Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment1 before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a.
Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced
respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with
whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene
had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you,"
"I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the
following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she
replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the
second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and
respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the
venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.

Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its
face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his
wedding to Irene, reading:

My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer
for you that you may find meaning in what you're about to do.
 Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience
eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a
bigger plan for the two of us?

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible
to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we
spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until
the life in me is gone and until we are together again.

Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime.
Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE
YOU'LL BE!"2

Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New
Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned
still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a
concert, she was pregnant.

In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter
was handwritten.

On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they
attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the
couple attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega
Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of
the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were
photographed together; their picture was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A
photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship" supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as
alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low
profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families, and that
Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to
Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or
neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to
keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a
"piece of paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on the
very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together again," as now
they are.6 (Underscoring supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding

his adulterousrelationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him
unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with Irene
was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as
in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special
friendship with Irene.

xxxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling
the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted
handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was
merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The
Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family
(Article XV, Sec. 2).9

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a
lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's
wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's
marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being
thatunder the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low
profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule
138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene
named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply, as
Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the
father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's
Hospital.

Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003 from
respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the
complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed
by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against
respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer were
adopted as his testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine
complainant.17

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.

The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006
briefly reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936

Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
above-entitled case for lack of merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original)

Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 13922 of
the Rules of Court.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-
word Resolution shows.

Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no evidence
against him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item
published in theManila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that
respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are other pieces
of evidence on record which support the accusation of complainant against respondent.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel
made the following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an
adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the
matter being [that] their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of their
respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the
complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to
his purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances
nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a
"special" relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with
the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove
that there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the
birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that
complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the father of the child.
Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with Irene there is no reason to
believe that Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the
child. It should be underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the
father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene,
"adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married
woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal
knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void."26 (Italics
supplied) What respondent denies is havingflaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile
and known only to the immediate members of their respective families."

In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are
not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated
otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or
at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or
modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it
has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter
Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a
"lawyer," 38 years old as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired
information on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the
certificate28 with her signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the
same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied
being the father of the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate
of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer.31

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by
more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive
and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32 which is the
quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant
evidence" is all that is required.33 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not,
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.34

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase
"grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall
have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall
cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods.
 x x x x,

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman
elsewhere.

"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances."35 The case at bar
involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial
whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v.
Rongcal:36

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary
sanction. We disagree.

xxxx

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between
two unmarriedadults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is
not so with respect tobetrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous
marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has
beencarrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of
an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable
behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges
which his license confers upon him.39 (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly
swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution andobey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I
will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me
God. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:
 Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision,
obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support."40

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law."

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP
Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition
for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and
Irene "based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw
Petition for Review reads:

Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review, we
are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3,
2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw
the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall
stand as though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is
immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void.43 As a
lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.44 In carrying on
an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null
and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred
by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to
state thatbefore complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the
DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the
Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's
Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the
Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both
respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on
dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's frequent
phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having
a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be
married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's
eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her
about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This becomes
all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11thStreet, New Manila, Quezon
 City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital vows with
complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and that
of Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address
whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said
address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too
much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that was
where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both respondent's
love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when
Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates
against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished
the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and
damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal
procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and
Moje have not denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha
Irene Louise Moje.45(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves
the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if
respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in
court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative]
proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables
one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is
acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case47 (Italics
in the original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they
mayproceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his
oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, Chief Justice, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000]

ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, vs. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta.

Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and
Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso
charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction
and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage contract with the
office of the Local Civil Registrar alleging

"a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO A. YMAN
got married and our marriage was solemnized by judge (sic) Juan Daguman in
his residence in J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar; xxx

b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who acted as

our principal sponsor and spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITA DEAN;
xxx

c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO YMAN abandoned me

without any reason at all;

d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog City and
wrote the City Civil Registrar to inquire regarding my Marriage Contract;

e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog

City that my marriage was not registered; xxx!"#$%&

f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar, I wrote Judge Juan
Daguman, to inquire;
 g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman that all the
copies of the Marriage Contract were taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);

h. That no copy was retained by Judge Daguman;

i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial to my

interest such as:#&#$'(

1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;

2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering our marriage

before the office of the Local Civil Registrar."

The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge for comment.

In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:

1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman had
to be solemnized by respondent in Calbayog City though outside his territory as
municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar due to the following and pressing
circumstances:#!"

