G.R. No.

167057 April 11, 2012

NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and ESTER R. GUERZON, Chairman, Bids and Awards
Committee, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Republic Act No. 89751 expressly prohibits any court, except the Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary restraining
order (TRO), preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain, prohibit or compel the Government, or
any of its subdivisions or officials, or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the Governments
direction, from: (a) acquiring, clearing, and developing the right-of-way, site or location of any National Government project;
(b) bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the National Government; (c) commencing, prosecuting, executing,
implementing, or operating any such contract or project; (d) terminating or rescinding any such contract or project; and (e)
undertaking or authorizing any other lawful activity necessary for such contract or project.
Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC) that ignores the statutory prohibition and issues a TRO or a writ of preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against a government contract or project acts contrary to law.
Antecedents
The following antecedents are culled from the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 22,
2004,2 viz:
In 1999, the National Electrification Administration ("NEA") published an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for a contract,
otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and delivery of about sixty thousand (60,000) pieces of woodpoles and
twenty thousand (20,000) pieces of crossarms needed in the countrys Rural Electrification Project. The said contract
consisted of four (4) components, namely: PIA, PIB and PIC or woodpoles and P3 or crossarms, necessary for NEAs
projected allocation for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. In response to the said invitation, bidders, such as private
respondent [Nerwin], were required to submit their application for eligibility together with their technical proposals. At the
same time, they were informed that only those who would pass the standard pre-qualification would be invited to submit
their financial bids.
Following a thorough review of the bidders qualifications and eligibility, only four (4) bidders, including private respondent
[Nerwin], qualified to participate in the bidding for the IPB-80 contract. Thereafter, the qualified bidders submitted their
financial bids where private respondent [Nerwin] emerged as the lowest bidder for all schedules/components of the contract.
NEA then conducted a pre-award inspection of private respondents [Nerwins] manufacturing plants and facilities, including
its identified supplier in Malaysia, to determine its capability to supply and deliver NEAs requirements.
In the Recommendation of Award for Schedules PIA, PIB, PIC and P3 - IBP No. 80 [for the] Supply and Delivery of
Woodpoles and Crossarms dated October 4, 2000, NEA administrator Conrado M. Estrella III recommended to NEAs
Board of Directors the approval of award to private respondent [Nerwin] of all schedules for IBP No. 80 on account of the
following:
a. Nerwin is the lowest complying and responsive bidder;
b. The price difference for the four (4) schedules between the bid of Nerwin Industries (lowest responsive and
complying bidder) and the second lowest bidder in the amount of $1.47 million for the poles and $0.475 million for
the crossarms, is deemed substantial and extremely advantageous to the government. The price difference is
equivalent to 7,948 pcs. of poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms;
c. The price difference for the three (3) schedules between the bids of Nerwin and the Tri-State Pole and Piling, Inc.
approximately in the amount of $2.36 million for the poles and $0.475 million for the crossarms are equivalent to
additional 12.872 pcs. of poles and 20.967 pcs. of crossarms; and
d. The bidder and manufacturer are capable of supplying the woodpoles and specified in the bid documents and as
based on the pre-award inspection conducted.
However, on December 19, 2000, NEAs Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 32 reducing by 50% the material
requirements for IBP No. 80 "given the time limitations for the delivery of the materials, xxx, and with the loan closing date of
October 2001 fast approaching". In turn, it resolved to award the four (4) schedules of IBP No. 80 at a reduced number to
private respondent [Nerwin]. Private respondent [Nerwin] protested the said 50% reduction, alleging that the same was a
ploy to accommodate a losing bidder.
On the other hand, the losing bidders Tri State and Pacific Synnergy appeared to have filed a complaint, citing alleged false
or falsified documents submitted during the pre-qualification stage which led to the award of the IBP-80 project to private
respondent [Nerwin].
Thus, finding a way to nullify the result of the previous bidding, NEA officials sought the opinion of the Government
Corporate Counsel who, among others, upheld the eligibility and qualification of private respondent [Nerwin]. Dissatisfied,
the said officials attempted to seek a revision of the earlier opinion but the Government Corporate Counsel declared anew
that there was no legal impediment to prevent the award of IPB-80 contract to private respondent [Nerwin]. Notwithstanding,
NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders relative to the IPB-80 contract, prompting private respondent [Nerwin] to
file a complaint for specific performance with prayer for the issuance of an injunction, which injunctive application was
granted by Branch 36 of RTC-Manila in Civil Case No. 01102000.
In the interim, PNOC-Energy Development Corporation purporting to be under the Department of Energy, issued
Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 or an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural
Electrification Project ("O-ILAW project").
Upon learning of the issuance of Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1 for the O-ILAW Project, Nerwin filed a civil action in the RTC
in Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 03106921 entitled Nerwin Industries Corporation v. PNOC-Energy Development
Corporation and Ester R. Guerzon, as Chairman, Bids and Awards Committee, alleging that Requisition No. FGJ 30904R1
was an attempt to subject a portion of the items covered by IPB No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to
enjoin respondents proposed bidding for the wooden poles.
Respondents sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 03106921, stating that the complaint averred no cause of action,
violated the rule that government infrastructure projects were not to be subjected to TROs, contravened the mandatory
prohibition against non-forum shopping, and the corporate president had no authority to sign and file the complaint. 3
On June 27, 2003, after Nerwin had filed its rejoinder to respondents reply, the RTC granted a TRO in Civil Case No.
03106921.4
On July 30, 2003, the RTC issued an order,5 as follows:
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing considerations, an order is hereby issued by this Court:
1. DENYING the motion to consolidate;
2. DENYING the urgent motion for reconsideration;
3. DISQUALIFYING Attys. Michael A. Medado, Datu Omar S. Sinsuat and Mariano H. Paps from appearing as
counsel for the defendants;
4. DECLARING defendants in default;
5. GRANTING the motion for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction.
Accordingly, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue enjoining the defendant PNOC-EDC and its Chairman of Bids and
Awards Committee Esther R. Guerzon from continuing the holding of the subject bidding upon the plaintiffs filing of a bond
in the amount of 200,000.00 to answer for any damage or damages which the defendants may suffer should it be finally
adjudged that petitioner is not entitled thereto, until final determination of the issue in this case by this Court.
This order shall become effective only upon the posting of a bond by the plaintiffs in the amount of 200,000.00.
Let a copy of this order be immediately served on the defendants and strict compliance herein is enjoined. Furnish the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel copy of this order.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the order of July 30, 2003, and also to set aside the order of default and to
admit their answer to the complaint.
On January 13, 2004, the RTC denied respondents motions for reconsideration, to set aside order of default, and to admit
answer.6
Thence, respondents commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari (CA-GR SP No. 83144),
alleging that the RTC had thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding
that Nerwin had been entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction despite the express prohibition from the
law and from the Supreme Court; in issuing the TRO in blatant violation of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence;
in declaring respondents in default; and in disqualifying respondents counsel from representing them.7
On October 22, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision,8 to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated July 30 and December 29, 2003 are hereby
ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 03106921, private respondents complaint for issuance of
temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction before Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Nerwin filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on February 9, 2005. 9
Issues
Hence, Nerwin appeals, raising the following issues:
I. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 prohibiting the issuance of
temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, except if issued by the Supreme Court, on government
projects.
II. Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the entire case on the basis of Rep. Act 8975 which
prohibits the issuance only of a preliminary injunction but not injunction as a final remedy.
III. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case considering that it is also one for damages.
Ruling
The petition fails.
In its decision of October 22, 2004, the CA explained why it annulled and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC issued on
July 20, 2003 and December 29, 2003, and why it altogether dismissed Civil Case No. 03106921, as follows:
It is beyond dispute that the crux of the instant case is the propriety of respondent Judges issuance of a preliminary
injunction, or the earlier TRO, for that matter.
Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an application for TRO/preliminary injunction, and worse, in
issuing a preliminary injunction through the assailed order enjoining petitioners sought bidding for its O-ILAW Project. The
same is a palpable violation of RA 8975 which was approved on November 7, 2000, thus, already existing at the time
respondent Judge issued the assailed Orders dated July 20 and December 29, 2003.
Section 3 of RA 8975 states in no uncertain terms, thus:
Prohibition on the Issuance of temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions.
No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials, or any person or entity, whether public or
private, acting under the governments direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
xxx
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
xxx
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party, including but not limited to
cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition
shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary
restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. xxx
The said proscription is not entirely new. RA 8975 merely supersedes PD 1818 which earlier underscored the prohibition to
courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving infrastructure or National Resources
Development projects of, and public utilities operated by, the government. This law was, in fact, earlier upheld to have such
a mandatory nature by the Supreme Court in an administrative case against a Judge.
Moreover, to bolster the significance of the said prohibition, the Supreme Court had the same embodied in its Administrative
Circular No. 11-2000 which reiterates the ban on issuance of TRO or writs of Preliminary Prohibitory or Mandatory
Injunction in cases involving Government Infrastructure Projects. Pertinent is the ruling in National Housing Authority vs.
Allarde "As regards the definition of infrastructure projects, the Court stressed in Republic of the Phil. vs. Salvador Silverio
and Big Bertha Construction: The term infrastructure projects means construction, improvement and rehabilitation of
roads, and bridges, railways, airports, seaports, communication facilities, irrigation, flood control and drainage, water supply
and sewerage systems, shore protection, power facilities, national buildings, school buildings, hospital buildings and other
related construction projects that form part of the government capital investment."
Thus, there is nothing from the law or jurisprudence, or even from the facts of the case, that would justify respondent
Judges blatant disregard of a "simple, comprehensible and unequivocal mandate (of PD 1818) prohibiting the issuance of
injunctive writs relative to government infrastructure projects." Respondent Judge did not even endeavor, although
expectedly, to show that the instant case falls under the single exception where the said proscription may not apply, i.e.,
when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is
issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.
Respondent Judge could not have legally declared petitioner in default because, in the first place, he should not have given
due course to private respondents complaint for injunction. Indubitably, the assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Perforce, this Court no longer sees the need to resolve the other grounds proffered by petitioners. 10
The CAs decision was absolutely correct. The RTC gravely abused its discretion, firstly, when it entertained the complaint
of Nerwin against respondents notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby contravening the express provisions of Section 3
and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 for its seeking to enjoin the bidding out by respondents of the O-ILAW Project; and,
secondly, when it issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.
Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 provide:
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory
Injunctions. No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether
public or private, acting under the governments direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any national government
project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such contract/project.
This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party, including but not limited to
cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition
shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary
restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be
fixed by the court, which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally decide that the applicant
was not entitled to the relief sought.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the court may, if appropriate under the
circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to
any liability that the guilty party may incur under existing laws.
Section 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. - Any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction issued in violation of Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and effect.
The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous, nothing was left for the RTC to do except to enforce
them and to exact upon Nerwin obedience to them. The RTC could not have been unaware of the prohibition under
Republic Act No. 8975 considering that the Court had itself instructed all judges and justices of the lower courts, through
Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, to comply with and respect the prohibition against the issuance of TROs or writs of
preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction involving contracts and projects of the Government.
It is of great relevance to mention at this juncture that Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo, the Presiding Judge of Branch 37 of the
RTC, the branch to which Civil Case No. 03106921 had been raffled, was in fact already found administratively liable for
gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law as the result of his issuance of the assailed TRO and writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction. The Court could only fine him in the amount of 40,000.00 last August 6, 2008 in view of his
intervening retirement from the service. That sanction was meted on him in A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133 entitled Sinsuat v.
