III.
EQUAL PROTECTION
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. ENGQUIST VS. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE
FACTS:
Anup Engquist is a woman born in India.3 In
December 1992, she was hired by the Oregon
Department of Agriculture (ODA) to work as
an international food standards specialist in the
Export Service Center (ESC), a laboratory
within ODAs Laboratory Services Division
(LSD).
Engquist was hired by Norma Corristan, the
LSD administrator and a Mexican-American.
Engquists job was to generate business for the
ESC and to consult with the ESCs customers,
companies that export food overseas.
Engquist developed an international database of
food additives, laws, and regulations; marketed
the ESCs services, which included testing and
certifying exported goods and providing
consulting services for customers; and created
food safety training and scientific exchange
programs.
Respondent Joseph Hyatt was hired in 1990 as a
chemist and made it difficult for Engquist to do
her job. He did not communicate with her or
give her information necessary for her job, and
made false, derogatory statements about her to
others.
Hyatt took it upon himself to monitor her, even
following her when she went to the ladies room.
He told other employees she was absent from
her work location when she was present and that
she lied on time sheets.
Hyatt conceded that he made false, derogatory
statements to others about Engquist.
In response, Corristan initiated disciplinary
action against Hyatt. She required him to attend
anger management and diversity training
programs. Corristan testified that Hyatt told her
that it made him angry to have to go.
Afterwards, Corristan heard Hyatt comment that
Engquist did not do anything, did not work, did
not show up for work, and that whatever she did
was insignificantall claims Corristan believed
were false.
1
In December 1999, when the incumbent ESC
manager left, Hyatt asked Corristan to promote
him to that position. Corristan refused on the
ground that he was unready to be a manager.
Denied promotion to be ESC manager a second
time, Hyatt transferred from the LSD to the
Administrative Services Division to work as a
systems analyst in Information Services. Hyatt
continued to work in the same building as
Engquist, and to torment her.
Respondent John Szczepanski became ODAs
Assistant Director in 2001, and oversaw the
LSD.
In June 2001, Szczepanski removed the ESC
from Corristans supervision and assumed
control of the laboratory. Szczepanski
contemporaneously told a customer that
Corristan and Engquist would be gotten rid of.
Hyatt told a coworker that Szczepanski had
asked him to prepare a personnel plan and that
the two of them were working on getting rid of
Norma and Anup.
Hyatt then sent Szczepanski an email urging him
to sharply limit Corristans and Engquists
duties. He told Szczepanski to remove Corristan
from all ESC responsibilities and to eliminate
Engquists management responsibilities.
Meanwhile, since December 1999, Corristan,
Engquist, and one other employee had jointly
assumed the duties of the departed ESC
manager. After assuming control of the ESC,
Szczepanski moved to fill the position.
Hyatt, Engquist, and a third employee applied
for the position. Szczepanski chose Hyatt,
ignoring the recommendation of an independent
expert and deviating from the list of official
interview questions.
Almost immediately upon his appointment,
Hyatt began curtailing Engquists duties,
excessively monitoring her performance and
circulating false statements and innuendo to
others.
Szczepanski and Hyatt ultimately eliminated
Corristans and Engquists positions.
Szczepanski dismissed Corristan in December
2001 and Engquist in February 2002. They
claimed that their actions were taken for
budgetary reasons, but Engquist introduced
evidence, which the jury credited, that this was
not a credible or rational justification for
 dismissing her and Corristan rather than others
in LSD.
In sum, Szczepanski gave Hyatt the promotion
that Corristan had denied him, and Hyatt and
Szczepanski terminated both Corristan, who had
disciplined Hyatt, and Engquist, who had been a
thorn in Hyatts side for years.
Engquists complaint claimed, inter alia, that
Respondents Joseph Hyatt and John Szczepanski
caused her to lose her job for arbitrary,
vindictive, and malicious reasons in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause. This claim was
made under the class-of-one doctrine.
HELD:
The Text of the Equal Protection Clause Protects All
Persons From Unequal Treatment.
The Equal Protection Clause is simple, clear,
and direct: No state shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV
The text does not limit itself to certain classes,
nor does it exempt public employers from its
command. Whoever the state actor and whatever
the state action, the Clause demands that
government treat all similarly situated persons
equally unless there is a rational basis for doing
otherwise.
The Equal Protection Clause thus protect[s]
persons, not groups.
The Clause prohibits the government from
singling out individuals for harsh treatment
without a rational basis, even if no other person
falls within the same classification.
In short, as this Court recently reaffirmed in
Olech, the text contemplates that an individual
may bring a claim as a class of one.
The History of the Equal Protection Clause
Demonstrates That the Clause Was Originally
Understood To Protect Individual Persons, Not Just
Classes.
Olechs understanding that the Equal Protection
Clause protects individuals from discrimination
by a state actor is supported by that Clauses
history.
The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted in
large part to support and validate the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, which
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declared that all persons born in the United
States . . . are hereby declared to be citizens of
the United States and that such citizens, of
every race and color, . . . shall have the same
right as others to make and enforce contracts
and enjoy the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and
property.
The Civil Rights Act had been passed under the
Thirteenth Amendment, which authorized
Congress to enforce the constitutional
prohibition on slavery through legislation.
However, when some legislators expressed
doubt that the Act could reasonably be construed
as a remedy against slavery, its proponents
responded by advancing the Fourteenth
Amendment, with its broader guarantee of equal
protection for all.
After adoption of the Amendment, Congress
extended the Civil Rights Acts protections not
only to citizens, of every race and color, but to
all persons,
This change reflects a broad conception of the
Clause as a guarantor of personal rights against
all forms of invidious discrimination.
The Fourteenth Amendment Protects Individuals
From Unequal Treatment by State Officials and
Agencies.
This Court made clear early on that the Equal
Protection guarantee protects against
discrimination arising not only from a legislative
act but also from the conduct of an
administrative official.
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880),
held that the Fourteenth Amendment must
mean that no agency of the State, or of the
officers or agents by whom its powers are
exerted, shall deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
At the start of the next century, the Court
expressly found the Fourteenth Amendment
applicable to all state officials: The provisions of
the 14th Amendment are not confined to the
action of the state through its legislature, or
through the executive or judicial authority.
Those provisions relate to and cover all the
instrumentalities by which the state acts, and so
it has been held that whoever, by virtue of public
position under a state government, deprives
 another of any right protected by that
amendment against deprivation by the state,
violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he
acts in the name of the state and for the state,
and is clothed with the states powers, his act is
that of the state.
Equal Protection Clause reaches all forms of
alleged discrimination by state actors, whether
premised on disparate classification of a group
or discrimination against a single individual.
PUBLIC EMPLOYERS ARE STATE ACTORS
AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ARE PERSONS
ENTITLED TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAWS.
For every constitutional right that it has
considered, including the Fourteenth
Amendment, this Court has treated public
employers as state actors.
The government as employer still acts as a
sovereign, and public employees are still citizens
entitled to equal protection of the laws.
The government is not exempt from
constitutional limitations when it acts as
employer. [S]tate and federal governments,
even in the exercise of their internal operations,
do not constitutionally have the complete
freedom of action enjoyed by a private
employer.
Indeed, this Court has recognized that its
responsibility is to ensure that citizens are not
deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of
working for the government.
It is now firmly established that public
employers are state actors subject to the
Constitution in their dealings with employees.
The Jury Found the Governments Different
Treatment of Engquist to Be Without Any Rational
Basis.
Because plaintiffs face significant hurdles in
proving a class-of-one claim, as established in
Olech, allowing plaintiffs to bring such claims
does not substantially burden the day-to-day
administration of government, but it does protect
individuals from the rare circumstance in which
the government discriminates without a rational
basis.
The district court properly instructed the jury on
all of the elements Engquist needed to prove to
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win her class-of-one equal protection claim.
Pursuant to the judges instructions, the jury
found in this case that (1) the acts . . . of the
defendants were intentional, (2) the plaintiff
prove[d] that defendants treated her differently
than others similarly situated, (3) the different
treatment caused the denial of Plaintiffs
promotion, the exercise of her bumping rights or
the termination of her employment, (4) no
rational basis exists for the difference in
treatment, and (5) Defendant took these
actions for arbitrary, vindictive, or malicious
reasons.
2. BIRAOGO VS. PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION
FACTS:
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them.
--- Justice Jose P. Laurel
For consideration before the Court are two
consolidated cases both of which essentially
assail the validity and constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010,
entitled Creating the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010.
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil
action for prohibition instituted by petitioner
Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a
citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive
Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative
power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI
of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional
authority of the legislature to create a public
office and to appropriate funds therefor.
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed
by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B.
Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and
Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as
 incumbent members of the House of
Representatives.
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced
to the events prior to the historic May 2010
elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon
Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of
graft and corruption with his slogan, Kung
walang corrupt, walang mahirap. The Filipino
people, convinced of his sincerity and of his
ability to carry out this noble objective,
catapulted the good senator to the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality,
President Aquino found a need for a special
body to investigate reported cases of graft and
corruption allegedly committed during the
previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the
President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive
Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a
mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of
the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by
third-level public officers and employees, their
co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration, and
thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and
the Ombudsman. Though it has been described
as an independent collegial body, it is essentially
an entity within the Office of the President
Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it
constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is
one.
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all
the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however,
a quasi-judicial body as it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render
awards in disputes between contending
parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers
but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a
fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such
facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the
filing of an information in our courts of law.
4
Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal,
civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.
Truth commissions have been described as
bodies that share the following characteristics:
(1) they examine only past events; (2) they
investigate patterns of abuse committed over a
period of time, as opposed to a particular event;
(3) they are temporary bodies that finish their
work with the submission of a report containing
conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they
are officially sanctioned, authorized or
empowered by the State.
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive
Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to
declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC
from performing its functions.
o (d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal
protection clause as it selectively targets
for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their
peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past
and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents: The Truth Commission does not
violate the equal protection clause because it
was validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal
protection clause
RULING:
YES.
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls
within the investigative power of the President, the
Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in
Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution. Section 1 reads:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it
is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They
contend that it does not apply equally to all members of
the same class such that the intent of singling out the
previous administration as its sole object makes the PTC
an adventure in partisan hostility. Thus, in order to be
accorded with validity, the commission must also cover
reports of graft and corruption in virtually all
administrations previous to that of former President
Arroyo.
The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the
reported cases of graft and corruption must encompass
acts committed not only during the administration of
former President Arroyo but also during prior
administrations where the same magnitude of
controversies and anomalies were reported to have been
committed against the Filipino people. They assail the
classification formulated by the respondents as it does
not fall under the recognized exceptions because first,
there is no substantial distinction between the group of
officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order
No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their
public office for personal gain; and second, the selective
classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive
Order No. 1 to end corruption. In order to attain
constitutional permission, the petitioners advocate that
the commission should deal with graft and grafters prior
and subsequent to the Arroyo administration with the
strong arm of the law with equal force.
Position of respondents
According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1
identifies the previous administration as the initial
subject of the investigation, following Section 17
thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of large
scale graft and corruption solely during the said
administration. Assuming arguendo that the commission
would confine its proceedings to officials of the previous
administration, the petitioners argue that no offense is
committed against the equal protection clause for the
segregation of the transactions of public officers during
the previous administration as possible subjects of
investigation is a valid classification based on substantial
distinctions and is germane to the evils which the
Executive Order seeks to correct. To distinguish the
Arroyo administration from past administrations, it
recited the following:
First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread
reports of large scale graft and corruption in the
previous administration which have eroded public
confidence in public institutions. There is, therefore, an
urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding
certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the
5
government and to put a closure to them by the filing of
the appropriate cases against those involved, if
warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil,
restore the peoples faith and confidence in the
Government and in their public servants.
Second. The segregation of the preceding administration
as the object of fact-finding is warranted by the reality
that unlike with administrations long gone, the current
administration will most likely bear the immediate
consequence of the policies of the previous
administration.
Third. The classification of the previous administration
as a separate class for investigation lies in the reality that
the evidence of possible criminal activity, the evidence
that could lead to recovery of public monies illegally
dissipated, the policy lessons to be learned to ensure that
anti-corruption laws are faithfully executed, are more
easily established in the regime that immediately
precede the current administration.
Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of
their predecessors to investigations to provide closure to
issues that are pivotal to national life or even as a routine
measure of due diligence and good housekeeping by a
nascent administration like the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG), created by the late
President Corazon C. Aquino under Executive Order No.
1 to pursue the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her
predecessor former President Ferdinand Marcos and his
cronies, and the Saguisag Commission created by former
President Joseph Estrada under Administrative Order
No, 53, to form an ad-hoc and independent citizens
committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances
surrounding Philippine Centennial projects of his
predecessor, former President Fidel V. Ramos.
Concept of the Equal Protection Clause
One of the basic principles on which this government
was founded is that of the equality of right which
is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is
embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and
fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause,
however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged
on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted
partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down
is the equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a
states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms
of a statue or by its improper execution through the
states duly constituted authorities. In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law requires the state
to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state
actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions
cover all the departments of the government including
the political and executive departments, and extend to all
actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws,
through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of
the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class. Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.
For a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons
who naturally belong to the class. The classification will
be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the
classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the
sense that the members of the class should possess the
same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial
similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all
those covered by the classification are to be treated
equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a
6
class differs from the other members, as long as that
class is substantially distinguishable from all others,
does not justify the non-application of the law to him.
The classification must not be based on existing
circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude
addition to the number included in the class. It must be
of such a nature as to embrace all those who may
thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It
must not leave out or underinclude those that should
otherwise fall into a certain classification. As elucidated
in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union and
reiterated in a long line of cases,
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon
all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement,
in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be
affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of
statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality,
not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require
that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause
does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited
either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the
Constitution allows classification. Classification in law,
as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is
the grouping of things in speculation or practice because
they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law
is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea
of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes
without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All
that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of
the class. This Court has held that the standard is
satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not
palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted]
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order
No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned
truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration[87] only. The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent
and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least
three portions of the questioned executive order.
Specifically, these are:
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body
dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration, and which will
recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure
justice for all;
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby
created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION,
hereinafter referred to as the COMMISSION, which
shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of
such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the
moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed
by public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if
any, during the previous administration; and thereafter
recommend the appropriate action or measure to be
taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice
shall be served without fear or favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission,
which shall have all the powers of an investigative body
under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to
conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported
cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1,
involving third level public officers and higher, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories from the private
sector, if any, during the previous administration and
thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo
administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a
class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own.
Not to include past administrations similarly situated
constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection
clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
7
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution.
Though the OSG enumerates several differences
between the Arroyo administration and other past
administrations, these distinctions are not substantial
enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the
previous administration only. The reports of widespread
corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken
as basis for distinguishing said administration from
earlier administrations which were also blemished by
similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not
inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo
administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it,
Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.
The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order
No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended
investigation to the previous administration only. The
OSG ventures to opine that to include other past
administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily
overburden the commission and lead it to lose its
effectiveness. The reason given is specious. It is without
doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble objective of
the PTC to stamp out or end corruption and the evil it
breeds.
The probability that there would be difficulty in
unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports involving
the earlier administrations were already inquired into is
beside the point. Obviously, deceased presidents and
cases which have already prescribed can no longer be the
subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC
expected to conduct simultaneous investigations of
previous administrations, given the bodys limited time
and resources. The law does not require the
impossible (Lex non cogit ad impossibilia).
Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the
Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of
investigating almost a centurys worth of graft
cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order
No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to
be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not
exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at
least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations. While reasonable prioritization is
permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck
down for being unconstitutional. In the often quoted
language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations
between persons in similar circumstances, material to
their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the constitution.
It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad
hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court, however, is of
the considered view that although its focus is restricted,
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the
laws should not in any way be circumvented. The
Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of
the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and
all public authority administered. Laws that do not
conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for
being unconstitutional. While the thrust of the PTC is
specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft and
corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be
read together with the provisions of the Constitution. To
exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of
substantial distinctions would only confirm the
petitioners lament that the subject executive order is only
an adventure in partisan hostility. In the case of US v.
