
The regime of Bashar al-Assad is pursuing a relentless
security campaign that is unlikely to deliver the outright
victory that he seeks
o Rebel groups are mounting self-defense operations
and challenging the security forces, though their
effort has not been coordinated or powerful enough
to weaken the regime decisively.
Stalling of international diplomacy is causing some
countries to consider more direct involvement but there
remains widespread reluctance to intervene.
The erosion of its credibility, authority, resources and
territorial hold is unlikely to be decisively reversed
o Assad has had to fracture the Syrian polity in
irremediable ways:
The state purposely cultivates tension and rifts
within society
Security services often operate as occupation
forces.
Syrians of all political persuasions are finding ways of
circumventing the state apparatus in order to cope,
organize and survive.
The regimes Tactic
Assads government used the respite offered by the
Russian-Chinese veto of a UNSC resolution that called for
a transition of power in Syria to step up its security
campaign.
o Feb. 2012, the regime launched counter-attacks
across the country to recover ground lost to
opposition groups
o The heaviest fighting is now taking place in the city
of Homs, where determined defectors assisted by
armed civilians have held several neighborhoods for
months.
The regime focused with relative success on areas closer
to the capital Damascus, fearing that unrest there would
demoralize supporters and energize the opposition.
Security forces are constrained by several factors:
o Not everybody can be counted on
o Deploying units whose loyalty is in question could
lead to defections, but relying on trusted units
overstretches them
Whatever military success it achieves, the government
faces a deteriorating economic and security situation that
is corroding its fundamental trade-off with key
constituencies.
o For minorities, regime protection required the
abandonment of political rights and unconditional
alignment with Assad.
o Assad is reduced to exploiting fears of the unknown,
of Islamists and a grand conspiracy.
Assad can also count on significant Iranian backing
sole Arab ally
o Technical assistance to monitor communications,
and has helped the regime to circumvent oil
sanctions, shore up its economy and acquire
weapons and ammunition
However, Assad has already lost Hamas symbolic support,
the Palestinian group whose loyalty has been torn
between its anti-Israeli patrons and its identity as a Sunni
Arab movement
POLITICAL FRONT, Assad pays lip service to the idea of
reform in order to paint his detractors as bent on
destroying the nation and its institutions, just as he is
seeking to strengthen them.
Feb. 26 referendum, a new constitution nominally ends
the primacy of the Baath party and promises political
pluralism.
The rationale behind promises of reform is to split the
opposition by reaching out to people who accept the
principle of dialogue and reject the internationalization of
the crisis at a time when the opposition lacks a political
strategy.
o Cosmetic reforms are also necessary to allow Russia
and China to counter international and Arab
accusations that their support for Assad is
unconditional, meant only to create time and space
for repressions
Armed Opposition
Free Syrian Army (FSA) hardly developed beyond a
franchise that galvanizes civilians and drives recruitment
into armed resistance to the regime.
o Its small fighting units, consist mainly of defectors
from the normal army, operate alongside various
tribal and sectarian groups and criminal gangs have
also seized opportunities
Role of FSA fighters became more prominent
o Conducted in conjunction with local self-defense
groups, these daring attacks against regime forces
have caused significant casualties.
o Popular frustration has grown at the political
oppositions failure to unite and mobilize
international action, turning the FSA fighters into
folk heroes dedicated to protecting civilians and
neighborhoods.
Recent fighting exposed the weakness of the armed
opposition and a tendency to carry out locally motivated
operations
Fear of penetration by the regime plagues its operations
o In recent months, the rate of defection from the
regular Syrian military has increased but rarely have
entire units broken away despite persistent rumors
to the contrary, there is little evidence that they
have received sophisticated weapons- they are
 forced to engage in urban warfare in which their
knowledge of the terrain and the sympathy of the
population are a counterweight to the regimes
superior firepower and armored capabilities.
