L. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY It contends that it is entitled to register the lands as a trustee. This contention is erroneous.
The
1. Republic v. Villanueva
Republic of the philippines (director of lands), vs.
Iglesia ni cristo and judge domingo m. Angeles, branch i, court of first instance of camarines norte
This case is about the same issue which was resolved against the Iglesia ni Cristo and is, therefore, res
judicata: that, as a corporation sole, (1) it is not entitled to register lands under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Law, which refers only to Filipino citizens, and (2) that it is disqualified under Section 11,
Article XIV of the Constitution to hold alienable public lands except by lease. (Republic vs. Villanueva,
G.R. No. 55289, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Gonong, G.R. No. 56025, November 25,
1982, 118 SCRA 729; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 59447 and Republic vs. Cendaa, G.R.
No. 60188, December 27, 1982, 119 SCRA 449 and Republic vs. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
L-35273, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 516.)
The Iglesia on November 6, 1976 filed an application for confirmation and registration of its title over
two parcels of land located at Barrio Calabaca and the poblacion of Capalonga, Camarines Norte with
areas of 300 and 599 square meters used as sites of its chapels.
The town lot was purchased by the Iglesia on May 30, 1955 from Josefina Diezmo who in turn
purchased it from Esteban Arcea who had used the lot for residential purposes since 1920. The realty
taxes had been paid up to the time Diezmo possessed the lot.
The Calabaca lot was purchased by the Iglesia on July 18, 1973 from Basilio Parale who inherited it
from his father Simeon. It used to be coconut land. Simeon possessed the lot since 1920 and used it for
residential purposes. He paid realty taxes on the land.
The Iglesia and its predecessors claimed to have actual, public, peaceful, continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the two lots in the concept of an owner for more than thirty years
preceding the filing of the application. No realty taxes were paid by the Iglesia because it is an exempt
corporation.
The Director of Lands opposed the application. The trial court in its decision of April 30, 1982 granted
it, confirmed the title of the applicant and ordered the lands registered in the name of Iglesia ni
Cristo, with its Executive Minister Erao G. Manalo, as corporation sole, with office and postal address
at corner Central and Don Mariano Marcos Avenues, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila.
The Republic appealed under Republic Act No. 5440 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
trial court found, and it is a matter of judicial notice, that the Iglesia is a duly registered corporation
sole (Exhs. E and F). As the application is for confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title, that
application is necessarily subject to the following provisions of the Public Land Law, Commonwealth
Act No. 141:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, unless the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(a) . . .
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) . . .
Sec. 49. No person claiming title to lands of the public domain not in possession of the qualifications
specified in the last preceding section may apply for the benefits of this chapter.
The Iglesia is not a Filipino citizen, the lands in question are still public lands until registered (Heirs of
Pelagio Zara vs. Director of Lands, 127 Phil. 8). Moreover, under the aforecited Section 11 of Article
XIV, it is disqualified as a corporation to hold lands of the public domain except by lease. (Manila
Electric Company vs. Castro Bartolome, L-49623, June 29, 182, 114 SCRA 799; Director of Lands, vs.
Lood, L-32521, September 2, 1983, 124 SCRA 460).
The Iglesia in its appellees brief has not shown that it is not covered by the said constitutional and
statutory provisions. Its statement on page 2 of its brief that it is not a religious corporation when it
filed its application is belied by the facts.
unarguable fact is that it is a corporation sole governed by Section 109 et sequitur of the Corporation
Code. It did not apply for registration as a trustee.
As stated at the outset, the matter is subject to the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta
movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled).
WHEREFORE, the trial courts decision is reversed and set aside and the Iglesias application is
dismissed with costs against it.
SO ORDERED.
2. Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome
FACTS:
The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots (165 sqm.) at Tanay, Rizal on August 13, 1976 from
Piguing spouses. After acquisition, they subsequently filed for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
on Dec. 1, 1976. However, the court denied the petition and the corresponding appeal was likewise
rejected. It elevates its appeal with the following arguments; firstly, the land in question had
essentially been converted to private land by virtue of acquisitive prescription as a result of open
continuous and notorious possession and occupation for more than thirty years by the original owner,
Olimpia Ramos and his predecessor in interest, Piguing spouses, whom Meralco acquired the disputed
land, and finally, the substantial rights acquired by Ramos spouses and Peguing spouses for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, extend to Meralco by virtue of the provision of the Public Land Law.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Meralco as a juridical person, allowed under the law to hold lands of public domain
and apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
2. Does the possession tacked to predecessor Private Corporation automatically guarantee its rights to
possession and title of the land.
