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1 Following Rowe 1988, on 257b6, I read eros, not Eros. Throughout this study I leave eros
untranslated or I translate it as love or passionate desire. On the different senses of the Greek
term see further below I.2.
2 Aeschines, Alcibiades: SSR, frag. VI A53, quoted by Kahn 1996: 21, whose ch. 1 provides an excellent
survey of the theme of eros and philosophy in the Sokratikoi logoi.
1
2 Socrates Daimonic Art
dialogue Zopyrus opposes Socrates erotic tendencies to his devotion to
philosophy. Here, the physiognomist Zopyrus, reading Socrates character
from his physical appearance, states that he is stupid and a womanizer.
Socrates says that Zopyrus is right: these are his natural weaknesses, but he
has overcome them by the study of philosophy.3
In Platos own dialogues, as in the passage from the Phaedrus just quoted,
eros is often associated with philosophy in a positive way. In other passages
and dialogues of Plato, however, eros is opposed to reason and philosophy.
In the Phaedo, Socrates says that eros is among the affections of the body that
impede wisdom (phronesis) and philosophy (64c468c3, especially 66c28).
In the Republic, Cephalus quotes with approval Sophocles characterization
of sex (t frodsia) as a mad master (1.329b8d2), Glaucon agrees that
the pleasures of sex are mad (3.403a46), and Socrates agrees with those
who characterize Eros as a tyrant (9.573a4575a7). According to Timaeus,
eros is among those things that a just person must conquer (Ti. 42a6b2),
and it is one of the terrible and necessary affections of the mortal soul
(69c5d6). In Laws 6.782d10783b1, the Athenian Stranger associates eros
with madness and hybris and says that it is a disease that needs restraint.4
Such passages appear to suggest that a philosopher would need, like the
Socrates of Zopyrus, to attempt to overcome erotic inclinations. How, then,
can Platos Socrates claim, as he does in the Phaedrus, that erotic art is not
only compatible with, but actually necessary to, philosophical activities?
I argue that Plato answers this question in a group of four dialogues:
Alcibiades I, Lysis, Symposium and Phaedrus.5 I refer to these four dialogues
as the erotic dialogues, in part because ordinary eros (desire for sexual or
other objects such as wealth or power) is a central concern in all of them.
The Symposium contains a series of speeches in praise of Eros, followed by
Alcibiades praise of Socrates, his beloved. The Phaedrus begins with three
speeches about the relationship between lover and beloved speeches that
are the subject of subsequent discussions about rhetoric and in the Alcib-
iades I Socrates represents himself as the lover of Alcibiades. Although the
central philosophical concern of the Lysis is the question of what a friend is,
the dramatic framework of this dialogue concerns Socrates demonstration
to Hippothales, a young man in love with Lysis, of how a lover should treat a
3 filosofav skhsin: Rossetti frags. 10 (Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato 6) and 6 (Cicero, De fato
10). The texts relevant to Zopyrus are collected in Rossetti 1980, and discussed in Blondell 2002: 724,
and Kahn 1996: 11. On Socrates physical appearance see further Chapter 4 at 4.6 and Chapter 6
at 6.3.
4 Bres 1968: 21532 gives a helpful survey of negative attitudes toward eros, in the sense of desire for
sexual pleasure, expressed in Platos dialogues.
5 I take Alcibiades I to be Platos own work, for reasons given in Chapter 1 n.1.
Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues 3
beloved. Most important, all of these dialogues are erotic in that they depict
Socrates as practicing an art or skill that is itself erotic because it shares
certain characteristics attributed to the daimon Eros in the Symposium. In
all four dialogues, Socrates art enables him, like Eros, to be marvelously
skilled in the philosophical activities of searching for wisdom and beauty,
and of helping others to seek these same objects of eros. A central compo-
nent of the erotic art is Socratic eros: a passionate desire for the wisdom,
beauty and other good things that one recognizes that one lacks.6
Socrates claim to have an erotic art is explicit in his prayer to Eros
in the Phaedrus, quoted above. Here, Socrates states that he has a special
relationship to Eros, the god who has given him erotic art. He also claims
in this passage to have used his art, in the recantation speech he has just
made, to exhort Phaedrus to devote himself to the life Socrates second
speech has represented as best, and to which he himself is devoted: a life
that combines philosophical words with eros (cf. 249a12 and 256a7b1).7
The nature of the erotic art, and of the relationship between eros and
philosophy, is clarified in the Symposium. Socrates teacher, Diotima, says
that eros in a broad, or generic, sense is desire for any of a number of good
things. For example, one kind of eros is desire for wisdom (philosophia:
literally, liking, or love, for wisdom).8 According to Diotima: Wisdom
[sophia] is among the most beautiful things, and eros is concerned with
beauty [or the fine: to kalon], so that it is necessary for Eros to be a
philosopher (204b24). Diotima goes on to substitute the good for the
beautiful (204e13, 205e7206a12), and to define eros as desire for good
things (205d13). According to Diotima, then, philosophy is one kind of
eros, eros for wisdom, something that is not only good, but also among
the most beautiful things.9 This view of philosophy as one kind of eros is
clarified by Diotimas further characterization of Eros, the personification
of eros. Eros is neither god nor mortal, but a great daimon (202d13), who
is not the beloved but the lover (eron: 204c13). He desires to become wise
(sophos: 204a12) because he realizes that he lacks wisdom. Moreover, Eros
is a marvelously skilled plotter and hunter (qhreutv deinv: 203d46) after
the good and the beautiful things he recognizes that he does not possess
6 I am indebted to an anonymous reader for Cambridge University Press for suggesting the helpful
terms ordinary eros and Socratic eros.
7 Some complexities concerning the nature of philosophy in the Phaedrus are discussed in Introduction
to Part III.
8 See 205d18, discussed further below I.2.
9 Cf. Resp. 3.402d6: the most beautiful is the most lovable. The relationship in Symp. between the
good and the beautiful is close but not necessarily identical: see Rowe 1998, on 201c12, 204e12,
206e23. On eros as desire for the good see especially Chapter 1 n.9 and Chapter 2 n.68.
4 Socrates Daimonic Art
(203d4204c6). Thus, philosophy, as practiced by Eros, is not simply one
kind of eros. It also includes marvelous skill in searching for the objects of
eros.
Socrates concludes his speech with a declaration of his own devotion to
this Eros and to ta erotika, matters with which Eros is concerned:
12 Socrates erotike techne differs significantly from lovers hunting by means of gifts that is called erotike
techne in Soph. 222d10e3. I disagree with Balansard 2001: 232 in connecting the two.