Cyprian, it was written: A rather limited number of such
classifications have routinely been held or assumed to be
arbitrary; those include: race, national origin,
gender, political activity or membership in a political
party, union activity or membership in a labor union, or
more generally the exercise of first amendment rights.
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the
requirements of constitutionality, it must include or
embrace all persons who naturally belong to the
class. Such a classification must not be based on existing
circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude
additions to the number included within a class, but must
be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may
thereafter be in similar circumstances and
conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and
circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory
legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of
the members of the class must be brought under the
influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as
are the members of the class.
The Court is not unaware that mere under inclusiveness
is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal
protection clause. Legislation is not unconstitutional
merely because it is not all-embracing and does not
8
include all the evils within its reach. It has been written
that a regulation challenged under the equal protection
clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply
because it happens to be incomplete. In several
instances, the under inclusiveness was not considered a
valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the
purpose can be attained in future legislations or
regulations. These cases refer to the step by step process.
With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does
not run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme
simply because it fails, through inadvertence or
otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably
have been attacked.
In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no
inadvertence. That the previous administration was
picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be
gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least
three times in the assailed executive order. It must be
noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention
any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike
the investigative commissions created in the past. The
equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and
intentional discrimination.
To disprove petitioners contention that there is deliberate
discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the commission
does not only confine itself to cases of large scale graft
and corruption committed during the previous
administration. The OSG points to Section 17 of
Executive Order No. 1, which provides:
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate.
If and when in the judgment of the President there is a
need to expand the mandate of the Commission as
defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation
of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the
prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended
accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order.
The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows
the President the discretion to expand the scope of
investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of
graft and corruption committed in other past
administrations, it does not guarantee that they would be
covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the
commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of
the President. If he would decide not to include them, the
section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify
the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order No.
1 was crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and
personalities of the Arroyo administration.
The Court tried to seek guidance from the
pronouncement in the case of Virata v.
Sandiganbayan, that the PCGG Charter (composed of
Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the
equal protection clause. The decision, however, was
devoid of any discussion on how such conclusory
statement was arrived at, the principal issue in said case
being only the sufficiency of a cause of action.
B. BASES FOR CLASSIFICATION
1. BRADWELL VS. ILLINOIS
FACTS:
Myra Bradwell applied for a license to practice law in
the State of Illinois. She completed all appropriate forms
and provided the required documentation as to both her
character and training. However, Illinois law afforded
the Supreme Court discretion in bar admissions,
including restrictions on classes of persons not intended
for membership. Here the State Supreme Court
determined it had the authority to deny women a law
license. Accordingly, her application was denied. At the
time of her application, Bradwell was and had for many
years been a resident of the City of Chicago. While she
was born in Vermont and spent much of her life there,
she was now a resident of Illinois. Bradwell brought suit
against the State of Illinois, alleging that as a former
citizen of Vermont now a citizen of the United States
residing in Illinois, she was being denied one of the
Privileges and Immunities of citizenship through refusal
to grant a law license after proper application. The State
Supreme Court refused to admit her, citing the strife that
would result from practicing law and the attendant
threats to femininity. This appeal followed.
Issue: May a State, consistent with the Privileges and
Immunities clause, deny an otherwise proper application
for a license to practice law merely because the applicant
is a woman and state law restricts bar membership to
men?
Holding: No, the Privileges and Immunities clause does
not apply here as the Appellant was a citizen of the State
enforcing the law complained of. States have the
authority to regulate the practice of law, including denial
of licenses to women on the basis of sex.
Reasoning: Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the
Court, joined by Justices Clifford, Davis, Strong, and
Hunt. The majority began by explaining the Privileges
9
and Immunities clause does not apply here, as that
provision only protects citizens of one state from denial
of rights by another state. In this case, the Court
explained that Bradwell was a citizen of Illinois. While
she claimed to only reside there, citizens of the United
States are citizens of the State in which they reside,
unless they can demonstrate another domicile.
Responding to the suggestions that certain protections,
including the ability to pursue a particular trade, are
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States that individual states may not disregard, the Court
disagreed. In addition to their earlier explanation of the
proper understanding of the constitutional protections at
issue, the majority explained that the right to practice
law is not a protected privilege. Finally, the Court
pointed out that the issues here had already been
adequately addressed in The Slaughterhouse Cases and
so no reason to revisit the issue. The right of state courts
to regulate the granting of law licenses is not one of the
state functions transferred to the federal government for
protection, and in accordance with precedent the
Appellant here did not state a valid claim.
Concurrence: Justice Bradley concurred in the
judgment, joined by Justices Field and Swayne. He
agreed that the Court should affirm the decision below,
but based on a different rationale. As he explained, the
law has always recognized fundamental differences
between the sexes. In Bradleys view, men had an
obligation to protect women just as surely as women
should be protected based on their timidity and delicacy.
Furthermore, the protection of women required
restricting their participation in certain occupations and
in work outside the home generally. While Justice
Bradley pointed out that the standard may be somewhat
different with regard to an unmarried woman, he
concluded that married women may clearly be prohibited
from separate careers as they may be excluded from
even separate legal existence apart from their husbands.
While he noted the early movement toward greater
equality between the sexes, Justice Bradley refused to
restrict the role of the States in regulating the practice of
law, including complete denial of that profession to
women on the basis of their sex.
Dissent: Chief Justice Chase dissented, but did not offer
an opinion.
Conclusion: States may, consistent with the
Constitution, regulate the practice of law so as to
exclude all women. The Privileges and Immunities
clause does not apply to citizens complaining of laws in
their own State.
4. MICHAEL M. VS. SUPERIOR COURT
FACTS:
JUSTICE REHNQUIST announced the judgment of the
Court and delivered an opinion, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE BURGER and JUSTICES STEWART and
POWELL joined. JUSTICE STEWART filed a
concurring opinion. JUSTICE BLACKMUN filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment. JUSTICE
BRENNAN filed a dissenting opinion, in which
JUSTICES WHITE and MARSHALL joined. JUSTICE
STEVENS filed a dissenting opinion. JUSTICE
REHNQUIST announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered an opinion.
The question presented in this case is whether
Californias statutory rape law, violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section 261.5 defines unlawful sexual intercourse as an
act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not
the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the
age of 18 years.
The statute thus makes men alone criminally liable for
the act of sexual intercourse. In July 1978, a complaint
was filed in the Municipal Court of Sonoma County,
Cal., alleging that petitioner, then a 171/2-year-old male,
had unlawful sexual intercourse with a female under the
age of 18, in violation of 261.5.
The evidence adduced at a preliminary hearing showed
that at approximately midnight on June 3, 1978,
petitioner and two friends approached Sharon, a 16 1/2-
year-old female, and her sister as they waited at a bus
stop.
Petitioner and Sharon, who had already been drinking,
moved away from the others and began to kiss. After
being struck in the face for rebuffing petitioners initial
advances, Sharon submitted to sexual intercourse with
petitioner.
Prior to trial, petitioner sought to set aside the
information on both state and federal constitutional
grounds, asserting that 261.5 unlawfully discriminated
on the basis of gender.
10
The trial court and the California Court of Appeal denied
petitioners request for relief and petitioner sought
review in the Supreme Court of California. The
California Supreme Court held that section 261.5
discriminates on the basis of sex because only females
may be victims, and only males may violate the section.
. . . The court then subjected the classification to strict
scrutiny, stating that it must be justified by a
compelling state interest. It found that the classification
was supported not by mere social convention but by the
immutable physiological fact that it is the female
exclusively who can become pregnant. ... . . . Unlike
the California Supreme Court, we have not held that
gender-based classifications are inherently suspect and
thus we do not apply so-called strict scrutiny to those
classifications.
Our cases have held, however, that the traditional
minimum rationality test takes on a somewhat sharper
focus when gender-based classifications are challenged.
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, . . . (Justice Powell,
concurring). In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), for
example, the Court stated that a gender-based
classification will be upheld if it bears a fair and
substantial relationship to legitimate state ends, while in
Craig v. Boren, supra, . . ., the Court restated the test to
require the classification to bear a substantial
relationship to important governmental objectives.
Underlying these decisions is the principle that a
legislature may not make overbroad generalizations
based on sex which are entirely unrelated to any
differences between men and women or which demean
the ability or social status of the affected class. Parham
v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979) (plurality opinion
of Justice Stewart). But because the Equal Protection
Clause does not demand that a statute necessarily apply
equally to all persons or require things which are
different in fact . . . to be treated in law as though they
were the same, Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309
(1966), quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147
(1940), this Court MICHAEL M. V. SUPERIOR
COURT OF SONOMA COUNTY 450 U.S. 464 (1981)
1 2 Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County has
consistently upheld statutes where the gender
classification is not invidious, but rather realistically
reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated
in certain circumstances. . . . As the Court has stated, a
legislature may provide for the special problems of
women. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653
(1975).
RULING: The statute at issue here protects women from sexual
intercourse at an age when those consequences are
Applying those principles to this case, the fact that the
particularly severe. The question thus boils down to
California Legislature criminalized the act of illicit
whether a State may attack the problem of sexual
sexual intercourse with a minor female is a sure
intercourse and teenage pregnancy directly by
indication of its intent or purpose to discourage that
prohibiting a male from having sexual intercourse with a
conduct. Precisely why the legislature desired that result
minor female.
is of course somewhat less clear....
We hold that such a statute is sufficiently related to the
Here, for example, the individual legislators may have
States objectives to pass constitutional muster. Because
voted for the statute for a variety of reasons. Some
virtually all of the significant harmful and inescapably
legislators may have been concerned about preventing
identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on
teenage pregnancies, others about protecting young
the young female, a legislature acts well within its
females from physical injury or from the loss of
authority when it elects to punish only the participant
chastity, and still others about promoting various
who, by nature, suffers few of the consequences of his
religious and moral attitudes towards premarital sex.
conduct.
The justification for the statute offered by the State, and
It is hardly unreasonable for a legislature acting to
accepted by the Supreme Court of California, is that the
protect minor females to exclude them from punishment.
legislature sought to prevent illegitimate teenage
Moreover, the risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a
pregnancies.
substantial deterrence to young females. No similar
That finding, of course, is entitled to great deference. natural sanctions deter males. A criminal sanction
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373374 (1967). And imposed solely on males thus serves to roughly
although our cases establish that the States asserted equalize the deterrents on the sexes.
reason for the enactment of a statute may be rejected, if
We are unable to accept petitioners contention that the
it could not have been a goal of the legislation,
statute is impermissibly under inclusive and must, in
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, at 648, n. 16, this is
order to pass judicial scrutiny, be broadened so as to
not such a case.
hold the female as criminally liable as the male.
We are satisfied not only that the prevention of
It is argued that this statute is not necessary to deter
illegitimate pregnancy is at least one of the purposes
teenage pregnancy because a gender-neutral statute,
of the statute, but also that the State has a strong interest
where both male and female would be subject to
in preventing such pregnancy.
prosecution, would serve that goal equally well.
At the risk of stating the obvious, teenage pregnancies,
The relevant inquiry, however, is not whether the statute
which have increased dramatically over the last two
is drawn as precisely as it might have been, but whether
decades, have significant social, medical, and economic
the line chosen by the California Legislature is within
consequences for both the mother and her child, and the
constitutional limitations. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S., at
State. Of particular concern to the State is that
356, n. 10. In any event, we cannot say that a gender-
approximately half of all teenage pregnancies end in
neutral statute would be as effective as the statute
abortion.
California has chosen to enact.
And of those children who are born, their illegitimacy
The State persuasively contends that a gender-neutral
makes them likely candidates to become wards of the
statute would frustrate its interest in effective
State. We need not be medical doctors to discern that
enforcement. Its view is that a female is surely less
young men and young women are not similarly situated
likely to report violations of the statute if she herself
with respect to the problems and the risks of sexual
would be subject to criminal prosecution.
intercourse. Only women may become pregnant, and
they suffer disproportionately the profound physical, In an area already fraught with prosecutorial difficulties,
emotional, and psychological consequences of sexual we decline to hold that the Equal Protection Clause
activity. requires a legislature to enact a statute so broad that it
may well be incapable of enforcement. We similarly

11
reject petitioners argument that 261.5 is impermissibly
overbroad because it makes unlawful sexual intercourse
with prepubescent females, who are, by definition,
incapable of becoming pregnant.
Quite apart from the fact that the statute could well be
justified on the grounds that very young females are
particularly susceptible to physical injury from sexual
intercourse, see Rundlett v. Oliver, 607 F.2d 495 (CA1
1979), it is ludicrous to suggest that the Constitution
requires the California Legislature to limit the scope of
its rape statute to older teenagers and exclude young
girls.
There remains only petitioners contention that the
statute is unconstitutional as it is applied to him because
he, like Sharon, was under 18 at the time of sexual
intercourse. Petitioner argues that the statute is flawed
because it presumes that as between two persons under
18, the male is the culpable aggressor.
We find petitioners contentions unpersuasive. Contrary
to his assertions, the statute does not rest on the
assumption that males are generally the aggressors. It is
instead an attempt by a legislature to prevent illegitimate
teenage pregnancy by providing an additional deterrent
for men.
The age of the man is irrelevant since young men are as
capable as older men of inflicting the harm sought to be
prevented. In upholding the California statute we also
recognize that this is not a case where a statute is being
challenged on the grounds that it invidiously
discriminates against females.
To the contrary, the statute places a burden on males
which is not shared by females. But we find nothing to
suggest that men, because of past discrimination or
peculiar disadvantages, are in need of the special
solicitude of the courts.
Nor is this a case where the gender classification is made
solely for . . . administrative convenience, as in
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973)
(emphasis omitted), or rests on the baggage of sexual
stereotypes as in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S., at 283. As we
have held, the statute instead reasonably reflects the fact
that the consequences of sexual intercourse and
pregnancy fall more heavily on the female than on the
male.
Accordingly the judgment of the California Supreme
Court is Affirmed. [The concurring opinions of
JUSTICES STEWART and BLACKMUN are not
reprinted here.] JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by
JUSTICES WHITE and MARSHALL, dissenting: I It is
disturbing to find the Court so splintered on a case that
presents such a straightforward issue: Whether the
admittedly gender-based classification in Cal. Penal
Code Ann. 261.5 (West Supp. 1981) bears a sufficient
relationship to the States asserted goal of preventing
teenage pregnancies to survive the mid-level
constitutional scrutiny mandated by Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976).
Applying the analytical framework provided by our
precedents, I am convinced that there is only one proper
resolution of this issue: the classification must be
declared unconstitutional.
I fear that the plurality opinion and Justices Stewart and
Blackmun reach the opposite result by placing too much
emphasis on the desirability of achieving the States
asserted statutory goalprevention of teenage
pregnancyand not enough emphasis on the
fundamental question of whether the sex-based
discrimination in the California statute is substantially
related to the achievement of that goal. II ...
The State of California vigorously asserts that the
important governmental objective to be served by
261.5 is the prevention of teenage pregnancy. It claims
that its statute furthers this goal by deterring sexual
activity by malesthe class of persons it considers more
responsible for causing those pregnancies.
But even assuming that prevention of teenage pregnancy
is an important governmental objective and that it is in
fact an objective of California still has the burden of
proving that there are fewer teenage pregnancies under
its gender based statutory rape law than there would be if
the law were gender neutral.
To meet this burden, the State must show that because
its statutory rape law punishes only males, and not
females, it more effectively deters minor females from
having sexual intercourse.
The plurality assumes that a gender-neutral statute
would be less effective than in deterring sexual activity
because a gender-neutral statute would create significant
enforcement problems.
The plurality thus accepts the States assertion that a
female is surely less likely to report violations of the
statute if she herself would be subject to criminal

12
prosecution. In an area already fraught with
prosecutorial difficulties, we decline to hold that the
Equal Protection Clause requires a legislature to enact a
statute so broad that it may well be incapable of
enforcement. . . .