1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically indisposed and

unable to report to his station in Sta. Margarita. In the forenoon of that
date, without prior appointment, complainant Beso and Mr. Yman
unexpectedly came to the residence of respondent in said City, urgently
requesting the celebration of their marriage right then and there, first,
because complainants said she must leave that same day to be able to fly
from Manila for abroad as scheduled; second, that for the parties to go to
another town for the marriage would be expensive and would entail
serious problems of finding a solemnizing officer and another pair of
witnesses or sponsors, while in fact former Undersecretary Pacifico
Maghacot, Sangguniang Panglunsod [member] Ramon Dean were
already with them as sponsors; third, if they failed to get married on
August 28, 1997, complainant would be out of the country for a long
period and their marriage license would lapse and necessitate another
publication of notice; fourth, if the parties go beyond their plans for the
scheduled marriage, complainant feared it would complicate her
employment abroad; and, last, all other alternatives as to date and venue
of marriage were considered impracticable by the parties;
 1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired cocuments (sic)
for a valid marriage, which respondent found all in order.#!))%*

1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker, who,

respondent realized, deserved more than ordinary official attention under
present Government policy.

2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he believed in

good faith that by so doing he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so
that it may be not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married.

3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of registration of

the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, which failure was
also occasioned by the following circumstances beyond the control of
respondent:#!"+,-

3.1. After handing to the husband the first copy of the marriage
certificate, respondent left the three remaining copies on top of the desk
in his private office where the marriage ceremonies were held, intending
later to register the duplicate and triplicate copies and to keep the forth
(sic) in his office.

3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered all the
papers relating to the said marriage but notwithstanding diligent search
in the premises and private files, all the three last copies of the certificate
were missing. Promptly, respondent invited by subpoena xxx Mr. Yman
to shed light on the missing documents and he said he saw complainant
Beso put the copies of the marriage certificate in her bag during the
wedding party. Unfortunately, it was too late to contact complainant for
a confirmation of Mr. Ymans claim.#.,-#-"

3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now that she is

out of the country, a reasonable conclusion can be drawn on the basis of
the established facts so far in this dispute. If we believe the claim of
complainant that after August 28, 1997 marriage her husband, Mr.
Yman, abandoned her without any reason xxx but that said husband
admitted "he had another girl by the name of LITA DANGUYAN" xxx
it seems reasonably clear who of the two marriage contracting parties
probably absconded with the missing copies of the marriage
certificate.#/0#-))%*
 3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse but to
protect the public interest by trying all possible means to recover custody
of the missing documents in some amicable way during the expected
hearing of the above mentioned civil case in the City of Marikina, failing
to do which said respondent would confer with the Civil Registrar
General for possible registration of reconstituted copies of said
documents.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August 11, 1998
found that respondent Judge " committed non-feasance in office" and recommended that he
be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that the commission of the same
or future acts will be dealt with more severely pointing out that:

"As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar,

the authority to solemnize marriage is only limited to those municipalities
under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer within his area of
jurisdiction.#.,-0

Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the

Family Code, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his
chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to wit:

(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;

(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place;#1%&#0$*

(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in

writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house
or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.

Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when he

failed to register the marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman.

Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code
which provides:#1"+

"It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish
either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate
referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of
the certificates not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local
 civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. xxx"
(underscoring ours)

It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the respondent Judge
committed non-feasance in office, he also undermined the very foundation of
marriage which is the basic social institution in our society whose nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by law. Granting that respondent
Judge indeed failed to locate the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage
certificate, he should have exerted more effort to locate or reconstitute the
same. As a holder of such a sensitive position, he is expected to be
conscientious in handling official documents. His imputation that the missing
copies of the marriage certificate were taken by Bernardito Yman is based
merely on conjectures and does not deserve consideration for being devoid of
proof."

After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court finds the evaluation
report of the OCA well-taken.#.'2,#3&

Jimenez v. Republic underscores the importance of marriage as a social institution thus:

[1]

"[M]arriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The
state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence.
The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty
of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition
that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction."

With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides, among
others, that

"ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:#.'2,3-

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction; xxx"
(Italics ours)

In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:

ART. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the

judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the
consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at the point of death or in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties
request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
 solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that
effect." (Italics ours)#!))%*#40

As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judges
chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in
remote places in accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing
in a sworn statement to this effect.