13 His skill includes the ability to affect others, but is not limited to this, as suggested by Yunis 2005:
121: Socrates claim to be an erotic expert (rwtikv) . . . refers to his ability to affect men like
Alcibiades, Charmides, and perhaps Phaedrus with his passion for inquiry and philosophy.
Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues 7
much wisdom as possible. The way in which he seeks wisdom is by exam-
ining himself and others by means of question and answer (dialectic), as he
explicitly states, for example, in Alcibiades I 127e47. Dialectic, moreover, is
a non-competitive and mutually beneficial activity that requires, and helps
to create, friendly relationships among interlocutors.14 In helping others to
search for wisdom, Socrates creates or increases the friendly feelings that
are an especially important issue in the Lysis and Phaedrus.15
Socrates art, then, is essentially both philosophical and erotic together,
in that it helps him to seek the wisdom and other good things that are
the objects of his passionate desire. However, philosophy, as Socrates is
represented as practicing it in the erotic dialogues, is not simply one form
of eros.16 Instead, Socratic eros (component (3) above) is one of several
components of the erotic art that allows Socrates, like Eros, to practice
philosophy with marvelous skill. The kind of skill involved in component
(5) also has a dimension more closely connected with ordinary eros for
another person. To help someone else seek wisdom is to benefit and act
as a friend to the person examined, and also can, but does not always,
lead an older partner to become or continue to be the erastes (lover) of an
individual young person who has a beautiful soul. Thus, in Alcibiades I,
Socrates, the erastes of Alcibiades beautiful soul, says that his own love will
not cease as long as Alcibiades goes on improving (131d4132a2). In this
dialogue, Socrates eros for Alcibiades soul helps the young man to become
better.
Socrates art can be characterized as daimonic as well as erotic in that
each of the five components of this art is associated with the characteristics
attributed to the philosopher Eros in the Symposium.17 This daimon, a being
14 On the differences between dialectic and eristic see below n.51 and Chapter 2 n.47.
15 My account, arrived at independently, of Socrates erotic art is similar in some respects to the
characterization given by Scott and Welton 2008 of Socratic philosophy as an art of love (136),
although my approach to this topic is very different (see Preface n.7). However, I disagree in two
major respects with Scott and Weltons views on Socrates erotic art. First (190), they identify
Socrates erotic art with the true art of rhetoric, whose practitioner can explain all it does with
reference to the good of the subject (Grg. 464465a). I argue below (I.3 and Introduction to Part III)
that Socrates erotike techne differs significantly from craft-knowledge of this kind. Second, Scott
and Welton claim that in the Symposium Socrates awareness of his ignorance is inseparable from
some partial recollection of the Forms (186). I believe that this view relies too heavily on material
from dialogues other than the Symposium (see below n.17).
16 On philosophy as a form of eros see Kahn 1987: 967; Nehamas 2007a: 67 and 2007b: esp. 131;
Pakaluk 2004: 108; Ruprecht 1999: 103; Sier 1997: 823; de Strycker and Slings 1994: 64; Wohl
2002: 1601 and n.91, on Grg. 481d35. According to Rowe 2009: 139 eros, properly understood, is
philosophy.
17 The interconnections among Eros, Socrates and philosophy are discussed at length by Scott and
Welton 2008, who argue that philosophy is fundamentally erotic (3). I agree with much of what
8 Socrates Daimonic Art
neither god nor mortal, but in between both (202d8e1), to whom Socrates
claims to be devoted (212b6), is himself devoted to, and passionately desires,
ta erotika: the beauty, wisdom, and other good things he recognizes that he
lacks (203e4204a7); he is a marvelously skilled hunter after these things
(203d48); and he is the best co-worker for human nature in its striving to
attain wisdom (212b24). Indeed, Socrates is portrayed in these dialogues
as a daimonic figure, who, like Diotimas Eros (Symp. 202d13), is called
daimonion (Alcibiades, at Symp. 219c1). He resembles not only Eros, but
also a satyr, a being who, like Eros, is a daimon.18
they say about the intermediate state of all three entities, although my own interpretation differs
in many respects. In particular, I question their attempt, explained at length in their Appendix,
to fill out the account of Eros given by Diotima in the Symposium by means of psychological and
metaphysical theories drawn from other dialogues.
18 On Socrates resemblance to Eros see Chapter 4 at 4.6; on his satyr-like characteristics see 4.2, 4.6
and Chapter 6 at 6.3.
19 Davidson 2007: 35, who comments further: Socrates is the archetype of the erotikos man because
he is permanently besotted (with knowledge, with handsome young men) and never manages to
achieve a finality, not because he was an erotic philosopher in the modern sense of the term
someone who converses about sex, or who gives lectures wearing fishnet stockings and a red silk
basque (36).
20 Rowes translations, 1998, adapted.
Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues 9
According to Diotima, then, eros has a broad sense, referring to desire
for good things of all kinds, and a more restricted sense, used of only one
kind of desire. Scholars often refer to these two senses of eros as generic
and specific, respectively.21 Diotima gives helpful examples of generic
eros in the passage quoted above, but in characterizing specific eros she
simply refers to the way in which people speak. Although there are many
disagreements about how to interpret Diotimas distinction, most scholars
agree that specific eros in this passage has a sexual component.22
However, Diotimas distinction is not simply one between desires with
and without a sexual component, as Paul Ludwigs recent detailed analysis
of Greek usage helps to show. In Homer, eros does not necessarily refer
to sexual desire, or even to a particularly strong desire, but includes the
desires to eat (e.g., Il. 1.469), weep, dance and make war: Homeric eros
seems to mean mere desire of any kind, for any object or aim, no matter
how mundane, no matter how intense or lacking in intensity.23 According
to Ludwig, then, Diotimas generic eros resembles Homeric eros in referring
to a mere desire of any kind.24 Her specific eros, however, differs from the
Homeric kind of generic eros not only in its association with sexual desire,
but also in being intense and passionate.25 According to Ludwig, there is
also a third category of usage, one transferring (literally or metaphorically)
the passionate intensity of the specific eros to a wider range of objects
found only in generic eros.26 For example, in Aeschylus Agamemnon
3412, Clytemnestra says: Let not an eros first fall upon the army . . . to
ravage what they ought not.27 Ludwigs third category, then, would seem
to include cases comparable to the English use of lust to characterize
passionate desire for such non-sexual objects as power and wealth. In
interpreting individual passages, Ludwig concludes, it is important, but
often difficult, to distinguish sexual from broader uses of eros, and to
determine what degree of passionate intensity is involved.28
What Ludwig calls the transferred sense of eros can help us to under-
stand the sense in which Socratic eros is erotic. Plato often uses the term
eros and cognates to refer to passionate desire for non-sexual objects.