However, a States bare assertion that its genderbased
statutory classification substantially furthers an
important governmental interest is not enough to meet its
burden of proof under Craig v. Boren. Rather, the State
must produce evidence that will persuade the court that
its assertion is true. See Craig v. Boren.... The State has
not produced such evidence in this case. Moreover, there
are at least two serious flaws in the States assertion that
law enforcement problems created by a gender-neutral
statutory rape law would make such a statute less
effective than a genderbased statute in deterring sexual
activity.
First, the experience of other jurisdictions, and
California itself, belies the pluralitys conclusion that a
gender-neutral statutory rape law may well be incapable
of enforcement.
There are now at least 37 States that have enacted
gender-neutral statutory rape laws. Although most of
these laws protect young persons (of either sex) from the
sexual exploitation of older individuals, the laws of
Arizona, Florida, and Illinois permit prosecution of both
minor females and minor males for engaging in mutual
sexual conduct.
California has introduced no evidence that those States
have been handicapped by the enforcement problems the
plurality finds so persuasive. Surely, if those States
could provide such evidence, we might expect that
California would have introduced it. ... The second flaw
in the States assertion is that even assuming that a
gender-neutral statute would be more difficult to
enforce, the State has still not shown that those
enforcement problems would make such a statute less
effective than a gender-based statute in deterring minor
females from engaging in sexual intercourse.
Common sense, however, suggests [450 U.S. 464, 494]
that a gender-neutral statutory rape law is potentially a
greater deterrent of sexual activity than a gender-based
law, for the simple reason that a gender-neutral law
subjects both men and women to criminal sanctions and
thus arguably has a deterrent effect on twice as many
potential violators.
13
Even if fewer persons were prosecuted under the gender-
neutral law, as the State suggests, it would still be true
that twice as many persons would be subject to arrest.
The States failure to prove that a gender-neutral law
would be a less effective deterrent than a genderbased
law, like the States failure to prove that a gender-neutral
law would be difficult to enforce, should have led this
Court to invalidate ... It is perhaps because the gender
classification in Californias statutory rape law was
initially designed to further these outmoded sexual
stereotypes, rather than to reduce the incidence of
teenage pregnancies, that the State has been unable to
demonstrate a substantial relationship between the
classification and its newly asserted goal. . . .
It has therefore not met its burden of proving that the
statutory classification is substantially related to the
achievement of its asserted goal. I would hold that
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and I would reverse the judgment of the
California Supreme Court. JUSTICE STEVENS,
dissenting: . . .
The societal interests in reducing the incidence of
venereal disease and teenage pregnancy are sufficient, in
my judgment, to justify a prohibition of conduct that
increases the risk of those harms. . . . ... In my judgment,
the fact that a class of persons is especially vulnerable to
a risk that a statute is designed to avoid is a reason for
making the statute applicable to that class.
The argument that a special need for protection provides
a rational explanation for an exemption is one I simply
do not comprehend....
In this case, the fact that a female confronts a greater risk
of harm than a male is a reason for applying the
prohibition to hernot a reason for granting her a
license to use her own judgment on whether or not to
assume the risk.
Surely, if we examine the problem from the point of
view of societys interest in preventing the risk-creating
conduct from occurring at all, it is irrational to exempt
50% of the potential violators. And, if we view the
governments interest as that of a parens patriae seeking
to protect its subjects from harming themselves, the
discrimination is actually perverse.
Would a rational parent making rules for the conduct of
twin children of opposite sex simultaneously forbid the
son and authorize the daughter to engage in conduct that
is especially harmful to the daughter?
That is the effect of this statutory classification. he
question raised by this statute is whether the State,
consistently with the Federal Constitution, may always
punish the male and never the female when they are
equally responsible or when the female is the more
responsible of the two.
It would seem to me that an impartial lawmaker could
give only one answer to that question. The fact that the
California Legislature has decided to apply its
prohibition only to the male may reflect a legislative
judgment that in the typical case the male is actually the
more guilty party. Any such judgment must, in turn,
assume that the decision to engage in the risk-creating
conduct is alwaysor at least typicallya male
decision.
5. GARCIA VS DRILON
FACTS
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the
Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93
percent of a total population of 93.3 million adhering
to the teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for
husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as
Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her2
failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of
violence against Filipino women. The National
Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW)
reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence
comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and
violence and more than 90% of these reported cases
were committed by the women's intimate partners such
as their husbands and live-in partners."3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited
advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes."
It took effect on March 27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and
criminalizes acts of violence against women and their
children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate
partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person
who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
14
whom the woman has a common child.5 The law
provides for protection orders from the barangay and the
courts to prevent the commission of further acts of
VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of
barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court
personnel, social workers, health care providers, and
other local government officials in responding to
complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the
equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue
delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private
respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor
children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City
for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO)
against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner),
pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of
physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic
violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her
children and of financial support.
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she
was 34 years old and the former was eleven years her
senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J.
Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of
petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie
Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J.
Garcia, 3 years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and
faithful wife, whose life revolved around her husband.
On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese
descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute
obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private
respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from
her friends. When she took up law, and even when she
was already working part time at a law office, petitioner
trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just
stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his
attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at one
point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her
killed.
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an
affair with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod
City, who is the godmother of one of their sons.
Petitioner admitted to the affair when private respondent
confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the
household help about his sexual relations with said bank
manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though, that
he was just using the woman because of their accounts
with the bank.
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left
private respondent physically and emotionally wounded.
In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private
respondent on both arms and shook her with such force
that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time,
petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips
that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned
his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text
messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed
for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and
slapped her many times. When private respondent
decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to
stay for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would
beat her up. Even the small boys are aware of private
respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that
when he grows up, he would beat up his father because
of his cruelty to private respondent.
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove
private respondent to the brink of despair. On December
17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by
cutting her wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on
the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of
taking her to the hospital. Private respondent was
hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time
petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or
showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has
been undergoing therapy almost every week and is
taking anti-depressant medications.
When private respondent informed the management of
Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against
the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for
jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his
things and told private respondent that he was leaving
her for good. He even told private respondent's mother,
who lives with them in the family home, that private
respondent should just accept his extramarital affair
since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not
sired a child with her.
15
Private respondent is determined to separate from
petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her
children from her and deprive her of financial support.
Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes on
a legal battle with him, she would not get a single
centavo.
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving
mostly the construction of deep wells. He is the
President of three corporations 326 Realty Holdings,
Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros Trading
Corporation of which he and private respondent are
both stockholders. In contrast to the absolute control of
petitioner over said corporations, private respondent
merely draws a monthly salary of P20,000.00 from one
corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation.
Household expenses amounting to not less than
P200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent
through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid
by the same corporation together with the bills for
utilities.
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary
of P60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and
enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in
hundreds of thousands of pesos from the corporations.16
After private respondent confronted him about the affair,
petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building,
Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the corporations
are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full
information about said businesses. Until the filing of the
petition a quo, petitioner has not given private
respondent an accounting of the businesses the value of
which she had helped raise to millions of pesos.
ISSUE
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A.
9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND
VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE.
RULING
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal
protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-
repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. prejudice against women all make for real differences
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union is instructive: justifying the classification under the law. As Justice
McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
differences is the essence of true equality."70
guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon
all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be
National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's
affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of
Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is
statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
relationship between women and men otherwise known
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality,
as "gender-based violence". Societal norms and
not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require
traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders,
that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in
though they were the same. The equal protection clause
society while women are nurturers, men's companions
does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society.
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited
This perception leads to men gaining more power over
either in the object to which it is directed or by the
women. With power comes the need to control to retain
territory within which it is to operate.
that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of
The equal protection of the laws clause of the controlling women to retain power.
Constitution allows classification. Classification in law,
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as
as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is
a human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the
the grouping of things in speculation or practice because
Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women
they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law
on December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against
is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea
women is a manifestation of historically unequal power
of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes
relations between men and women, which have led to
without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no
domination over and discrimination against women by
manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All
men and to the prevention of the full advancement of
that is required of a valid classification is that it be
women, and that violence against women is one of the
reasonable, which means that the classification should be
crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced
based on substantial distinctions which make for real
into subordinate positions, compared with men."72
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of and social context of gender-based violence and
the class. This Court has held that the standard is developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his
satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A.
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004,
palpably arbitrary. the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of
we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification violence against women. The patriarch of a family was
as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not accorded the right to use force on members of the family
violate the equal protection clause by favoring women under his control. I quote the early studies:
over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the
State extends its protection. Traditions subordinating women have a long history
rooted in patriarchy the institutional rule of men.
I) RA 9262 rests on substantial distinctions Women were seen in virtually all societies to be
naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. In
The unequal power relationship between women and
ancient Western societies, women whether slave,
men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be
concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In
victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and
law, they were treated as property.
16
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the
husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered
his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and
other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family
strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male
control over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has
been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and
wife were one and that one was the husband. However,
in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English
common law began to limit the right of husbands to
chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the
rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their
wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of
these rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal
punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the
family was given more importance than preventing
violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United
States followed that of the English common law. In
1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first
appellate court to strike down the common law right of a
husband to beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's
wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her
face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like
indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In
person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the
law that the husband can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement
became more organized. The temperance leagues
initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They
considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of
wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed
saloons, bars and their husbands' other watering holes.
Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette
movements, expanding the liberation movement's
agenda. They fought for women's right to vote, to own
property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement
was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility
of the domestic violence to the public gaze. They
succeeded in transforming the issue into an important
public concern. No less than the United States Supreme
Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
17
In an average 12-month period in this country,
approximately two million women are the victims of
severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey,
women reported that nearly one of every eight husbands
had assaulted their wives during the past year. The
[American Medical Association] views these figures as
"marked underestimates," because the nature of these
incidents discourages women from reporting them, and
because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those
who do not speak English well, and women who are
homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey
is conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on
family violence agree that the true incidence of partner
violence is probably double the above estimates; or four
million severely assaulted women per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-
third of all women will be physically assaulted by a
partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an
average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women
are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of
these incidents involve sexual assault... In families
where wife beating takes place, moreover, child abuse is
often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture.
Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse.
Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and
economic isolation of women, is also common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their
abusers, perhaps because they perceive no superior
alternative...Many abused women who find temporary
refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part
because they have no other source of income...
Returning to one's abuser can be dangerous. Recent
Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that
8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States
are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female
homicide victims are killed by their male partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the
Violence Against Women Act.
In the International front, the women's struggle for
equality was no less successful. The United States
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the
UN General Assembly adopted the landmark
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the
UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World
conferences on the role and rights of women have been
regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and
Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the
Status of Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half and
full steps of all these women's movements. No less
than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution
mandates the State to recognize the role of women in
nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men. Our Senate has
ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all,
Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No.
9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and
for other Purposes."
B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely" victims of
violence.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723,
official statistics on violence against women and
children show that
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at
5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total cases
reported (9,903). And for the first semester of 2003,
there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which
represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in
especially difficult circumstances served by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically
abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases.
xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total
number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003.
Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms
of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these
reported cases were committed by the women's intimate
partners such as their husbands and live-in partners.73
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained
on domestic abuse and violence against men in the
Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low
and, perhaps, because many men will not even attempt
to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of
women who had ever experienced domestic violence did
so four or five (or more) times, compared with 11% of
the smaller number of men who had ever experienced
domestic violence; and women constituted 89% of all
18
those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of
domestic violence.75 Statistics in Canada show that
spousal violence by a woman against a man is less likely
to cause injury than the other way around (18 percent
versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence from
their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of
violence at the hands of their spouses, and much less
likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of
physical violence by a woman against a spouse are in
self-defense or the result of many years of physical or
emotional abuse.76
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence
and abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the
same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance
requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up,
gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or
discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any
public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said
ordinance was challenged as violative of the guaranty of
equal protection of laws as its application is limited to
owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not
to those animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass
through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for
the reason that, while there may be non-vehicle-drawing
animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their
number must be negligible and their appearance therein
merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as
not to constitute a menace to the health of the
community."77 The mere fact that the legislative
classification may result in actual inequality is not
violative of the right to equal protection, for every
classification of persons or things for regulation by law
produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not
thereby rendered invalid.78
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution,
trial, and sentencing, crimes against women are often
treated differently and less seriously than other crimes.
This was argued by then United States Senator Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending
the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S.
Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal
Protection Clauses. He stressed that the widespread
gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic
prejudices against victims of rape or domestic violence,
subjecting them to "double victimization" first at the
hands of the offender and then of the legal system.79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her
Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that
"(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police
treat it as a private matter and advise the parties to settle
the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the
case to the prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the
complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This
lack of response or reluctance to be involved by the
police and prosecution reinforces the escalating,
recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence."
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices
and biases against our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined
RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming
of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language
in reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and
PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in
partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a
"mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila
even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being
motivated by "insatiable greed" and of absconding with
the contested property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge
Amila's prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the
discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices
against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through
specific measures focused on women does not
discriminate against men.82 Petitioner's contention,83
therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is
an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law
deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the
CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all
appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural
patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary
and all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women."84 Justice Puno
correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing
the character of domestic violence from a private affair
to a public offense will require the development of a
distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution
and the judges."
19
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the
law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to
the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence
committed against women and children, spelled out in its
Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared
that the State values the dignity of women and children
and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State
also recognizes the need to protect the family and its
members particularly women and children, from
violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address
violence committed against women and children in
keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed
under the Constitution and the provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child
and other international human rights instruments of
which the Philippines is a party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the
CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August 5,
1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the
CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October
6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that State parties
shall accord to women equality with men before the
law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in all matters
relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of
equality of men and women.88 The Philippines likewise
ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its
two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions
and their respective protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to
the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to
future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and
security of women and their children are threatened by
violence and abuse.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the
aforequoted provision are attributable to research that
has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery.
The acts described here are also found in the U.N.
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women.90 Hence, the argument advanced by petitioner
that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the
difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs
is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague
and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his
defense. The acts enumerated above are easily
understood and provide adequate contrast between the
innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited,
and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its
application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92 that phrases like
"depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her
child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or
common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and
"causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that
they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse.
However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is
permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the
statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held
invalid merely because it might have been more explicit
in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A.
9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As
defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed
"against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the
gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or
dating relationship with the woman encompasses even
lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides
that the offender be related or connected to the victim by
marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94
the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the
victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case
filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their
son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and
purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient
financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be
ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing
her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
20
6. GSIS VS MONTESCLAROS
FACTS
Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros
(Nicolas) married Milagros Orbiso (Milagros) on 10 July
1983. Nicolas was a 72- year old widower when he
married Milagros who was then 43 years old.
On 4 January 1985, Nicolas filed with the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) an application for
retirement benefits effective 18 February 1985 under
Presidential Decree No. 1146 or the Revised
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 (PD 1146).
In his retirement application, Nicolas designated his wife
Milagros as his sole beneficiary. Nicolas last day of
actual service was on 17 February 1985. On 31 January
1986, GSIS approved Nicolas application for retirement
effective 17 February 1984, granting a lump sum
payment of annuity for the first five years and a monthly
annuity thereafter. Nicolas died on 22 April 1992.
Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship
pension under PD 1146. On 8 June 1992, GSIS denied
the claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the
surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if
the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the
pensioner within three years before the pensioner
qualified for the pension. According to GSIS, Nicolas
wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from
his date of retirement on 17 February 1984.
On 2 October 1992, Milagros filed with the trial court a
special civil action for declaratory relief questioning the
validity of Section 18 of PD 1146 disqualifying her from
receiving survivorship pension.
On 9 November 1994, the trial court rendered judgment
declaring Milagros eligible for survivorship pension.
