JESUS C. GARCIA vs.THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T.
DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial him of his affair, he forbade her to hold office. This deprived her of access to full information
Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of
minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA
G.R. No. 179267
June 25, 2013
CONCURRING OPINIONS
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
ISSUE: Constitutionality of RA 9262
WON R.A. NO. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) appears to have inflicted violence against private
respondents. Petitioner admitted having an affair with a bank manager. He callously
boasted about their sexual relations to the household help. His infidelity emotionally
wounded private respondent. Their quarrels left her with bruises and hematoma. Petitioner
also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann, whom he blamed for squealing on him.
All these drove respondent Rosalie Garcia(wife) to despair causing her to attempt suicide on
December 17, 2005 b y slitting her wrist. Instead of taking her to the hospital, petitioner left
the house. He never visited her when she was confined for seven (7) days. He even told his
mother-in-law that respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not
cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.
The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he
would take away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if
she pursued legal battle, she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted
about their businesses.
Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence
against respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders
(TPO) ordering petitioner, among other things, to surrender all his firearms including a
.9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK.
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of RA 9262 for
1. making a gender-based classification, thus, providing remedies only to wives/women
and not to husbands/men.
2. He claims that even the title of the law, "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and
Their Children" is already sex-discriminatory because it means violence by men against
women.
3. The law also does not include violence committed by women against children and
other women.
4. He adds that gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the
remedies under it because its avowed purpose is to curb and punish spousal violence. The
said remedies are discriminatory against the husband/male gender.
5. There being no reasonable difference between an abused husband and an abused
wife, theequal protection guarantee is violated.
Important and Essential Governmental Objectives:
1. Safeguard Human Rights,
2. Ensure Gender Equality and
3. Empower Women
International Laws
By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to ensure that human rights and
fundamental freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone.
1. It was one of the countries that voted in favor of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR). In addition, the Philippines is a signatory to many United Nations human
rights treaties such as the
2. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
3. the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
4. Convention Against Torture, and the
5. Convention on the Rights of the Child, among others.
UDHR
As a signatory to the UDHR, the Philippines pledged itself to achieve the promotion of
universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, keeping in
mind the standards under the Declaration. Among the standards under the UDHR are the
following:
Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
xxxx
Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal
protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in
violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.
Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.
Declaration of Policy in RA 9262
enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is to fulfill the governments obligation
to safeguard the dignity and human rights of women and children by providing effective
remedies against domestic violence or physical, psychological, and other forms of abuse
perpetuated by the husband, partner, or father of the victim.
The said law is also viewed within the context of the constitutional mandate to ensure
gender equality, which is quoted as follows:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
HELD:
RA 9262 is NOT UNCONSITUTIONAL.
1. RA 9262 - compliance with the CEDAW
It has been acknowledged that "gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that
seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with
men." RA 9262 can be viewed therefore as the Philippines compliance with
the CEDAW, which is committed to condemn discrimination against women and directs its
members to undertake, without delay, all appropriate means to eliminate discrimination
against women in all forms both in law and in practice.
CEDAW
Known as the International Bill of Rights of Women, the CEDAW is the central and most
comprehensive document for the advancement of the welfare of women. The CEDAW, in its
preamble, explicitly acknowledges the existence of extensive discrimination against women,
and emphasized that such is a violation of the principles of equality of rights and respect for
human dignity.

2. Philippines obligation as state-party to CEDAW
The Philippines is under legal obligation to ensure their development and advancement for
the improvement of their position from one of de jure as well as de facto equality with men.
The CEDAW, going beyond the concept of discrimination used in many legal standards and
norms, focuses on discrimination against women, with the emphasis that women have
suffered and are continuing to suffer from various forms of discrimination on account of
their biological sex.
The governmental objectives of protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, which
includespromoting gender equality and empowering women, as mandated not only by
our Constitution, but also by commitments we have made in the international sphere, are
undeniably important and essential.
RA 9262 provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who are victims of
violence, which are often reported to have been committed not by strangers, but by a father
or a husband or a person with whom the victim has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
3. The Gender-Based Classification in RA 9262 is Substantially Related to the
Achievement of Governmental Objectives
Historical Perspective:
A foreign history professor noted that: "from the earliest civilizations on,
the subjugation of women, in the form of violence, were facts of life,
Judeo-Christian religious ideas; Greek philosophy; and the Common Law Legal Code:
all "assumed patriarchy as natural; that is, male domination stemming from the view of
male superiority."
18th century legal expert William Blackstone, reflected the theological assumption
that: husband and wife were one body before God; thus "they were one person under the
law, and that one person was the husband," a concept that evidently found its way in some
of our Civil Code provisions prior to the enactment of the Family Code.
Society and tradition dictate that the culture of patriarchy continues. Men are
expected to take on the dominant roles both in the community and in the family. This
perception naturally leads to men gaining more power over women power, which must
necessarily be controlled and maintained. Violence against women is one of the ways men
control women to retain such power.
In ancient western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under
the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his
wife if she endangered his property right over her.
Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family
strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women.
However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began
to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule
of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than
their thumb.
Statistics:
The enactment of RA 9262 was in response to the undeniable numerous cases involving
violence committed against women in the Philippines.
In 2012, the Philippine National Police (PNP) reported that 65% or 11,531 out of
15,969 cases involving violence against women were filed under RA 9262.
From 2004 to 2012, violations of RA. 9262 ranked first among the different categories
of violence committed against women. The number of reported cases showed an increasing
trend from 2004 to 2012,
The law recognizes, with valid factual support based on statistics that women and
children are the most vulnerable victims of violence, and therefore need legal intervention.
On the other hand, there is a dearth of empirical basis to anchor a conclusion that men
need legal protection from violence perpetuated by women.
4. Different treatment of women and men based on biological, social, and cultural
differences
The persistent and existing biological, social, and cultural differences between women and
men prescribe that they be treated differently under particular conditions in order to
achieve substantive equality for women. Thus, the disadvantaged position of a woman as
compared to a man requires the special protection of the law, as gleaned from the following
recommendations of the CEDAWCommittee:
The Convention requires that women be given an equal start and that they be
empowered by an enabling environment to achieve equality of results. It is not enough to
guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather, biological as well as
socially and culturally constructed differences between women and men must be taken into
account. Under certain circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be
required in order to address such differences. Pursuit of the goal of substantive equality also
calls for an effective strategy aimed at overcoming under representation of women and a
redistribution of resources and power between men and women.
Equality of results is the logical corollary of de facto or substantive equality. These
results may be quantitative and/or qualitative in nature; that is, women enjoying their rights
in various fields in fairly equal numbers with men, enjoying the same income levels, equality
in decision-making and political influence, and women enjoying freedom from violence.
The governments commitment to ensure that the status of a woman in all spheres of her
life are parallel to that of a man, requires the adoption and implementation of ameliorative
measures, such as RA 9262. Unless the woman is guaranteed that the violence that she
endures in her private affairs will not be ignored by the government, which is committed to
uplift her to her rightful place as a human being, then she can neither achieve substantive
equality nor be empowered.
5. RA 9262 justified under the Constitution
The Constitution abundantly authorize Congress or the government to actively undertake
ameliorative action that would remedy existing inequalities and inequities experienced by
women and children brought about by years of discrimination. The equal protection clause
when juxtaposed to this provision provides a stronger mandate for the government to
combat such discrimination. Indeed, these provisions order Congress to "give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and remove cultural
inequities."
RA 9262 is THE ameliorative action
In enacting R.A. 9262, Congress has taken an ameliorative action that would address
the evil effects of the social model of patriarchy, a pattern that is deeply embedded in the
societys subconscious, on Filipino women and children and elevate their status as human
beings on thesame level as the father or the husband.
R.A. 9262 aims to put a stop to the cycle of male abuses borne of discrimination
against women. It is an ameliorative measure, not a form of "reverse discrimination"
against.Ameliorative action "is not an exception to equality, but an expression and
attainment of de facto equality, the genuine and substantive equality which the Filipino
people themselves enshrined as a goal of the 1987 Constitution." Ameliorative measures are
necessary as a redistributive mechanism in an unequal society to achieve substantive
equality.
Ameliorative measures to achieve substantive equality
In the context of womens rights, substantive equality has been defined by the Convention
on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as equality which
requires that women be given an equal start and that they be empowered by an enabling
environment to achieve equality of results. It is not enough to guarantee women treatment
that is identical to that of men. Rather, biological as well as socially and culturally
constructed differences between women and men must be taken into account. Under
certain circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be required in order
to address such differences.
Womens struggle for equality with men has evolved under three models:
1. Formal equality - women and men are to be regarded and treated as the same. But this
model does not take into account biological and socially constructed differences between
women and men. By failing to take into account these differences, a formal equality
approach may in fact perpetuate discrimination and disadvantage.
2. Protectionist model this recognizes differences between women and men but
considerswomens weakness as the rationale for different treatment. This approach
reinforces the inferior status of women and does not address the issue of discrimination of
women on account of their gender.
3. Substantive equality model this assumes that women are "not vulnerable by nature,
but suffer from imposed disadvantage" and that "if these imposed disadvantages were
eliminated, there was no further need for protection." Thus, the substantive equality model
gives prime importance to womens contexts, realities, and experiences, and the
outcomes or results of acts and measures directed, at or affecting them, with a view to
eliminating the disadvantages they experience as women.
6. The gender-based classification of RA 9262 does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause(application of the substantive equality model)
The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition
against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is
justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the
state to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social,
and culturally endowed differences between men and women.
The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection
clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
Justice Brion: As traditionally viewed, the constitutional provision of equal protection simply
requires that similarly situated persons be treated in the same way. It does not connote
identity of rights among individuals, nor does it require that every person is treated
identically in all circumstances. It acts as a safeguard to ensure that State-drawn distinctions
among persons are based on reasonable classifications and made pursuant to a proper
governmental purpose. In short, statutory classifications are not unconstitutional when
shown to be reasonable and made pursuant to a legitimate government objective.