3. Whether or not it is contingent for a judicial confirmation of title before any grant would be
extended to a juridical person.
RULING:
1. No. Private corporation or juridical person is prohibited and not allowed under the law to hold land
of public domain. Article XIV Sec. 14 of the 1973 Constitution prohibits private corporations from
holding alienable lands of the public domain except for lease of lands not exceeding one thousand
hectares.
2. No. The presumption that since they bought the property from the person who occupied the land in
open, continuous and notorious possession of the public land for more than thirty years, does not
automatically amount to rights and possession. It would cease to be public only upon the issuance of
the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under the law. This conclusion is anchored on
the principle that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the public domain. The exception to the rule is only when the occupant and his
predecessors-in-interest possess and occupied the same since time immemorial. Such possessions
justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a
private property even before the Spanish conquest.
3. Yes. In this case, the court declared that it is contingent upon the issuance of title before juridical
entity may have acquired possession over the property. That means that until the certificate of title is
issued, a piece of land, over which an imperfect title is sought to be confirmed, remains public land.
Thus, any levy and execution were void. As between the State and the Meralco, the land in question
remains a public land. The court also took notice that the constitutional prohibition makes no
distinction between (on one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an
imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant
has an imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation. Since section 11 of Article XIV does not
distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification.
 3. Director of Lands v. IAC
FACTS:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano
and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land
possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan
land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to
members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with
the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements
ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government
when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
ISSUES:
W/N the land is already a private land - YES
W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations
applies- NO
HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
1. YES
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is
not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by
the courts, an application therefore is sufficient
it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of said patent.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally
sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must
also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares
4. Godines v. Pak Luen
Facts:
The plaintiffs filed a case to recover a parcel of land sold by their father Jose Godinez to defendant
Fong Pak Luen. Said defendant executed a power ofattorney in favour of his co-defendant Kwan Pun
Ming, who conveyed and sold the above described parcel of land to co-defendant Trinidad S. Navata.
Thelatter is aware of and with full knowledge that Fong Pak Luen is a Chinese citizen as well as Kwan
Pun Ming, who under the law are prohibited anddisqualified to acquire real property; that Fong Pak
Luen has not acquired any title or interest in said parcel of land as purported contract of sale executed
byJose Godinez alone was contrary to law and considered non-existent.The defendant filed her answer
that the complaint does not state a cause of action since it appears from the allegation that the
property is registered in thename of Jose Godinez so that as his sole property he may dispose of the
same; that the cause of action has been barred by the statute of limitations as thealleged document of
sale executed by Jose Godinez on November 27, 1941, conveyed the property to defendant Fong Pak
Luen as a result of which a titlewas issued to said defendant; that under Article 1144(1) of the Civil
Code, an action based upon a written contract must be brought within 10 years from thetime the right
of action accrues; that the right of action accrued on November 27, 1941 but the complaint was filed
only on September 30, 1966, beyond the10-year period provided by law.The trial court issued an order
dismissing the complaint. A motion for reconsideration was filed by plaintiffs but was denied.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the sale was null and void ab initio since it violates applicable provisions of the
Constitution and the Civil Code
Ruling:
No. Prescription may never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution prohibits. However, we
see no necessity from the facts of this case to pass upon the nature of the contract of sale executed by
Jose Godinez and Fong Pak Luen whether void ab initio, illegal per se, or merely prohibited. It is
enough to stress that insofar as the vendee is concerned, prescription is unavailing. But neither can the
vendor or his heirs rely on an argument based on imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941 is
now in the hands of a Filipino citizen against whom the constitutional prescription was never intended
to apply. As earlier mentioned, Fong Pak Luen, the disqualified alien vendee later sold the same
property to Navata, a Filipino citizen qualified to acquire real property. Navata, as a naturalized
citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property
5. Phils. Ports Authority v. Mendoza
FACTS:
The Board of Directors of PPA passed Resolution No. 10 placing on only one organization the
responsibility for the operation of arrastre and stevedoring services in one port. To implement its
policy of integration, PPA issued Memorandum Order No. 21 which provides that it is necessary that
two or more contractors presently operating within the same port premises who desire to continue or
renew their cargo handling services must merge into only one organization. Accordingly, the eleven
port services contractors in the Cebu City Port formed the United South Dockhandlers, Inc. (USDI).