The trial court ordered GSIS to pay Milagros the
benefits due including interest. Citing Articles 115 and
117 of the Family Code, the trial court held that
retirement benefits, which the pensioner has earned for
services rendered and for which the pensioner has
contributed through monthly salary deductions, are
onerous acquisitions. Since retirement benefits are
property the pensioner acquired through labor, such
benefits are conjugal property. The trial court held that
the prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146 is deemed
repealed for being inconsistent with the Family Code, a
later law. The Family Code has retroactive effect if it
does not prejudice or impair vested rights.GSIS appealed
to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of
the trial court. Hence, this petition for review.
In the meantime, in a letter dated 10 January 2003,
Milagros informed the Court that she has accepted GSIS
decision disqualifying her from receiving survivorship
pension and that she is no longer interested in pursuing
the case. Commenting on Milagros letter, GSIS asserts
that the Court must decide the case on the merits.
The Court will resolve the issue despite the
manifestation of Milagros. The issue involves not only
the claim of Milagros but also that of other surviving
spouses who are similarly situated and whose claims
GSIS would also deny based on the proviso. Social
justice and public interest demand that we resolve the
constitutionality of the proviso.
RULING
The main question for resolution is the validity of the
proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146, which proviso
prohibits the dependent spouse from receiving
survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married
the pensioner within three years before the pensioner
qualified for the pension (the proviso).
SEC. 18. Death of a Pensioner. Upon the death of a
pensioner, the primary beneficiaries shall receive the
applicable pension mentioned under paragraph (b) of
section seventeen of this Act: Provided, That, the
dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said pension if
his marriage with the pensioner is contracted within
three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension. When the pensioner dies within the period
covered by the lump sum, the survivorship pension shall
be paid only after the expiration of the said period. This
shall also apply to the pensioners living as of the
effectivity of this Act, but the survivorship benefit shall
be based on the monthly pension being received at the
time of death.
We hold that the proviso, which was the sole basis for
the rejection by GSIS of Milagros claim, is
unconstitutional because it violates the due process
clause. The proviso is also discriminatory and denies
equal protection of the law.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The surviving spouse of a government employee is
entitled to receive survivors benefits under a pension
system. However, statutes sometimes require that the
spouse should have married the employee for a certain
21
period before the employees death to prevent sham
marriages contracted for monetary gain. One example is
the Illinois Pension Code which restricts survivors
annuity benefits to a surviving spouse who was married
to a state employee for at least one year before the
employees death. The Illinois pension system classifies
spouses into those married less than one year before a
members death and those married one year or more. The
classification seeks to prevent conscious adverse risk
selection of deathbed marriages where a terminally ill
member of the pension system marries another so that
person becomes eligible for benefits. In Sneddon v. The
State Employees Retirement System of Illinois, the
Appellate Court of Illinois held that such classification
was based on difference in situation and circumstance,
bore a rational relation to the purpose of the statute, and
was therefore not in violation of constitutional
guarantees of due process and equal protection.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not
violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal
protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and
reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class. Thus, the law may treat and
regulate one class differently from another class
provided there are real and substantial differences to
distinguish one class from another.
The proviso in question does not satisfy these
requirements. The proviso discriminates against the
dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the
pensioner within three years before the pensioner
qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the
dependent spouse married the pensioner more than three
years before the pensioners death, the dependent spouse
would still not receive survivorship pension if the
marriage took place within three years before the
pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the
prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose intended.
The law itself does not provide any reason or purpose for
such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to
prevent deathbed marriages, then we do not see why the
proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the date
the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date
the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on
substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps
all those marriages contracted within three years before
the pensioner qualified for pension as having been
contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of
pension benefits.
Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary.
This is probably the reason Congress deleted the proviso
in Republic Act No. 8291 (RA 8291), otherwise known
as the Government Service Insurance Act of 1997, the
law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD 1146). Under
the implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving
spouse who married the member immediately before the
members death is still qualified to receive survivorship
pension unless the GSIS proves that the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage solely to receive the benefit.
Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that
marriages contracted within three years before
retirement or death of a member are sham marriages
contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present
GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the survivorship
pension of the surviving spouse who contracted marriage
to a GSIS member within three years before the
members retirement or death. The law acknowledges
that whether the surviving spouse contracted the
marriage mainly to receive survivorship benefits is a
matter of evidence. The law no longer prescribes a
sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the
legitimate surviving spouse and defeats the purpose for
which Congress enacted the social legislation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of
merit. We declare VOID for being violative of the
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the law the proviso in Section 18 of
Presidential Decree No. 1146, which proviso states that
the dependent spouse shall not be entitled to said
pension if his marriage with the pensioner is contracted
within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension. The Government Service Insurance System
cannot deny the claim of Milagros O. Montesclaros for
survivorship benefits based on this invalid proviso.
7. TUAN AHN NGUYEN VS. IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICES
FACTS:
Petitioner Tuan Anh Nguyen was born out of wedlock in
Vietnam to a Vietnamese citizen and copetitioner Joseph
Boulais, a United States citizen. Nguyen became a
lawful permanent United States resident at age six and
was raised by Boulais. At age 22, Nguyen pleaded guilty
in a Texas state court to two counts of sexual assault on
22
a child. Subsequently, respondent Immigration and
Naturalization Service initiated deportation proceedings
against him based on his serious criminal offenses. The
Immigration Judge ordered him deportable. Boulais
obtained an order of parentage from a state court while
Nguyen's appeal was pending before the Board of
Immigration Appeals, but the Board dismissed the
appeal, rejecting Nguyen's citizenship claim because he
had not complied with 8 U. S. C. 1409(a)'s requirements
for one born out of wedlock and abroad to a citizen
father and a noncitizen mother. On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit rejected petitioners' claim that 1409 violates
equal protection by providing different citizenship rules
for children born abroad and out of wedlock depending
on whether the citizen parent is the mother or the father.
HELD: Section 1409 is consistent with the equal
protection guarantee embedded in the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. Pp. 59-73.
(a) A child born abroad and out of wedlock acquires at
birth the nationality status of a citizen mother who meets
a specified residency requirement. 1409(c). However,
when the father is the citizen parent, inter alia, one of
three affirmative steps must be taken before the child
turns 18: legitimization, a declaration of paternity under
oath by the father, or a court order of paternity.
1409(a)(4). The failure to satisfy this section renders
Nguyen ineligible for citizenship.
(b) A gender-based classification withstands equal
protection scrutiny if it serves important governmental
objectives and the discriminatory means employed are
substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives. United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 533.
Congress' decision to impose different requirements on
unmarried fathers and unmarried mothers is based on the
significant difference between their respective
relationships to the potential citizen at the time of birth
and is justified by two important governmental interests.
(1) The first such interest is the importance of assuring
that a biological parent-child relationship exists. The
mother's relation is verifiable from the birth itself and is
documented by the birth certificate or hospital records
and the witnesses to the birth. However, a father need
not be present at the birth, and his presence is not
incontrovertible proof of fatherhood. See Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U. S. 248, 260, n. 16. Because fathers
and mothers are not similarly situated with regard to
proof of biological parenthood, the imposition of
different rules for each is neither surprising nor
troublesome from a constitutional perspective. Section
1409(a)(4)'s provision of three options is designed to
ensure acceptable documentation of paternity.
Petitioners argue that 1409(a)(1)'s requirement that a
father provide clear and convincing evidence of
parentage is sufficient to achieve the end of establishing
paternity, given the sophistication of modern DNA tests.
However, that section does not mandate DNA testing.
Moreover, the Constitution does not require that
Congress elect one particular mechanism from among
many possible methods of establishing paternity, and
1409(a)(4) represents a reasonable legislative conclusion
that the satisfaction of one of several alternatives will
suffice to establish the father-child blood link required as
a predicate to the child's acquisition of citizenship.
Finally, even a facially neutral rule would sometimes
require fathers to take additional affirmative steps which
would not be required of mothers, whose names will be
on the birth certificate as a result of their presence at the
birth, and who will have the benefit of witnesses to the
birth to call upon.
(2) The second governmental interest furthered by
1409(a)(4) is the determination to ensure that the child
and citizen parent have some demonstrated opportunity
to develop a relationship that consists of real, everyday
ties providing a connection between child and citizen
parent and, in turn, the United States. Such an
opportunity inheres in the event of birth in the case of a
citizen mother and her child, but does not result as a
matter of biological inevitability in the case of an unwed
father. He may not know that a child was conceived, and
a mother may be unsure of the father's identity. One
concern in this context has always been with young men
on duty with the Armed Forces in foreign countries.
Today, the ease of travel and willingness of Americans
to visit foreign countries have resulted in numbers of
trips abroad that must be of real concern when
contemplating the prospect of mandating, contrary to
Congress' wishes, citizenship by male parentage subject
to no condition other than the father's residence in this
country. Equal protection principles do not require
Congress to ignore this reality. Section 1409 takes the
unremarkable step of ensuring that the opportunity
inherent in the event of birth as to the mother-child
relationship exists between father and child before
citizenship is conferred upon the latter. That interest's
importance is too profound to be satisfied by a DNA test
because scientific proof of biological paternity does not,
by itself, ensure father-child contact during the child's
minority. Congress is well within its authority in
23
refusing, absent proof of an opportunity for a
relationship to develop, to commit this country to
embracing a child as a citizen. Contrary to petitioners'
argument, 1409 does not embody a gender-based
stereotype. There is nothing irrational or improper in
recognizing that at the moment of birth-a critical event in
the statutory scheme and tradition of citizenship law-the
mother's knowledge of the child and the fact of
parenthood have been established in a way not
guaranteed to the unwed father.
(3) The means Congress chose substantially relate to its
interest in facilitating a parent-child relationship. First,
various statutory provisions, in addition to 1409(a),
require that some act linking a child to the United States
occur before the child turns 18. Second, petitioners'
argument that 1409(a)(4) reflects a stereotype that
women are more likely than men to actually establish the
required relationship misconceives both the
governmental interest's nature and the equal protection
inquiry. As to the former, Congress could have chosen to
advance the interest of ensuring a meaningful
relationship in every case, but it enacted instead an
easily administered scheme to promote the different but
still substantial interest of ensuring an opportunity for
that relationship to develop. Petitioners' argument
confuses the equal protection inquiry's means and ends;
1409(a)(4) should not be invalidated because Congress
elected to advance an interest that is less demanding to
satisfy than some alternative. Even if one conceives of
Congress' real interest as the establishment of a
meaningful relationship, it is almost axiomatic that a
policy seeking to foster the opportunity for meaningful
parent-child bonds to develop has a close and substantial
bearing on the governmental interest in that bond's
formation. Here, Congress' means are in substantial
furtherance of an important governmental objective, and
the fit between the means and that end is exceedingly
persuasive. See Virginia, supra, at 533.
(c) Section 1409(a)(4) imposes a minimal obligation.
Only the least onerous of its three options must be
satisfied; and it can be satisfied on the day of birth, or
the next day, or for the next 18 years. Section 1409(a),
moreover, is not the sole means of attaining citizenship
for the child, who can seek citizenship in his or her own
right, rather than via reliance on parental ties.
(d) Because the statute satisfies the equal protection
scrutiny applied to gender-based qualifications, this
Court need not consider whether it can confer citizenship
on terms other than those specified by Congress or
assess the implications of statements in earlier cases
regarding the wide deference afforded to Congress in
exercising its immigration and naturalization power.
8. LABINE VS. VINCENT
FACTS:
Vincent died intestate survived by collateral relatives
and illegitimate minor daughter. Nothing was given to
the daughter. She was acknowledged by her father but
was not legitimated. Appellant contends that intestate
succession laws that bar an illegitimate child from
sharing equally with legitimate children constitute an
invidious discrimination violative of due process and
equal protection.
HELD:
No violation. An illegitimate not acknowledged have no
right to take property by intestate. If acknowledged, they
may be given to the exclusion of the state. The father
may grant the child 1/3 or of the estate provided there
are no legitimate children. They can also be adopted or
legitimated, in which case, they may be heirs like any
other child. Here, there is no suggestion that barred from
succession the illegitimate daughter. Vincent could have
given him 1/3 of his estate, or he could have legitimated
or adopted the child, or acknowledged her.
9) STANLEY v. ILLINOIS, (1972)
Brief Fact Summary. Appellant had an ongoing
relationship with a woman with whom he sired and
raised three children. Upon the death of the mother the
children were deemed wards of the State under an
Illinois law that did not place children in the custody of
unwed fathers.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The statute violated
appellants equal protection under the laws by depriving
him of custody of his children when married fathers and
unwed mothers could not be deprived of custody without
being shown to be unfit parents.
Facts. Joan Stanley lived with Peter Stanley, appellant,
intermittently for 18 years, during which time they had
three children. Under Illinois law the children of unwed
fathers became wards of the State upon death of the
mother. When Joan died a dependency proceeding was
24
instituted by the State and appellants children were
declared wards of the State and placed with court-
appointed guardians. Appellant appealed upon the fact
that he had never been shown to be an unfit parent and
that since married fathers and unwed mothers could not
be deprived of their children without such a showing, he
had been deprived of the equal protection of laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Issue. Does the Illinois statute violate the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution by
distinguishing against and burdening unwed fathers?
Held. As a matter of due process of law, appellant was
entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his
children were taken from him. By denying him a hearing
when all other parents whose custody of their children is
challenged are permitted one, the State denied appellant
the equal protection of laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Under Illinois law, children of all parents can be taken
from them in a neglect proceeding, but only after notice,
hearing, and proof of unfitness. In contrast, an unwed
father is uniquely subject to the more simplistic
dependency proceeding.
The private interest of a man and the children he has
sired and raised warrants deference and protection. In
comparison, previous case law has not refused to
recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a
marriage ceremony.
The State claims that the interest furthered by the statue
is to protect the moral, emotional, mental, and physical
welfare of the minor and the best interests of the
community. In support of this interest, the State asserts
that most unmarried fathers are unsuitable and neglectful
parents. However, the State registers no gain toward its
goals when it separates children from the custody of fit
parents. The States insistence on presuming rather than
proving appellants unfitness solely on the basis of
convenience is unconstitutional.
Discussion. The Court acknowledges that the State has a
legitimate interest in prompt efficacious procedures
furthered by the presumption that unwed fathers are
unfit. However, such an interest is outweighed by the
fathers right to demonstrate that he is fit when the right
taken away from the father would be the right to raise
his child.
FULL TEXT: STANLEY VS. ILLINOIS
Argued: October 19, 1971 Decided: April 3, 1972
Petitioner, an unwed father whose children, on the
mother's death, were declared state wards and placed in
guardianship, attacked the Illinois statutory scheme as
violative of equal protection. Under that scheme the
children of unmarried fathers, upon the death of the
mother, are declared dependents without any hearing on
parental fitness and without proof of neglect, though
such hearing and proof are required before the State
assumes custody of children of married or divorced
parents and unmarried mothers. The Illinois Supreme
Court, holding that petitioner could properly be
separated from his children upon mere proof that he and
the dead mother had not been married and that
petitioner's fitness as a father was irrelevant, rejected
petitioner's claim.
Held:
1. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment petitioner was entitled to a hearing on his
fitness as a parent before his children were taken from
him.
(a) The fact that petitioner can apply for adoption or for
custody and control of his children does not bar his
attack on the dependency proceeding.
(b) The State cannot, consistently with due process
requirements, merely presume that unmarried fathers in
general and petitioner in particular are unsuitable and
neglectful parents. Parental unfitness must be established
on the basis of individualized proof. See Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535 .
2. The denial to unwed fathers of the hearing on fitness
accorded to all other parents whose custody of their
children is challenged by the State constitutes a denial of
equal protection of the laws
Patrick T. Murphy argued the cause and filed a brief for
petitioner.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Joan Stanley lived with Peter Stanley intermittently for
18 years, during which time they had three children.
When Joan Stanley died, Peter Stanley lost not only her
but also his children. Under Illinois law, the children of
25
unwed fathers become wards of the State upon the death
of the mother.