The Laws mentions eros for wealth (831c4, 870a26), and a divine eros
for temperate and just pursuits (711d67). In the Republic Plato writes of
21 For example, Bury 1932: xiii and 106, on 205a; Ferrari 1992: 254; Ludwig 2002: 127 and 1456; Santas
1988: 329.
22 See Ferrari 1992: 254; Rowe 1999a: 243; Santas 1988: 33; Sier 1997: 213.
23 Ludwig 2002: 1246; quotation: 126. In quoting, I preserve Ludwigs use of italics to refer to the
Greek word eros, and his lack of italics in using the modern English word eros (7 n.5).
24 Ibid. 127; cf. 145. 25 Ibid. 127. 26 Ibid. 128. 27 Ibid. 133, his translation. 28 Ibid. 128.
10 Socrates Daimonic Art
lovers (erastas) of rule (521b4) and of eros for poetry (607e7, 608a5), while
in the Phaedrus Socrates says that his interlocutor, Phaedrus, is in need
of a fellow lover [erastou] of speeches (228c12). In Theaetetus 169b5c2,
Socrates states that he has a strong sickness, consisting in a terrible eros
for discussions. Alcibiades is said to have eros for renown (Alc. I 124b36),
and in the Statesman, the Eleatic Visitor discusses eros for peace (307e56).
The contexts of these passages suggest that the term eros is used by Plato
to indicate an intensity of desire for non-sexual objects that is closer to
sexual passion than to a generic desire for such objects as food.
Especially when Plato uses eros and cognates to refer to love of wisdom
or truth the term is often used of an intense desire that is explicitly compared
to sexual passion. The vision of the lover who arrives at the sight of truth
in the Symposium is described in sexual terms (211e4212a7), as is the lovers
eagerness to see the plain of truth (248b6) in the Phaedrus (251a1252c2).
The Phaedo compares lovers [erastai] of wisdom [phronesis] to lovers of
sexual objects (66e23, 68a28). In the Republic, Socrates characterizes an
eros of reality (490a8b7) by means of an elaborate metaphor of sexual
intercourse and generation that lends sexual overtones to a later passage
in which he speaks of the eros for true philosophia that comes from
some true divine inspiration (499b8c1), and asks if philosophers are not
lovers (erastas) of being and truth (501d12). In the erotic dialogues, then,
Socrates eros for wisdom and other good things is a desire as passionate
as sexual desire. His art is erotic in part because it includes this passionate
desire.
In the erotic dialogues, Plato also uses erotic vocabulary and themes in
adapting for his own purposes Greek conventions concerning interpersonal
love. One especially important convention is that of the erotic-educational
relationship, in which an older lover (erastes) seeks to educate and improve
a younger beloved (eromenos) in exchange for the younger mans sexual
favors. This relationship is reflected especially clearly in the speech of
Pausanias in the Symposium.29 The negative aspects of this convention are
highlighted in the first two speeches of the Phaedrus that attributed to
Lysias, and Socrates first speech. In both speeches, a lover is said to seek
only his own physical pleasure, while harming the object of his lust.30
29 I borrow the phrase erotic-educational relationship from Gill 1999: xv. On Pausanias speech as
exemplifying one kind of Greek love, Athenian love, see Davidson 2007: 41845. In his discussion
of the multiplicity of homoerotic relationships in ancient Greece, Davidson decisively refutes the
view, argued for in Dovers influential study (1989, originally published 1978), that a single kind of
relationship constitutes the norm. Skinner 2005 also calls attention to the great variety of love
relationships in antiquity.
30 See further Chapter 5.
Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues 11
Plato also represents the relationship between erastes and eromenos in a
more positive light, as he uses and adapts the erotic-educational convention
in his portrayal of Socrates throughout the four dialogues. While Socrates
resembles the erastes of convention in being concerned with the education
of beautiful young men, his motives are very different. The Alcibiades I,
which comes closest to representing Socrates in the role of an older erastes
in love with a younger eromenos, whom he educates, also shows how greatly
Socrates differs from the erastes who seeks sexual favors. Socrates says that
he is in love with Alcibiades soul instead of his body, and he does not
use his erotic skill for sexual seduction. He explicitly denies that he seeks
pleasure from physical beauty when he says that he has remained as the
lover of Alcibiades soul, even after the young mans physical bloom has
faded (131c5e11). The Socrates of the erotic dialogues also differs from the
erastes of Pausanias speech in providing another kind of education, one
that does not involve claims to teach. Socrates disclaims wisdom himself
(component (2) of the erotic art), and he seeks to make others aware of their
own lack of wisdom (component (5)). Plato emphasizes this last difference
when his Socrates shows Hippothales in the Lysis that the way to capture
a beloved is not by praising, but by humbling him (206a13, 210e25), and
when Socrates leads Alcibiades to agree that he has long been in a shameful
state without realizing it (Alc. I 127d78). Finally, Socrates differs from
the erastes of Pausanias speech in that he leads others to become lovers
in turn.31 For example, Alcibiades I ends with Socrates suggestion that his
own love may have hatched a new love in Alcibiades (135e13). This love is
both Socratic eros for wisdom and other good things and, in the Alcibiades
I, eros for Socrates himself.
Sexual desire also plays a more positive role in the erotic dialogues than
it does in the Greek erotic-educational convention. Although Socrates
art, and the love he himself has for Alcibiades, are not erotic in a sexual
sense, Socrates nevertheless recognizes that sexual desire need not be mere
lust, but can instead play an important and legitimate role in relationships
between those who search together for wisdom. The lover who has been
initiated into the Lesser Mysteries, which are preparatory to the Greater
Mysteries, experiences sexual desire, which he satisfies at least in part, by
touching . . . the beautiful one, and associating with him (Symp. 209c2
3). In the myth in Socrates second speech in the Phaedrus, the lovers who
occasionally complete the sexual act (diepraxsqhn: 256c45) are said
to be more vulgar and less philosophical than those who refrain from sex.