R.A. No. 9262 as a measure intended to strengthen the family. Congress found that
domestic and other forms of violence against women and children contribute to the failure
to unify and strengthen family ties, thereby impeding the States mandate to actively
promote the familys total development. Congress also found, as a reality, that women and
children are more susceptible to domestic and other forms of violence due to, among
others, the pervasive bias and prejudice against women and the stereotyping of roles within
the family environment that traditionally exist in Philippine society. On this basis, Congress
found it necessary to recognize the substantial distinction within the family between men,
on the one hand, and women and children, on the other hand. This recognition, incidentally,
is not the first to be made in the laws as our law on persons and family under the Civil Code
also recognize, in various ways, the distinctions between men and women in the context of
the family.
Justice Leonen: It may be said that violence in the context of intimate relationships should
not be seen and encrusted as a gender issue; rather, it is a power issue.

By concurring with these statements I express a hope: that the normative constitutional
RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are
requirements of human dignity and fundamental equality can become descriptive reality.
vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental
The socially constructed distinctions between women and men that have afflicted us and
objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women.
spawned discrimination and violence should be eradicated sooner. Power and intimacy
The gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of
should not co-exist.
women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such
objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny.
The intimate spaces created by our human relationships are our safe havens from the helter
skelter of this world. It is in that space where we grow in the safety of the special other who
we hope will be there for our entire lifetime. If that is not possible, then for such time as will
be sufficient to create cherished memories enough to last for eternity.

I concur in the ponencia. Against abominable acts, let this law take its full course.

Justice Abad: RA 9262 is a historic step in the Filipino women's long struggle to be freed
from a long-held belief that men are entitled, when displeased or minded, to hit their wives
or partners and their children. This law institutionalizes prompt community response to this
violent behavior through barangay officials who can command the man to immediately
desist from harming his home partner and their children. It also establishes domestic
violence as a crime, not only against its victims but against society as well. No longer is
domestic violence lightly dismissed as a case of marital dispute that law enforcers ought not
to get into.

Chief Justice Puno on Expanded Equal protection and Substantive Equality

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno espouses that the equal protection clause can no longer be
interpreted as only a guarantee of formal equality but of substantive equality. "It ought to
be construed in consonance with social justice as the heart particularly of the 1987
Constitutiona transformative covenant in which the Filipino people agreed to
enshrine asymmetrical equality to uplift disadvantaged groups and build a genuinely
egalitarian democracy." This means that the weak, including women in relation to men, can
be treated with a measure of bias that they may cease to be weak.

Chief Justice Puno goes on: "The Expanded Equal Protection Clause, anchored on the human
rights rationale, is designed as a weapon against the indignity of discrimination so that in
the patently unequal Philippine society, each person may be restored to his or her rightful
position as a person with equal moral status."
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a
Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An
Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures
for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She claimed to be a
victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set
forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO
ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner
failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance
to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an
axercise in futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO
on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being an unwanted product of
an invalid law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for
failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the
petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted
collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes
a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory,
unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due
process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to
protect the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it
allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction,
inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority
and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the
pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be
considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers
Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not
limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class.
Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection
clause by favouring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate
extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have
in support of ones defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative
of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners contention that by
not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum
of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator.
This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any
branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer
the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a
judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy.
Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive
function. The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 181973 April 17, 2013
AMELIA AQUINO, RODOLFO TAGGUEG, JR.,* ADELAIDA HERNANDEZ and LEOPOLDO
BISCOCHO, JR.,Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
praying that the Decision2 dated 29 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 91743 be set aside. In the assailed decision, the CA reversed the 10 August 2005
Decision3 and 15 September 2005 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 55,
Manila.
Background of the case
The Congress of the Philippines passed on 21 August 19895 Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758
entitled "An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification in the
Government and for Other Purposes" otherwise known as The Salary Standardization Law.
Before the law, or on 31 August 1979, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of
Implementation No. 97 (LOI No. 97), authorizing the implementation of standard
compensation position classification plans for the infrastructure/utilities group of
government-owned or controlled corporations. On the basis thereof, the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA) issued Memorandum Circular No. 57-87 dated 1 October 1987 which
granted to its officials holding managerial and supervisory positions representation and
transportation allowance (RATA) in an amount equivalent to 40% of their basic salary.6
Thereafter, on 23 October 1989, PPA issued Memorandum Circular No. 36-89, which
extended the RATA entitlement to its Section Chiefs or heads of equivalent units, Terminal
Supervisors and senior personnel at the rate of 20% of their basic pay.7 And, on 14
November 1990, PPA issued Memorandum Circular No. 46-90, which adjusted effective 1
January 1990, the RATA authorized under Memorandum Circular No. 36-89, from 20% to
40% based on the standardized salary rate.8
The continued validity of the RATA grant to the maximum ceiling of 40% of basic pay finds
support from the Opinions9 rendered by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC), Department of Justice.
Finding justification in the increase in salary due these officials brought about by the
standardization mandated by R.A. No. 6758, PPA paid RATA differentials to its officials.
The Commission on Audit (COA) Corporate Auditor, however, in a letter dated 14 November
1990, addressed to PPA, disallowed in post-audit the payment of the RATA differentials. It
likewise disallowed in audit the grant of RATA to PPA Section Chiefs or heads of equivalent
units, Terminal Supervisors and senior personnel occupying positions with salary grades of
17 and above who were appointed after the effectivity of R.A. No. 6758.
The COA called PPAs attention to Memorandum No. 90-679 dated 30 October 1990 which
provides that "LOImp No. 97 series of 1979 implementing Compensation and Position
Classification for Infrastructure/Utilities for GOCC is replaced by Section 16 of R.A. No.
6758."10
In view of the disallowances, the affected PPA officials, represented by the OGCC, filed a
petition before the Supreme Court claiming their entitlement to the RATA provided for
under LOI No. 97. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 100773 entitled "Philippine Ports
Authority v. Commission on Audit, et al."11
In a decision dated 16 October 1992, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the COA and
declared that an official to be entitled to the continued RATA benefit under LOI No. 97 must
be an incumbent as of 1 July 1989 and more importantly, was receiving the RATA provided
by LOI No. 97 as of 1 July 1989.
As a result of the aforesaid ruling, there are at present two categories of managers and
supervisors at the PPA. The first category is composed of PPA officials who were occupying
their positions and actually receiving the 40% RATA under LOI No. 97 as of 1 July 1989 and
who continue to receive such benefit. The second category consists of officials who were
not incumbents as of 1 July 1989 or were appointed or promoted to their positions only
after 1 July 1989. The second category officials therefore receive a lesser RATA under the
General Appropriations Act although they hold the same rank, title and may have the same
responsibilities as their counterparts in the first category.
The Case
On 26 July 2000, petitioners, who are second category PPA officials filed a Petition for
Mandamus and Prohibition before the RTC of Manila, raffled to Branch 55. They claim anew
that they are entitled to RATA in the amount not exceeding 40% of their respective basic
salaries. They anchor their petition on recent developments allegedly brought about by the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of De Jesus v. Commission on Audit, et al.12which
was decided almost six (6) years after the Courts decision in PPA v. COA, et al.13 They
further claim that certain issuances were released by the COA and the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM), which in effect, extended the cut-off date in the grant of
the 40% RATA, thus entitling them to these benefits.
PPA filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata under paragraph (f), Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court. It argued that a case involving the same parties, subject matter and
cause of action had already been resolved by this Court in PPA v. COA, et al.14
Finding merit in PPAs motion, the RTC ordered the dismissal of the petition in an Order
dated 8 November 2000. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and the
Petition in this case is hereby DISMISSED on the ground that it is already barred by the
principle of res judicata.15
Petitioners elevated the case before the Supreme Court by way of appeal under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court, however, in a Resolution16 dated 28 March 2001
referred the case to the CA for appropriate action. The case was docketed as CA G.R. SP No.
64702.
On 31 July 2002, a decision was rendered by the CA on the referred case. It declared that
the principle of res judicata is not applicable to the case. The appellate court explained that
the existence of DBM and COA issuances which entitle herein petitioners to the grant of
RATA is the pertinent fact and condition which is material to the instant case taking it away
from the domain of the principle of res judicata.17 When new facts or conditions intervene
before the second suit, furnishing a new basis for the claims and defenses of the party, the
issues are no longer the same; hence, the former judgment cannot be pleaded as a bar to
the subsequent action.18 At the time judgment was rendered in the previous case, the fact
and condition now in existence, which consist of the DBM and COA issuances, has not yet
come about. In view of the issuances, petitioners are faced with an entirely separate facts
and conditions, which make the principle of res judicata inapplicable.19 The decision ordered
the remand of the case to the court of origin for continuation of proceedings.
After due proceedings in the trial court, a decision in favor of petitioners was rendered on
10 August 2005. The dispositive portion of the decision commanded respondent PPA to pay
the claim for RATA equivalent to 40% of petitioners standardized basic salaries authorized
under LOI No. 97, commencing from their respective dates of appointments or on 23
October 2001 when the case of Irene V. Cruz, et al. v. COA20 was promulgated by the
Supreme Court, whichever is later.
