ART VIII.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Hacienda Luisita vs PARC

Case Digest GR 171101 July 5 2011 Nov 22 2011
Facts:

In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at redistributing public and private agricultural lands
to farmers and farmworkers who are landless. One of the lands covered by this law is the Hacienda Luisita, a 6,443-
hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac. Hacienda Luisita was
bought in 1958 from the Spanish owners by the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), which is owned and/or
controlled by Jose Cojuanco Sr., Group. Back in 1980, the Martial Law administration filed an expropriation suit against
TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now DAR) so that the land can be distributed
to the farmers at cost. The RTC rendered judgment ordering TADECO to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.

In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the governments case against TADECO. The CA dismissed it, but the dismissal was
subject to the condition that TADECO shall obtain the approval of FWB (farm worker beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock
Distribution Plan) and to ensure its implementation.

Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two alternative modes in distributing land
ownership to the FWBs. Since the stock distribution scheme is the preferred option of TADECO, it organized a spin-off
corporation, the Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers.

After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA)
proposed by TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), led by then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago,
approved the SDP of TADECO/HLI through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989.

From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the farmworkers. Such claim was subsequently
contested by two groups representing the interests of the farmers the HLI Supervisory Group and the AMBALA. In 2003,
each of them wrote letter petitions before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or revocation of the SDOA.
They claimed that they havent actually received those benefits in full, that HLI violated the terms, and that their lives
havent really improved contrary to the promise and rationale of the SDOA.

The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review the terms of the SDOA and the Resolution 89-
12-2. Adopting the report and the recommendations of the Task Force, the DAR Sec recommended to the PARC (1) the
revocation of Resolution 89-12-2 and (2) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through compulsory acquisition scheme.
Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP of TADECO/HLI and subjected those lands covered by the SDP to the mandated
land acquisition scheme under the CARP law. These acts of the PARC was assailed by HLI via Rule 65.

On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the
corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer. For
FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian
reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.

Administrative Law
Issue 1: W/N PARC has the authority to revoke the Stock Distribution Plan or SDP
Issue 1: W/N PARC has the authority to revoke the Stock Distribution Plan or SDP

Constitutional Law
Issue 2: W/N the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the constitutionality of Sec 31 of RA 6657
Issue 2: W/N the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the constitutionality of Sec 31 of RA 6657
 Statutory Construction
Issue 3: W/N Sec 31 of RA 6657 is consistent with the Constitutions concept of agrarian reform
Issue 3: W/N Sec 31 of RA 6657 is consistent with the Constitutions concept of agrarian reform

* The SC, through a resolution dated Nov 21 2011 of the motion for reconsideration filed by HLI, affirmed the revocation
of HLIs SDP and the placing of Hacienda Luisita under the compulsory land distribution scheme of the CARP law. It was
also held that the date of taking was Nov 21 1989, when the PARC, by Resolution 89-12-2, approved the SDP of HLI. ##

DAZA VS SINGSON
G.R. No. 86344 December 21 1989

FACTS:
The HoR proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the CoA among several political parties represented in that chamber in
accordance with Art. VI Sec 18. The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment
in the HoR. 24 members of the Liberal Party joined the LDP, reducing their former party to only 17 members.

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the CoA by withdrawing the
seat occupied by Daza and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5th, the chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein Luis C. Singson as the
additional member from the LDP.

Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the CoA and the assumption of his seat by the Singson.
Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, SC issued a TRO that same day to
prevent both Daza and Singson from serving in the CoA.

Daza contented that he cannot be removed from the CoA because his election thereto is permanent. He claimed that the
reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment because
the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability.

ISSUE: Whether or not the question raised by the Daza is political in nature and is beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.

RULING:
No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a discretionary act of the House
of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the legality,
not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments.

The term political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.

Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political
question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

MANTRUSTE SYSTEMS VS CA
G.R. Nos. 86540-41 November 6, 1989 [Judicial Power]

FACTS:
MSI entered into an 4 interim lease agreement with DBP, owner of Bayview Plaza Hotel, where it would operate the hotel
for a minimum of 3 months or until such time that the said properties are sold to MSI or other 3rd parties by DBP.
The Bayview Hotel was subsequently identified for privatization under Proclamation No. 50 and was consequently
transferred from DBP to Asset Privatization Trust for disposition. The DBP notified MSI that it was terminating the interim
lease agreement to effect the disposition of the property. The APT granted the President of MSI's condition an extension
of 30 days within which to effect the delivery of the Bayview Hotel to APT.
However, MSI sent a letter to APT stating that in their opinion, having leased the property for more than 1 year the
agreement is long term in character and MSI have acquired preference in buying the property, while emphasizing that
MSI has a legal lien on the property because of its advances for the hotel operations and repairs which amounted to P12
Million.
APT answered MSI saying that there was no agreement to that effect. The bidding took place but MSI did not participate.
Makati-Agro Trading and La Filipina Uy Gongco Corporation were awarded the property as the highest bidder for P85
Million. MSI filed a complaint with injunction on awarding and transfer of the property to the winning bidders. Trial court
granted, but the CA reversed the trial court ruling for being violative to Sec 1 of Proclamation No. 50: "No court or
administrative agency shall issue any restraining order or injunction against the trust in connection with the acquisition,
sale or disposition of assets transferred to it. Nor shall such order or injunction be issued against any purchaser of assets
sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking possession of any assets purchased by him."
The CA rejected the TC's opinion that said proclamation is unconstitutional, rather it up held that it continues to be
operative after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution by virtue of Section 3 Art.XVIII. It also noted that MSI has not been
deprived of its property rights since those rights are non-existent and its only property right was the alleged reimbursable
advances made to DBP, which it may sue to collect in a separate action. It further held that the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction by the lower court against APT may not be justified as a valid exercise of judicial power for MSI
does not have a legally demandable and enforceable right of retention over the said property.

ISSUE:
WoN the CA erred in not declaring unconstitutional Sec. 31 of Proclamation No. 50, prohibiting the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction by the TC.

RULING:
Sec 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any provision of the Constitution. It does not impair the inherent power
of courts to settle actual controversies which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government". (Sec 1 Art. VIII). The power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts belongs to the legislature, except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
Courts may not substitute their judgement for that of the APT, nor block, by an injunction, the discharge of its functions
and the implementation of its decisions in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it.

