Professional Documents
Culture Documents
January 1982
Air transportation is expected to continue growing during the next two decades. In
dealing with this growth it will be important to ensure safety and minimize the costs of
the system to the Government and airspace users. Large investments are now antici-
pated in both airports and air traffic control systems, investments that require unusu-
ally long leadtimes. For these reasons the House Committee on Appropriations has re-
quested that OTA conduct an assessment of airport capacity and related air traffic con-
trol issues.
This subject is, more than most, a moving target. There have been rapid changes
in Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) plans in recent years, and these plans have
been further complicated by airline deregulation and the aftermath of the Professional
Air Traffic Controllers Organization strike. These events affect future plans because
they influence the rate of growth and where that growth will occur. There also con-
tinue to be rapid and significant changes in the aviation, telecommunications, and
data-processing technologies on which the system relies. In addition, these plans are
coming before Congress during a period of increasing budgetary constraints.
This assessment is intended to provide a perspective on both airport development
aid and FAA’s proposed air traffic control system modernization. In both areas there
are questions of how much improvement will be needed, how soon it will be needed,
and how the funding of improvements will be allocated among airspace users.
Director
...
Ill
Airport and Air Traffic Control Advisory Panel Members
iv
Airport and Air Traffic Control System Project Staff
Marsha Fenn M. Karen Gamble Larry L. Jenney Paul B. Phelps Zalman Shaven
Contractors
Chapter Page
1. Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction and Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. The National Airspace System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4. Aviation Growth Scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
S. Technology and the Future Evolution of the ATC System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6. Airport Capacity Alternatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
7. Policy Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
ACRONYMS
AATF Airport and Airways Trust ILS Instrument Landing System
Fund, trust fund INS inertial navigation system
ACARS ARINC /Communications Ad- ITU International Telecommunica-
dressing Reporting System tion Union
ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance MLS Microwave Landing System
System Mode S a digital data link system
ADAP Airport Development Aid Pro- (formerly DABS)
gram NASCOM National Airspace Communica-
AERA automated en route air traffic tions System
control NAS National Airspace System
ANCLUC airport noise comparability and NASP National Airport System Plan
land use NOTAMs Notices to Airmen
ARINC Aeronautical Radio, Inc. O&M operation and maintenance
ARTCC air route traffic control center OMB Office of Management and
ARTS Automated Radar Terminal Budget
System, a computer-driven PANCAP practical annual capacity of an
display system used in ter- airport
minal areas PATCO Professional Air Traffic Con-
ASR airport surveillance radar trollers Organization
ATA Air Transport Association PIREP
ATARS Automatic Traffic Advisory PMS Performance Measuring System
and Resolution Service PSR primary surveillance radar
ATC air traffic control RCAG remote communication air-
ATCRBS Air Traffic Control Radar ground
Beacon System RE&D research, engineering, and
BCAS Beacon Collision Avoidance development
System ROI return on investment
CDTI cockpit display of traffic infor- RNAV area navigation
mation SACDRS Standard Air Carrier Delay
CFC central flow control Reporting System
DABS Discrete Address Beacon Sys- SMSA Standard Metropolitan Station
tem (Mode S) Area
DARC Direct Access Radar Channel SSR secondary surveillance radar
DME distance measuring equipment TACAN Tactical Control and Naviga-
DOD Department of Defense tion System
DOT Department of Transportation TCA terminal control area
DPI disposable personal income TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision
F&E facilities and equipment Avoidance System
FAA Federal Aviation Administra- TRACON terminal radar approach control
tion TRB Transportation Research Board
FAR Federal Air Regulation Tri-Modal BCAS a variation of the Beacon Col-
FSS flight service stations lision Avoidance System
GA general aviation VFR Visual Flight Rules
GPS Global Positioning System VOR very high frequency omnirange
ICAO International Civil Aviation transmitters
Organization VORTAC A TACAN colocated with a
IFR Instrument Flight Rules VOR station
...
Vlll
Chapter 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Contents
Page
Aviation Growth Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Airport Capacity Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Air Traffic Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Funding Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Response to Future Growth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Chapter 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
.
The National Airspace System includes about will be magnified. General aviation users of ma-
6,500 public-use airports connected by a net- jor hubs also feel the effects of delay in the form
work of air routes defined by navigational aids. of access restrictions imposed during peak hours
Aircraft operating along these routes and in ter- to deal with airport congestion.
minal areas near airports are monitored and con-
Concern about these problems, and about the
trolled by a system of ground-based surveillance feasibility and cost of the proposed solutions,
and communications equipment—the air traffic prompted the House Committee on Appropria-
control (ATC) system—operated by the Federal tions (Subcommittee on Transportation) to re-
Aviation Administration (FAA).
quest that OTA undertake an assessment of air-
In 1980, the 435 airports with FAA towers port and terminal area capacity and related ATC
handled some 180,000 takeoffs and landings per issues. The Senate Committee on Commerce,
day, or roughly 66 million per year, of which 74 Science, and Transportation endorsed the re-
percent are general aviation flights and 4 percent quest of the House Committee on Appropria-
are military. The remaining 22 percent of opera- tions, which directed OTA to concentrate on
tions are commercial flights (air carrier, com- four major topics:
muter, and air taxi) and are heavily concen-
● scenarios of future growth in air transporta-
trated in a few large airports. The 66 top airports
tion;
handle 77 percent of commercial operations and
• alternative ways to increase airport and ter-
88 percent of passenger enplanements; the 10
minal area capacity;
largest handle 33 percent of operations and 47
● technological and economic alternatives to
percent of passengers.
the ATC system modifications proposed by
This concentration of air traffic at a few large FAA; and
hubs creates congestion and delay, which in turn • alternatives to the present ATC process.
increases airline operating costs and, ultimately,
OTA’s major findings are presented below.
the cost of air travel for the public. As air traffic
and fuel prices increase, the cost of these delays
3
.
ized market structure and airline profitability, fleet. One such uncertainty is the future price
leading to questions about the ability of the in- and availability of the aviation gasoline used by
dustry to finance badly needed new equipment. small personal aircraft. As for air carriers, mar-
There are questions about the future price and ket forces and the restrictions imposed following
availability of aviation fuel and about the long- the strike have already resulted in a redistribu-
term impacts of the Professional Air Traffic tion of operations away from congested hubs to
Controllers Organization walkout. second-tier airports that have excess capacity.
This new trend, in combination with improved
There is also uncertainty about the future dis-
facilities for general aviation traffic at reliever
tribution of operations among user groups and
airports, could make it possible to accommodate
among airports. FAA expects general aviation
some increases in aggregated operations within
users to account for 75 percent of the increase in
existing system capacity.
demand, but there are large uncertainties about
the continued growth of the general aviation
Alternative options involve reestablishing, in charges and the appropriate distribution of trust
one form or another, the Airport and Airways fund revenues. Other issues that could emerge in
Trust Fund which expired in October 1980. Pos- the debate are how to use the present uncom-
sible approaches to reinstituting the trust fund mitted balance in the trust fund (amounting to
include: 1) a user tax structure and tax rates simi- about $3 billion) and whether to use trust fund
lar to those that existed before; 2) higher user tax moneys to help meet operating and maintenance
rates—raised either uniformly or selectively by costs. In the past, trust fund allocations derived
type of user; or 3) a different scheme of taxation from user fees have covered only about 15 per-
that would levy fees in proportion to benefits cent of these costs, and many feel that users
received or costs imposed by each type of air- should pay a larger share of them. Others argue
space user. that trust fund moneys should be reserved ex-
clusively for capital improvements and R&D ex-
All of these options are controversial, and the
penses,
search for a solution is complicated by many
long-standing issues about the equity of user
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ‘9
Trends and Forecasts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The Airport Capacity Problem. ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The ATC Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
The Committee Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
OTA’s Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Technological Improvements. ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Control Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Freedom of Airspace Use. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Automation and Controller Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Funding and Cost Allocation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure No. Page
1. Profile
of U.S. Airports, 1980. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2. FAA Budget and Funding Sources, 1971-80. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
The National Airspace System (NAS) includes (FAA), which has responsibility for assuring the
about 6,500 public-use airports serving nearly all safe and expeditious movement of aircraft in
cities and small communities in the United U.S. airspace and contiguous areas. FAA is also
States. Connecting these airports is a network of responsible for coordinating the use of airspace
air routes, defined by navigational aids, that shared by military and civil aviation.
channeI the flow of traffic. Flight along these
In all, the NAS accommodates about 180,000
routes, as well as operations in the terminal
operations (takeoffs and landings) per day at air-
areas surrounding airports, is monitored and
ports with FAA control towers, or roughly 66
controlled by a system of ground-based surveil-
million per year. Of these, 22 percent are com-
lance equipment and communication links—the
mercial flights (scheduled air carrier, commuter,
air traffic control (ATC) system.
and air taxi), 74 percent are general aviation,
With two exceptions (Washington National and 4 percent are military. Most of the commer-
Airport and Dunes International Airport), * U.S. cial operations are concentrated at the top 66
airports used by commercial flights are owned airports, which account for over 77 percent of
and operated by local, regional, or State author- commercial operations and 88 percent of passen-
ities. Many general aviation (GA) aircraft also ger enplanements. Within this group, airline
use these commercial air carrier airports, but traffic is even more highly concentrated at a few
most are served by smaller public airports and major hubs. As shown in figure 1, the 10 largest
by roughly 10,000 privately owned fields. The hubs handle 33 percent of all operations and 47
air route system and the ATC system are oper- percent of all passengers.l
ated by the Federal Aviation Administration
‘FAA Statistical Handbook of Aviation, Calendar Year 1980
*Washington National and Dunes International are owned by (Washington, D. C.: Federal Aviation Administration, 1981),
the Federal Government and operated by the FAA. passim.
9
10 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
a
Figure 1.— Profile of U.S. Airports, 1980
alncludes heliports, STOL ports, seaplane bases, and mllltary-cwll joint.use fields, excludes facllltles tn Puerlo RICO, Vlrgln Islands, and Paclflc
Territories.
tial pricing for airport access according to the willingly accept diversion, especially if it im-
time of day. This solution tends to work to the poses inconvenience or extra cost. One way to
advantage of major air carriers and against the make diversion more attractive would be to im-
commuter and air taxi operators, and even more prove the ground transportation links between
heavily against GA users, who complain that hubs and reliever airports.
quotas or peak-hour pricing might effectively
The intractability of the congestion problem
preclude them from using major airports at all.
and the difficulties of increasing airport capacity
An alternative strategy is to divert some traffic
or making more efficient use of capacity through
to another airport— for example, from a large
managerial techniques have prompted some
metropolitan hub to GA reliever airports in the
people to look to the ATC system for an alter-
vicinity. In several cities the problem is not a
nate solution. Through procedural changes or
general shortage of capacity but a dispropor-
technological improvements, the ATC system
tionate demand at one airport, while excess
might be able to make more efficient use of the
capacity exists at nearby airports that could
airspace in crowded terminal areas, thereby ex-
serve as satellites or relievers. The difficulty
pediting the flow of traffic to and from runways.
arises in determining who is to be diverted, since
few potential users of reliever airports would
traffic in terminal areas and thereby permit made by the Federal Government, but some of
pilots to cooperate more effectively with the the funds could be provided by taxes on airspace
controller or to assume some of the controller’s users, who might also have to purchase new
present responsibility for separation assurance avionics equipment to supplement or replace
and determining flight path in terminal areas. what they already have. Managing the transi-
Finally, the Microwave Landing System (MLS) tion to a new generation of ATC would also re-
would not only improve the ability to land in quire careful attention, both to assure continuity
conditions of severely reduced visibility, but of service and to avoid the penalties of excessive
also permit multiple or curving approach paths cost or unexpected delay. It therefore seems
to the runway instead of the single-file, straight- especially important to select an evolutionary
en approach required with the present Instru- path that does not foreclose options prematurely
ment Landing System (ILS). In the longer term, and does allow flexibility in the choice between
proposed new ATC technology might replace competing technologies.
the present system of ground-based radar and
These prospective ATC improvements raise
radio navigation and surveillance capabilities.
important issues for airspace users. If the re-
These proposed improvements, if adopted, quired new avionics systems become mandatory
would require very large investments over the for access to terminal areas or for general use of
next two decades. These investments would be controlled airspace, some GA, small commuter,
and air taxi operators may find the cost pro- of the present system as possible. Some possible
hibitive. New civil aviation requirements may improvements might ultimately have to be re-
not be entirely compatible with the missions or jected, despite of their potential for increasing
capabilities of military aircraft that share the capacity or enhancing safety, because of the cost
airspace. There will probably be pressure to pro- to users or infringement of the right of access to
long the transition period and to retain as much the airspace.