The trial court ratiocinated that "when the Supreme Court En Banc ruled on 23 October
2001 in the IRENE CRUZ case that The date of hiring of an employee cannot be considered
as a substantial distinction, the so-called first (sic) category managers and supervisors
whose appointments thereto were made after 01 July 1989 and who were effectively
deprived of the 40% RATA on account of the Supreme Courts ruling in the PPA v. COA, et al.
case have established a clear legal right to claim the 40% RATA under LOI No. 97
commencing on 23 October 2001, and the correlative legal duty of respondent PPA to pay
the same; thus, entitling petitioners who are qualified to avail of the extraordinary remedy
of mandamus."21
PPA raised the matter before the CA which docketed the case as CA G.R. SP No. 91743. In a
decision dated 29 August 2007, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court
and held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the August 10, 2005 Decision and the September 15,
2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, National Capital Judicial Region, Manila,
are hereby REVERSED. Accordingly, the Amended Petition in Civil Case No. 00-98161 is
hereby DISMISSED. No costs.22
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the appellate court in a
resolution dated 29 February 2008.
Hence, this petition assailing the 29 August 2007 decision of the CA and its 29 February 2008
resolution.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE
TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FINAL DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA. G.R.
SP NO. 64702.
II. WHETHER OR NOT PPA IN DENYING THE CLAIM OF PETITIONERS FOR 40% RATA HAS
COMMITTED A VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION; AND
III. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO 40% RATA AND SHOULD NOT BE
MADE TO REFUND THE RATA THEY HAD ALREADY RECEIVED.
Petitioners Argument
Petitioners submit that the decision of the CA in CA G.R. SP No. 64702 adequately cited
jurisprudence and authorities on the matter involving the issue of res judicata. Such decision
of the appellate court was not appealed by the PPA and as such, has attained finality. In
view thereof, petitioners allege that the case of PPA v. COA, et al.23 can no longer serve as a
ground for the dismissal of the instant case since such would result in "the sacrifice of
justice to technicality."24
Petitioners further submit that the CA in its decision in CA G.R. SP No. 91743 may have
overlooked the significance of the Supreme Courts ruling in the case of De Jesus v.
Commission on Audit, et al.25 which extended the prescribed date of effectivity of R.A. No.
6758 from 1 July 1989 to 31 October 1989, viz:
In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which
completely disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to
government officials and employees starting November 1, 1989 is not a mere interpretative
or internal regulation. It is something more than that. And why not, when it tends to deprive
government workers of their allowances and additional compensation sorely needed to
keep body and soul together. x x x
Petitioners claim that the DBM, which is the agency tasked to implement R.A. No. 6758,
amplified this extension in its 4 May 1992 letter to the Administrator of the National
Electrification Administration (NEA). The pertinent portion of the letter reads:
DBM has authorized certain GOCCs/GFIs to grant also to officials and employees hired
between the period of July 1, 1989 and October 31, 1989 the allowances and fringe benefit
enumerated in said Item 5.5 of CCC No. 10.
At this juncture it is pertinent to point out that although the effectivity date prescribed in
R.A. No. 6758 is July 1, 1989, said Act and its implementing circulars were formally
promulgated only in the later part of October 1989. The preparation of all required
documents, more particularly the Index of Occupational Services (IOS) and the Position
Allocation List (PAL) for the GOCCs/GFIs was completed at much later date. Thus, within the
period of transition from July 1, 1989 up to the date of completion of all the required
documents for the actual implementation by each GOCC/GFI of said salary standardization,
flexibility in the interpretation of rules and regulations prescribed under R.A. 6758 was
necessary. DBM felt it illogical to assume that during the period R.A. 6758 was not yet issued
all GOCCs/GFIs were already aware of what implementing guidelines it (DBM) will prescribe
and have their personnel actions accordingly adjusted to said guidelines. Likewise, it is
counter-productive if at that time, we advised all GOCCs/GFIs to suspend their personnel
actions as same could be disruptive to their operations and delay the completion of
important projects.
Premised on the above considerations, we maintain the position that our action allowing
officials and employees hired between the period of July 1, 1989 and October 31, 1989 to be
paid allowances under Item No. 5.5 of CCC No. 10 is logically tenable and reasonable since
same was made during the "transitory period" from the old system to the new system.26
They further claim that even the COA took cognizance of this extension in the
memorandum27 issued by the officer-in-charge of the COA Audit Office, to wit:
Moreover, this office gives much weight to the position of the Secretary, DBM in his letter to
the Administrator, NEA, dated October 30, 1993 that the cut-off date of July 1, 1989
prescribed in R.A. 6758/CCC #10 was extended to October 31, 1989 primarily on
consideration that said R.A. 6758/CCC #10 were formally issued/promulgated only in the
later part of October 1989. x x x
Petitioners likewise raised as their cause of action the violation of their constitutional right
to equal protection of the law. They contend that this alone would constitute sufficient
justification for the filing anew of the instant petition. Contrary to the statement in the
assailed decision of the CA to the effect that they failed to plead or raise such issue in the
trial court, they submit that a perusal of their amended petition would show that
paragraphs 30, 31, 32 and 33 thereof were devoted to that issue.
Finally, as regards the matter of refund of the RATA being demanded by COA, petitioners
submit that they should not be required to make such refund since these were received in
good faith and on the honest belief that they were entitled to it.
PPAs Argument
Respondent PPA maintains that PPA employees who were appointed to managerial and
supervisory positions after the effectivity of RA No. 6758 are not entitled to the 40% RATA
benefit provided under LOI No. 97. Consistent with the ruling of the Court in PPA v. COA, et
al.,28 respondent PPA contends that only the first category officials or those who were
granted and were receiving RATA equivalent to 40% of their salaries prior to 1 July 1989 are
entitled to such benefits. Petitioners who are included in the second category officials or
those who are not incumbents as of 1 July 1989 are not entitled to the 40% RATA benefit
provided under LOI No. 97.
Our Ruling
There is merit in petitioners argument that their petition should not be dismissed on the
ground of res judicata since this is based on jurisprudence and issuances not yet in existence
at the time of the promulgation of the Courts decision in PPA v. COA, et al.29 Petitioners are,
however, incorrect in their contention that the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP
No. 64702 which was not appealed by the PPA has become final and as such, barred the
appellate courts subsequent ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 91743.
We note that when the petition was elevated to the CA in the first instance in CA-G.R. SP
No. 64702, the matter submitted to be resolved by the appellate court was simply the issue
on whether the trial court was correct in granting the motion to dismiss and in declaring
that the case is barred by the principle of res judicata. Despite the non-appeal by PPA of the
appellate courts ruling that res judicata is not applicable, the case did not attain finality in
view of the order of the CA remanding the case to the trial court for continuation of hearing.
The appellate courts ruling in CA G.R. SP No. 91743, therefore, was not barred by the ruling
in CA G.R. SP No. 64702 since the ruling in the second instance was already a ruling after
trial on the merits.
Although the principle of res judicata is not applicable, the petition must still fail because
our ruling must adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis. In Chinese Young Men's Christian
Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation,30 the Court expounded
on the importance of this doctrine in securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions,
thus:
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice
that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it
will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and
disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a
conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first
principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought
to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been
put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a
competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
issue. (Emphasis supplied)
The issues raised by petitioners are no longer novel. In a catena of Cases31 promulgated
after De Jesus v. COA32 and Cruz v. COA,33 this Court has ruled that the pronouncement it
has established in the earlier case of PPA v. COA, et al.34 with regard to the interpretation
and application of Section 12 of RA 6758 is still applicable. The subsequent decisions
maintained that allowances or fringe benefits, whether or not integrated into the
standardized salaries prescribed by R.A. 6758, should continue to be enjoyed only by
employees who (1) were incumbents and (2) were receiving those benefits as of 1 July 1989.
In those cases, the Court reiterated that the intention of the framers of the law was to
phase out certain allowances and privileges gradually, without upsetting the principle of
non-diminution of pay. The intention of Section 12 to protect incumbents who were already
receiving those allowances on 1 July 1989, when RA 6758 took effect was emphasized thus:
An incumbent is a person who is in present possession of an office.
The consequential outcome, under sections 12 and 17, is that if the incumbent resigns or is
promoted to a higher position, his successor is no longer entitled to his predecessors RATA
privilege x x x or to the transition allowance.
Finally, to explain what July 1, 1989 pertained to, we held in the same case as follows:
x x x. The date July 1, 1989 becomes crucial only to determine that as of said date, the
officer was an incumbent and was receiving the RATA, for purposes of entitling him to its
continued grant. x x x.
In Philippine International Trading Corporation v. COA, the Court confirmed the legislative
intention in this wise:
x x x There was no intention on the part of the legislature to revoke existing benefits being
enjoyed by incumbents of government positions at the time of the passage of RA 6758 by
virtue of Sections 12 and 17 thereof. x x x.
The Court stressed that in reserving the benefits to incumbents alone, the legislatures
intention was not only to adhere to the policy of non-diminution of pay, but also to be
consistent with the prospective application of laws and the spirit of fairness and
justice.35 (Emphasis omitted)
xxxx
The disquisition of the Court in Philippine National Bank v. Palma36 is instructive, viz:
The reliance of the court a quo on Cruz v. COA is misplaced. It was held in that case that the
specific date of hiring, October 31, 1989, had been not only arbitrarily determined by the
COA, but also used as an unreasonable and unsubstantial basis for awarding allowances to
employees. The basis for the Courts ruling was not primarily the resulting disparity in
salaries received for the same work rendered but, more important, the absence of a
distinction in the law that allowed the grant of such benefits -- between those hired before
and those after the said date.
Thus, setting a particular date as a distinction was nullified, not because it was
constitutionally infirm or was against the "equal pay for equal work" policy of RA 6758.
Rather, the reason was that the COA had acted without or in excess of its authority in
arbitrarily choosing October 31, 1989, as the cutoff date for according the allowances. It was
explained that "when the law does not distinguish, neither should the court." And for that
matter, neither should the COA.
In consonance with stare decisis, there should be no more misgivings about the proper
application of Section 12. In the present case, the payment of benefits to employees hired
after July 1, 1989, was properly withheld, because the law clearly mandated that those
benefits should be reserved only to incumbents who were already enjoying them before its
enactment. Withholding them from the others ensured that the compensation of the
incumbents would not be diminished in the course of the latters continued employment
with the government agency.