There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency, except when it violates a
citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, or acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction.
Categories: 179 SCRA 136, Constitutional
 MALAGA VS. PENACHOS (DIGEST)
Ma. Elena Malaga, et. al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., et.al.
GR No. 86995 03 September 1992

Chartered Institution and GOCC, defined.

FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused
the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the
construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-
qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12,
1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.

Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best Built Construction, respectively,
submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana
submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their
documents were considered late.

On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their refusal
without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the
resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They also asked that if the bidding
had already been conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.

On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and award the
project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing
such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1
of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after
the bidding had been awarded and closed.

On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It
declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling
within the coverage of the subject law.

ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818?

RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:

Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with
functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges,
and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).

It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818.

There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was created in pursuance of
the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the government to effect the socio-
economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer
of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized
representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it,
upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such
employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been
appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds and
maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law.

Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree as there are
irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the award
of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).

PACU VS. SEC. OF EDUC.

95 Phil. 806 Political Law Civic Efficiency

The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended
by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate the ownership of private schools in the
country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a person
may be granted the right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to
ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools. It also provides that the Secretary of Education can and may
ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.

PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law
requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship
of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that such power granted
to the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue delegation because the law
did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban
books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.

ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.

HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show that it suffered any injury from
the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by the said law.

Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The Constitution provides for state
control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the
development of moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties
of citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by the organic law.

Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part of the
power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.
 MARIANO, JR. VS. COMELEC, digested
G.R. No. 118627; 242 SCRA 213, March 7, 1995
(Constitutional Law Requirements in challenging the constitutionality of the law)

FACTS: Petitioners suing as tax payers, assail a provision (Sec 51) of RA No. 7859 (An Act Converting the Municipality of
Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati) on the ground that the same attempts to alter or
restart the 3-consecutive term limit for local elective officials disregarding the terms previously served by them, which
collides with the Constitution (Sec 8, Art X & Sec 7, Art VI).

ISSUE: Whether or not challenge to the constitutionality of questioned law is with merit.

HELD: No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well-delineated. They are: (1)
there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3)
the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita
Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and
Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig,
Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the questioned sections
of R.A. No. 7854.
HELD:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent
events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections;
and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may
or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract issue. Worse,
they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
 JOYA VS. PCGG
G.R. NO. 96541, AUG. 24, 1993

Requisites for exercise of judicial review: (1) that the question must be raised by the proper party; (2) that there must be
an actual case or controversy; (3) that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, (4) that the
decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
LEGAL STANDING: a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayer's Suits
REQUISITES FOR MANDAMUS: a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced
and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
WHEN TAXPAYER SUIT MAY PROSPER: A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve
disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose
of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request
of a taxpayer.
ACTUAL CONTROVERSY: one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of
judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not
cognizable by a court of justice.

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG entered into a Consignment Agreement with Christies of New York,
selling 82 Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila
alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late Pres. Marcos, his relatives and cronies. Prior to the auction sale, COA
questioned the Consignment Agreement, there was already opposition to the auction sale. Nevertheless, it proceeded as
scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction and authority to enter into an agreement with Christies of New York for the sale of
the artworks

RULING:
On jurisdiction of the Court to exercise judicial review
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard
and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question
must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself. But the most important are the first two (2) requisites.
Standing of Petitioners
On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as party-plaintiff in an action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action
must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the
subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of
judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal
question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate
the constitutional right of some third and related party.

EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayers Suit:

There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen
brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by
the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public
funds.
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of
the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG from
acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art.
XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act,"
governing the preservation and disposition of national and important cultural properties. Petitioners also anchor their case
on the premise that the paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and by the people in
general to view and enjoy as great works of art. They allege that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art pieces,
petitioners have been deprived of their right to public property without due process of law in violation of the Constitution.
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They themselves allege that the paintings
were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation,
which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman
was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of
these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been
given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit.
Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends
and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the
Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary government, these paintings and silverware were taken from
Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of
these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these
paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements
of due process and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or
statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true
owners thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and
the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become
publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized
disposition.
Requisites for a Mandamus Suit
Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria for a
mandamus suit. In Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, this Court laid down the rule that a writ of mandamus may be issued
to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in
the Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent officials
under the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed.
Moreover, petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a
privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus.

When a Taxpayer's Suit may prosper

Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the
legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned
involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the
request of a taxpayer. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition
of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique
silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money.

Actual Controversy
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy one which involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot
and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for
prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date 11
January 1991 which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have become moot and academic.
At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not
satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. We find however
that there is no such justification in the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the rule.

LEGASPI VS CSC, supra

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 Case Analysis
Case Summary and Outcome
The Supreme Court of the Philippines held that the government agencies have no discretion to refuse disclosure of, or
access to, information of public concern because the Constitution guarantees access to such information. The Court also
held that a citizen does not need to show any legal or special interest in order to establish his or her right to information,
and that the State bears the burden of proving that the information is either exempt from disclosure by law or that it is not
of public concern.

Facts
Valentin Legaspi, a citizen of the Philippines, had requested information from the Civil Service Commission regarding the
civil service eligibility of sanitation employees in the Health Department of Cebu City. The Commission rejected the request
asserting that Legaspi was not entitled to the information. Legaspi then instituted an action asking the Court to compel the
Civil Service Commission to provide the information.
Decision Overview
The Court began by noting that both the 1973 (Art. IV, Sec. 6) and 1987 (Art. III, Sec. 7) constitutions recognize the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern. Further, they specify that information shall be provided, subject
only to limitations provided by law.
While the Solicitor General interposed a procedural objection challenging the requesters standing in this petition, the Court
ruled that, in this case, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the requester, as a citizen interested in
the execution of the laws, did not need to show any legal or special interest in the result. [p. 2] Further, government agencies
have no discretion to refuse disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern because the Constitution guarantees
access to information of public concern, a recognition of the essential nature of the free flow of ideas and information in a
democracy. The government agency denying information access has the burden to show that the information is not of
public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the information has been exempted by law from the obligation of disclosure.
Here, the information was of public concern because it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government
positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by eligible persons, and the Civil Service Commission failed to
cite any law limiting the requesters right to know. Thus, the Court ordered the Civil Service Commission to provide the
information.