Hidalgo,11 where this Court stated:
The Court finds that, indeed, respondent is liable for gross misconduct. As the CA explained in its above-stated Decision in
the petition for certiorari, respondent failed to heed the mandatory ban imposed by P.D. No. 1818 and R.A. No. 8975
against a government infrastructure project, which the rural electrification project certainly was. He thereby likewise
obstinately disregarded this Courts various circulars enjoining courts from issuing TROs and injunctions against
government infrastructure projects in line with the proscription under R.A. No. 8975. Apropos are Gov. Garcia v. Hon.
Burgos and National Housing Authority v. Hon. Allarde wherein this Court stressed that P.D. No. 1818 expressly deprives
courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs against the implementation or execution of a government infrastructure project.
Reiterating the prohibitory mandate of P.D. No. 1818, the Court in Atty. Caguioa v. Judge Lavia faulted a judge for grave
misconduct for issuing a TRO against a government infrastructure project thus:
xxx It appears that respondent is either feigning a misunderstanding of the law or openly manifesting a contumacious
indifference thereto. In any case, his disregard of the clear mandate of PD 1818, as well as of the Supreme Court Circulars
enjoining strict compliance therewith, constitutes grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of
justice. His claim that the said statute is inapplicable to his January 21, 1997 Order extending the dubious TRO is but a
contrived subterfuge to evade administrative liability.
In resolving matters in litigation, judges should endeavor assiduously to ascertain the facts and the applicable
laws. Moreover, they should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules.
Also, they are expected to keep abreast of and be conversant with the rules and the circulars which the Supreme
Court has adopted and which affect the disposition of cases before them.
Although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance of their judicial
functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable terms of the law obviates this presumption and renders
them susceptible to administrative sanctions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The pronouncements in Caguioa apply as well to respondent.
The questioned acts of respondent also constitute gross ignorance of the law for being patently in disregard of simple,
elementary and well-known rules which judges are expected to know and apply properly.
IN FINE, respondent is guilty of gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law, which are serious charges under
Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. He having retired from the service, a fine in the amount of 40,000 is imposed
upon him, the maximum amount fixed under Section 11 of Rule 140 as an alternative sanction to dismissal or suspension. 12
Even as the foregoing outcome has rendered any further treatment and discussion of Nerwins other submissions
superfluous and unnecessary, the Court notes that the RTC did not properly appreciate the real nature and true purpose of
the injunctive remedy. This failing of the RTC presses the Court to use this decision to reiterate the norms and parameters
long standing jurisprudence has set to control the issuance of TROs and writs of injunction, and to now insist on conformity
to them by all litigants and lower courts. Only thereby may the grave misconduct committed in Civil Case No. 03106921 be
avoided.1wphi1
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order,
requiring a party or a court, agency or person, to refrain from a particular act or acts.13 It is an ancillary or preventive remedy
resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests during the pendency of the case. As such, it is issued
only when it is established that:
(a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either
for a limited period or perpetually; or
(b) The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be
done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.14
The existence of a right to be protected by the injunctive relief is indispensable. In City Government of Butuan v.
Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc.,15 the Court elaborated on this requirement, viz:
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in
or title to the right or the property sought to be protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the
relief demanded in the complaint, which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or whose
averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly, the
conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act
sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may
never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act
prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is
enforceable as a matter of law.16
Conclusive proof of the existence of the right to be protected is not demanded, however, for, as the Court has held in
Saulog v. Court of Appeals,17 it is enough that:
xxx for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts affording a present right which is directly threatened
by an act sought to be enjoined. And while a clear showing of the right claimed is necessary, its existence need not
be conclusively established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted to justify preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon
need not be conclusive or complete but need only be a "sampling" intended merely to give the court an idea of the
justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. This should really be so since
our concern here involves only the propriety of the preliminary injunction and not the merits of the case still
pending with the trial court.
Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction, the private respondent needs only to show that it has the ostensible
right to the final relief prayed for in its complaint xxx.18
In this regard, the Rules of Court grants a broad latitude to the trial courts considering that conflicting claims in an
application for a provisional writ more often than not involve and require a factual determination that is not the function of the
appellate courts.19 Nonetheless, the exercise of such discretion must be sound, that is, the issuance of the writ, though
discretionary, should be upon the grounds and in the manner provided by law. 20 When that is done, the exercise of sound
discretion by the issuing court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with except when there is manifest abuse. 21
Moreover, judges dealing with applications for the injunctive relief ought to be wary of improvidently or unwarrantedly
issuing TROs or writs of injunction that tend to dispose of the merits without or before trial. Granting an application for the
relief in disregard of that tendency is judicially impermissible,22 for it is never the function of a TRO or preliminary injunction
to determine the merits of a case,23 or to decide controverted facts.24 It is but a preventive remedy whose only mission is to
prevent threatened wrong,25 further injury,26 and irreparable harm27 or injustice28 until the rights of the parties can be settled.
Judges should thus look at such relief only as a means to protect the ability of their courts to render a meaningful
decision.29 Foremost in their minds should be to guard against a change of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the
granting of proper reliefs after a trial on the merits.30 It is well worth remembering that the writ of preliminary injunction
should issue only to prevent the threatened continuous and irremediable injury to the applicant before the claim can be
justly and thoroughly studied and adjudicated.31
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
The Court Administrator shall disseminate this decision to the lower courts for their guidance.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143870 September 30, 2005
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Petitioners,
vs.
RIVERA VILLAGE LESSEE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 dated August 23, 2000 filed by the Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA), assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated June 30, 2000 which directed the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining petitioner from evicting the homeowners of Rivera Village from their dwellings.
The antecedents, culled from the petition and the assailed Decision, are as follows:
The then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) was entrusted with the administration, operation, management, control,
maintenance and development of the Manila International Airport (MIA), now the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. Among
its powers was the power to enter into, make and execute concessions and concession rights for purposes essential to the
operation of the airport.
On May 25, 1965, the CAA, through its Director, Capt. Vicente C. Rivera, entered into individual lease contracts with its
employees (lessees) for the lease of portions of a four (4)-hectare lot situated in what is now known as Rivera Village
located in Barangay 199 and 200 in Pasay City. The leases were for a twenty-five (25)-year period to commence on May
25, 1965 up to May 24, 1990 at 20.003 per annum as rental.
On May 4, 1982, Executive Order No. (EO) 778 was issued (later amended by EO 903 on July 21, 1983), creating petitioner
MIAA, transferring existing assets of the MIA to MIAA, and vesting the latter with the power to administer and operate the
MIA.
Sometime in January 1995, MIAA stopped issuing accrued rental bills and refused to accept rental payments from the
lessees. As a result, respondent Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners Association, Inc. (homeowners association),
purportedly representing the lessees, requested MIAA to sell the subject property to its members, invoking the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1517 or the Urban Land Reform Act and PD 2016.
The MIAA, on February 14, 1996, denied the request, claiming that the subject property is included in its Conceptual
Development Plan intended for airport-related activities.
Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction4 against MIAA and the National Housing Authority (NHA). The petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 97-1598 in the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, sought to restrain the MIAA from implementing its Conceptual Development
Plan insofar as Rivera Village is concerned. It also sought to compel MIAA to segregate Rivera Village from the scope of the
Conceptual Development Plan and the NHA to take the necessary steps for the disposition of the property in favor of the
members of the homeowners association.
MIAA filed an answer5 alleging that the petition fails to state a cause of action in view of the expiration of the lease contracts
and the lack of personality to sue of the homeowners association. MIAA also claimed that the homeowners association is
not entitled to a writ of mandamus because it does not have a clear legal right to possess the subject property and MIAA
does not have a corresponding duty to segregate Rivera Village from its Conceptual Development Plan.
A preliminary hearing on MIAAs affirmative defenses was conducted, after which the trial court issued an Order6dated
October 12, 1998, denying the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
and dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
In view of all the foregoing, the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
is hereby denied for lack of merit and the above-entitled petition is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.7
The trial court held that PD 1818 bars the issuance of a restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction in any case, dispute or controversy involving infrastructure projects of the government or any public utility
operated by the government. It also ruled that the petition failed to state a cause of action inasmuch as petitioner therein
(respondent homeowners association) is not the real party-in-interest, the individual members of the association being the
ones who have possessory rights over their respective premises. Moreover, the lease contracts have already expired.
As regards the contention that the lessees are entitled to possess the subject property by virtue of PD 1517, Proclamation
No. 1967 and PD 2016, which respectively identify parcels of urban land as part of the Urban Land Reform Zone, specify
certain areas in Metro Manila, including Rivera Village, as areas for priority development or urban land reform zones, and
prohibit the eviction of occupant families from such lands, the trial court declared that the subject property has been
reserved by MIAA for airport-related activities and, as such, is exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive and
Continuing Urban Development and Housing Program under Republic Act No. (RA) 7279.
Respondent filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, interposing essentially the same arguments raised before the trial
court. The appellate court annulled and set aside the order of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the assailed October 12, 1998 Order is annulled, set aside and reversed. The case is remanded to the court
a quo for further proceedings.
A writ of preliminary injunction is issued restraining and preventing respondent MIAA from evicting the members of petitioner
Rivera Village Association from their respective lots in the Rivera Village. Petitioner is ordered to post a bond in the amount
of 500,000.00 with the condition that petitioner will pay to respondent MIAA all damages it may sustain by reason of the
injunction if the court should finally decided that petitioner is not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the bond, the writ of
preliminary injunction shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.8
The appellate court foremost ruled that the case can be construed as a class suit instituted by the Rivera Village lessees.
The homeowners association, considered as the representative of the lessees, merely instituted the suit for the benefit of its
members. It does not claim to have any right or interest in the lots occupied by the lessees, nor seek the registration of the
titles to the land in its name.
On the issue of the expiration of the lease contracts and the application of PD 1517, Proclamation No. 1967 and PD 2016,
the Court of Appeals held that the expiration of the lease contracts cannot adversely affect the rights acquired by the
lessees under the foregoing laws. Besides, the lease contracts were impliedly renewed by virtue of MIAAs acceptance of
rental payments from May 25, 1990 up to December 1994. This resulted in an implied new lease under Article 1670 of the
Civil Code.
Moreover, the appellate court construed Sec. 5(c) of RA 7279 to mean that if the government lot has not been utilized
during the ten (10)-year period for the purpose for which it has been reserved prior to 1983, then said lot is encompassed by
the law and is subject to distribution to the legitimate and qualified residents of the area after appropriate proceedings have
been undertaken.
As to whether PD 1818 bars the issuance of an injunctive writ in this case, the appellate court ruled that PD 1818 is a
general law on the issuance of restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction. On the other hand, PD 2016 is a
special law specifically prohibiting the eviction of tenants from lands identified as areas for priority development. Thus, the
trial court can issue an injunctive writ if the act sought to be restrained will enforce the eviction of tenants from urban land
reform zones.
The court, however, declared that it cannot make a definitive ruling on the rights of the members of the homeowners
association vis--vis the MIAA Conceptual Development Plan, considering the need for a full-blown trial to ferret out whether
the claimed rights under the pertinent laws have ripened to actual legal and vested rights in their favor.
MIAA now seeks a review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. In the instant petition, MIAA contends that the appellate
court erred in ruling that PD 2016, which prohibits the eviction of occupant families from real property identified as areas for
priority development or urban land reform zones, has modified PD 1818, which bars the issuance of injunctive writ in cases
involving infrastructure projects of the government, including public utilities for the transport of goods and commodities.
