People vs Simplicio Villanueva

Facts:
In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the municipality of Alaminos in
Laguna. In said case, the private offended party asked his lawyer friend, Ariston Fule to prosecute
said case. Apparently, Fule was the fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna. Villanueva the opposed the
appearance of Fule as counsel for the offended party as he said that according to the Rules of
Court when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City
Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice.

HELD: No. Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active
and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to
the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
In the case at bar, Fule is not being compensated but rather hes doing it for free for his friend
who happened to be the offended party. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words,
it is frequent habitual exercise. Further, the fact that the Secretary of Justice approved Fules
appearance for his friend should be given credence.

Cui vs Cui

This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The office
in contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was
rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the
defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.

The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa
Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and
incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239
of the Philippine Legislature passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with extensive properties
by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation executed on
2 January 1926.

Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their
incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed
to them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows:

Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro
legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo
en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino
Mariano Cui no estuviese residiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar a
nuestro otro sobrino legitime Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el
HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la
administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon,
mayor de edad, que descienda legitimainente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos
Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o
ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor impuesto
o contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el varon de mas edad descendiente
de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare persona de estas
cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al senor Obispo de
Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica, apostolica, Romana, que tuviere
asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.

Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death
in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first
died on 8 May 1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of
Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of controversies
and court litigations ensued concerning the position of administrator, to which, in so far as they
are pertinent to the present case, reference will be made later in this decision.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano
Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui. On 27 February
1960 the then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui
pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The
next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no
prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.

Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the
defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the
demand not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui
later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another
one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.

As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the
position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances
would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of
age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of
the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o
farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."

The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds
the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a
member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui,
on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March
1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February
1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.

The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de
abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of
donation and considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a
strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor
of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the intervenor.

We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado"
means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the
Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word
"titulo" is defined as "testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o
profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Espaola, Real Academia Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and
the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio,
por escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre
las cuestiones o puntos legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred
by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to
exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law.
This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are
by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.

In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the
Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations,
taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being
his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little
to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an
applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law
school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose,
however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed
courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the
former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any formal legal
education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section
14 of that code required possession of "the necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet
certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado"
because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.

The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test
advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be
a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one
who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under
Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the
government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids
and incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see
to it that the rules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the
provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties of considerable value for all of which
work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the
profession would be a distinct asset.

Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant,
to the office of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he
is nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that
the administrator may be removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge
of his office or lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is made to the fact that the
defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional
conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he
assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation,
upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t

Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion
of the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that
the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the
applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant
must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person of good moral
character a fit and proper person to practice law. The court will take into consideration the
applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the
charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that
has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301,
p. 443)

Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement,

notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the
requirements for reinstatement have been held to be the same as for original admission to the
bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original admission. (7
C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)

The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is "of good
moral character" in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and
is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney, and
whether his mental qualifications are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to
the public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate and distinct from his mental
qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816).
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to
the office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of
donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was
restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous
disbarment were wiped out.

This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting the
prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section
216 of Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within one (1) year after the right of plaintiff to
hold the office arose.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as 1932. On
January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who
assumed the administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father and
Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance
upon a demurrer by the defendant there to the complaint and complaint in intervention. Upon
appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of dismissal, the case was remanded for further
proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as
indicated in the decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui
continued as administrator, Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui
accepted a position as assistant administrator.

Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial maneuvers. First
he informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1 February 1950, that as of the
previous 1 January he had "made clear" his intention of occupying the office of administrator of
the Hospicio." He followed that up with another letter dated 4 February, announcing that he had
taken over the administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually, however, he took his oath of office
before a notary public only on 4 March 1950, after receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2
March, from the Social Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the
position as stated in his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather muddled situation was
referred by the Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 April 1950
(op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting another opinion previously given, in effect ruled that the plaintiff,
not beings lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of the Hospicio.

Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March 1950,
the Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein.
The Bank then filed a third-party complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who
had, as stated above, taken oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950, having been deprived of
recognition by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party
complaint on the ground that he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the administration
of the Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February 1954
he was able to take another oath of office as administrator before President Magsaysay, and
soon afterward filed a second motion to dismiss in Civil case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay,
be it said, upon learning that a case was pending in Court, stated in a telegram to his Executive
Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned the court may disregard the oath" thus taken. The
motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and the other parties in the case filed their notice of
appeal from the order of dismissal. The plaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as
party in the appeal and the trial Court again granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954.
Appellants thereupon instituted a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-
8540), which was decided on 28 May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in
the appeal. That appeal, however, after it reached this Court was dismiss upon motion of the
parties, who agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of the Hospicio ... should be
ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbent by whomsoever is
not occupying the office but believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of
dismissal was issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui,
but no action in quo warranto was filed against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the
aforesaid motion for dismissal.

On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as member of the
Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as administrator in his favor,
pursuant to the "convenio" between them executed on the same date. The next day Antonio Ma.
Cui took his oath of office.

The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the first case
of Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings; his
acceptance instead of the position of assistant administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to
continue as administrator and his failure to file an action in quo warranto against said Dr. Cui
after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was dismissed
upon motion of the parties precisely so that the conflicting claims of the parties could be
ventilated in such an action all these circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present claim
in view of the rule that an action in quo warranto must be filed within one year after the right of
the plaintiff to hold the office arose. The excuse that the plaintiff did not file an action against Dr.
Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of the latter's illness did not interrupt the running of the
statutory period. And the fact that this action was filed within one year of the defendant's
assumption of office in September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's position any better, for the
basis of the action is his own right to the office and it is from the time such right arose that the
one-year limitation must be counted, not from the date the incumbent began to discharge the
duties of said office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.

Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson
of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the
deed of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who
is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la
muerte o incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una
sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de
nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo
de abogado ... En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente
de quien tenia ultimamente la administration." Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo
Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are
otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the
administration by line and successively to the descendants of the nephews named in the deed,
in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui,
who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente
Cui, to whom the intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms
of the deed of donation.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set
aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs equally
against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.

In Re: Almacen

Rule 11.03 Duty to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before
the Courts

FACTS

This is about Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's Petition to surrender Lawyer's certificate of title filed
in protest against what he asserts is a great injustice committed against his client by this
Supreme Court. Almacen indicts the Court as a tribunal peopled by men who are calloused to
pleas of justice, who ignore without reasons as their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.

Almacen continues, his client, who was deeply aggrieved by the Court's unjust judgments, has
become one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy. He also ridiculed the
members of the Court saying that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb. He vows to argue the cause of his
client in the people's forum so that people may know of the silent injustices committed by
this Court, and that whatever mistakes, wrongs, and injustices that were committed must
never be repeated.

He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of his petition thus, the Manila Times
published statements attributed to him by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of Manila
Chronicle. In connection, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had accused the high tribunal of
offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself.

(You can start here if di ka ganahan mag taas taas pa)

It all started because of the civil case Yaptinchay v. Calero in which Atty. Almacen was the counsel
for Calero where the trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. Atty.
Almacen received a copy of the decision and 20 days later, he moved for reconsideration. He
served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify on the time and place of
hearing. Said motion was denied for lack of proof of service. To prove that he did serve the
adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed a 2 nd motion for
reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card but the motion was
however withdrawn by the trial Court. Trial Court elevated the case to CA.

CA however on the authority of the SC's decision in Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. Inc. v. Batu
Construction & Co. dismissed the appeal:

Court resolved to dismiss the appeal for the reason that the motion for reconsideration does
not contain notice of time and place of hearing thereof, and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper
which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was
perfected out of time.

Atty. Almacen moved again to reconsider the resolution urging that the Manila Surety nd Fidelity
Co. Inc. v. Batu Construction & Co. is not decisive. At the same time, he filed a pleading entitled
Latest decision of the Supreme Court in support for Motion for Reconsideration citing Republic
of PH v. Gregorio Venturanza. Again, CA denied his motion.

Atty. Almaen then appealed to Court by certiorari and was again denied through a minute
resolution but shortly thereafter, he again filed a motion for reconsideration as well as his
petition for leave to file a 2nd motion for reconsideration and for extension of time but was
ordered expunged from the records. It was at this juncture Atty. Almacen vented his
disappointment by filing his Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title pleading filled

from beginning to end with insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory
remarks against the Court as well as for its individual members that is seen as unprofessional.

