Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1. LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners, vs. MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late
NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, respondents.
DECISION
The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on
27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60720, entitled Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of
the Late Nicanor Navidad vs. Rodolfo Roman, et. al., which has modified the decision of 11 August 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 266, Pasig City, exonerating Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and
finding Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on account of the death of
Nicanor Navidad.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven oclock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered
the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on
the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad.
A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence,
however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how
Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner
Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. On 08
December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a
complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc.
(Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad
and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards. The LRTA and Roman presented
their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that
Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court
rendered its decision; it adjudged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Prudent Security
and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following:
a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00; 3) Indemnity for the death of
Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00; b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;c) Attorneys fees of P20,000;d) Costs
of suit.
The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of merit
The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed.[1]
Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court promulgated its now assailed
decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA
and Roman jointly and severally liable thusly:
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the appellants from any liability for the
death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman and the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are
held liable for his death and are hereby directed to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees, the
following amounts:
The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000.
In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the appellte court; viz:
I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL
COURT
II.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE
DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
III.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE
OF LRTA.[3]
Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual findings of the trial court
by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping conclusion that the presumption of negligence on the part of a
common carrier was not overcome. Petitioners would insist that Escartins assault upon Navidad, which caused
the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA
would add that the appellate courts conclusion on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between
Roman and LRTA lacked basis because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not
of the LRTA.
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of carriage was deemed
created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling
Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation, and that the appellate court had correctly
held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon
a common carrier.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of
public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers.[4] The
Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances
Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or
to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles
1733 and 1755.
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful
acts of the formers employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or
in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carriers employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons
with due regard for all circumstances.[5] Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so
obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and
where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.[6] The statutory provisions render a common
carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b)
on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees
through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.[7] In case of such
death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and[8] by simple proof of injury, the
passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the
burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.[9] In the
absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to
the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault,[10] an exception
from the general rule that negligence must be proved.[11]
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from
the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier.
In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own
employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either
case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article
2176[12] and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,[13] of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for
the employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the
employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and
can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter
that has not been shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the
common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be
solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury,
one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194[14] of the Civil Code can well
apply.[15] In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the
contract.[16] Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted
the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to
have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.[17]
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad, this Court is
concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of
Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x.
This finding of the appellate court is not without substantial justification in our own review of the records of the
case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission,
he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not
itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or
negligence.
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in
order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.[18] It is an
established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.[19]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the
award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Facts: Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners for the death of Pedrito Cudiamat.
The deceased was attempting to board a bus, but it suddenly accelerated forward. He fell off and the bus ran over
him, resulting to his death.
Issue: Whether the bus is liable as a common carrier to the deceased who was still attempting to board
Held: It is the duty of common carriers of passengers to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in
order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding
passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so.
FACTS:
-May 13, 1985: Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus belonging to Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc.
(Dangwa)
-The bus was at full stop bet. Bunkhouses 53 and 54 when Pedro alighted
-Pedro Cudiamat fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly accelerated forward
-Pedro was ran over by the rear right tires of the vehicle
-Theodore first brought his other passengers and cargo to their respective destinations before bringing Pedro to
Lepanto Hospital where he expired
-Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against Dangwa for the death of Pedro Cudiamat
Dangwa: observed and continued to observe the extraordinary diligence required in the operation of the co. and
the supervision of the employees even as they are not absolute insurers of the public at large
RTC: in favour of Dangwa holding Pedrito as negligent and his negligence was the cause of his death but still
ordered to pay in equity P 10,000 to the heirs of Pedrito
CA: reversed and ordered to pay Pedrito indemnity, moral damages, actual and compensatory damages and cost
of the suit
ISSUE: W/N Dangwa should be held liable for the negligence of its driver Theodore
HELD: YES. CA affirmed.
-A public utility once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders (EVEN when moving as long as it
is still slow in motion)
-Duty of the driver: do NOT make acts that would have the effect of increasing peril to a passenger while he is
attempting to board the same
-Premature acceleration of the bus in this case = breach of duty
-Stepping and standing on the platform of the bus is already considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights
and protection pertaining to such a contractual relation
-Duty extends to boarding and alighting
GR: By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his
destination safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury
that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier
EX: carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Art. 1733 and 1755 of the Civil
Code
-Failure to immediately bring Pedrito to the hospital despite his serious condition = patent and incontrovertible
proof of their negligence
-Hospital was in Bunk 56
-1st proceeded to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger (who later called the family of Pedrito on his own will) to alight
and deliver a refrigerator
-In tort, actual damages is based on net earnings
3. La Mallorca V CA
Facts:
Mariano Beltran and his family rode a bus owned by petitioner. Upon reaching their desired destination, they
alighted from the bus. But Mariano returned to get their baggage. His youngest daughter followed him without
his knowledge. When he stepped into the bus again, it suddenly accelerated. Marianos daughter was found dead.
The bus ran over her.
Issue:Whether the liability of a common carrier extends even after the passenger had alighted
Held:
The relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carriers
vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a
reasonable time or reasonable opportunity to leave the current premises.
Facts: Plaintiffs husband and wife, together with their minor children, boarded a La Mallorca bus. Upon arrival at
their destination, plaintiffs and their children alighted from the bus and the father led them to a shaded spot about
5 meters from the vehicle. The father returned to the bus to get a piece of baggage which was not unloaded. He
was followed by her daughter Raquel. While the father was still on the running board awaiting for the conductor
to give his baggage, the bus started to run so that the father had to jump. Raquel, who was near the bus, was run
over and killed.
Lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff which was affirmed by CA, holding La Mallorca liable for quasi-
delict and ordering it to pay P6,000 plus P400. La Mallorco contended that when the child was killed, she was no
longer a passenger and therefore the contract of carriage terminated.
Issue: Whether or not the contractual obligation between the parties ceases the moment the passenger alighted
form the vehicle.
Held: On the question whether the liability of the carrier, as to the child who was already led a place 5 meters
from the bus under the contract of carrier, still persists, we rule in the affirmative. It is a recognized rules that the
relation between carrier and passengers does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carriers
premises, to be determined from the circumstances. In this case, there was no utmost diligence. Firstly, the
driver, although stopping the bus, did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the
bus conductor gave him the signal and while the latter was unloading cargo. Here, the presence of said passenger
near the bus was not unreasonable and the duration of responsibility still exists. Averment of quasi-delict is
permissible under the Rules of Court, although incompatible with the contract of carriage. The Rules of Court
allows the plaintiffs to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with each other or not (Sec.