The Opposition
Political opposition has yet emerged as a credible
alternative to the Assad regime
o Has limited contact with the armed insurrection
and the local coordination committees that
organize peaceful demonstrations and
disobedience, leaving it seemingly blindsided and
overtaken by events.
Major umbrella group, the Syrian National Council (SNC)
suffered from poor communication, infighting and a split
between secular activists and Islamists.
o Attempt to unify the SNCs component groups
o Failed as splits have persisted along political,
sectarian, ethnic, and regional lines
o SNC has yet to articulate a vision that will convince
fence-sitters and key pro-regime sympathizers who
fear retribution and relegation if Assad is deposed
Ambiguous stance on foreign interventions and the future
Foreign Intervention
of minorities has especially estranged Alawites, a
heterodox Shia Muslim sect to which Syrias ruling elite
belongs to, who hoped it would serve as a brake on the
uprisings growing sectarian instincts.
The SNCs failure to win international recognition as the
sole representative of the Syrian people and to obtain a
strong UN resolution has been costly in terms of domestic
support
Internal splits within the two organization (SNC & FSA)
have previously derailed collaborative efforts while FSA
commanders have bemoaned the inability of the SNC to
provide them with funding and weaponry and SNC leaders
worry that military commanders will emerge as the
shapers of a post-Assad Syria
Syria-based activists affiliated with the National
Coordination Body, another opposition group argued
against the internationalization of the crises and in favor
of a dialogue with the regime, but this argument
weakened as the death toll mounted.
Arab and International Diplomacy
International community has been slow and divided in its
response to Syrias rebellion
Only major initiative come from the Arab League, which
has been goaded by Gulf nations into playing a prominent
role
o Saudi sees an opportunity in Assads fall to reverse
Irans gains in the Levant and to reclaim its role as
Arab and Sunni leader
The Arab League has adopted an unprecedented series of
measures against Syria:
o Membership suspension
o Sanctions
o Dispatch of a monitoring mission and referral of a
transitional plan to the UNSC
The UNGA overwhelmingly adopted a non-binding
resolution condemning the Syrian regime and backing the
Arab League plan.
o Former UN Sec.Gen Kofi Annan has been appointed
as the envoy of the Arab League and the UN
Reflecting the division and apprehension in the internal
community, the conference did not result in any
important decisions
o The group called for an immediate ceasefire and
the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and
mentioned the possibility of additional sanctions
The SNC head endorsed the Arab League
initiative and presented a political vision for
post-Assad Syria, the SNC did not receive
recognition as the Syrian populaces only
legitimate representative
Desperate Syrians are calling for intervention to protect
civilians, often without defining its scope, requirements or
the possible identity of the intervening party, others resist
this idea on principle or because of the experience of Iraq.
Many rebel commanders are calling for foreign
involvement in the form of no-fly or safe zones as a way
to establish a Benghazi-like bas where their units can
group, train and equip themselves.
The range of possible forms of intervention mentioned by
the various players in broad.
o It extend from monitoring events
o Opening humanitarian corridors and imposing no-
fly zones to arming the rebellion
o Creating safe zone and launching attacks on the
regimes military assets.
Syrias military shows level of readiness, cohesion,
organization and equipment significantly greater than
that of Muammar Gadhafi.
The issue of intervention has divided Arab states and
threatened to end the fragile consensus at the Arab
League
o Each countrys personal interests clashed with each
other
Gulf states, enraged by the Russian veto, intent on rolling
back Iranian influence and pressed to do more by their
own publics, are examining ways to support the armed
rebellion with funding and weaponry.
o Rumors that they have done so already remain
unconfirmed, though Gulf individuals have
undoubtedly contributed to the rebel cause
 o Lacking experience in running complex intelligence
operations abroad, they would have to rely on
intermediaries like Jordan or Turkey, which are
both nervous about further destabilization on their
immediate borders
The Wests reluctance to get involved, along with its
doubts about the Gulf states resolve and agenda will be
further disincentives for Ankara