You are on page 1of 20

G.R. No.

88211 September 15, 1989

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R.


MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC, TOMAS
MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS,
NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President,
CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE RAUL
MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ,
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE
VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration
Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of
Staff, respectively, Respondents. chanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

CORTES, J.:

Before the Court is a controversy of grave national importance.


While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision
in this case would undeniably have a profound effect on the
political, economic and other aspects of national life. chan ro blesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles vi rt ual law li bra ry

We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed


from the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution
and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared
President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Her
ascension to and consilidation of power have not been
unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political
leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7
by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos
loyalists" and the unseccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to
surreptitiously return from Hawii with mercenaries aboard an
aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer [Manila Bulletin,
January 30, 1987] awakened the nation to the capacity of the
Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanaticism and
blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of the
1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power" and also
clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's
presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges to the
government. On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of
the major players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that
left scores of people, both combatants and civilians, dead. There
were several other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the
message they conveyed was the same - a split in the ranks of the
military establishment that thraetened civilian supremacy over
military and brought to the fore the realization that civilian
government could be at the mercy of a fractious military. chanroble svirtualawl ibraryc hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in
misguided elements and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There
are also the communist insurgency and the seccessionist movement
in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to
the extent that the communists have set up a parallel government
of their own on the areas they effectively control while the
separatist are virtually free to move about in armed bands. There
has been no let up on this groups' determination to wrest power
from the govermnent. Not only through resort to arms but also to
through the use of propaganda have they been successful in
dreating chaos and destabilizing the country. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated
foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos
and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at
economic recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office,
have yet to show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the
masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses
has remained elusive. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to
the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability
of government is threatened from various directions and the
economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood
firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

The Petition

This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of
a dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty
years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who
within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by
itself. chan roblesv irtualawl ibra rycha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order
the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the
immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation
of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

The Issue

Th issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of


the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. chan roblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would


depend on the resolution of the following issues:

1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former
President Marcos and family to the Philippines? chanrobles vi rtua l law li bra ry

a. Is this a political question? chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former


President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines, in
the interest of "national security, public safety or public health chanroble s virt ual law l ibra ry

a. Has the President made a finding that the return of former


President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and
present danger to national security, public safety or public health?
libra ry
chanroble s virtual law

b. Assuming that she has made that finding

(1) Have the requirements of due process been complied with in


making such finding? chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary

(2) Has there been prior notice to petitioners? chanroble s virtual law lib rary

(3) Has there been a hearing? chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary

(4) Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed with, has
the President's decision, including the grounds upon which it was
based, been made known to petitioners so that they may controvert
the same?

c. Is the President's determination that the return of former


President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and
present danger to national security, public safety, or public health a
political question? chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the return of


former President Marcos and his family is a clear and present
danger to national security, public safety, or public health, have
respondents established such fact? chanroble s virtual law l ib rary

3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the President's


decision to bar the return of former President Marcos and his family,
acted and would be acting without jurisdiction, or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in performing any act
which would effectively bar the return of former President Marcos
and his family to the Philippines? [Memorandum for Petitioners, pp.
5-7; Rollo, pp. 234-236.1

The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of
the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the
following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property


without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws. chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

xxx xxx xxx chanroble s virtual law l ibrary

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.

The petitioners contend that the President is without power to


impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court
may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the
President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized
her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to travel
may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government,
there must be legislation to that effect. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right
of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own,
and to return to his country.

Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,


which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:

Article 12 chanroble s virtual law l ibra ry

1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that


territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary ch anro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.


virtua l law lib rary
chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles

3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any


restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary
to protect national security, public order (order public), public
health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are
consistent with the other rights recognized in the present
Covenant. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own


country.

On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the


issue in this case involves a political question which is non-
justiciable. According to the Solicitor General:
As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or
not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family have the right to
travel and liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional
rights in vacuo without reference to attendant circumstances. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ryc hanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is


whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the
right to return to the Philippines and reside here at this time in the
face of the determination by the President that such return and
residence will endanger national security and public safety. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question


is not a political question as it involves merely a determination of
what the law provides on the matter and application thereof to
petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family. But when the question
is whether the two rights claimed by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos
and family impinge on or collide with the more primordial and
transcendental right of the State to security and safety of its
nationals, the question becomes political and this Honorable Court
can not consider it.

There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:

Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to


return to the Philippines and reestablish their residence here? This is
clearly a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can
decide.cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to


return to the Philippines and reestablish their residence here even if
their return and residence here will endanger national security and
public safety? this is still a justiciable question which this Honorable
Court can decide. chanro blesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners


Ferdinand E. Marcos and family shall return to the Philippines and
establish their residence here? This is now a political question which
this Honorable Court can not decide for it falls within the exclusive
authority and competence of the President of the Philippines.
[Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp. 297-299.]
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to
national security over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite
Article II of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect


the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the
State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required,
under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military, or
civil service.
chan roblesv irt ualawli bra rycha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of


life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare
are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy.

Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and
family from returning to the Philippines for reasons of national
security and public safety has international precedents. Rafael
Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of
Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, Fulgencio batista of Cuba,
King Farouk of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El
Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela were among the
deposed dictators whose return to their homelands was prevented
by their governments. [See Statement of Foreign Affairs Secretary
Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for Respondents, pp.
26-32; Rollo, pp. 314-319.] chanrobles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the
scope of presidential power and its limits. We, however, view this
issue in a different light. Although we give due weight to the parties'
formulation of the issues, we are not bound by its narrow confines
in arriving at a solution to the controversy. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case
within the confines of the right to travel and the import of the
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v.
Dulles [357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt 1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig v.
Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt 2766, 69 L Ed. 2d 640) which affirmed
the right to travel and recognized exceptions to the exercise
thereof, respectively. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the
right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally
connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's
country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent
from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and
abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country,
and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights.
The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately
from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand, the
Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom
to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to
leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may
be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national
security, public order, public health or morals or enter qqqs own
country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).]
It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the
right to return to one's country in the same context as those
pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights


specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the
liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered
view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally
accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution,
is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and
enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived"
thereof [Art. 12 (4).]chanrobles v irt ual law l ibra ry

Thus, the rulings in the cases Kent and Haig which refer to the
issuance of passports for the purpose of effectively exercising the
right to travel are not determinative of this case and are only
tangentially material insofar as they relate to a conflict between
executive action and the exercise of a protected right. The issue
before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine, and
even in American jurisprudence. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtual law li bra ry

Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of


whether or not there can be limitations on the right to travel in the
absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An
appropriate case for its resolution will have to be awaited. chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ib rary

Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need
to explain the methodology for its resolution. Our resolution of the
issue will involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve
whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution,
to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall
determine, pursuant to the express power of the Court under the
Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President
acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the
Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

Executive Power

The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of


the three great branches of government. To recall the words of
Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139
(1936)], "the Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in
bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and
the judicial departments of the government." [At 157.1 Thus, the
1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[the legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines" Art VI, Sec. 11,
"[t]he executive power shall bevested in the President of the
Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 11, and "[te judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only
establish a separation of powers by actual division [Angara v.
Electoral Commission, supra] but also confer plenary legislative,
executive and judicial powers subject only to limitations provided in
the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v.
Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of the
legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant
of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which
may be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.1 If this can
be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers
with a combined membership of more than two hundred members
and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it
can equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one
official the President. chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive


power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII,
Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by executive
power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of
certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute
the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-
in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the
power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power
to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address
Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 14-23]. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan ro bles virtual law lib rary

The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers


of the President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the
President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are
these se enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive
power"? Petitioners advance the view that the President's powers
are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987
Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated
powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to
her. Inclusion unius est exclusio alterius[Memorandum for
Petitioners, p. 4- Rollo p. 233.1 This argument brings to mind the
institution of the U.S. Presidency after which ours is legally
patterned.** chanroble s virtual law l ibra ry

Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United


States grappled with the same problem. He said:
Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To
those who think that a constitution ought to settle everything
beforehand it should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those
who think that constitution makers ought to leave considerable
leeway for the future play of political forces, it should be a vision
realized.
chan rob lesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtual law lib rary

We encounter this characteristic of Article 11 in its opening words:


"The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America." . . .. [The President: Office and Powers,
17871957, pp. 3-4.]

Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by


the different persons who held the office from Washington to the
early 1900's, and the swing from the presidency by commission to
Lincoln's dictatorship, he concluded that "what the presidency is at
any particular moment depends in important measure on who is
President." [At 30.] chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

This view is shared by Schlesinger who wrote in The Imperial


Presidency:

For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution. it


remained of course, an agency of government subject to unvarying
demands and duties no remained, of cas President. But, more than
most agencies of government, it changed shape, intensity and ethos
according to the man in charge. Each President's distinctive
temperament and character, his values, standards, style, his habits,
expectations, Idiosyncrasies, compulsions, phobias recast the
WhiteHouse and pervaded the entire government. The executive
branch, said Clark Clifford, was a chameleon, taking its color from
the character and personality of the President. The thrust of the
office, its impact on the constitutional order, therefore altered from
President to President. Above all, the way each President
understood it as his personal obligation to inform and involve the
Congress, to earn and hold the confidence of the electorate and to
render an accounting to the nation and posterity determined
whether he strengthened or weakened the constitutional order. [At
212- 213.]
We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or
what she does but, rather, that the consideration of tradition and
the development of presidential power under the different
constitutions are essential for a complete understanding of the
extent of and limitations to the President's powers under the 1987
Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong President with
explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973
Constitution attempted to modify the system of government into the
parliamentary type, with the President as a mere figurehead, but
through numerous amendments, the President became even more
powerful, to the point that he was also the de facto Legislature. The
1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system
of government and restored the separation of legislative, executive
and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct
branches of government with provision for checks and balances.
libra ry
chanroblesv irtualawli bra ry chan roble s virtual law

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power"


is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state
as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds
it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of
the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants
the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any
provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign
relations. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987


Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers
of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered
as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of
the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive
power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated, chanrobles v irt ual law l ibra ry

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the


government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive. Thus, in the landmark decision of Springer v.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), on the
issue of who between the Governor-General of the Philippines and
the Legislature may vote the shares of stock held by the
Government to elect directors in the National Coal Company and the
Philippine National Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding the
power of the Governor-General to do so, said:

...Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of


the "board" and "committee" respectively, are not charged with the
performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of
anything which is in aid of performance of any such functions by the
legislature. Putting aside for the moment the question whether the
duties devolved upon these members are vested by the Organic Act
in the Governor-General, it is clear that they are not legislative in
character, and still more clear that they are not judicial. The fact
that they do not fall within the authority of either of these two
constitutes logical ground for concluding that they do fall within that
of the remaining one among which the powers of government are
divided ....[At 202-203; Emphasis supplied.]

We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his


enduring words of dissent we find reinforcement for the view that it
would indeed be a folly to construe the powers of a branch of
government to embrace only what are specifically mentioned in the
Constitution:

The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide


fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found
to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to
the other. .... chanroblesv irtualawli bra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibrary

xxx xxx xxx chanroble s virtual law l ibrary

It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may


disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the
distinction between legislative and executive action with
mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight
compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far
from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires. [At 210-
211.]

The Power Involved


The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he
prime duty of theGovernment is to serve and protect the people"
and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,the protection of
life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare
are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.] chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance


of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and
the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide
governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty
words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a
plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these
plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as
President of the Republic, the President has to consider these
principles, among other things, and adhere to them. chanroblesv irt u alawlibra ry chan roble s virtual law lib rary

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow
the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the
Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in
arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and
uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the
Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and
advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the
Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social
contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign
powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers
of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people
forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the
Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II,
Sec. 1.]chanrobles v irt ual law l ibra ry

The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons


who seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his
family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from
whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought
to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are
neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the
preferred freedoms of speech and ofexpression, although couched in
absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the
requirements of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1981.] chanrobles vi rtual law lib rary

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general


welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of
certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual
power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on
the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase
Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but
also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the
laws that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at
153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and
defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit
in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the author
advances the view that an allowance of discretionary power is
unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the
President]. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's
powers as protector of the peace. Rossiter The American
Presidency].The power of the President to keep the peace is not
limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in
times of emergency or to leading the State against external and
internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed
with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked
with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign
foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of
law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any
way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in
the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President
commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot
be said to exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in-
Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in
order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
law libra ry
chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the
Marcose's from returning has been recognized by memembers of
the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the
House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging
the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a
genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as
irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to uncompromising
respect for human rights under the Constitution and our laws."
[House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The Resolution does
not question the President's power to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's
sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his
country.chanroblesv irtualawli bra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the


Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to
certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated
situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be
treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual
unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request
or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on
the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted
or denied.

The Extent of Review

Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to


determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government." [Art. VIII, Sec.
1] Given this wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor General
that the issue constitutes a political question which is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Court to decide. chan roble svirtuala wlibra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question


doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which
the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to
the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain
issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is
exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people
themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for
example, question the President's recognition of a foreign
government, no matter how premature or improvident such action
may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it
may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the
grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of
resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is reserved
to the people.
chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l l aw libra ry

There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our


determination thereof on the political question doctrine. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners
show that the framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review
but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual
controversies before them. When political questions are involved,
the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being
questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide
a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to
decide. In this light, it would appear clear that the second
paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining
"judicial power," which specifically empowers the courts to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling
in Lansang v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42
SCRA 4481 that:]

Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the


power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under
specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of
powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is
supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers,
under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand
in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the
Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege,
but only if and when he acts within the sphere alloted to him by the
Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so
acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is,
in turn, constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority,
the function of the Court is merely to check - not to supplant the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power
vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act [At 479-480.]

Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or


not there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it
was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she
has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her
discretion in deciding to bar their return. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral
arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers
by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were
represented, there exist factual bases for the President's
decision..
chanroble svi rtualawl ib raryc hanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that
the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized
communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist
conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with
impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to
mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the
Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier
narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of
the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the
violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may


be contained. The military establishment has given assurances that
it could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is
the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to
be the proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back.
With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted
arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the
return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return. chanroblesvi rtualaw lib raryc han robl es virt ual law li bra ry

It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the


Philippines will cause the escalation of violence against the State,
that would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the
commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to
suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting through the
Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action
against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are
perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the
people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation
of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation
in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend
the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot
shirk from that responsibility.
chan roble svirtualawl ibra rycha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now
beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the
plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close
associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the
Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the
Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its
efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the
Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the
continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the
excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles
and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of
widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting
precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is
easily within the ambit of judicial notice. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the


return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during
the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what
is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the
economy, we cannot argue with that determination. chanrobl esvirt ualawli bra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the


President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President Marcos and his
family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting
their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan robles v irt ual law l ib rary

You might also like