2, Rule 1). Even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner can be
held liable for the negligence of its driver pursuant to Art. 2180 of NCC. Decision MODIFIED. Only question raised
in the briefs can be passed upon, and as plaintiffs did not appeals the award of P3,000.00 the increase by the CA
of the award to P6,000.00 cannot be sustained.
On November 3, 1987, petitioner as subrogee of San Miguel Corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City a case for collection against private respondents to recover the amount it paid to San Miguel
Corporation for the loss of the latters cargo.
Meanwhile, the Board of Marine Inquiry conducted its own investigation of the sinking of the M/V Peatheray
Patrick-G to determine whether or not the captain and crew of the vessel should be held responsible for the
incident.[3] On May 11, 1989, the Board rendered its decision exonerating the captain and crew of the ill-fated
vessel for any administrative liability. It found that the cause of the sinking of the vessel was the existence of
strong winds and enormous waves in Surigao del Sur, a fortuitous event that could not have been forseen at the
time the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G left the port of Mandaue City. It was further held by the Board that said
fortuitous event was the proximate and only cause of the vessels sinking.
On April 15, 1993, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134, promulgated its Decision finding private respondents
solidarily liable for the loss of San Miguel Corporations cargo and ordering them to pay petitioner the full amount
of the lost cargo plus legal interest, attorneys fees and costs of suit.[4]
Private respondents appealed the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals. On September 23, 1998, the
appellate court issued the assailed Decision, which reversed the ruling of the RTC. It held that private respondents
could not be held liable for the loss of San Miguel Corporations cargo because said loss occurred as a consequence
of a fortuitous event, and that such fortuitous event was the proximate and only cause of the loss.[5]
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are mandated to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them.[7] Owing to this high degree of diligence required of them, common carriers, as a general rule, are
presumed to have been at fault or negligent if the goods transported by them are lost, destroyed or if the same
deteriorated.[8]
However, this presumption of fault or negligence does not arise in the cases enumerated under Article 1734 of
the Civil Code:
Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same
is due to any of the following causes only:
In order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability where the loss, destruction or deterioration
of the goods is due to a natural disaster or calamity, it must further be shown that the such natural disaster or
calamity was the proximate and only cause of the loss;[9] there must be an entire exclusion of human agency from
the cause of the injury of the loss.[10]
Moreover, even in cases where a natural disaster is the proximate and only cause of the loss, a common
carrier is still required to exercise due diligence to prevent or minimize loss before, during and after the occurrence
of the natural disaster, for it to be exempt from liability under the law for the loss of the goods.[11] If a common
carrier fails to exercise due diligence--or that ordinary care which the circumstances of the particular case
demand[12] --to preserve and protect the goods carried by it on the occasion of a natural disaster, it will be
deemed to have been negligent, and the loss will not be considered as having been due to a natural disaster under
Article 1734 (1).
In the case at bar, the issues may be narrowed down to whether the loss of the cargo was due to the
occurrence of a natural disaster, and if so, whether such natural disaster was the sole and proximate cause of the
loss or whether private respondents were partly to blame for failing to exercise due diligence to prevent the loss
of the cargo.
The parties do not dispute that on the day the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G sunk, said vessel encountered
strong winds and huge waves ranging from six to ten feet in height. The vessel listed at the port side and eventually
sunk at Cawit Point, Cortes, Surigao del Sur.
The Court of Appeals, citing the decision of the Board of Marine Inquiry in the administrative case against
the vessels crew (BMI--646-87), found that the loss of the cargo was due solely to the existence of a fortuitous
event, particularly the presence of strong winds and huge waves at Cortes, Surigao del Sur on March 3, 1987:
I. WAS LCT PEATHERAY PATRICK-G SEAWORTHY WHEN SHE LEFT THE PORT OF MANDAWE, CEBU AND AT THE
TIME OF SINKING?
Evidence clearly shows that the vessel was propelled with three (3) diesel engines of 250 BHP each or a total of
750 BHP. It had three (3) propellers which were operating satisfactorily from the time the vessel left the port of
Mandawe up to the time when the hull on the double bottom tank was heavily floaded (sic) by uncontrollable
entry of sea water resulting in the stoppage of engines. The vessel was also equipped with operating generator
pumps for emergency cases. This equipment was also operating satisfactorily up to the time when the engine
room was heavily floaded (sic) with sea water. Further, the vessel had undergone emergency drydocking and
repair before the accident occurred (sic) on November 9, 1986 at Trigon Shipyard, San Fernando, Cebu as shown
by the billing for the Drydocking and Repair and certificate of Inspection No. 2588-86 issued by the Philippine
coast Guard on December 5, 1986 which expired on November 8, 1987.
LCT Peatheray Patrick-G was skippered by Mr. Manuel P. Ramilo, competent and experienced licensed
Major Patron who had been in command of the vessel for more than three (3) years from July 1984 up to the time
of sinking March 3, 1987. His Chief Mate Mr. Mariano Alalin also a licensed Major Patron had been the Chief Mate
of " LCT Peatheray Patrick-G" for one year and three months at the time of the accident. Further Chief Mate Alalin
had commanded a tanker vessel named M/T Mercedes of MGM Corporation for almost two (2) years from 1983-
1985 (Alalin TSN-4-13-88 pp. 32-33).
That the vessel was granted SOLAS clearance by the Philippine Coast Guard on March 1, 1987 to depart
from Mandawe City for Bislig, Surigao del Sur as evidenced by a certification issued to D.C. Gaerlan Oil Products
by Coast Guard Station Cebu dated December 23, 1987.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, "LCT Peatheray Patrick-G" should be considered seaworthy vessel
at the time she undertook that fateful voyage on March 2, 1987.
To be seaworthy, a vessel must not only be staunch and fit in the hull for the voyage to be undertaken but
also must be properly equipped and for that purpose there is a duty upon the owner to provide a competent
master and a crew adequate in number and competent for their duty and equals in disposition and seamanship
to the ordinary in that calling. (Ralph 299 F-52, 1924 AMC 942). American President 2td v. Ren Fen Fed 629. AMC
1723 LCA 9 CAL 1924).[17]
Overloading was also eliminated as a possible cause of the sinking of the vessel, as the evidence showed
that its freeboard clearance was substantially greater than the authorized freeboard clearance.[18]
Although the Board of Marine Inquiry ruled only on the administrative liability of the captain and crew of
the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G, it had to conduct a thorough investigation of the circumstances surrounding the
sinking of the vessel and the loss of its cargo in order to determine their responsibility, if any. The results of its
investigation as embodied in its decision on the administrative case clearly indicate that the loss of the cargo was
due solely to the attendance of strong winds and huge waves which caused the vessel accumulate water, tilt to
the port side and to eventually keel over. There was thus no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in relying
on the factual findings of the Board of Marine Inquiry, for such factual findings, being supported by substantial
evidence are persuasive, considering that said administrative body is an expert in matters concerning marine
casualties.[19]
Since the presence of strong winds and enormous waves at Cortes, Surigao del Sur on March 3, 1987 was
shown to be the proximate and only cause of the sinking of the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G and the loss of the cargo
belonging to San Miguel Corporation, private respondents cannot be held liable for the said loss.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
6. Pilapil V. CA
FACTS: Petitioner Pilapil, on board respondents bus was hit above his eye by a stone hurled by an unidentified
bystander. Respondents personnel lost no time in bringing him to a hospital, but eventually petitioner partially
lost his left eyes vision and sustained a permanent scar.