Accordingly, upon Joan Stanley's death, in a dependency
proceeding instituted by the State of Illinois, Stanley's
children 2 were declared wards of the State and placed
with court-appointed guardians. Stanley appealed,
claiming that he had never been shown to be an unfit
parent and that since married fathers and unwed mothers
could not be deprived of their children without such a
showing, he had been deprived of the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed him by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Illinois Supreme Court accepted the fact that
Stanley's own unfitness had not been established but
rejected the equal protection claim, holding that Stanley
could properly be separated from his children upon proof
of the single fact that he and the dead mother had not
been married. Stanley's actual fitness as a father was
irrelevant.
Stanley presses his equal protection claim here. The
State continues to respond that unwed fathers are
presumed unfit to raise their children and that it is
unnecessary to hold individualized hearings to determine
whether particular fathers are in fact unfit parents before
they are separated from their children. We granted
certiorari to determine whether this method of procedure
by presumption could be allowed to stand in light of the
fact that Illinois allows married fathers - whether
divorced, widowed, or separated - and mothers - even if
unwed - the benefit of the presumption that they are fit
to raise their children.
III
The State of Illinois assumes custody of the children of
married parents, divorced parents, and unmarried
mothers only after a hearing and proof of neglect. The
children of unmarried fathers, however, are declared
dependent children without a hearing on parental fitness
and without proof of neglect. Stanley's claim in the state
courts and here is that failure to afford him a hearing on
his parental qualifications while extending it to other
parents denied him equal protection of the laws. We
have concluded that all Illinois parents are
constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness
before their children are removed from their custody. It
follows that denying such a hearing to Stanley and those
like him while granting it to other Illinois parents is
inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is
reversed and the case is remanded to that court for
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
FOOTNOTES:
[ Footnote 10 ] Predicating a finding of constitutional
invalidity under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment on the observation that a State
has accorded bedrock procedural rights to some, but not
to all similarly situated, is not contradictory to our
holding in Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971). In
that case a due process, rather than an equal protection,
claim was raised in the state courts.
The federal courts were, in our opinion, barred from
reversing the state conviction on grounds of
contravention of the Equal Protection Clause when that
clause had not been referred to for consideration by the
state authorities. Here, in contrast, we dispose of the case
on the constitutional premise raised below, reaching the
result by a method of analysis readily available to the
state court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom MR.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN concurs, dissenting.
The only constitutional issue raised and decided in the
courts of Illinois in this case was whether the Illinois
statute that omits unwed fathers from the definition of
"parents" violates the Equal Protection Clause. We
granted certiorari to consider whether the Illinois
Supreme Court properly resolved that equal protection
issue when it unanimously upheld the statute against
petitioner Stanley's attack
In regard to the only issue that I consider properly before
the Court, I agree with the State's argument that the
Equal Protection Clause is not violated when Illinois
gives full recognition only to those father-child
relationships that arise in the context of family units
bound together by legal obligations arising from
marriage or from adoption proceedings. Quite apart from
the religious or quasi-religious connotations that
marriage has - and has historically enjoyed - for a large
proportion of this Nation's citizens, it is in law an
essentially contractual relationship, the parties to which
have legally enforceable rights and duties, with respect
both to each other and to any children born to them.
Stanley and the mother of these children never entered
such a relationship. The record is silent as to whether
26
they ever privately exchanged such promises as would
have bound them in marriage under the common law.
any event, Illinois has not recognized common-law
marriages since 1905. Stanley did not seek the burdens
when he could have freely assumed them.
Where there is a valid contract of marriage, the law of
Illinois presumes that the husband is the father of any
child born to the wife during the marriage; as the father,
he has legally enforceable rights and duties with respect
to that child. When a child is born to an unmarried
woman, Illinois recognizes the readily identifiable
mother, but makes no presumption as to the identity of
the biological father.
It does, however, provide two ways, one voluntary and
one involuntary, in which that father may be identified.
First, he may marry the mother and acknowledge the
child as his own; this has the legal effect of legitimating
the child and gaining for the father full recognition as a
parent.
Second, a man may be found to be the biological father
of the child pursuant to a paternity suit initiated by the
mother; in this case, the child remains illegitimate, but
the adjudicated father is made liable for the support of
the child until the latter attains age 18 or is legally
adopted by another. Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 106 3/4, 52.
Stanley argued before the Supreme Court of Illinois that
the definition of "parents," set out in Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 37,
701-14, as including "the father and mother of a
legitimate child, or the survivor of them, or the natural
mother of an illegitimate child, [or] . . . any adoptive
parent," 3 violates the Equal Protection Clause in that it
treats unwed mothers and unwed fathers differently.
Stanley then enlarged upon his equal protection
argument when he brought the case here; he argued
before this Court that Illinois is not permitted by the
Equal Protection Clause to distinguish between unwed
fathers and any of the other biological parents included
in the statutory definition of legal "parents."
The Illinois Supreme Court correctly held that the State
may constitutionally distinguish between unwed fathers
and unwed mothers. Here, Illinois' different treatment of
the two is part of that State's statutory scheme for
protecting the welfare of illegitimate children. In almost
all cases, the unwed mother is readily identifiable,
generally from hospital records, and alternatively by
physicians or others attending the child's birth. Unwed
fathers, as a class, are not traditionally quite so easy to
identify and locate. Many of them either deny all
responsibility or exhibit no interest in the child or its
welfare; and, of course, many unwed fathers are simply
not aware of their parenthood.
10) TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ
TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO, MA
NIMFA B. ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in
their behalf and in behalf of applicants for admission
into the Medical Colleges during the school year 1987-
88 and future years who have not taken or successfully
hurdled tile National Medical Admission Test (NMAT).
petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S.
GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVII of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region with seat at Manila, THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY LOURDES QUISUMBING, in her
capacity as Chairman of the BOARD OF MEDICAL
EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR
EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT (CEM),
respondents.
FACTS:
- The petitioners sought admission into colleges or
schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988.
- However, the petitioners either did not take or did not
successfully take the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education,
one of the public respondents, and administered by the
private respondent, the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM).
- On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a
Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a
prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction.
- The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical
Education and the Center for Educational Measurement
from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No.
2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of
1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the
taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for
27
securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceeding with accepting applications for taking the
NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled
on 26 April 1987 and in the future.
- After hearing on the petition for issuance of
preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said
petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted
and administered as previously scheduled.
- Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action
for certiorari with this Court to set aside the Order of the
respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction.
-Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos.
4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959"
defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
Section 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall
govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical
education (b) the examination for registration of
physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and
regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines.
- The statute, among other things, created a Board of
Medical Education
- Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for
applicants to medical schools:
Admission requirements. The medical college may
admit any student who has not been convicted by any
court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving
moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of
completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a
certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school
from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of
good moral character issued by two former professors in
the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate.
Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any
college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the
preceding, other entrance requirements that may be
deemed admissible.
- MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then
Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23
August 1985, established a uniform admission test called
the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an
additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of
eligibility for admission into medical schools of the
Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987.
- 8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite
Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA), or
admitted for enrollment as first year student in any
medical college, beginning the school year, 1986-87,
without the required NMAT qualification as called for
under this Order. (Underscoring supplied)
- Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private
respondent Center conducted NMATs for entrance to
medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987. In
December 1986 and in April 1987, respondent Center
conducted the NMATs for admission to medical colleges
during the school year 1987.1988.
ISSUES:
- Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ
of preliminary injunction may be issued to enjoin the
enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No.
2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985,
pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the
assailed statute and administrative order. The
fundamental issue is of course the constitutionality of the
statute or order assailed.
RULING:
1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the
1987 Constitution which are, in their assertion, violated
by the continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f)
of Republic Act 2381, as amended, and MECS Order
No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions invoked read as follows:
(a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect of
human rights. "
(b) Article II, Section l3: "The State recognizes the vital
role of the youth in nation building and shall promote
and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual
and social well being. It shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs."
(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority
to education, science and technology, arts, culture and
sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate
social progress and to promote total human liberation
and development. "
(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect and
promote the right of all citizens to quality education at
all levels and take appropriate steps to make such
education accessible to all. "
28
(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right
to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements."
Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second
half certain "State policies" which the government is
enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here
have not seriously undertaken to demonstrate to what
extent or in what manner the statute and the
administrative order they assail collide with the State
policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have
not, in other words, discharged the burden of proof
which lies upon them.
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987
Constitution, we note that once more petitioners have
failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they
assail in fact clash with that provision. On the contrary
we may note-in anticipation of discussion infra that
the statute and the regulation which petitioners attack are
in fact designed to promote "quality education" at the
level of professional schools.
When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of
Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that the
latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute
literalness. The State is not really enjoined to take
appropriate steps to make quality education accessible
to all who might for any number of reasons wish to
enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make
such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements. "
ABOUT EQUAL PROTECTION
2. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order
No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners
assert that that portion of the MECS Order which
provides that the cutoff score for the successful
applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be
determined every-year by the Board of Medical 11
Education after consultation with the Association of
Philippine Medical Colleges.
"infringes the requirements of equal protection." They
assert, in other words, that students seeking admission
during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when
subjected to a different cutoff score than that established
for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against
and that this renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and
capricious."
Different cutoff scores for different school years may be
dictated by differing conditions obtaining during those
years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year
may be a function of such factors as the number of
students who have reached the cutoff score established
the preceding year; the number of places available in
medical schools during the current year; the average
score attained during the current year; the level of
difficulty of the test given during the current year, and so
forth.
To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff score
regardless of changes in circumstances from year to
year, may wen result in an unreasonable rigidity. The
above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being
arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of Medical
Education with the measure of flexibility needed to meet
circumstances as they change.
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring
certain minimum scores therein as a condition for
admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not
constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court
denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
11) SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY
INC. VS. CABILES
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.
FACTS:
"This case involves an overseas Filipino worker with
shattered dreams. It is our duty, given the facts and the
law, to approximate justice for her."
-Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is
a recruitment and placement agency. Responding to an
ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted
her application for a quality control job in Taiwan.
29
- Joys application was accepted. Joy was later asked to
sign a oneyear employment contract for a monthly salary
of NT$15,360.00. She alleged that Sameer Overseas
Agency required her to pay a placement fee of
P70,000.00 when she signed the employment contract.
- Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd.
(Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her
employment contract, she agreed to work as quality
control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work
as a cutter.
- Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on
July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal
informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was
terminated and that "she should immediately report to
their office to get her salary and passport." She was
asked to "prepare for immediate repatriation."
- Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July
14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15
According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover
her plane ticket to Manila.16
- On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint with the
National Labor Relations Commission against petitioner
and Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally
dismissed.
- She asked for the return of her placement fee, the
withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment of her
salary for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary
damages. She identified Wacoal as Sameer Overseas
Placement Agencys foreign principal.
- Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that
respondent's termination was due to her inefficiency,
negligence in her duties, and her "failure to comply with
the work requirements [of] her foreign [employer]." The
agency also claimed that it did not ask for a placement
fee.
- Petitioner added that Wacoal's accreditation with
petitioner had already been transferred to the (Pacific),
Thus, petitioner asserts that it was already substituted by
Pacific Manpower.
- On July 29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Joys
complaint. Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro
C.Ramos ruled that her complaint was based on mere
allegations.
- Joy appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission.
- In a resolution dated March 31, 2004, the National
Labor Relations Commission declared that Joy was
illegally dismissed. It found that Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency failed to prove that there were just
causes for termination. Furthermore, procedural
dueprocess was not observed in terminating respondent.
- NLRC refused to entertain the issue of the alleged
transfer of obligations to Pacific. It did not acquire
jurisdiction over that issue because Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency failed to appeal the Labor Arbiters
decision not to rule on the matter.
- The National Labor Relations Commission awarded
respondent only three (3) months worth of salary in the
amount of NT$46,080, the reimbursement of the
NT$3,000 withheld from her, and attorneys fees of
NT$300.46
- Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement
Agency caused the filing of a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals assailing the National Labor
Relations Commissions resolutions
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission with respect to
the finding of illegal dismissal, Joys entitlement to the
equivalent of three months worth of salary,
reimbursement of withheld repatriation expense, and
attorneys fees.
- Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency filed
this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the
unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal dismissal.
RULING: (CASE DIGEST)
YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month
equivalent of respondents salary should be increased to
the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the
employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled that the
clause or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less is unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection clause and substantive due
process.
A statute or provision which was declared
unconstitutional is not a law. It confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no
30
office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at
all.
The Court said that they are aware that the clause or
for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less was reinstated in Republic Act
No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022
in 2010.
RULING ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme.
No branch or office of the government may exercise its
powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution,
regardless of the existence of any law that supports such
exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any
other law. All laws must be read in light of the
Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a
nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because
it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot
be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same
or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law
that was already declared unconstitutional remains as
such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant
a reverse conclusion.
The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time
as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the
constitutional rights to equal protection and due
process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General
have failed to show any compelling change in the
circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the
precedent.
The Court declared, once again, the clause, or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less in Section 7 of Republic Act No.
10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is
declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
RULING: (ABT EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE)
(FULL TEXT)
- The Office of the Solicitor General also argued that the
clause was valid and constitutional. However, since the
parties never raised the issue of the constitutionality of
the clause as reinstated in Republic Act No. 10022, its
contention is that it is beyond judicial review.
On the other hand, respondent argued that the clause was
unconstitutional because it infringed on workers right to
contract.
We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as
provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.
We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime
that limiting wages that should be recovered by an
illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is
both a violation of due process and the equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.
Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons
under like circumstances and falling within the same
class are treated alike, in terms of "privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced." It is a guarantee against "undue
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality."
The equal protection clause does not infringe on this
legislative power. A law is void on this basis, only if
classifications are made arbitrarily. There is no violation
of the equal protection clause if the law applies equally
to persons within the same class and if there are
reasonable grounds for distinguishing between those
falling within the class and those who do not fall within
the class. A law that does not violate the equal protection
clause prescribes a reasonable classification.
A reasonable classification "(1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the
law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same
class."
The reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement of
reasonable classification.
In Serrano, we identified the classifications made by the
reinstated clause. It distinguished between fixed-period
overseas workers and fixed period local workers.
It also distinguished between overseas workers with
employment contracts of less than one year and overseas
workers with employment contracts of at least one year.
The Congress classification may be subjected to judicial
review. In Serrano, there is a "legislative classification
which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class."
31
Under the Constitution, labor is afforded special
protection. Thus, this court in Serrano, "[i]mbued
with the same sense of obligation to afford
protection to labor, . . . employ[ed] the standard of
strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceive[d] in the
subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to
OFWs."
We also noted in Serrano that before the passage of
Republic Act No. 8042, the money claims of illegally
terminated overseas and local workers with fixed-term
employment were computed in the same manner.
Their money claims were computed based on the
"unexpired portions of their contracts." The adoption of
the reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 8042 subjected
the money claims of illegally dismissed overseas
workers with an unexpired term of at least a year to a
cap of three months worth of their salary.
There was no such limitation on the money claims of
illegally terminated local workers with fixed-term
employment.
We observed that illegally dismissed overseas workers
whose employment contracts had a term of less than one
year were granted the amount equivalent to the
unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
Meanwhile, illegally dismissed overseas workers with
employment terms of at least a year were granted a cap
equivalent to three months of their salary for the
unexpired portions of their contracts.
Observing the terminologies used in the clause, we also
found that "the subject clause creates a sub-layer of
discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are
for more than one year: those who are illegally
dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts
shall be entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired
portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed
with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall
be covered by the reinstated clause, and their monetary
benefits limited to their salaries for three months only.
Overseas workers regardless of their classifications are
entitled to security of tenure, at least for the period
agreed upon in their contracts. This means that they
cannot be dismissed before the end of their contract
terms without due process. If they were illegally
dismissed, the workers right to security of tenure is
violated.
The rights violated when, say, a fixed-period local
worker is illegally terminated are neither greater than nor
less than the rights violated when a fixed-period
overseas worker is illegally terminated.