The latter corporation was recognized by PPA and granted a special permit to handle exclusively the
cargo handling requirements of the entire port in the City of Cebu pending the eventual award of a
management contract. Private respondents Pernito, et al. instituted an action for declaratory relief and
mandamus with preliminary preventive and mandatory injunction and damages against PPA and
USDI. They assail the policy adopted by PPA to grant only one permit to only one group as violative of
the constitutional and statutory provision on monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PPA's policy of integration through compulsory merger is unconstitutional and void
for being violative of the constitutional and statutory provision on monopolies and combinations in
restraint of trade.
RULING:
No. Section 2, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides that the state shall regulate or
prohibit private monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combination in restraint of trade
or unfair competition shall be allowed. Private monopolies are not necessarily prohibited. The
use of the word "regulate" in the Constitution indicates that some monopolies, properly regulated, are
allowed. Regulate means includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain, but regulate should
not be construed as synonymous with suppress or prohibit. "Competition can best regulate a free
economy. Like all basic beliefs, however, that principle must accommodate hard practical experience.
There are areas where for special reasons the force of competition, when left wholly free, might
operate too destructively to safeguard the public interest. Public utilities are an instance of that
consideration." By their very nature, certain public services or public utilities such as those which
supply water, electricity, transportation, telegraph, etc. must be given exclusive franchises if public
interest is to be served. Such exclusive franchises are not violative of the law against monopolies
(Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro, supra). In the case at bar, the area affected is maritime
transportation in the port of Cebu. The operations there, particularly arrastre and stevedoring, affect
not only the City of Cebu, the principal port in the South, but also the economy of the whole country as
well. Any prolonged disjunction of the services being rendered there will prejudice not only inter-
island and international trade and commerce. Operations in said port are therefore imbued with
public interest and are subject to regulation and control for the public good and welfare. PPA's policy
of integration through compulsory merger may not even be in this instance considered as promoting a
monopoly because the fact of the matter is that while the sole operator permitted by PPA to engage in
the arrastre and stevedoring operations in the port of Cebu is only USDI, actually USDI is comprised
of the eleven (11) port services contractors that previously used said ports but decided to merge and
ultimately constituted themselves as USDI. But over and above the platter of whether the monopoly
has been created, the overriding and more significant consideration is public interest. Accordingly,
PPA's policy of integration is not violative of any constitutional and legal provision on monopolies.
6. The Secretary of DENR v. Mayor Jose Yap et al
FACTS:
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed
by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling
purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a
tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an
application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition countering that
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands
classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No.
705 or the Revised Forestry Code.
ISSUE:
Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land, therefore
making these lands alienable.
HELD:
No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators,
and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption
of state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.
7. Republic of the Philippines v. CA
Facts:
On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial court) issued Decree No.
3819284in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag), predecessors-in-
interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents),
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151, containing an area of 7,047,673 square
meters (subject property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July 1938, pursuant to said Decree,
the Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 115855 (OCT No. 11585) in the
name of spouses Carag.
On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly stated in Decree
No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued: Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277,6
issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square
meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1278,7 issued in the name of the private respondents,
covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters.
On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case. Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended Complaint as well
as those in the Motion to dismiss are factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper trial
court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public Land Act.14 (Citations omitted)
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25 September 2002 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether the allegations of the complaint clearly stated that the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate remedies are no longer available
Ruling:
While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on procedural grounds, we
will still deny the petition because the complaint for annulment of decree has no merit. Petitioner
clearly alleged in the complaint and amended complaint that it was seeking to annul Decree No.