It argues that the petition filed by the homeowners association with the trial court fails to state a cause of action because the
homeowners association is not the real party-in-interest in the suit. Allegedly, the Board Resolution presented by
respondent shows that it was only the board of directors of the association, as distinguished from the members thereof,
which authorized respondent to act as its representative in the suit.
MIAA also stresses that the subject property has recently been reserved by MIAA for airport-related activities and, as such,
Sec. 5(c) of RA 7279 applies. Under the said law, lands which are used, reserved or otherwise set aside for government
offices, facilities and other installations are exempt from the coverage of the law.
Moreover, MIAA avers that the Court of Appeals should not have granted injunctive relief to respondent, considering that the
grant of an injunction would inflict greater damage to petitioner and to the public.
Respondent filed a Comment9 dated November 20, 2000, arguing that MIAA is mandated by law to dispose of Rivera
Village to the homeowners thereof. Under existing laws, the homeowners have the right to possess and enjoy the property.
To accept MIAAs pretense that the property has been recently reserved for airport-related activities and therefor exempt
from the coverage of RA 7279 will allegedly violate the right of the homeowners as bona fide tenants to socialized housing.
Respondent further argues that PD 1818 is inapplicable to this case because it has established a clear and unmistakable
right to an injunction. Besides, PD 2016 which protects from eviction tenants of lands identified for priority development, is a
later enactment which should be deemed to prevail over PD 1818.
In the Resolution10 dated January 24, 2001, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to submit their
respective memoranda.
Accordingly, MIAA submitted its Memorandum11 dated March 20, 2001, while respondent filed its Memorandum12dated April
20, 2001. For its part, NHA manifested that it is adopting the memorandum of MIAA as its own insofar as the same is
germane and material to NHAs stand.13
As presented and discussed by the parties, the issues are the following:
1. Has PD 2016 modified PD 1818?
2. Did the petition filed by respondent with the trial court state a cause of action against petitioner?
3. Is petitioner obliged to dispose of the subject properties in favor of the members of respondent association after
appropriate proceedings?
4. Is respondent entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction?14
We first resolve the threshold question of whether respondent has personality to sue.
MIAA contends that the real parties-in-interest in the petition filed with the trial court are the individual members of the
homeowners association. Not having been brought in the name of the real parties-in-interest, the suit was correctly
dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a cause of action.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of Court) requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.15 A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the
real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action.16
The petition before the trial court was filed by the homeowners association, represented by its President, Panfilo R.
Chiutena, Sr., upon authority of a Board Resolution empowering the latter to file "[A]ll necessary action to the Court of
Justice and other related acts necessary to have our Housing Project number 4 land be titled to the members of the
Association."
Obviously, the petition cannot be considered a class suit under Sec. 12, Rule 317 of the Rules of Court, the requisites
therefor not being present in the case, notably because the petition does not allege the existence and prove the requisites
of a class suit, i.e., that the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons and the
parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, and because it was brought only by one
party.
In Board of Optometry v. Colet,18 we held that courts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the
exception to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For while no difficulty may arise if the decision secured is
favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as those who were deemed impleaded by
their self-appointed representatives would certainly claim denial of due process.
There is, however, merit in the appellate courts pronouncement that the petition should be construed as a suit brought by
the homeowners association as the representative of the members thereof under Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties.Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or
someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to
be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or
administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to
the principal. [Emphasis supplied.]
It is a settled rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. Where the
action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary must be
included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party-in-interest. The name of such beneficiaries shall,
likewise, be included in the complaint.19
Moreover, Sec. 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued, or the
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity must be averred in the complaint. In order to maintain an
action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he or she or it must be a person in law
and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial person. The party bringing suit has the burden of proving
the sufficiency of the representative character that he claims. If a complaint is filed by one who claims to represent a party
as plaintiff but who, in fact, is not authorized to do so, such complaint is not deemed filed and the court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the complaint. It must be stressed that an unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. 20
In this case, the petition filed with the trial court sufficiently avers that the homeowners association, through its President, is
suing in a representative capacity as authorized under the Board Resolution attached to the petition. Although the names of
the individual members of the homeowners association who are the beneficiaries and real parties-in-interest in the suit were
not indicated in the title of the petition, this defect can be cured by the simple expedient of requiring the association to
disclose the names of the principals and to amend the title and averments of the petition accordingly.
Essentially, the purpose of the rule that actions should be brought or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest is to
protect against undue and unnecessary litigation and to ensure that the court will have the benefit of having before it the
real adverse parties in the consideration of a case. This rule, however, is not to be narrowly and restrictively construed, and
its application should be neither dogmatic nor rigid at all times but viewed in consonance with extant realities and
practicalities.21 As correctly noted by the Court of Appeals, the dismissal of this case based on the lack of personality to sue
of petitioner-association will only result in the filing of multiple suits by the individual members of the association.
What is more decisive to the resolution of the present controversy, however, is a matter not addressed by the parties in the
case before this Court, that is, the fact that the petition filed before the trial court is for mandamus to compel MIAA to
segregate Rivera Village from the scope of its Conceptual Development Plan and the NHA to take the necessary steps for
the disposition of the subject property in favor of the members of the homeowners association.
Parenthetically, while the procedural rule is that a party is required to indicate in his brief an assignment of errors and only
those assigned shall be considered by the appellate court in deciding the case, it is equally settled that appellate courts
have ample authority to rule on matters not assigned as errors in an appeal, if these are indispensable or necessary to the
just resolution of the pleaded issues.22
For instance, the Court has allowed the consideration of other grounds not raised or assigned as errors specifically in the
following instances: (1) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within the contemplation of the law; (3) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution
of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (4) matters not specifically assigned
as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which
the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related
to an error assigned; and (6) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question
properly assigned is dependent.23
In this case, although the propriety of the filing of a petition for mandamus was no longer raised as an issue before this
Court, MIAA asserted in its answer24 to the original petition that the homeowners association is not entitled to a writ of
mandamus because it has not shown any legal right to possess the subject property and a correlative obligation on the part
of MIAA to segregate the property from its Conceptual Development Plan. MIAA averred:
28. Petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus. For a writ of mandamus to issue, it is essential that
petitioner has a legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.
The legal right of petitioner to the thing demanded must be well-defined, clear and certain. The corresponding duty of
respondent to perform the required act must also be clear and specific (Cf. Lemi v. Valencia, 26 SCRA 203, 210 [1968]).
29. Petitioner, in view of the expiration of the lease contracts of its individual members, has failed to show that it has the
legal right to possess the subject property.
30. There is therefore no corresponding duty on the part of respondent MIAA to segregate the property from the scope of its
Conceptual Development Plan.25
The question of whether the homeowners association is entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus was again raised in
the memorandum26 filed by MIAA with the Court of Appeals. MIAA alleged:
Appellant is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus. For a writ of mandamus to issue, it is essential that the
appellant has a legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required.
The legal right of appellant to the thing demanded must be well-defined, clear and certain. The corresponding duty of
respondent to perform the required act must also be clear and specific (cf. Lemi v. Valencia, 26 SCRA 203, 210 [1968]).
In view of the expiration of the lease contracts of its individual members, appellant has failed to show that it has the legal
right to possess the subject property. There is therefore no corresponding duty on the part of the MIAA to segregate the
property from the scope of its conceptual development plan.27
The question of whether mandamus is the proper remedy was clearly raised in the trial court and the Court of Appeals
although it was largely ignored by both courts. This issue being indispensable to the resolution of this case, we shall rule on
the matter.
A writ of mandamus can be issued only when petitioners legal right to the performance of a particular act which is sought to
be compelled is clear and complete. A clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a
matter of law.28
In order that a writ of mandamus may aptly issue, it is essential that, on the one hand, petitioner has a clear legal right to the
claim that is sought and that, on the other hand, respondent has an imperative duty to perform that which is demanded of
him. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with
a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to
command and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate. Thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a
legal right but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will
not issue.
In this case, the Court of Appeals itself conceded that no definitive ruling as regards the rights of the individual members of
the homeowners association could yet be made considering the need for a full determination of whether their claimed rights
under the pertinent laws have ripened into actual legal and vested rights. The appellate court even outlined the requisites
under PD 1517 which have yet to be complied with, namely: (1) the submission to the NHA of a proposal to acquire the
subject property as required under Sec. 929 of PD 1517;
and (2) proof that the members of the homeowners association are qualified to avail of the benefits under PD 1517 as
mandated by Sec. 630 of the same law.
Resort to mandamus is evidently premature because there is no showing that the members of the homeowners association
have already filed an application or proposal with the NHA to acquire their respective lots. There is still an administrative
remedy open to the members of the homeowners association which they should have first pursued, failing which they
cannot invoke judicial action.31
We note that while respondent alleges that its members enlisted themselves with the NHA in order to avail of the benefits of
the law, the NHA, in its answer32 to the petition, denied this allegation for being self-serving. Whatever rights the members
of the homeowners association may have under the relevant laws are still in substantial doubt or dispute. Hence, the
petition for mandamus was appropriately dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
So, too, should the prayer for the issuance of a writ of prohibition contained in the same petition be denied. Writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are prerogative writs of equity and their granting is ordinarily within the sound
discretion of the courts to be exercised on equitable principles. Said writs should only be issued when the right to the relief
is clear.33 As our findings in this case confirm, the homeowners association failed to establish a clear legal right to the
issuance of the writs of mandamus and prohibition prayed for.
There is, moreover, another ground for the dismissal of the petition filed before the trial court which appears to have been
overlooked by the parties in this case.
In the original petition filed before the trial court, the homeowners association averred that although EO 903 transferred to
MIAA the properties and assets of MIA, such transfer was made subject to what the homeowners association claims to be
the existing rights of its members.34 MIAA dismissed this allegation as an erroneous conclusion of law.35
We cite the complete text of the relevant provision of EO 903 to fully understand the import thereof and its effect on the
present controversy. Section 3 thereof states:
Sec. 3. Creation of the Manila International Airport Authority.There is hereby established a body corporate to be known as
the Manila International Airport Authority which shall be attached to the Ministry of Transportation and Communications. The
principal office of the Authority shall be located at the New Manila International Airport. The Authority may establish such
offices, branches, agencies or subsidiaries as it may deem proper and necessary; Provided, That any subsidiary that may
be organized shall have the prior approval of the President.
The land where the Airport is presently located as well as the surrounding land area of approximately six hundred
hectares, are hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to the ownership and administration of the Authority,
subject to existing rights, if any. The Bureau of Lands and other appropriate government agencies shall undertake an
actual survey of the area transferred within one year from the promulgation of this Executive Order and the corresponding
title to be issued in the name of the authority. Any portion thereof shall not be disposed through sale or through any
other mode unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines. [Emphasis supplied.]
As can clearly be seen from the foregoing provision, while it is true that the ownership and administration of the airport and
its surrounding land was assigned to MIAA subject to existing rights, which we may here understand to be the rights granted
under PD 1517, EO 903 specifically requires the approval of the President of the Philippines before any disposition by sale
or any other mode may be made concerning the property transferred to MIAA.
The Executive Secretary as representative of the President of the Philippines is, therefore, an indispensable party in actions
seeking to compel the sale or disposition of properties of the MIAA. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that
parties-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants.
Thus, the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely
when an indispensable party is not before the court that the action should be dismissed. The plaintiff is mandated to implead
all indispensable parties, and the absence of one renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present. One who is a party to a case is not bound by
any decision of the court; otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to due process.36
For the foregoing reasons, the prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction must perforce be denied.