Thus, Petitioner lodged an action for recovery of damages before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
which the latter granted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed said decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not common carriers assume risks to passengers such as the stoning in this case?
HELD: In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the business of transporting passengers
and goods, a common carrier does not give its consent to become an insurer of any and all risks to passengers and
goods. It merely undertakes to perform certain duties to the public as the law imposes, and holds itself liable for
any breach thereof.
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their
passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an
insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful
acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of
the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger does
not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common carrier is held
responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being committed when
the same could have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted
that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of
care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a good
father of a family.
7. Fortune Express VS CA
This is an appeal by petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated July 29, 1994, of the Court of Appeals,
which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VI, Iligan City. The aforesaid decision of the trial
court dismissed the complaint of private respondents against petitioner for damages for breach of contract of
carriage filed on the ground that petitioner had not exercised the required degree of diligence in the operation of
one of its buses. Atty. Talib Caorong, whose heirs are private respondents herein, was a passenger of the bus and
was killed in the ambush involving said bus.
Petitioner is a bus company in northern Mindanao. Private respondent Paulie Caorong is the widow of Atty.
Caorong, while private respondents Yasser King, Rose Heinni, and Prince Alexander are their minor children.
On November 18, 1989, a bus of petitioner figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte,
resulting in the death of several passengers of the jeepney, including two Maranaos. Crisanto Generalao, a
volunteer field agent of the Constabulary Regional Security Unit No. X, conducted an investigation of the accident.
He found that the owner of the jeepney was a Maranao residing in Delabayan, Lanao del Norte and that certain
Maranaos were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses. Generalao rendered a
report on his findings to Sgt. Reynaldo Bastasa of the Philippine Constabulary Regional Hearquarters at Cagayan
de Oro. Upon the instruction of Sgt. Bastasa, he went to see Diosdado Bravo, operations manager of petitioner,
at its main office in Cagayan de Oro City. Bravo assured him that the necessary precautions to insure the safety of
lives and property would be taken.[1]
At about 6:45 P.M. on November 22, 1989, three armed Maranaos who pretended to be passengers, seized a bus
of petitioner at Linamon, Lanao del Norte while on its way to Iligan City. Among the passengers of the bus was
Atty. Caorong. The leader of the Maranaos, identified as one Bashier Mananggolo, ordered the driver, Godofredo
Cabatuan, to stop the bus on the side of the highway. Mananggolo then shot Cabatuan on the arm, which caused
him to slump on the steering wheel. Then one of the companions of Mananggolo started pouring gasoline inside
the bus, as the other held the passengers at bay with a handgun. Mananggolo then ordered the passengers to get
off the bus. The passengers, including Atty. Caorong, stepped out of the bus and went behind the bushes in a field
some distance from the highway.[2]
However, Atty. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve something from the overhead rack. At that time, one of
the armed men was pouring gasoline on the head of the driver. Cabatuan, who had meantime regained
consciousness, heard Atty. Caorong pleading with the armed men to spare the driver as he was innocent of any
wrong doing and was only trying to make a living. The armed men were, however, adamant as they repeated their
warning that they were going to burn the bus along with its driver. During this exchange between Atty. Caorong
and the assailants, Cabatuan climbed out of the left window of the bus and crawled to the canal on the opposite
side of the highway. He heard shots from inside the bus. Larry de la Cruz, one of the passengers, saw that Atty.
Caorong was hit. Then the bus was set on fire. Some of the passengers were able to pull Atty. Caorong out of the
burning bus and rush him to the Mercy Community Hospital in Iligan City, but he died while undergoing
operation.[3]
The private respondents brought this suit for breach of contract of carriage in the Regional Trial Court, Branch VI,
Iligan City. In his decision, dated December 28, 1990, the trial court dismissed the complaint, holding as follows:
The fact that defendant, through Operations Manager Diosdado Bravo, was informed of the rumors that the
Moslems intended to take revenge by burning five buses of defendant is established since the latter also utilized
Crisanto Generalaos as a witness. Yet despite this information, the plaintiffs charge, defendant did not take proper
precautions. . . . Consequently, plaintiffs now fault the defendant for ignoring the report. Their position is that the
defendant should have provided its buses with security guards. Does the law require common carriers to install
security guards in its buses for the protection and safety of its passengers? Is the failure to post guards an omission
of the duty to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family which could have prevented the killing of Atty.
Caorong? To our mind, the diligence demanded by law does not include the posting of security guards in buses. It
is an obligation that properly belongs to the State. Besides, will the presence of one or two security guards suffice
to deter a determined assault of the lawless and thus prevent the injury complained of? Maybe so, but again,
perhaps not. In other words, the presence of a security guard is not a guarantee that the killing of Atty. Caorong
would have been definitely avoided.
Accordingly, the failure of defendant to accord faith and credit to the report of Mr. Generalao and the fact that it
did not provide security to its buses cannot, in the light of the circumstances, be characterized as negligence.
Finally, the evidence clearly shows that the assailants did not have the least intention of harming any of the
passengers. They ordered all the passengers to alight and set fire on the bus only after all the passengers were
out of danger. The death of Atty. Caorong was an unexpected and unforseen occurrence over which defendant
had no control. Atty. Caorong performed an act of charity and heroism in coming to the succor of the driver even
in the face of danger. He deserves the undying gratitude of the driver whose life he saved. No one should blame
him for an act of extraordinary charity and altruism which cost his life. But neither should any blame be laid on
the doorstep of defendant. His death was solely due to the willful acts of the lawless which defendant could
neither prevent nor stop.
.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the complaint is hereby dismissed. For lack of merit, the counter-claim is
likewise dismissed. No cost.[4]
In the case at bench, how did defendant-appellee react to the tip or information that certain Maranao hotheads
were planning to burn five of its buses out of revenge for the deaths of two Maranaos in an earlier collision
involving appellees bus? Except for the remarks of appellees operations manager that we will have our action . . .