OTA’s APPROACH
This assessment considers the growth of air Chapter 3. Description of the functions, or-
transportation over the remainder of this cen- ganization, and operation of NAS with em-
tury. Particular attention is given to large hub phasis on ATC.
airports, where most of the congestion and delay Chapter 4. Analysis of possible long-range
is expected to occur. For the ATC system, the as- trends in air activity and the effect they
sessment focuses on improvements that would might have on technical, investment, and
affect the safety and capacity of terminal air- management decisions.
space, but developments in other parts of the Chapter 5. Examination of prospective new
ATC system (en route and flight information technologies and organizational alterna-
services) are also considered, Effects of these tives for the ATC system.
changes on airspace users (commercial opera- Chapter 6. Analysis of various ways to in-
tors, passengers, general aviation, and the mili- crease airport capacity and their advantages
tary services) are also examined. Policy options and disadvantages.
and alternative development plans are identified
Chapter 7. Discussion of the policy implica-
and analyzed.
tions that arise from alternative approaches
The results of this assessment are presented in to increasing airport capacity and improv-
the following five chapters: ing the ATC system.
ISSUES
Expanding, improving, and maintaining the of the Federal Government from the earliest
national system of airways, airports, and air days of aviation. There have been undeniable
traffic control has been an important objective benefits to airspace users and the general public
Ch. 2—Introducflon and Overview • 15
——.———
from the greater speed and regularity of air changes such as airline deregulation, the growth
transportation and from the remarkable record of commuter service, sharp rises in fuel cost, and
of safety that has been achieved over the years. slower economic growth will either dampen
The rationale for Federal involvement in the de- growth or cause it to develop in a pattern
velopment and operation of NAS has tradition- significantly different from that of the past. For
ally rested on two grounds: 1) promotion and example, one suggestion is that in an unregu-
regulation of interstate and foreign commerce; lated environment, market forces will cause a
and 2) enhancement of the capability for na- redistribution of traffic as users find that delay
tional defense. It has been argued on both costs outweigh the benefits of operating at con-
grounds that the Federal Government must take gested hub airports.
an active role to coordinate the development GA is the sector of aviation where growth has
and to manage the operation of the system. The
been the most rapid and where there is most seri-
system that has evolved under Federal sponsor- ous concern about accommodating future de-
ship and direction is not without its flaws,
mand. Twenty years ago, GA accounted for
however, and some observers believe that future
only a small fraction of instrument operations;
development should be directed along lines
today it represents slightly over half of all instru-
other than those of the past. Many of their con-
ment operations at FAA facilities, and most
cerns are embodied in the summary of major
forecast; show GA demand for ATC services in-
issues which follows; these issues will be treated
creasing at rates far higher than those of com-
in greater detail in subsequent chapters of the
mercial air carriers. Measures to restrict GA
report.
activity at major hubs or to divert it to reliever
airports or offpeak hours are certain to be con-
Growth troversial. GA users feel that reservations, quo-
tas, or differential pricing schemes, would un-
There is basic agreement among aviation ex-
fairly deny them access to and use of the air-
perts that civil aviation in the United States will
space system. On the other hand, some believe
continue to grow, thereby increasing the overall
that GA flights into congested terminal areas
demand for airport use and ATC services. There
should be limited because they typically carry
is considerably less agreement about the rate of very few passengers and so provide less public
growth, the distribution among airspace users, benefit than commercial aviation per operation
the demands on various types of facilities and
or per unit of airspace use.
the kinds of services that will be required. As a
result, there are sharp disputes about how to ac- At a more general level, the prospects of traf-
commodate this growth or to influence the form fic growth and capacity limitations raise the
and direction it may take. issue of strategic response to accommodating
future demand. In the past, the approach has
FAA’s projections have led it to conclude that
been essentially to accommodate demand wher-
severe capacity restrictions will manifest them-
ever and whenever it occurred, i.e., the aim has
selves in terminal areas and some parts of the en
been to foster growth in civil aviation. Some
route system and that perhaps as many as 20 air-
question whether this approach is still desirable,
ports may be saturated by 2000. To accommo-
arguing that demand and the growth of air activ-
date this expected growth, the FAA proposes the
ity should be managed and directed in ways to
addition of new airport capacity and ATC facil-
make the most productive use of airspace and
ities designed to handle higher traffic volumes.
the most efficient use of existing facilities.
However, past FAA forecasts have consistently
projected higher rates of growth than have ac- Basically, there are three forms of action that
tually materialized, casting doubt on the current can be taken to influence growth: regulatory,
FAA forecasts and the expected demand for economic, and technological. Regulatory a c -
ATC services through the remainder of this cen- tions include measures imposed by the Govern-
tury. Some observers see trends already devel- ment that would control the use of the airspace
oping in a different way. They argue that recent or the availability of ATC services according to
16 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
user class or types of activity. Economic meas- tion and to avoid the costs that could result from
ures are those that would affect the cost or price delay or unexpected technical setbacks.
of using the airspace or that would allow market
Beyond these technical and managerial mat-
competition to determine access to facilities and
ters, there are more fundamental questions
services that are in high demand. Technological
about the role of FAA in planning and carrying
responses include not only improved forms of
out technological programs of this nature. Con-
ground-based and avionic equipment to increase
gress, for example, has questioned FAA’s pro-
the efficiency of airspace use, but also increases posed handling of the program for moderniza-
in airport capacity through construction of new
tion of its en route computer system, as have
or improved landing facilities. All three ap-
other members of the aviation community. They
proaches are likely to be used, and the issue is
not which to adopt but what combination and are concerned that FAA is not consulting ade-
with what relative emphasis. Ultimately, the quately with specific user groups and not taking
advantage of relevant expertise available outside
choice of measures will reflect a more fundamen-
the aviation community. Some of them foresee a
tal strategic decision about how to meet increas-
time when air traffic may have to be curtailed
ing demand. Chapter 4 presents a further discus-
simply because the technology to handle in-
sion of future growth, and chapters 5 and 6 ex-
creased traffic with an acceptable level of safety
amine the various responses to growth.
has not been properly planned, developed, and
deployed.
Technological Improvements
On the other side, there are those who defend
The many technological improvements of the FAA’s general strategy for ATC modernization
ATC system being contemplated by FAA fall and approve the way in which particular techno-
into four classes: logical programs are being handled. They argue
navigation and guidance systems;
●
that deployment must proceed at a cautious pace
surveillance;
● both because of the enormous uncertainties that
● communication; and
must be overcome and because there must be
● process improvements.
continuity of operations throughout the transi-
tion. In their view, the potential consequences of
These potential improvements have three major abrupt changes or premature decisions are more
characteristics: 1) most are technologically serious and, in the long run, more harmful to
sophisticated and require further development aviation than temporary curtailments that may
and testing before they can be operationally have to be imposed while technological dif-
deployed; 2) they will entail very large expendi- ficulties are being resolved.
tures by the Federal Government to put them in
place and— in most cases—additional costs to Chapters examines some of the technological
airspace users who will have to equip their air- issues surrounding proposed system improve-
craft with special avionics; and 3) many years ments, and chapter 7 addresses strategy and
will be required for full deployment. policy options for managing the transition.
able) behavior by airspace users. In contrast, about 60 sites, compared to the present disper-
VFR traffic has little contact with the ATC sys- sion at over 300 locations.
tem, except with flight service stations and con-
trol towers at airports, and operates much as it Perhaps the best example of the trend toward
did in the early days of aviation, even though it centralization is the growing importance of the
shares airspace with IFR traffic in some in- Central Flow Control (CFC) facility at FAA
stances. headquarters in Washington, D. C., which acts
as a nerve center for the entire airspace system.
As ATC technology evolved the locus of deci- With the aid of computers, CFC reviews the na-
sionmaking under IFR began to shift from the tional weather picture and anticipated aircraft
cockpit to the ground. Routes were determined operations for the coming day and determines
by the placement of ground-based navigation the incidence and cost (extra fuel consumed) of
aids; surveillance was accomplished by reports delays that could occur because of weather and
to ground centers and later by search radar; and air traffic demand. This results in a daily opera-
observers in airport towers began to direct air- tional master plan that smooths demand among
craft in landing and takeoff patterns. As the den- airports and allows delays to be taken on the
sity of air traffic increased, ground-based ATC ground at the point of departure rather than in
personnel began to take more and more control holding patterns at the destination. The value of
over the altitude, route, and speed to be flown. this capability was demonstrated when capacity
To some extent this transfer of responsibility quotas were imposed as a consequence of the
was the inevitable consequence of the technol- August 1981 air traffic controllers’ strike. CFC
ogy employed, but organizational reasons also allowed a national airspace utilization plan to be
dictated ground-based control. Decisions con- developed, with detailed instructions to airports
cerning not the movement of individual aircraft and en route centers on how to manage traffic
but the pattern of traffic as a whole can best be and minimize the adverse effects of the capacity
made by a single person who is in a position to restrictions,
observe all flights operating throughout a
volume of airspace over a span of time. Coor- A system characteristic that accompanies
dination and direction of several aircraft re- ground-based centralization of control authority
quired that a single individual have authority is standardization of performance. FAA operat-
over others—a role that the pilot of a single air- ing procedures specify the behavior of pilots and
craft could not be expected to assume or that controllers in every circumstance, which in-
other pilots would accept. creases the reliability of system operation by
reducing uncertainty and by routinizing nearly
Ground basing implies concentration of con- every form of air-ground transaction. Safety is
trol at relatively few locations, and the trend has the prime motivating factor, but capacity and ef-
been for centralization to increase over time. ficiency are also highly important considera-
Again, the reasons are both technological and tions. Controller workload is reduced when the
organizational: centralization is organizationally range of possibilities they have to deal with is
advantageous because it consolidates functional- limited, and this in turn permits a given volume
ly similar activities and allows technical speciali- of traffic to be handled with less stress or, alter-
zation, both of which lead to greater efficiency nately, an increase in the number of aircraft each
and reliability of operation. For example, en controller can safely handle. Either way, the effi-
route traffic in continental U.S. airspace is now ciency of the ATC system (measured in terms of
controlled from 20 regional centers (ARTCCs, hourly throughput or controller productivity) is
and proposed ATC system improvements would increased, with a corresponding reduction in
lead to even further consolidation, with en route system operating cost.
and terminal control eventually merging into a
single type of facility. A similar trend toward Despite the advantages of ground-basing, cen-
centralization can be observed in FAA’s plans to tralization, and standardization, there are com-
consolidate flight service station activities at plaints about the control philosophy of the pre-
18 • Airport and Air Traffic Control System
sent system. Pilots complain that a ground- problems or assure the safety of high-density
based system detracts from their control over airspace are often controversial with some cate-
the conduct of the flight. Centralization may gories of users because they are perceived as in-
also be a problem if, by concentrating control fringements on their freedom to use NAS. GA
facilities or flight services, the personnel on the users feel particularly threatened, but air carriers
ground are less able to provide particularized in- and commuter airline operators have also voiced
structions or to take action based on localized concern. The military services as well are wary
knowledge of flight conditions. Standardization, of some new forms of ATC technology and the
by definition, limits the flexibility of response procedures that may accompany their use be-
and the freedom to pursue individual or special cause they may interfere with military missions
courses of action. or be incompatible with performance re-
quirements for combat aircraft.