1.3 techne
Socrates art, then, is erotic and daimonic in that it has five specific com-
ponents associated with the characteristics of the philosopher-daimon Eros
in the Symposium, who is both philosopher and lover. But in what sense is
it art (techne)?
One answer to this question specifically concerns Socrates use of the
term techne in the Phaedrus. In the passage from his second speech, quoted
at the beginning of this Introduction (257a3b6), Socrates use of the
phrase erotike techne distinguishes his own art from (1) a true techne of
rhetoric (rhetorike), and from (2) an atechnos diatribe, a practice without
art (260e26, 261a7). He says that the true techne of rhetoric is to the soul
what the techne of medicine is to the body. Just as the practitioner of the
art of medicine understands by means of techne the nature of the body,
and how to make it healthy and strong, so the person who has rhetorike
techne must understand the nature of the soul, and know how to produce
persuasion and virtue within in (270b19). The practice without art, on
the other hand, aims at pleasure rather than the good. It is directed toward
pleasing fellow slaves rather than good masters, that is, mortals instead
of gods (273e9274a2), and is used, for example, by experts in seduction
in order to gain physical pleasure. Socrates erotic techne differs from the
atechnos diatribe in not seeking pleasure, and from the true techne in not
being craft-knowledge. It nevertheless resembles true techne in having the
goal of pleasing gods rather than mortals, as indicated by the passage quoted
at the beginning of this Introduction, and of striving, and helping others
to strive, to attain as much craft-knowledge as they can. These similarities
help to explain why Socrates uses the term techne in characterizing his own
erotic art in this dialogue.32
A more general answer to the question about the sense in which Socrates
erotic art is a techne takes into account a range of passages concerning techne
in many dialogues. Socrates frequently uses the term techne to refer to a
33 Annas 2001: 244. As examples of teachability, Annas cites (n.20) Meno 89eff. (which refers to doctors,
cobblers and pipe players), and Prt. 319eff. (see the entire discussion at 319a320c, with the examples
of house and ship building: 319b5c1). As an example of (3), she cites (n.22) Grg. 465a and 501a,
which give medicine as an example.
34 Annas 2001: 244. 35 Ibid. 241, discussing Lach. 191ce.
36 Ibid. 244 n.21, citing Grg. 503d504b. In this passage, painters, builders and doctors are said to
arrange things according to a certain order, and to compel one part to be suitable and fitting to
another, so that the whole is composed as an arranged and ordered thing (503e4504a4).
37 Other helpful accounts of the criteria for techne include those of Brickhouse and Smith 1994:
57, whose first three criteria are essentially the same as those of Annas; Reeve 1989: 3745, who
states (39) that craft-knowledge is explanatory, teachable, and luck-independent; Woodruff
1990, who lists as necessary conditions teachability, specialisation, and completeness (702).
Roochnik 1996 provides a helpful survey that includes (1788) pre-Platonic criteria for techne. Less
useful is Balansard 2001, whose bibliography does not cite Brickhouse and Smith 1994, Reeve 1989,
Roochnik 1996, or Woodruff 1990, and who draws from Phdr. 269a13ff. the unwarranted inference
that authentic poetry is said to be a techne (12830, 139).
Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues 15
Diotima taught (ddaxen) him about ta erotika (Symp. 201d5), but that he
himself only tries to persuade others (212b23). In the Lysis, he responds
to Hippothales request for advice about how a lover can become liked by
a beloved by saying that this is not an easy thing to tell (epen), that is,
to give an account of, but claims that he might perhaps be able to give
a demonstration (epideixis) by talking to Lysis (206b9c7). And in the
Phaedrus, he attributes his techne not to an understanding of ta erotika that
he has acquired by his own efforts, but to a divine gift (257a79), which is
also the source for his knowledge (oda) that Hippothales is in love (Lys.
204b7c2).38
One important way in which Socrates erotic art differs from craft-
knowledge is that an important aspect of erotic art is recognition of ones
own lack of wisdom (component (2) of the erotic art).39 In the erotic
dialogues, Socrates is represented as recognizing that he lacks wisdom in two
important respects. First, in two passages he explicitly states that he knows
nothing except ta erotika: Symposium 177d78 (cf. the spurious Theages
128b16) and Lysis 204b8c2, where Socrates claims to be inferior and
useless in matters other than the ability to recognize lover and beloved.40
Socrates avowals of ignorance in other passages in the four dialogues also
suggest that he knows only about ta erotika, and that his knowledge fails
him in other respects. In the Lysis, for example, Socrates says that he does
not know how to acquire the good friend, the possession of which is the
object of his eros (212a46), and he is in fact unable to say who or what
the friend is (222e67) that is the object of his search in this dialogue. In
Alcibiades I, he states that he and Alcibiades need self-care more than all
other people, and that he does not differ from Alcibiades in his own need
for education and self-care (124b10d5). The Socrates of the Symposium
claims that his own wisdom (sophia) is inferior and questionable, like a
dream (175e24), and he warns Alcibiades that he, Socrates, may be worth
nothing (219a12). In the Phaedrus, Socrates says that only a god should be
called wise (sophos); a human can be, at most, only a lover of wisdom
38 On divine inspiration cf. Resp. 499b8c1. I will argue that the kind of knowledge Socrates claims
to have been given by a divine source is true belief. On support from divine sources for Socrates
beliefs see Brickhouse and Smith 1994: 189201, and 1989: 1057; Forster 2007.
39 A discussion of the many complex and controversial epistemological issues surrounding the status of
the kinds of knowledge Socrates claims and disclaims in the dialogues generally is beyond the scope
of this study. However, I agree with Benson 2000: 168 about the impossibility of determining the
precise nature of the knowledge Socrates disavows in the early dialogues. Helpful surveys of the
controversy surrounding Socrates claims to and disclaimers of knowledge are provided by Forster
2007; Reeve 1989: 5362; Wolfsdorf 2004a; Yonezawa 1995.
40 Insightful interpretations of Socrates claim to know ta erotika include those of Blondell 2006; Detel
2003; Roochnik 1987 and 1996: 23351; Scott and Welton 2008. See also Chapter 4 at 4.6 and n.81.
16 Socrates Daimonic Art
(philosophon: 278d36). In this dialogue, when Socrates says that he spoke
at length because of his own longing (pq) for things seen in a former
life (250c78), he implies that he, like the fallen souls in his speech, has
forgotten the truth he once glimpsed.