Preliminary injunction is a mere ancillary remedy which cannot stand separately or proceed independently of the main case.
Having declared that the petition filed before the trial court was correctly dismissed, the determination of the homeowners
associations entitlement to a writ of preliminary injunction is already moot and academic.37
Besides, as earlier noted, the right of the members of the homeowners association to possess and purchase the subject
property is still uncertain considering that they have not completed the process for the acquisition of their lots as outlined in
PD 1517.
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. The writ of preliminary injunction is
issued by the court to prevent threatened or continuous irreparable injury to parties before their claims can be thoroughly
studied and adjudicated. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. The
writ is issued upon the satisfaction of two requisites, namely: (1) the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) acts which
are violative of said right. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive relief constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainants right is doubtful or
disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground
for an injunction.38
With this conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in this petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 30, 2000 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 97-1598 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157315 December 1, 2010
CITY GOVERNMENT OF BUTUAN and CITY MAYOR LEONIDES THERESA B. PLAZA, the latter in her personal
capacity and as representative of her co-defendant, Petitioners,
vs.
CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM (CBS), INC., doing business under the name and style "DXBR" Bombo
Radyo Butuan, represented by its Manager, Norberto P. Pagaspas, and HON. ROSARITO F. DABALOS, PRESIDING
JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 2, OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN CITY,Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioners City Government of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza (petitioners) appeal the adverse decision
dated October 28, 2002 (dismissing their petition for certiorari and prohibition to challenge the grant by the trial judge of the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction after reconsidering his earlier self-inhibition),1 and the resolution dated January
29, 2003 (denying their motion for reconsideration), both promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
69729 entitled City Government of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, the latter in her personal capacity
and as representative of her co-defendant v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc., doing business under the
name and style "DXBR" Bombo Radyo Butuan, represented by its Manager, Norberto P. Pagaspas, and the Hon. Rosarito
F. Dabalos, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 2, of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City.
Antecedents2
In February, 2002, City Mayor Plaza (Mayor Plaza) wrote to the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Butuan City to solicit its
support for her decision to deny the application for mayors permit of respondent Bombo Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting
System (CBS), and to eventually close down CBSs radio station. She justified her decision by claiming that CBSs
operating its broadcasting business within the Arujiville Subdivision, a residential area, had violated the Citys zoning
ordinance. Her letter pertinently reads:
In 1994, Bombo Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting System manifested their intention to operate on their current site at
Arujiville Subdivision which is a residential area. They were informed that they cannot situate their business in the area as it
violates our zoning ordinance. However, they have pleaded and was agreeable to operate in the area by virtue of a
Temporary Use Permit (TUP) xxx.
The TUP allowed them to operate in the area but only for a very limited period. As a matter of fact, the TUP was good only
for one year, which can be renewed every year for a maximum of five (5) years or until 1999. Thus, right from the beginning
they have been informed and forewarned that they cannot operate in the area forever and that they have to relocate to a
proper area.
Bombo Radyo renewed its TUP only in 1995 and 1996. They have failed to renew their TUP up to today.
This office has received numerous complaints against Bombo Radyo for violation of private rights, inciting people to go rise
against the government, malicious imputations, insinuations against people not of their liking, false or fabricated news, etc.
The list is so long to enumerate. Copies of the petitions, manifestos from various groups is hereto attached for your perusal.
Thus, for violation of the city zoning ordinance, the expiration of their TUP, which was never renewed since 1997, failure to
secure ECC and the numerous complaints against the station of the residents within the immediate vicinity of their premises
and the threat they are causing to the peace and order of the City, I have decided to deny their application for a mayor's
permit and thereafter to close the radio station.
In view of the foregoing premises, I am forwarding this matter to the Sangguniang Panlungsod to solicit your resolution of
support on the matter.
This is not a decision calculated to deprived (sic) Radio Bombo of its freedom of speech or expression. This is just a simply
matter of whether or not Radyo Bombo has complied with existing laws and ordinances.
Thereupon, the Sangguninang Panlungsod adopted Resolution-057-2002 "to strongly support the decision of the City Mayor
to deny the application of Consolidated Broadcasting System Development Corporation (Bombo Radyo-Butuan) for a
Mayors Permit and thereafter close the radio station." 3
On February 18, 2002, the Citys licensing officer served on CBSs station manager a final/last notice of violation and
demand to cease and desist illegal operation, with a warning that he would recommend the closure of its business in case of
non-compliance.
On February 19, 2002, CBS and its manager, Norberto Pagaspas, filed a complaint for prohibition, mandamus, and
damages against the petitioners in the Regional Trial Court in Butuan City (RTC), 4 with prayer for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the petitioners from closing its station, or from disturbing and
preventing its business operations. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 5193, was raffled to Branch 2, presided by Judge
Rosarito P. Dabalos.
On February 20, 2002, Judge Dabalos voluntarily inhibited and directed the return of Civil Case No. 5193 to the Office of the
Clerk of Court for re-raffle.5 He cited the circumstances that might affect his objectivity and impartiality in resolving the
controversy as his justification, to wit:
xxx
a) That the undersigned was the object of its (plaintiff's) attacks and criticism which are judgmental and not
inquisitorial in the comments over the air;
b) That the undersigned was shouted at disrespectfully by one of plaintiff's reporters/news gatherers in the vicinity
of the Hall of Justice;
c) That plaintiff's commentaries are making pronouncements on legal matters, substantive and procedural, based
on its perception and not on laws;
d) That in its commentaries in attacking public officials as well as private individuals, words which are disrespectful
and indecent are used.
and the net effect and result of its commentaries over the air causes confusion on the minds of the public, including the
young that the court and government offices and public officials will lose their credibility and respect which are due them.
The court is aware of press freedom is enshrined in our constitution but such freedom should not be abused because in
every right there is a concomitant obligation.
Let therefore this case be returned immediately to the office [of the] Clerk of Court VI for re-raffling.
SO ORDERED.
On the same day, Judge Victor Tomaneng, Presiding Judge of Branch 33, issued an order also inhibiting himself from
handling Civil Case No. 5193, and in his capacity as Vice Executive Judge (in lieu of Executive Judge Cipriano B. Alvizo,
Jr., then on sick leave) directed the assignment of Civil Case No. 5193 to Branch 5 without raffle, 6 viz:
xxx Considering that the Executive Judge Hon. Cipriano B. Alvizo, the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 4 and Acting-
Designate Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 3, but who is now in Cebu City for medical treatment, it would be impractical to
include his courts in the re-raffling of cases for the reason that the case is for prohibition, mandamus, injunction, etc., that
needs immediate action. The herein Vice-Executive Judge who is the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 33, could not also act
on this case on the ground of 'delicadeza' considering that defendant Hon. Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza is his
'kumadre' plus the fact that before becoming judge he was the legal counsel of the LDP party here in Butuan City, in the
election of 1992 and 1995, which is the political party of the Plazas. RTC-Branch 1, being the exclusive Family Court cannot
also be included in any raffle.
In view of the foregoing, and on the ground of expediency, the Clerk of Court is ordered to send this case to RTC-Branch 5,
without raffle anymore, it being the only practical available court in this jurisdiction as of this moment.
Civil Case No. 5193 was forwarded to Branch 5, presided by Judge Augustus L. Calo, who recused because his wife had
been recently appointed by Mayor Plaza to the Citys Legal Office. Judge Calo ordered the immediate return of the case to
the Clerk of Court for forwarding to Vice Executive Judge Tomaneng.
Without any other judge to handle the case, Judge Tomaneng formally returned Civil Case No. 5193 to Judge Dabalos,
stating in his letter that Judge Dabalos reason for inhibition did not amount to a plausible ground to inhibit. Judge
Tomaneng instructed Judge Dabalos to hear the case unless the Supreme Court approved the inhibition. 7
On February 21, 2002, Judge Tomaneng issued a TRO,8 to wit:
The Court believes that there is a need to maintain the status quo until all the other issues in the complaint shall have been
duly heard and determined without necessarily implying that plaintiff is entitled to the prayers for injunction. The Court
hereby resolves in the meantime to grant a temporary restraining order.
WHEREFORE, defendants City Gov't of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, their attorneys, agents,
employees, police authorities and/or any person acting upon the Mayors order and instruction under her authority are
hereby enjoined to cease, desist and to refrain from closing or padlocking RADYO BOMBO or from preventing, disturbing,
or molesting its business operations, including but not limited to the use and operation of its building, structures and
broadcasting facilities, and the ingress or egress of its employees therein.
As this Court cannot issue a seventy-two (72) hour Temporary Restraining Order because of the incoming delay on
Monday, February 25, 2002, a temporary restraining order is hereby issued effective for twenty (20) days from issuance
(Sec. 5, Rule 58, 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure).
Meanwhile, let this case be set for summary hearing on March 11, 2002 at 8:30 in the morning to resolve the pending
application for injunction and for the defendants to show cause why the same shall not be granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
On February 25, 2002, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to lift or dissolve temporary restraining order in Branch 2 (sala
of Judge Dabalos).
On February 26, 2002, Judge Dabalos referred his order of inhibition in Civil Case No. 5193 to the Court Administrator for
consideration, with a request for the designation of another Judge not stationed in Butuan City and Agusan del Norte to
handle the case.9
Consequently, CBS requested the Court to designate another judge to hear its application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, the hearing of which Judge Tomaneng had set on March 11, 2002.10
In the meanwhile, or on March 8, 2002, the petitioners filed their answer to the complaint, alleging affirmative and special
defenses and praying for the dismissal of the complaint, the lifting of the TRO, the denial of the prayer for preliminary
injunction, and the granting of their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation
expenses.
During the hearing on March 11, 2002 of CBSs application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, at which the
petitioners and their counsel did not appear, CBSs counsel manifested that he was desisting from his earlier request with
the Court for the designation of another judge to hear Civil Case No. 5193. Judge Dabalos noted the manifestation but reset
the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction on March 12, 2002, to give the petitioners an opportunity to show
cause why the writ prayed for should not issue. For the purpose of the resetting, Judge Dabalos caused a notice of hearing
to be served on the petitioners.11
Upon receipt of the notice of hearing, the petitioners moved to quash the notice and prayed that the TRO be lifted, insisting
that Judge Dabalos had already lost his authority to act on Civil Case No. 5193 by virtue of his inhibition. 12
Nonetheless, Civil Case No. 5193 was called on March 12, 2002. The parties and their respective counsel appeared. At the
close of the proceedings on that date, Judge Dabalos granted CBSs prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, 13 to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing as the defendants did not introduce any evidence in spite of the order of the Court to
show cause why no writ of preliminary injunction be issued and the repeated directive of the court in open court for the
defendants to present evidence which the defendants firmly refused to do so on flimsy grounds, the Court resolves to issue
a writ of preliminary injunction as the complaint under oath alleges that plaintiff is a grantee of a franchise from the
Congress of the Philippines and the act threatened to be committed by the defendants curtail the constitutional right of
freedom of speech of the plaintiff which the Court finds that it should be looked into, the defendants' refusal to controvert
such allegations by evidence deprived the Court [of] the chance to be guided by such evidence to act accordingly that it left
the court no alternative but to grant the writ prayed for, the City Government of Butuan and City Mayor Leonides Theresa B.