It bears emphasis also that in promulgating the Irene Cruz case, there was no intention on
the part of the Court to abandon its earlier ruling in PPA v. COA, et al.37 The factual
circumstances in the former case are different from those attendant in the case of herein
petitioners. In fine, the Irene Cruz case is not on all fours with the present case. The
petitioners in the former case, who were employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration,
were able to obtain from the Office of the President a post facto approval or ratification of
their social amelioration benefit.1wphi1No such authority granted by the Office of the
President has been presented by the second category officials of the PPA.
Petitioners further invoked that the denial of their claim of 40% RATA violated their
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. We note that the Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the
same. The equal protection clause does not prohibit discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.38
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. x x x. A law
is not invalid simply because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that
it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class.39
As explained earlier, the different treatment accorded the second sentence (first paragraph)
of Section 12 of RA 6758 to the incumbents as of 1 July 1989, on one hand, and those
employees hired on or after the said date, on the other, with respect to the grant of non-
integrated benefits lies in the fact that the legislature intended to gradually phase out the
said benefits without, however, upsetting its policy of non-diminution of pay and benefits.40
The consequential outcome under Sections 12 and 17 is that if the incumbent resigns or is
promoted to a higher position, his successor is no longer entitled to his predecessors RATA
privilege or to the transition allowance. After 1 July 1989, the additional financial incentives
such as RATA may no longer be given by the GOCCs with the exemption of those which were
authorized to be continued under Section 12 of RA 6758.41
Therefore, the aforesaid provision does not infringe the equal protection clause of the
Constitution as it is based on reasonable classification intended to protect the rights of the
incumbents against diminution of their pay and benefits.42
Anent the issue of refund, we note that petitioners were referring to the RAT A received by
the second category officials pursuant to PPA Memorandum Circular No. 36-89 dated 23
October 1989 and PPA Memorandum Circular No. 46-90 dated 14 November 1990. We
deem it 110 longer necessary to discuss this issue considering that it was already ruled upon
in the earlier PPA case and was even part of the dispositive portion43 of the decision which
became final and executory. Well-settled is the rule that once a judgment becomes final and
executory, it can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified in any respect. It is essential to
an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or
cause therein should be laid to rest.44 The arguments of petitioners regarding this issue
should have been raised in that case and not in this present petition.
We conclude this case with the words borrowed from former Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban:
During these tough economic times, this Court understands, and in fact sympathizes with,
the plight of ordinary government employees. Whenever legally possible, it has bent over
backwards to protect labor and favor it with additional economic advantages. In the present
case, however, the Salary Standardization Law clearly provides that the claimed benefits
shall continue to be granted only to employees who were "incumbents" as of July 1, 1989.
Hence, much to its regret, the Court has no authority to reinvent or modify the law to
extend those benefits even to employees hired after that date.45
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Ce11iorari is DENIED. The Decision dated 29
August 2007 and Resolution dated 29 February 2008 of the Court Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
91743 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 189028 July 16, 2013
NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR
LITERATURE BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS (PAINTING)
BENEDICTO CABRERA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS (SCULPTURE) NAPOLEON
ABUEVA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS (PAINTING AND SCULPTURE) ARTURO LUZ,
NATIONAL ARTIST FOR PRODUCTION DESIGN SALVADOR BERNAL, UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR
EMERITUS GEMINO ABAD, DEAN MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN (UP COLLEGE OF LAW), DEAN
DANILO SILVESTRE (UP COLLEGE OF ARCHITECTURE), DEAN ROLAND TOLENTINO (UP
COLLEGE OF MASS COMMUNICATION), PROF. JOSE DALISAY, DR. ANTON JUAN, DR.
ALEXANDER CORTEZ, DR. JOSE NEIL GARCIA, DR. PEDRO JUN CRUZ REYES, PROF. JOSE
CLAUDIO GUERRERO, PROF. MICHAEL M. COROZA, PROF. GERARD LICO, PROF. VERNE DE
LA PENA, PROF. MARIAN ABUAN, PROF. THEODORE O. TE, DR. CRISTINA PANTOJA-
HIDALGO, PROF. JOSE WENDELL CAPILI, PROF. SIR ANRIAL TIATCO, PROF. NICOLO DEL
CASTILLO, PROF. HORACIO DUMANLIG, PROF. DANTON REMOTO, PROF. PRISCELINA
PATAJOLEGASTO, PROF. BELEN CALINGACION, PROF. AMIEL Y. LEONARDIA, PROF. VIM
NADERA, PROF. MARILYN CANTA, PROF. CECILIA DELA PAZ, ROF. CHARLSON ONG, PROF.
CLOD MARLON YAMBAO, PROF. KENNETH JAMANDRE, PROF. JETHRO JOAQUIN, ATTY.
F.D. NICOLAS B. PICHAY, ATTY. ROSE BEATRIX ANGELES, MR. FERNANDO JOSEF, MS.
SUSAN S. LARA, MR. ALFRED YUSON, MS. JING PANGANIBANMENDOZA, MR. ROMULO
BAQUIRAN, JR., MR. CARLJOE JAVIER, MS. REBECCA T. ANONUEVO, MR. JP ANTHONY D.
CUNADA, MS. LEAH NAVARRO, MR. MARK MEILLY, MR. VERGEL O. SANTOS, MR. GIL OLEA
MENDOZA, MR. EDGAR C. SAMAR, MS. CHRISTINE BELLEN, MR. ANGELO R. LACUESTA, MS.
ANNA MARIA KATIGBAKLACUESTA, MR. LEX LEDESMA, MS. KELLY PERIQUET, MS. CARLA
PACIS, MR. J. ALBERT GAMBOA, MR. CESAR EVANGELISTA BUENDIA, MR. PAOLO
ALCAZAREN, MR. ALWYN C. JAVIER, MR. RAYMOND MAGNO GARLITOS, MS. GANG
BADOY, MR. LESLIE BOCOBO, MS. FRANCES BRETANA, MS. JUDITH TORRES, MS. JANNETTE
PINZON, MS. JUNE POTICAR-DALISAY, MS. CAMILLE DE LA ROSA, MR. JAMES LADIORAY,
MR. RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR., and CONCERNED ARTISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES
(CAP), Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, THE CULTURAL CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON CULTURE AND THE ARTS, MS. CECILE GUIDOTE-ALVAREZ, MR. CARLO
MAGNO JOSE CAPARAS,1 MR. JOSE MORENO, MR. FRANCISCO MANOSA, AND ALL
PERSONS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, ACTING UNDER THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, DIRECTION,
CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN RELATION TO THE CONFERMENT OF THE ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL ARTIST AND THE RELEASE OF FUNDS IN RELATION TO THE CONFERMENT OF
THE HONORS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE ORDER OF NATIONAL ARTISTS ON RESPONDENTS
GUIDOTE-ALVAREZ, CAPARAS, MORENO AND MANOSA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Art has traditionally been viewed as the expression of everything that is true, good and
beautiful. As such, it is perceived to evoke and produce a spirit of harmony. Art is also
considered as a civilizing force, a catalyst of nation-building. The notion of art and artists as
privileged expressions of national culture helped shape the grand narratives of the nation
and shared symbols of the people. The artist does not simply express his/her own individual
inspiration but articulates the deeper aspirations of history and the soul of the people.2 The
law recognizes this role and views art as something that "reflects and shapes values, beliefs,
aspirations, thereby defining a peoples national identity."3 If unduly politicized, however,
art and artists could stir controversy and may even cause discord, as what happened in this
case.
The Antecedents
History of the Order of National Artists
On April 27, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No.
10014 and, upon recommendation of the Board of Trustees of the Cultural Center of the
Philippines (CCP), created the category of Award and Decoration of National Artist to be
awarded to Filipinos who have made distinct contributions to arts and letters. In the same
issuance, Fernando Amorsolo was declared as the first National Artist.
On May 15, 1973, Proclamation No. 11445 was issued. It amended Proclamation No. 1001
"by creating a National Artists Awards Committee" that would "administer the conferment
of the category of National Artist" upon deserving Filipino artists. The Committee, composed
of members of the Board of Trustees of the CCP, was tasked to "draft the rules to guide its
deliberations in the choice of National Artists, to the end that those who have created a
body of work in the arts and letters capable of withstanding the test of time will be so
recognized."
The authority of the National Artists Awards Committee to administer the conferment of the
National Artist Award was again reiterated in Presidential Decree No. 2086 issued on June 7,
1973.
On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise known as the Law Creating the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts, was signed into law. It established the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) and gave it an extensive mandate over the
development, promotion and preservation of the Filipino national culture and arts and the
Filipino cultural heritage. The NCCA was tasked with the following:
Sec. 8. The Commission. A National Commission for Culture and Arts is hereby created to
formulate policies for the development of culture and arts; implement these policies in
coordination with affiliated cultural agencies; coordinate the implementation of programs of
these affiliated agencies; administer the National Endowment Fund for Culture and Arts
(NEFCA); encourage artistic creation within a climate of artistic freedom; develop and
promote the Filipino national culture and arts; and preserve Filipino cultural heritage. The
Commission shall be an independent agency. It shall render an annual report of its activities
and achievements to the President and to Congress.