Another way in which Socrates recognizes his own lack of wisdom
is by claiming to have only limited knowledge even of ta erotika; that
is, he does not have the complete understanding of the relevant field
which would be required by craft-knowledge, according to Julia Annas
characterization quoted above. Specifically, he claims to have only the
kind of skill that is gained from his own personal experience.41 This skill,
however, is not the kind of empeiria (experience) disparaged in the Gorgias,
by means of which cookery, for example, aims at producing pleasure,
without the use of reason, and without having considered the nature or
cause of pleasure (Grg. 501a3b1).42 Socrates art instead includes, but is
not limited to, the use of reason to consider what the natures and causes
of things might be, and to arrive at the conclusion that he lacks knowledge
about these matters.43 His ability to recognize his own lack of wisdom
(component (2) of the erotic art) is gained from his experience, as are the
four other components of this art. Socrates has experience in being devoted
to the daimon Eros or to ta erotika (component (1)), and in passionately
desiring to attain as much as he can of wisdom and other good things
(component (3)). His experience in searching for the wisdom he realizes
he lacks (component (4)) is represented in two different ways in the erotic
dialogues. First, the dialogues make frequent use of a pun on eran (to
love) and erotan (to question) in order to emphasize Socrates use of
human reasoning to examine and question (erotan) others.44 In so doing,
he strives, together with the people he questions, to attain the object of his
eros; that is, to become as wise and good as it is possible for him to become
(for example, Alc. 1 127e57). Second, Socrates searches by using certain
41 Cf. English adjective expert (from the Latin experior, to try or experience), used of someone
who has tried or experienced something: see Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. expert, adj
(accessed September 12, 2011).
42 Brickhouse and Smith 1994: 9 correctly deny that this kind of empeiria is necessary or sufficient for
the use of the elenchus.
43 See Resp. 9.582a45, where Plato writes that we judge by means of empeiria, phronesis and reason.
This passage was drawn to my attention by Frank 2007: 460.
44 Griswold 1986: 116, notes that Socrates erotic art ([Phdr.] 257a78) is the dialectical rhetoric that uses
the power of questioning to lead the soul to insights (emphasis in original); Reeve 2006a: 135 writes
of [t]he identification of the craft of love with that of asking questions, and Roochnik 1987: 128
states that the paradigmatic form of philosophical discourse is the question, which itself is erotic in
structure. I hold that the art of questioning is an important aspect of erotic art, but not identical
with it. On the connection between loving (eran) and questioning (erotan) see below, 2.3.4 and n.93.
Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues 17
god-given abilities, which do not depend on reasoning, to attain true belief.
He claims, for example, to have a god-given ability to recognize lovers and
beloveds (Lys. 204b7c2, discussed further in Chapter 2). Socrates also has
experience in exhorting others to acquire erotic art (component (5)). An
important aspect of his exhortation of others involves leading them to
recognize that they lack wisdom.45 In giving his demonstration of how to
produce friendliness in a beloved, Socrates leads Lysis to agree that Lysis
lacks wisdom (phronein) and needs a teacher (210d48). Moreover, the
Lysis ends in aporia about what the friend is (222e17). In the Alcibiades I,
Socrates shows his ambitious young beloved that he, Alcibiades, lacks self-
knowledge and needs to care for himself (for example, at 124b79, 127d6
8), while in the Symposium, Socrates induces Agathon to agree that he did
not know what he was talking about when he gave his speech about Eros
(201b1112), and he leads Alcibiades to be ashamed of his own deficiencies
(216a4b3). In the Phaedrus, Socrates shows his young interlocutor that the
speech of Phaedrus beloved, Lysias, is inferior in both content and style
(234c6235a8, 263d5264e3), thus implying that Phaedrus did not know
what he was talking about when he expressed admiration for it.
Socrates erotic art, then, is not craft-knowledge, but is instead erotic or
daimonic in that it, like its possessor, the daimon Eros in the Symposium,
is always in a state in between wisdom and ignorance.46 A passage in the
Cratylus (397d10398c4) supports interpreting this daimonic state as a kind
of skill that is based on experience rather than on knowledge of the truth.
Socrates begins his discussion of daimones, and heroes, and daimonic
humans47 by quoting Hesiods account of the daimones as the golden race
of humans who, after their death, become guardians of mortals. Hesiod,
he says, named them daimonas because they were wise [phronimoi] and
experienced [daemones] (398b67).48 In Homer, daemon means skilled,
experienced, and the verb dao means to acquire practical knowledge of
or skill in.49 This connection of daimon with daemon is appropriate to the
Eros of the Symposium. As the son of Resource (Poros: 203b3), Eros is a
schemer after the beautiful and good, courageous, impetuous, and intense,
a marvelously skilled hunter, always weaving new devices, both passionate
for wisdom and resourceful in looking for it, philosophizing through all his
45 This aspect of Socrates use of dialectic is well analyzed by Frede 1992: 210.
46 Cf. Roochnik 1996: 23940, Scott and Welton 2008.
47 My translation of 397d9e1 includes the words bracketed by Duke et al. 1995.
48 At 397e12398a2, Socrates quotes Hesiod, Op. 1213, with slight variations from our texts. On the
Cra. passage see Clay 1972 and 2000: 519; West 1979: 1534.
49 Cunliffe 1963.
18 Socrates Daimonic Art
life, a marvelously skilled magician, sorcerer, and sophist.50 Socrates, like
Eros, is daimonic in that he recognizes his own lack of wisdom, and has the
kind of art that allows him to be a marvelously skilled hunter for wisdom.
Like the daimones of the Cratylus, he is daemon, skilled or experienced.
55 On the setting of the dialogue see the excellent discussion of Ferrari 1987: 136.
56 Phaedrus explicitly states that they are alone in a deserted place and that he is younger than Socrates
(smn d mnw n rhm . . . g ka neterov: 236c8d1). According to Nails 2002: 232 Phaedrus
is in his mid-twenties.
57 Nails, 2006: 204 rightly notes, however, that there are some indications that the conversation is
overheard by non-participants: women and slaves.
20 Socrates Daimonic Art
at least temporarily, positive changes in others. His success is shown, in
part, by the eros or friendly feelings he arouses in his interlocutors. At
the end of the Alcibiades I, Alcibiades says that he will be Socrates atten-
dant (pedagogue) and begin to study justice. Socrates then speculates that
his own eros may have hatched a new eros in the young man (135d7e3).
Although Socrates expresses fears about his own future and that of Alci-
biades, he also states that he does not distrust Alcibiades nature (135e68).