Nonetheless, Court decided by resolution to withhold action for his petition until he has actually
surrendered his certificate. Court waited for him but no word came from him. He was reminded
to turn over his certificate so that the Court can act on his petition however he manifested he
has no pending petition in connection with Calero v. Yaptinchay for case is now final and
executory and that the Court's resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative
act, and that since his offer was not accepted, he chose to pursue the negative act.

In exercise of the Court's inherent power to discipline a member of the Bar for gross misconduct,
the Court resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him.

Atty. Almacen denying the charges against him asked for permission to give reasons and cause
why no disciplinary action should be taken against him... in open and public hearing. Court then
resolved to require Atty. Almacen to state his reasons for such request. He then reasoned that
since the Court is the complainant, prosecutor and Judge he preferred to be heard and answer
questions in an open and public hearing so that the Court could observe his sincerity and candor.
He also asked to file a written explanation in the event the Court has no time to hear him in
person. Court allowed him and he was also heard in oral argument.

In Atty. Almacen's written answer, he offered no apology. He repeated his lamentations

embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo.

ISSUE

Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined

HELD

Yes.

Before going into detail, Court first justified the importance of minute resolutions. Court held
that most petitions by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all.
The rest do exhibit a 1st impression cogency but fail to withstand critical scrutiny and the Court
has been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari. As it is, if they were to accept
every case or write a full opinion for every petition they reject, Court will be unable to carry out
effectively the burden placed upon by the Constitution to decide only those cases which present
questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond particular facts and parties
involved. It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain
the courts denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of
Appeals opinion. (sec.4, Rule 46 of Rules of Court)

Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review it was found that Court of Appeals had fully and
correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of
the Court tracing the procedural lines etched by the Court in a number of decisions.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew or
ought to have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of period of
appeal, movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon adverse party but to also notify
of the time and place of hearing which admittedly did not. This rule was articulated in Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co. Inc. v. Batu Construction & Co. :

Rule 15, Section 4 & 5 which provides that such notice shall state the time and place of hearing
and shall be served upon all parties concerned at least 3 days in advance. And according to
Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by Court without proof of such notice.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate Court to review lower court's judgment, he has only
himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of remedy of appeal, which is not a
matter of right. To shift away himself from his carelessness he looked for a whipping boy and
took the liberty of vilifying Court and inflicted exacerbating rancor on members thereof. It thus
appears there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.

On Almacen's attack on the high Court, they acknowledged that it is natural for a lawyer to
express his dissatisfaction each tim he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case.
That is why lawyers are given wide latitude to differ with, and voice disapproval of, not only on
Court's rulings but also in manner which they are handed down. However, as a citizen and officer
of the Court, every lawyer is expected not to only exercise his right, but also to consider his duty
to expose shortcomings and indiscretions of Courts and judges. It is the cardinal condition of all
such criticism that it shall be bonafide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
A wide chasm exists between fair criticism on the one hand, and abuse and slander of Courts and
judges on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty to respect to
Courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

Membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux
and ferment. He vows solemnly to conduct himself with all good fidelity.. to the Court and the
Rules of Court constantly remind him to observe and maintain respect due to courts of justice
and judicial officers. The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him to maintain toward the Courts
a respectful attitude, not for the sake of temporary incumbent of judicial office but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance.

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to Courts is essential to orderly

administration of justice. Hence, in assertion of their client's rights, lawyers, even those gifted
with superior intellect, are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and
it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but
discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to
the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the
tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering
respectful submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by
corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does
not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The
lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of
two years. (In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723, 725)
In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney
in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms "criminal, corrupt, and wicked
conspiracies," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal
prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered
conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered
stricken from the roll of attorneys.

In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the
official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was
disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general, claiming that the judge
was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.

In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared
Over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his
acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His
disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.

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In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rights of
the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this
Court found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made
disclosed.

In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al.,
supra, where counsel charged this Court With having "repeatedly fallen" into the pitfall of blindly
adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction"
of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal.

The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession,
by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within Court's authority to do. By constitutional mandate, ours is the
solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of
law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from
the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in
the Bar.
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an
assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in
question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.