DUMLAO VS COMELEC
95 SCRA 392
Political Law Constitutional Law Equal Protection Eligibility to Office after Being 65
Judicial Review; Requisites thereof
Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from his office and he has been receiving
retirement benefits therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides,
among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law averring
that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits
of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of
the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for
public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary
investigation would already disqualify them from office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.

HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should have never been merged. Dumlaos
issue is different from Igots. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be
eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review,
namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that
the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.

In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.

The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing
of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.

The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee
of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service,
employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age
are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years
of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although,
as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in
our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective
local officials.

Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one
thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify
retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office,
there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the
challenged provision.
 Bugnay Construction v. Laron Digest
G.R. No. 79983 August 10, 1989
Ponente: Regalado, J.:

Facts:
1. A lease contract between the City of Dagupan and P & M Agro was executed for the use of a city lot called the Magsaysay
Market Area. Subsequently, the City filed a case to rescind the contract due to the failure of P&M to comply with the lease
contract conditions.

2. Thereafter, the City issued a resolution granting the lease of said lot to the petitioner Bugnay COnstruction for the
establishment of a Magsaysay Market building. As a result, respondent Ravanzo filed a taxpayer's suit against the City
assailing the validity of the lease contract between the petitioner and the city. Ravanzo was the counsel of P&M Agro in the
earlier case.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is the real party in interest

NO.
1. The Court held that the respondent has no standing to file the case. There was no disbursement of public funds involved
in this case since it is the petitioner, a private party which will fund the planned construction of the market building.

Kilosbayan, Incorporated, et. al. vs. Teofisto Guingona, PCSO and PGMC
05 May 1994 G.R. No. 113375
Ponente: Davide, JR., J.
FACTS:
The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its
sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating on an online
lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the International Totalizator Systems, Inc. became interested to
offer its services and resources to PCSO. Considering the citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that Berjaya Group
undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local
investors. An open letter was sent to President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an online lottery system due to
ethical and moral concerns, however the project pushed through.
ISSUES:
Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing); and
Whether the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of Sec. 1 of R.A. 1169 as amended by B.P. Blg. 42.
RULING:
The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental importance to the public that the case demands. The
ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic and moral well-being of the people. The legal standing
then of the petitioners deserves recognition, and in the exercise of its sound discretion, the Court brushes aside the
procedural barrier.
Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries in
collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign.
The language of the section is clear that with respect to its franchise or privilege to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes
races, lotteries and other similar activities, the PCSO cannot exercise it in collaboration, association or joint venture with
any other party. This is the unequivocal meaning and import of the phrase. By the exception explicitly made, the PCSO
cannot share its franchise with another by way of the methods mentioned, nor can it transfer, assign or lease such franchise.

KILOSBAYAN VS GUINGONA JR.

232 SCRA 110 Business Organization Corporation Law PCSOs Charter

In 1993, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office decided to put up an on-line lottery system which will establish a national
network system that will in turn expand PCSOs source of income.
A bidding was made. Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) won it. A contract of lease was awarded in favor
of PGMC.
Kilosbayan opposed the said agreement between PCSO and PGMC as it alleged that:
PGMC does not meet the nationality requirement because it is 75% foreign owned (owned by a Malaysian firm Berjaya
Group Berhad);
PCSO, under Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), is prohibited from holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity;
The network system sought to be built by PGMC for PCSO is a telecommunications network. Under the law (Act No. 3846),
a franchise is needed to be granted by the Congress before any person may be allowed to set up such;
PGMCs articles of incorporation, as well as the Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) does not allow it to install, establish
and operate the on-line lotto and telecommunications systems.
PGMC and PCSO, through Teofisto Guingona, Jr. and Renato Corona, Executive Secretary and Asst. Executive Secretary
respectively, alleged that PGMC is not a collaborator but merely a contractor for a piece of work, i.e., the building of the
network; that PGMC is a mere lessor of the network it will build as evidenced by the nature of the contract agreed upon,
i.e., Contract of Lease.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kilosbayan is correct.

HELD: Yes, but only on issues 2, 3, and 4.

On the issue of nationality, it seems that PGMCs foreign ownership was reduced to 40% though.
On issues 2, 3, and 4, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting
lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic
or foreign. There is undoubtedly a collaboration between PCSO and PGMC and not merely a contract of lease. The relations
between PCSO and PGMC cannot be defined simply by the designation they used, i.e., a contract of lease. Pursuant to the
wordings of their agreement, PGMC at its own expense shall build, operate, and manage the network system including its
facilities needed to operate a nationwide online lottery system. PCSO bears no risk and all it does is to provide its franchise
in violation of its charter. Necessarily, the use of such franchise by PGMC is a violation of Act No. 3846.
 PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 113105 August 19 1994 [Article VI Section 25 - Appropriations]

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.
GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the REalignment of Allocation for Operational
Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are the ones authorized
under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain provisional conditions: that the AFP
Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits of
the AFP.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.

RULING:
Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and 2) the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer to be made.

As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. the AFP Chief of Staff may not be given
authority.

PHILCONSA vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both
houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on certain items of
appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to
propose and identify projects in the pork barrels allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the
said bill to the President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become Republic Act NO.
7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM
JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of
1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he
vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994
GAA. And that appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated
pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI
of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds
in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of the Special
Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding
modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the Specific Prohibition which states that the said
Modernization Fund shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and
150 armored personnel carriers
6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.
Issue:
whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme
Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Units (CAFGUS) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are constitutional; whether or not the veto of
the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds therefore is
constitutional
Held:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process. There is, therefore,
sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof
to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing
Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws
should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special
provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to
use their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such
privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the one-fund policy (e.g., R.A. No.
4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the
Department of Budget and Managements Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special
Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation
for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative
and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly comply with the formulary
embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an appropriate provision. Being directly related to
and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed
by the President without also vetoing the said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP modernization program that the President must
submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the congressional or legislative
veto. However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as
provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore,
being inappropriate provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes and
armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the
passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government
itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed
by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision
that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to
deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the
proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another law considering that it
abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGUs to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriations to the Supreme Court,
constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the
expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether
they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take necessary and
proper steps to carry into execution the law. These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.