381928 on the ground of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject land, specifically over the
disputed portion, which petitioner maintained was classified as timber land and was not alienable and
disposable.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic of the Philippines
complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
8. Province of North Cotabato v. The Government
FACTS: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 (MOA) in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia. This public document would reach a consensus between both parties and the
aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland. However, the Executive Department did not
sign the document.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD and pray for
the Court to enjoin the Executive Department to enter into agreements similar to MOA in the future.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MO-AD is constitutional insofar as provisions on Articles XII of the
Constitution is concerned.
RULING: The initiated MOA-AD between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP)
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is patently unconstitutional. The Executive branch's
commitment under the MOA-AD to amend the Constitution to conform to the MOA-AD violates,
among others, the following provisions in the Constitution:
(1) Section 2, Article XII on State ownership of all lands of the public domain and of all natural
resources in the Philippines. Under paragraph 3 on Concepts and Principles of the MOA-AD, ancestral
domain, which consists of ancestral lands and the natural resources in such lands, does not form part
of the public domain. The ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro refers to land they or their ancestors
continuously possessed since time immemorial, excluding the period that their possession was
disrupted by conquest, war, civil disturbance, force majeure, other forms of usurpation or
displacement by force, deceit or stealth, or as a consequence of government project, or any voluntary
dealings by the government and private parties. Under paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles of the
MOA-AD, the Bangsamoro people are the Moros and all indigenous peoples of Mindanao, Sulu and
Palawan. Thus, the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro refers to the lands that all the peoples in
Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan possessed before the arrival of the Spaniards in 1521. In short, the
ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro refers to the entire Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. This negates
the Regalian doctrine in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions;
(2) Section 9, Article XII on the establishment of an independent economic and planning agency
headed by the President. This agency is the National Economic and Development Authority. Under the
MOA-AD, the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) will have its own economic planning agency.;
(3) Section 20, Article XII on the establishment of an independent monetary authority, now the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Under the MOA-AD, the BJE will have its own financial and banking
authority.
In sum, if this Court did not stop the signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD), this country would have been dismembered because the Executive branch would have
committed to amend the Constitution to conform to the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD gives to the
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) the attributes of a state, with its own people, territory,
government, armed forces, foreign trade missions, and all other institutions of a state, under the BJE's
own basic law or constitution. Clearly, under the MOA-AD, the Executive branch assumes the
mandatory obligation to amend the Constitution to conform to the MOA-AD.
9. Nicasio Alcantara v. DENR
FACTS:
Petitioner Nicasio Alcantara, under the Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement (FLGLA) No. 542 by the
DENR, was allowed to lease 923 hectares of public forest land at Sitio Lanton, Barrio Apopong,
General Santos City. However, such land is being claimed as the ancestral land of the Indigenous
B'laan and Maguindanao people, who claim that they and their ancestors have been cultivating,
possessing, and occupying it since time immemorial. According to them, Christian settlers started
occupying the area only after WWII. Due to this, there was a constant friction (violent at times)
between them. The IPs eventually lost physical control of much of the and.
Alcantara, a son of one of the settlers, claims that FLGLA No. 542 has been subsisting since 1983. The
respondents, as representatives of said tribes, filed a complaint before the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking the cancellation of FLGLA No. 542 and the reversion
of land to the indigenous communities.
Respondent-intervenors, the Heirs of Datu Abdul Pendatun and the Heirs of Sabal Mula Gawan, claim
that among those who took the land by force was petitioner's predecessor, Conrado Alcantara. They
narrate that in 1962, some of their tribal leaders tried to retake the land but failed because the well-
armed settlers repelled them, which led to the killing of 2 of their leaders.
Petitioner filed an answer to the complaint questioning the authority of the COSLAP and alleged that it
was the DENR secretary who should have jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public lands. Also,
the COSLAP should suspend the hearing of the case, because the DENR was then hearing a similar
controversy. He was able to renew FLGLA No. 542 for another 25 years, to expire on Dec 31, 2018,
despite the pendedncy f the COSLAP case and the opposition from private respondents.
