The police power, it is commonplace learning, is

10) TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ
Facts:
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of
Medical Education and the Center for
Educational Measurement from enforcing a
requirement the taking and passing of the NMAT
as a condition for securing certificates of
eligibility for admission, from proceeding with
accepting applications for taking the NMAT and
from administering the NMAT as scheduled on
26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court
denied said petition and the NMAT was
conducted and administered as scheduled.
The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as
an instrument toward upgrading the selection of
applicants for admission into the medical schools
and its calculated to improve the quality of
medical education in the country. The cutoff
score for the successful applicants, based on the
scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every
year by the Board of Medical Education after
consultation with the Association of Philippine
Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each
applicant, together with the other admission
requirements as presently called for under
existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the
issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility
for admission into the medical colleges.
Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the
NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores
therein as a condition for admission to medical
schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an
unconstitutional imposition.
the pervasive and non-waivable power and
authority of the sovereign to secure and promote
all the important interests and needs in a word,
the public order of the general community. An
important component of that public order is the
health and physical safety and well being of the
population, the securing of which no one can
deny is a legitimate objective of governmental
effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that
needs some consideration is whether there is
some reasonable relation between the prescribing
of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the one hand, and
the securing of the health and safety of the general
community, on the other hand. This question is
perhaps most usefully approached by recalling
that the regulation of the practice of medicine in
all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and
safety of the public.
10) TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ (G.R. NO.
78164)
Facts:
Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B.
Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought
admission into colleges or schools of medicine
for the school year 1987-1988. However, they
either did not take or did not successfully take the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
required by the Board of Medical Education and
administered by the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987,
Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for
admission into the Medical Colleges who have
not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT,
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for
Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a
prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Board of Medical Education and the Center for
Educational Measurement from enforcing
Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as
amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985),
dated 23 August 1985 [which established a
uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional
requirement for issuance of a certificate of
eligibility for admission into medical schools of
the Philippines, beginning with the school year
1986-1987] and from requiring the taking and
passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceeding with accepting applications for taking
the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as
scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future.
After hearing on the petition for issuance of
preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said
petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was
conducted and administered as previously
scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a
Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the
Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the RTC
judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Whether NMAT requirement for admission to
medical colleges contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee for the accessibility of education to all,
and whether such regulation is invalid and/or
unconstitutional.
Held:
No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic
Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the Medical Act
of 1959 defines its basic objectives to govern (a)
the standardization and regulation of medical
education; (b) the examination for registration of
physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and
regulation of the practice of medicine in the
Philippines. The Statute created a Board of
Medical Education and prescribed certain
minimum requirements for applicants to medical
schools.
The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of
the 1987 Constitution which are, in their
assertion, violated by the continued
implementation of Section 5(a) and (f) of RA 238,
as amended, and MECS Order No. 52 series
1985. One of the provision is Article 14, Section
1 which states The State shall protect and
promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels and take appropriate steps
to make such education accessible to all.
The State is not really enjoined to take
appropriate steps to make quality education
accessible to all who might for any number of
reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but
rather merely to make such education accessible
to all who qualify under fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements.
Also, the legislative and administrative
provisions impugned by the petitioners, to the
mind of the Court, is a valid exercise of the Police
Power of the State. The police power is the
pervasive and non-waivable power and authority
of the sovereign to secure and promote important
interest and needs -- in other words, the public
order -- of the general community. An important
component of that public order is health and
physical safety and well being of the population,
the securing of which no one can deny is a
legitimate objective of governmental effort and
regulation.
The regulation of the practice of medicine in all
its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and
safety of the public. The power to regulate and
control the practice of medicine includes the
power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who
wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations have long ago been
recognized as valid exercises of governmental
powers. Similarly, the establishment of minimum
medical educational requirements for admission
to the medical profession, has also been sustained
as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory
authority of the state.
Thus, prescribing the NMAT and requiring
certain scores as a condition for admission to
medical schools do not constitute
unconstitutional imposition.
Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.