TATAD V. GARCIA, JR. (G.R. NO. 114222)

Facts:
DOTC planned to construct a light railway transit line along EDSA (EDSA LRT III) to provide a mass transit system and alleviate
the congestion and growing transportation problem in the metropolis. RA 6957 was enacted allowing for the financing,
construction and operation of government projects through private initiative and investment. Accordingly, prequalification
and bidding was made and EDSA LRT Corporation (organized under HK laws) was recommended to be awarded with the
contract. The President approved the awarding of the contract. Petitioners are senators praying for the prohibition of
respondents from further implementing and enforcing the contract.
Issue:
Whether or not the EDSA LRT III, a public utility, can be owned by a foreign corporation.
Ruling: YES.
The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility. However, it does not
require a franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a public utility so long as it does not operate them
to serve the public.
In law, there is a clear distinction between the operation of a public utility and the ownership of the facilities and
equipment used to serve the public. Ownership is defined as a relation in law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one
person is completely subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by law or the concurrence with the rights of another.
The exercise of the rights encompassed in ownership is limited by law so that a property cannot be operated and used to
serve the public as a public utility unless the operator has a franchise. The operation of a rail system as a public utility
includes the transportation of passengers from one point to another point, their loading and unloading at designated places
and the movement of the trains at pre-scheduled times.
In sum, private respondent will not run the light rail vehicles and collect fees from the riding public. It will have no dealings
with the public and the public will have no right to demand any services from it. Even the mere formation of a public utility
corporation does not ipso facto characterize the corporation as one operating a public utility. The moment for determining
the requisite Filipino nationality is when the entity applies for a franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for
that purpose.

OPOSA VS FACTORAN, supra

The case of Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993, has unusual petitioners and an unusual cause of action,
making it a novel case in more ways than one.
Facts
This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44 children, through their parents, claiming that they bring the case in
the name of their generation as well as those generations yet unborn. Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against
the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, seeking to have him cancel all the timber license
agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements.
The children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as parens
patriae. The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary
to the highest law of humankind-- the natural law-- and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation."
The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari.
Issue
Did the children have the legal standing to file the case?
Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal standing to file the case based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility. Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve
that environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future
generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power
of the state in the interest of public welfare.
Relevance
The case of Oposa vs. Factoran has been widely cited worldwide for its concept of intergenerational responsibility,
particularly in cases related to ecology and the environment. For example:
Oposa vs. Factoran's concept of "intergenerational responsibility" was cited in a case in Bangladesh.<ref
name="test1">Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide. Farooque vs. Government of Bangladesh, WP 998 of 1994, CA 24 of
1995 (1996.07.25) (Flood Action Plan Case) (accessed November 24, 2007).</ref>
The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) considers Oposa vs. Factoran a landmark case in judicial thinking for
environmental governance.<ref name="test2">Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy Global Environmental
Governance Project. The Role of the Judiciary in Promoting Environmental Governance and the Rule of Law by Lal
Kurukulasuriya, Chief, Environmental Law Programme, UNEP (accessed November 24, 2007).</ref>
In the book Public Health Law and Ethics by Larry O. Gostin, Oposa vs. Factoran is cited as a significant example of the
justiciability of the right to health. <ref name="test3">Public Health Law and Ethics. Book by Larry Ogalthorpe Gostin
(accessed November 24, 2007).</ref>
In the book The Law of Energy for Sustainable Development by the IUCN Academy of Environmental Law Research Studies,
a study cites Oposa vs. Factoran as basis for asserting that the right to breathe is part of the right to life as an acknowledged
human right.<ref name="test4">The Law of Energy for Sustainable Development. Book compilation of research results of
2003 IUCN Conference (accessed November 24, 2007).
 KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO
G.R. NO. 118910. July 30, 1993
Facts:
GR 113375 (KIlosbayan vs. Guingona) held invalidity of the contract between Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
and the privately owned Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) for the operation of a nationwide on-line
lottery system. The contract violated the provision in the PCSO Charter which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting
lotteries through a collaboration, association, or joint venture.
Both parties again signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) for online lottery equipment and accessories on January
25, 1995. The agreement are as follow:
Rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by PCSO at which in no case be less than an annual rental computed at P35,000
per terminal in commercial operation.
Rent is computed bi-weekly.
Term is 8 years.
PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities.
Upon expiration of term, PCSO can purchase the equipment at P25M.
Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA invalid because:
It is the same as the old contract of lease.
It is still violative of PCSOs charter.
It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It has not been approved by the President and it is not most advantageous
to the government.
PCSO and PGMC filed separate comments
ELA is a different lease contract with none of the vestiges in the prior contract.
ELA is not subject to public bidding because it fell in the exception provided in EO No. 301.
Power to determine if ELA is advantageous vests in the Board of Directors of PCSO.
Lack of funds. PCSO cannot purchase its own online lottery equipment.
Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade.
Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated has a legal standing to sue.
Whether or not the ELA between PCSO and PGMC in operating an online lottery is valid.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue.
STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled
rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved.
LAW OF THE CASE (opinion delivered on a former appeal) cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one
litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of
this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not.
RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine
in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause
of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the
second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in
the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters
at issue.
Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioners standing.
Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate
issue is whether the petitioners are real parties of interest.
Question of contract of law: The real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are bound either principally or
are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which would
positively result to them from the contract.
Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest. Questions to the nature or validity of public contracts maybe
made before COA or before the Ombudsman.
Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) is valid.
It is different with the prior lease agreement: PCSO now bears all losses because the operation of the system is completely
in its hands.
Fixing the rental rate to a minimum is a matter of business judgment and the Court is not inclined to review.
Rental rate is within the 15% net receipts fixed by law as a maximum. (4.3% of gross receipt is discussed in the dissenting
opinion of Feliciano, J.)
In the contract, it stated that the parties can change their agreement. Petitioners state that this would allow PGMC to
control and operate the on-line lottery system. The Court held that the claim is speculative. In any case, in the construction
of statutes, the resumption is that in making contracts, the government has acted in good faith. The doctrine that the
possibility of abuse is not a reason for denying power.
It was held in Kilosbayan Vs. Guingona that PCSO does not have the power to enter into any contract which would involve
it in any form of collaboration, association, or joint venture for the holding of sweepstakes activities. This only mentions
that PCSO is prohibited from investing in any activities that would compete in their own activities.
It is claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement which does not compete with their own activities. The Court held that is
also based on speculation. Evidence is needed to show that the transfer of technology would involve the PCSO and its
personnel in prohibited association with the PGMC.
O. 301 (on law of public bidding) applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and equipment and not
on the contracts of lease. Public bidding for leases are only for privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use or
of government owned buildings or spaces for private use.
Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease contract. The motion for reconsideration of petitioners is DENIED with
finality.
 LOZADA VS COMELEC (G.R. NO. L-59068)