The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation
speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far
transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. It is not a whit less than a classic
example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the
Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion
of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.

We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism.

But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function
as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means
synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real
qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court
must possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed by perspective and infused by
philosophy.

The misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be

overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be
decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not
perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize
that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence
of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will
suffice under the circumstances.

His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering
apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last and,
accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. The merit of this
choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself
how long or how short that suspension shall] last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes
effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby,
suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.

TAN V. SABANDAL (170 SCRA 211 2/10/89

FACTS: Respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but because of
pending administrative complaints filed against him regarding instances when he called himself
attorney knowing full well that he was not yet admitted to the Bar, he was not allowed to take
the lawyers oath. Oppositors evidence sufficiently show that respondent had held himself out
as an attorney in the agrarian, civil and criminal cases and he was paid for his legal services

He then filed a petition to be admitted to the Philippine Bar and

to be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys. In a resolution promulgated

on November 29, 1983 respondent petition was denied. Respondent asks for

forgiveness, understanding and benevolence and promises that, if given a

chance to be a member of the Phil. Bar, he would always be faithful to the

lawyers oath and conduct himself in an upright manner.

HELD: Whether or not respondent shall be admitted to the Philippine Bar rests to a great extent
in the sound discretion of the Court. An applicant must satisfy the Court that he is a person of
good moral character, fit and proper to practice law. Sabandal hereby allowed to take the
lawyers oath

Tan vs. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473 (1992)

DOCTRINES:

The practice of law is not a matter of right.

No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than

truthfulness or candor.

FACTS:

Respondent Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but was denied to take

his oath in view of the finding of the Court that he was guilty of

unauthorized practice of law. Since then, he had filed numerous petitions

for him to be allowed to take his lawyer's oath.

Acting to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the executive judge of the
province where Sabandal is domiciled to submit a comment on respondent's

moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. In compliance therewith, the

executive judge stated in his comment that he is not aware of any acts

committed by the respondent as would disqualify him to from admission to

the Bar. However, he added that respondent has a pending civil case before

his court for cancellation/reversion proceedings, in which respondent, then

working as Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands, is alleged to have

secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land

which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible

of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the

bank. The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land subsequently sold at

public auction and respondent has not redeemed the land since then.

The case was however been settled through amicable settlement. The said

amicable settlement canceled the OCT under Free Patent in the name of

Sabandal and his mortgage in the bank; provided for the surrender of the

certificate of title to the RD for proper annotation; reverted to the mass

of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid certificate of title

with respondent refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership

over the said land. Respondent also paid the bank a certain sum for the

loan and interest.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent may be admitted to the practice of law

considering that he already submitted three (3) testimonials regarding his

good moral character, and his pending civil case has been terminated.
HELD:

His petition must be denied.

Time and again, it has been held that practice of law is not a matter of

right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned

in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.

It should be recalled that respondent worked as Land Investigator at the

Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated his procurement of the free

patent title over the property which he could not but have known was a

public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of

his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the

public service, which cannot be erased by the termination of the case and

where no determination of guilt or innocence was made because the suit has

been compromised. This is a sad reflection of his sense of honor and fair

dealings.

Moreover, his failure to reveal to the Court the pendency of the civil case

for Reversion filed against him during the period that he was submitting

several petitions and motions for reconsiderations reveal his lack of

candor and truthfulness.

Although, the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it

has been defined as "including at least common dishonesty." It has also

been held that no moral qualification for membership is more important than

truthfulness or candor.
BANSIG VS CELERA

ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, RESPONDENT

Facts:

Bansig, sister of bunagan narrated that, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan, entered into a
contract of marriage. However, notwithstanding respondents marriage with Bunagan,
respondent contracted another marriage with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba, as evidenced
by a certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage Bansig stressed that the marriage between
respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when he contracted his second
marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any
lawful authority.

Bansig alleged that respondents act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which
renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.

Issue:

whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of
justice

Ruling:

For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of
respondent are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which
renders him unfit to continue as a member of the Bar

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member
of the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.
His act of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly
immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court.

JOSE ALCALA and AVELINA IMPERIAL, petitioners,

vs.
HONESTO DE VERA, respondent.