11) SAMEER OVERSEAS
PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC.,
PETITIONER,
VS.
JOY C. CABILES, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014
PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Section 10 of RA 8042 vis-a-vis
Section 7 of RA 10022
FACTS:
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency,
Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.
Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus
signed a one-year employment contract for
a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was
deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd.
(Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in
her employment contract, she agreedto work as
quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she
was asked to work as a cutter.
Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a
certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy,
without prior notice, that she was terminated and
that she should immediately report to their office
to get her salary and passport. She was asked to
prepare for immediate repatriation. Joy claims
that she was told that from June 26 to July 14,
1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15
According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to
cover her plane ticket to Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC
against petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the
complaint. NLRC reversed LAs decision. CA
affirmed the ruling of the National Labor
Relations Commission finding respondent
illegally dismissed and awarding her three
months worth of salary, the reimbursement of
the cost of her repatriation, and attorneys fees
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to
the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal
dismissal.
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the award of
the three-month equivalent of respondents salary
should be increased to the amount equivalent to
the unexpired term of the employment contract.
 In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime
Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc.,
this court ruled that the clause or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less is unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection clause and
substantive due process.
A statute or provision which was
declared unconstitutional is not a law. It confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as
if it has not been passed at all.
The Court said that they are aware that
the clause or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less was
reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon
promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in
2010.
Ruling on the constitutional issue
In the hierarchy of laws, the
Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of
the government may exercise its powers in any
manner inconsistent with the Constitution,
regardless of the existence of any law that
supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot
be trumped by any other law. All laws must be
read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is
inconsistent with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law
is null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by
reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a
similar law or provision. A law or provision of
law that was already declared unconstitutional
remains as such unless circumstances have so
changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
The Court observed that the reinstated
clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No.
10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal
protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well
as the Solicitor General have failed to show any
compelling change in the circumstances that
would warrant us to revisit the precedent.
The Court declared, once again, the
clause, or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less in Section
7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section
10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
12) NATIONAL ARTIST ALMARIO V.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
On April 27, 1972, former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1001and, upon
recommendation of the Board of Trustees of the
Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), created
the category of Award and Decoration of
National Artist to be awarded to Filipinos who
have made distinct contributions to arts and
letters. In the same issuance, Fernando Amorsolo
was declared as the first National Artist.
On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356,
otherwise known as the Law Creating the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts,
was signed into law. It established the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA)
and gave it an extensive mandate over the
development, promotion and preservation of the
Filipino national culture and arts and the Filipino
cultural heritage.
CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA have been
mandated by law to promote, develop and protect
the Philippine national culture and the arts, and
authorized to give awards to deserving Filipino
artists, the two bodies decided to team up and
jointly administer the National Artists Award.
On April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel
met. A total of 87 nominees were considered
during the deliberation and a preliminary shortlist
of 32 names was compiled.
On April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation Panel
shortlisted 13 out of the 32 names in the
preliminary shortlist.On May 6, 2009, the final
deliberation was conducted by the 30-member
Final Deliberation Panel comprised of the CCP
Board of Trustees and the NCCA Board of
Commissioners and the living National
Artists.From the 13 names in the second shortlist,
a final list of four names was agreed upon
namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro
Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.
CCP and NCCA submitted this recommendation
to the President. According to respondents, the
aforementioned letter was referred by the Office
of the President to the Committee on Honors.
Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly
received nominations from various sectors,
cultural groups and individuals strongly
endorsing private respondents Cecile Guidote-
Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco
Masa and Jose Moreno. The Committee on
Honors purportedly processed these nominations
and invited resource persons to validate the
qualifications and credentials of the nominees.
Acting on this recommendation, Proclamation
No. 1823 declaring Manuel Conde a National
Artist was issued on June 30, 2009. Subsequently,
on July 6, 2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829
were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico
AguilarAlcuaz and private respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno,
respectively, as National Artists. This was
subsequently announced to the public by then
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita on July 29,
2009.
Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive
province of the NCCA Board of Commissioners
and the CCP Board of Trustees to select those
who will be conferred the Order of National
Artists and to set the standard for entry into that
select group, petitioners instituted this petition for
prohibition, certiorari and injunction (with prayer
for restraining order) praying that the Order of
National Artists be conferred on Dr. Santos and
that the conferment of the Order of National
Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Masa and Moreno be enjoined and declared to
have been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.
All of the petitioners claim that former President
Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her discretion
in disregarding the results of the rigorous
screening and selection process for the Order of
National Artists and in substituting her own
choice for those of the Deliberation Panels.
According to petitioners, the Presidents
discretion to name National Artists is not absolute
but limited. In particular, her discretion on the
matter cannot be exercised in the absence of or
against the recommendation of the NCCA and the
CCP.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of
discretion committed by former President Arroyo
HELD: Yes.
Political Law- Legal Standing
The parties who assail the constitutionality or
legality of a statute or an official act must have a
direct and personal interest. They must show not
only that the law or any governmental act is
invalid, but also that they sustained or are in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that they suffer thereby in some indefinite
way.
In this case, the petitioning National Artists will
be denied some right or privilege to which they
are entitled as members of the Order of National
Artists as a result of the conferment of the award
on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa
and Moreno. In particular, they will be denied the
privilege of exclusive membership in the Order of
National Artists.
Political Law- equal protection
It should be recalled too that respondent Guidote-
Alvarez was disqualified to be nominated for
being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that
time while respondents Masa and Caparas did not
make it to the preliminary shortlist and
respondent Moreno was not included in the
second shortlist. Yet, the four of them were
treated differently and considered favorably
when they were exempted from the rigorous
screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and
conferred the Order of National Artists.
The special treatment accorded to respondents
Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno
fails to pass rational scrutiny.No real and
substantial distinction between respondents and
petitioner Abad has been shown that would
justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and
established procedures, and placing respondents
in an exceptional position. The undue
classification was not germane to the purpose of
the law. Instead, it contradicted the law and well-
established guidelines, rules and regulations
meant to carry the law into effect. While
petitioner Abad cannot claim entitlement to the
Order of National Artists, he is entitled to be
given an equal opportunity to vie for that honor.
In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of
petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an
interest that is substantial enough to confer him
standing in this case.
Political Law- Limits of the Presidents
Discretion
The "power to recommend" includes the power to
give "advice, exhortation or indorsement, which
is essentially persuasive in character, not binding
upon the party to whom it is made."
Thus, in the matter of the conferment of the Order
of National Artists, the President may or may not
adopt the recommendation or advice of the
NCCA and the CCP Boards. In other words, the
advice of the NCCA and the CCP is subject to the
Presidents discretion.
Nevertheless, the Presidents discretion on the
matter is not totally unfettered, nor the role of the
NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless. The
Presidents power must be exercised in
accordance with existing laws. Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution prescribes faithful
execution of the laws by the President
The Presidents discretion in the conferment of the
Order of National Artists should be exercised in
accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the
relevant laws. The faithful execution clause is
best construed as an obligation imposed on the
President, not a separate grant of power.
In this connection, the powers granted to the
NCCA and the CCP Boards in connection with
the conferment of the Order of National Artists
by executive issuances were institutionalized by
two laws, namely, Presidential Decree No. 208
dated June 7, 1973 and Republic Act No. 7356.
In particular, Proclamation No. 1144 dated May
15, 1973 constituted the CCP Board as the
National Artists Awards Committee and tasked it
to "administer the conferment of the category of
National Artist" upon deserving Filipino artists
with the mandate to "draft the rules to guide its
deliberations in the choice of National Artists".

By virtue of their respective statutory mandates
in connection with the conferment of the National
Artist Award, the NCCA and the CCP decided to
work together and jointly administer the National
Artist Award. They reviewed the guidelines for
the nomination, selection and administration of
the National Artist Award. An administrative
regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force
and effect of law. Thus, the rules, guidelines and
policies regarding the Order of National Artists
jointly issued by the CCP Board of Trustees and
the NCCA pursuant to their respective statutory
mandates have the force and effect of law. Until
set aside, they are binding upon executive and
administrative agencies,including the President
himself/herself as chief executor of laws.