. and Ill be the one to settle it personally, nothing concrete whatsoever was taken by appellee or its employees to
prevent the execution of the threat. Defendant-appellee never adopted even a single safety measure for the
protection of its paying passengers. Were there available safeguards? Of course, there were: one was frisking
passengers particularly those en route to the area where the threats were likely to be carried out such as where
the earlier accident occurred or the place of influence of the victims or their locality. If frisking was resorted to,
even temporarily, . . . . appellee might be legally excused from liability. Frisking of passengers picked up along the
route could have been implemented by the bus conductor; for those boarding at the bus terminal, frisking could
have been conducted by him and perhaps by additional personnel of defendant-appellee. On hindsight, the
handguns and especially the gallon of gasoline used by the felons all of which were brought inside the bus would
have been discovered, thus preventing the burning of the bus and the fatal shooting of the victim.
Appellees argument that there is no law requiring it to provide guards on its buses and that the safety of citizens
is the duty of the government, is not well taken. To be sure, appellee is not expected to assign security guards on
all of its buses; if at all, it has the duty to post guards only on its buses plying predominantly Maranao areas. As
discussed in the next preceding paragraph, the least appellee could have done in response to the report was to
adopt a system of verification such as frisking of passengers boarding its buses. Nothing, and to repeat, nothing
at all, was done by defendant-appellee to protect its innocent passengers from the danger arising from the
Maranao threats. It must be observed that frisking is not a novelty as a safety measure in our society. Sensitive
places in fact, nearly all important places have applied this method of security enhancement. Gadgets and devices
are available in the market for this purpose. It would not have weighed much against the budget of the bus
company if such items were made available to its personnel to cope up with situations such as the Maranao
threats.
In view of the constitutional right to personal privacy, our pronouncement in this decision should not be construed
as an advocacy of mandatory frisking in all public conveyances. What we are saying is that given the circumstances
obtaining in the case at bench that: (a) two Maranaos died because of a vehicular collision involving one of
appellees vehicles; (b) appellee received a written report from a member of the Regional Security Unit,
Constabulary Security Group, that the tribal/ethnic group of the two deceased were planning to burn five buses
of appellee out of revenge; and (c) appellee did nothing absolutely nothing for the safety of its passengers
travelling in the area of influence of the victims, appellee has failed to exercise the degree of diligence required
of common carriers. Hence, appellee must be adjudged liable.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and another rendered ordering defendant-appellee
to pay plaintiffs-appellants the following:
(A) THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DATED
DECEMBER 28, 1990 DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AS WELL AS THE COUNTERCLAIM, AND FINDING FOR PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS BY ORDERING PETITIONER TO PAY THE GARGANTUAN SUM OF P3,449,649.20 PLUS P500.00 PER
APPEARANCE AS ATTORNEYS FEES, AS WELL AS DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND THE
SUPPLEMENT TO SAID MOTION, WHILE HOLDING, AMONG OTHERS, THAT PETITIONER BREACHED THE CONTRACT
OF CARIAGE BY ITS FAILURE TO EXERCISE THE REQUIRED DEGREE OF DILIGENCE;
(B) THAT THE ACTS OF THE MARANAO OUTLAWS WERE SO GRAVE, IRRESISTIBLE, VIOLENT, AND FORCEFUL, AS TO
BE REGARDED AS CASO FORTUITO; AND
(C) THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER COULD HAVE
PROVIDED ADEQUATE SECURITY IN PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM AREAS AS PART OF ITS DUTY TO OBSERVE EXTRA-
ORDINARY DILIGENCE AS A COMMON CARRIER.
Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of the wilful acts of other passengers, if the employees of the common carrier could have prevented the
act the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the
negligence of petitioners employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible.
Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos were planning to take
revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the assurance of petitioners operation manager,
Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its
passengers.
Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the malefactors had a large
quantity of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of
passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such
as metal detectors, before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the passengers
constitutional rights. As this Court intimated in Gacal v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,[6] a common carrier can be held
liable for failing to prevent a hijacking by frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages.
From the foregoing, it is evident that petitioners employees failed to prevent the attack on one of petitioners
buses because they did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family. Hence, petitioner should be held
liable for the death of Atty. Caorong.
Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous even as an occurrence which could not be foreseen or which though
foreseen, is inevitable. In Yobido v. Court of Appeals,[7] we held that to be considered as force majeure, it is
necessary that: (1) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will; (2) the event
must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free of participation in, or
aggravation of, the injury to the creditor. The absence of any of the requisites mentioned above would prevent
the obligor from being excused from liability.
Thus, in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals,[8] it was held that the common carrier was liable for its failure to take the
necessary precautions against an approaching typhoon, of which it was warned, resulting in the loss of the lives
of several passengers. The event was foreseeable, and, thus, the second requisite mentioned above was not
fulfilled. This ruling applies by analogy to the present case. Despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the
Maranaos were going to attack its buses, petitioner took no steps to safeguard the lives and properties of its
passengers. The seizure of the bus of the petitioner was foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous event
which would exempt petitioner from liability.
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Pilapil v. Court of Appeals[9] and De Guzman v. Court of Appeals[10] in support of
its contention that the seizure of its bus by the assailants constitutes force majeure. In Pilapil v. Court of
Appeals,[11] it was held that a common carrier is not liable for failing to install window grills on its buses to protect
passengers from injuries caused by rocks hurled at the bus by lawless elements. On the other hand, in De Guzman
v. Court of Appeals,[12] it was ruled that a common carrier is not responsible for goods lost as a result of a robbery
which is attended by grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force.
It is clear that the cases of Pilapil and De Guzman do not apply to the present case. Art. 1755 of the Civil Code
provides that a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances. Thus, we held in
Pilapil and De Guzman that the respondents therein were not negligent in failing to take special precautions
against threats to the safety of passengers which could not be foreseen, such as tortious or criminal acts of third
persons. In the present case, this factor of unforeseeablility (the second requisite for an event to be considered
force majeure) is lacking. As already stated, despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were
planning to burn some of petitioners buses and the assurance of petitioners operations manager (Diosdado Bravo)
that the necessary precautions would be taken, nothing was really done by petitioner to protect the safety of
passengers.