Among the specific mandates of the NCCA under Republic Act No. 7356 is to "extend
recognition of artistic achievement through awards, grants and services to artists and
cultural groups which contribute significantly to the Filipinos cultural legacy."7 In
connection with this mandate, the NCCA is vested with the power to "advise the President
on matters pertaining to culture and the arts, including the creation of a special decoration
or award, for persons who have significantly contributed to the development and promotion
of Philippine culture and arts."8
As both the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA have been mandated by law to promote,
develop and protect the Philippine national culture and the arts, and authorized to give
awards to deserving Filipino artists, the two bodies decided to team up and jointly
administer the National Artists Award.9 Thereafter, they reviewed the guidelines for the
nomination, selection and administration of the National Artists Award. Pursuant to their
respective powers to draft and promulgate rules, regulations and measures to guide them in
their deliberations in the choice of National Artists, the CCP and NCCA adopted the following
revised guidelines in September 200710:
4. ADMINISTRATION OF THE AWARD
4.1. The National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) shall plan, organize and
implement the Order of National Artists in coordination with the Cultural Center of the
Philippines (CCP).
4.2. It shall enlist the support and cooperation of private sector experts from the various
fields of art to ensure that the awards are implemented in a successful and impartial
manner.
4.3. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall commission art experts to form a Special
Research Group who shall verify information submitted on nominees and provide essential
data.
They shall be selected for their specialization and familiarity with the works and
accomplishments of nominated artists.
4.4. The Special Research Group shall be composed of ten (10) to twenty (20) members who
have expertise in one or more fields or disciplines.
4.5. The National Artist Award Council of Experts shall be created before or during the
nomination period. It is tasked to screen nominees and recommend to the NCCA and CCP
Boards the candidates for the Order of National Artists. It shall be composed of highly
regarded peers, scholars, (including cultural philosophers and historians), academicians,
researchers, art critics, and other knowledgeable individuals. A wider age-range of experts
who would have first-hand knowledge of achievements of nominees shall be considered.
4.6. The selection of the members of the National Artist Award Council of Experts shall be
based on the following criteria:
(a) should have achieved authority, credibility and track record in his field(s) of expertise;
(b) should have extensive knowledge in his field(s) and his views on Philippine art and
culture must be national in perspective;
(c) should be a recognized authority in the study or research of Philippine art and culture;
(d) must be willing to devote sufficient time and effort to the work of the Council;
(e) must be willing to sign a non-disclosure statement in order to safeguard the
confidentiality of the deliberations;
(f) must not have been convicted with finality of any crime by a court of justice or dismissed
for cause by any organization, whether public or private.
4.7. The National Artist Award Council of Experts shall be composed of a maximum of seven
(7) members each of the seven (7) areas/disciplines. The living National Artists will
automatically become members in addition to the forty-nine (49) selected members. These
members will constitute the first deliberation panel and will be invited to evaluate the
nominations and materials submitted by the Special Research Group.
4.8. Any member of the Council of Experts who is nominated or related to a nominee up to
the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity shall inhibit himself/herself from the
deliberation process. Likewise, any member may decline to participate in the deliberation
for any reason or may be removed for just cause upon recommendation to the NCCA Board
by at least two thirds (2/3) of the members; in which case, the National Artist Award
Secretariat shall again select the replacements for those who decline or resigned until the
first deliberation panel is completed.
4.9. The list of nominated members of the National Artist Award Council of Experts shall be
reviewed by the National Artist Award Secretariat as needed, for purposes of adding new
members or replacements.
4.10. The members of the National Artist Award Council of Experts shall serve for a fixed
term of three (3) years.
5. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION
The Order of National Artists shall be given to:
5.1 Living artists who are Filipino citizens at the time of nomination, as well as those who
died after the establishment of the award in 1972 but were Filipino citizens at the time of
their death.
5.2 Artists who through the content and form of their works have contributed in building a
Filipino sense of nationhood.
5.3. Artists who have pioneered in a mode of creative expression or style, thus, earning
distinction and making an impact on succeeding generations of artists.
5.4. Artists who have created a substantial and significant body of works and/or consistently
displayed excellence in the practice of their art form thus enriching artistic expression or
style.
5.5 Artists who enjoy broad acceptance through:
5.5.1. prestigious national and/or international recognition, such as the Gawad CCP Para sa
Sining, CCP Thirteen Artists Award and NCCA Alab ng Haraya
5.5.2. critical acclaim and/or reviews of their works
5.5.3. respect and esteem from peers.
6. NOMINATION PROCEDURE
6.1. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall announce the opening of nominations
through media releases and letters to qualified organizations.
6.2. Candidates may be nominated under one or more of the following categories:
6.2.1. Dance choreography, direction and/or performance.
6.2.2. Music composition, direction, and/or performance.
6.2.3. Theater direction, performance and/or production design.
6.2.4. Visual Arts painting, sculpture, printmaking, photography, installation art, mixed
media works, illustration, comics/komiks, graphic arts, performance art and/or imaging.
6.2.5. Literature poetry, fiction (short story, novel and play); non-fiction (essay, journalism,
literary criticism and historical literature).
6.2.6. Film and Broadcast Arts direction, writing, production design, cinematography,
editing, camera work, and/or performance.
6.2.7. Architecture, Design and Allied Arts architecture design, interior design, industrial
arts design, landscape architecture and fashion design.
6.3. Nominations for the Order of National Artists may be submitted by government and
non-government cultural organizations and educational institutions, as well as private
foundations and councils.
6.4. Members of the Special Research Group, as well as agencies attached to the NCCA and
CCP shall not submit nominations.
6.5. NCCA and CCP Board members and consultants and NCCA and CCP officers and staff are
automatically disqualified from being nominated.
6.6. Nominations shall be accepted only when these are submitted in writing and with
proper supporting documentation, as follows:
6.6.1. A cover letter signed by the head or designated representative of the nominating
organization.
The cover letter shall be accompanied by a Board Resolution approving the nominee
concerned with the said resolution signed by the organization President and duly certified
by the Board Secretary.
6.6.2. A duly accomplished nomination form;
6.6.3. A detailed curriculum vitae of the nominee;
6.6.4. A list of the nominees significant works categorized according to the criteria;
6.6.5. The latest photograph (color or black and white) of the nominee, either 5" x 7" or 8" x
11";
6.6.6. Pertinent information materials on the nominees significant works (on CDs, VCDs and
DVDs);
6.6.7. Copies of published reviews;
6.6.8. Any other document that may be required.
6.7. Nominations received beyond the announced deadline for the submission of
nominations shall not be considered.
6.8. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall announce the opening of nominations
through media releases.
6.9. All inquiries and nominations shall be submitted to
The NATIONAL ARTIST AWARD SECRETARIAT
Office of the Artistic Director Cultural Center of the Philippines Roxas Boulevard, 1300 Pasay
City or The NATIONAL ARTIST AWARD SECRETARIAT Office of the Deputy Executive Director
National Commission for Culture and the Arts 633 General Luna Street, Intramuros, Manila
7. SCREENING AND SELECTION PROCESS
7.1. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall pre-screen the nominees based on technical
guideline items 5.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. The pre-screening shall not be based on the
accomplishments and merits of the nominee.
7.2. The Special Research Group shall accomplish its task within six (6) months. The main
objective is to verify the validity of the data, and evaluate the quality, true value and
significance of works according to the criteria. It shall come up with the updated and
comprehensive profiles of nominees reflecting their most outstanding achievements.
7.3. The National Artist Award Secretariat will meet to review the list of nominees for
oversights. Consequently, deserving nominees shall be added to the list.
7.4. The first deliberation panel (Council of Experts) shall be intra-disciplinary. The panelists
shall be grouped according to their respective fields of expertise or disciplines to shortlist
the nominees in their disciplines or categories for presentation to the second deliberation
panel.
7.5. The second deliberation panel shall be composed of a different set of experts from the
first deliberation panel three (3) experts each of the seven (7) areas/discipline and may
include members from varying backgrounds such as critics and academicians. The
achievements of each shortlisted nominee shall be presented by one designated member of
Council of Experts. Then panel deliberates and ranks the shortlisted nominees according to
the order of precedence following the set criteria of the Order of National Artists. In
extreme cases, the Second Deliberation may add new names to the lists.
7.6. The second deliberation panel may recommend not to give award in any category if no
nominee is found deserving. The number of awardees shall also depend on the availability
of funds. All decisions and recommendations shall be in writing.
7.7. The recommendations from the Second Deliberation Panel of the National Artist Award
Council of Experts shall then be presented to the joint boards of NCCA and CCP for final
selection. The presentors shall prepare their presentation in writing together with an audio-
visual presentation or powerpoint presentation. Written interpellations/opinions will be
accepted from selected critics. The review shall be based on the ranking done by the Second
Deliberation. The voting shall be across disciplines. The National Artists will be given the
option whether to vote on all categories or on his/her particular discipline.
7.8. Proxy votes will not be allowed in the Selection Process. Designation of permanent
representatives of agencies should be made at the outset to make them regular Board
members of NCCA and thus, may be allowed to cast votes.
7.9. The list of awardees shall be submitted to the President of the Republic of the
Philippines for confirmation, proclamation and conferral.
8. PRESENTATION OF THE AWARDS
8.1. The Order of National Artists shall not be conferred more frequently than every three
(3) years.
8.2. The Order of National Artists shall be conferred by the President of the Philippines on
June 11 or any appropriate date in fitting ceremonies to be organized by the National Artist
Secretariat.
8.3. The medallion of the Order of National Artists and citation shall be given to the honoree
during the conferment ceremony. The cash award of P100,000.00 in cheque shall be given
immediately after the ceremony or at another time and place as requested by the honoree.
8.4. A posthumous conferral consisting of the medallion and citation shall be given to the
family or legal heir/s of the honoree. The cash award of P75,000.00 in cheque shall be given
to the honorees legal heir/s or a representative designated by the family immediately after
the ceremony or at another time and place as requested by the family. (Emphases supplied.)
In 1996, the NCCA and the CCP created a National Artist Award Secretariat composed of the
NCCA Executive Director as Chairperson, the CCP President as Vice-Chairperson, and the
NCCA Deputy Executive Director, the CCP Vice-President/Artistic Director, the NCCA
National Artist Award Officer and the CCP National Artist Award Officer as members. They
also centralized with the NCCA all financial resources and management for the
administration of the National Artists Award. They added another layer to the selection
process to involve and allow the participation of more members of the arts and culture
sector of the Philippines in the selection of who may be proclaimed a National Artist.