FACTS:

In a civil case for annulment of a sale of 2 lots filed by one Semenchuk against Sps.
Alcala on the ground that one of the lots cannot be located or did not exist, herein respondent
represented sps. Alcala. Trial Court rendered judgement rescinding the contract of sale on the
ground that Semenchuk was not able to take material possession of the lot in question and that
it has been occupied by one Ruperto Ludovice and his brothers for a number of years already.

On April 19, 1963, respondent Atty. de Vera received a copy of the decision but he failed
to inform his clients of the judgment against them. On July 17, 1963, a sheriff came to
complainants' house to serve a writ of executionissued in said case. Totally caught by surprise,
Jose Alcala immediately wrote to the trial court and inquired for the status of case 2478. The
deputy Clerk of Court, in his reply dated July 22, 1963, informed Alcala that the case was
decided on April 17, 1963, that a copy of the decision was received by respondent attorney on
April 19, 1963, and that since no appeal was taken, a writ of execution was issued by the trial
court on motion of the plaintiff Semenchuk.

spouses Alcala instituted civil case 2723 for damages against Atty. Honesto de Vera for
having failed to inform them of the decision in case 2478 as a result of which they lost their
right to appeal from said decision. The court denied it for failure to show that they indeed
suffered damages.

Complainants instituted this complaint for disbarment against their former counsel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not disbarment is proper.

HELD:
 For indifference, loyalty and lack of interest of respondent in handling complainant's
defense.

The evidence proving existence of lot offered by sps. Alcala which respondent allegedly
failed to present was rendered unnecessary for the commissioner appointed already reported
that the lot existed but the same was in the possession of other persons. The fact that the
plaintiff, Semenchuk, was not awarded any damages, attorney's fees, and costs shows that
respondent attorney exerted his utmost to resist plaintiff's complaint.

For gross negligence and malpractice committed by respondent for failure to inform his
clients of the decision in the civil case.

Petitioners do not appear to have suffered any material or pecuniary damage by the
failure of respondent Atty. De Vera to notify them of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478 since
the decision rendered was fair and justified. It is no less true, however, that in failing to inform
his clients, the petitioners, of the decision in said civil case, respondent failed to exercise "such
skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such
matters of professional employment"

The correctness of the decision in the civil case is no ground for exonerating respondent
of the charge but at most will serve only to mitigate his liability. While there is no finding of
malice, deceit, or deliberate intent to cause damage to his clients, there is, nonetheless, proof
of negligence, inattention, and carelessness on the part of respondent in his failure to give
timely notice of the decision in question. Fortunately for respondent, his negligence did not
result in any material or pecuniary damage to the herein complainants and for this reason We
are not disposed to impose upon him what may be considered in a lawyer's career as the
extreme penalty of disbarment.

The disbarment of an attorney is not intended as a punishment, but is rather intended

to protect the administration of justice.

Act of respondent manifests a lack of total dedication or devotion to their interest

expected of him under his lawyer's oath and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Respondent's
inaction merits a severe censure from the Court.

GUILTY only of simple negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer of

complainants, and We hereby SEVERELY CENSURE him.

Natividad Navarro v Ivan Solidum

Facts:

In April 2006, Hilda Presbitero engaged the services of Atty. Ivan Solidum, Jr. to help her in the
quieting of her title over a parcel of land. Presbitero paid Solidum P50,000.00 as acceptance fee.
In May 2006, Ma. Theresa Yulo, daughter of Presbitero also engaged the services of Solidum for
the registration of a parcel of land. Yulo however asked the help of her sister, Natividad Navarro,
to finance the case. Hence, Navarro gave Solidum Php200,000.00 for the registration expenses.
Meanwhile, Solidum in May and June 2006, obtained a total of Php2 million from Navarro. The
loan was covered by two Memorandum of Agreement (MOAs). The MOA was prepared by
Solidum. The MOA stated that the monthly interest shall be 10%.
Solidum also borrowed Php 1 million from Presbitero during the same period. He again drafted a
MOA containing the same terms and conditions as with Navarro. As additional security for the
loan, Solidum mortgaged his 263-hectare land for P1 million in favor of Presbitero.
Nothing happened in the quieting of title case field by Presbitero since Solidum did nothing after
receiving the acceptance fee.
In the land registration case of Yulo financed by Navarro, Navarro later found out that the land
was already registered to someone else. Navarro claims that she should not have financed the
case if only Solidum advised her of the status of the land.
Anent the loans, Solidum failed to pay them. Instead, he questioned the terms of the loans as he
claimed that the interest rate of said loans at 10% is unconscionable.
Navarro and Presbitero later filed an administrative case against Solidum.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ivan Solidum, Jr. should be disbarred.