The petitioner contends that Atty. Caorong was guilty of contributory negligence in returning to the bus to retrieve
something. But Atty. Caorong did not act recklessly. It should be pointed out that the intended targets of the
violence were petitioner and its employees, not its passengers. The assailants motive was to retaliate for the loss
of life of two Maranaos as a result of the collision between petitioners bus and the jeepney in which the two
Maranaos were riding. Mananggolo, the leader of the group which had hijacked the bus, ordered the passengers
to get off the bus as they intended to burn it and its driver. The armed men actually allowed Atty. Caorong to
retrieve something from the bus. What apparently angered them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by
pleading for his life. He was playing the role of the good Samaritan. Certainly, this act cannot be considered an act
of negligence, let alone recklessness.
Fourth. Petitioner Liable to Private Respondents for Damages
We now consider the question of damages that the heirs of Atty. Caorong, private respondents herein, are entitled
to recover from the petitioner.
Indemnity for Death. Art. 1764 of the Civil Code, in relation to Art. 2206 thereof, provides for the payment of
indemnity for the death of passengers caused by the breached of contract of carriage by a common carrier. Initially
fixed in Art. 2206 at P3,000.00, the amount of the said indemnity for death has through the years been gradually
increased in view of the declining value of the peso. It is presently fixed at P50,000.00.[13] Private respondents
are entitled to this amount.
Actual damages. Art. 2199 provides that Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. The trial court found that the
private respondents spent P30,000.00 for the wake and burial of Atty. Caorong.[14] Since petitioner does not
question this finding of the trial court, it is liable to private respondents in the said amount as actual damages.
Moral Damages. Under Art. 2206, the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. The trial court
found that private respondent Paulie Caorong suffered pain from the death of her husband and worry on how to
provide support for their minor children, private respondents Yasser King, Rose Heinni, and Prince Alexander.[15]
The petitioner likewise does not question this finding of the trial court. Thus, in accordance with recent decisions
of this Court,[16] we hold that the petitioner is liable to the private respondents in the amount of P100,000.00 as
moral damages for the death of Atty. Caorong.
Exemplary Damages. Art. 2232 provides that in contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary
damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. In the
present case, the petitioner acted in a wanton and reckless manner. Despite warning that the Maranaos were
planning to take revenge against the petitioner by burning some of its buses, and contrary to the assurance made
by its operations manager that the necessary precautions would be taken, the petitioner and its employees did
nothing to protect the safety of passengers. Under the circumstances, we deem it reasonable to award private
respondents exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00.[17]
Attorneys Fees. Pursuant to Art. 2208, attorneys fees may be recovered when, as in the instant case, exemplary
damages are awarded. In the recent case of Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[18] we held an award of
P50,000.00 as attorneys fees to be reasonable. Hence, the private respondents are entitled to attorneys fees in
that amount.
Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity. Art. 1764 of the Civil Code, in relation to Art. 2206 thereof, provides
that in addition to the indemnity for death arising from the breach of contract of carriage by a common carrier,
the defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid
to the heirs of the latter. The formula established in decided cases for computing net earning capacity is as
follows:[19]
Gross Necessary
Net earning = Life x Annual - Living
Capacity Expectancy Income Expenses
Life expectancy is equivalent to two thirds (2/3) multiplied by the difference of eighty (80) and the age of the
deceased.[20] Since Atty. Caorong was 37 years old at the time of his death,[21] he had a life expectancy of 28
2/3 more years.[22] His projected gross annual income, computed based on his monthly salary of P11,385.00[23]
as a lawyer in the Department of Agrarian Reform at the time of his death, was P148,005.00.[24] allowing for
necessary living expenses of fifty percent (50%)[25]of his projected gross annual income, his total earning capacity
amounts to P2,121,404.90.[26] Hence, the petitioner is liable to the private respondents in the said amount as
compensation for loss of earning capacity.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated July 29, 1994, of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that petitioner Fortune Express, Inc. is ordered to pay the following amounts to private
respondents Paulie, Yasser King, Rose Heinni, and Prince Alexander Caorong:
8. Juntilla V Fontanar
FACTS:
Jeepney was driven by Berfol Camoro from Danao City to Cebu City. It was Clemente Fontanar but was
actually owned by defendant Fernando Banzon.
When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to turn
turtle. Roberto Juntilla was sitting at the front seat was thrown out of the vehicle.
Upon landing on the ground, he momentarily lost consciousness. When he came to his senses,
he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm. He also injured his left arm, right thigh
and on his back.
Because of his shock and injuries, he went back to Danao City but on the way, he discovered that his
"Omega" wrist watch worth P 852.70 was lost. Upon his arrival in Danao City, he immediately entered
the Danao City Hospital to attend to his injuries, and also requested his father-in-law to proceed
immediately to the place of the accident and look for the watch.
Roberto Juntilla filed for breach of contract with damages
Respondents: beyond the control since tire that exploded was newly bought and was only slightly
used
RTC: favored Roberto Juntilla
CA: Reversed since accident was due to fortuitous event
ISSUE: W/N there is a fortuitous event
HELD: NO. CA reversed, RTC reinstated.
passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident
at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up
passenger jeepney was overloaded
3 passengers in the front seat
14 passengers in the rear
caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics:
(1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with
his obligation, must be independent of the human will.
(2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen,
it must be impossible to avoid.
(3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner.
(4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to
the creditor.
In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the
human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical
defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed
safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring
the safety of passengers at all times
the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage, and by entering into the said
contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with a due regard for all the circumstances. The records
show that this obligation was not met by the respondents
respondents likewise argue that the petitioner cannot recover any amount for failure to prove such
damages during the trial
findings of facts of the City Court of Cebu
9. Lasam V Smith
The plaintiff are husband and wife and this action is brought to recover damages in the sum of P20,000 for physical
injuries sustained by them in an automobile accident. The trial court rendered a judgment in their favor for the
sum of P1,254.10, with legal interest from the date of the judgment. Both the plaintiffs and the defendant appeal,
the former maintaining that the damages awarded are insufficient while the latter denies all liability for any
damages whatever.
It appears from the evidence that on February 27, 1918, the defendant was the owner of a public garage in the
town of San Fernando, La Union, and engaged in the business of carrying passengers for hire from the one point
to another in the Province of La Union and the surrounding provinces. On the date mentioned, he undertook to
convey the plaintiffs from San Fernando to Currimao, Ilocos Norte, in a Ford automobile. On leaving San Fernando,
the automobile was operated by a licensed chauffeur, but after having reached the town of San Juan, the
chauffeur allowed his assistant, Remigio Bueno, to drive the car. Bueno held no driver's license, but had some
experience in driving, and with the exception of some slight engine trouble while passing through the town of
Luna, the car functioned well until after the crossing of the Abra River in Tagudin, when, according to the testimony
of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, defects developed in the steering gear so as to make accurate steering
impossible, and after zigzagging for a distance of about half a kilometer, the car left the road and went down a
steep embankment.