The prospective changes in ATC technology
are viewed with mixed feelings by airspace users As the complexity of ATC technology has in-
and air traffic controllers. Technology that creased, so has the amount of equipment that
would increase the level of automation could, on must be carried on the aircraft and the amount
one hand, promote greater centralization and of controlled airspace from which VFR flight is
standardization of control functions and could excluded unless the aircraft is equipped with a
lead to increases in safety, capacity, or efficien- transponder to allow identification and tracking
cy, On the other, automation could serve to in- by the ATC system. Restrictions on airport use,
crease ground authority still further and to especially at large and medium hubs, have also
reduce the flexibility of the system in dealing grown more confining for VFR flights, and the
with nonroutine events. Technology like colli- airspace around many of the busiest airports is
sion avoidance systems or cockpit displays of now designated as a “terminal control area” in
traffic information could give back to the pilot which all aircraft are subject to air traffic control
critical information (and hence control respon- and may operate only under rules and equip-
sibility) and might enhance the pilot’s ability to ment requirements specified by FAA. GA, the
cooperate more effectively with the ground- principal user of the VFR system, finds itself
based controller. At the moment, these devices pressured in several ways. Uncontrolled airspace
are thought of as backups in the event of con- is shrinking and may disappear altogether; it is
troller or system error, but their prospective use becoming increasingly difficult to use metropoli-
also raises the possibility of independent pilot tan airports because of equipment requirements;
actions that might contravene controller instruc- and the cost of equipping the aircraft with IFR
tions or disrupt the overall pattern of traffic. avionics and acquiring an instrument rating are
often out of economic reach for the personal GA
Chapter S, which deals with these and other
pilot. Prospective technological improve-
forms of advanced aviation technology for
ments—such as the Traffic Alert and Collision
ground-based and airborne application, treats
Avoidance System (TCAS), data link, or MLS—
the issues that arise from prospective changes in
distribution of control between the air and the are viewed by many GA users as further restric-
tions on their access to airports and airspace.
ground or from further centralization of ATC
functions and services. Many of them feel that, while this new technol-
ogy may be desirable or even necessary for air
carriers and larger business aircraft, it should
Freedom of Airspace Use not be required of all GA users or made a pre-
requisite for IFR services or access to commercial
The rising demand for ATC services and the airports.
prospect of congestion at more and more major
airports are the basic stimuli for many of the Commuter airline operators share some of
technological improvements and procedural these GA concerns. Virtually all commuter and
changes now being sought by the FAA. How- air taxi operators are equipped for IFR operation
ever, the very measures that might ease capacity and find their needs well served by the present
Ch. 2—Introduction and Overview ● 19
—
ATC technology. They see little further advan- Automation and Controller Functions
tage in new technology and are concerned about
the expense of having two sets of equipment Despite the vast complex of ground-based
serving the same purpose—advanced avionics equipment and facilities for surveillance, com-
needed for a high-density terminal at one end of munication, and data processing, ATC remains
the flight and present-day equipment that may a highly labor-intensive activity. FAA is keenly
be useful for many years to come at small com- aware of this and has sought for some time to
munity airports. They are also concerned that find ways to automate selected ATC functions.
the more advanced avionics might eventually However, most of the automation that has been
lead to more restrictive rules of operation or ac- instituted so far has been to assist air traffic con-
cess to terminal areas. Thus, many commuter trollers rather than replace them. Decisionmak-
and air taxi operators would favor a dual-mode ing and communication—two major elements of
system that allowed them to retain their present controller workload—have not been automated
IFR avionics even though more advanced forms to any appreciable degree, and the ratio of con-
were in use by other types of aircraft operators. troller work force to aircraft handled has re-
mained relatively constant. In addition, the
Military aviation operates under the civil present method of backup to automated control
ATC system in all shared airspace and under functions involves reversion to manual proce-
military control in areas restricted to military dures used in the previous generation of ATC
use. In flying through civil airspace to and from equipment; this method of assuring service in
training areas, military aircraft must often fol- the event of outages has tended to perpetuate the
low circuitous routes or observe altitude and team size and staffing patterns of the previous
speed restrictions that lengthen transit time. The generation.
military services would prefer an arrangement
that allows more direct access to training areas Plans for an advanced generation of ATC call
and avoids operation in mixed airspace. Air car- for automation of several manual controller
riers have a different view: the most direct functions: conflict prediction and resolution,
routes for trunk airlines are often blocked by terminal area metering and spacing, flight plan
restricted military areas, and the air carriers approval and issue of clearances, and communi-
argue for procedures that would allow them to cating routine control instructions to individual
traverse these areas in the interest of shortening aircraft. Such forms of automation could lead to
flight time and saving fuel. substantial increases in controller productivity
and might eventually provide the basis for a
Another issue has to do with new technology more extensively automated system in which
that might be adopted for civil aviation, which most routine control functions are carried out by
in most cases would be extra equipment for mili- computers, with the human controller acting in
tary aircraft. For combat aircraft, particularly the role of manager and overseer of machine
fighters, the space for avionics and antennas is operation.
often at a premium. While careful coordination
of military and civil requirements can eliminate This path of evolution raises three important
some of these problems, certain basic incompati- groups of issues. First, there are questions about
bilities are likely to remain and to produce con- the feasibility and advisability of replacing the
tinuing controversy. human controller to such an extent. ATC now
relies heavily on judgment and awareness of the
The issues of freedom of airspace access and dynamics and subtleties of the air traffic situa-
use are discussed further in chapters in connec- tion. Some observers doubt that all of these
tion with specific forms of new aviation technol- characteristics could be dependably incorpo-
ogy. rated into computer software in the foreseeable
20 . Airport and Air Traffic Control System
future. The proponents of automation argue it would be better to keep all control of individ-
that much of the routine, repetitive, or predic- ual flight paths under one authority.
tive work of ATC is ideally suited to computers,
and that an incremental approach to automation Chapter 5 contains a further examination of
the issue of automation in connection with the
will help solve many of the problems since each
discussion of the proposed en route computer re-
new step can build on successful previous ad-
vances. placement program and the mechanization of
the Mode S data link and TCAS systems.
A second major set of issues is the reliability
of automated systems and the backup methods Funding and Cost Allocation
to be used when the inevitable equipment
failures occur. Experience with the present The expenditures that are likely to be required
automated ATC equipment indicates that com- for ATC system improvements over the coming
puter failure rates are a cause for concern, and years could be considerably higher than those of
the loss of computer-supplied data may mean past years. For the period 1971 to 1980, the
that ground personnel lose effective control of amounts budgeted for facilities and equipment
traffic until manual backup procedures are in- (F&E) and associated research, engineering, and
stituted—a process that may take several min- development (RE&D) have averaged $397 mil-
utes to complete. Computer experts maintain lion and $106 million respectively (in constant
that equipment and software reliability can be 1980 dollars).3 Future improvements of the en
greatly improved and that automated systems route and terminal area ATC system and related
can be designed to be more failure tolerant. programs for flight service station, navigation,
These experts also contend that present ex- and communication facility modernization may
perience with manual procedures as backups to call for spending at twice this annual level or
outages of automated equipment indicates a fun- more. At the same time, operating and mainte-
damental flaw in design philosophy because the nance (O&M) costs are expected to rise, at least
proper backup to an automated system is not until modern labor-saving equipment is installed
manual operation, but another automated sys- and productivity gains begin to be realized.
tem. Critics of automation question the accept- Since creation of the Airport and Airways
ability of a system in which the human con- Trust Fund in 1970, FAA has had two sources of
troller has no effective means of intervening in funding. F&E, RE&D, and airport grants-in-aid
degraded states of operation. have been covered wholly by appropriations
A third issue is whether some of the respon- from the trust fund. In addition, the trust fund
sibility that now resides with the ground-based has covered about 15 percent of O&M expenses,
system ought not to be transferred to, or at least although this proportion has varied consider-
shared with, the cockpit. A pilot in an aircraft ably from year to year. The balance of O&M
equipped with an airborne collision avoidance costs, about $1.9 billion per year (1980 dollars),
system and a display of the immediately sur- and all other FAA budget items have been from
rounding air traffic might be in a superior posi- general fund appropriations. Overall, trust fund
tion to select the appropriate maneuver in case outlays have met about 40 percent of annual
of conflict; in effect, such an airborne system FAA expenses. The major source of revenue for
would create a mode of IFR operation similar to the trust fund has been a tax levied on domestic
the present VFR system. The chief disadvantage and international airline passengers (see fig. 2).
of this concept is that it could lead pilots to make In October 1980, the Airport and Airways De-
a series of short-term tactical responses that velopment Act expired, and Congress declined
might not be consistent with the overall scheme to pass reauthorizing legislation. At that time
of managing traffic in congested airspace. In this the trust fund had an uncommitted balance of
case, the ground system would still have to act
in the capacity of referee, and some contend that 3
0TA calculations based on FAA budget data, 1971-80.
Ch. 2—Introduction and Overview • 21
—————————— — .
General
fund
SOURCE: Off Ice of Technology Assessment, based on FAA budget data, 1971-80.
In considering sources of funding for future paid nearly all (88 percent) of the cost of services
airport and ATC system improvements, Con- provided to them. On the other hand, general
gress will encounter three broad and long-stand- aviation taxes returned at almost one quarter of
ing areas of controversy. In the absence of a allocated costs.4 GA representatives have disa-
trust fund or some other form of user charges to greed strongly with these findings, arguing that
support capital improvement programs, these there is a substantial public benefit of aviation
parts of the FAA budget would have to be that has been undervalued in these cost alloca-
funded from general revenues, which is certain tion studies and that GA is charged for facilities
to raise the issue of whether civil aviation and and services that are neither required nor used
the airport and ATC system should be subsi- by a major part of GA operators. Congress has
dized by the general public. The argument that shown little inclination to alter the user charge
the recipients of a service should pay the costs structure, and most of the proposed legislation
for the Federal Government to provide that serv- to reestablish the trust fund would have little ef-
ice (a position strongly supported by the present fect on the distribution of user charges that ex-
administration), holds that capital improve- isted previously.
ments of facilities and equipment and the O&M
The third area of controversy concerns how
costs of running the airport and ATC system
the collected levies should be applied to costs.
should be borne by airspace users through vari- By congressional action, the use of trust fund
ous specific taxes. On the other hand, it can be moneys is restricted largely to capital expendi-
argued that civil aviation, like other modes of
tures and research and development activities,
transportation, provides a general benefit and with some contribution toward operating ex-
therefore deserves support with public moneys. penditures. There are two major points at issue:
Other modes of transportation receive subsidy 1) how should expenditures for capital improve-
from the Government, and some members of the ments be allocated between airports and ATC
aviation community contend that there is no jus- facilities and equipment (and among airports
tification for singling out civil aviation for full and ATC facilities used by various types of avia-
recovery of capital and operating costs.
tion); and 2) should the allocation be broadened
The resolution of this issue that has prevailed to cover a substantial part (or perhaps all) of
for the past 10 years has been a combination of O&M costs.
special users taxes and General Fund financing, Resolution of these issues will become espe-
with the former going for capital expenditures cially important when FAA presents its long-
and a small share of operating costs and the lat- range plan for ATC system improvement. In-
ter for the balance of FAA costs. A perpetuation creased expenditures for facilities and equipment
of this scheme, through reestablishment of the
and associated R&D will be called for, and oper-
Airport and Airways Trust Fund, could embroil
ating expenses will probably remain high. FAA
Congress in another issue—what is the “fair” will be seeking a long-term commitment and an
amount to be paid by various user classes. Most
assured source of funding, but it will face strong
people concede that each user should pay rough-
opposition from segments of the aviation com-
ly in proportion to the cost that they impose on
munity if paying for FAA’s programs and oper-
the system, but there is violent disagreement
ating costs entails an increase in user taxes or a
within the aviation community as to what these
reallocation of the share to be borne by various
costs are and how they are to be reckoned. Cost
classes of airspace users.
allocation studies conducted by the Department
of Transportation and the FAA have generally
‘J. M. Rodgers, Financing the Airport gnd Air-way System; Cost
concluded that, under the tax structure that ex- Allocation and Recovery, FAA-AVP-78-14 (Washington, D. C.:
isted before October 1980, commercial aviation Federal Aviation Administration, November 1978).