HELD: Yes.
Although Solidum acted in his private capacity when he obtained a total of Php3 million from
Navarro and Presbitero, he may still be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his private
capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the
court. In this case, such act displayed by Solidum merited his disbarment.
Solidum is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional capacity
with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to Navarro. Both
Presbitero and Navarro allowed Splidum to draft the terms of the loan agreements.
Solidum drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his
knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same MOAs he prepared.
In the case of Navarro, who financed the Yulo case, Solidum also violated Canon 16 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession. This is notwithstanding the fact that
Navarro is not actually his client in the Yulo case but was only the financier of the Yulo case.
In Presbiteros case, since Presbitero is his client, Solidum also violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Even though Solidum secured the loan with a mortgage and a MOA, Presbiteros interest
was not fully protected because the property Solidum mortgaged was overvalued. He claimed
that his 263-hectare land was worth P1 million but in fact Solidum sold it later for only
P150,000.00. Clearly, Presbitero was disadvantaged by Solidums ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation. He took advantage of his knowledge of the law as well
as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client.
Solidum was disbarred by the Supreme Court.

De Los Santos Sr. v. Sebastian Palanca

Facts:
In 1952, Atty. Ceferino De Los Santos, Sr. and his son, also a lawyer, was engaged by Sebastian
Palanca to represent the latter in an estate proceedings case. Their written agreement only
covered the estate case. However, some time later, Palanca also engaged the services of Attys.
De Los Santos in a civil case against La Tondea, Inc. That was not covered by any written
agreement.
That case was later dismissed due to the negligence of Atty. De Los Santos and their failure to
appear in court during trial. As such, Palanca refused to pay them their attorneys fees. It is the
contention of Atty. De Los Santos that they should still be paid their fees amounting to
Php40,000.00 based on quantum meruit.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. De Los Santos and his son are entitled to attorneys fees based
on quantum meruit.
HELD: No. It was upon their negligence that the civil case was dismissed. Even assuming that their
negligence is excusable, as they in fact so claim, still, the fact is, the case was dismissed due to
their non-appearance and negligence. Hence, they are not entitled to any fee at all.

Gloria Jinon v Leonardo Jiz

Facts:
In 2003, Gloria Jinon engaged the services of Atty. Leonardo Jiz to help her recover a land title
from her sister-in-law. Jinon paid Atty. Jiz Php17,000.00 as acceptance fee.
After accepting the case, Atty. Jiz sent demand letters to Jinons sister-in-law, collected rents
from the tenant of the disputed property, and gave legal advice to Jinon. At the same time, he
asked Php45,000.00 from Jinon which he said will be used as expenses in the transfer of title. But
Atty. Jiz never made a move to cause the title to be transferred in Jinons name.
Eventually, Jinon decided to terminate the services of Atty. Jiz. And since the title was not
transferred in her name, she demanded that Atty. Jiz return the Php45,000.00 she earlier paid as
well as the rents that Atty. Jiz had been collecting (amounting to Php12,000.00). Atty. Jiz only
returned Php5,000.00 from the rent.
Jinon then filed an administrative case against Atty. Jiz. Jinon demanded that Atty. Jiz return the
Php45,000.00, the remaining Php7,000.00 rent, as well as the Php17,000.00 acceptance fee.
In his defense, Atty. Jiz averred that Jinon agreed that his services will be worth Php75,000.00;
and that his services will only cover the protection of the rights of Jinon against her sister in law
and not for the recovery of title. As such, deducting the Php45,000.00 and the acceptance fee of
Php17,000.00, Jinon actually still owe Atty. Jiz Php13,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Leonardo Jiz violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: Yes, he violated Canons 16 and 18. Atty. Jiz was remiss in his duties as a lawyer in
neglecting his clients case and misappropriating her fund. The defense raised by Atty. Jiz cannot
be given credence because it appears that the receipt for the acceptance fee he received from
Jinon showed that the Php17 k was the full payment. The receipt was even signed by him. Said
amount is also sufficient to cover the actual legal services he rendered to Jinon.