On Oct. 29, 1997, RA 8371 or the Indigenous People's Rigths Act (IPRA), which was intended to
recognize and promote all the rights of country's Indigenus Cultural Communities(ICCs)/IPs within
the framework of the Constitution.
iSSUE:
W/N the petitioner may continue his enjoyment of the land up to the expiration of FLGLA No. 542
(Dec. 31, 2018) based on his alleged residual rights
RULING:
No. The Court made the final finding that FLGLA No. 542 was issued illegally, and it was made in
volation of prevailing laws and it was proper for it to be cancelled.
The CA also stated that based on the records, that subject land belongs to the Blaan ICC since they
have been in possession of, and have been occupying and cultivating the same since time immemorial,
a fact which has not been disputed by the petitioner. It was also declared that FLGLA No. 542 violated
Sec 1 of PD 410 which states that "all unappropriated agricultural lands forming the part of the public
domain are declared part of the ancestral land of the ICCs/IPs occupying the same, and these lands are
further declared alienable and disposable, to be distributed exclusively among the members of ICC
concerned.
10. Oroport Cargohandling Services Inc. v. Phividee Industrial Authority
Overview: In 2003, Oroport participated in a bidding for the management and operation of
Mindanao Container Terminal (MCT). No bidder won in the two public biddings conducted so
Phividec Industrial Authority (PIA) took over MCT operations. Oroport then sued PIA and Phividec in
the RTC for injunction and damages. RTC ruled in Oroports favor. In a petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by PIA with the CA, CA annulled the orders of the RTC ruling that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing them. SC affirmed the CA ruling that (1) the RTC has
no jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction (RA 8975) and (2) PIA can temporarily
operate as a seaport cargo-handler upon agreement with PPA (Philippine Ports Authority) sans a
franchise or a license.
Statement of the Case
- RTC: (1) April 27, 2004 - the RTC enjoined PIA and Phividec from handling cargoes not owned or
consigned to its industrial estate locators; (2) May 11, 2004 - RTC issued the two orders (a) denying
the MR filed by defendants with urgent motion for the dismissal of the complaint and (b) granting the
injunctive relief prayed for by the plaintiff.
- CA: January 5, 2005 Annulled the orders of the RTC.
Background
- Oroport is a cargo-handling contractor at the Cagayan de Oro International Port.
- PIA (Phividec Industrial Authority) is a Phividec subsidiary created to uplift the socio-economic
condition of war veterans, military retirees and their children by allowing them to participate in its
development undertakings as employees, developers and business partners with the mission to,
develop and professionally administer industrial areas, ports and utilities.
- Mindanao Container Terminal (MCT) is a P3.24 billion government infrastructure project at Phividec
Industrial Estate in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental. MCT was funded by a loan contracted by the
Philippine government with the Japan Bank for International Cooperation. It was later renamed
Mindanao Container Terminal Sub-Port and placed under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs as
a sub-port entry.
Statement of Facts
- 2003: Oroport bid for the management and operation of MCT. As no bidder won in the two public
biddings, PIA took over MCT operations.
- April 19, 2004: Oroport sued PIA and Phividec in the RTC for injunction and damages.
- It accused PIA of illegally operating MCT without a license from PPA or a franchise from Congress.
- It also alleged unfair competition since PIA handled cargoes of the general public.
- It further invoked unlawful deprivation of property as it stands to incur investment losses with PIAs
take over of MCT operations.
- It prayed that PIA be stopped from handling cargoes not owned or consigned to its industrial estate
locators. During the hearings for its application for preliminary injunction, it contended that since the
core business of PIA and Phividec is the establishment and operation of industrial estates, their
authority to build and operate ports should be construed merely as a complement of their primary
function. Thus, the ports they built should accommodate only cargoes owned or consigned to its
industrial estate locators or else it can build ports and handle cargoes anywhere, directly competing
with PPA.
- PIA and Phividec invoked RA 8975 which prohibits lower courts from issuing temporary restraining
orders or preliminary injunctions on government infrastructure projects. They highlighted the fact
that PIAs operation of MCT is endorsed by the government and by various groups. 11 They added that
preventing PIA from operating MCT will aggravate the huge financial deficit of the national
government and contribute to the collapse of the economy.