FACTS: Lozada together with Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the COMELEC to hold an election to fill the
vacancies in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on Sec 5 (2), Art 8 of the 1973 Constitution
which provides: In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the
Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the
Member to serve the unexpired term. COMELEC opposes the petition alleging, substantially, that 1) petitioners lack
standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) this Court has no jurisdiction
to entertain this petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim Batasan
Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill vacancies in the legislature.

HELD: The SCs jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latters decision, orders or rulings. This is
as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New Constitution which reads: Any decision, order, or ruling of the
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt
of a copy thereof. There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this
Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is the only known provision
conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC.
It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist, would entail huge
expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this
power of the BP may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its
power of appropriation. From the role BP has to play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds
for the expenses thereof, it would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from the BP, not the COMELEC, even
when the vacancies would occur in the regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive prerogative of
the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for mandamus. What is more, the
provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to apply to vacancies in the regular National Assembly,
now BP, not to the IBP.

ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANO-ENDRIANO, Petitioners,

versus
SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives, Respondents
G.R. No. 187910
Facts:
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for
the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for
the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members
of Congress, convening the Congress into a Constituent Assembly to amend the 1987 Constitution. In essence, both
petitions seek to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1,
Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners contend that the
House Resolution contradicts the procedures set forth by the 1987 Constitution regarding the amendment or revision of
the same as the separate voting of the members of each House (the Senate and the House of Representatives) is deleted
and substituted with a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of Congress (i.e., of the members of Congress without
distinction as to which institution of Congress they belong to).
Issue:
Whether the court has the power to review the case of the validity of House Resolution No. 1109.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court cannot indulge petitioners supplications. While some may interpret petitioners moves as vigilance
in preserving the rule of law, a careful perusal of their petitions would reveal that they cannot hurdle the bar of justiciability
set by the Court before it will assume jurisdiction over cases involving constitutional disputes.
The Courts power of review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having
adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. The case-or-controversy requirement bans this court from
deciding abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions, lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning
legislative or executive action
An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness. In the United States, courts are centrally
concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed
may not occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for
judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction,
the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An alternative road to review
similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of
government before the courts may step in.
In the present case, the fitness of petitioners case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly lacking. In the first place,
petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second place,
House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose
of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of
procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power
or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of
an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not
yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.
As in the case of Tan v. Macapagal, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the
interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the
appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction
A party will be allowed to litigate only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought. In the cases at bar, petitioners
have not shown the elemental injury in fact that would endow them with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a
personal stake in the outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It assures adverseness and sharpens the presentation
of issues for the illumination of the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions. The lack of petitioners personal
stake in this case is no more evident than in Lozanos three-page petition that is devoid of any legal or jurisprudential basis.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers
and concerned citizens. A taxpayers suit requires that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation. It is undisputed that there has been no allocation or disbursement of public funds in
this case as of yet.
The possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi
The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to settle only actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.
Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent
requirements of personal injury to the broader transcendental importance doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused.
It is not an open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.

LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC

Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas assailing
the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent
municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress
did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion
of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words
of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the
Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which
sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were
not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No.
29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and
forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the
advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The
16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income
requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood
bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law
(Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the Presidents signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality
approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale
conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because
more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government
Code.
Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive
application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of
the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a
municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained
an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting
a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the
exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

INONOG VS IBAY
Grave abuse of authority. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial
proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of justice. The courts must exercise the power of contempt for purposes
that are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges but for the functions they exercise.
Thus, judges have, time and again, been enjoined to exercise their contempt power judiciously, sparingly, with utmost
restraint and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for
retaliation or vindication. Respondent judges act of unceremoniously citing complainant in contempt is a clear evidence of
his unjustified use of the authority vested upon him by law. Venancio Inonog vs. Judge Francisco B. Ibay, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 135, Makati City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175, July 28, 2009.

BIRAOGO VS PTC
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft
and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite
people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if
probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued
that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because
the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity
and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the
Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial
powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the
DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and
personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive power and power of control
necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any
event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere
allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a
fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to
appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. To
the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their
office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes
on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury
attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed by the
real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party
in interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief
as a citizen or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the
petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight
as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are not
limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant
to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to
ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to
exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and
guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is no
usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the
amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the
Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the
PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of
the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is
limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of
the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional
and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the
states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1)
The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not
to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the
Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

MACALINTAL V. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

G.R. NO. 191618 JUNE 7, 2011
NACHURA, J.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET); whether or not the PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution
Held:
A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court
sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified
in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Courts exercise thereof. The Supreme
Courts method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of
the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the
provision for the Supreme Court to promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority conferred upon the
electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
Next, petitioner still claims that the PET exercises quasi-judicial power and, thus, its members violate the proscription in
Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which reads:
SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that the power
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Consistent with our
presidential system of government, the function of dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts
involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable is apportioned to courts of justice.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. The power was expanded, but it remained absolute.
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an
exercise of judicial power.
At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over election contests is vested in the municipal or
metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial courts, respectively.
At the higher levels city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial exclusive and original
jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals,which are not,
strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve
election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional
empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House
Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their
decisions are still subject to judicial review via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party if there is a showing
that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it
performs what is essentially a judicial power.
The present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latters exercise of judicial power inherent
in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise
thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided
in the Constitution.