Since he was not able to act on the transfer of title, he must return Jinons money. Money
entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of land title,
but not used for the purpose, should be immediately returned. A lawyers failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed to him by his client.
Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. Atty. Jiz was suspended for two
years.

Commission on Elections vs Tomas Noynay

Facts:
In 1996, the Commission on Elections filed criminal cases against certain individuals for violations
of the Omnibus Election Code. The cases were filed with a Regional Trial Court in Samar presided
over by Judge Tomas Noynay. Judge Noynay however dismissed the said cases as he ruled that
the RTC has no jurisdiction over the said cases because said criminal offenses were punishable
with less than six years imprisonment. He said that said cases should be filed with the MTC.
Atty. Jose Balbuena, member of COMELECs legal department, filed a motion for reconsideration.
He cited a case entitled: Alberto Naldeza vs Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M No. MTJ-94-1009, March
5, 1996 (245 SCRA 286). According to Atty. Balbuena, in the said case he cited, the Supreme
Court has already settled the issue and Atty. Balbuena even copied in toto the said ruling by the
Supreme Court in his motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Tomas Noynay is correct in dismissing the case.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court admonished Judge Noynay for dismissing the case as the same was
contrary to Section 32 of B.P. 129 as well as Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that election cases are within the jurisdiction
of the regional trial courts except certain cases (which were not the cases filed by COMELEC in
this case).
Section 32 of B.P. 129, on the other hand, provides that as a rule, Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of
fine EXCEPT otherwise provided by special law. The Omnibus Election Code is a special law which
provides that election offenses, regardless of penalties, are under the jurisdiction of the regional
trial courts.
Judge Noynay was not able to follow these rules. It is a judges duty to be studious of the
principles of law, to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law
itself, to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional competence.
On the other hand, Atty. Balbuena is also admonished for being reckless in citing cases. The
Supreme Court said that the passage cited by Balbuena in his Motion was not the actual decision
of the Supreme Court in the said case cited but rather the memorandum of the court
administrator which was quoted in the said case. Further, his citation of Naldeza vs Lavilles, Jr.
was wrong. Not only did he spell Naldeza wrong (as the correct spelling was NALDOZA), he also
cited the wrong SCRA. It should have been 254 SCRA 286 and not 245 SCRA 286.
Balbuena is reminded of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
requires that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or
authority.

Ma. Libertad Cantiller vs Atty. Humberto Potenciano

Facts:
In 1987, the sisters Ma. Libertad Cantiller and Peregrina Cantiller lost an ejectment case. The two
were later introduced by a friend to Atty. Humberto Potenciano. Potenciano said he can help the
sisters because the judge handling the case was his close friend. Potenciano, with the little time
he got, immediately filed a petition to counter the order to vacate issued against the sisters. He
asked for P1,000.00 for his fees from the sisters.
But later on, the judge handling the case asked Potenciano to inhibit because of the fact that they
are friends. Potenciano then asked an additional P2,000.00 from the sisters. He said he needs to
find another judge who can rule in their favor. He also asked another P10,000.00 from the sisters.
He said this amount is needed in order for them to re-acquire their apartment. On top of the
P10k, he also asked for another P1k for additional expenses. The sisters were able to pool
resources from friends just to raise the amount asked for by Potenciano.
It turned out however that the court never asked P10k from the parties nor was the additional
P1k asked by the court. Worse, said amount (P11k) was never deposited in court. The sisters
demanded Potenciano to return the said amount but he failed to do so hence they filed an
administrative case against him. In his defense, Potenciano claimed that the sister were merely
harassing him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Potenciano should be subjected to disciplinary actions.