On September 19, 2003, Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, entitled Establishing the Honors
Code of the Philippines to Create an Order of Precedence of Honors Conferred and for Other
Purposes, was issued. The National Artists Award was renamed the Order of National Artists
and raised to the level of a Cultural Order, fourth in precedence among the orders and
decorations that comprise the Honors of the Philippines. Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003,
recognizes the vital role of the NCCA and the CCP in identifying Filipinos who have made
distinct contributions to arts and letters and states that the National Artist recognition is
conferred "upon the recommendation of the Cultural Center of the Philippines and the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts."12 Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, further
created a Committee on Honors to "assist the President in evaluating nominations for
recipients of Honors,"13 including the Order of National Artists, and presidential awards. The
Committee on Honors has been allowed to "authorize relevant department or government
agencies to maintain Honors and/or Awards Committees to process nominations for Honors
and/or Presidential Awards."14In this connection, Section 2.4(A) of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations15 of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, states:
2.4: Awards Committees
There shall be two types of awards committees: the Committee on Honors and the various
awards committees in the various units of the government service.
A. The Committee on Honors
The Committee on Honors serves as a National Awards Committee. It is composed of the
following:
The Executive Secretary, Chairman
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Vice-Chairman
Head, Presidential Management Staff, member
Presidential Assistant for Historical Affairs, member
Chief of Presidential Protocol, member
Chief of Protocol, DFA, member
All nominations from the various awards committees must be submitted to the Committee
on Honors via the Chancellery of Philippine Orders and State Decorations. The Chancellery
shall process nominations for the consideration of the Committee on Honors. The
Committee on Honors shall screen and recommend these nominations to the President.
The Committee on Honors shall, as a general rule, serve as a screening committee to ensure
that nominations received from the various awards committees meet two tests: that there
has not been an abuse of discretion in making the nomination, and that the nominee is in
good standing. Should a nomination meet these criteria, a recommendation to the President
for conferment shall be made.
The President of the Philippines takes the recommendations of the Committee on Honors in
the highest consideration when making the final decision on the conferment of awards.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, entitled Amending Section 5(IV) of Executive Order No.
236 Entitled "Establishing the Honors Code of the Philippines to Create an Order of
Precedence of Honors Conferred and for Other Purposes" was subsequently issued on June
8, 2005. It amended the wording of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, on the Order of
National Artists and clarified that the NCCA and the CCP "shall advise the President on the
conferment of the Order of National Artists."
Controversy Surrounding the 2009
Order of National Artists
Petitioners alleged that on January 30, 2007, a joint meeting of the NCCA Board of
Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees was held to discuss, among others, the
evaluation of the 2009 Order of National Artists and the convening of the National Artist
Award Secretariat. The nomination period was set for September 2007 to December 31,
2007, which was later extended to February 28, 2008. The pre-screening of nominations was
held from January to March 2008.16
 On April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel met.17 A total of 87 nominees18 were
considered during the deliberation and a preliminary shortlist19 of 32 names was compiled.
On April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation Panel purportedly composed of an entirely new
set of Council of Experts met and shortlisted 13 out of the 32 names in the preliminary
shortlist.20 On May 6, 2009, the final deliberation was conducted by the 30-member Final
Deliberation Panel comprised of the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA Board of
Commissioners and the living National Artists.21 From the 13 names in the second shortlist, a
final list of four names was agreed upon.22 The final list, according to rank, follows:
Name Art Field/Category Number of Votes
3. Mr. LAZARO FRANCISCO+ (Posthumous) Literature
4. Mr. FEDERICO AGUILAR-ALCUAZ Visual Arts
The above persons were identified by experts in the various fields of arts and culture,
including living National Artists. An intensive selection process was observed following
established practice. In the past, awards were presented by the President at a Ceremony
held at the Malacaan Palace followed by a program called "Parangal" at the Cultural Center
of the Philippines. We also propose to continue with past practice of celebrating the life and
works of the four (4) Order of National Artists through an exhibit that will open and a
commemorative publication that will be released on the day of the proclamation.

We respectfully suggest, subject to Her Excellencys availability, that the Proclamation be on

Manuel Conde (+) Film and Broadcast Arts (Film) 26 June 11, 2009, if possible at the Malacaan Palace.

Ramon Santos Music 19 Thank you for your kind attention.

Very respectfully yours,

Lazaro Francisco (+) Literature 15
(Sgd.)
VILMA L. LABRADOR
Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz Visual Arts 15
Chairman
National Commission for Culture and the Arts
On May 6, 2009, a letter, signed jointly by the Chairperson of the NCCA, Undersecretary
Vilma Labrador, and the President and Artistic Director of the CCP, Mr. Nestor Jardin, was (Sgd.)
sent to the President.23 The letter stated, thus: NESTOR O. JARDIN
President and Artistic Director
May 6, 2009
Cultural Center of the Philippines24
Her Excellency GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the
President of the Philippines
President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly
Malacaan Palace, Manila
received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly
Subject: 2009 Order of National Artist Awardees endorsing private respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco
Maosa and Jose Moreno. The Committee on Honors purportedly processed these
Dear President Arroyo: nominations and invited resource persons to validate the qualifications and credentials of
the nominees.25
We are respectfully submitting a recommendation of the NCCA Board of Trustees and CCP
Board of Trustees for the Proclamation of the following as 2009 Order of National Artists: The Committee on Honors thereafter submitted a memorandum to then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo recommending the conferment of the Order of National Artists on the
1. Mr. MANUEL CONDE+ (Posthumous) Film and Broadcast Arts four recommendees of the NCCA and the CCP Boards, as well as on private respondents
Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno. Acting on this recommendation,
2. Dr. RAMON SANTOS Music
Proclamation No. 1823 declaring Manuel Conde a National Artist was issued on June 30,
2009. Subsequently, on July 6, 2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued declaring
Lazaro Francisco, Federico AguilarAlcuaz and private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Maosa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists. This was subsequently announced to
the public by then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita on July 29, 2009.26
Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA Board of Commissioners and
the CCP Board of Trustees to select those who will be conferred the Order of National Artists
and to set the standard for entry into that select group, petitioners instituted this petition
for prohibition, certiorari and injunction (with prayer for restraining order) praying that the
Order of National Artists be conferred on Dr. Santos and that the conferment of the Order
of National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno be
enjoined and declared to have been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.27
In a Resolution28 dated August 25, 2009, the Court issued a status quo order29 enjoining
"public respondents" "from conferring the rank and title of the Order of National Artists on
private respondents; from releasing the cash awards that accompany such conferment and
recognition; and from holding the acknowledgment ceremonies for recognition of the
private respondents as National Artists."
What is the nature and scope of the power of the President to confer the Order of the
National Artists and how should it be exercised? This is the essential issue presented in this
case. It will determine whether the proclamation of respondents as National Artists is valid.
Preliminary procedural issues on the standing of the petitioners and the propriety of the
remedies taken,30 however, call for resolution as a prerequisite to the discussion of the main
question.
Contention of the Parties
A perusal of the pleadings submitted by the petitioners reveals that they are an aggrupation
of at least three groups, the National Artists, cultural workers and academics, and the
Concerned Artists of the Philippines (CAP). The National Artists assert an "actual as well as
legal interest in maintaining the reputation of the Order of National Artists."31 In particular,
they invoke their right to due process not to have the honor they have been conferred with
diminished by the irregular and questionable conferment of the award on respondents
Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno. For petitioners, this would adversely affect
their right to live a meaningful life as it detracts not only from their right to enjoy their
honor as a fruit of their lifelong labor but also from the respect of their peers.32
The cultural workers, academics and CAP claim to be Filipinos who are deeply concerned
with the preservation of the countrys rich cultural and artistic heritage. As taxpayers, they
are concerned about the use of public monies for illegal appointments or spurious acts of
discretion.33
All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her
discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection process for the
Order of National Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation
Panels. According to petitioners, the Presidents discretion to name National Artists is not
absolute but limited. In particular, her discretion on the matter cannot be exercised in the
absence of or against the recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP. In adding the names of
respondents Caparas, Guidote-Alvarez, Maosa and Moreno while dropping Dr. Santos from
the list of conferees, the Presidents own choices constituted the majority of the awardees
in utter disregard of the choices of the NCCA and the CCP and the arts and culture
community which were arrived at after a long and rigorous process of screening and
deliberation. Moreover, the name of Dr. Santos as National Artist for Music was deleted
from the final list submitted by the NCCA and the CCP Boards without clearly indicating the
basis thereof. For petitioners, the Presidents discretion to name National Artists cannot be
exercised to defeat the recommendations made by the CCP and NCCA Boards after a long
and rigorous screening process and with the benefit of expertise and experience. The
addition of four names to the final list submitted by the Boards of the CCP and the NCCA
and the deletion of one name from the said list constituted a substitution of judgment by
the President and a unilateral reconsideration without clear justification of the decision of
the First, Second and Final Deliberation Panels composed of experts.34
Petitioners further argue that the choice of respondent GuidoteAlvarez was illegal and
unethical because, as the then Executive Director of the NCCA and presidential adviser on
culture and arts, she was disqualified from even being nominated.35 Moreover, such action
on the part of the former President constituted grave abuse of discretion as it gave
preferential treatment to respondent Guidote-Alvarez by naming the latter a National Artist
despite her not having been nominated and, thus, not subjected to the screening process
provided by the rules for selection to the Order of National Artists. Her inclusion in the list
by the President represented a clear and manifest favor given by the President in that she
was exempted from the process that all other artists have to undergo. According to
petitioners, it may be said that the President used a different procedure to qualify
respondent Guidote-Alvarez. This was clearly grave abuse of discretion for being manifest
and undue bias violative of the equal protection clause.36
Respondent Caparas refutes the contention of the petitioning National Artists and insists
that there could be no prejudice to the latter. They remain to be National Artists and
continue to receive the emoluments, benefits and other privileges pertaining to them by
virtue of that honor. On the other hand, all the other petitioners failed to show any material
and personal injury or harm caused to them by the conferment of the Order of National
Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno. The rule on standing
may not be relaxed in favor of the petitioners as no question of constitutionality has been
raised and no issue of transcendental importance is involved.37
Respondent Caparas further argues that the remedies of prohibition and injunction are
improper as the act sought to be enjoined the declaration of respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Maosa and Moreno as National Artists had already been consummated. In
particular, respondent Caparas was already proclaimed National Artist through
Proclamation No. 1827 issued on July 6, 2009.38
On the merits, respondent Caparas contends that no grave abuse of discretion attended his
proclamation as National Artist. The former President considered the respective
recommendations of the NCCA and the CCP Boards and of the Committee on Honors in
eventually declaring him (Caparas) as National Artist. The function of the NCCA and the CCP
Boards is simply to advise the President. The award of the Order of National Artists is the
exclusive prerogative of the President who is not bound in any way by the recommendation
of the NCCA and the CCP Boards. The implementing rules and regulations or guidelines of
the NCCA cannot restrict or limit the exclusive power of the President to select the
recipients of the Order of National Artists.39
For her part, in a letter40 dated March 11, 2010, respondent Guidote-Alvarez manifested
that she was waiving her right to file her comment on the petition and submitted herself to
the Courts discretion and wisdom.