The defendant, in his testimony, maintains that there was no defect in the steering gear, neither before nor after
the accident, and expresses the opinion that the swaying or zigzagging of the car must have been due to its having
been driven at an excessive rate of speed. This may possibly be true, but it is, from our point of view, immaterial
whether the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the defendant's employees, or whether it was due
to defects in the automobile; the result would be practically the same in either event.
In going over the bank of the road, the automobile was overturned and the plaintiffs pinned down under it. Mr.
Lasam escaped with a few contusions and a "dislocated" rib , but his wife, Joaquina Sanchez, received serious
injuries, among which was a compound fracture of one of the bones in her left wrist. She also appears to have
suffered a nervous breakdown from which she had not fully recovered at the time of the trial.
The complaint in the case was filed about a year and a half after the occurrence above related. It alleges, among
other things, that the accident was due to defects in the automobile as well as to the incompetence and negligence
of the chauffeur, and the case appears to have been tried largely upon the theory that it sounds in tort and that
the liability of the defendant is governed by article 1903 of the Civil Code. The trial court held, however, that the
cause of action rests on the defendant's breach of the contract of carriage and that, consequently, articles 1101-
1107 of the Civil Code, and not article 1903, are applicable. The court further found that the breach of the contract
was not due to fortuitous events and that, therefore, the defendant was liable in damages.
In our opinion, the conclusions of the court below are entirely correct. That upon the facts stated the defendant's
liability, if any, is contractual, is well settled by previous decisions of the court, beginning with the case of Rakes
vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359), and the distinction between extra-contractual liability and contractual
liability has been so ably and exhaustively discussed in various other cases, that nothing further need here be said
upon that subject. (See Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil., 768; Manila Railroad Co. vs. Compania
Trasatlantica and Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 38 Phil., 875; De Guia vs. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., 40 Phil.,
706.) It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of the defendant's legal liability is the contract of carriage; that by
entering into that contract he bound himself to carry the plaintiffs safely and securely to their destination; and
that having failed to do so he is liable in damages unless he shows that the failure to fulfill his obligation was due
to causes mentioned in article 1105 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen, were inevitable, with the
exception of the cases in which the law expressly provides otherwise and those in which the obligation itself
imposes such liability.
This brings us to the principal question in the case:
What is meant by "events which cannot be foreseen and which, having been foreseen, are inevitable?" The
Spanish authorities regard the language employed as an effort to define the term caso fortuito and hold that the
two expressions are synonymous. (Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espaol, vol. 8, pp. 88 et seq.; Scvola,
Codigo Civil, vol. 19, pp. 526 et seq.)
The antecedent to article 1105 is found in Law 11, Title 33, Partida 7, which defines caso fortuito as "occasion que
a case por aventura de que non se puede ante ver. E son estos, derrivamientos de casas e fuego que se enciende
a so ora, e quebrantamiento de navio, fuerca de ladrones. . . . (An event that takes place by accident and could
not have been foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of
robbers. . . .)"
Escriche defines caso fortuito as "an unexpected event or act of God which could either be foreseen nor resisted,
such as floods, torrents, shipwrecks, conflagrations, lightning, compulsion, insurrections, destructions, destruction
of buildings by unforseen accidents and other occurrences of a similar nature."
In discussing and analyzing the term caso fortuito the Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola says: "In a legal sense and,
consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics: (1) The
cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation,
must be independent of the human will. (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso
fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free
from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor." (5 Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola,
309.)
As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the
obligor, or of his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito. Turning to the present case, it is at once
apparent that this element is lacking. It is not suggested that the accident in question was due to an act of God or
to adverse road conditions which could not have been foreseen. As far as the records shows, the accident was
caused either by defects in the automobile or else through the negligence of its driver. That is not a caso fortuito.
We agree with counsel that neither under the American nor Spanish law is a carrier of passengers an absolute
insurer against the risks of travel from which the passenger may protect himself by exercising ordinary care and
diligence. The case of Alba vs. Sociedad Anonima de Tranvias, Jurisprudencia Civil, vol. 102, p. 928, cited by the
defendant in support of his contentions, affords a good illustration of the application of this principle. In that case
Alba, a passenger on a street car, was standing on the platform of the car while it was in motion. The car rounded
a curve causing Alba to lose his balance and fall off the platform, sustaining severe injuries. In an action brought
by him to recover damages, the supreme court of Spain held that inasmuch as the car at the time of the accident
was travelling at a moderate rate of speed and there was no infraction of the regulations, and the plaintiff was
exposed to no greater danger than that inherent in that particular mode of travel, the plaintiff could not recover,
especially so since he should have been on his guard against a contingency as natural as that of losing his balance
to a greater or less extent when the car rounded the curve.
But such is not the present case; here the passengers had no means of avoiding the danger or escaping the injury.
The plaintiffs maintain that the evidence clearly establishes that they are entitled to damages in the sum of
P7,832.80 instead of P1,254.10 as found by the trial court, and their assignments of error relate to this point only.
There can be no doubt that the expenses incurred by the plaintiffs as a result of the accident greatly exceeded the
amount of the damages awarded. But bearing in mind that in determining the extent of the liability for losses or
damages resulting from negligence in the fulfillment of a contractual obligation, the courts have "a discretionary
power to moderate the liability according to the circumstances" (De Guia vs. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co.,
40 Phil., 706; art. 1103, Civil Code), we do not think that the evidence is such as to justify us in interfering with the
discretion of the court below in this respect. As pointed out by that court in its well-reasoned and well-considered
decision, by far the greater part of the damages claimed by the plaintiffs resulted from the fracture of a bone in
the left wrist of Joaquina Sanchez and from her objections to having a decaying splinter of the bone removed by
a surgical operation. As a consequence of her refusal to submit such an operation, a series of infections ensued
and which required constant and expensive medical treatment for several years. We agree with the court below
that the defendant should not be charged with these expenses.