HELD: Yes. From the records, it appears that Potenciano haphazardly prepared the pleadings he
wrote for the sisters. In fact, the cases he filed for the sisters were all dismissed for lack of cause
of action. Worse, he got P11k from the sisters but never used the same for the case instead he
pocketed it for himself. When he contracted the sisters, Potenciano, as a lawyer, bound himself
to undertake his legal services with maximum effort until the conclusion of the case. The failure
to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of a clients cause makes such lawyer unworthy of
the trust which the client had reposed on him.
It is also of no moment that Potenciano had little time to prepare for the pleading. When he
accepted the case, his clients reposed full faith in him. But he never complemented the trust and
faith reposed in him. He even bragged his closeness with the judge and even intimated the need
to buy another judge. Such actions are reprehensible.
Potenciano was suspended indefinitely until he can show to the court that he is fit to practice
law.

Atty. Elmer Solidon vs Atty. Ramil Macalalad

Facts:
In 2005, Atty. Elmer Solidon engaged the services of Atty. Ramil Macalalad for the latter to handle
the judicial titling of a parcel of land owned by the Solidons in Borongan, Samar. They agreed for
a fee of P80k. Solidon gave P50k as downpayment to Macalalad and the remaining P30k shall be
paid after Solidon shall receive the title over the said property.
But for 6 months after the P50k was given, Atty. Macalalad never gave an update to Solidon. It
turns out that Macalalad never filed any petition to register the land.
Solidon then filed an administrative case against Macalalad. Solidon alleged that Macalalad
neglected his duties and even avoided talking to him despite efforts from Solidon to
communicate with Macalalad.
In his defense, Macalalad averred that he did not file the petition because Solidon failed to
update him and that Solidon never gave the documents he was asking for.
Eventually, the Commission on Bar Discipline recommended Macalalad to be suspended for three
months.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Macalalad should be suspended.

HELD: Yes. Macalalad is guilty of negligence when he neglected his clients cause. This is a
violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is negligent
if he failed to do anything to protect his clients interest after receiving his acceptance fee.
Further, there is also negligence when he failed to update his client about the status of the case.
Even if assuming that Solidon was also negligent, Macalalad cannot shift the blame to his client
for failing to follow up on his case because it was the lawyers duty to inform his client of the
status of the case. Even if the client has been equally at fault for the lack of communication, the
main responsibility remains with the lawyer to inquire and know the best means to acquire the
required information. The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling
Solidons case, and subsequently failing, without valid excuse, to render the services, is a clear
violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Supreme Court also found that not only did Macalalad violated Canon 18, he also violated
Canon 16 when he failed to account for Solidons money. It appears he failed to return Solidons
downpayment of P50k. A lawyer, when he fails to render legal services, shall immediately account
for and promptly return the money he received from his client. Hence, on top of the
recommended 3 months suspension, Macalald was suspended for an additional 3 months or for
a total of 6 months.

Benedicto Hornilla vs Ernesto Salunat

Facts:
Benedicto Hornilla and Federico Ricafort were members of the Philippine Public School Teachers
Association (PPSTA). In 1997, they accused the Board of Directors of PPSTA of unlawfully
spending the funds of PPSTA. However, since the PPSTA was not initiating a complaint against
the Board of Directors, the two then filed a suit on behalf of PPSTA against the Board of PPSTA.
In the said suit, the Board of Directors were represented by Atty. Ernesto Salunat. Hornilla et al
were against the legal representation being made by Salunat for and on behalf of the Board of
Directors because of the fact that Salunat is part of the ASSA Law Offices. And the ASSA Law
Offices happen to be the retained law firm of the PPSTA. In short, Hornilla et al alleged that there
is conflict of interests.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is conflict of interest.

HELD: Yes. The suit filed by Hornilla et al against the Board of PPSTA is a derivative suit. Where
corporate directors have committed a breach of trust either by their frauds, ultra vires acts, or
negligence, and the corporation is unable or unwilling to institute suit to remedy the wrong, a
stockholder (in this case a member because PPSTA is non-stock) may sue on behalf of himself
and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation, to bring about a redress of the
wrong done directly to the corporation and indirectly to the stockholders. In such a case, even
though it was the members who filed the case and not the corporation itself, the real party in
interest is still the corporation (PPSTA) and the suing members (Hornilla et al) are only the
nominal party.
Therefore, since it is the corporation suing, Salunat cannot represent the Board Members of
PPSTA because he is a member of ASSA Law Office which is the retained law firm of PPSTA. Surely,
there is conflict of interest in him representing the Board while his law office represents the
corporation. Salunat was admonished by the Supreme Court.