In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiance Yman was at the
point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the
contracting parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers
or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on record is that respondent Judge
was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because
complainant was "[a]n overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved more than
ordinary official attention under present Government policy." Respondent Judge further
avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "[h]e believed in good faith that by doing
so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive and
complicated for citizens to get married.".'2,3'2

A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live and
abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled
for. A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law; he must also
[2] [3]

be conscientious and thorough in doing so. Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of
[4]

their office should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties. [5]

If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried solemnization of the
marriage in this case only tends to degrade the revered position enjoyed by marriage in the
hierarchy of social institutions in the country. They also betray respondents cavalier
proclivity on its significance in our culture which is more disposed towards an extended
period of engagement prior to marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed
marital unions.1"++,-

An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws let alone that enacted in order to preserve so
sacrosanct an inviolable social institution as marriage and the stability of judicial doctrines
laid down by superior authority should have given respondent judge pause and made him
more vigilant in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties as a
solemnizing officer. A judge is, furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of
the authority or jurisdiction of his court. Thus respondent Judge should be reminded that
[6]

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry the

faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place
allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court justice or a Justice of this Court has
 jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the
venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, Judges
who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside
his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite
laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability. #!"2"#+
[7]

Considering that respondent Judges jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-
Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage
in the City of Calbayog. [8]

Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should
exercise extra care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in its
solemnization, he is likewise commanded to observe extra precautions to ensure that the
event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the Family Code which states
in no uncertain terms that

ART. 23. - It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to
furnish either of the contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract
referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the
certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil
registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts
shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer
transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall
retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original
of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting
party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those
mentioned in Article 8. (Italics supplied)#!*''*

In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent Judge
was less than conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged with
exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in his
custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous
events. However, the records show that the loss was occasioned by carelessness on
[9]

respondent Judges part. This Court reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record
management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch
of business. It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing
[10]

system in his court because he is after all the one directly responsible for the proper
discharge of his official functions. [11]
In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge be fined Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely. This Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA. /56,-

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar infractions will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.#.,#-%*)

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002]

MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M.

OCCIANO, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the
Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February
2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia
without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his
territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her
husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit
the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of
receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts
and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships,
embarrassment and sufferings.
 On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting
Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of
the Court Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a
certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17
February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete,
he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a
difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located
almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge
could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully
examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties
did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and
suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the
influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize
the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might
aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the
solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the
parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia
assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that
same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the
latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his
sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their
marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and
embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August
2001 with the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially
refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that
it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She
confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the
Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered
by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their
Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that
the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor
Orobia claimed it.
 It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it
has no record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification
dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties
since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the
issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of
Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T.
Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to
the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15
November 2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly
issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of
P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the
regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to
their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,[1] respondent judge
held office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities
of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is
authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An
appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes
a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.[2] (Emphasis
supplied.)

In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act
of solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We
further held that:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in
the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant
with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While magistrates
may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent
judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly
prejudiced the status of married persons.[3]

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner
and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he
allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot
avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. In People vs. Lara,[4] we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance
of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot
render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law,
it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage
of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by
petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the
complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the
discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.[5] Disciplinary actions of this nature do
not involve purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will
of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We
cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Courts
constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught,
undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this
Court as a disciplining authority.[6]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

 SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C.

DOMAGTOY, respondent.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa,

Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two
specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the
groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano
Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on
October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding
was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa,
which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica
and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge
avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by
someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations
both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed
Administrative Matter No. 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on
September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio
Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from
his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man
separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the
Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact
that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven
years.[1] With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the
marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph
1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that Article 8
thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the
pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.[2]
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of
complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts
complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be
objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and
Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this
declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He
presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio
Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla,
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar.[3] The affidavit was not issued by the latter
judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him. In
their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been
civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of
cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling
in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost
seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is
sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to
proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse." (Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact,

the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration
of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a
mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code
to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous
marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead,
in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for
the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration,
he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was
manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit
submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a
bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The
following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x
marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside
the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:

"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open
court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-
consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on
the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or
where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect."