In view of the various stages of deliberation in the
selection process and as a consequence of his/her
duty to faithfully enforce the relevant laws, the
discretion of the President in the matter of the
Order of National Artists is confined to the names
submitted to him/her by the NCCA and the CCP
Boards. This means that the President could not
have considered conferment of the Order of
National Artists on any person not considered and
recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards.
That is the proper import of the provision of
Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, that the NCCA
and the CCP "shall advise the President on the
conferment of the Order of National Artists."
Applying this to the instant case, the former
President could not have properly considered
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and
Moreno, as their names were not recommended
by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. Otherwise,
not only will the stringent selection and
meticulous screening process be rendered futile,
the respective mandates of the NCCA and the
CCP Board of Trustees under relevant laws to
administer the conferment of Order of National
Artists, draft the rules and regulations to guide its
deliberations, formulate and implement policies
and plans, and undertake any and all necessary
measures in that regard will also become
meaningless.
Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6,
2009 proclaiming respondents Cecile Guidote-
Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas,
Francisco Masa, and Jose Moreno,
respectively, as National Artists are declared
INVALID and SET ASIDE for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion.
13) VACCO VS. QUILL
Brief Fact Summary. Under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
a state statute forbidding assisted suicide was
challenged as unconstitutional.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Although there is a
distinction between refusing lifesaving medical
treatment and assisted suicide, neither violates
the Equal Protection Clause since they apply
evenhandedly to all.
Facts.
Quill (Plaintiff) and three gravely ill patients who
have since died sued the New York State
Attorney General (Defendant). They urged that
because New York (Defendant) permits a
competent person to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment, and the refusal of such
treatment is "essentially the same thing" as
physician-assisted suicide, Defendant"s ban on
assisted suicide was a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The district court disagreed, but the court of
appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, finding
that those in the final stages of fatal illness who
were on life-support systems were allowed to
hasten their deaths by choosing to have those
systems removed; but those who were in a similar
situation, except for the previous attachment of
life-sustaining equipment, were not allowed to
hasten death by self-administering drugs
prescribed by a doctor. The court of appeals
concluded that this supposed unequal treatment
was not rationally related to any legitimate state
interest. Certiorari was granted by the Supreme
Court.
Issue. Although there is a distinction between
refusing lifesaving medical treatment and
assisted suicide, does this distinction operate in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause by
treating individuals who wish to end their lives
differently?
Held. (Rehnquist, C.J.) No. Although there is a
distinction between refusing lifesaving medical
treatment and assisted suicide, neither violates
the Equal Protection Clause since they apply
evenhandedly to all. Logic and current practice
support New York"s (Defendant) judgment that
the two acts are different and, therefore,
Defendant may treat them differently, consistent
with the Constitution. A doctor who assists a
suicide must, necessarily and unquestionably,
primarily intend that the patient be made dead.
The law has long used actors" intent or purpose
to distinguish between two acts that may have the
same result. The overwhelming majority of state
legislatures have drawn a clear line between
assisted suicide and withdrawing or permitting
the refusal of unwanted lifesaving medical
treatment by prohibiting the former but allowing
the latter. New York"s (Defendant) statutes
outlawing assisted suicide do not infringe
fundamental rights or involve suspect
classifications, and therefore are entitled to a
strong presumption of validity. On their faces,
neither Defendant"s ban on assisted suicide nor
its statutes that allow patients to refuse medical
treatment treat anyone differently or draw any
distinctions between individuals. Generally
speaking, laws that apply evenhandedly to all
unquestionably comply with the Equal Protection
Clause. Reversed.
Concurrence. (Souter, J.) The reasons that lead
me to conclude that the prohibition on assisted
suicide in Glucksberg is not arbitrary under the
due process standard also support the distinction
between assisted suicide, which is banned, and
practices such as termination of artificial life
support and pain medication that hastens death,
which are permitted.