Chapter 3
THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM
List of Tables
Table Page
l. Airports Included in National Airport System Plan, 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2. U.S. Pilot Population, 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3. Summary of Aviation Activity, 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
List of Figures
Figure Page
3. Airspace Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4. Typical Flight Service Station C o m m u n i c a t i o n L i n k s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . 34
5. Air Route Traffic Control Center Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
6. Connections of aTypical ARTCC With Other Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7. ATC Activities for a Typical IFR Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8. ATC Facilities and Equipment at a Typical Large Airport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Chapter 3
The National Airspace System (NAS) is a see how the system operates and to identify fac-
large and complex network of airports, airways, tors that may shape its future development. For
and air traffic control (ATC) facilities that exists explanatory purposes, it first considers the goals
to support the commercial, private, and military of the system and then describes the system
use of aircraft in the United States. This chapter under three major headings: airports, air traffic
examines the major parts of the system, both to services, and airspace users.
GOALS
NAS is designed and operated to accomplish dle more aircraft or to provide better service to
three goals with respect to civil aviation: those aircraft with a given combination of run-
ways, controllers, and ATC facilities.
1. safety of flight;
2. expeditious movement of aircraft; and Whereas safety cannot be compromised in the
3. efficient operation. interest of cutting costs, capacity and cost may
be traded off for the sake of safety. The special
These goals are related hierarchically, with safe- measures adopted to deal with disruption of the
ty of flight the primary concern. The use of air- system as a result of the air traffic controllers’
port facilities, the design and operation of the strike in August 1981 illustrate the hierarchal re-
ATC system, the flight rules and procedures em- lationship of safety, capacity, and efficiency. In
ployed, and the conduct of operations are all order to continue safe operation in the face of
guided by the principle that safety is the first work force reductions, the number of aircraft al-
consideration. lowed to use certain crowded airports and air
Without compromising safety, the second ways at peak demand hours was reduced to a
goal is to permit aircraft to move from origin to level that could be handled safely. These meas-
destination as promptly and with as little inter- ures reduced capacity (the number of aircraft
ference as possible. This involves preventing that the system could accommodate) and in-
conflicts between flights, avoiding delays at air- creased cost (delays, canceled flights, adherence
ports or en route, and eliminating inefficient or to quotas), but an effort was made to allow the
circuitous flight paths. It also entails making remaining capacity to be used effectively and
maximum use of airport and airway capacity in keep costs within reasonable limits. For exam-
order to satisfy demand, so long as safety is not ple, limits on the number of air carrier flights
compromised. If safety and capacity utilization were imposed only at the 22 busiest airports,
are in conflict, the Federal Aviation Adminstra- and restrictions were later eased at those airports
tion’s (FAA) operating rules require that the vol- where more operations could be accommodated.
Airlines were allowed to use larger aircraft so as
ume of traffic using the system be reduced to a
level consistent with safety. to provide as much seat capacity as possible but
with fewer flights, and wherever possible flow
The third goal is to provide airport and ATC control procedures were employed to ensure
services at low cost. This entails minimizing the that aircraft were delayed on the ground rather
costs to users—not only monetary costs but also than in flight, so as to minimize waste of fuel.
the penalties of delay, inconvenience, or undue Other restrictive measures were applied to cut
restriction. It also entails operating the system as back on general aviation (GA) flights. The mili-
efficiently as possible so as to reduce transaction tary services voluntarily reduced flight oper-
costs and to increase productivity, i.e., to han- ations.
25
26 • Airport and Air Traffic Control System
—.—
The anticipated growth of air traffic and the capacity. Before turning to examination of these
demand for ATC services over the next two dec- problems, however, it is first necessary to look
ades poses several problems, and the need to at the major parts of the NAS and to consider
maintain a dynamic balance among system goals the factors that could shape their course of re-
motivates the search for improved methods of velopment.
ATC and better utilization of airway and airport
AIRPORTS
Airports are the first major part of NAS. They tem Plan (NASP). It identifies categories of air-
are any place designed, equipped, or commonly ports that are of Federal interest and that are
used for the landing and takeoff of aircraft. This eligible for Federal funds under the Airport De-
definition covers a broad variety of sites: many velopment Aid Program (ADAP), and the Plan-
of the sites designated as airports by the FAA are ning Grant Program administered by FAA.
merely dirt strips or seaplane moorings near NASP categorizes public use airports according
open water; at the opposite end of the spectrum to the type of aviation activity they accommo-
are complex air terminals serving major metro- date: international, domestic air carrier, com-
politan areas, like the 5,000-acre JFK Interna- muter, reliever, and general aviation. This does
tional Airport in New York. About 60 percent of not imply that GA aircraft use only GA airports;
the 15,000 U.S. airports are private or military in fact, there are GA operations at all categories
fields and not available for public use. Of the of airports. Rather, the GA classification de-
roughly 6,500 civil airports open to the public, notes that such airports serve only GA and not
almost 90 percent are used exclusively by small other types of users.
GA aircraft. The remaining 780 airports (about 5
percent of all U.S. airports) are served either by International Airports
scheduled air carriers or by commuter and air
taxi operators (see table 1). An international airport regularly serves air
carrier flights operating between the United
FAA, in compliance with the Airport and Air- States and foreign countries. International air-
way Development Act of 1970, maintains a mas- ports tend to be among the best equipped air-
ter list of airport development needs for the next ports in terms of runways, landing aids, and
decade. This compilation, which is periodically ATC facilities. In 1980 there were 76 such air-
revised, is known as the National Airport Sys- ports.
SOURCE: Federal Aviation Administration, National A/rPort Sysfern Plan, 1980-89, 1980,
Ch. 3—The National Airspace System . 27
Reliever Airports
Reliever airports are a special category of GA
Photo credit: Federal Aviation Administration
airport whose primary purpose is to reduce con-
All filled up gestion at air carrier airports in large and medi-
28 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
urn hubs by providing GA users with alternative development or improvement funds under
operational facilities and aircraft services of NASP. There were approximately 2,200 GA
roughly similar quality to those available at hub public-use airports in the 1980 NASP. Capacity
airports. The criteria for classification as a re- is usually not a concern except at the largest GA
liever airport in NASP are 25,000 itinerant oper- airports, such as Long Beach, Van Nuys, Teter-
ations or 35,000 local operations annually, boro, or Opa-Locka, which may require im-
either at present or within the last 2 years. The provements similar to those contemplated at
reliever airport must also be situated in a SMSA major hub airports. For most GA airports the
with a population of at least 500,000 or where chief concern is upgrading and extending airport
passenger enplanements by scheduled airlines facilities and ATC services so as to accommo-
are at least 250,000 annually. There were 155 date larger and more sophisticated aircraft and
airports designated as relievers in the 1980-89 to allow operation under adverse conditions.
NASP. These improvements are being sought both to
support the expected growth of GA and to pro-
General Aviation vide facilities comparable to air carrier airports,
thereby permitting diversion of some GA opera-
GA airports are either private use or public tions from congested hubs.
use, but only the latter are eligible for Federal
at the horizon, and navigational signals from a produce the most direct routing from origin to
station can be received over a much smaller area destination.
than low-frequency radio. To provide the same
Several alternative navigational systems (de-
geographical coverage as the older low-fre-
veloped principally for military aviation) are
quency radio system, therefore, a great many
available, and some are already used in auxiliary
more VOR stations were required. At present,
applications by civil aviation. The Omega sys-
there are 1,039 VOR stations in operation (930
tem, developed by the U.S. Navy, is a low-fre-
FAA, 42 military, 67 non-Federal), providing ex-
quency radio system that provides global cover-
tensive but not complete coverage of the con-
age. It has been purchased by some airlines for
tiguous 48 States and Hawaii and limited cover-
transoceanic flights. Loran-C (also low-freq-
age of Alaska.
uency radio), operated by the Coast Guard, is a
In the 1960’s, the basic VOR system was sup- maritime navigation system that also covers
plemented by distance measuring equipment most of the continental United States; it affords
(DME) that permitted measurement of range as very good accuracy and low-altitude coverage,
well as direction to a station. The DME used the even in mountainous areas. Some airline and
distance-measuring portion of a military Tac- corporate jet aircraft have self-contained air-
tical Control and Navigation System (TACAN), borne navigation systems such as Doppler radar
colocated with a VOR station to create what is or Inertial Navigation System (INS), which are
called a VORTAC. This is the standard airway accurate and are usable worldwide. All of these
navigation aid in use today, and at present all new systems permit “area navigation” (RNA V),
commercial air carriers have VOR/DME equip- whereby the pilot can fly directly between any
merit. ’ Over 80 percent of GA aircraft are also two points without restriction to a VOR airway.
equipped with VOR receivers, and over one- There are also available RNAV systems that per-
third of these also have DME. In addition to the mit the aircraft to follow direct routings using
Federal investment in VORTAC facilities (on the VOR as a reference.
order of $250 million), there is a very large pri-
Many commercial air carriers and more than 7
vate investment (roughly $300 million) in air-
percent of GA aircraft (largely business and cor-
borne navigation equipment to use the present porate aircraft) have RNAV capability. Since
VORTAC technology. As a result, both the Fed-
1973, FAA has been gradually implementing
eral Government and the aviation community
RNAV routes in the upper airspace and insti-
have a strong incentive to protect this invest-
tuting approach procedures at selected airports
ment by prolonging the operational life of their
to accommodate aircraft equipped with such
VORTAC equipment and the airway route
systems. Phasing out the current airways struc-
structure based on it.
ture and converting to a more flexible system of
Nevertheless, VOR—which relies on 30- or area navigation is a process that will require
40-year-old technology-has some inherent dis- many years to complete. At present, FAA is
advantages. Because it is a ground-based sys- committed to upgrading VORTAC stations to
tem, it does not provide coverage of oceanic solid-state equipment at a cost of roughly $210
areas. Because it is a line-of-sight system, VOR is million (fiscal year 1980 dollars) over the next 10
of limited usefulness at low altitudes or in moun- years. At the same time, FAA must face the
tainous areas. The VOR route structure concen- question of adopting new navigation technolog y
trates traffic along rather narrow channels and to conform to new international standards
produces a potential for conflict at intersections scheduled for consideration by the International
where airways cross. Further, navigation from Civil Aviation Organization in 1984. The issue is
one fix (intersection) to the next does not always not so much selection of a single new navigation
● Military aircraft are equipped with TACAN, VOR/DME, or
system to replace VORTAC as it is a question of
both. adopting procedures for worldwide navigation
30 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
(especially RNAV) that will be compatible with the airport must be closed. Such severely re-
several possible technologies. duced visibility occurs less than 1 percent of the
time for U.S. airports as a whole, but when this
Landing Aids happens at a busy airport, traffic can be backed
up not only at the affected airport but also at
A guidance system for approach and landing alternate landing sites and at airports where traf-
is simply a precise, low-altitude form of naviga- fic originates. The other limitation is that it pro-
tion aid with the additional accuracy and relia- vides only a single fixed path to the runway—in
bility needed for landing aircraft in conditions of effect, a conduit extending 4 to 7 miles from the
reduced visibility. The standard system now in runway threshold through which all traffic must
use, the Instrument Landing System (ILS), was flow. This has an even greater affect on capac-
first deployed in the early 1940’s although a pro- ity. When visibility is such that the ILS approach
totype system was first demonstrated by James must be used, traffic must be strung out along a
Doolittle in 1929. single path and the rate at which landings can be
ILS provides guidance for approach and land- effected is constrained by the speed and spacing
ing by two radio beams transmitted from equip- of aircraft in single file.