The Lysis ends in aporia (impasse) about what the friend is, but within
this dialogue Socrates successfully demonstrates to Hippothales his ability
to create friendliness in a beloved (206c47 with 210e15). Lysis, the sub-
ject of the demonstration, is humbled by Socrates. Far from being angry,
however, Lysis addresses him in a friendly manner (211a3). By the end of
the dialogue, all of the interlocutors give the impression of being friends
with one another (223b57). In the Symposium, Agathon yields gracefully
to Socrates criticisms of his speech about Eros. When, in the final scene,
he gets up to sit next to Socrates in order to be praised by him, Agathon
clearly indicates that he does not object to receiving more of the same
kind of critical treatment (223a35). Alcibiades in this dialogue is benefited
at least temporarily by his association with Socrates, for he feels shame
and agrees with all that the philosopher says (215e7216b6). Moreover, the
behavior of Socrates that Alcibiades calls hybris (219c5) leads him to fall in
love with Socrates (222b34, c23), and Alcibiades warns Agathon against
doing so also (222b47).58 In the Phaedrus, Socrates interlocutor, Phae-
drus, seconds his prayer to Eros (sunecomai: 257b7) that both Phaedrus
and Lysias may turn their lives toward eros and philosophical words. At the
end of the dialogue, Phaedrus joins in another prayer made by Socrates,
this time to Pan, and remarks that friends have possessions in common
(279c67).
This is not to deny that Socrates success, as the examples just noted
make clear, is also due to his ability to arouse emotions very different from
friendliness. In showing his interlocutors that they lack the wisdom and
other good things they think they have, Socrates gives them a beneficial
humbling that is necessary for the removal of false beliefs and for the arousal
of love for wisdom.59 He acts, moreover, in ways that sometimes appear
to his interlocutors to be offensive, or even hubristic. In the Symposium,
58 I leave untranslated the Greek term hybris (often rendered as insolence) because its meaning is
controversial. See detailed discussion in Chapter 4 at 4.2.
59 Cf. the end of the Apology (41e142a2), where Socrates asks the jurors to give his sons the same
punishment Socrates has given the Athenians, if his sons appear to care more for wealth or anything
else than for virtue. On the beneficial effects of shame see further Chapter 1 at 1.2 and n.23.
Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues 21
both Agathon and Alcibiades tell Socrates: You are hubristic (bristv
e: 175e7, 215b7). Alcibiades compares the man to an hubristic satyr and
his words to the skin of an hubristic satyr (215b38, 221e24). Even though
they occur in a friendly and playful atmosphere, these accusations of hybris
highlight an important aspect of Socrates use of erotic skill in helping
others to acquire it also: his ability, like that of the daimonic satyr, to
arouse shame. Indeed, Alcibiades says that Socrates is the only one who
can cause him to feel shame (Symp. 216a8b3). Socrates gives Alcibiades a
similar humbling in Alcibiades I by, for example, showing the young man
that he knows even less than the women of his adversaries (124a57), and
that he is in the most shameful state (127d68). As a result, Alcibiades
says, just as he does in the Symposium: You are hubristic (Alc. I 114d7).
The humbling of Lysis in the company of his friends could also be seen as
offensive, and it makes Lysis lover, Hippothales, very uncomfortable (Lys.
210e56). In the Phaedrus, Socrates speaks disrespectfully of a speech that
was much admired by Phaedrus, thereby in effect showing the young man
that he did not know what he was talking about when he admired this
speech (234c6235a8).
Thus, my focus on Socrates erotic art helps to explain some puzzling
features of Platos Socrates. In the erotic dialogues, at least, Socrates is more
successful in persuading others, and more friendly towards them, than he
is often represented as being by those scholars who emphasize his use of
the harsh elenchus against adversaries.60 His friendliness, however, does
not prevent him from arousing painful emotions in those who require the
beneficial humbling that is conducive to their recognition of their own lack
of wisdom.
Not only does the youth of Socrates interlocutors contribute to his
comparative success in the erotic dialogues, it also helps us to understand
the emphasis on eros in these dialogues, as the next section will argue.
61 Eros and initiation: Seaford 1994: 2845, citing Soph. Aj. 6856 and 693 (frix rwti), Eur. Bacch.
813, and Platos Phdr. 251a. Philosophy as initiation: Morgan 1990 and 1992: esp. 235.
Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues 23
including the proper guidance of ordinary eros so that it becomes a power-
ful and positive motivational force in the search for the wisdom and beauty
that are the objects of Socratic eros. As Socrates says, there is no better
helper than Eros for human nature (Symp. 212b24).
Third, Socrates interlocutors in the erotic dialogues are passionate by
nature and deeply concerned with ordinary eros. These young men, unlike
the sophists in other dialogues, are capable of being motivated by ordi-
nary eros to strive to acquire Socratic eros for beauty and wisdom. It is
Alcibiades eros to acquire the greatest power, a power that he at first
mistakenly believes to be renown and tyranny (Alc. I 105c34, 124b46,
134e8135b5), that makes it possible for him to acquire eros for what is
truly the greatest power, namely, the power conferred by wisdom in the
form of self-knowledge and self-care. In the Symposium, Alcibiades pre-
occupation with ordinary eros is evident in his attempt to seduce Socrates
(217a219d), in the theme of his sexual jealousy of Socrates (213cd, 222c
223a), and in Aristodemus statement that Alcibiades still seems to be in
love with Socrates (222c23). This is so, even as Alcibiades description
of his own strong emotional reactions to Socrates philosophical words
(215e216c, 218a27) suggests that his passionate nature makes it possible
for him to be drawn, however temporarily, toward Socratic eros. Agathon,
who benefits greatly from his association with Socrates, is characterized by
Eryximachus as, like Socrates, marvelously skilled in ta erotika (Symp.
193e5). The young poets speech demonstrates his skill in praising an Eros
who is the patron of many activities, including the composition of love
poetry (196d6e6), that are erotic in the ordinary sense. The first two
speeches in the Phaedrus are evidence of the interest of both Socrates and
his interlocutor in ordinary eros. At the end of his second speech, Socrates
claims to have used erotike techne (257a78) in an attempt to lead Phaedrus
from his interest in ordinary eros to a life motivated by Socratic eros, just as
the lover within his speech is led by erotic enthusiasm from love of physical
beauty in this world to love of heavenly beauty. In the Lysis, Hippothales
eros for Lysis drives the dramatic action, in which Socrates demonstrates
his erotic skill by showing how a lover can become liked by his beloved
(206b9c7) if the two engage in the common search for the wisdom that
is the object of Socratic eros.