- April 27, 2004: The RTC enjoined PIA and Phividec from handling cargoes not owned or consigned
to its industrial estate locators. PIA sought to reverse the order and dismiss the complaint which
Oroport opposed.
- May 11, 2004: RTC issued the two orders (1) denying the MR filed by defendants with urgent motion
for the dismissal of the complaint and (2) granting the injunctive relief prayed for by the plaintiff.
- The RTC emphasized that before PIA could operate as a public utility, it should be properly
authorized by PPA since cargo-handling is a regulated activity.
- In imposing low tariff rates and accepting third-party cargoes, PIA unlawfully deprived Oroport of its
property.
- May 18, 2004: PIA sought to dismiss the complaint and filed a P30 million-counterclaim.
- May 28, 2004: PIA moved to lift and dissolve the preliminary injunction due to the alleged defective
and invalid plaintiffs bond and insufficiency of the P2 million bond to cover for its projected damage.
Oroport opposed. The RTC upheld the opposition.
- June 1, 2004: PIA filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition invoking Section 3 of
Rep. Act No. 8975, arguing that the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue writs of preliminary injunction
against operations of government infrastructure projects. Assuming it had, it issued the writ without
hearing and Oroport was not entitled thereto. It prayed ex parte for a TRO. Oroport countered that
Rep. Act No. 8975 exempts urgent constitutional issues from the prohibition to issue injunctive relief.
- January 5, 2005: CA annulled the subject orders, ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing them. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by Oroport
Applicable Laws:
RA 8975 (AN ACT TO ENSURE THE EXPEDITIOUS IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLETION OF
GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS BY PROHIBITING LOWER COURTS FROM
ISSUING
TEMPORARY RESTRANING ORDERS. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS OR PRELIMINARY
MANDATORY
INJUNCTIONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES);
Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution;
PD 538 (CREATING AND ESTABLISHING THE PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY AND
MAKING IT A
SUBSIDIARY AGENCY OF THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
DEFINING ITS POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES);
Memorandum of Agreement dated October 20, 1980 and October 16, 1995 (Check case.)
Issues:
1. Did the CA err in ruling that the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction?
(No)
2. Can PIA temporarily operate as a seaport cargo-handler upon agreement with PPA (Philippine Ports
Authority) sans a franchise or a license? (Yes)
Rationale
1. CA did not err in annulling the writ of preliminary injunction and in ruling that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to enjoin the operation of this multi-billion government infrastructure project.
a. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final
order, requiring a party, court, agency or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. A preservative
remedy, its issuance lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which
should be avoided; otherwise, the outcome of litigation would be useless as far as the party applying
for the writ is concerned. There must be a clear and material right to be protected and that the facts
against which the injunction is to be directed violate said right.
b. While Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 8975 exempts urgent constitutional issues from the prohibition to
issue injunctive relief, it does not follow that a claim of unlawful deprivation of property involves such
a constitutional issue.
c. Rep. Act No. 8975 is clear that it is not within the RTCs jurisdiction to issue an injunctive writ
against the operation of a government infrastructure project. Since Oroport failed to specify what
property was robbed of it, the CA ruled that PIA does not need a license from PPA to operate because
the MOA (Check case.) and its amendment granted PIA exclusive control and supervision of MCT on
all cargo-handling services, including the discretion to impose rates and charges not higher than those
PPA-prescribed.
d. Rep. Act No. 8975 reserves the power to issue injunctive writs on government infrastructure
projects exclusively with this Court and the RTC cannot issue an injunctive writ to stop the cargo-
handling operations at MCT. The issues presented by Oroport can hardly be considered constitutional,
much more constitutional issues of extreme urgency.