ment located near the runway. One transmitter, The Microwave Landing System (MLS),
known as the localizer, emits a narrow beam which has been under development by FAA for
alined with the runway centerline. The other several years and is now ready for initial de-
transmitter, the glide slope, provides vertical ployment, could overcome these limitations of
guidance along a fixed approach angle of about ILS, which in turn could help improve the flow
3°. These two beams define a sloping approach of traffic in terminal areas by allowing more
path with which the pilot alines the aircraft, flexibility in segregating and sequencing the ar-
starting at a point 4 to 7 miles from the runway. rival of aircraft on the runway. The magnitude
Because the ILS is generally not accurate or relia- of the resulting capacity gains is subject to some
ble enough to bring the aircraft all the way onto dispute, however, and not all agree that MLS
the runway surface by instrument reference would play a major part in reducing terminal
alone, the pilot makes a transition to external airspace congestion. The MLS is discussed fur-
visual reference before reaching a prescribed ther in chapter 5.’
minimum altitude on the glide slope (the deci-
sion height). The decision height varies accord-
ing to the airport and the type of ILS installa- Flight Planning and
tion: 200 feet for most airports (category I), but Advisory Information
100 feet on certain runways at some airports Timely and accurate information about
(category II). At present there are 708 category I weather and flight conditions is vital to airmen,
and 44 category II ILS installations in commis- and FAA perceives this aspect of system opera-
sion in the United States. * FAA plans call for in- tion to be a prime benefit, particularly to the GA
stallation of ILS at additional sites, primarily community. Flight planning and information
commuter airports, and for modernization of services take several forms and are provided
some 250 existing sites by converting to solid- partly by FAA and partly by the National Oce-
state equipment and, in the process, upgrading anic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
69 of them to category II capability. of the Department of Commerce. NOAA pub-
ILS has two major limitations, both of which lishes maps, aeronautical charts, and related
affect airport capacity. First, since the ILS does documents from information furnished by the
not provide reliable guidance all the way to FAA. The National Weather Service of NOAA
touchdown, there are times and conditions when provides weather maps and reports. FAA pub-
● In addition, there are 48 non-FAA facilities that have category I ‘Microwave Landing Transition Plan, APO-81-1 (Washington,
ILS installations. D. C.: Federal Aviation Administration, 1981).
Ch. 3—The National Airspace System • 31
pilot choosing to fly VFR may navigate by any A display of air traffic as it appears to a controller
means available to him: visible landmarks, dead
reckoning, electronic aids (such as VORTAC),
or self-contained systems on board the aircraft. The distinction between VFR and IFR is basic
If he intends to fly at altitudes below 18,000 ft, to ATC and to the safe and efficient use of
he need not file a flight plan or follow prescribed airspace, since it not only defines the services
VOR airways, although many pilots do both for provided to airmen but also structures the
reasons of convenience. The basic responsibility airspace according to pilot qualifications and the
for avoiding other aircraft rests with the pilot, equipment their aircraft must carry. VFR flights
who must rely on visual observation and alert- over the contiguous 48 States may not operate at
ness (the “see and avoid” concept). altitudes above 18,000 ft, which are reserved for
In conditions of poor visibility or at altitudes IFR flights. The altitudes between 18,000 and
above 18,000 ft, pilots must fly under IFR. Many 60,000 ft are designated as positive control
also choose to fly IFR in good visibility because airspace; flights at these levels must have an ap-
they feel it affords a higher level of safety and proved IFR flight plan and be under control of
access to a wider range of ATC services. Under an ATC facility. Airspace above 60,000 ft is
IFR, the pilot navigates the aircraft by referring rarely used by any but military aircraft. Most of
to cockpit instruments and by following instruc- the airspace below 18,000 ft is controlled, but
tions from air traffic controllers on the ground. both VFR and IFR flights are permitted.
The pilot is still responsible for seeing and avoid- The airspace around and above the busiest
ing VFR traffic, when visibility permits, but the airports is designated as a terminal control area
ATC system will provide separation assurance (TCA) and only transponder-equipped aircraft
from other IFR aircraft and, to the extent prac- with specific clearances may operate in it regard-
tical, alert the IFR pilot to threatening VFR air- less of whether operating under VFR or IFR. All
craft. airports with towers have controlled airspace to
regulate traffic movement. At small airports
● Similar visual and instrument flight rules are in force in foreign without towers, all aircraft operate by the see-
countries that are members of the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization (ICAO ). In many cases, ICAO rules are patterned on and-avoid principle except under instrument
the U.S. model, weather conditions. Figure 3 is a schematic rep-
32 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
45,000 ft.
(FL450)
Continental
control Positive Transponder
* area control with altitude
I Jet
routes area encoding
I I required
1
—18,000 ft MSL 1
14,500 f’ MSL
A
v
—.—— ——..—— --— - 1 2 , 5 0 0 ft M S L- --
--3,000 f’ AGL ~
v-
– – 1,200 ft AGL
Airport transition area1- ‘
traffic
r 700 ft AGL
7area . . -. ,>. !
resentation of the resulting airspace structure; as have a radio if he elects to file a VFR flight plan
the general rule, VFR flights are permitted every- or land at an airport with a control tower. Air-
where except in positive control airspace al- craft flying under IFR, on the other hand, are re-
though clearances are required to operate within quired to have radio and avionics equipment
TCAs and at airports with control towers. that will allow them to communicate with all
ATC facilities that will handle the flight from
The IFR/VFR distinction also governs avi- origin to destination. They must also be instru-
onics and pilot qualifications. A VFR flight tak- mented to navigate along airways and to execute
ing off and landing at a small private field and an IFR approach at the destination airport.
flying only in uncontrolled airspace needs little These requirements apply to all IFR aircraft, and
or no avionic equipment, although a pilot must Federal Air Regulations also specify additional
Ch. 3—The National Airspace System ● 33
equipment requirements and pilot qualifications pinpoint the location and coordinate search and
for various classes of air carrier aircraft. In addi- rescue operations. Flight service stations also
tion, both IFR and VFR aircraft must have trans- make periodic weather observations and trans-
ponders that automatically transmit their iden- mit this information by teletype network to
tity and altitude when they are in TCAs* or at other ATC facilities and U.S. weather reporting
altitudes above 12,500 feet. services. Thus, FSS is essentially a communica-
tions center, serving general aviation directly
The VFR/IFR distinction also determines the but also providing information services for all
type of ATC facility that will provide service to
airspace users. Figure 4 illustrates the communi-
airspace users. There are three general types of cation links and the types of facilities that are in
facilities operated by FAA: air route traffic con-
trol center (ARTCC), which serve primarily IFR contact with a typical FSS.
traffic; airport traffic control towers, which FAA operates 317 FSSs, mostly at airports
serve both IFR and VFR aircraft; and flight serv- with VORTAC installations. Since traffic oper-
ice stations (FSS), which primarily serve VFR ates out of thousands of airports, much of FSS’s
traffic. work is done by means of transcribed messages
FSS serves three primary purposes: flight and standardized briefings. The importance of
planning and advisory information for all GA FSS as an onsite facility at airports may thus be
aircraft; the dissemination of flight plans (VFR diminishing, and FAA has plans to consolidate
and IFR) to other facilities along the intended FSSs into about 60 centralized locations. Con-
route; and operation of teletype networks to fur- current with the reduction in the number of
nish information on weather and facility status FSSs, FAA plans to increase the amount and
to civil and military users. FAA encourages but type of on-call and remote services, including
does not require pilots flying VFR to file a flight methods for semiautomatic filing of flight plans.
plan; IFR flights must file a flight plan and ob- FSS personnel would, however, be available—
tain clearance to use the airspace. Personnel are but usually at a remote location—to provide
on duty to provide direct briefings and assist- emergency services or to provide direct assist-
ance in filing flight plans (counter service), but ance to airmen. This proposed consolidation of
most FSS contacts are by telephone or by radio. FSS facilities has been the subject of controversy
If a VFR flight encounters weather or restricted in the aviation community because it is feared
visibility en route, the pilot (provided he is rated that the quality and extent of services might be
for instrument flight) can change to an IFR flight diminished and that observations for the Na-
plan while in the air and be placed in contact tional Weather Service might be curtailed.
with the ATC system. The FSS handles these re-
quests and coordinates changes with towers or
ARTCCs. * * Air Traffic Control
FSS personnel are also ready to aid VFR pilots The essential feature of air traffic control serv-
who experience in-flight emergencies. If a pilot is ice to airspace users is separation. The need for
lost, the FSS will assist him by means of direc- this service derives from the simple fact that,
tion-finding equipment or arranging for tracking under IFR conditions, the pilot may not be able
by an ATC radar facility. FSS personnel provide to see other aircraft in the surrounding airspace
weather reports to pilots aloft and receive and and will therefore need assistance to maintain
relay pilot reports on weather and flight condi- safe separation and reach his destination. His-
tions. In more serious cases, such as engine trou- torically, this need came about gradually with
ble or forced landing, the FSS will attempt to the increasing use of the airspace as the airlines
began to operate under instrument flight condi-
*Altitude-encoding transponders (Mode C) are required only in tions in the 1930’s. In 1934 and 1935, the airlines
Group I TCAs, of which there are nine at present.
● *In the interest of reducing controller workload, this service
organized a system for controlling traffic within
was suspended following the controllers’ strike in August 1981. roughly 100 miles of Newark, Chicago, and
SOURCE: Federal Aviation Administration.
Cleveland. In 1936, the U.S. Government as- pilots to the controller handling their flights.
sumed responsibility for these centers and estab- This greatly improved the safety, capacity, and
lished five more “airway” centers within the fol- efficiency of the control process. In the first
lowing year. generation system, aircraft flying in the same
direction and altitude were kept 15 minutes
This “first generation” of separation service
apart in their estimated arrival times at reporting
relied solely on radio and telephone communica-
points. This separation standard depended on
tion. At established points along the airways, the accuracy of position information and—
pilots were expected to report their time of ar-
equally important—on the speed and reliability
rival and altitude and their estimated time of ar-
of communicating instructions to resolve poten-
rival over the next checkpoint. In the ATC cen-
tial conflicts. Since the capacity of the ATC sys-
ter controllers wrote the message on a black-
tem increases as separation standards are re-
board and tracked flights by moving a marker duced, progress therefore depended on further
on a tabletop map. In a later improvement,
improvements in both communications and sur-
paper strips marked with flight data were posted veillance equipment as the ATC system devel-
in the order of their estimated arrival at each
oped.
reporting point or airway intersection. This
flight-strip system is still available as a backup The second generation of separation service
system in the event of radar surveillance equip- came with the introduction of radar after World
ment failure, since it requires only radio commu- War II. In the 1950’s, airport surveillance radars
nication between the pilot and the controller. To (ASRs) were introduced at major airports to
provide direct pilot-controller contact, espe- provide data on arriving and departing aircraft
cially as traffic density grew, it became neces- within roughly 50 miles* At about the same
sary in the 1950’s to establish remote communi- time, the Civil Aeronautics Authority (predeces-
cation air-ground stations at distances over 100
miles from ATC centers to relay messages from ● FAA now operates 195 ASRs.
Ch. 3—The National Airspace System ● 35
sor to FAA), in coordination with the Air Force, to a reduction of controller workload. Auto-
began purchasing long-range (200-mile) radars mated flight plan processing and dissemination,
for the en route centers with a view to establish- introduced at about the same time, further
ing complete radar coverage of the continental reduced controller workload by facilitating
United States. This was completed in 1965, with handoffs of aircraft from one en route sector to
the exception of some gaps in low-altitude another and between en route and terminal area
coverages, and today data from multiple radar controllers. Collectively, these technological
sites are relayed to ATC centers, so that radar changes constitute the third generation of air
contact can be kept with almost every IFR flight. traffic control.