In the trial and death dialogues, in contrast, Socrates and his interlocutors
are preoccupied not with eros but with death. This difference is especially
evident in the use of initiation language in the Phaedo, where Socrates
compares true philosophers to initiates into the Mysteries who prepare
24 Socrates Daimonic Art
for a better afterlife (69d3e3, 81a89).62 The other three dialogues may
also be said to represent Socratic philosophy as a kind of initiation, in
a non-mystical sense, that prepares one to face death courageously. This
training for death (Phd. 81a12) emphasizes the avoidance of wrongdoing
rather than the passionate striving toward the objects of Socratic eros. These
different philosophical purposes of the two quartets help to explain why
eros is all but absent from the trial and death dialogues.
Socrates makes his defense in the Apology by emphasizing his lack of
wisdom about divine matters, his pious obedience to the divine, and the
ways in which he has benefited others. He thus resembles the Socrates
of the erotic dialogues in many respects. However, the absence of eros
from this dialogue corresponds to a notable difference in his philosophical
purposes.63 Socrates represents himself as devoted to a god very different
from the daimon Eros: Apollo, the god of the oracle, who is associated not
with passionate striving toward beauty and wisdom, but with the restraint
that comes from knowing ones own limits.64 Socrates is also obedient to his
daimonion, the divine voice that, like Apollo, urges restraint, and that may
in fact be the sign of Apollo.65 Unlike the daimon Eros in the Symposium,
who provides the impetus that moves lovers toward the objects of eros
(Symp. 203d48), the daimonion is a divine voice that always turns him
away (apotropei) from doing something wrong, and never turns him toward
(protrepei) anything (Ap. 31c8d4). Socrates claims, as he does in the erotic
dialogues, to lack wisdom of the kind only a god has (19b4c6, 20d9e2,
21b45, 23a5), and instead to possess a kind of human wisdom (20d79) that
consists in knowing that a human being is worth nothing with respect to
wisdom (21d48, 23b24). However, Socrates is not represented as eagerly
striving for the wisdom and beauty that he recognizes that he lacks, but
as searching more narrowly to discover what the oracle means (21b27,
e5), in obedience to Apollo (23b4c1, 29a4, 29d34, 30a57). This search
is not passionate striving, but a labor (pnouv: 22a68), undertaken
with great reluctance (mgiv pnu: 21b8), that has aroused hatred and
enmity (21de, 23a, 23e24a, 28ab) instead of the mutual philia Socrates
62 I am concerned here only with the fact that Plato uses the language of initiation in the Phaedo,
and am unable to consider many controversial issues. See Bussanich 2006; McPherran 1996: esp.
26871; Morgan 1990: 5579 and 1992; Peterson 2011: ch. 6.
63 Eros and cognates do not appear in the Apology.
64 The presence of Apollo is also felt in the Phaedo, in which the gods festival delays Socrates execution
(58bc), and Socrates calls himself the servant of Apollo (85a9b5), to whom he composes a hymn
(61b23). On the association of Apollo with Socrates see McPherran 1996: 166, 21718, 2269;
Morgan 1992: 231; Reeve 1989: 2837.
65 Bussanich 2006: 203; McPherran 1996: 137, 140.
Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues 25
common search creates in the erotic dialogues. Socrates represents himself
as skilled in, or at least uniquely fitted to conduct, this search when he
says that he himself is a gift from the god that cannot easily be replaced
(30d6e6). Socrates benefits others by means of his search, specifically by
helping them to recognize their own lack of wisdom and to be ashamed of
placing higher value on things that are in fact of lesser value (29d730c2).
In so doing, however, he does not represent himself as educating the young,
but as serving the god and providing the greatest good to the city (36c4).
In describing his obedience to Apollo, Socrates appropriately character-
izes himself not as an erotic, but as an heroic figure, explicitly comparing
himself to Homers Achilles (Ap. 28c1d4). Socrates avoids wrongdoing by
thinking little of death and danger, and placing the highest value on the
affairs of the god (21e24, 28b6c1), on justice (32e25), and on remaining
at the post where the god placed him (28e429a2). He cares nothing for
death, and everything about doing whatever he can to avoid acting unjustly
or impiously (32d14). An attitude more consistent with an erotic striving
toward what is both good and pleasant, appears, significantly, only after
the verdict, when Socrates looks fearlessly toward death and the possibility
of an afterlife. He then says that the greatest good for a human being in
this life is to converse about virtue (38a23), and that doing so in Hades
would be a great good, something not unpleasant, and an immeasurable
blessing (41c34). In living the philosophical life that has prepared him
to face death courageously, Socrates has also prepared himself to receive
blessings in the afterlife, if in fact the soul goes to another place after death
(40c610).
In the Euthyphro, Socrates search for wisdom is represented as moti-
vated not by Socratic eros, but by fear of acting impiously. Indeed, eros and
cognates are absent, as in the Apology, from discussions about the search
for wisdom.66 Socrates tells Euthyphro that Meletus has indicted Socrates
on the charge of corrupting the young by inventing new gods (3a9b4).
Socrates is well aware of the dangers to which this charge exposes him (3c6
e4). He shows no fear of death, however, but is instead deeply concerned, as
he has always been, with knowing about divine matters (5a67). What he
fears is acting impiously, through ignorance of these matters (15e516a4). To
avoid this great evil, Socrates claims that he desires (epithumo: 5c5) to learn
from Euthyphro.67 Euthyphro, Socrates says, clearly has knowledge about
66 It is disputed whether or not cognates of eros occur, at 14c4, in the context of a general remark
about leading and following. Duke et al. 1995 read rwtnta . . . rwtwmn; Burnet 1924, on
14c3 defends rnta . . . rwmn.
67 See also 5a39, 11e34, 12e15, 14b8c3, 14d46, 15c1116a4.
26 Socrates Daimonic Art
what is holy, because he has no fear (o fob) of doing something impious
when he prosecutes his own father (4e48). If he did not have this knowl-
edge, Socrates says, fear (deisav) of the gods and shame before humans
would have prevented him from taking the risk of doing something wrong
(15d48). Although his motivation differs, Socrates has characteristics that
are similar to those in the erotic dialogues. He is devoted to learning about
divine matters so as to avoid acting impiously. He also recognizes that
he lacks wisdom about divine matters, and he desires to obtain this wis-
dom (sophia: 14d4). In attempting to learn, Socrates uses the question and
answer method, in which he claims to have skill. When Euthyphro com-
plains that Euthyphro does not know how to say what he means, and that
Socrates makes Euthyphros statements move around (11b68), Socrates
replies that he must, then, be more marvelously skilled (deinoteros . . . ten
technen) than his ancestor Daedalus (11d34). Socrates uses his skill in a
vain attempt to help Euthyphro recognize that Euthyphro lacks wisdom
about what is holy, and so to experience fear and shame at the possibility
of wrongdoing.