Note:
The PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the
framers of the Constitution, is to be an institutionindependent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the
Supreme Court.
SECTION 3
BENGZON VS. DRILON G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992 208 SCRA 133
BENGZON VS. DRILON
G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992 208 SCRA 133
Gutierrez, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving pensions under RA
910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which authorized the
adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued
by Marcos which provided for the automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while
that of the retired justices was not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the wrong
information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President
Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its publication, thus there was no law. It
follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was superfluous because it tried to restore benefits which were never
taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted
pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or valid.

HELD:
The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary ot its funds should be utilized,
which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the
disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law.
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on the ground that there should be
no grant of distinct privileges or preferential treatment to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and
in effect asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed.
The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are declared valid and subsisting.
SECTION 4

LIMKETKAI SONS MILLING VS CA & BPI (1995 & 1996)

FACTS:
Philippine Remnants was the owner of a piece of land which it then entrusted to BPI. Pedro Revilla was authorized by BPI
to sell the lot for PHP1000/sqm. Revilla contacted Alfonso Lim who agreed to buy the land. Alfonso Lim and Albino Limketkai
went to BPI and were entertained by VP Albano and Asst. VP Aromin. BPI set the price at 1,100 while Limketkai haggled to
900. They subsequently agreed on Php1,000 on cash basis. Alfonso Lim asked if it was possible to pay on terms and BPI
officials said there was no harm in trying to ask for payment in terms but if disapproved, the price would have to be paid in
cash. Limketkai paid the initial 10% with the remaining 90% to follow. Two or three days later, Alfonso Lim found out that
their offer had been frozen and then went to BPI to tender full payment of 33M to Albano but was refused by both Albano
& Bona.
Issue:
W/N there was a perfected contract of sale
Held:
1995 decision
> Perfection of the contract took place when Aromin and Albano, acting for BPI, agreed to sell and Alfonso Lim & Albino
Limketkai, agreed to buy the lot at Php1000/sqm. A consensual contract is perfected upon mere meeting of the minds and
although the deed of sale had yet to be notarized, it does not mean that no contract was perfected.
1996 decision
> Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and acceptance upon the thing, and the cause which are to constitute
the contract. The offer must be certain and aceptance absolute. Limketkais acceptance was qualified and therefore, was
actually a counter offer.

Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v CA, BPI, National Bookstore GR No. 118509 September 5, 1996

Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or
in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard
by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc,
including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.cralaw (3) Cases or matters heard by a
division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case
without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be
decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en bancor in
division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
ACTS:
(1) Motion of petitioner Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc., for reconsideration of the Court' s resolution of March 29, 1996, which
set aside the Court' s December 1, 1995 decision and affirmed in toto the Court of Appeals' decision dated August 12, 1994.
(2) Petitioner questions the assumption of Chief Justice Narvasa of the chairmanship of the Third Division and arrogantly
ramsits idea on how each Division should be chaired, i.e., the First Division should have been chaired by Chief J ustice
Narvasa, the Second Division by Mr. Justice Padilla, the next senior Justice, and the Third Division by Mr. J ustice Regalado,
the third in line. We need only to stress that the change in the membership of the three divisions of the Court was inevitable
by reason of Mr. Justice Feliciano' s retirement. Such reorganization is purely an internal matter of the Court to which
petitioner certainly has no business at all. (3) In this Manifestation, petitioner merely moved for the inhibition of the Chief
Justice on the ground that the Chief Justice previously acted as counsel for one of the respondents, which allegation the
Chief J ustice vehemently denied by saying that the information upon which the petitioner relied "it utterly without
foundation in fact and is nothing but pure speculation or wistful yearning"
(4) Counsel for the petitioner additionally insinuates that the ponente employed a "double standard" in deciding the case
and professes bewilderment at the ponente ' s act of purportedly taking a position in the ponencia contrary to ponente' s
act of purportedly taking a position in the ponencia contrary to ponente' s standing his book.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case should be referred to Court En banc.
HELD:
ACCORDINGLY, petitioner's motion for reconsideration and motion to refer the case to the Court En Banc are hereby DENI
ED WI TH FIN ALI TY, without prejudice to any and all appropriate actions that the Court may take not only against counsel
on record for the petitioner for his irresponsible remarks, but also against other persons responsible for the reckless
publicity anent this case calculated to maliciously erode the people's faith and confidence in the integrity of this Court.
RATIO:
This reorganization, like those before it, was made only upon prior consultation with and approval of the Members of
theCourt. The petitioner itself found such reorganization "long overdue"
SECTION 5
DRILON VS LIM
GR NO. 112497
AUGUST 4, 1994
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code. The Secretary of Justice
(on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void
for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary
to law and public policy.
RTCs Ruling:
1. The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as
unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution.
Petitioners Argument:
1. The annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances
as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due
to failure to submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
2. Grounds of non-compliance of procedure
a. No written notices as required by Art 276 of Rules of Local Government Code
b. Not published
c. Not translated to tagalog
Supreme Courts Argument:
1. Section 187 authorizes the petitioner to review only the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinance. What he found
only was that it was illegal. That act is not control but supervision.
2. Control lays down the rules in the doing of act and if not followed order the act undone or re-done. Supervision sees to
it that the rules are followed.
3. Two grounds of declaring Manila Revenue Code null and void (1) inclusion of certain ultra vires provisions (2) non-
compliance with prescribed procedure in its enactment but were followed.
The requirements are upon approval of local development plans and public investment programs of LGU not to tax
ordinances.
First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA Digest

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS VS CA

Facts:
1. Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the Supreme
Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of
Investments (BOI).
2. BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing
the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor
appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with CA.
4. CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20) days
after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction.
5. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over
the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments
Code of 1987.
6. Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules
Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down
therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed
directly with the Supreme Court.
7. While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O.
226 on the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was
promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case

YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing
the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was
previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
 ARUELO V. CA
G.R. NO. 107852 OCTOBER 20, 1993
QUIASON, J.

Facts:
Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the respondent therein only five
days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day
period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his answer. According to him, the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill
of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said
pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his answer.
Issue:
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond the five-day period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
Held:
No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are governed by the
Revised Rules of Court.

Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the regular courts.
As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and
bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought before the Commission.
Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction.
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss and bill
of particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto cases pending before the regular courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts.
The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court
(Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5])
 JAVELLANA VS DILG

FACTS: Javellana is an incumbent member of the City Council or Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by
profession who has continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that purpose from the
Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to
DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58.
As to members of the bar the authority given for them to practice their profession shall always be subject to the
restrictions provided for in Section 6 of Republic Act 5185. In all cases, the practice of any profession should be favorably
recommended by the Sanggunian concerned as a body and by the provincial governors, city or municipal mayors, as the
case may be.

c) That no conflict of interests between the practice of profession or engagement in private employment and the
official duties of the concerned official shall arise thereby;
Five months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was signed into law, Section 90
of which provides:
Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession
or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief
executives.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session
hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is accused of
an offense committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an
official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the
interest of the Government.

HELD: Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No.
90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches
upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code and
DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest
between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law
allows it.
SECTION 6

MACEDA VS. VASQUEZ (G.R. NO. 102781)

Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC
Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of service by
certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been
determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision
had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that
petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.

Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SCs constitutional
duty of supervision over all inferior courts

Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under Sec.
1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision over all
courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel,
from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC
that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge or
court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

RAQUIZA VS. JUDGE CASTANEDA

The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the
charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The general
rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply (33 C.J. 945, see. 47); also National Intelligence and Security
Authority (NISA) vs. Martinez, 62 SCRA 411; Castral vs. Bullecer 64 SCRA 289; Melquiades Udani Jr. vs. Pagharion 65 SCRA
549)
Parenthetically, under Count I and II, 'misconduct' also implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment'
(Buenaventura v. Hon. Mariano V. Benedicto, 38 SCRA 71). It results that even if respondent were not correct in his legal
conclusions, his judicial actuations cannot be regarded as grave misconduct, unless the contrary sufficiently appears. And
undersigned finds, as above discussed, that complainant's evidence is wanting in this respect.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the charges against the respondent be dismissed for lack of merit.
SECTION 10

NITAFAN VS CIR
G.R. No. 78780 July 23 1987 [Salaries of the members of Judiciary, Tax Exemption]

FACTS:
Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC, NCR, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit
and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from
making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or
diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that
during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent
judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."

ISSUE: Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.

HELD:
No. The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such
intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of
the1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept
of non-diminution of salaries of judicial officers. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income has been
reduced in accepting service in government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all
other employees.
SECTION 11
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, et.al. vs. MANUEL ALBA, et.al.
GR No. L-57883 12 March 1982

FACTS: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking ti enjoin the Minister of the
Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129
which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan
and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the
judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that
thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.

ISSUES: W/N BP 129 is unconstitutional for impairing the security of tenure of the justices and judges in this case?

RULING: It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. Of course,
if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The rule that the abolition of an office
does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made
in good faith.

Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-
existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
security of tenure does not arise.

PEOPLE V. GACOTT
G.R. NO. 116049 MARCH 20, 1995
BIDIN, J.

Facts:
On February 2, 1994, a complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. No. 108) was filed by Asst. City
Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom and Reyes. The accused filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal
case contending that since the power to prosecute is vested exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic Act No.
1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an opposition
pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has already been abolished by Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972.
Despite such opposition, however, respondent judge granted the motion espousing the position that the Letter Of
Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the law contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code which can
repeal another law such as R.A. 1130. Thus, respondent judge in the assailed order of March 18, 1994 held that the City
Prosecutor has no power or authority to file and prosecute the case and ordered that the case be quashed.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to Quash gravely abused his discretion as to warrant the
issuance of a writ of certiorari

Held:
Yes. The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI
No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed more
clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his
opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of the text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent
judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. Paragraph 1 of LOI No. 2 reads:
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1 dated September 23, 1972, Reorganizing the Executive Branch of the National
Government, the following agencies of the Department of Justice are herebyreorganized or activated in accordance with
the applicable provisions of the Integrated Reorganization Plan and the following instructions: . . . (emphasis supplied).
General, Presidential Decrees, such as P.D No. 1, issued by the former President Marcos under his martial law powers have
the same force and effect as the laws enacted by Congress. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Aquino vs. Comelec,
(62 SCRA 275 [1975]), all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the former
President are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or
superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President. LOI No. 2 is one such
legal order issued by former President Marcos in the exercise of his martial law powers to implement P.D. No. 1. Inasmuch
as neither P.D. No. 1 nor LOI No. 2 has been expressly impliedly revised, revoked, or repealed, both continue to have the
force and effect of law.

Indeed, Section 3, Article XVII of the Constitution explicitly ordains:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
SECTION 12
IN RE: RODOLFO MANZANO

Facts:
Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the
member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that his
membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge
of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member of judiciary.

Issue:
What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned?

Ruling:
The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the Judiciary to any agency performing
Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12, Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution).

Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any
Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction.

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct & affairs of individuals for
their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the Legislature or such as
are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.

Administrative functions as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Governments executive machinery and its performance of
governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer
the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control.

In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez:

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for
their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as
are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence we can readily see that membership in the
Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of
individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative
functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the
administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases
particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members,
and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or
administer the particular function involved in their implementation.
SECTION 14
NICOS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION V CA
GR NO. 88709 FEBRUARY 11, 1992
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without
stating the legal basis therefor.
FACTS:
(1) The order is assailed by the petitioners on the principal ground that it violates the aforementioned constitutional
requirement of Article 8 Section 14 of the Constitution. The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and
does not clearly and distinctly explain how it was reached by the trial court. Petitioners complain that there was no
analysis of their testimonial evidence or of their 21 exhibits, the trial court merely confining itself to the pronouncement
that the sheriff's sale was valid and that it had no jurisdiction over the derivative suit. There was therefore no adequate
factual or legal basis for the decision that could justify its review and affirmance by the Court of Appeals.
(2) January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a loan of P2,000,000.00 from private respondent United
Coconut Planters Bank and to secure payment thereof executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land located at
Marilao, Bulacan. The mortgage was foreclosed for the supposed non-payment of the loan, and the sheriff's sale was held
on July 11, 1983, without re-publication of the required notices after the original date for the auction was changed without
the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor.
(3) CA decision: We hold that the order appealed from as framed by the court a quo while leaving much to be desired,
substantially complies with the rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial courts decision is unconstitutional
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE for lack of basis. This case is REMANDED
to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 10, for revision, within 30 days from notice, of the Order of June 6,
1986, conformably to the requirements of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution, subject to the appeal thereof, if
desired, in accordance with law.
RATIO:
(1) The questioned order is an over-simplification of the issues, and violates both the letter and spirit of Article VIII,
Section 14, of the Constitution.
(2) It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that
judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action.
The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that
the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is
based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is
unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
(3) Brevity is doubtless an admirable trait, but it should not and cannot be substituted for substance. As the ruling on this
second ground was unquestionably a judgment on the merits, the failure to state the factual and legal basis thereof was
fatal to the order.
(4) Kilometric decisions without much substance must be avoided, to be sure, but the other extreme, where substance
is also lost in the wish to be brief, is no less unacceptable either. The ideal decision is that which, with welcome
economy of words, arrives at the factual findings reaches the legal conclusions renders its ruling and having done so
ends.
 KOMATSU INDUSTRIES (PHILS.), INC. V. CA
G.R. NO. 127682 APRIL 24, 1998
REGALADO, J.