The introduction of radar allowed continuous
All of these improvements have simplified and
monitoring of actual aircraft progress and the
speeded up the acquisition of information
detection of potential conflicts or hazard situa-
needed to provide separation service, but they
tions. The controller, under a process known as
have not substantially altered the decisionmak-
“radar vectoring, ” could direct aircraft away
ing process itself, which still depends upon the
from thunderstorms, around slower aircraft or
controller’s skill and judgment in directing air-
downwind for spacing in the approach area. In
craft to avoid conflicts. In recent years, attempts
so doing, however, the controller began to
have been made to automate the decisionmaking
preempt control of heading and altitude from
aspects of separation assurance or to provide a
the pilot for short periods of time. Radar separa-
backup to the controller in the form of com-
tion standards were greatly reduced from those
puter-derived conflict alerts. Computers can
of the first generation: 3 miles on approach or
now perform a simplistic conflict alert function
about 2 minutes at piston aircraft speeds.
by making short-term projections of aircraft
Despite these improvements, there were still tracks and detecting potential conflicts that the
two major deficiencies in a surveillance system controller may have missed. Since the technique
that relied on raw radar return: the altitude of depends upon all aircraft being equipped with
the aircraft was not measured; and the identity transponders, however, it does not provide sep-
of the aircraft could not be established from aration assurance between unequipped aircraft.
radar return alone. In 1958, the newly formed
The introduction of two-way digital commu-
FAA began development of a so-called “second-
nication rather than voice would mark the be-
ary” radar surveillance system in which the
radar beam, as it rotated in the scan of azimuth, ginning of a new generation of separation serv-
ice. In 1969, the Air Traffic Control Advisory
triggered a positive, pulsed-code reply from a
“transponder” (or beacon) on board the aircraft. Committee recommended the introduction of an
improved form of radar known as the Discrete
This pulse contained information on the identity
and altitude of the aircraft which could be cor- Address Beacon System (DABS). This system
provides selective identification and address and
related with primary radar return. This develop-
ment program, known as Project Beacon, led to a two-way, digital data link that allows im-
proved transmission of data between ground
adoption of the secondary radar system in 1961,
and it is the standard surveillance method in use and aircraft, so that much of the routine ATC
information can be displayed in the cockpit for
today for separation assurance. All commercial
the pilot. DABS would thus provide more com-
air carriers and about two-thirds of GA aircraft
plete and rapid exchange of information than the
are now equipped with transponders* and the
primary radar system has become a backup for present voice radio method. DABS would im-
prove separation service in other ways as well. It
use in the event of equipment malfunction. The
could provide more accurate position and track
introduction of transponders and the simul-
taneous development of digitized information data and could lead to more comprehensive
systems and computer-driven traffic displays led forms of automated conflict detection and reso-
lution. Further, because DABS can interrogate
● Slightly less than 30 percent of GA aircraft have altitude- aircraft selectively it can avoid the overlap of
encoding (Mode C) transponders. signals in areas of high traffic density.
36 . Airport and Air Traffic Control System
Another method for providing improved sep- ing conflicts per se but at preventing the con-
aration assurance is by means of collision avoid- gested conditions in which conflicts are more
ance systems on board the aircraft, which would likely to occur. Traffic metering, spacing, and
alert the pilot to converging aircraft and direct sequencing techniques are now used by control-
an avoidance maneuver. Airborne collision lers to prevent traffic buildup or undesirable
avoidance systems, while conceived as a backup mixes of aircraft, but for some time FAA has
to ground-based separation service, would effec- been seeking to develop automated methods that
tively transfer back to the IFR pilot some of the will accomplish this smoothing and sorting of
see-and-avoid responsibility that now governs traffic flow without intervention by controllers.
VFR flight. Still another approach to separation Success of these efforts will depend upon devel-
assurance is the use of techniques to meter or opment of computer prediction and resolution
space the movement of aircraft traffic into ter- routines that will detect conflicts among flight
minal areas from the en route portion of the sys- plans (rather than flight paths) and issue appro-
tem. These are strategic rather than tactical priate instructions before actual conflict occurrs.
measures, in that they are directed not at avoid-
The en route portion of the ATC system con- port tower. At major hubs, however, there is an
sists of 20 ARTCCs, * each reponsible for a ma- intermediate ATC facility called terminal radar
jor geographic region of the continental United approach control (TRACON) located at the air-
States (see figs. 5 and 6). An ARTCC contains port. The TRACON (or “IFR room”) handles ar-
between 12 and 25 sectors which control traffic riving and departing traffic within roughly 40
on the airways within the region, and ARTCC miles of the airport— sequencing and spacing ar-
airspace is further divided into low-altitude sec- rivals for landing on one or more runways, and
tors primarily used by propeller aircraft and sometimes at more than one airport. The
high-altitude jet sectors. When aircraft are in TRACON also vectors departing aircraft along
level cruise, management of traffic is relatively climbout corridors into en route airspace. The
simple and problems are infrequent. The sectors approach and departure controllers at a
that are difficult to control are those where TRACON exercise a high degree of control over
flights are climbing or descending around a ma- aircraft and must monitor the progress of each
jor airport. Since these en route sectors are feed- aircraft closely, as well as coordinate their ac-
ing aircraft into and out of terminal areas, the tivities with the ARTCCs from which they are
task of control also becomes complicated if the receiving traffic and with the towers that are
airport is operating near capacity. En route con- handling the takeoffs and landings at the airport
trollers may be required to delay the passage of itself.
aircraft out of their sector in order to meter traf-
fic flow into terminal areas. Tower personnel control the flow of traffic to
and from the runways and on ramps and taxi-
At smaller airports, aircraft leaving control of ways connecting to the terminal. Tower control-
an ARTCC pass directly to control by the air- lers are the only ATC personnel that actually
have aircraft under visual observation, although
*In addition, there are two ARTCCs located outside the con- at larger airports they rely heavily on radar for
tinental United States, in Hawaii and Puerto Rico. surveillance. Figure 7 illustrates the activities of
ATC terminal and en route facilities handling a available at a large airport with an approach
typical IFR flight. control tower. A nonapproach control tower is
responsible for assisting traffic by providing
There are currently 431 airports with towers weather, traffic, and runway information for all
operated by FAA, of which 234 are approach arrivals (VFR or IFR), but does not provide ILS
control towers and the remainder are nonap- or separation assurance.
proach control towers. An approach control
tower, with its associated TRACON, provides
separation and instrument landing services for Airspace Users
IFR traffic and is also responsible for integrating The users are the fourth major part of the Na-
VFR traffic into the approach Pattern. Figure 8 tional Airspace System. They cover a wide spec-
illustrates the equipment and facilities typically trum in skill and experience, types of aircraft
Ch. 3—The National Airspace System ● 39
Chicago O’Hare
International Airport
At the departure gate, pilot con- Thirty miles farther in the flight,
firms altitude, speed, route and the departure controller transfers
estimated flight time with con- responsibility by instructing the
troller in the Chicago tower at pilot to contact a particular con-
O’Hare. After flight clearance, troller at the en-route Chicago
pilot contacts Chicago ground Center, located in Aurora, Ill.
control for taxiing instructions
and proceeds to runway.
The controller at Chicago Center
tracks the plane as it climbs to ap-
When ready for takeoff, pilot once proximately 23,000 feet, then The plane continues its descent
again contacts controller in the hands over the flight to another and New York Center hands off
Chicago tower who, using radar controller at the center who responsibility for the flight to the
and his own view from the tower, handles flights above that height. local New York approach-control
clears airplane for takeoff. The airplane reaches cruising alti- facility at Garden City, N. Y.,
tude of 33,000 feet about 100 where a controller lines up the
miles east of Chicago. plane for its final approach to La
One mile away from takeoff point, Guardia Airport.
the controller in the Chicago
tower transfers responsibility for The next handoff takes place as
the fright to a departure control- Chicago Center passes responsi- About 6 miles from the runway,
ler, also at O’Hare airport, who bility to the en-route Cleveland responsibility passes to the tower
directs the pilot to the proper Center in Oberlin, Ohio. One con- at La Guardia, where a controller
course for the first leg of the troller tracks the airplane and monitors the aircraft’s instrument
flight. transfers responsibility to a col- landing. The last handoff of the
league as the fright passes from flight is made from tower to
one sector to another. ground control, which directs the
plane to its assigned gate.
SOURCE Newsweek
flown, and demands for air traffic services. They Table 2.-U.S. Pilot Population, 1980
can be grouped in three categories—commercial,
Instrument
GA, and military— with GA exhibiting the Pilot group Number rated Percent
greatest diversity. Table 2 is a summary of the Private (GA):
U.S. pilot population in 1980 according to the Student. . . . . . . . . . . 199,833 0 0
type of license held and the percentage with in- Private license ... , . 357,479 39,347 11
strument ratings, i.e., those qualified to use the Commercial:
Commercial a . . . . . . 183,422 147,741 81
airspace under IFR. The table shows that about Airline transport
42 percent of all pilots are now IFR qualified; 10 Iicense b. . . . . . . . . 69,569 69,569 100
years ago the percentage was about 30 percent. Total (excluding
Almost all of this growth has occurred in the students) . . . . . 610,490 256,547 42
private (GA) category. ‘A cO~mercla\ license allows the holder to work aS a pilot and operate on air
craft providing passenger service for hire.
bA more advanced rating required of pIlols for air Carrier airlint3S.
Table 3, which is a breakdown of aviation ac-
tivity according to type of aircraft and hours SOURCE: FAA Statist/ca/ I-/arrdbook of Aviation, 7980.
40 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
flown, indicates the relative airspace use and de- a class, general aviation aircraft (98 percent of
mand for IFR services among user categories. the civil fleet) fly only about 1 hour in 5 under
Commercial air carrier aircraft (including com- IFR, but this figure is deceptive. Turboprop and
muters and air taxis) make up less than 2 percent turbojet GA aircraft (those with performance
of the civil aviation fleet, but they account for characteristics and usage most like air carrier air-
about 17 percent of hours flown and almost half craft) are virtually all IFR-equipped and log a
of the total IFR hours flown in civil aviation. As very high percentage of their flight hours under
Ch. 3—The National Airspace System ● 41
IFR. The growing numbers and increasing tend- ing aids and control facilities towers at more
ency of these more sophisticated GA aircraft to smaller airports.
operate under IFR has caused the general in-
crease in ATC system workload over the past 10 GA aircraft include virtually all types, ranging
years. At present, GA aircraft account for 51 from jet aircraft like those used by scheduled air
percent of all IFR flight hours, 30 percent of IFR carriers to small single-engine planes that are
aircraft handled by ARTCCs and 45 percent of used only for recreation. Most are small, low-
instrument approaches at FAA control facilities. performance aircraft that operate only at low al-
titudes under VFR, and many use only GA air-
Commercial air carriers are the most homo- ports and never come into contact with the en
geneous category of airspace users, although route and terminal control facilities of the ATC
there are some differences between trunkline system. However, there is increasing use of more
operators and commuter or air taxi operators in sophisticated, IFR-equipped aircraft by busi-
terms of demand for ATC services. Certificated nesses and corporations, many of whom operate
route air carriers follow established schedules their fleets in a way that approximates that of
and operate in and out of larger and better small airlines. By using larger aircraft and equip-
equipped airports. They have large, high-per- ping them with the latest avionics, the business
formance aircraft that operate at altitudes above portion of the GA fleet creates demands for
18,000 feet en route, where they have only ATC services that are indistinguishable from
minimal contact with aircraft not under the posi- commercial airspace users.