Discussion. Assisted suicide and euthanasia are
officially prohibited, but doctors are not
criminally prosecuted for either. Juries do not
usually convict physicians who assist in their
patients" suicides.
14) LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS. COMELEC
C. UNDERINCLUSIVENESS ARGUMENT
AND INVERSE EQUAL PROTECTION
15) PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION
VS PETE PRADO
227 SCRA 703 Political Law Constitutional
Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection
Franking Privilege of the Judiciary
Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized
the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to
withdraw franking privileges from certain
government agencies. Franking privilege is a
privilege granted to certain agencies to make use
of the Philippine postal service free of charge.
In 1992, a study came about where it was
determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the
postal service comes from the judiciarys use of
the postal service (issuance of court processes).
Hence, the postal service recommended that the
franking privilege be withdrawn from the
judiciary. AS a result, the PPC issued a circular
withdrawing the said franking privilege.
The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed
the circular and questioned the validity of Section
35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed that the said
provision is violative of the equal protection
clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the
franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there
is a violation of the equal protection clause. The
judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as
it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is
the high expense allotted to the judiciarys
franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be
sustained in contending that the removal of the
franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to
cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the
Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by
removing the franking privilege of the judiciary,
then they should have removed the franking
privilege all at once from all the other
departments. If the problem is the loss of
revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy
is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of
the government, including those who do not need
it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for
some and withdrawing it from others, especially
where there is no substantial distinction between
those favored, which may or may not need it at
all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it.
The problem is not solved by violating the
Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the
universal application of the laws on all persons or
things without distinction (it is true that the
postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from
other agencies of the government but still, the
judiciary is different because its operation largely
relies on the mailing of court processes). This
might in fact sometimes result in unequal
protection, as where, for example, a law
prohibiting mature books to all persons,
regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the
youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the
clause requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. By
classification is meant the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars
and different from all others in these same
particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices
from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice
in a category to which it does not belong. If it
recognizes the need of the President of the
Philippines and the members of Congress for the
franking privilege, there is no reason why it
should not recognize a similar and in fact greater
need on the part of the Judiciary for such
privilege.
16) DE GUZMAN VS COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
GR 129118 19 July 2000
Facts:
Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations
pursuant to Section 44 of the Voters registration
act.
The act prohibits election officers from holding
office in a particular city or municipality for more
than 4 years. Petitioners claim that the act
violated the equal protection clause because not
all election officials were covered by the
prohibition.
Petitioners contend that RA 8189 Section 44 is
unconstitutional as it violates the equal protection
clause enshrined in the constitution; that it
violates constitutional guarantee on security of
civil servants; that it undermines the
constitutional independence of comelec and
comelecs constitutional authority; that it
contravenes the basic constitutional precept; that
it is void for its failure to be read on 3 separate
readings
Issue: Whether or Not section 44 of RA 8189 is
unconstitutional
Ruling: No, RA 8189 Sec 44 is not
unconstitutional. It has not violated the equal
protection clause. It is intended to ensure the
impartiality of election officials by preventing
them from developing familiarity with the people
of their place of assignment. Large-scale
anomalies in the registration of voters cannot be
carried out without the complicity of election
officers, who are the highest representatives of
Comelec in a city or municipality
D. DOCTRINE OF RELATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALITY
17) CENTRAL BANK V. BANGKO
SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (2004)
EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 148208, DECEMBER 15, 2004]
CENTRAL BANK (NOW BANGKO
SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS) EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, INC., PETITIONER, vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New
Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old
Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a
new BSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central
Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc.,
filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and
the Executive Secretary of the Office of the
President, to restrain respondents from further
implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c),
Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it
is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653
provides:
Section 15, Exercise of Authority -In the exercise
of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:
(c) Establish a human resource management
system which shall govern the selection, hiring,
appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of
all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels of the
Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound
principles of management.
A compensation structure, based on job
evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject
to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an
integral component of the Bangko Sentrals
human resource development program: Provided,
That the Monetary Board shall make its own
system conform as closely as possible with the
principles provided for under Republic Act No.
