Coalition for Good Governance

7035 Marching Duck Drive E504

Charlotte, NC 28210
Marilyn@USCGG.org
704-552-1618

August 11, 2017

Dear Lilvender Bolton and Lincoln County Board of Elections:

The Coalition for Good Governance (CGG) represents electors across the state as
we advocate for fair and transparent elections. CGG urges you to employ hand-
counted paper ballots in the upcoming September 19 special election to ensure
accuracy and voter confidence in the election's results.

As you are no doubt aware, our nations election infrastructure has been under
attack by those who would manipulate election outcomes. The public deserves
provably accurate elections. Georgias voting computers are considered the least
secure and least reliable in the nation. No elections should be conducted on
Georgias hackable, uncertified, unverifiable and illegal voting computers. They
should be taken out of service immediately. For these reasons, we have recently
filed litigation seeking a court order to discontinue the use of the touchscreen
voting computers prior the states municipal elections in November.

In the court document (attached), we direct your attention particularly to Section

E beginning on page no. 55 (PDF page no. 71). You will see that these
touchscreen computers cannot meet Georgias statutes that set minimum
standards for safety and accuracy.

Please read the complaint noting particularly Exhibits F through J containing

voting system computer scientists expert opinions. These computer scientists are
nationally recognized experts on election systems. The contents of Exhibits F
through J are briefly noted below (see postscript for contents of the other
exhibits):

Exhibit F (beginning on PDF page no. 165)Affidavit of Edward W.

Felten, Princeton University computer science professor, on his research
concerning the vulnerabilities of Diebold voting machines used by Georgia
Exhibit G (beginning on PDF page no. 184)Affidavit of Duncan A. Buell,
University of South Carolina computer science professor, on his research
concerning the vulnerabilities of Diebold voting machines used by
Georgia.
Exhibit H (beginning on PDF page no. 193)Declaration of Barbara
Simons, computer scientist, formerly with IBM Research and now
president of Verified Voting (among other pertinent credentials), on

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 research concerning possible hacking and other vulnerabilities in
Georgia's system and detailing her efforts to have Georgia use paper
ballots for the June 20 election (Simons mentions Exhibits A, B, and C. A
is her curriculum vitae, which follows her declaration. B is the March 15th
letter here presented as Exhibit I. C is the May 24th letter here presented
as Exhibit J.)
Exhibit I (beginning on PDF page no. 208)March 15th letter to Secretary
Brian Kemp from expert computer scientists around the country asking
him to direct the state to use paper ballots and paper pollbooks for the
June 20 election.
Exhibit J (beginning on PDF page no. 212)May 24th letter to Secretary
Brian Kemp from expert computer scientists around the country escalating
and re-emphasizing their previous requests, providing more information
especially about the FBI's investigation, and requesting that manual post-
election audits be instituted (which require paper ballots)

These experts are joined by virtually all other experts in the county with
unanimous agreement that the methods of vote capture and tallying on Georgia's
voting computers cannot be relied on to be accurate. If errors occur, it is rare that
they can even be detected. Thus errors due to procedural and/or software
problems, whether honest mistakes or the result of hacking, can result in
outcomes counter to the voters choices.

Georgia officials and voters have been misled by state officials who frequently
claim, we have never had significant problems with these machines. In truth,
officials dont know whether there have been any problems, significant or trivial,
because there is no way to effectively check these voting computers for accuracy.
They are unauditable. Georgias system is particularly vulnerable because the
Center for Election Systems at Kennesaw State left its servers and all files
including password assignments open for months or possibly years to anyone
with Internet access.
(http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/14/will-the-georgia-special-
election-get-hacked-215255). See affidavit concerning discovery of this dangerous
security lapse (Exhibit A in the attachment, beginning on PDF page no. 139).
Other related documents are provided in Exhibits B through E (briefly
summarized below).

It is the responsibility of the Board to employ a voting scheme that is secure and
accurate and meets the requirements of the state law. Georgias touchscreen
voting computers cannot meet any of those essential requirements. The Board
has the authority under the Georgia Election Code (21-2-281 and 21-2-334) to
use hand-counted paper ballots when it is impracticable to use the voting
computers. It is obviously impracticable to use voting computers that cannot
meet the most basic requirements of security and accuracy or the election laws of
Georgia.

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With the special election more than a month away, the board has the opportunity
and responsibility to avoid a contentious and challenged outcome by employing a
simple option permitted in Georgia lawhand-counted paper ballotsthat will
build voter confidence.

We are happy to provide more information if it would be helpful.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Marilyn Marks
Executive Director, Coalition for Good Governance

P.S. Here are brief summaries of the other exhibits:

Exhibits A through E cover the discovery and belated removal of Georgia's voter
registration and other election data including passwords from a computer system
openly accessible via the Internet:

Exhibit A (beginning on PDF page no. 139)Affidavit of Logan Lamb,

cybersecurity researcher based in Atlanta who first found that Georgia had
an election-related computer system that was open to the Internet
Exhibit B (beginning on PDF page no. 145) FBI memo expressing
concerns that election data stored in Internet-accessible computers is
subject to hacking
Exhibit C (beginning on PDF page no. 152)Kennesaw State University
emails on March 1 concerning reaction to exposed vulnerability of
Georgia's election-related data
Exhibit D (beginning on PDF page no. 156)Information Security Office at
Kennesaw State University summary of security actions taken and list of
problem areas
Exhibit E (beginning on PDF page no. 161)Kennesaw State University
emails on March 4 concerning delay since March 1 for closing the exposed
vulnerability of Georgia's election-related data

Exhibits K through N show certification documents, a letter from the Office of the
Secretary of State denying citizens' rights under Georgia statute to have the
voting system reexamined, voters' requests for recanvassing, and request by
Rocky Mountain Foundation (our previous name), that Fulton County not certify
the election results:

Exhibit K (beginning on PDF page no. 217)Certifications by various

secretaries of state

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 Exhibit L (beginning on PDF page no. 229)Response by Office of the
Secretary of State to request to reexamine the voting system
Exhibit M (beginning on PDF page no. 232)George Balbona's and
others' June 26th request for recanvass by electors of the memory cards
(PCMCIA cards) for precincts in DeKalb and Cobb counties
Exhibit N (beginning on PDF page no. 239)Marilyn Marks's detailed
June 24th request that Fulton County not certify the June 20 election
results

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