It is state policy to protect the rights of workers without
qualification as to the place of employment. In both
cases, the workers are deprived of their expected salary,
which they could have earned had they not been illegally
dismissed.
For both workers, this deprivation translates to economic
insecurity and disparity.
For this reason, we cannot subscribe to the argument that
"[overseas workers] are contractual employees who can
never acquire regular employment status, unlike local
workers" because it already justifies differentiated
treatment in terms of the computation of money claims.
We also find that the classifications are not relevant
to the purpose of the law, which is to "establish a
higher standard of protection and promotion of the
welfare of migrant workers, their families and
overseas Filipinos in distress, and for other
purposes."
Putting a cap on the money claims of certain overseas
workers does not increase the standard of protection
afforded to them.
Meanwhile, these overseas workers who are impressed
with an expectation of a stable job overseas for the
longer contract period disregard other opportunities only
to be terminated earlier. They are left with claims that
are less than what others in the same situation would
receive. The reinstated clause, therefore, creates a
situation where the law meant to protect them makes
violation of rights easier and simply benign to the
violator.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification.
Petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency is
ORDERED to pay respondent Joy C. Cabiles the amount
equivalent to her salary for the unexpired portion of her
employment contract at an interest of 6% per annum
from the finality of this judgment. Petitioner is also
ORDERED to reimburse respondent the withheld
NT$3,000.00 salary and pay respondent attorney's fees
of NT$300.00 at an interest of 6% per annum from the
finality of this judgment.
32
The clause, "or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" in Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and,
therefore, null and void.
12) ALMARIO VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Art has traditionally been viewed as the expression of
everything that is true, good and beautiful. As such, it is
perceived to evoke and produce a spirit of harmony. Art
is also considered as a civilizing force, a catalyst of
nation-building. The notion of art and artists as
privileged expressions of national culture helped shape
the grand narratives of the nation and shared symbols of
the people. The artist does not simply express his/her
own individual inspiration but articulates the deeper
aspirations of history and the soul of the people.
The law recognizes this role and views art as something
that "reflects and shapes values, beliefs, aspirations,
thereby defining a peoples national identity." If unduly
politicized, however, art and artists could stir
controversy and may even cause discord, as what
happened in this case.
FACTS:
History of the Order of National Artists
On April 27, 1972, former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Proclamation No. 10014 and, upon
recommendation of the Board of Trustees of the Cultural
Center of the Philippines (CCP), created the category of
Award and Decoration of National Artist to be awarded
to Filipinos who have made distinct contributions to arts
and letters. In the same issuance, Fernando Amorsolo
was declared as the first National Artist.
On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise
known as the Law Creating the National Commission for
Culture and the Arts, was signed into law. It established
the National Commission for Culture and the Arts
(NCCA) and gave it an extensive mandate over the
development, promotion and preservation of the Filipino
national culture and arts and the Filipino cultural
heritage.
Among the specific mandates of the NCCA under
Republic Act No. 7356 is to "extend recognition of
artistic achievement through awards, grants and services
to artists and cultural groups which contribute
significantly to the Filipinos cultural legacy."
In connection with this mandate, the NCCA is vested
with the power to "advise the President on matters
pertaining to culture and the arts, including the creation
of a special decoration or award, for persons who have
significantly contributed to the development and
promotion of Philippine culture and arts."
CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA have been
mandated by law to promote, develop and protect the
Philippine national culture and the arts, and authorized
to give awards to deserving Filipino artists, the two
bodies decided to team up and jointly administer the
National Artists Award.9 Thereafter, they reviewed the
guidelines for the nomination, selection and
administration of the National Artists Award.
On September 19, 2003, Executive Order No. 236, s.
2003, entitled Establishing the Honors Code of the
Philippines to Create an Order of Precedence of Honors
Conferred and for Other Purposes, was issued.
The National Artists Award was renamed the Order of
National Artists and raised to the level of a Cultural
Order, fourth in precedence among the orders and
decorations that comprise the Honors of the Philippines.
Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, recognizes the vital
role of the NCCA and the CCP in identifying Filipinos
who have made distinct contributions to arts and letters
and states that the National Artist recognition is
conferred "upon the recommendation of the Cultural
Center of the Philippines and the National Commission
for Culture and the Arts." Executive Order No. 236, s.
2003, further created a Committee on Honors to "assist
the President in evaluating nominations for recipients of
Honors," including the Order of National Artists, and
presidential awards.
The Committee on Honors has been allowed to
"authorize relevant department or government agencies
to maintain Honors and/or Awards Committees to
process nominations for Honors and/or Presidential
Awards."14 In this connection, Section 2.4(A) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations 15 of Executive
Order No. 236, s. 2003, states:
All nominations from the various awards committees
must be submitted to the Committee on Honors via the
Chancellery of Philippine Orders and State Decorations.
The Chancellery shall process nominations for the
consideration of the Committee on Honors. The
33
Committee on Honors shall screen and recommend these
nominations to the President.
The Committee on Honors shall, as a general rule, serve
as a screening committee to ensure that nominations
received from the various awards committees meet two
tests: that there has not been an abuse of discretion in
making the nomination, and that the nominee is in good
standing. Should a nomination meet these criteria, a
recommendation to the President for conferment shall be
made.
The President of the Philippines takes the
recommendations of the Committee on Honors in the
highest consideration when making the final decision on
the conferment of awards. (Emphasis supplied.)
Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, entitled Amending
Section 5(IV) of Executive Order No. 236 Entitled
"Establishing the Honors Code of the Philippines to
Create an Order of Precedence of Honors Conferred and
for Other Purposes" was subsequently issued on June 8,
2005. It amended the wording of Executive Order No.
236, s. 2003, on the Order of National Artists and
clarified that the NCCA and the CCP "shall advise the
President on the conferment of the Order of National
Artists."
Controversy Surrounding the 2009
Order of National Artists
Petitioners alleged that on January 30, 2007, a joint
meeting of the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the
CCP Board of Trustees was held to discuss, among
others, the evaluation of the 2009 Order of National
Artists and the convening of the National Artist Award
Secretariat. The nomination period was set for
September 2007 to December 31, 2007, which was later
extended to February 28, 2008. The pre-screening of
nominations was held from January to March 2008.
On April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel met.17 A
total of 87 nominees18 were considered during the
deliberation and a preliminary shortlist 19 of 32 names
was compiled.
On April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation Panel
shortlisted 13 out of the 32 names in the preliminary
shortlist.On May 6, 2009, the final deliberation was
conducted by the 30-member Final Deliberation Panel
comprised of the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA
Board of Commissioners and the living National
Artists.From the 13 names in the second shortlist, a final
list of four names was agreed upon namely: Manuel
Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and Federico
Aguilar-Alcuaz.
CCP and NCCA submitted this recommendation to the
President. According to respondents, the aforementioned
letter was referred by the Office of the President to the
Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the
President allegedly received nominations from various
sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly
endorsing private respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez,
Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Masa and Jose
Moreno. The Committee on Honors purportedly
processed these nominations and invited resource
persons to validate the qualifications and credentials of
the nominees.
Acting on this recommendation, Proclamation No. 1823
declaring Manuel Conde a National Artist was issued on
June 30, 2009. Subsequently, on July 6, 2009,
Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued declaring
Lazaro Francisco, Federico AguilarAlcuaz and private
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and
Moreno, respectively, as National Artists. This was
subsequently announced to the public by then Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita on July 29, 2009.
Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of
the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the CCP Board
of Trustees to select those who will be conferred the
Order of National Artists and to set the standard for
entry into that select group, petitioners instituted this
petition for prohibition, certiorari and injunction (with
prayer for restraining order) praying that the Order of
National Artists be conferred on Dr. Santos and that the
conferment of the Order of National Artists on
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and
Moreno be enjoined and declared to have been rendered
in grave abuse of discretion.
All of the petitioners claim that former President
Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in
disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and
selection process for the Order of National Artists and in
substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation
Panels. According to petitioners, the Presidents
discretion to name National Artists is not absolute but
limited. In particular, her discretion on the matter cannot
be exercised in the absence of or against the
recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP.
Contention of the Parties
34
A perusal of the pleadings submitted by the petitioners
reveals that they are an aggrupation of at least three
groups, the National Artists, cultural workers and
academics, and the Concerned Artists of the Philippines
(CAP).
The National Artists assert an "actual as well as legal
interest in maintaining the reputation of the Order of
National Artists."
In particular, they invoke their right to due process not to
have the honor they have been conferred with
diminished by the irregular and questionable conferment
of the award on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Maosa and Moreno. For petitioners, this would
adversely affect their right to live a meaningful life as it
detracts not only from their right to enjoy their honor as
a fruit of their lifelong labor but also from the respect of
their peers.
The cultural workers, academics and CAP claim to be
Filipinos who are deeply concerned with the
preservation of the countrys rich cultural and artistic
heritage. As taxpayers, they are concerned about the use
of public monies for illegal appointments or spurious
acts of discretion.
All of the petitioners claim that former President
Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in
disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and
selection process for the Order of National Artists and in
substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation
Panels.
According to petitioners, the Presidents discretion to
name National Artists is not absolute but limited. In
particular, her discretion on the matter cannot be
exercised in the absence of or against the
recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP.
In adding the names of respondents Caparas, Guidote-
Alvarez, Maosa and Moreno while dropping Dr. Santos
from the list of conferees, the Presidents own choices
constituted the majority of the awardees in utter
disregard of the choices of the NCCA and the CCP and
the arts and culture community which were arrived at
after a long and rigorous process of screening and
deliberation. Moreover, the name of Dr. Santos as
National Artist for Music was deleted from the final list
submitted by the NCCA and the CCP Boards without
clearly indicating the basis thereof.
For petitioners, the Presidents discretion to name
National Artists cannot be exercised to defeat the
recommendations made by the CCP and NCCA Boards
after a long and rigorous screening process and with the
benefit of expertise and experience. The addition of four
names to the final list submitted by the Boards of the
CCP and the NCCA and the deletion of one name from
the said list constituted a substitution of judgment by the
President and a unilateral reconsideration without clear
justification of the decision of the First, Second and
Final Deliberation Panels composed of experts.
Petitioners further argue that the choice of respondent
Guidote Alvarez was illegal and unethical because, as
the then Executive Director of the NCCA and
presidential adviser on culture and arts, she was
disqualified from even being nominated. Moreover, such
action on the part of the former President constituted
grave abuse of discretion as it gave preferential
treatment to respondent Guidote-Alvarez by naming the
latter a National Artist despite her not having been
nominated and, thus, not subjected to the screening
process provided by the rules for selection to the Order
of National Artists. Her inclusion in the list by the
President represented a clear and manifest favor given
by the President in that she was exempted from the
process that all other artists have to undergo.
According to petitioners, it may be said that the
President used a different procedure to qualify
respondent Guidote-Alvarez. This was clearly grave
abuse of discretion for being manifest and undue bias
violative of the equal protection clause.
Respondent Caparas refutes the contention of the
petitioning National Artists and insists that there could
be no prejudice to the latter. They remain to be National
Artists and continue to receive the emoluments, benefits
and other privileges pertaining to them by virtue of that
honor. On the other hand, all the other petitioners failed
to show any material and personal injury or harm caused
to them by the conferment of the Order of National
Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Maosa and Moreno. The rule on standing may not be
relaxed in favor of the petitioners as no question of
constitutionality has been raised and no issue of
transcendental importance is involved.
On the merits, respondent Caparas contends that no
grave abuse of discretion attended his proclamation as
National Artist. The former President considered the
respective recommendations of the NCCA and the CCP
35
Boards and of the Committee on Honors in eventually
declaring him (Caparas) as National Artist.
The function of the NCCA and the CCP Boards is
simply to advise the President. The award of the Order
of National Artists is the exclusive prerogative of the
President who is not bound in any way by the
recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP Boards. The
implementing rules and regulations or guidelines of the
NCCA cannot restrict or limit the exclusive power of the
President to select the recipients of the Order of National
Artists.
The original position of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) was similar to that of respondent
Caparas.
The OSG argued that, while the President exercises
control over the NCCA and the CCP, the President has
the duty to faithfully execute the laws, including the
NCCA-CCP guidelines for selection of National Artists
and the implementing rules of Executive Order No. 236,
s. 2003.
Moreover, the laws recognize the expertise of the NCCA
and the CCP in the arts and tasked them to screen and
select the artists to be conferred the Order of National
Artists. Their mandate is clear and exclusive as no other
agency possesses such expertise.
The OSG also assailed the former Presidents choice of
respondent Guidote-Alvarez for being contrary to
Republic Act No. 7356.54 Section 11 of the said law
provides:
Sec. 11. Membership Restrictions. During his/her term
as member of the Commission, a Commissioner shall
not be eligible for any grant, or such other financial aid
from the Commission as an individual: Provided,
however, That he/she may compete for grants and
awards on the same level as other artists one (1) year
after his/her term shall have expired.
The omission of the word "award" in the first portion of
the above provision appears to be unintentional as shown
by the proviso which states that a member may compete
for grants and awards only one year after his or her term
shall have expired. As such, respondent Guidote-Alvarez
is restricted and disqualified from being conferred the
2009 Order of National Artists
ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of
discretion committed by former President Arroyo
RULING: YES.
The conferment of the Order of National Artists on
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and
Moreno was an entirely different matter.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1)
done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously
or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias.86
There was a violation of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution when the former President gave
preferential treatment to respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Maosa and Moreno.1wphi1 The former
Presidents constitutional duty to faithfully execute the
laws and observe the rules, guidelines and policies of the
NCCA and the CCP as to the selection of the nominees
for conferment of the Order of National Artists
proscribed her from having a free and uninhibited hand
in the conferment of the said award. The manifest
disregard of the rules, guidelines and processes of the
NCCA and the CCP was an arbitrary act that unduly
favored respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa
and Moreno. The conferment of the Order of National
Artists on said respondents was therefore made with
grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.
While the Court invalidates today the proclamation of
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and
Moreno as National Artists, such action should not be
taken as a pronouncement on whether they are worthy to
be conferred that honor. Only the President, upon the
advise of the NCCA and the CCP Boards, may
determine that. The Court simply declares that, as the
former President committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6,
2009, the said proclamations are invalid. However,
nothing in this Decision should be read as a
disqualification on the part of respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Maosa and Moreno to be considered
for the honor of National Artist in the future, subject to
compliance with the laws, rules and regulations
governing said award.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED in
PART. Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6,
2009 proclaiming respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez,
Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Maosa, and Jose
Moreno, respectively, as National Artists are declared
INVALID and
36
SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
FOOTNOTE: (EQUAL PROTECTION)
The rational basis scrutiny is one of three tests used by
the Court to test compliance with the equal protection
clause. It is the minimal level of scrutiny which requires
that the challenged classification is rationally related to
serving a legitimate State interest. It is used when the
government action is a type of discrimination that does
not warrant the intermediate and strict levels of scrutiny.
The intermediate or middle-tier test requires the
government to show that (1) the challenged
classification serves an important State interest, and (2)
the classification is at least substantially related to
serving that interest. It is applied to suspect
classifications like gender or illegitimacy.
The most demanding is the strict scrutiny test which
requires the government to show that (1) the challenged
classification serves a compelling State interest, and (2)
the classification is necessary to serve that interest. It is
used in classifications based on race, national origin,
religion alienage, denial of the right to vote, access to
courts and other rights recognized as fundamental.
(Bernas, Joaquin S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A
COMMENTARY [2009 edition], pp. 139-140).
RULING: (CASE DIGEST)
Political Law- equal protection
It should be recalled too that respondent Guidote-
Alvarez was disqualified to be nominated for being the
Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while
respondents Masa and Caparas did not make it to the
preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not
included in the second shortlist. Yet, the four of them
were treated differently and considered favorably when
they were exempted from the rigorous screening process
of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order of
National Artists.
The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno fails to pass
rational scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction
between respondents and petitioner Abad has been
shown that would justify deviating from the laws,
guidelines and established procedures, and placing
respondents in an exceptional position. The undue
classification was not germane to the purpose of the law.