6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided,
however, that compensation and wage structure
of employees whose positions fall under salary d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all
grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus
the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. within the class of rank-and-file personnel of
6758. The thrust of petitioners challenge is that government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP
the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut rank-and-file are also discriminated upon; and
between two classes of employees in the BSP,
e. the assailed proviso has caused the
viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from
demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and
the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law
resulted in the gross disparity between their
(SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file
compensation and that of the BSP officers.
(Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not
exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-
exempt class). It is contended that this
classification is a classic case of class In sum, petitioner posits that the classification
legislation, allegedly not based on substantial is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and
distinctions which make real differences, but violates the equal protection clause of the
solely on the SG of the BSP personnels position. Constitution. Petitioner also stresses: (a) that
R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which
will allow the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the proviso in question
Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to
without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the
the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A.
urgency and propriety of the petition, as some
No. 7653, the most important of which is to
2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have been
establish professionalism and excellence at all
prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was
levels in the BSP. Petitioner offers the following
implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since
sub-set of arguments:
the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of
law, respondents implementation of such
amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no
a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows
appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate
that the questioned proviso does not appear in the
remedy in the ordinary course except through this
original and amended versions of House Bill No.
petition for prohibition, which this Court should
7037, nor in the original version of Senate Bill
take cognizance of, considering the
No. 1235;
transcendental importance of the legal issue
b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank- involved.
and-file employees to the rate prescribed by the
SSL actually defeats the purpose of the law of
establishing professionalism and excellence eat Respondent BSP, in its comment, contends that
all levels in the BSP; the provision does not violate the equal protection
clause and can stand the constitutional test,
c. the assailed proviso was the product of
provided it is construed in harmony with other
amendments introduced during the deliberation
provisions of the same law, such as fiscal and
of Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its
administrative autonomy of BSP, and the
relevance to the objectives of the law, and even
mandate of the Monetary Board to establish
admitted by one senator as discriminatory against
professionalism and excellence at all levels in
low-salaried employees of the BSP;
accordance with sound principles of
management.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent
Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of
the provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that
the classification is based on actual and real
differentiation, even as it adheres to the
enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish
professionalism and excellence within the BSP
subject to prevailing laws and policies of the
national government.
ISSUE:
Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be
resolved in this case is whether the last paragraph
of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs
afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No
person shall be . . . denied the equal protection of
the laws."
RULING:
A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF
EQUAL PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c),
ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection
challenges indubitably show that the
classification created by the questioned proviso,
on its face and in its operation, bears no
constitutional infirmities.
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal
protection" clause does not prevent the
Legislature from establishing classes of
individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate - so long as the classification is not
unreasonable.
B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF
SUBSEQUENT LAWS - EXEMPTING ALL
OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF
GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE
CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE
CHALLENGED PROVISION A VIOLATION
OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure
well within the legislatures power, we hold that
the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all
rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched all
validity out of the challenged proviso.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in
every instance, be determined by a mere
comparison of its provisions with applicable
provisions of the Constitution, since the statute
may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set
of facts and invalid in its application to another.
A statute valid at one time may become void at
another time because of altered circumstances.
Thus, if a statute in its practical operation
becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity,
even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is
open to inquiry and investigation in the light of
changed conditions.
The foregoing provisions impregnably
institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long
honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal
work." Persons who work with substantially
equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should
be paid similar salaries.
Congress retains its wide discretion in
providing for a valid classification, and its
policies should be accorded recognition and
respect by the courts of justice except when they
run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops
where the classification violates a fundamental
right, or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution. When these
violations arise, this Court must discharge its
primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more
exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.
Rational basis should not suffice.
Furthermore, concerns have been raised as to
the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged
provision. It has been proffered that the remedy
of petitioner is not with this Court, but with
Congress, which alone has the power to erase any
inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a
bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-
and-file from the SSL has supposedly been filed.