tive control of the ATC system. In terminal
areas, however, they share the airspace and fa- It is the disparate nature of GA that makes it
cilities with all types of traffic and must compete increasingly difficult to accommodate this class
for airport access with other users. Airline pilots of users in NAS. The tendency of GA aircraft
are highly proficient and thoroughly familiar owners at the upper end of the spectrum to up-
with the rules and procedures under which they grade the performance and avionic equipment of
must operate. All air carrier flights are con- their aircraft increases the demand for IFR serv-
ducted under IFR, regardless of visibility, in ices and for terminal airspace at major airports.
order to avail themselves of the full range of In response, FAA finds it necessary to increase
services, especially separation assurance. the extent of controlled airspace and to improve
ATC facilities at major airports. These actions,
Commuter airlines also follow established however, tend to crowd out other types of GA,
schedules and are crewed by professional pilots. typically VFR users who would prefer not to
However, they characteristically operate smaller participate in the IFR system but are forced to do
and lower performance aircraft in airspace that so or forego access to high-density terminal
must often be shared with GA aircraft, including areas. The safety of mixed IFR-VFR traffic is the
those operating under VFR. As commuter opera- major concern, but in imposing measures to sep-
tions have grown in volume, they have created arate and control this traffic, the ATC system
extra demands on the airport and ATC systems. creates more restrictions on airspace use and
At one end of their flight they use hub airports raises the level of aircraft equippage and pilot
along with other commercial carriers and so may qualification necessary for access to the air-
contribute to the growing congestion at major space.
air traffic nodes. Their aircraft are IFR-equipped
and can operate under IFR plans like other Military operations can be placed in two
scheduled air carriers, but this capability cannot broad categories. Many operations are similar to
be used to full advantage unless the airport at GA, but others involve high-performance air-
the other end of the flight, typically a small com- craft operating in airspace where they are sub-
munity airport, is also capable of IFR operation. ject to control by the ATC system. Front an op-
Thus, the growth of commuter air service cre- erational point of view, military flight activities
ates pressure on FAA to install instrument land- comprise a subsystem that must be fully inte-
42 • Airport and Air Traffic Control System
grated within NAS; but military aviation has imize the time aircrews spend in operational ex-
unique requirements that must also be met, and ercises. Civilian users, on the other hand, are
these requirements sometimes conflict with civil forced to detour around these areas at consider-
aviation uses. Training areas and low-level able expense in both time and fuel. FAA is
routes that are used for training by military air- charged with coordinating the development of
craft are set aside and clearly indicated on the ATC systems and services with the armed
standard navigation charts. The military serv- forces, so that a maximum degree of compati-
ices would like to have ranges located near their bility between the civil and military aviation can
bases in order to cut down transit time and max- be achieved.
Chapter 4
AVIATION GROWTH SCENARIOS
Page
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
FAA Aviation Forecasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Baseline Scenarios: Procedures and Assumptions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Alternative Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Other Aviation Forecasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Forecast Structures and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Comparison and Critique of Forecasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Factors Affecting Traffic Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
U.S. Economic and Regulatory Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Deregulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Industry Maturity and Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Fuel and Labor Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Substitution for Air Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Strike Impacts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Implications for Airport Congestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Continued Growth and Airport Saturation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Redistribution of System Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Expanded Capacity and Improved Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
List of Tables
Table Page
4. Comparison of Selected Economic Assumptions and Aviation
Growth Predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5. Aviation Growth Assumptions for ’’Redistribution” Scenarios, Domestic
Service, 48 States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
List of Figures
Figure Page
9. FAA Tower Workload, Actual and Forecast 1960-93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
10. FAA En Route Workload, Actual and Forecast 1960-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
11. FAA Flight Service Workload, Actual and Forecast 1960-2000. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
12. Tower Operations, Actual and Forecast 1974-93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . so
13. Instrument Operations, Actual and Forecast 1974-93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
14. IFR Aircraft Handled by En Route Centers, Actual and Forecast,
1974-93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
15. Total Flight Service Station Activities, Actual and Forecasq 1943-93 . . . . . . . . . . 52
16. Projected U.S. Certificated Air Carrier Growth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
17. Possible Long-Term Impacts of PATCO Strike on ATC Workload Levels . . . . . 58
18. Activity at Top 50 Commercial Airports-48 States, 1978. ......, . . . . . . . . . . . 60
19. Airport Airside Capacity Perspectivte-Low Economic Growth Scenario . . . . . . 60
20. Airport Airside Capacity Perspective-Average Economic Growth Scenario . . . 61
21. Airport Airside Capacity Perspective-High Economic Growth Scenario . . . . . . 61
22* Number of Commercial Airports Overcapacity-Year2000,
48 Contiguous States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Chapter 4
INTRODUCTION
There is a general consensus that domestic higher than FAA’s. In all such projections, how-
aviation activity will increase over the next 10 ever, there is considerable uncertainty about a
to 20 years, and with it the demands placed on number of factors that might affect future
the Nation’s airports and air traffic control growth and system requirements, such as U.S.
(ATC) system. There is far less agreement, how- economic growth, fuel prices and availability,
ever, about how much growth there will be, airline profitability, new technology, and the
how it will be distributed, and how it will affect possibility of significantly higher aviation user
the future characteristics of the National Air- fees. Industry maturity may lead to a leveling-
space System (NAS). As a result, there is uncer- off of airline operations, and changes in route
tainty about where system improvements will be structure may lead to a more even distribution
needed, and how soon. of these operations throughout the system. Even
greater uncertainty surrounds the effects of
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) plans
airline deregulation and the long-term impacts
for the modernization and expansion of the NAS of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers
are predicated on the continued rapid growth of (PATCO) walkout.
air traffic and ATC workloads. Preliminary fig-
ures for the most recent FAA “Aviation Fore- As a result of these uncertainties, there are
casts” indicate that the number of aircraft using valid questions about the accuracy and useful-
the system will double by 2000 and that, be- ness of any projection of aviation activity over
tween 1981 and 1993, total operations will in- 10 or 20 years. At present, no individual projec-
crease by 56 percent at en route ATC centers, by tion—including FAA’s-should be considered
60 percent at FAA-towered airports, and by 88 more than a broad estimate. Collectively, such
percent at flight service stations. projections indicate a likely range of possible
Accommodating this anticipated demand futures for NAS and its ATC requirements; but
growth has been a primary justification for pro- because they are based on similar assumptions
posed investments in system improvements, but and similar forecasting procedures, they may
FAA’s forecasts have consistently proven to be also be subject to similar errors.
too high in the past. In part, this is due to the
This chapter examines and compares a num-
way in which they are made: FAA makes its ber of projections, but its main focus is on the
forecasts on the assumption that present trends procedures and assumptions underlying the
will continue, that there will be no constraints aviation forecasts on which FAA will base its
on growth, and that proposed improvements 1982 system plan. The purpose of this examina-
will in fact be made. tion is to provide some sense of the range of pos-
Comparison with other aviation forecasts is sible future demand for aviation facilities and
difficult, since only FAA projects ATC work- services, in order to assist Congress in making its
loads, but it is of interest that some recent fore- decisions about long-lived investments in both
casts of other measures of demand have been airports and ATC equipment.
45
46 • Airport and Air Traffic Control System
also use FAA’s forecasts as the basis for their bargo, sharp increases in fuel prices, rising infla-
own long-range planning activities. tion and interest rates, and airline deregulation.
These factors and other pertinent changes in his-
However, FAA has a poor forecasting record: torical trends are now reflected in FAA fore-
over the past 15 years its predictions have con-
casts, but current expectations may once again
sistently been too high, often by 50 percent or
be betrayed by unanticipated developments in
more. Figures 9, 10, and 11 compare past fore-
the future. If key assumptions are overly op-
casts with actual levels of operations at FAA timistic, the resulting projections will once again
towers, en route centers, and flight service sta-
be too high.
tions. They show that the workloads originally
forecast for fiscal year 1981 were between 50 and
Three sets of FAA forecasts were compared in
180 percent higher than what actually occurred;
detail for this review: those of September 1978,
in more recent forecasts this level of demand on
the ATC system is not expected until the 1990’s which predate the Airline Deregulation Act, and
those of 1979 and 1980. The year-by-year fore-
or later.
casts for 1982-93, due in October 1981, were
Several unforeseeable events combined to “sent to the shredders instead of the printers” (in
cause these errors, including the 1973 oil em- the words of the Director of OAPP) because the
I i *1971a
160
140 - 1967 *
*1975
120 -
Difference between
actual and forecast 1979 * 1981
100 - 1977* * * *
1978 1980
60 -
60 -
40 “
20 I
t I
I
o I I I I I 1 I
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Source. Off Ice of Technology Assessment, from Federal Aviation Administration data.
Ch. 4—Aviation Growth Scenarios ● 47
NASP*
1982
*1961
*1980
1 9 7 3 * *1 9 7 5
Difference between ~
actual and forecast ~
* I
I
I
I
i
I
I
I
I
1 1 I I I I I
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Source Office of Technology Assessment, from Federal Aviation Admlnistratlon data
uncertain impacts of the PATCO walkout had dicators are prepared by Wharton Econometric
invalidated the short-term projections. Prelim- Forecasting Associates, Inc., using their long-
inary long-term figures only are used in the fol- term industry and economic forecasting model.
lowing discussion and accompanying graphics, In the withdrawn 1981 forecasts, however, the
but these projections are somewhat higher than baseline scenario is based on economic projec-
those of 1980 despite a decline in overall activity tions supplied by the Office of Management and
since 1979. Forecasting procedures, assump- Budget (OMB) rather than the Wharton model.
tions, and scenario specifications are based on Aviation activity levels and ATC workloads are
the last published forecast, that of September derived from these economic indicators by
1980. means of aviation submodels designed and run
by FM itself.
Baseline Scenarios: Procedures The baseline (or most probable) projections
and Assumptions are based on the general assumption of uncon-
strained growth—that past trends will continue
As described in the 1980 “Aviation Forecasts, ” and that there will be no change in the relation-
FAA predictions are based on a combination of ships between economic activity and aviation
econometric modeling, trend extrapolation, and variables. Specific assumptions about the var-
expert judgment. Forecasts of key economic in- ious user groups include the following:
48 • Airport and Air Traffic Control System
Figure 11.— FAA Flight Service Workload, Actual and Forecast, 1960-2000
150
975
140 NASP *
*1978 1982
F
130
r ‘1977 *1981
120
110 [
979* *
*1980
Di
and high prices to encourage energy conser- tions, which are closer to those of 1980 “eco-
vation, increased defense spending and wel- nomic expansion” scenario (3.6 and 3.9 percent
fare costs, Federal aid keeps major hubs average real GNP growth per year, respec-
open but many GA airports close and air tively). “Energy conservation” was dropped; the
service to small communities deteriorates, specifications for the other scenarios remain the
and both business and government make same as for 1980.
more use of teleconferencing and other sub-
FAA projections of ATC workloads from re-
stitutes for personal travel.
cent “Aviation Forecasts” are presented in fig-
Preliminary projections for the 1981 “Avia- ures 12 through 15. Several features of these pro-
tion Forecasts” also include three alternative sce- jections are worth noting:
narios: “economic expansion, ” “Wharton Econ- ● the spread between high and low projec-
ometric Model, ” ‘4 stagflation. ” The middle sce- tions has increased dramatically, suggesting
nario reflects the baseline Wharton economic greater uncertainty about future trends;
indicators and would have been called the “base- ● the overall range of the projections is lower,
line” scenario in past years; the 1981 baseline, suggesting less-confidence ‘about the prob-
however, is based on OMB’s economic projec- ability of rapid growth;
x
x
X
1981
I
I I 1 I 1 I I I I i I 1 1 I I I I I I I
50
1975 1978 1979 1980 1981 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, from Federal Aviation Administration data.