Instead, it contradicted the law and well-established
guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry the law
into effect. While petitioner Abad cannot claim
entitlement to the Order of National Artists, he is entitled
to be given an equal opportunity to vie for that honor. In
view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner
Abads right to equal protection, an interest that is
substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.
B. BASES FOR CLASSIFICATION
13. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997)
Brief Fact Summary. Under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state statute
forbidding assisted suicide was challenged as
unconstitutional.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Although there is a distinction
between refusing lifesaving medical treatment and
assisted suicide, neither violates the Equal Protection
Clause since they apply evenhandedly to all.
FACTS:
Quill (Plaintiff) and three gravely ill patients who have
since died sued the New York State Attorney General
(Defendant). They urged that because New York
(Defendant) permits a competent person to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment, and the refusal of such
treatment is "essentially the same thing" as physician-
assisted suicide, defendants ban on assisted suicide was
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The district court disagreed,
but the court of appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
finding that those in the final stages of fatal illness who
were on life-support systems were allowed to hasten
their deaths by choosing to have those systems removed;
but those who were in a similar situation, except for the
previous attachment of life-sustaining equipment, were
not allowed to hasten death by self-administering drugs
prescribed by a doctor. The court of appeals concluded
that this supposed unequal treatment was not rationally
related to any legitimate state interest. Certiorari was
granted by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Although there is a distinction between refusing
lifesaving medical treatment and assisted suicide, does
this distinction operate in violation of the Equal
37
Protection Clause by treating individuals who wish to
end their lives differently? (WON New Yorks
prohibition on assisting suicide violates the Equal
Protection Clause)
RULING:
(Rehnquist, C.J.) No. Although there is a distinction
between refusing lifesaving medical treatment and
assisted suicide, neither violates the Equal Protection
Clause since they apply evenhandedly to all. Logic and
current practice support New York"s (Defendant)
judgment that the two acts are different and, therefore,
Defendant may treat them differently, consistent with the
Constitution. A doctor who assists a suicide must,
necessarily and unquestionably, primarily intend that the
patient be made dead. The law has long used actors"
intent or purpose to distinguish between two acts that
may have the same result. The overwhelming majority
of state legislatures have drawn a clear line between
assisted suicide and withdrawing or permitting the
refusal of unwanted lifesaving medical treatment by
prohibiting the former but allowing the latter. New
York"s (Defendant) statutes outlawing assisted suicide
do not infringe fundamental rights or involve suspect
classifications, and therefore are entitled to a strong
presumption of validity. On their faces, neither
Defendant"s ban on assisted suicide nor its statutes that
allow patients to refuse medical treatment treat anyone
differently or draw any distinctions between individuals.
Generally speaking, laws that apply evenhandedly to all
unquestionably comply with the Equal Protection
Clause. Reversed.
Concurrence. (Souter, J.) The reasons that lead me to
conclude that the prohibition on assisted suicide in
Glucksberg is not arbitrary under the due process
standard also support the distinction between assisted
suicide, which is banned, and practices such as
termination of artificial life support and pain medication
that hastens death, which are permitted.
Discussion. Assisted suicide and euthanasia are
officially prohibited, but doctors are not criminally
prosecuted for either. Juries do not usually convict
physicians who assist in their patients" suicides.
FULL TEXT:
In New York, as in most States, it is a crime to aid
another to commit or attempt suicide,1 but patients may
refuse even lifesaving medical treatment.2 The question
presented by this case is whether New Yorks
prohibition on assisting suicide therefore violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
We hold that it does not.
Petitioners are various New York public officials.
Respondents Timothy E. Quill, Samuel C. Klagsbrun,
and Howard A. Grossman are physicians who practice in
New York. They assert that although it would be
consistent with the standards of [their] medical
practice[s] to prescribe lethal medication for mentally
competent, terminally ill patients who are suffering
great pain and desire a doctors help in taking their own
lives, they are deterred from doing so by New Yorks
ban on assisting suicide. Respondents, and three gravely
ill patients who have since died,4 sued the States
Attorney General in the United States District Court.
They urged that because New York permits a competent
person to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, and
because the refusal of such treatment is essentially the
same thing as physician-assisted suicide, New Yorks
assisted-suicide ban violates the Equal Protection
Clause.
The District Court disagreed: [I]t is hardly
unreasonable or irrational for the State to recognize a
difference between allowing nature to take its course,
even in the most severe situations, and intentionally
using an artificial death producing device. The court
noted New Yorks obvious legitimate interests in
preserving life, and in protecting vulnerable persons,
and concluded that [u]nder the United States
Constitution and the federal system it establishes, the
resolution of this issue is left to the normal democratic
processes within the State.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.
The court determined that, despite the assisted-suicide
bans apparent general applicability, New York law
does not treat equally all competent persons who are in
the final stages of fatal illness and wish to hasten their
deaths, because those in the final stages of terminal
illness who are on life-support systems are allowed to
hasten their deaths by directing the removal of such
38
systems; but those who are similarly situated, except for
the previous attachment of life-sustaining equipment, are
not allowed to hasten death by self-administering
prescribed drugs.
In the courts view, [t]he ending of life by [the
withdrawal of life-support systems] is nothing more nor
less than assisted suicide. The Court of Appeals then
examined whether this supposed unequal treatment was
rationally related to any legitimate state interests, and
concluded that to the extent that [New Yorks statutes]
prohibit a physician from prescribing medications to be
self-administered by a mentally competent, terminally-ill
person in the final stages of his terminal illness, they are
not rationally related to any legitimate state interest. We
granted certiorari, 518 U. S. 1055 (1996), and now
reverse.
The Equal Protection Clause commands that no State
shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. This provision creates no
substantive rights. Instead, it embodies a general rule
that States must treat like cases alike but may treat
unlike cases accordingly. [T]he Constitution does not
require things which are different in fact or opinion to be
treated in law as though they were the same. If a
legislative classification or distinction neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will
uphold [it] so long as it bears a rational relation to some
legitimate end.
New Yorks statutes outlawing assisting suicide affect
and address matters of profound significance to all New
Yorkers alike. They neither infringe fundamental rights
nor involve suspect classifications.
On their faces, neither New Yorks ban on assisting
suicide nor its statutes permitting patients to refuse
medical treatment treat anyone differently from anyone
else or draw any distinctions between persons.
Everyone, regardless of physical condition, is entitled, if
competent, to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical
treatment; no one is permitted to assist a suicide.
Generally speaking, laws that apply evenhandedly to all
unquestionably comply with the Equal Protection
Clause. [M]any [laws] affect certain groups unevenly,
even though the law itself treats them no differently
from all other members of the class described by the
law).
The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that some
terminally ill peoplethose who are on life-support
systems are treated differently from those who are not,
in that the former may hasten death by ending
treatment, but the latter may not hasten death through
physician-assisted suicide.
This conclusion depends on the submission that ending
or refusing lifesaving medical treatment is nothing
more nor less than assisted suicide. Unlike the Court of
Appeals, we think the distinction between assisting
suicide and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, a
distinction widely recognized and endorsed in the
medical profession 6 and in our legal traditions, is both
important and logical; it is certainly rational. See
Feeney, supra, at 272 (When the basic classification is
rationally based, uneven effects upon particular groups
within a class are ordinarily of no constitutional
concern).
The distinction comports with fundamental legal
principles of causation and intent. First, when a patient
refuses life sustaining medical treatment, he dies from an
underlying fatal disease or pathology; but if a patient
ingests lethal medication prescribed by a physician, he is
killed by that medication. [D]eath which occurs after
the removal of life sustaining systems is from natural
causes); American Medical Association, Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Physician-Assisted Suicide,
10 Issues in Law & Medicine 91, 93 (1994) (When a
life-sustaining treatment is declined, the patient dies
primarily because of an underlying disease).
Furthermore, a physician who withdraws, or honors a
patients refusal to begin, life-sustaining medical
treatment purposefully intends, or may so intend, only to
respect his patients wishes and to cease doing useless
and futile or degrading things to the patient when [the
patient] no longer stands to benefit from them. Assisted
Suicide in the United States, Hearing before the
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., 368
(1996) (testimony of Dr. Leon R. Kass). The same is
true when a doctor provides aggressive palliative care; in
some cases, painkilling drugs may hasten a patients
death, but the physicians purpose and intent is, or may
be, only to ease his patients pain. A doctor who assists a
suicide, however, must, necessarily and indubitably,
intend primarily that the patient be made dead.
39
Similarly, a patient who commits suicide with a doctors
aid necessarily has the specific intent to end his or her
own life, while a patient who refuses or discontinues
treatment might not. (patients who refuse life-sustaining
treatment may not harbor a specific intent to die and
may instead fervently wish to live, but to do so free of
unwanted medical technology, surgery, or drugs); [I]n
refusing treatment the patient may not have the specific
intent to die).
The law has long used actors intent or purpose to
distinguish between two acts that may have the same
result. ([T]he . . . common law of homicide often
distinguishes . . . between a person who knows that
another person will be killed as the result of his conduct
and a person who acts with the specific purpose of
taking anothers life); Morissette v. United States, 342
U. S. 246, 250 (1952) (distinctions based on intent are
universal and persistent in mature systems of law); M.
Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown 412 (1847) (If A. with an
intent to prevent a gangrene beginning in his hand doth
without any advice cut off his hand, by which he dies, he
is not thereby felo de se for tho it was a voluntary act,
yet it was not with an intent to kill himself). Put
differently, the law distinguishes actions taken because
of a given end from actions taken in spite of their
unintended but foreseen consequences.
Given these general principles, it is not surprising that
many courts, including New York courts, have carefully
distinguished refusing life-sustaining treatment from
suicide. [M]erely declining medical care . . . is not
considered a suicidal act). In fact, the first state-court
decision explicitly to authorize withdrawing lifesaving
treatment noted the real distinction between the self-
infliction of deadly harm and a self-determination
against artificial life support. And recently, the
Michigan Supreme Court also rejected the argument that
the distinction between acts that artificially sustain life
and acts that artificially curtail life is merely a
distinction without constitutional significancea
meaning- less exercise in semantic gymnastics,
insisting that the Cruzan majority disagreed and so do
we.
Similarly, the overwhelming majority of state
legislatures have drawn a clear line between assisting
suicide and with- drawing or permitting the refusal of
unwanted lifesaving medical treatment by prohibiting
the former and permitting the latter. Glucksberg, ante, at
710711, 716719. And nearly all states expressly
disapprove of suicide and assisted suicide either in
statutes dealing with durable powers of attorney in
health-care situations, or in living will statutes.
Thus, even as the States move to protect and promote
patients dignity at the end of life, they remain opposed
to physician-assisted suicide. New York is a case in
point. The State enacted its current assisted-suicide
statutes in 1965.10 Since then, New York has acted
several times to protect patients commonlaw right to
refuse treatment. In so doing, however, the State has
neither endorsed a general right to hasten death nor
approved physician-assisted suicide.
Quite the opposite: The State has reaffirmed the line
between killing and letting die. (This article is not
intended to permit or promote suicide, assisted suicide,
or euthanasia); New York State Task Force on Life and
the Law, Life- Sustaining Treatment: Making Decisions
and Appointing a Health Care Agent 3642 (July 1987);
Do Not Resuscitate Orders: The Proposed Legislation
and Report of the New York State Task Force on Life
and the Law.
More recently, the New York State Task Force on Life
and the Law studied assisted suicide and euthanasia and,
in 1994, unanimously recommended against legalization.
When Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia
in the Medical Context vii (1994). In the Task Forces
view, allowing decisions to forgo life-sustaining
treatment and allowing assisted suicide or euthanasia
have radically different consequences and meanings for
public policy.
This Court has also recognized, at least implicitly, the
distinction between letting a patient die and making that
patient die. In Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health,
497 U. S. 261, 278 (1990), we concluded that [t]he
principle that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions, and
we assumed the existence of such a right for purposes of
that case, id., at 279. But our assumption of a right to
refuse treatment was grounded not, as the Court of
Appeals supposed, on the proposition that patients have
a general and abstract right to hasten death, but on
well-established, traditional rights to bodily integrity and
40
freedom from unwanted touching. In fact, we observed
that the majority of States in this country have laws
imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another
to commit suicide. Cruzan therefore provides no
support for the notion that refusing life-sustaining
medical treatment is nothing more nor less than
suicide.
For all these reasons, we disagree with respondents
claim that the distinction between refusing lifesaving
medical treatment and assisted suicide is arbitrary and
irrational. Granted, in some cases, the line between the
two may not be clear, but certainty is not required, even
were it possible.12 Logic and contemporary practice
support New Yorks judgment that the two acts are
different, and New York may therefore, consistent with
the Constitution, treat them differently.
By permitting everyone to refuse unwanted medical
treatment while prohibiting anyone from assisting a
suicide, New York law follows a longstanding and
rational distinction. New Yorks reasons for recognizing
and acting on this distinction including prohibiting
intentional killing and preserving life; preventing
suicide; maintaining physicians role as their patients
healers; protecting vulnerable people from indifference,
prejudice, and psychological and financial pressure to
end their lives; and avoiding a possible slide towards
euthanasiaare discussed in greater detail in our
opinion in Glucksberg, ante. These valid and important
public interests easily satisfy the constitutional
requirement that a legislative classification bear a
rational relation to some legitimate end.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
C. UNDERINCLUSIVENESS ARGUMENT AND
INVERSE EQUAL PROTECTION
15. Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227
SCRA 703 (1993)
FACTS:
Petitioners, members of the lower courts, are assailing
the constitutionality of Sec 35 of RA 7354 due to, inter
alia, its being discriminatory because of withdrawing the
franking privilege from the Judiciary but retaining said
privilege for the President, the VP, members of
Congress, the Comelec, former Presidents, and the
National Census and Statistics Office. Respondents
counter that there is no discrimination as the franking
privilege has also been withdrawn from the Office of
Adult Education, the Institute of National Language, the
Telecommunications Office, the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the National Historical
Commission, the AFP, the AFP Ladies Steering
Committee, the City and Provincial Prosecutors, the
Tanodbayan (Office of the Special Prosecutor), the
Kabataang Baranggay, the Commission on the Filipino
Language, the Provincial and City Assessors, and the
National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.
ISSUE: Constitutionality of Sec. 35of RA 7354
RULING: Hereby declared unconstitutional.
The EPC is embraced in the concept of due process, as
every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of
justice and fair play. According to a long line of
decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should
not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to
some and unjustly discriminate against others. The
equal protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction. In lumping the Judiciary with the other
offices from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in
a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes
the need of the President of the Philippines and the
members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is
no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in
fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such
privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of
the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to
understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly
treated as that Committee.
In the SCs view, the only acceptable reason for the
grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of
the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify
a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the
41
interest of providing for a smoother flow of
communication between the government and the people.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues
from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us,
is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of
government, including those who do not need it. The
problem is not solved by retaining it for some and
withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no
substantial distinction between those favored, which
may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which
definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by
violating the Constitution.
v.2
FACTS:
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No.
7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal
Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These
measures withdraw the franking privilege from the SC,
CA, RTC, MTC, MeTC and the Land Registration
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with
certain other government offices while retaining the
same for the president, VP, senators The petitioners
are members of the lower courts who feel that their
official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the
above-named measures.
HELD:
There is violation of equal protection. All persons
similarly situated should be treated alike both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It does not
require universal application of the laws on all persons
or things without distinction. This might in fact result in
unequal protection. What the law requires is equality
among equals according to valid classification. The
postal service office claims that the expense from
judiciary with regards frank mails amounts to
73,574,864 as compared to 90,424, 175 total. The
respondents are in effect saying that franking privilege
should be extended only to those who do not need it
much at all but not to those who need it badly. The
problem is not solved by retaining it for some and
withdrawing it from others especially where theres no
substantial distinction. The distinction made is
superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that
make real differences between the judiciary and the conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar
grantees of the franking privilege. subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and
FULL TEXT SC DECISION (RE: EQUAL
unjustly discriminate against others.
