Irans Nuclear Agreement: The Terms
parties
July 14 - Iran & six global powers reached a
comprehensive agreement to resolve the nuclear crisis
that was building over the last decade.
It will put off the threat of a nuclear weapon for 15
years, and remove Iran from its economic &
political isolation.
Nuclear Limits
In the negotiations bet. Iran & the EU/E3+3 (European
Union, France, Germany & the United Kingdom +
China, Russia, & US) that produced the JCPOA (Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action), the 6 powers
dropped the demand that Iran forgo all activity related to
uranium enrichment.
They realized that this has become unattainable
because of the centrality of enrichment in Irans
self-identity & sovereignty.
Growing size of Irans enrichment program (19,500
centrifuges installed) also argued for seeking limits
rather than holding out zero enrichment.
EU/E3+3 set a one-year break out period as their
negotiating goal (will last for 10 years)
The JCPOA meets this goal by limiting the
enrichment capacity & the size of the low-
enriched uranium (LEU) stockpile.
For 10 years: uranium-enrichment
capacity will be limited to 5,600 first
generation (IR-1) centrifuges.
From year 11 onwards: can be replaced
with more advanced machines but with
no increase in capacity; will not be used
for enrichment for 15 years; Fordow will
be used for research & development of
other nuclear & physics technology.
13,500 centrifuges at Natanz & Fordow
will be uninstalled.
For 15 years: level of enrichment will not
exceed 3.67% (level required for fuel for
most light-water reactors)
Until Nov. 2013, Iran also produced near
20% LEU
LEU stockpile is to be reduced to a
total 300kg, and this limit is to be
applied for 15 years.
Excess LEU is to be down-blended
to the natural uranium level or sold
abroad.
Research & development of
advanced centrifuges is constrained
for a period of time --> prevents
Iran from rapidly introducing large
numbers of advance models when
the limits are relaxes in the latter
years of the agreement.
JCPOA blocks any potential plutonium path to
a bomb by requiring the redesign & rebuilding
of the heavy-water research reactor in Arak so
that it does not produce weapons-grade
plutonium.
Iran agreed to forgo reprocessing, and all
spent fuel from Arak will be shipped out
of the country for the reactors lifetime.
No other reactors are to be built for 15
years
Although the no-reprocessing condition is
limited to 15 years, Iran expressed an
intention to continue to do without this
sensitive technology.
JCPOA bans Iran permanently from
engaging in certain activities related to
nuclear weaponization.
Benefits to Iran in the JCPOA:
Civil-nuclear cooperation by the EU/E3+3
They are to facilitate Irans acquisition of
modern light-water research & power
reactors
Assistance will also be provided in
redesigning the Arak research reactor &
nuclear safety
JCPOA does not mention however about
Iran finally joining IAEA (Intl. Atomic
Energy Agency) Nuclear Safety
Convention
Verification & Transparency
Verification procedures in the agreement will be the
most intrusive set of measures employed by the IAEA
anywhere in the world.
Iran will fully implement the modified Code 3.1 of the
Subsidiary Arrangement to its safeguard agreement (w/c
requires early notification of any plans for new nuclear
facilities).
Irans unilateral abrogation of its observation of this rule
has been among the lingering points of contention about
its lack of nuclear transparency.
Beginning early 2016 --> Iran will apply the conditions of
the safeguards Additional Protocol (instrument that
provides intrusive inspections & has become the intl.
norm)
Later date (no longer than 8 years) --> Iran will
seek ratification of the Additional Protocol
According to JCPOA, the IAEA can seek access anywhere
in the country where it has concerns about undeclared
activities inconsistent with JCPOA.
IAEAs access is not unfettered, however. Additional
Protocol provides for the managed access under
which, to protect military & commercial secrets,
Iran can suggest alternative means for IAEA to
meet its verification objectives.
If IAEA is not satisfied & the two sides cannot
reach an agreement in terms of access, the
issue will be referred to a newly established
dispute-resolution mechanism.
IAEA will also be able to monitor all uranium ore
concentrate produced or imported (for 25 years) &
Irans centrifuge production, assembly, & storage
facilities (for 20 years).
JCPOA also established a procurement working
group (composed of 8 parties to the agreement
who have the responsibility to review proposed
sales to Iran, for 10 years, in terms of nuclear-
related items & technology for its allowed nuclear
program)
Verification measures were not specified
concerning the ban on weaponization
activities.