Under most circumstances, the Court will
exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad
discretion given to Congress in exercising its
legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be
based on the rational basis test, and the
legislative discretion would be given deferential
treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised
on the denial of a fundamental right or the
perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored
by the Constitution with special protection,
judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak
and watered down view would call for the
abdication of this Courts solemn duty to strike
down any law repugnant to the Constitution and
the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the
actor committing the unconstitutional act is a
private person or the government itself or one of
its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be
struck down regardless of the character or nature
of the actor.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is
qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the
issue on whether or not the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met, or the
limitations respected, is justifiable or non-
political, the crux of the problem being one of
legality or validity of the contested act, not its
wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications,
conditions or limitations - particularly those
prescribed or imposed by the Constitution -
would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial
inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof
are the main functions of courts of justice under
the Presidential form of government adopted in
our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks
and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a
consequence, we have neither the authority nor
the discretion to decline passing upon said issue,
but are under the ineluctable obligation - made
particularly more exacting and peremptory by our
oath, as members of the highest Court of the land,
to support and defend the Constitution - to settle
it.
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso
operates on the basis of the salary grade or
officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction
based on economic class and status, with the
higher grades as recipients of a benefit
specifically withheld from the lower grades.
Officers of the BSP now receive higher
compensation packages that are competitive with
the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried
employees are limited to the rates prescribed by
the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing:
BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly
regimented rates of the SSL while employees
higher in rank - possessing higher and better
education and opportunities for career
advancement - are given higher compensation
packages to entice them to stay. Considering that
majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees
consist of people whose status and rank in life are
less and limited, especially in terms of job
marketability, it is they - and not the officers -
who have the real economic and financial need
for the adjustment This is in accord with the
policy of the Constitution "to free the people from
poverty, provide adequate social services, extend
to them a decent standard of living, and improve
the quality of life for all. Any act of Congress
that runs counter to this constitutional
desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court
before it can pass muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees
merit greater concern from this Court. They
represent the more impotent rank-and-file
government employees who, unlike employees in
the private sector, have no specific right to
organize as a collective bargaining unit and
negotiate for better terms and conditions of
employment, nor the power to hold a strike to
protest unfair labor practices. These BSP rank-
and-file employees represent the politically
powerless and they should not be compelled to
seek a political solution to their unequal and
iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for
many years for the legislature to act. They cannot
be asked to wait some more for discrimination
cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the
equal protection clause of the Constitution is a
mere platitude, it is the Courts duty to save them
from reasonless discrimination.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the
continued operation and implementation of the
last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of
Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.
17) CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION VS BSP (SHORTER
DIGEST)
GR 148208 15 December 2004
Facts: The New Central Bank Act abolished the
old Central Bank and created the new BSP on
1993 through RA No 7653. Central Bank
Employees Association assailed the provision of
RA No 7653, Art II Sec 15(c). They contend that
it makes an unconstitutional cut between two
classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP
officers as exempt class of Salary Standardization
Law (RA 6758) and (2) the rank-and-file non-
exempt class. BSP contends that the exemption of
officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was
intended to address the BSPs lack of
competitiveness in terms of attracting competent
officers and executives. It was not intended to
discriminate against the rank-and-file.
Issue: Whether or not Section 15(c) violates
equal protection right of the BSP r&f employees?
Decision: Sec 15(c) unconstitutional. Judicial
notice that other Govt Financial Institution
undertook amendment of their charters from 1995
to 2004 a blanket provision for all employees to
be covered by SSL. The said subsequent
enactments constitute significant changes in
circumstance that considerably alter the
reasonability of the continued operation of the
last proviso of Section 15(c). Legal history shows
that GFIs have long been recognized as
comprising one distinct class, separate from other
governmental entities. There is no substantial
distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-
and-file from the other rank-and-file of the seven
GFIs. The equal protection clause does not
demand absolute equality but it requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
Those that fall within a class should be treated in
the same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on
some in the group is equally binding on the rest.
It is clear that the enactment of the seven
subsequent charters has rendered the continued
application of the challenged proviso anathema to
the equal protection of the law, and the same
should be declared as an outlaw.