PROTECTION)
The equal protection clause does not require the
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory
universal application of the laws on all persons or things
because while withdrawing the franking privilege from
without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result
the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the
in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law
Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines;
prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives,
age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate
the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the
the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality
Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office;
among equals as determined according to a valid
and the general public in the filing of complaints against
classification. By classification is meant the grouping of
public offices and officers. 10
persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination
particulars. 13
because the law is based on a valid classification in
accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege
franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from the
in the first place? Is the franking privilege extended to
Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the
the President of the Philippines or the Commission on
Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications
Elections or to former Presidents of the Philippines
Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation;
purely as a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it
the National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces
offered because of the importance or status of the
of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines
grantee or because of its need for the privilege? Or have
Ladies Steering Committee; the City and Provincial
the grantees been chosen pell-mell, as it were, without
Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special
any basis at all for the selection?
Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission
on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt
Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of
that the statute as a whole was carefully deliberated
Disabled Persons. 11
upon, by the political departments before it was finally
enacted. There is reason to suspect, however, that not
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the
enough care or attention was given to its repealing
concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination
clause, resulting in the unwitting withdrawal of the
offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has
franking privilege from the Judiciary.
nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in
Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification
more, specific guaranty against any form of undue
was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that the
favoritism or hostility from the government.
political departments would have intended this serious
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis
slight to the Judiciary as the third of the major and equal
of the due process clause. But if the particular act
departments the government. The same observations are
assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
made if the importance or status of the grantee was the
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
criterion used for the extension of the franking privilege,
protection clause.
which is enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics
Office and even some private individuals but not the
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection
courts of justice.
simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
42
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of
the franking privilege was the perceived need of the
grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a
waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the
interest of providing for a smoother flow of
communication between the government and the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all
the departments of the government, it is the Judiciary,
that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no
question that if there is any major branch of the
government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial
Department, as the respondents themselves point out.
Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction
on the basis precisely of this need and, on this basis,
deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while
extending it to others less deserving.
In their Comment, the respondents point out that
available data from the Postal Service Office show that
from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of
frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this
amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other
agencies whose functions include the service of judicial
processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of
Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to
P86,481,759. Frank mails coming fromthe Judiciary
amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the
petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00.
The respondents' conclusion is that because of this
considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the
franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in
effect saying that the franking privilege should be
extended only to those who do not need it very much, if
at all, (like the widows of former Presidents) but not to
those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice).
It is like saying that a person may be allowed cosmetic
surgery although it is not really necessary but not an
operation that can save his life.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues
from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us,
is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of
government, including those who do not need it. The
problem is not solved by retaining it for some and
43
withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no
substantial distinction between those favored, which
may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which
definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by
violating the Constitution.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from
which the franking privilege has been withdrawn,
Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category
to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of
the President of the Philippines and the members of
Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason
why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater
need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.
While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking
privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why
the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that
Committee. And while we may concede the need of the
National Census and Statistics Office for the franking
privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater
need is not recognized in the courts of justice.
(On second thought, there does not seem to be any
justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering
Committee, which, like former Presidents of the
Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank
mail as the Judiciary.)
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal
Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation,
was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of
promoting the public service. While it may have been
established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse
itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of
the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by
the government and the many advantages it enjoys under
its charter.14 Among the services it should be prepared to
extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the
government that need the franking privilege in the
discharge of their own public functions.
We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the
Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of
which is supplied by the Government, and that it derives
substantial revenues from the sources enumerated in
Section 10, on top of the exemptions it enjoys. It is not
likely that the retention of the franking privilege of the
Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the
delay in the administration of justice, the withdrawal
from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen
this serious problem. The volume of judicial mail, as
emphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress
the dependence of the courts of justice on the postal
service for communicating with lawyers and litigants as
part of the judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest
appropriation in the national budget compared to the
Legislative and Executive Departments; of the P309
billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is
alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine
the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to
affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the
discharge of their judicial functions.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section
35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of
discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On
the contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a
discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or
things similarly situated. The distinction made by the
law is superficial. It is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between the
Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the
Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness
that this Court has the duty and power to correct.
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that
its subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not
passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
However, we annul Section 35 of the law as violative of
Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no
person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of
laws."
We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of
the criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling against
the discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be
accused of similar discrimination through the exercise of
44
our ultimate power in our own favor. This is inevitable.
Criticism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a
fact of life in the political system that we are prepared to
accept.. As judges, we cannot debate with our detractors.
We can only decide the cases before us as law imposes
on us the duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us
the light to be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED
and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET
ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege
from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the
Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the
National Land Registration Authority and its Register of
Deeds to all of which offices the said privilege shall be
RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated
June 2, 1992, is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
16. De Guzman, Jr. v. Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), 336 SCRA 188 (2000)
FACTS:
Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations pursuant
to Section 44 of the Voters registration act. The act
prohibits election officers from holding office in a
particular city or municipality for more than 4 years.
Petitioners claim that the act violated the equal
protection clause because not all election officials were
covered by the prohibition.
Petitioners contend that RA 8189 Section 44 is
unconstitutional as it violates the equal protection clause
enshrined in the constitution; that it violates
constitutional guarantee on security of civil servants;
that it undermines the constitutional independence of
comelec and comelecs constitutional authority; that it
contravenes the basic constitutional precept; that it is
void for its failure to be read on 3 separate readings
ISSUE: Whether or Not section 44 of RA 8189 is
unconstitutional
RULING:
No, RA 8189 Sec 44 is not unconstitutional. It has not
violated the equal protection clause. It is intended to
ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing
them from developing familiarity with the people of
their place of assignment. Large-scale anomalies in the
registration of voters cannot be carried out without the
complicity of election officers, who are the highest
representatives of Comelec in a city or municipality.
G.R.No. 129118 (July 19, 2000)
FACTS:
Section 44 of the Voters Registration Act provided that
no election officer shall hold office in a particular
municipality or city for more than 4 years. In
accordance with it, the Comelec reassigned petitioners,
who were election officers to other stations. Petitioners
argued that the provision was not expressed in the title of
the law, which is An Act Providing for a General
Registration of Voters, Adopting a System of Continuing
Registration, Prescribing the Procedures Thereof and
Authorizing the Appropriation of Fund Thereof.
HELD: The contention is untenable. Section 44 is
relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to
ensure the integrity of the registration process by
providing a guideline for the Comelec to follow in the
reassignment of election officers.
FACTS: Section 44 of the Voters Registration Act
provided that no election officer shall hold office in a
particular municipality or city for more than 4 years. In
accordance with it, the Comelec reassigned petitioners,
who were election officers to other stations. Petitioner
argue that the law undermined the constitutional
authority of the Comelec to appoint its own officials.
HELD: The law merely provides the basis for the
transfer of an election officers and does not deprive the
Comelec of its power to appoint its officials.
FULL TEXT SC DECISION (RE: EQUAL
PROTECTION)
45
At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the
validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA
8189) otherwise known as "The Voters Registration Act
of 1996".
RA 8189 was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by
President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1996. Section 44
thereof provides:
"SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No
Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or
municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election
officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act
or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4)
years in a particular city or municipality shall
automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new
station outside the original congressional district."
By virtue of the aforequoted provision of law, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated
Resolution Nos. 97-0002[1] and 97-0610[2] for the
implementation thereof. Thereafter, the COMELEC
issued several directives[3] reassigning the petitioners,
who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, to
different stations.
Aggrieved by the issuance of the aforesaid directives and
resolutions, petitioners found their way to this Court via
the present petition assailing the validity of Section 44 of
RA 8189, contending that:
I
SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189
VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION;
II
SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189
VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE
ON SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVANTS;
III
SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189
CONSTITUTES A DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW;
IV
SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189
UNDERMINES THE CONSTITUTIONAL
INDEPENDENCE OF COMELEC AND COMELECS
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO NAME,
DESIGNATE AND APPOINT AND THEN
REASSIGN AND TRANSFER ITS VERY OWN
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES;
V the law;
SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189
CONTRAVENES THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL
PRECEPT [Article VI, SECTION 26(1), Phil.
Constitution] THAT EVERY BILL PASSED BY
CONGRESS SHALL EMBRACE ONLY ONE
SUBJECT WHICH MUST BE EXPRESSED IN THE
TITLE THEREOF; and
VI
SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 IS VOID
FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT [ARTICLE VI,
SECTION 26 (2)] OF THREE READINGS ON
SEPARATE DAYS AND DISTRIBUTION OF
PRINTED COPIES IN ITS FINAL FORM THREE
DAYS BEFORE ITS PASSAGE.
Petitioners contentions revolve on the pivotal issue,
whether Section 44 of RA 8189 is valid and
constitutional.
The petition is barren of merit. Section 44 of RA 8189
enjoys the presumption of validity, and the Court
discerns no ground to invalidate it.
Petitioners theorize that Section 44 of RA 8189 is
violative of the "equal protection clause" of the 1987
Constitution because it singles out the City and
Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as
prohibited from holding office in the same city or
46
municipality for more than four (4) years. They maintain
that there is no substantial distinction between them and
other COMELEC officials, and therefore, there is no
valid classification to justify the objective of the
provision of law under attack.
The Court is not persuaded by petitioners arguments.
The "equal protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution
permits a valid classification under the following
conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of
3. The classification must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members
of the same class.
After a careful study, the ineluctable conclusion is that
the classification under Section 44 of RA 8189 satisfies
the aforestated requirements.
The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure
the impartiality of election officials by preventing them
from developing familiarity with the people of their
place of assignment" does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
In Lutz vs. Araneta,[5] it was held that "the legislature is
not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of
all or none". This is so for underinclusiveness is not an
argument against a valid classification. It may be true
that all the other officers of COMELEC referred to by
petitioners are exposed to the same evils sought to be
addressed by the statute. However, in this case, it can be
discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose
of the law would be sufficiently served by breaking an
important link in the chain of corruption than by
breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily, under
Section 3(n) of RA 8189, election officers are the
highest officials or authorized representatives of the
COMELEC in a city or municipality. It is safe to say that
without the complicity of such officials, large scale
anomalies in the registration of voters can hardly be
carried out.
Moreover, to require the COMELEC to reassign all
employees (connected with the registration of voters)
who have served at least four years in a given city or
municipality would entail a lot of administrative burden
on the part of the COMELEC.
Neither does Section 44 of RA 8189 infringe the security
of tenure of petitioners nor unduly deprive them of due
process of law. As held in Sta. Maria vs. Lopez.[6]
"xxx the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as
anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer
who is appointed - not merely assigned - to a particular
station. Such a rule does not pr[o]scribe a transfer
carried out under a specific statute that empowers the
head of an agency to periodically reassign the employees
and officers in order to improve the service of the
agency. xxx" (italics supplied)
The guarantee of security of tenure under the
Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment.
It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or
transferred) from the service for causes other than those
provided by law and after due process is accorded the
employee. What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise
of the power to dismiss. But, where it is the law-making
authority itself which furnishes the ground for the
transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness
can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to cure
a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law.
Untenable is petitioners contention that Section 44 of
RA 8189 undermines the authority of COMELEC to
appoint its own officials and employees. As stressed
upon by the Solicitor General, Section 44 establishes a
guideline for the COMELEC to follow. Said section
provides the criterion or basis for the reassignment or
transfer of an election officer and does not deprive the
COMELEC of its power to appoint, and maintain its
authority over its officials and employees. As a matter of
fact, the questioned COMELEC resolutions and
directives illustrate that it is still the COMELEC which
has the power to reassign and transfer its officials and
employees. But as a government agency tasked with the
47
implementation and enforcement of election laws, the
COMELEC is duty bound to comply with the laws
passed by Congress.
The independence of the COMELEC is not at issue here.
There is no impairment or emasculation of its power to
appoint its own officials and employees. In fact, Section
44 even strengthens the COMELECs power of
appointment, as the power to reassign or transfer is
within its exclusive jurisdiction and domain.
Petitioners contention that Section 44 has an isolated and
different subject from that of RA 8189 and that the same
is not expressed in the title of the law, is equally
untenable.
The objectives of Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title thereof", are:
1. To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;
2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by
means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no
information, and which might therefore be overlooked
and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and
3. To fairly apprise the people, through such publication
of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the
subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order
that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon
by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire.
Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is
sufficiently complied with where, as in this case, the title
is comprehensive enough to embrace the general
objective it seeks to achieve, and if all the parts of the
statute are related and germane to the subject matter
embodied in the title or so long as the same are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and
title.
Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated considering that it
is related and germane to the subject matter stated in the
title of the law. The title of RA 8189 is "The Voters
Registration Act of 1996" with a subject matter
enunciated in the explanatory note as "AN ACT
PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF
VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING
REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE
PROCEDURES THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING
THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR."
Section 44, which provides for the reassignment of
election officers, is relevant to the subject matter of
registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the
registration process by providing a guideline for the
COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of election
officers. It is not an alien provision but one which is
related to the conduct and procedure of continuing
registration of voters. In this regard, it bears stressing
that the Constitution does not require Congress to
employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue, all the
contents and the minute details therein.
In determining the constitutionality of a statute dubbed
as defectively titled, the presumption is in favor of its
validity.
As regards the issue raised by petitioners - whether
Section 44 of RA 8189 was enacted in accordance with
Section 26 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
petitioners have not convincingly shown grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Congress. Respect due to co-
equal departments of the government in matters
entrusted to them by the Constitution, and the absence of
a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion suffice to
stay the judicial hand.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED; and the
constitutionality and validity of Section 44 of RA 8189
UPHELD. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
D. DOCTRINE OF RELATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALITY
17. Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299 (2004)
FACTS:
RA 7653 otherwise known as the New Central Bank
Act took effect July 3 1993, effectively replacing the
earlier Central Bank of the Philippines (established
48
1949) by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. On June 8
2001, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees
Association Inc. filed a petition against the Executive
Secretary of the Office of the President to restrain BSP
from implementing the last proviso in Section 15 (i),
Article II of RA 7653 which pertains to establishment of
a Human resource management system and a
compensation structure as part of the authority of the
Monetary Board. Employees whose positions fall under
SG 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates in
the salary standardization act. Petitioner contends that
the classifications is not reasonable, arbitrary and
violates the equal protection clause. The said proviso has
been prejudicial to some 2994 rank- and file BSP
employees. Respondent on the other hand contends that
the provision does not violate the equal protection
clause, provided that it is construed together with other
provisions of the same law such as the fiscal and
administrative autonomy of the Bangko Sentral and the
mandate of its monetary board. The Solicitor General,
as counsel of the Executive Secretary defends the
provision, that the classification of employees is based
on real and actual differentiation and it adheres to the
policy of RA 7653 to establish professionalism and
excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and
policies of the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA
7653 violates the equal protection of laws, hence
unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it
operate on the salary grade or the officer employee
status, it distinguishes between economic class and
status with the higher salary grade recipients are of
greater benefit above the law than those of mandated by
the Salary Standardization Act. Officers of the BSP
receive higher wages that those of rank-and-file
employees because the former are not covered by the
salary standardization act as provided by the proviso.
Jurisprudence:
The law must be fair, as any law should be fair. A fair
law recognizes and balances the competing interests of
the parties. The balance to be achieved in rehabilitation
is an especially delicate and sensitive one since the
interests of secured creditors are at odds with the
interests of the debtor and the unsecured creditors.

However, it must be emphasized that fairness and equity

does not necessarily mean equal or identical treatment.
In interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, Central
Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas21 recognized that equal protection does
not necessarily mean equal treatment, regardless of
differences in condition or situation, to wit:
[i]t is settled in constitutional law that the equal
protection clause does not prevent the Legislature from
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which
different rules shall operate so long as the
classification is not unreasonable.22

The law must recognize, for example, that not all

creditors are similarly situated. A secured creditor has
superior rights than an unsecured creditor and should
accordingly be afforded different (i.e., preferential
treatment).

49