For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs in this instance. So ordered
11. Ganzon V CA
he private respondent instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila 1 an action against the petitioner for
damages based on culpa contractual. The antecedent facts, as found by the respondent Court, 2 are undisputed:
On November 28, 1956, Gelacio Tumambing contracted the services of Mauro B. Ganzon to haul 305 tons of scrap
iron from Mariveles, Bataan, to the port of Manila on board the lighter LCT "Batman" (Exhibit 1, Stipulation of
Facts, Amended Record on Appeal, p. 38). Pursuant to that agreement, Mauro B. Ganzon sent his lighter "Batman"
to Mariveles where it docked in three feet of water (t.s.n., September 28, 1972, p. 31). On December 1, 1956,
Gelacio Tumambing delivered the scrap iron to defendant Filomeno Niza, captain of the lighter, for loading which
was actually begun on the same date by the crew of the lighter under the captain's supervision. When about half
of the scrap iron was already loaded (t.s.n., December 14, 1972, p. 20), Mayor Jose Advincula of Mariveles, Bataan,
arrived and demanded P5,000.00 from Gelacio Tumambing. The latter resisted the shakedown and after a heated
argument between them, Mayor Jose Advincula drew his gun and fired at Gelacio Tumambing (t.s.n., March 19,
1971, p. 9; September 28, 1972, pp. 6-7).<re||an1w> The gunshot was not fatal but Tumambing had to be
taken to a hospital in Balanga, Bataan, for treatment (t.s.n., March 19, 1971, p. 13; September 28, 1972, p. 15).
After sometime, the loading of the scrap iron was resumed. But on December 4, 1956, Acting Mayor Basilio Rub,
accompanied by three policemen, ordered captain Filomeno Niza and his crew to dump the scrap iron (t.s.n., June
16, 1972, pp. 8-9) where the lighter was docked (t.s.n., September 28, 1972, p. 31). The rest was brought to the
compound of NASSCO (Record on Appeal, pp. 20-22). Later on Acting Mayor Rub issued a receipt stating that the
Municipality of Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron (Stipulation of Facts, Record on Appeal, p. 40; t.s.n.,
September 28, 1972, p. 10.)
On the basis of the above findings, the respondent Court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and a new one entered ordering
defendant-appellee Mauro Ganzon to pay plaintiff-appellant Gelacio E. Tumambimg the sum of P5,895.00 as
actual damages, the sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the amount of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Costs against defendant-appellee Ganzon. 3
In this petition for review on certiorari, the alleged errors in the decision of the Court of Appeals are:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS FINDING THE HEREIN PETITIONER GUILTY OF BREACH OF THE CONTRACT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND IN IMPOSING A LIABILITY AGAINST HIM COMMENCING FROM THE TIME THE SCRAP WAS
PLACED IN HIS CUSTODY AND CONTROL HAVE NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.
II
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN CONDEMNING THE PETITIONER FOR THE ACTS OF HIS EMPLOYEES IN DUMPING
THE SCRAP INTO THE SEA DESPITE THAT IT WAS ORDERED BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITHOUT HIS
PARTICIPATION.
III
THE APPELLATE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE LOSS OF THE SCRAP WAS DUE TO A FORTUITOUS EVENT
AND THE PETITIONER IS THEREFORE NOT LIABLE FOR LOSSES AS A CONSEQUENCE THEREOF. 4
The petitioner, in his first assignment of error, insists that the scrap iron had not been unconditionally placed
under his custody and control to make him liable. However, he completely agrees with the respondent Court's
finding that on December 1, 1956, the private respondent delivered the scraps to Captain Filomeno Niza for
loading in the lighter "Batman," That the petitioner, thru his employees, actually received the scraps is freely
admitted. Significantly, there is not the slightest allegation or showing of any condition, qualification, or restriction
accompanying the delivery by the private respondent-shipper of the scraps, or the receipt of the same by the
petitioner. On the contrary, soon after the scraps were delivered to, and received by the petitioner-common
carrier, loading was commenced.
By the said act of delivery, the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the common
carrier, and upon their receipt by the carrier for transportation, the contract of carriage was deemed perfected.
Consequently, the petitioner-carrier's extraordinary responsibility for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the
goods commenced. Pursuant to Art. 1736, such extraordinary responsibility would cease only upon the delivery,
actual or constructive, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. 5 The fact
that part of the shipment had not been loaded on board the lighter did not impair the said contract of
transportation as the goods remained in the custody and control of the carrier, albeit still unloaded.
The petitioner has failed to show that the loss of the scraps was due to any of the following causes enumerated
in Article 1734 of the Civil Code, namely:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
Hence, the petitioner is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. 6 By reason of this
presumption, the court is not even required to make an express finding of fault or negligence before it could hold
the petitioner answerable for the breach of the contract of carriage. Still, the petitioner could have been exempted
from any liability had he been able to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods in his custody, according to all the circumstances of the case, or that the loss was due to an unforeseen
event or to force majeure. As it was, there was hardly any attempt on the part of the petitioner to prove that he
exercised such extraordinary diligence.
It is in the second and third assignments of error where the petitioner maintains that he is exempt from any
liability because the loss of the scraps was due mainly to the intervention of the municipal officials of Mariveles
which constitutes a caso fortuito as defined in Article 1174 of the Civil Code. 7
We cannot sustain the theory of caso fortuito. In the courts below, the petitioner's defense was that the loss of
the scraps was due to an "order or act of competent public authority," and this contention was correctly passed
upon by the Court of Appeals which ruled that:
... In the second place, before the appellee Ganzon could be absolved from responsibility on the ground that he
was ordered by competent public authority to unload the scrap iron, it must be shown that Acting Mayor Basilio
Rub had the power to issue the disputed order, or that it was lawful, or that it was issued under legal process of
authority. The appellee failed to establish this. Indeed, no authority or power of the acting mayor to issue such an
order was given in evidence. Neither has it been shown that the cargo of scrap iron belonged to the Municipality
of Mariveles. What we have in the record is the stipulation of the parties that the cargo of scrap iron was
accilmillated by the appellant through separate purchases here and there from private individuals (Record on
Appeal, pp. 38-39). The fact remains that the order given by the acting mayor to dump the scrap iron into the sea
was part of the pressure applied by Mayor Jose Advincula to shakedown the appellant for P5,000.00. The order of
the acting mayor did not constitute valid authority for appellee Mauro Ganzon and his representatives to carry
out.
Now the petitioner is changing his theory to caso fortuito. Such a change of theory on appeal we cannot, however,
allow. In any case, the intervention of the municipal officials was not In any case, of a character that would render
impossible the fulfillment by the carrier of its obligation. The petitioner was not duty bound to obey the illegal
order to dump into the sea the scrap iron. Moreover, there is absence of sufficient proof that the issuance of the
same order was attended with such force or intimidation as to completely overpower the will of the petitioner's
employees. The mere difficulty in the fullfilment of the obligation is not considered force majeure. We agree with
the private respondent that the scraps could have been properly unloaded at the shore or at the NASSCO
compound, so that after the dispute with the local officials concerned was settled, the scraps could then be
delivered in accordance with the contract of carriage.