2. PIA properly took over MCT operations sans a franchise or license as it was necessary, temporary
and beneficial to the public.
a. The decision to bid out cargo-handling services is within the province and discretion of PPA which
necessarily required prior study and evaluation. This task is best left to the judgment of PPA and
cannot be set aside absent grave abuse of discretion on its part. As long as the standards are set in
determining the contractor and such standards are reasonable and related to the purpose for which
they are used, courts should not inquire into the wisdom of PPAs choice.
i. Philippine Ports Authority v. Court of Appeals - The exercise of such discretion is a policy
decision that necessitates such procedures as prior inquiry, investigation, comparison, evaluation
and deliberation. No other persons or agencies are in a better position to gauge the need for the
floating grains terminal than the PPA; certainly, not the courts.
b. We have ruled that franchises from Congress are not required before each and every public utility
may operate because the law has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses
for or to authorize the operation of certain public utilities. Article XII, Section 11 of the Constitution
does not necessarily imply that only Congress can grant such authorization. The determination of
whether the winning bidder is qualified to undertake the contracted service should be left to the sound
judgment of PPA or PIA as these agencies are in the best position to evaluate the feasibility of the
projections of the bidders and to decide which bid is compatible with the projects development plans.
Neither the Court nor Congress has the time and the technical know-how to look into this matter.
c. Section 4(e) of Presidential Decree No. 538, gives PIA the legal authority to construct, operate and
maintain port facilities including stevedoring and port terminal services even without PPAs authority.
The MOA granting PIA the exclusive control and supervision of all ports, wharves, piers and services
within the industrial area, recognizing its power to collect port fees, dues and charges, makes PIAs
authority over MCT operations more secure.
d. After the two public biddings failed, PIA was left with no other option but to take over MCT
operations so that it could earn, pending the award to a qualified bidder, some amount to pay the loan
to JBIC and to avoid being declared in default. During the September 27, 2004 hearing before the CA-
Mindanao, Atty. Raul Ragandang of PIA said that Phividec will not permanently engage in cargo-
handling considering that it has no capacity to operate MCT.
f. Oroport is estopped from questioning PIAs authority because it participated in the two public
biddings. As a cargo-handling contractor, it is not a real party-in-interest in this case as only PPA may
protest PIAs operation of MCT. Even assuming that Oroport is a real party-in-interest, it is not
entitled to an injunction as the alleged damage or threat of damage is speculative and factually
baseless.
g. Oroport failed to convince the SC that it has a clear and actual right to be enforced and protected.
i. Oroport has no right to manage MCT since it has no contractual relations with PIA, Phividec or
PPA. It has no statutory grant of authority. Clearly, it has no right in esse to be protected by an
injunctive writ.
ii. Even if Oroport won the public bidding and obtained an exclusive contract for port operations at
MCT, it has no vested right to operate MCT because contract clauses are not inflexible barriers to
public regulations.
1. Business permits may be terminated by authorities any time based on policy guidelines
and statutes because what is given is not a property right but a mere privilege.
2. The law authorizing PPA to take over arrastre and stevedoring services in government-
owned ports and cancel permits issued to private operators is a valid exercise of police
power; it does not violate due process of law as the exercise of police power is
paramount over the right against non-impairment of contracts.
3. Moreover, a regulated monopoly is not proscribed in industries affected with public
interest such as in port rendition of arrastre/stevedoring services in Philippine ports.
h. Oroports allegation of unfair competition also fails because private monopolies are not necessarily
prohibited by the Constitution. Certain public utilities must be given franchises for public interest and
these franchises do not violate the law against monopolies. PIAs policy decision to handle the cargo
operation itself enjoys presumption of regularity as it did not violate any relevant law, rules,
regulations, ordinance or issuances in so doing. Even so, there is no unfair competition as PIA (1) is
not a competitor of Oroport; (2) imposes the same tariff rates as Oroport; and (3) is operating in an
entirely separate and distinct port
i. MCT is not exclusive to the industrial estate locators as the feasibility study of MCT prepared by PIA
and approved by the National Economic Development Authority emphasized that MCT will cater not
only to locator firms but also to outside clients and prospective users. Addressing CDOIP congestion,
MCT is beneficial to shipping lines and the general public.
Judgment: CA affirmed. Petition denied
 (COA cont.)

6.Francisco v. House of Representatives

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative
Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph
E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven
Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust
and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B.
Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House
Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient
in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To
date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance
with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the
filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee
on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General
of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of
the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.

HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint
and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment
complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along
with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that
judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere
specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to
clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political
questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1)
"truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political
questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of
powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution,
courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.