Respondent Maosa manifested that his creations speak for themselves as his contribution
to Filipino cultural heritage and his worthiness to receive the award. Nonetheless, he
expressed his conviction that the Order of National Artists is not a right but a privilege that
he would willingly relinquish should he be found not worthy of it.41
Respondent Moreno did not file any pleading despite being given several opportunities to
do so. Hence, the Court dispensed with his pleadings.42
In a Resolution dated July 12, 2011, this Court gave due course to the petition and required
the parties to file their respective memoranda.43 Respondent Caparas filed his
memorandum on September 8, 2011,44 the CCP filed its memorandum on September 19,
2011,45 respondent Maosa on September 20, 2011,46 and the Office of the Solicitor General
filed a manifestation stating that it is adopting its comment as its memorandum on
September 21, 2011.47 Respondent Moreno failed to file a Memorandum, hence, the Court
resolved to dispense with the same.48 Petitioners filed their Memorandum on May 14,
2012.49
On the other hand, the original position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was
similar to that of respondent Caparas.50 In a subsequent manifestation,51 however, the OSG
stated that the current Board of Commissioners of the NCCA agree with the petitioners that
the President cannot honor as a National Artist one who was not recommended by the joint
Boards of the NCCA and the CCP. The implementing rules and regulations of Executive Order
No. 236, s. 2003, recognized the binding character of the recommendation of the NCCA and
the CCP Boards and limited the authority of the Committee on Honors to the determination
that (1) there has been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NCCA and the CCP
Boards in making the nomination, and (2) the nominee is in good standing. Where a
nomination meets the said two criteria, a recommendation to the President to confer the
award shall be made.52
The OSG further argued that, while the President exercises control over the NCCA and the
CCP, the President has the duty to faithfully execute the laws, including the NCCA-CCP
guidelines for selection of National Artists and the implementing rules of Executive Order
No. 236, s. 2003. Moreover, the laws recognize the expertise of the NCCA and the CCP in the
arts and tasked them to screen and select the artists to be conferred the Order of National
Artists. Their mandate is clear and exclusive as no other agency possesses such expertise.53
The OSG also assailed the former Presidents choice of respondent Guidote-Alvarez for
being contrary to Republic Act No. 7356.54 Section 11 of the said law provides:
Sec. 11. Membership Restrictions. During his/her term as member of the Commission, a
Commissioner shall not be eligible for any grant, or such other financial aid from the
Commission as an individual: Provided, however, That he/she may compete for grants and
awards on the same level as other artists one (1) year after his/her term shall have expired.
The omission of the word "award" in the first portion of the above provision appears to be
unintentional as shown by the proviso which states that a member may compete for grants
and awards only one year after his or her term shall have expired. As such, respondent
Guidote-Alvarez is restricted and disqualified from being conferred the 2009 Order of
National Artists.55
The Courts Ruling
Standing of the Petitioners
Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a
matter to the court for adjudication.56 The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.57
The parties who assail the constitutionality or legality of a statute or an official act must
have a direct and personal interest. They must show not only that the law or any
governmental act is invalid, but also that they sustained or are in immediate danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that they suffer
thereby in some indefinite way. They must show that they have been or are about to be
denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled or that they are about to
be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.58
In this case, we find that the petitioning National Artists will be denied some right or
privilege to which they are entitled as members of the Order of National Artists as a result of
the conferment of the award on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and
Moreno. In particular, they will be denied the privilege of exclusive membership in the
Order of National Artists.
In accordance with Section 2(a)59 of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, the Order of National
Artists is "an exclusive association of honored individuals." To ensure the exclusivity of the
membership in the Order, a rigid nomination and screening process has been established
with different sets of renowned artists and respected art critics invited to sit as the Council
of Experts for the First and Second Deliberation Panels. Moreover, all living National Artists
are given a voice on who should be included in their exclusive club as they automatically
become members of the Final Deliberation Panel that will vote on who should be included in
the final list to be submitted to the President for conferment of the Order of National
Artists. To allow the untrammeled discretion and authority of the President to confer the
Order of National Artists without regard to the stringent screening and rigorous selection
process established by the NCCA and the CCP will diminish, if not negate, the exclusive
nature of the said Order. It will unduly subject the selection and conferment of the Order of
National Artists to politics rather than to principles and procedures. It will subvert the
transparent and rigorous process and allow entry to the exclusive Order of National Artists
through a secret backdoor of lobbying, back channeling and political accommodation.
Among the other petitioners, Prof. Gemino Abad presents a unique valid personal and
substantial interest. Like respondents Caparas, Maosa and Moreno, he was among the 87
nominees for the 2009 Order of National Artists. Like respondent Moreno, he made it to the
preliminary shortlist. As he did not make it to the second shortlist, he was not considered by
the Final Deliberation Panel, more so by the former President.
It should be recalled too that respondent Guidote-Alvarez was disqualified to be nominated
for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Maosa and
Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not
included in the second shortlist. Yet, the four of them were treated differently and
considered favorably when they were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the
NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists. The Committee on Honors
and the former President effectively treated respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa
and Moreno as a preferred class. The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny.60 No real and
substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that
would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing
respondents in an exceptional position. The undue classification was not germane to the
purpose of the law. Instead, it contradicted the law and well-established guidelines, rules
and regulations meant to carry the law into effect. While petitioner Abad cannot claim
entitlement to the Order of National Artists,61 he is entitled to be given an equal opportunity
to vie for that honor. In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads
right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing in
this case.
As regards the other concerned artists and academics as well as the CAP, their claim of deep
concern for the preservation of the countrys rich cultural and artistic heritage, while
laudable, falls short of the injury in fact requirement of standing. Their assertion constitutes
a generalized grievance shared in a substantially equal measure by all or a large class of
citizens.62 Nor can they take refuge in their status as taxpayers as the case does not involve
any illegal appropriation or taxation. A taxpayers suit is proper only when there is an
exercise of the spending or taxing power of the Congress.63
Nonetheless, as a reading of the petition shows that it has advanced an issue which
deserves the attention of this Court in view of its seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedent, it behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue
presented before it.64 Moreover, this issue is of paramount interest,65 which further justifies
a liberal stance on standing.
Propriety of the Remedies
The present action is a petition for prohibition, certiorari, injunction, restraining order and
all other legal, just and equitable reliefs.
It has been held that the remedies of prohibition and injunction are preventive and, as such,
cannot be availed of to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.66 Where the act sought
to be prohibited or enjoined has already been accomplished or consummated, prohibition
or injunction becomes moot.67
Nevertheless, even if the principal issue is already moot, this Court may still resolve its
merits for the future guidance of both bench and bar. Courts will decide a question
otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."68
It is an opportune time for the Court to assert its role as republican schoolmaster,69 a
teacher in a vital national seminar.70 There are times when the controversy is of such
character that, to prevent its recurrence and to assure respect for constitutional limitations,
this Court must pass on the merits of a case.71 This is one such case. More than being a
teaching moment, this is not the first time that the Order of National Artists was conferred
in the manner that is being assailed in this case.72 If not addressed here and now, there is
great probability that the central question involved in this case will haunt us again in the
future. Every President may invoke absolute presidential prerogative and thrust upon us
National Artists after his or her own heart, in total disregard of the advise of the CCP and the
NCCA and the voice of the community of artists, resulting to repeated episodes of
indignation and uproar from the artists and the public.
Furthermore, if not corrected, such an act would give rise to mischief and dangerous
precedent whereby those in the corridors of power could avoid judicial intervention and
review by merely speedily and stealthily completing the commission of an illegality.73
In any event, the present petition is also for certiorari and there is no procedural bar for the
Court to pass upon the question of whether the proclamations of respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno as National Artists were attended by grave abuse of
presidential discretion.
Limits of the Presidents Discretion
The respective powers of the CCP Board of Trustees and of the NCCA Board of
Commissioners with respect to the conferment of the Order of National Artists are clear.
They jointly administer the said award and, upon their recommendation or advice, the
President confers the Order of National Artists.