There is no incompatibility between the Civil Code provisions on common carriers and Articles 361 8 and 362 9 of
the Code of Commerce which were the basis for this Court's ruling in Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Ynchausti & Co.10 and which the petitioner invokes in tills petition. For Art. 1735 of the Civil Code, conversely
stated, means that the shipper will suffer the losses and deterioration arising from the causes enumerated in Art.
1734; and in these instances, the burden of proving that damages were caused by the fault or negligence of the
carrier rests upon him. However, the carrier must first establish that the loss or deterioration was occasioned by
one of the excepted causes or was due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. Be that as it may, insofar as
Art. 362 appears to require of the carrier only ordinary diligence, the same is .deemed to have been modified by
Art. 1733 of the Civil Code.
Finding the award of actual and exemplary damages to be proper, the same will not be disturbed by us. Besides,
these were not sufficiently controverted by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED; the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.
19. PNR v CA
Invoking the principle of state immunity from suit, the Philippine National Railways, PNR for short, instituted this
petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision of the respondent Appellate Court which held petitioner
PNR liable for damages for the death of Winifredo Tupang, a paying passenger who fell off a train operated by the
petitioner.
The pertinent facts are summarized by the respondent court as follows:
The facts show that on September 10, 1972, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Winifredo Tupang, husband of
plaintiff Rosario Tupang, boarded 'Train No. 516 of appellant at Libmanan, Camarines Sur, as a paying passenger
bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical defect, the train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for repairs, taking
some two hours before the train could resume its trip to Manila. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at
Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in his death.The train did not stop despite the alarm
raised by the other passengers that somebody fell from the train. Instead, the train conductor Perfecto Abrazado,
called the station agent at Candelaria, Quezon, and requested for verification of the information. Police authorities
of Lucena City were dispatched to the Iyam Bridge where they found the lifeless body of Winifredo Tupang.
As shown by the autopsy report, Winifredo Tupang died of cardio-respiratory failure due to massive cerebral
hemorrhage due to traumatic injury [Exhibits B and C, Folder of Exhibits],Tupang was later buried in the public
cemetery of Lucena City by the local police authorities. [Rollo, pp. 91-92]
Upon complaint filed by the deceased's widow, Rosario Tupang, the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, after trial,
held the petitioner PNR liable for damages for breach of contract of carriage and ordered "to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P12,000,00 for the death of Winifredo Tupang, plus P20,000.00 for loss of his earning capacity and the
further sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs. 1
On appeal, the Appellate Court sustained the holding of the trial court that the PNR did not exercise the utmost
diligence required by law of a common carrier. It further increased the amount adjudicated by the trial court by
ordering PNR to pay the plaintiff an additional sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Moving for reconsideration of the above decision, the PNR raised for the first time, as a defense, the doctrine of
state immunity from suit. It alleged that it is a mere agency of the Philippine government without distinct or
separate personality of its own, and that its funds are governmental in character and, therefore, not subject to
garnishment or execution. The motion was denied; the respondent court ruled that the ground advanced could
not be raised for the first time on appeal.
Hence, this petition for review.
The petition is devoid of merit. The PNR was created under Rep. Act 4156, as amended. Section 4 of the said Act
provides:
The Philippine national Railways shall have the following powers:
a. To do all such other things and to transact all such business directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or
conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the corporation; and
b. Generally, to exercise all powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law.
Under the foregoing section, the PNR has all the powers, the characteristics and attributes of a corporation under
the Corporation Law. There can be no question then that the PNR may sue and be sued and may be subjected to
court processes just like any other corporation. 2
The petitioner's contention that the funds of the PNR are not subject to garnishment or execution hardly raises a
question of first impression. In Philippine National Railways v. Union de Maquinistas, et al., 3 then Justice
Fernando, later Chief Justice, said. "The main issue posed in this certiorari proceeding, whether or not the funds
of the Philippine National Railways, could be garnished or levied upon on execution was resolved in two recent
decisions, the Philippine National Bank v. Court of Industrial Relations [81 SCRA 314] and Philippine National Bank
v. Hon. Judge Pabalan [83 SCRA 595]. This Court in both cases answered the question in the affirmative. There
was no legal bar to garnishment or execution. The argument based on non-suability of a state allegedly because
the funds are governmental in character was unavailing.So it must be again."
In support of the above conclusion, Justice Fernando cited the Court's holding in Philippine National Bank v. Court
of Industrial Relations, to wit: "The premise that the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be
accepted in the sense that the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-owned entity. It
does not follow though that they were exempt from garnishment. National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v.
Court of Industrial Relations is squarely in point. As was explicitly stated in the opinion of then Justice, later Chief
Justice, Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the
government, and that, as such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as a
government- owned and controlled corporation, the NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct and separate
from that of the Government. It has-pursuant to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 *
* *, pursuant to which the NASSCO has been established- 'all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation
Law * * *. 4
As far back as 1941, this Court in the case of Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Co., 5 laid down
the rule that "when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to
be treated like any other corporation. [Bank of the U.S. v. Planters' Bank, 9 Waitch 904, 6 L. ed. 244]. By engaging
in a particular business through the instrumentality of a corporation the government divests itself pro hac vice of
its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private
corporations. 6 Of Similar import is the pronouncement in Prisco v. CIR,' that "when the government engages in
business, it abdicates part of its sovereign prerogatives and descends to the level of a citizen, ... . " In fine, the
petitioner PNR cannot legally set up the doctrine of non-suability as a bar to the plaintiff's suit for damages.
The appellate court found, the petitioner does not deny, that the train boarded by the deceased Winifredo Tupang
was so over-crowded that he and many other passengers had no choice but to sit on the open platforms between
the coaches of the train. It is likewise undisputed that the train did not even slow down when it approached the
Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the time, Neither did the train stop, despite the alarm raised by other
passengers that a person had fallen off the train at lyam Bridge. 7
The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to observe extraordinary
diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the presumption that it
was negligent in the performance of its obligation under the contract of carriage. Thus, as correctly ruled by the
respondent court, the petitioner failed to overthrow such presumption of negligence with clear and convincing
evidence.
But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, 8 it appears that the deceased
was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the coaches of
the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform
to avoid falling off from the speeding train. Such contributory negligence, while not exempting the PNR from
liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount adjudicated as moral damages. By the same token, the
award of exemplary damages must be set aside. Exemplary damages may be allowed only in cases where the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. 9There being no evidence
of fraud, malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner, the grant of exemplary damages should be discarded.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby modified by eliminating therefrom the
amounts of P10,000.00 and P5,000.00 adjudicated as moral and exemplary damages, respectively. No costs.
SO ORDERED.