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for
his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del
Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a
marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the
following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this
effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of
death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to
the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.[4]
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the
authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of
marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may
be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue
of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the
solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith
will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the
faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by
his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over
the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as
the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there
is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.[5]
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in
the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions
therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge
again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the
law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are
elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure
to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least,
proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They
should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved
in instant case.[6] It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law
intelligently.[7] Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed,
compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not
penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of
law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered
bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan
and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the
Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages
in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked
the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said
recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law
and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is
hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000]

FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE

HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA,
BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review is the decision dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
[1]

44144, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga,
[2]

denying the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy
[3]

and Fernando Sy.

Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on

November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22
[4]
years old. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were
born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978,respectively. [5]

The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga,
and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware
business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. [6]

On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived
separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son
Frederick transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15,1988,
and from then on, lived with his father. [7]

On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil Case No.
7900 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of
petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds
that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living separately for
more than one year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated
September 29, 1983, containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership. Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and
[8]

approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement

executed by the spouses. The trial court also granted custody of the children to Filipina.
[9] [10]

In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina
testified that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay,
Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring
him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and
continued playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her
son, and started spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son,
and punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband
started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released her only when he thought she was
dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on different parts of her body as a
result of the blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a Medical Certificate issued by a
certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was not the first time Fernando maltreated her. [11]

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision dated April 26, 1990, convicted
[12]

Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days
imprisonment. Edpmis

Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, docketed as
Civil Case No. 8273,on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual
infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her
husband without justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision dated December 4,1991, granted the petition on the
[13]

grounds of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal
separation. It awarded custody of their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son
Frederick to respondent.

On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her
[14]

marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final
judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for separation of
property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to
the conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological
incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the
following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing
to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act
only to satisfy himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her
husband existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest
thereafter. [15]

The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision dated December 9,
[16]

1993, denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not
constitute psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of
their marriage.Lexjuris

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner
[17]

concerning respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of

evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of
law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the celebration of their
marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couple's marital problems
surfaced only in 1983, or almost ten years from the date of the celebration of their marriage.
And prior to their separation in 1983, they were living together harmoniously. Thus, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court which it found to be in accordance with law
and the evidence on record. [18]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its
[19]

resolution dated November 21, 1996. [20]

Hence, this appeal by certiorari wherein petitioner now raises the following issues: Jurismis
[21]

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE DATE OF THE
CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT
DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE
LICENSE THERETO;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED
 UPON BY APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF
HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein respondent];

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO
SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE
HAD EXISTED OR WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS
CELEBRATED IN 1973; Jjjuris

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING
OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN
TO THE COURT BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS
CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE
PARTIES IS NOT A REMOTE POSSIBILITY WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND

5.WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V.COURT OF APPEALS (240

SCRA 20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO. [22]

In sum, two issues are to be resolved: justice

1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and

2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said

marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.

Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid
marriage license at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of the
actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and
marriage license are different and incongruous. Jksm

Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on
appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, in a number of
[23]

instances, we have relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not
ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. We said that
certain rules ought not to be applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for
their existence would be defeated. Hence, when substantial justice plainly requires,
[24]

exempting a particular case from the operation of technicalities should not be subject to
cavil. In our view, the case at bar requires that we address the issue of the validity of the
[25]

marriage between Fillipina and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for
lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent
conflict between the parties. Note, however, that here the pertinent facts are not disputed; and
what is required now is a declaration of their effects according to existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of
marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the
celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando
was void from the beginning, she points out that these critical dates were contained in the
documents she submitted before the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and
marriage certificate, September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract which was
attached as Annex "A" in her petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the
trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial. The date of
[26]

celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15,
1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of
petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and
private respondent's answer admitting it. This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in open
[27]

court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct examination, as follows: Es m

[28]

ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married on November
15,1973?

FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.

November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's
and daughter's birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes " B" and "C" in the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter
marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial. These pieces of evidence on record
[29]

plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage
license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab
initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519,
was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in
Carmona. [30]

Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner
did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between
the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their
marriage license. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on
September 17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973.
The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage
license. Nowhere do we find private respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80 of
the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional
[31]

character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be
classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that
[32]

under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is
void from the beginning. Es msc

We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the
birth certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these
documents were marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows that
these have been examined and admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been
made as to their authenticity and due execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to
petitioner's testimony in open court when she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been
admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents
are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.[33]

The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer
detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized. Esmm is

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, dated December 9,1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May
21, 1996 by the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996, in CA-G.R. No.
44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner
Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of
marriage license at the time of celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.