To "recommend" and to "advise" are synonymous. To "recommend" is "to advise or
counsel."74 To "advise" is "to give an opinion or counsel, or recommend a plan or course of
action; also to give notice. To encourage, inform or acquaint."75 "Advise" imports that it is
discretionary or optional with the person addressed whether he will act on such advice or
not.76 This has been clearly explained in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Atty. Palma77:
The "power to recommend" includes the power to give "advice, exhortation or indorsement,
which is essentially persuasive in character, not binding upon the party to whom it is made."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, in the matter of the conferment of the Order of National Artists, the President may or
may not adopt the recommendation or advice of the NCCA and the CCP Boards. In other
words, the advice of the NCCA and the CCP is subject to the Presidents discretion.
Nevertheless, the Presidents discretion on the matter is not totally unfettered, nor the role
of the NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless.
Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it pleases but is reined
in to keep it from straying. In its classic formulation, "discretion is not unconfined and
vagrant" but "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing."78
The Presidents power must be exercised in accordance with existing laws. Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution prescribes faithful execution of the laws by the President:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Presidents discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be
exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. The faithful
execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a separate
grant of power.79 It simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle
that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them.80 This is
precisely why the law provides that "administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution."81
In this connection, the powers granted to the NCCA and the CCP Boards in connection with
the conferment of the Order of National Artists by executive issuances were
institutionalized by two laws, namely, Presidential Decree No. 208 dated June 7, 1973 and
Republic Act No. 7356. In particular, Proclamation No. 1144 dated May 15, 1973 constituted
the CCP Board as the National Artists Awards Committee and tasked it to "administer the
conferment of the category of National Artist" upon deserving Filipino artists with the
mandate to "draft the rules to guide its deliberations in the choice of National Artists":
Proclamation No. 1001 dated April 27, 1972, creating the Award and Decoration of National
Artist, is hereby amended by creating a National Artists Awards Committee, hereinafter to
administer the conferment of the category of National Artist upon those deserving thereof.
The Committee, which shall be composed of members of the Board of Trustees of the
Cultural Center of the Philippines, shall organize itself immediately and shall draft the rules
to guide its deliberations in the choice of National Artists, to the end that those who have
created a body of work in the arts and in letters capable of withstanding the test of time will
be so recognized. (Emphases supplied.)
The authority of the CCP Board of Trustees as National Artists Awards Committee was
reiterated in Presidential Decree No. 208 dated June 7, 1973.
The function of the CCP Board of Trustees as National Artists Awards Committee has been
recognized under Republic Act No. 7356:
Sec. 18. The National Cultural Agencies. The [NCCA] shall coordinate with the national
cultural agencies including but not limited to the Cultural Center of the Philippines, the
Institute of Philippine Languages, the National Historical Institute, the National Library, the
National Museum, the Records Management and Archives Office. However, they shall
continue operating under their respective charters or as provided by law where provisions
therein are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. They shall serve as the national
repository and/or showcase, as the case may be, of the best of Philippine culture and arts.
For this purpose, these agencies shall submit periodic reports, including recommendations
to the [NCCA]. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, the NCCA has been given the following mandate in connection with the
conferment of cultural or arts awards:
Sec. 12. Mandate. The Commission is hereby mandated to formulate and implement
policies and plans in accordance with the principles stated in Title 1 of this Act.
(a) To encourage the continuing and balanced development of a pluralistic culture by the
people themselves, it shall:
xxxx
(4) extend recognition of artistic achievement through awards, grants and services to artists
and cultural groups which contribute significantly to the Filipinos cultural legacy;
xxxx
Sec. 13. Powers and Functions. To carry out its mandate, the Commission shall exercise
the following powers and functions:
xxxx
(j) advise the President on matters pertaining to culture and the arts, including the creation
of a special decoration or award, for persons who have significantly contributed to the
development and promotion of Philippine culture and arts;
(k) promulgate rules, regulations and undertake any and all measures as may be necessary
to implement this Act. (Emphases supplied.)
By virtue of their respective statutory mandates in connection with the conferment of the
National Artist Award, the NCCA and the CCP decided to work together and jointly
administer the National Artist Award. They reviewed the guidelines for the nomination,
selection and administration of the National Artist Award, created a National Artist Award
Secretariat, centralized all financial resources and management for the administration of the
National Artist Award, and added another layer to the selection process so that more
members of the arts and culture sector of the Philippines may be involved and participate in
the selection of National Artists.
We have held that an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and
effect of law.82 Thus, the rules, guidelines and policies regarding the Order of National
Artists jointly issued by the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA pursuant to their respective
statutory mandates have the force and effect of law. Until set aside, they are binding upon
executive and administrative agencies,83 including the President himself/herself as chief
executor of laws. In this connection, Section 2.5(A) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations84 of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003 provides:
2.5: General Guidelines for Awards Committees
A. National Orders of Cultural and Scientific Merit
The existing modalities of the NCCA for selecting recipients for the Order of National Artists,
and the Gawad sa Manlilikha ng Bayan, and of the NAST for selecting recipients of the Order
of National Scientists, shall remain in force. (Emphases supplied.)
Section 2.4(A) of the same implementing rules further states:
2.4: Awards Committees
There shall be two types of awards committees: the Committee on Honors and the various
awards committees in the various units of the government service.
A. The Committee on Honors
The Committee on Honors serves as a National Awards Committee. It is composed of the
following:
The Executive Secretary, Chairman
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Vice-Chairman
Head, Presidential Management Staff, member
Presidential Assistant for Historical Affairs, member
Chief of Presidential Protocol, member
Chief of Protocol, DFA, member
All nominations from the various awards committees must be submitted to the Committee
on Honors via the Chancellery of Philippine Orders and State Decorations. The Chancellery
shall process nominations for the consideration of the Committee on Honors. The
Committee on Honors shall screen and recommend these nominations to the President.
The Committee on Honors shall, as a general rule, serve as a screening committee to ensure
that nominations received from the various awards committees meet two tests: that there
has not been an abuse of discretion in making the nomination, and that the nominee is in
good standing. Should a nomination meet these criteria, a recommendation to the President
for conferment shall be made.
The President of the Philippines takes the recommendations of the Committee on Honors in
the highest consideration when making the final decision on the conferment of awards.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to the above provision of the implementing rules of Executive Order No. 236, s.
2003, the authority of the Committee on Honors is limited to determining whether the
nominations submitted by a particular awards committee, in this case, the joint NCCA and
CCP Boards, have been tainted by abuse of discretion, and whether the nominees are in
good standing. Should the nominations meet these two criteria, the Committee on Honors
shall make a recommendation to the President for conferment of the Order of National
Artists.
In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection process and as a consequence
of his/her duty to faithfully enforce the relevant laws, the discretion of the President in the
matter of the Order of National Artists is confined to the names submitted to him/her by
the NCCA and the CCP Boards. This means that the President could not have considered
conferment of the Order of National Artists on any person not considered and
recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. That is the proper import of the provision
of Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, that the NCCA and the CCP "shall advise the President
on the conferment of the Order of National Artists." Applying this to the instant case, the
former President could not have properly considered respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Maosa and Moreno, as their names were not recommended by the NCCA and the CCP
Boards. Otherwise, not only will the stringent selection and meticulous screening process be
rendered futile, the respective mandates of the NCCA and the CCP Board of Trustees under
relevant laws to administer the conferment of Order of National Artists, draft the rules and
regulations to guide its deliberations, formulate and implement policies and plans, and
undertake any and all necessary measures in that regard will also become meaningless.
Furthermore, with respect to respondent Guidote-Alvarez who was the Executive Director
of the NCCA at that time, the Guidelines expressly provides:
6.5 NCCA and CCP Board members and consultants and NCCA and CCP officers and staff are
automatically disqualified from being nominated.85
Respondent Guidote-Alvarez could not have even been nominated, hence, she was not
qualified to be considered and conferred the Order of National Artists at that time. The
Presidents discretion on the matter does not extend to removing a legal impediment or
overriding a legal restriction.
From the foregoing, the advice or recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP Boards as to
the conferment of the Order of National Artists on Conde, Dr. Santos, Francisco and Alcuaz
was not binding on the former President but only discretionary or optional for her whether
or not to act on such advice or recommendation. Also, by virtue of the power of control, the
President had the authority to alter or modify or nullify or set aside such recommendation
or advice. It was well within the Presidents power and discretion to proclaim all, or some or
even none of the recommendees of the CCP and the NCCA Boards, without having to justify
his or her action. Thus, the exclusion of Santos did not constitute grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the former President.
The conferment of the Order of National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Maosa and Moreno was an entirely different matter.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the
law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill
will or personal bias.86
There was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution87 when the former
President gave preferential treatment to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa
and Moreno.1wphi1 The former Presidents constitutional duty to faithfully execute the
laws and observe the rules, guidelines and policies of the NCCA and the CCP as to the
selection of the nominees for conferment of the Order of National Artists proscribed her
from having a free and uninhibited hand in the conferment of the said award. The manifest
disregard of the rules, guidelines and processes of the NCCA and the CCP was an arbitrary
act that unduly favored respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno. The
conferment of the Order of National Artists on said respondents was therefore made with
grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.
While the Court invalidates today the proclamation of respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Maosa and Moreno as National Artists, such action should not be taken as a
pronouncement on whether they are worthy to be conferred that honor. Only the
President, upon the advise of the NCCA and the CCP Boards, may determine that. The Court
simply declares that, as the former President committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6, 2009, the said proclamations are invalid.
However, nothing in this Decision should be read as a disqualification on the part of
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno to be considered for the honor
of National Artist in the future, subject to compliance with the laws, rules and regulations
governing said award.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED in PART. Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829
dated July 6, 2009 proclaiming respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose
Caparas, Francisco Maosa, and Jose Moreno, respectively, as National Artists are declared
INVALID and

SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

SO ORDERED.