Plaza, their attorneys, agents, employees, police authorities and/or any person acting upon the Mayor's order or instructions
or under her authority are hereby enjoined to cease and desist and to refrain from closing or padlocking RADYO BOMBO or
from preventing, disturbing or molesting its business operations, including but not limited to the use and operation of its
building, structures, broadcasting facilities and the ingress or egress of its employees therein upon plaintiff's putting up a
bond in the amount of P200,000.00 duly approved by this court which injunction bond shall be executed in favor of the
defendants to answer for whatever damages which the defendants may sustain in connection with or arising from the
issuance of this writ if, after all the court will finally adjudge that plaintiff is not entitled thereto.
This order is without prejudice to the findings of the court after a formal hearing or a full blown trial.
Furnish copies of this order to the Hon. Supreme Court and the Hon. Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.14
Following CBSs posting of 200,000.00 as the required injunction bond, Branch 2 issued the writ of preliminary injunction
on March 15, 2002,15 commanding and directing the provincial sheriff to:
xxx forthwith enjoin the City Government of Butuan and the Hon. City Mayor Leonides Theresa B. Plaza, their attorneys,
agents, employees, police authorities and/or any person acting upon the mayor's order or instruction or under her authority
to cease and desist and to refrain from closing or padlocking RADIO BOMBO or from preventing disturbing or molesting its
business operations, including the use and operation of its building, structures, broadcasting facilities and the ingress and
egress of its employees therein. Copies of the writ of preliminary injunction, bond and other pertinent documents thereto be
served on the defendants and thereafter make a return of your service of this writ within the period required by law and the
Rules of Court.
Thus, the petitioners commenced in the CA a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for TRO or writ of
preliminary injunction).
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition upon a finding that Judge Dabalos had committed no grave
abuse of discretion in acting upon CBSs application for preliminary injunction, given the peculiar circumstances surrounding
the raffling and assignment of Civil Case No. 5193, and the urgent need to resolve the application for preliminary injunction
due to the expiration of Judge Tomanengs TRO by March 13, 2002. The CA held that the writ of preliminary injunction had
properly issued, because the petitioners had threatened to defeat CBSs existing franchise to operate its radio station in
Butuan City by not issuing the permit for its broadcast business.
Issues
Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari, with the petitioners contending that:16
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS
ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN, ON MARCH 12, 2002, WITHOUT SUFFICIENT NOTICE
TO PETITIONERS, HE AGAIN TOOK COGNIZANCE OF AND RE-ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE
NO. 5193 AFTER HE HAD ALREADY EFFECTIVELY INHIBITED HIMSELF FROM HEARING THE SAME IN TWO
EARLIER ORDERS HE HAD ISSUED DATED FEBRUARY 20 AND FEBRUARY 26, 2002 RESPECTIVELY.
II. ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE ROSARITO DABALOS COULD VALIDLY RE-ASSUME
JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 5193 AFTER HE HAD EARLIER ISSUED TWO ORDERS VOLUNTARILY
INHIBITING HIMSELF FROM HEARING SAID CASE, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WITHOUT REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO
SHOW WHETHER SAID PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS A CLEAR RIGHT THERETO.
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit. We find that the CA did not commit any error in upholding the questioned orders of the RTC.
I
Judge Dabalos lawfully re-assumed jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 5193
In its decision, the CA ruled that Judge Dabalos did not gravely abuse his discretion in re-assuming jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. 5193 in the light of the obtaining circumstances cogently set forth in its assailed decision, to wit: 17
Seemingly, petitioners lost sight of the reality that after the respondent judge issued his order of inhibition and directed the
return of the case to the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle to another judge, Vice-Executive Judge Victor A.
Tomaneng, noting that there is no other judge to handle the case, directed the return thereof to the public respondent in
view of the extreme urgency of the preliminary relief therein prayed for. Under the circumstances then obtaining, the
respondent judge could do no less but to act thereon. So it is that he proceeded with the scheduled hearing on the
application for preliminary injunction on March 11, 2002 and thereafter reset it for continuation the following day to afford the
petitioners an opportunity to oppose the application and show cause why the writ prayed for should not issue. The urgency
of the action demanded of the respondent judge is further accentuated by the fact that the TRO issued by Judge Tomaneng
was then about to expire on March 13, 2002, not to mention the circumstance that Executive Judge Cipriano B. Alvizo, Jr.,
who happened to be around, advised the respondent judge to resolve the issues to the best of his discretion. xxx
The petitioners disagree, and insist that Judge Dabalos lost the authority to act upon CBSs application for preliminary
injunction by virtue of his prior self-inhibition from hearing Civil Case No. 5193.
We cannot sustain the petitioners insistence.
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which contains the rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges, states:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree
of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which
he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his
ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties-in-interest, signed by them and entered
upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just and valid reasons other
than those mentioned above.
The self-inhibition of Judge Dabalos was one taken in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1. Our resolution
herein turns, therefore, on the proper interpretation and application of the second paragraph.
The second paragraph of Section 1 (unlike the first paragraph) does not expressly enumerate the specific grounds for
inhibition. This means that the determination of the grounds is left to the sound discretion of the judge, who must discern
with only his or her conscience as guide on what may be just and valid reasons for self-inhibition. The vesting of discretion
necessarily proceeds from the reality that there may be many and different grounds for a judge to recuse from a case, and
such grounds cannot all be catalogued in the Rules of Court. Thus did the Court cogently point out in Gutang v. Court of
Appeals:18
xxx The import of the rule on the voluntary inhibition of judges is that the decision on whether or not to inhibit is left to the
sound discretion and conscience of the trial judge based on his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances
prevailing in the case brought before him. It makes clear to the occupants of the Bench that outside of pecuniary interest,
relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there might be other causes that could
conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that
lead to preference or predilections are many and varied.lawphi1
In his case, Judge Dabalos clearly discerned after the return of Civil Case No. 5193 to him by the Vice Executive Judge that
his self-doubt about his ability to dispense justice in Civil Case No. 5193 generated by the airing of criticisms against him
and other public officials by CBSs commentators and reporters would not ultimately affect his objectivity and judgment.
Such re-assessment of the ground for his self-inhibition, absent a showing of any malice or other improper motive on his
part, could not be assailed as the product of an unsound exercise of his discretion. That, it seems to us, even the petitioners
conceded, their objection being based only on whether he could still re-assume jurisdiction of Civil Case No. 5193.
We hold that although a trial judge who voluntarily inhibits loses jurisdiction to hear a case,19 he or she may decide to
reconsider the self-inhibition and re-assume jurisdiction after a re-assessment of the circumstances giving cause to the
inhibition. The discretion to reconsider acknowledges that the trial judge is in the better position to determine the issue of
inhibition, and a reviewing tribunal will not disturb the exercise of that discretion except upon a clear and strong finding of
arbitrariness or whimsicality.20 Thus, Judge Dabalos re-assumption of jurisdiction was legally tenable, having come from his
seizing the opportunity to re-assess the circumstances impelling his self-inhibition upon being faced with the urgent need to
hear and resolve CBSs application for preliminary injunction. Such action was commendable on his part, given that the
series of self-inhibitions by the other RTC Judges had left no competent judge in the station to hear and resolve the
application. It can even be rightly said that a refusal by Judge Dabalos to re-assess and reconsider might have negated his
sacred and sworn duty as a judge to dispense justice.
In this connection, the urgency for the RTC to hear and resolve the application for preliminary injunction factually existed. In
fact, CBS had communicated it to the Court in its letter dated March 5, 2002, 21 to wit:
If not for the temporary restraining order issued on February 21, 2002 by the Honorable Judge VICTOR A. TOMANENG,
Vice-Executive Judge and Presiding Judge of Branch 33 of said court xxx violent confrontations would have continued
between supporters of plaintiff RADIO BOMBO BUTUAN, on the one hand, and the loyalists of City Mayor LEONIDES
THERESA PLAZA (including some city employees) led by the Mayor herself and her husband, former Mayor DEMOCRITO
PLAZA II, on the other hand.
xxx
As set forth in the temporary restraining order, the hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction is set on
Monday, March 11, 2002 because the twenty-day lifetime of the temporary restraining order would expire on March 13,
2002. A repeat of the violent scenario of February 21 may occur unless the application is heard as scheduled by a Regional
Trial Court Judge who had not inhibited himself. xxx
Verily, Judge Dabalos decision to hear the application for preliminary injunction pending the Courts resolution of the query
on whether or not another Judge sitting outside the City of Butuan should take cognizance of Civil Case No. 5193 did not
constitute or equate to arbitrariness or whimsicality. He had reasonable grounds to do so in the context of the tight
circumstances that had developed in Civil Case No. 5193 following his self-inhibition. Surely, his decision to reconsider did
not proceed from passion or whim, but from his faithful adherence to his solemn oath to do justice to every man. He thereby
neither violated any law or canon of judicial conduct, nor abused his juridical authority.
II.
Petitioners to adduce evidence after granting of TRO
The petitioners submit that Judge Dabalos improperly resolved CBSs application for preliminary injunction by not first
requiring the applicant to adduce evidence in support of the application.
We do not agree with the petitioners.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order
requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a particular a particular act or acts. 22 It may also require
the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. 23 Thus, a
prohibitory injunction is one that commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act, while a mandatory injunction
commands the performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past.24
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in
or title to the right or the property sought to be protected.25 It is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the
relief demanded in the complaint,26 which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right,27 or whose
averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought. 28 Accordingly, the
conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act
sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may
never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act
prohibited by statute.29 Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or
is enforceable as a matter of law.30
While it is true that CBS was not required to present evidence to prove its entitlement to the injunctive writ, the writ was
nonetheless properly granted on the basis of the undisputed facts that CBS was a grantee of a franchise from the
Legislature, and that the acts complained against (i.e., refusal of the Mayors permit and resulting closure of the radio
station) were imminent and, unless enjoined, would curtail or set at naught CBSs rights under the franchise. In this regard,
worthy of mention is that even the Vice Executive Judge, acknowledging that CBS had stood to suffer grave
injustice and irreparable injury should its radio station suffer closure, had issued ex parte the TRO.
It was error on the part of the petitioners to insist that the evidence of CBS should have first been required before Judge
Dabalos issued the writ of preliminary injunction. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court clearly lays the burden on the shoulders of
the petitioners, as the parties against whom the TRO was issued, to show cause why the application for the writ of
preliminary injunction should not issue,31 thus:
Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. No preliminary injunction shall be granted without
hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by
the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice,
the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to
be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein
provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time
and place, why the injunction should not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary
injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.
xxx
In fine, Judge Dabalos properly directed the petitioners to first present evidence why the application for the writ of
preliminary injunction should not be granted. By their refusal to comply with the directive to show cause by presenting their
evidence to that effect, the petitioners could blame no one but themselves.
WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari, and affirm the decision dated October 28, 2002 promulgated by
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 69729.
Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152272 March 5, 2012
JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ANDRES C. BAUTISTA, BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN,
DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY, FLORENCIA M. MERCADO, LEOVINO C. DATARIO,
AIDA A. ABAYON, NAPOLEON M. DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY and NELSON A. LOYOLA, Petitioners,
vs.
FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., FIL ESTATE ECOCENTRUM CORPORATION, LA PAZ HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, WARBIRD SECURITY AGENCY, ENRIQUE RIVILLA, MICHAEL E. JETHMAL and MICHAEL
ALUNAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G. R. No. 152397
FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., FIL ESTATE ECOCENTRUM CORPORATION, LA PAZ HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, WARBIRD SECURITY AGENCY, ENRIQUE RIVILLA, MICHAEL E. JETHMAL and MICHAEL
ALUNAN, Petitioners,
vs.
JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ANDRES C. BAUTISTA, BRIGIDO DIMACULANGAN,
DOLORES P. PRADO, IMELDA DE LA CRUZ, EDITHA C. DY, FLORENCIA M. MERCADO, LEOVINO C. DATARIO,
AIDA A. ABAYON, NAPOLEON M. DIMAANO, ROSITA G. ESTIGOY and NELSON A. LOYOLA, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court are two (2) consolidated petitions assailing the July 31, 2001 Decision 1 and February 21, 2002
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60543, which annulled and set aside the March 3, 1999
Order3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Bian, Laguna (RTC), granting the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, and upheld the June 16, 2000 Omnibus Order4 denying the motion to dismiss.
The Facts:
On January 20, 1999, Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. (JCHA), together with individual residents of Juana
Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions (collectively referred as JCHA, et. al.), instituted a complaint5for damages, in
its own behalf and as a class suit representing the regular commuters and motorists of Juana Complex I and neighboring
subdivisions who were deprived of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc. (Fil-Estate), Fil-estate Ecocentrum
Corporation (FEEC), La Paz Housing & Development Corporation (La Paz), and Warbird Security Agency and their
respective officers (collectively referred as Fil-Estate, et al.).
The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al. were regular commuters and motorists who constantly travelled towards the
direction of Manila and Calamba; that they used the entry and exit toll gates of South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) by passing
through right-of-way public road known as La Paz Road; that they had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10)
years; that in August 1998, Fil-estate excavated, broke and deliberately ruined La Paz Road that led to SLEX so JCHA, et
al. would not be able to pass through the said road; that La Paz Road was restored by the residents to make it passable but
Fil-estate excavated the road again; that JCHA reported the matter to the Municipal Government and the Office of the
Municipal Engineer but the latter failed to repair the road to make it passable and safe to motorists and pedestrians; that the
act of Fil-estate in excavating La Paz Road caused damage, prejudice, inconvenience, annoyance, and loss of precious
hours to them, to the commuters and motorists because traffic was re-routed to narrow streets that caused terrible traffic
congestion and hazard; and that its permanent closure would not only prejudice their right to free and unhampered use of
the property but would also cause great damage and irreparable injury.
Accordingly, JCHA, et al. also prayed for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or a writ of
preliminary injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate, et al. from stopping and intimidating them in their use of La Paz Road.
On February 10, 1999, a TRO was issued ordering Fil-Estate, et al, for a period of twenty (20) days, to stop preventing,
coercing, intimidating or harassing the commuters and motorists from using the La Paz Road. 6
Subsequently, the RTC conducted several hearings to determine the propriety of the issuance of a WPI.
On February 26, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion to dismiss7 arguing that the complaint failed to state a cause of action
and that it was improperly filed as a class suit. On March 5, 1999, JCHA, et al. filed their comment8 on the motion to dismiss
to which respondents filed a reply.9
On March 3, 1999, the RTC issued an Order 10 granting the WPI and required JCHA, et al. to post a bond.
On March 19, 1999, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration11 arguing, among others, that JCHA, et al. failed to
satisfy the requirements for the issuance of a WPI. On March 23, 1999, JCHA, et al. filed their opposition to the motion.12
The RTC then issued its June 16, 2000 Omnibus Order, denying both the motion to dismiss and the motion for
reconsideration filed by Fil-Estate, et al.
Not satisfied, Fil-Estate, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA to annul (1) the Order dated March
3, 1999 and (2) the Omnibus Order dated June 16, 2000. They contended that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit. With regard to the issuance of the WPI, the defendants averred that
JCHA, et al. failed to show that they had a clear and unmistakable right to the use of La Paz Road; and further claimed that
La Paz Road was a torrens registered private road and there was neither a voluntary nor legal easement constituted over
it.13
On July 31, 2001, the CA rendered the decision partially granting the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially GRANTED. The Order dated March 3, 1999 granting the writ of preliminary
injunction is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE but the portion of the Omnibus Order dated June 16, 2000 denying the
motion to dismiss is upheld.
SO ORDERED.14
The CA ruled that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action when JCHA, et al. alleged in their complaint that they
had been using La Paz Road for more than ten (10) years and that their right was violated when Fil-Estate closed and
excavated the road. It sustained the RTC ruling that the complaint was properly filed as a class suit as it was shown that the
case was of common interest and that the individuals sought to be represented were so numerous that it was impractical to
include all of them as parties. The CA, however, annulled the WPI for failure of JCHA, et al. to prove their clear and present
right over La Paz Road. The CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for a full-blown trial on the merits.
Hence, these petitions for review.
In G.R. No. 152272, JCHA, et al. come to this Court, raising the following issues:
(A) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN HOLDING THAT A FULL-BLOWN TRIAL ON THE MERITS IS
REQUIRED TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THE LA PAZ ROAD, HAD DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
SUPERVISION.
(B) THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS FAILED TO SATISFY THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, HAD DECIDED NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.15
In G.R. No. 152397, on the other hand, Fil-Estate, et al. anchor their petition on the following issues:
I. The Court of Appeals declaration that respondents Complaint states a cause of action is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence.
II. The Court of Appeals pronouncement that respondents complaint was properly filed as a class suit is contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence.
III. The Court of Appeals conclusion that full blown trial on the merits is required to determine the nature of the La Paz
Road is contrary to existing laws and jurisprudence.16
JCHA, et al. concur with the CA that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. They, however, disagree with the
CAs pronouncement that a full-blown trial on the merits was necessary. They claim that during the hearing on the
application of the writ of injunction, they had sufficiently proven that La Paz Road was a public road and that commuters and
motorists of their neighboring villages had used this road as their means of access to the San Agustin Church, Colegio De
San Agustin and to SLEX in going to Metro Manila and to Southern Tagalog particularly during the rush hours when traffic at
Carmona Entry/Exit and Susana Heights Entry/Exit was at its worst.
JCHA, et al. argue that La Paz Road has attained the status and character of a public road or burdened by an apparent
easement of public right of way. They point out that La Paz Road is the widest road in the neighborhood used by motorists
in going to Halang Road and in entering the SLEX-Halang toll gate and that there is no other road as wide as La Paz Road
existing in the vicinity. For residents of San Pedro, Laguna, the shortest, convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang is
along Rosario Avenue joining La Paz Road.
Finally, JCHA, et al. argue that the CA erred when it voided the WPI because the public nature of La Paz Road had been
sufficiently proven and, as residents of San Pedro and Bian, Laguna, their right to use La Paz Road is undeniable.
In their Memorandum,17 Fil-Estate, et al. explain that La Paz Road is included in the parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-120008, T-90321 and T-90607, all registered in the name of La Paz. The purpose of
constructing La Paz Road was to provide a passageway for La Paz to its intended projects to the south, one of which was
the Juana Complex I. When Juana Complex I was completed, La Paz donated the open spaces, drainage, canal, and
lighting facilities inside the Juana Complex I to the Municipality of Bian. The streets within the subdivisions were then
converted to public roads and were opened for use of the general public. The La Paz Road, not being part of the Juana
Complex I, was excluded from the donation. Subsequently, La Paz became a shareholder of FEEC, a consortium formed to
develop several real properties in Bian, Laguna, known as Ecocentrum Project. In exchange for shares of stock, La Paz
contributed some of its real properties to the Municipality of Bian, including the properties constituting La Paz Road, to
form part of the Ecocentrum Project.
Fil-Estate, et al. agree with the CA that the annulment of the WPI was proper since JCHA, et al. failed to prove that they
have a clear right over La Paz Road. Fil-Estate, et al. assert that JCHA, et al. failed to prove the existence of a right of way
or a right to pass over La Paz Road and that the closure of the said road constituted an injury to such right. According to
them, La Paz Road is a torrens registered private road and there is neither a voluntary nor legal easement constituted over
it. They claim that La Paz Road is a private property registered under the name of La Paz and the beneficial ownership
thereof was transferred to FEEC when La Paz joined the consortium for the Ecocentrum Project.
Fil-Estate, et al., however, insist that the complaint did not sufficiently contain the ultimate facts to show a cause of action.
They aver the bare allegation that one is entitled to something is an allegation of a conclusion which adds nothing to the
pleading.
They likewise argue that the complaint was improperly filed as a class suit for it failed to show that JCHA, et al. and the
commuters and motorists they are representing have a well-defined community of interest over La Paz Road. They claim
that the excavation of La Paz Road would not necessarily give rise to a common right or cause of action for JCHA, et al.
against them since each of them has a separate and distinct purpose and each may be affected differently than the others.
The Courts Ruling
The issues for the Courts resolution are: (1) whether or not the complaint states a cause of action; (2) whether the
complaint has been properly filed as a class suit; and (2) whether or not a WPI is warranted.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as an act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
(1) the legal right of the plaintiff,
(2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.18
The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding the acts committed
by the defendant.19 Thus, it must contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiffs
cause of action.20 To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and
circumstances or other matters aliunde are not considered.21
The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts
alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint.22 Stated differently, if the
allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be
dismissed regardless of the defense that may be asserted by the defendant.23
In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action. First,JCHA, et
al.s averments in the complaint show a demandable right over La Paz Road. These are: (1) their right to use the road on
the basis of their allegation that they had been using the road for more than 10 years; and (2) an easement of a right of way
has been constituted over the said roads. There is no other road as wide as La Paz Road existing in the vicinity and it is the
shortest, convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang that the commuters and motorists may use. Second, there is an
alleged violation of such right committed by Fil-Estate, et al. when they excavated the road and prevented the commuters
and motorists from using the same. Third, JCHA, et al. consequently suffered injury and that a valid judgment could have
been rendered in accordance with the relief sought therein.
With respect to the issue that the case was improperly instituted as a class suit, the Court finds the opposition without merit.
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so
numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous
and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in
interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest.
The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or
general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court;
and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the
interests of all concerned.24
In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road. As succinctly stated by
the CA:
The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially shown to be of
common or general interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous individuals have filed manifestations with
the lower court, conveying their intention to join private respondents in the suit and claiming that they are similarly situated
with private respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in closing and excavating the La Paz Road.
Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by private respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is
impracticable to join them all as parties and be named individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These individuals claim to
be residents of various barangays in Bian, Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.
Anent the issue on the propriety of the WPI, Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court lays down the rules for the issuance
thereof. Thus:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period
or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, or agency or a person is doing, threatening, or attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be
done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to parties before their
claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated.25 The requisites for its issuance are: (1) the existence of a clear and
unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.26 For the writ to issue, the right sought to be protected must be a present right, a legal right which must be shown
to be clear and positive.27 This means that the persons applying for the writ must show that they have an ostensible right to
the final relief prayed for in their complaint.28
In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie proof of violation of their right to justify the issuance of a
WPI. Their right to the use of La Paz Road is disputable since they have no clear legal right therein. As correctly ruled by
the CA:
Here, contrary to the ruling of respondent Judge, private respondents failed to prove as yet that they have a clear and
unmistakable right over the La Paz Road which was sought to be protected by the injunctive writ. They merely anchor
their purported right over the La Paz Road on the bare allegation that they have been using the same as public road right-
of-way for more than ten years. A mere allegation does not meet the standard of proof that would warrant the issuance of
the injunctive writ. Failure to establish the existence of a clear right which should be judicially protected through the writ of
injunction is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction.