Issue:
Whether or not issuance of Minute Resolutions is valid under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
Held:
Resolutions are not decisions within the above constitutional requirements; they merely hold that the petition
for review should not be entertained. And the petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right
but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Courts denial since, for one thing, the facts and
the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals decision.
The constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course and after the
filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition is refused due course, with the resolution
therefor stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the Supreme Court, after deliberating on a petition and subsequent
pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or there is no reversible
error in the respondent courts decision, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

PRUDENTIAL BANK, complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO and ATTY. BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondents.,
A.C. No. 2756, 1988 June 27, En Banc

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Acting on the letter-appeal, dated June 6, 1988, filed on behalf of respondent Judge by his children, seeking clarification of
the Decision of June 5, 1986, on whether or not the Order of this Court forfeiting all of said Judge's retirement benefits and
pay "exclude the monetary value of his accumulated leave credits which he earned during his thirty six (36) years of service
in the government, the last eleven (11) years of which were spent in the Judiciary," and praying that the same be so excluded
considering their need for funds for the continuing medication of respondent Judge, now afflicted with liver cancer on its
terminal stage, the Court RESOLVED, out of humanitarian considerations, and following the precedent in Cathay Pacific
Airways, Ltd. vs. Hon. Romillo, Jr., 143 SCRA 396 [1986]), to AMEND the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of its
Decision of June 5, 1986, to read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES:
"1. Respondent Judge is hereby ordered dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and pay and
with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. He may,
however, enjoy all vacation and sick leave benefits that he has earned during the period of his government service. This
decision is immediately executory."
 OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION V. CA
G.R. NO. 114323 JULY 23, 1998
MARTINEZ, J.
Issue:
Whether or not Memorandum Decisions are violative of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
Held:
No. The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein dearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of memorandum decisions which
adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.
Even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision
of the lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. This is particularly true when the decision sought
to be incorporated is a lengthy and thorough discussion of the facts and conclusions arrived at.

Odchigue-Bondoc vs Tan Tiong Bio,

GR 186652, October 6, 2010
(Admin Law, DOJ Secretary, Prosecutor, Quasi-judicial power)
Facts: Respondent filed a complaint for estafa against Fil-Estate officials including its Corporate Secretary, herein
respondent. Petitioner denies the allegations.
The DOJ, by resolution signed by the Chief State Prosecutor for the Secretary of Justice, motu proprio dismissed the petition
on finding that there was no showing of any reversible error.
The CA set aside the DOJ Secretarys resolution holding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution
dismissing respondents petition for review without therein expressing clearly and distinctly the facts on which the dismissal
was based, in violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution (No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based).
Petitioner asserts in this present petition for review on certiorari that the requirement in Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution
applies only to decisions of courts of justice, and it does not extend to decisions or rulings of executive departments such
as the DOJ.
Respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is not limited to courts as it extends to quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies, as well as to preliminary investigations conducted by these tribunals.
Issue: Whether or not a prosecutor exercises quasi-judicial power.
Whether or not the DOJ Secretary exercises quasi-judicial power.
Held:
No. A prosecutor does not exercise adjudication or rule-making powers. A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding, but is merely inquisitorial since the prosecutor does not determine the guilt of innocence of the accused. While
the prosecutor makes the determination whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause, he
cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused.
No. The Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutors order or resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be
considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body. Sec 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution does
not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.
SECTION 16
VALDEZ, JR. V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 132424 (MAY 2, 2006) CASE DIGEST
Ownership > Ownership In General > Recovery Of Possession And/Or Ownership > Actions Available To Owner > Recovery Of
Real Property > Action To Recover Is Based On Ownership

Facts:
Valdez was the owner of a parcel of land where Fabella consructed a house without any color of title whatsoever. Valdez
orally asked Fabella several times to vacate the property but the latter stubbornly refused.
The parties were not able to settle the dispute amicably, which lead to the filing of a complaint for unlawful detainer by
Valdez against Fabella.
The MTC ruled in favor of Valdez, which was affirmed by the RTC. The CA, on the other hand, reversed the decision. It held
that Valdez failed to make a case for unlawful detainer because they failed to show that they had given Fabella the right to
occupy the premises or that they had tolerated the possession of the same, which is a requirement in unlawful detainer
cases.
Issue:
Whether or not the allegations of the complaint clearly made out a case for unlawful detainer.
Held:
No, the allegations of the complaint did not clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer.
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the tolerance must be present right from the start of the
possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for
unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.
The allegations in the complaint did not contain any fact that would substantiate the claim of Valdez that they permitted or
tolerated the occupation of the property by Fabella. The complaint contained only bare allegations that Fabella without any
color of title whatsoever occupied the land by building their house in the said land thereby depriving Valdez the possession
thereof. Nothing had been said on how Fabella's entry was effected or how and when dispossession started. Admittedly,
no express contract existed between the parties.
The evidence revealed that the possession of Fabella was illegal from the start and not merely tolerated as alleged in the
complaint, considering that Fabella started to occupy the lot and then built a house thereon without the permission and
consent of Valdez and before them, their mother.
Clearly, Fabella's entry into the land was without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as possession
by stealth which is forcible entry. Tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to
categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not of forcible entry.
There was nothing said on how Fabella's entry was effected or how and when dispossession started. There was also no
express contract existed between the parties. This failure of Valdez to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of
unlawful detainer was fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful
detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.