In accordance with a separate Roadmap agreement
(signed with the IAEA on July 14), Iran by Nov. 2015 is to
address all of IAEAs outstanding questions concerning
allegations of past & possibly present nuclear-weapons
related research.
IAEA summarized 12 types of what is called a
nuclear activity of a possible military dimension.
A classified agreement sets out the access Iran is to
provide to sites (inc. Parchin, individuals, &
documents in order to answer the questions).
It appears unlikely that all questions will be
resolved, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano
pledged to present a final report for the matter
(December).
It will be up to the IAEA Board of Governors to
determine whether to close the file.
 Sanctions relief will be dependent on iran consistent with JCPOA & UNSC
taking all steps specified in the Roadmap. resolutions.

Sanctions Relief
Iran will not experience any sanctions relief until after
the US Congress reviewed the agreement & it has
survived any vote of disapproval.
Sanctions relief is also dependent on UNSC adoption of a
new resolution (replacing old resolutions).
Implementation Day --> once the IAEA confirms that
Iran has fulfilled its obligations under JCPOA, the UN, EU,
and US are to cease their nuclear-related sanctions on
Iran.
A new UNSC resolution nullifies the previous 6
resolutions (w/c placed restrictions on Iran) but will
retain an embargo on conventional arms sales to
Iran.
After 10 years, the Security Council will no longer
be seized of the Iran nuclear issue --> file will be
closed.
The EU will suspend most of its nuclear-related
sanctions against Iran
EU Council decision that provided basis for
sanctions will remain until Transition Day
--> 8 years after Adoption Day or until IAEA
draws broader conclusion in accordance with Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy
Additional Protocol (that all nuclear material in
the country remains in peaceful activities). July 14, 2015 JCPOA Finalization Day
EU embargo on transfer of ballistic-missile
July 19 Agreement submitted to US for review
technology & other EU restrictions to remain
until Transition Day. September 60-day Congressional Review ends
US will cease the application of its most significant 17 (Congress has 12 days to vote on a possible
nuclear-related economic sanctions. joint resolution to approve/disapprove
US sanctions relief will apply to non-US
agreement)
persons.
They will no longer be subject to US Early October 10-day period allowed for Congressional
secondary sanctions in: finance & attempt to override pres. veto
banking; insurance; energy;
petrochemicals; shipping, shipbuilding, By October Adoption Day - JCPOA formally takes
ports; gold & other precious metals; 15 effect. Preparation begins for
certain software & metals; automotive implementation of commitments. Iran
industry completes specifics in the Roadmap to
Foreign financial institutions will be able to engage in provide access to IAEA in addressing issues
transactions with the Central Bank of Iran & other relating to nuclear activity
financial institutions that do not remain in the SDN
(Specially Designated Nationals & Blocked Early 2016 Implementation Day - once IAEA
Persons) verifies Iran has taken key nuclear-related
JCPOA also lifts the prohibition on transactions in the rial. measures, UN, US, EU lift main sanctions
After 8 years or an IAEA broader conclusion, US
executive branch will seek legislative action to Early 2017 Iran completes adjustments to Fordow (w/in
terminate most nuclear-related sanctions. 1 year from Implementation Day)
US Congress will decide whether or not to do so.
JCPOA does not mention lifting the US Treasury By July 14, 5 years after Adoption Day or when IAEA
designation (Nov. 2011) of Iran as a primary jurisdiction 2020 draws broader conclusion whichever
of money laundering concern. comes first, UN arms embargo to be
This is one of the several US sanctions applied in removed
the context of nuclear dispute with Iran.
Secondary US sanctions applied by the Comprehensive By July 14, Transition Day - 8 years after Adoption
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act 2023 Day or when IAEA draws broader
of 2010 (CISADA) will not be lifted either. conclusion whichever comes first.
An 8-member Joint Commission is to be established Additional sanctions relief applied (inc. on
(composed of EU/E3+3) to oversee implementation of missile sales). US to seek termination of
the agreement (inc. status of sanctions relief) previous sanctions
Commission decisions will be ruled by consensus
July 14, 2025 UNSC Resolution Termination Day -
(except for dispute resolution).
If efforts fail to resolve a dispute, any member Replacement UNSC Resolution is
of the Commission can refer to UNSC (would terminated & UNSC is no longer seized with
then be required to vote on a resolution to Iran nuclear issue
continue sanctions relief).
Snap-back sanctions procedure: failure
of such vote after 30 days would re-apply
all sanctions under old Security Council
resolutions.
This automatic re-imposition is to expire
in 10 years.
Any snap back sanctions will not apply to
business activities with Iran that were