Consequently, the case should be further heard by the RTC so that the parties can fully prove their respective positions on
the issues.1wphi1
Due process considerations dictate that the assailed injunctive writ is not a judgment on the merits but merely an order for
the grant of a provisional and ancillary remedy to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. The
hearing on the application for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is separate and distinct from the trial on the merits
of the main case. 29 The evidence submitted during the hearing of the incident is not conclusive or complete for only a
"sampling" is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of
the case on the merits.30 There are vital facts that have yet to be presented during the trial which may not be obtained or
presented during the hearing on the application for the injunctive writ.31 Moreover, the quantum of evidence required for one
is different from that for the other.32
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. Accordingly, the July 31, 2001 Decision and February 21, 2002 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60543 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168105 July 27, 2011
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO LISTANA, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to set aside the Decision1 dated November 12,
2004 and Resolution2 dated May 11, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70979. The CA affirmed the
Order3 dated October 25, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court, in Civil Case No. 99-6639 dismissing the petition for determination of just compensation on the ground of
late filing.
Respondent Severino Listana is the owner of a 246.0561-hectare land located at Inlagadian, Casiguran, Sorsogon and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-20193. The land was voluntarily offered for sale to the government
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657.
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued the 240.9066 hectares for acquisition at 5,871,689.03. Since the
respondent rejected the said amount, a summary proceeding for determination of just compensation was conducted by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). On May 2, 1996, respondent wrote LBP Department Manager III, Engr. Alex A.
Lorayes, requesting the release of payment of the cash portion of the "accepted x x x 151.1419 has. with an equivalent
valuation of 5,607,874.69." Consequently, on May 7, 1996, a Deed of Transfer was executed by respondent over the said
portion of his landholding in consideration of payment received from the transferee Republic of the Philippines consisting of
cash (1,078,877.54) and LBP bonds (2,747,858.60).4
On October 14, 1998, DAR Provincial Adjudicator Manuel M. Capellan rendered a decision 5 fixing the amount of just
compensation at 10,956,963.25 for the entire acquired area of 240.9066 hectares. Copy of the said decision was received
by petitioner on October 27, 1998.
Almost a year later, or on September 6, 1999, petitioner filed before the RTC of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, a
petition6] for judicial determination of just compensation (Civil Case No. 99-6639). Petitioner argued that the PARADs
valuation is unacceptable and that the initial valuation of 5,871,689.03 for the 240.9066 hectares is in accordance with
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR Administrative Order No. 11, series of 1994, as amended by DAR AO No. 5, series of
1998.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss7 contending that the landowners acceptance of the DARs valuation resulted in a
binding contract and therefore constitutes res judicata as it is in the nature of a compromise agreement that has attained
finality. Respondent also cited the contempt proceedings against the LBP for its refusal to comply with the writ of execution
issued by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicators (PARADs) Office on June 18, 1999.
The matter of contempt proceedings was the subject of G.R. No. 152611 (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Listana, Sr.). The
PARAD had issued on August 20, 2000 an order granting respondents motion for contempt and LBP Manager Alex A.
Lorayes was cited for indirect contempt and ordered to be imprisoned until he complied with the PARADs October 14, 1998
decision. After its motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal which was likewise denied due
course by PARAD Capellan who also ordered the issuance of an alias Writ of Execution for the payment of the adjudged
amount of just compensation and subsequently directed the issuance of an arrest order against Lorayes. Petitioner then
filed with the RTC a petition for injunction with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
PARAD Capellan from issuing the order of arrest. A writ of preliminary injunction was eventually issued by the trial court and
LBP posted a 5,644,773.02 cash bond. Respondent went to the CA and challenged said writ via a special civil action for
certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 65276). On December 11, 2001, the CA rendered its decision nullifying the trial courts orders. In
our Decision dated August 5, 2003, we granted the petition filed by LBP and reinstated the January 29, 2001 Order of the
RTC of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51 which enjoined the PARAD from enforcing its order of arrest against Lorayes
pending the final termination of Civil Case No. 99-6639 of RTC Branch 52.8
Petitioner filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss,9 arguing that the filing of petition with SAC is not an appeal from the
decision of the PARAD which is deemed vacated upon filing of the case before the SAC; hence res judicata cannot be
applied. It stressed that the determination of just compensation is inherently judicial in nature. There being no speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioner averred that unless it is authorized to file this case it cannot
protect the interest of the government who is the owner of the Agrarian Reform Fund.
In an Amended Petition,10 petitioner additionally alleged the fact that respondent had already accepted the valuation of the
cocoland portion (151.1419 hectares) in the amount of 5,312,190.23; that payment therefor had been received by
respondent; and that a Deed of Transfer of the said portion had been executed in favor of the government which was
notarized on May 7, 1996 and registered with the Registry of Deeds. Petitioner thus asserted that the valuation and
compensation process insofar as the 151.1419-hectare portion, should now be considered terminated. Respondent, on his
part, contended that by bringing the question of valuation before the court, petitioner is estopped from asserting that such
issue had already been laid to rest with the alleged acceptance by respondent of the prior valuation. 11
On April 28, 2000, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
In his Answer,12 the respondent asserted that petitioner, being part of the administrative machinery charged under the law to
determine the government land valuation/compensation offer is bound by the compensation fixed by the DARAB. Hence,
respondents acceptance of such offered compensation resulted in a binding contract, especially under the Voluntary Offer
to Sell (VOS) scheme. The PARADs decision therefore constitutes res judicata as it is, in effect, a judgment upon a
compromise. Respondent also filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying his motion to dismiss.
On October 25, 2000, the trial court issued the order13 granting respondents motion for reconsideration and dismissing the
petition for having been filed almost one year from receipt of the copy of the PARADs decision.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration14 alleging that it had filed a motion for reconsideration from the PARADs
decision dated October 14, 1998 but the order denying said motion was received only on May 12, 1999. It further averred
that the cause of delay was not solely attributable to it but also to the respondent through his counsel "because there was a
manifestation on their part to settle this case amicably." Petitioner stressed that while there was really a late filing, it was
done in good faith and without any intent to prejudice any person. Invoking a liberal construction of procedural rules,
petitioner argued that it is without any speedy and adequate remedy in this case, which is necessary for the protection of the
governments interest.
In its Order dated March 27, 2001, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Copy of the said order was
received by petitioner on April 6, 2001 and on the same date it filed a notice of appeal. 15
In its memorandum, petitioner argued that on the matter of its late filing of the petition for judicial determination of just
compensation, the trial court should have given primacy to the very clear demands of substantial justice over the rigid
application of technicalities. It cited Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 allowing a party to bring the issue of valuation of lands
acquired by virtue of CARP to the Special Agrarian Courts, which should be liberally construed to afford LBP the amplest
opportunity to prove that its valuation pertaining to the remaining portion of 89.1419 hectares of the subject landholding is in
accordance with the legally prescribed formula spelled out in DAR AO No. 5, series of 1998. Moreover, the government has
not acceded to the alteration of the valuation pertaining to the 151.1419 hectares, to which both the landowner and
government gave their consent, which had become a perfected contract having the force of law between the parties. 16
In the meantime, following this Courts ruling in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Listana, Sr. (supra) which voided all
contempt proceedings against LBP Manager Lorayes, petitioner filed with the RTC a motion to withdraw the 5,644,773.02
cash bond. The RTC denied the motion and petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Petitioner
challenged the trial courts order before the CA which eventually dismissed the petition. When the case was elevated to this
Court, we affirmed the CA and sustained the RTCs orders denying LBPs motion to withdraw the cash bond. By Decision
dated May 30, 2011, we ruled that LBP cannot withdraw the 5,644,773.02 cash bond which is a condition for the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC enjoining the PARAD from implementing the warrant of arrest against
Manager Lorayes pending final determination of the amount of just compensation for the property. 17
By Decision dated November 12, 2004, the CA dismissed petitioners appeal from the SACs dismissal of its petition for
judicial determination of just compensation. The CA said that petitioner failed to adequately explain its failure to abide by the
rules and "its loss of appellate recourse cannot be revived by invoking the mantra of liberality." We quote the pertinent
portion of the appellate courts ruling:
The argument of Listana that he rejected the pricing for the entire area and that the Request to Open a Trust Fund x x x is
proof of his refusal, is unmeritorious. If indeed Listana rejected the entire valuation then he would not have executed a Deed
of Transfer of Unsegregated Portion of a Parcel of Land x x x covering the 51.1419 [sic] hectares. Said document is not only
valid and binding but also reflects the true intention of the parties and is athwart the claim of Listana that he rejected the
valuation of this portion of the property.
The PARAB in the summary proceeding it conducted to determine the land valuation, should not have included in its
determination of just compensation the accepted portion but should have limited the scope to only the rejected portion of
89.7647 hectares.
While there is thus good cause to seek recourse against the PARAB ruling, Land Bank took this appeal 117 days
later and thus beyond the fifteen (15) day period provided by Rule XIII Sec. 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
Land Bank claims the court a quo was wrong in saying that it was late for less than one year for it was tardy only for 120
days by its reckoning. But whether it is one or the other, the fact is it was late for a considerable time and cannot be
absolved by the poor excuse that there was a prospect for an amicable settlement. Rudimentary prudence dictated that
appellate recourse should have been timely taken instead of just relying with crossed fingers that settlement would come
about.18 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition alleging that the CA committed serious errors of law, as follows:
A. THE DARAB ORDER DATED 14 OCTOBER 1998 WHICH ALLEGEDLY BECAME FINAL AND EXECUTORY
CANNOT ABROGATE OR RENDER WITHOUT EFFECT A CONSUMMATED CONTRACT INVOLVING THE
GOVERNMENT AND RESPONDENT LISTANA RELATIVE TO 151.1419 HECTARES OF SUBJECT PROPERTY.
BEING IMMUTABLE, THE CONSUMMATED CONTRACT CAN NO LONGER BE DISTURBED OR ABROGATED
BY THE DARAB ORDER DATED 14 OCTOBER 1998, WHICH THE COURT A QUO AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY AFFIRMED.
B. THE CHALLENGED DECISION AND THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION PLACE SO MUCH PREMIUM ON A
PROCEDURAL RULE AT THE EXPENSE OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE, A CIRCUMSTANCE THAT HAS
UNNECESSARILY PUT A COLOR OF VALIDITY TO THE DARAB ORDER WHICH IS VOID AB INITIO AS IT
UTTERLY DISREGARDED SECTION 17 OF R.A. NO. 6657 AND THE SUPREME COURT RULING IN "LBP vs.
SPOUSES BANAL," (G.R. NO. 143276, 20 JULY 2004).19
The sole issue to be resolved is whether the SAC may take cognizance of the petition for determination of just
compensation which is filed beyond the prescribed 15-day period or more than 100 days after the PARAD rendered its
valuation in a summary administrative proceeding.
The valuation of property in expropriation cases pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, is
essentially a judicial function which is vested in the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court and cannot be lodged with
administrative agencies such as the DAR.20 Section 57 of said law explicitly states that:
SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions
for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The
Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Court shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from
submission of the case for decision.
The CA affirmed the SACs order of dismissal applying Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure which
provides that:
Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. -- The decision of the
Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to
the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15)
days from notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner admits the late filing of an action with the SAC but nonetheless argue that the serious errors committed by the
PARAD when it included the 151.1419 hectares -- despite the initial valuation offered by LBP having been already accepted
by respondent who already conveyed said portion to the government -- in its decision fixing just compensation, and non-
application of the formula provided in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR AO No. 11, series of 1994, as amended by
DAR AO No. 5, series of 1998 on the remaining 89.1419 hectares, warrants a review by this Court. It contends that this
case deserves a relaxation of the procedural rule governing finality of judgments, adding that its "thoughtlessness" should
not be deemed fatal to the instant petition "for at stake is an OVERPAYMENT amounting to more than SEVEN MILLION
PESOS, which is GREATLY PREJUDICIAL to public interest, as the said amount shall be debited from the Agrarian Reform
Fund (ARF)."