In the Crito, Socrates friend Crito arrives at the prison to bring Socrates
the news that his death is imminent and to persuade him to flee (43c544c5).
This dialogue represents Socrates as using his reason to make a courageous
decision to avoid acting unjustly. He says that one should value living well
rather than merely living (48b45), and that death and suffering are of no
concern compared with doing injustice (48d36; cf. 54b35). In contrast to
the pain and grief of Crito, Socrates remains calm and fearless in the face
of death (43b3c8). He claims to revere and honor those arguments he has
followed in the past, arguments that have always persuaded him to obey
the reasoning that appears best to him. He cannot, he says, cast out these
arguments in his present circumstances, through fear of death (46b3c6).
Specifically, Socrates listens to and obeys the arguments telling him that it
is best to obey the laws of his country (50a54e), who are his parents and
masters (50e24). In so doing, Socrates indicates that he acts in obedience
to the divine, for he characterizes his country and its laws (51a25) as having
divine qualities, being more honored and revered and holy than father and
mother, in the eyes of gods and humans (51a9b4). The dialogue concludes:
Let us act in this way, since the god leads us in this way (54e12). The
Crito shows Socrates using his accustomed question and answer method,
when he answers the questions put to him by the Laws (50c910), and
persuades Crito that it would be unjust to escape.
Socrates, then, is portrayed in the Crito as devoted to the divine, in
that he obeys the laws of his country, which have divine qualities. His
recognition of his own lack of wisdom about justice and other virtues,
Introduction: overview of the erotic dialogues 27
and his search for wisdom about matters that do not directly concern his
present crisis, are not issues in this short and sharply focused dialogue.
Socrates is also portrayed as placing the highest value on avoiding injustice
and obeying the laws, as skilled in searching for what justice is in his present
circumstances, and as helping Crito to value acting justly, and to search
for what justice is by means of reasoning. Eros is never mentioned in this
dialogue concerned not with Socrates eager pursuit of wisdom and beauty,
but with his decision to turn away from doing injustice, even in the face
of death.68
In the Phaedo, Socrates companion, Phaedo, narrates the death of this
man whose practice of philosophy has prepared him to die fearlessly and
nobly (58e45). Socrates spends his last hours in philosophical conversa-
tion, just as he has done all his life. He notes that the topics of discussion,
death and the afterlife, are appropriate (prpei: 61e1; cf. 70b10c2) for
this occasion. The Phaedo, however, is exceptional among the trial and
death dialogues in using erotic terminology to refer to love for wisdom.
The argument shows, Socrates says, that only after death might we be
able to obtain that which we desire [piqumomn] and that of which we
say we are lovers [erastai]: wisdom [phronesis] (66e24). It would be very
illogical, he says, if the true philosophers, those who practice dying,
should fear to go where there is hope of obtaining that which they have
loved [rwn] throughout life and what they have loved [rwn] is wis-
dom (67e568a2). Someone truly loving [rn] wisdom, he says, and
who hopes to find it nowhere else than in Hades, will not grieve when he
dies (68a7b6).69
One explanation for this exceptional use of erotic vocabulary is that,
in the Phaedo, philosophy is explicitly compared to initiation into the
Mysteries, just as it is in the Phaedrus and Symposium, and, as noted
above, eros is associated with the Mysteries. The one who has practiced
philosophy correctly, Socrates says, is like the initiate into the Mystery
rites (teletas) who is described at Phaedo 69c3d3. This philosopher is not
profane and uninitiated (mhtov ka tlestov), but, being purified
(kekaqarmnov) and initiated (tetelesmnov), will dwell with the gods
after arriving in Hades. The account of eros and initiation in the Phaedo,
however, differs significantly from that of the Symposium and Phaedrus. In
the Phaedo, the initiate prepares not for a life devoted to eros together with
philosophical words (bon: Phdr. 257b6), but for death. Moreover, the eros
for physical beauty that is portrayed very positively in the erotic dialogues,
68 As is the case in the Apology, eros and cognates do not occur in the Crito.
69 Cognates of eros are also used in this dialogue to refer to ordinary eros associated with the body
(66c2, 81a7, b3), and to lovers reminded of their beloveds (73d6).
28 Socrates Daimonic Art
as preparatory to initiation into Socratic eros for true beauty, is represented
in the Phaedo as a hindrance to attaining the wisdom that is achieved only
by separation, or purification, of the soul from the human body (64c
69e), which fills us with (ordinary) eros, desire and fear, and thus prevents
us from hunting for the truth (66c14). The characteristics of Socrates
practice of philosophy in the Phaedo differ from their counterparts in the
erotic dialogues in large part because of this difference in the way in which
Socratic eros is represented. In the Phaedo, Socrates expresses and enacts his
devotion to the search for wisdom, a divine good that can be obtained, if
anywhere, only among the gods in Hades. He does not emphasize his own
lack of wisdom, but his statement that there is no hope of obtaining wisdom
anywhere else than in Hades (67e568b5) makes it clear that he recognizes
that he now lacks it, as does his exhortation to his interlocutors to examine
more closely the first assumptions of his arguments (107b46). Socrates
also has a passionate desire, called eros, to obtain wisdom of the kind that
results from purification of the soul from the body. He demonstrates his
skill in searching for wisdom by his use of the question and answer method
(78d12) to present a number of arguments for immortality. Socrates also
helps others, by argument and exhortation, to share his own devotion to
and desire for wisdom so as to do everything so as to participate in virtue
and wisdom in life (114c78), and thus to have hope of gaining a better
afterlife as well (107c1d5).
As he nears death, Socrates and his interlocutors turn away from life in
this world. He no longer needs a daimonic, erotic art that mediates, like
the daimon Eros, between mortals and gods, for he now speaks of the hope
of going to live not with mortals and daimones, but with gods, who do not
desire the wisdom they already possess (see Symp. 204a12, Lys. 218a24).