The petition is unmeritorious.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,21 private respondent landowner rejected the governments offer of its lands based on LBPs
valuation and the case was brought before the PARAD which sustained LBPs valuation. Private respondent then filed a
Petition for Just Compensation in the RTC sitting as Special Agrarian Court. However, the RTC dismissed its petition on the
ground that private respondent should have appealed to the DARAB, in accordance with the then DARAB Rules of
Procedure. Additionally, the RTC found that the petition had been filed more than fifteen days after notice of the PARAD
decision. Private respondent then filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which reversed the order of dismissal of RTC and
remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings. The government challenged the CA ruling before this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari. This Court, affirming the CA, ruled as follows:
Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of
lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking. Through notice sent to the landowner
pursuant to 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary
administrative proceeding is held and afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB)
adjudicator as the case may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the landowner
does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. This in essence is
the procedure for the determination of compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657. In accordance with it, the private
respondents case was properly brought by it in the RTC, and it was error for the latter court to have dismissed the case. In
the terminology of 57, the RTC, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions
for the determination of just compensation to landowners." It would subvert this "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the
RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an
appellate court for the review of administrative decisions.
Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special
Agrarian Courts, it is clear from 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the
RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the
RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to 57 and therefore would be void.What adjudicators are
empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners,
leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question.22 (Emphasis supplied.)
The above ruling was reiterated in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals.23 In that case, petitioner landowner who
was dissatisfied with the valuation made by LBP and DARAB, filed a petition for determination of just compensation in the
RTC (SAC). However, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period
for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB. On appeal, the CA upheld the order of dismissal. When the case was
elevated to this Court, we likewise affirmed the CA and declared that:
To implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6657, particularly 50 thereof, Rule XIII, 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure
provides:
Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. -- The decision of the Adjudicator on
land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but
shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.
As we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals, this rule is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the power to decide just
compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the courts. It is error to think that, because of
Rule XIII, 11, the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just
compensation has thereby been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance with settled
principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a
preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive" because the question is first
passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination.
For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the
courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of the administrative action.
Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Rule XIII, 11 of the
Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court correctly dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed
the order of dismissal.24 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court noted that Republic v. Court of Appeals does not serve as authority for disregarding the 15-day period to bring an
action for judicial determination of just compensation as there was no pronouncement therein invalidating Rule XIII, Section
11 of the New Rules of Procedure of the DARAB. Moreover, we stated that any speculation as to the applicability of said
provision was foreclosed by our subsequent ruling in Philippine Veterans Bank (supra) where we affirmed the order of
dismissal of a petition for determination of just compensation for having been filed beyond the fifteen-day period under
Section 11.25
However, in the 2007 case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Suntay,26 the Court ruled that the RTC erred in dismissing
LBPs petition for determination of just compensation on the ground that it was filed beyond the fifteen-day period provided
in Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure. Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals (supra), we stressed
therein the original and exclusive -- not appellate -- jurisdiction of the SAC over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners.27
To foreclose any uncertainty brought by the Suntay ruling, this Court in its July 31, 2008 Resolution denying LBPs motion
for reconsideration of the August 14, 2007 Decision in the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Martinez 28held:
On the supposedly conflicting pronouncements in the cited decisions, the Court reiterates its ruling in this case that the
agrarian reform adjudicators decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated in the
DARAB Rules. The petition for the fixing of just compensation should therefore, following the law and settled jurisprudence,
be filed with the SAC within the said period. This conclusion, as already explained in the assailed decision, is based on the
doctrines laid down in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals and Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
v. Lubrica.
xxxx
The Court notes that the Suntay ruling is based on Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, decided in 1996 also
through the pen of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza. In that case, the Court emphasized that the jurisdiction of the SAC is
original and exclusive, not appellate. Republic, however, was decided at a time when Rule XIII, Section 11 was not yet
present in the DARAB Rules. Further, Republic did not discuss whether the petition filed therein for the fixing of just
compensation was filed out of time or not. The Court merely decided the issue of whether cases involving just compensation
should first be appealed to the DARAB before the landowner can resort to the SAC under Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657.
To resolve the conflict in the rulings of the Court, we now declare herein, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, that the
better rule is that stated in Philippine Veterans Bank, reiterated in Lubrica and in the August 14, 2007 Decision in this case.
Thus, while a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from the agrarian reform
adjudicators decision but an original action, the same has to be filed within the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules;
otherwise, the adjudicators decision will attain finality. This rule is not only in accord with law and settled jurisprudence but
also with the principles of justice and equity. Verily, a belated petition before the SAC, e.g., one filed a month, or a year, or
even a decade after the land valuation of the DAR adjudicator, must not leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of
uncertainty as to the true value of his property.29 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners action before the SAC having been filed, by its own reckoning, 117 days after notice of the PARADs denial of its
motion for reconsideration of the decision fixing the just compensation for respondents landholding, the same has attained
finality.
Anent petitioners plea of liberality and relaxation of procedural rules, it is contended that in the interest of substantial justice,
the matter of overpayment which is greatly prejudicial to the agrarian reform fund must be addressed by this Court
notwithstanding petitioners "thoughtlessness" in the tardy filing of its case before the RTC.
In the more recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Umandap,30 the Court, in a decision penned by Associate Justice
Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, set aside the CAs amended decision affirming the RTCs order dismissing the petition for
judicial determination of just compensation which was re-filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Section 11, Rule XIII of
the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure. After LBPs initial valuation of the landowners property was rejected, a summary
administrative proceeding was conducted by the DARs Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). Dissatisfied with
the valuation fixed by the RARAD, LBP timely filed a petition for judicial determination of just compensation before the RTC.
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that LBP failed to submit a proper certification against forum shopping. LBP
immediately filed a motion for reconsideration attaching thereto a certification signed by its LBP President confirming the
authority of its regional operation manager to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping. The RTC,
however, denied the motion for reconsideration, and the order of denial was received by LBP on May 29, 2003. On June 3,
2003, LBP re-filed the petition attaching more documents showing the authority of its regional operation manager to sign the
verification and certification against forum shopping. The RTC still dismissed the petition, ruling that even though the
previous dismissal was without prejudice, LBP nevertheless failed to re-file the petition within the period allowed by the
DARAB Rules of Procedure, and thus, the Adjudicators decision fixing the just compensation of the subject property
attained finality. LBP filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which initially reversed and nullified the RTCs orders.
Respondent landowners filed a motion for reconsideration and subsequently the CA rendered an Amended Decision
dismissing LBPs petition and holding that certiorari is not the proper remedy since the RTC order dismissing the re-filed
petition was a final order and based on res judicata, hence certiorari is not the proper remedy.
In a petition for review on certiorari, LBP assailed the CAs amended decision dismissing its petition for certiorari. The Court
noted that at the core of the controversy is a jurisdictional issue, that is, whether the SAC acted without jurisdiction in
outrightly dismissing the petition for the determination of just compensation. The Court declared that since the SAC
statutorily exercises original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for determination of just compensation to
landowners, it cannot be said that the decision of the adjudicator, if not appealed to the SAC, would be deemed final and
executory, under all circumstances. Citing Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals (supra) which affirmed the order of
dismissal of a petition for determination of just compensation for having been filed beyond the said period and explained
that Section 11 is not incompatible with the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC, we held:
Notwithstanding this pronouncement, however, the statutorily mandated original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC led
this Court to adopt, over the years, a policy of liberally allowing petitions for determination of just compensation, even
though the procedure under DARAB rules have not been strictly followed, whenever circumstances so warrant:
1. In the 1999 case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we held that the SAC properly acquired
jurisdiction over the petition to determine just compensation filed by the landowner without waiting for the
completion of DARABs re-evaluation of the land.
2. In the 2004 case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, we allowed a direct resort to the SAC even where
no summary administrative proceedings have been held before the DARAB.
3. In the 2006 case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, this Court upheld the jurisdiction of the SAC despite
the pendency of administrative proceedings before the DARAB. We held:
It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise of the power of eminent
domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain
proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies.
Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of respondents petition for determination of just compensation.
4. In the 2009 case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Belista, this Court permitted a direct recourse to the SAC
without an intermediate appeal to the DARAB as mandated under the new provision in the 2003 DARAB Rules of
Procedure. We ruled:
Although Section 5, Rule XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure provides that the land valuation cases decided by the
adjudicator are now appealable to the Board, such rule could not change the clear import of Section 57 of RA No. 6657 that
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation is in the RTC. Thus, Section 57 authorizes direct
resort to the SAC in cases involving petitions for the determination of just compensation. In accordance with the said
Section 57, petitioner properly filed the petition before the RTC and, hence, the RTC erred in dismissing the case.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative
agencies while rules of procedure cannot.
In the case at bar, the refiling of the Petition for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation was done within five days from
the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration of the order dismissing the original petition, during which time said dismissal
could still be appealed to the Court of Appeals. The SAC even expressly recognized that the rules are silent as regards the
period within which a complaint dismissed without prejudice may be refiled. The statutorily mandated original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC, as well as the above circumstances showing that LBP did not appear to have
been sleeping on its rights in the allegedly belated refiling of the petition, lead us to assume a liberal construction
of the pertinent rules. To be sure, LBPs intent to question the RARADs valuation of the land became evident with
the filing of the first petition for determination of just compensation within the period prescribed by the DARAB
Rules. Although the first petition was dismissed without prejudice on a technicality, LBPs refiling of essentially
the same petition with a proper non-forum shopping certification while the earlier dismissal order had not attained
finality should have been accepted by the trial court.1avvphi1
In view of the foregoing, we rule that the RTC acted without jurisdiction in hastily dismissing said refiled Petition.
Accordingly, the Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing this dismissal should be granted. 31(Emphasis
supplied.)
In contrast to the diligence showed by LBP in the above-cited case, herein petitioner LBP admitted its "thoughtless" filing of
the petition before the SAC more than 100 days after notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the PARADs
decision fixing the just compensation for the subject property. Petitioner did not offer any explanation for its tardiness and
neglect, and simply reiterated the great prejudice to the agrarian reform fund with the erroneous inclusion in the PARADs
valuation of the 151.1419 hectares already conveyed to the government. As to the remaining 89.1419 hectares, petitioner
asserts that the PARADs valuation failed to apply the computation provided in Sec. 17 of R.A. No. 6657 as translated in
DAR AO No. 5, series of 1998.
Petitioner clearly slept on its rights by not filing the petition in the SAC within the prescribed fifteen-day period or a
reasonable time after notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration. Even assuming there was already a
consummated sale with respect to the 151.1419 hectares and LBPs valuation thereof had been fully paid to the
respondent, the amount already paid by LBP shall be deducted from the total compensation as determined by the PARAD.
Notably, LBP exhibited lack of interest in the discharge of its statutory functions as it failed to actively participate in the
summary administrative proceeding despite due notice of the hearings. Clearly, there exists no compelling reason to justify
relaxation of the rule on the timely availment of judicial action for the determination of just compensation.
It is a fundamental legal principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. The only exceptions to the general rule
on finality of judgments are the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and
inequitable.32 Indeed, litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, even at the risk of occasional errors. 33
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated November 12, 2004 and Resolution
dated May 11, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70979 are AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.