Ch. 4—Aviation Growth Scenarios ● 51
A = Historical data
* = Baseline scenarios
● = Alternative scenarios
x
x
x
x
20
I I I I I 1 1 I I I I I I I I I i I I I
1975 1978 19791980 1981 1985 1990 1991 19921993
Figure 14.— IFR Aircraft Handled by En Route Centers, Actual and Forecast, 1974-93
J I I I 1 I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I f
1975 1978 19791980 1981 1965 1990 1991 1992 1993
Figure 15.—Total Flight Service Station Activities, Actual and Forecast, 1974-93
● the baseline projections, on which FAA The reason for the growing uncertainty in recent
bases its system plans, have nevertheless “Aviation Forecasts” is not immediately clear.
moved from the middle of the overall range However, in combination with FAA’s poor fore-
toward the upper end; and casting record in the past (see figs. 9, 10, and
. the baseline projections are higher in 1981 11), it raises questions about the usefulness of
than in 1980, despite changes in the histor- FAA forecasts as a guide to decisions about
ical data that would seemingly have caused long-term investments in system improvements
them to be lower. and expansion.
world market for aircraft in the commercial of other sources have also been considered
fleet, rather than the level or patterns of air- in OTA’s analysis.
line operations. Two sets of projections
were reviewed: “Dimensions of Airline Forecast Structures and Assumptions
Growth” (March 1980) and “Current Mar-
ket Outlook” (November 1981); both are Table 4 presents the specific features and re-
based on economic projections from Case sults of the six forecasts that have been studied
Econometrics. in detail. In each case, the forecast begins by as-
• Transportation Research Board (TRB). — suming the macroeconomic indicators that are
This is not a regularly published forecast believed to be the driving force behind air traffic
but rather a result of the ongoing activities growth, and then uses these variables to gener-
of the Aviation Forecasting Committee of ate the growth rates and absolute levels of avia-
TRB, which is part of the National Research tion activity at the end of the forecast period.
Council of the National Academy of Sci- Although disposable personal income (DPI) ap-
ences. Published in August 1981 as “As- pears to be the most important driving variable
sumptions and Issues Influencing the Future in most of the forecasts, the direct link between
Growth of the Aviation Industry,” the fore- macroeconomic forecasts and traffic forecasts is
cast represents the consensus of forecasting seldom explictly given.
workshop participants representing most On the basis of their economic projections,
segments of the aviation community. the forecasts then derive growth rates and actual
● Office of Technology Assessment (OTA). —
levels of commercial air traffic in terms of reve-
These projections were commissioned by nue passenger miles (RPMs). FAA and OTA
OTA to provide different kinds of informa- forecasts are the only ones that include explicit
tion than was provided by the other major reference to GA operations; given the increasing
forecasts. In particular, its structure and as- importance of GA activity, its absence is a major
sumptions are designed to project the distri- shortcoming in the other forecasts. Similarly,
bution as well as the volume of future avia- only FAA’s “Aviation Forecasts” proceed from
tion activity, in order to determine its im- traffic levels to FAA workloads; lacking this fur-
pact on airport congestion and ATC capac- ther analysis, the other major forecasts (includ-
ity (see below). It is thus a “conditional” ing OTA’s) are useful only for purposes of com-
forecast, since its different assumptions re- parison in evaluating the traffic growth and air-
quire a change in current traffic patterns craft fleet mixes that the ATC system would
and industry structure. need to accommodate.
● Other Aviation Forecasts. —Recent updates
to the 1975 Air Transport Association All of the projections include alternative sce-
(ATA) forecast became available during the narios that reflect different assumptions about
course of this study, as did the most recent economic growth, typically referred to as low,
edition of Lockheed-California Co. ’s reg- medium, and high. The most recent FAA fore-
ularly published “World Air Traffic Fore- casts contain four scenarios, but only the base-
cast.” The ATA forecast focuses on the fi- line scenario is described in detail. Beyond these
nancial performance and capital needs of scenario specifications, none of the forecasts
the airline industry, while the Lockheed re- postulates specific events that might affect traffic
port emphasizes international rather than growth of system evolution; all of them as-
domestic traffic. However, neither report sume —explicitly or implicitly—that no “major
presents its forecast on a level of detail con- catastrophe” will occur. (The PATCO strike and
sistent with the above forecasts, and as a re- subsequent traffic restrictions may not consti-
sult they are given only cursory treatment tute such a catastrophe, but they do affect the
in the discussion that follows. The judg- short-term prospects of growth and may affect
ments and informal forecasts of a number long-term patterns. This has created sufficient
54 • Airport and Air Traffic Control System
uncertainty that FAA has delayed publication of forecasts are slightly but not significantly lower
the 1981 forecasts until the impacts can be as- than the others. Despite the more optimistic eco-
sessed. ) nomic assumptions, the 1981 FAA forecasts (if
and when published) will probably be somewhat
lower as well. Lockheed’s corresponding fore-
Comparison and Critique of Forecasts
cast, a single figure of 307 billion RPMs in 1990,
All of the major forecasts assume roughly sim- is somewhat lower than any of the forecasts in-
ilar economic growth rates. FAA’s projections cluded in table 4.
have tended to be lower than the others and had Only the FAA and OTA-commissioned fore-
become more so in recent years, although the casts break down these RPM figures into projec-
preliminary figures for the withdrawn 1981 fore- tions of air carrier operations by type. FAA’s
cast reflect OMB’s optimism about future eco- operations forecasts are considerably lower than
nomic growth. Nevertheless, given the range of OTA’s, particularly in the 1980 forecast. Where
forecast growth rates, the differences between the OTA “low” scenario translates 4.1-percent
the individual economic assumptions are prob- RPM growth into 1.5-percent annual growth in
ably not significant. In terms of aviation-specific air carrier operations, the 1980 FAA “baseline”
factors, there also seems to be general agreement scenario shows 4.3-percent RPM growth but no
among the projections about variables such as operations growth, and the FAA “stagflation”
load factors, aircraft size, and stage length. scenario translates 3.6-percent RPM growth into
Not surprisingly, the resulting growth rates a 0.8-percent decline in operations. As a result,
for domestic RPMs are also quite similar. OTA’s OTA’s forecast range for air carrier operations
projections for RPMs tend to be at the upper end in 1991 is 12.1 million to 19.6 million, while the
of the range for all the forecasts. The 1980 FAA FAA’s is 9.2 million to 15.5 million. The corre-
Ch. 4—Aviation Growth Scenarios ● 55
sponding projection from the Air Transport As- ● high and low estimates of key assumptions
sociation, reflecting the judgments of its airline to measure the extent of uncertainty about
members, is for 10.4 million air carrier opera- driving variables, and consequently an in-
tions in 1990. The overlap between these projec- crease in the number of alternative sce-
tions is sufficiently wide that the differences are narios (at present the FAA provides com-
probably not significant, particularly when plete results only for its “baseline” sce-
structural differences between the models are nario);
considered. However, because the forecasts rely ● a variety of techniques rather than a single
on common assumptions, they produce similar technique, in order to produce better fore-
results all of which may be in error for the same casts or competing scenarios;
reasons. ● in particular, less reliance on econometric
models and more on expert judgment (espe-
The TRB Aviation Demand Forecasting Com- cially industry experts), taking account of
mittee’s 2-day workshop on FAA aviation fore- nonlinear economic relationships and non-
casts resulted in four principal recommenda- economic factors; and
tions, all of which also apply to the other fore- ● forecasts of components rather than aggre-
casts considered here. In the opinion of the gates alone—regional and local activity
workshop participants, the following features rather than national, for instance, and
are needed by planners and decisionmakers point-to-point traffic levels rather than only
alike: total volumes.
bankruptcy of a major carrier by mid-1982, and ATC operations beyond 2000, but FAA expects
that by 1990 the industry will probably witness commuters too to become a “stable, mature in-
considerable consolidation through mergers, ac- dustry” after 1985 and GA may face growth con-
quisitions, and outright failures. The survivors, straints. It seems likely, in any case, that by 1990
however, may be in a far stronger financial and there will be a smaller number of trunk carriers,
competitive position. offering primarily long-haul service; a declining
number of specialized carriers, offering low-cost
Industry Maturity and Structure service in major hubs and major markets; and a
large number of commuters of various sizes, in-
Rolls Royce, a major aerospace manufacturer, cluding some that offer “regional” service.
has suggested that even if positive steps are
taken to reduce costs and increase efficiency, the Fuel and Labor Costs
U.S. airline industry has already reached about
60 percent of its mature size (see fig. 16). Others The greatest uncertainty facing domestic avia-
put the figure at closer to 80 percent. If this is so, tion in both the short and the long term is the fu-
then major air carrier passenger traffic may ture price and availability of aviation fuels. This
begin to level off before the end of the century, factor is crucial to the continued profitability of
and tower operations might actually decline. the airlines, which depends in a major wa y on
The continued growth of commuter carriers and their ability to absorb any differences between
GA traffic might nevertheless result in a con- the increase in fuel prices and the increase in the
tinued increase in the number of airport and CPI. The future course of fuel prices can only be
350
300
–4 –3 –2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
SOURCE: Rolls Royce, Inc., U.S. Air/ines /ndlcators and Pro/ecflons, July 1981,
Ch. 4—Aviation Growth Scenarios ● 57
guessed at, particularly in view of uncertainty ciency could, however, be achieved by retrofit-
about future OPEC policy and the inherent in- ting engines and making other modifications to
stability of the Middle East. However, the cur- existing aircraft.
rent “oil glut” and price decreases are probably a
transient event in the long-term price trend, Financing
although it is less certain whether or how rapidly
the real price of fuel will rise in the future. No Reports by various airline and banking
long-term shortage is expected. There are indica- sources indicate that the equipment needs of the
tions, however, that aviation gasoline (used by U.S. airline industry will impose capital require-
smaller piston-engined GA aircraft) may be in- ments of $50 billion to $100 billion by 1990,
creasingly difficult to obtain. GA activity is par- compared to total capital additions of only $30
ticularly sensitive to fuel prices, but rapid in- billion between 1960 and 1979 (current dollars).
creases are more likely to reduce personal GA This capital requirement would demand an aver-
traffic than business and commercial GA (cor- age annual corporate return on investment
porate and air taxi users, who generate greater (ROI) of 13 to 15 percent for the entire decade.
demand for ATC services). Industry ROI averaged 6.4 percent during the
1970’s, and only once—in 1978—has it risen as
Labor costs are also a major factor in air car- high as 13 percent. There are signs of increasing
rier profitability, and airlines can be expected to reluctance on the part of insurance companies
seek long-term wage and benefit concessions and even banks to provide long-term debt, even
from their unions during the 1982 round of con- when secured by the leveraged-lease financing or
tract negotiations. Financing costs may also be- equipment trust certificates that were used in the
come an increasingly important factor in the 1970’s. Deregulation has further increased the
future. risks and uncertainties of airline financing, al-
though a restructuring of the industry through
Technology bankruptcies or mergers (see above) might alter
this situation in the future. Without a firm mar-
Considerable optimism remains about the fu- ket, furthermore, aerospace manufacturers
ture impact of advanced air transport technol- might be less willing to develop and introduce
ogy, but such improvements are likely to be in- more advanced aircraft in the future.
troduced more slowly in the future than over the
last 20 or 30 years. Recent improvements in Substitution for Air Transport
airline efficiency and productivity have come
through higher utilization and economies of Very little can be said with any certainty
scale (aircraft size and seating density) rather about the future impacts of developments in
than technology (aircraft speed or fuel efficien- either substitute transportation modes (such as
cy). Several promising new developments ap- high-speed trains or, with higher speed limits
pear to be possible in the near future, but there is and gas mileage, the personal automobile) or al-
a considerable amount of aviation technology ternatives to travel (such as advanced telecom-
currently “on the shelf” that is only beginning to munication technologies and corporate telecon-
appear in the U.S. fleet. Whether the aerospace ferencing). Neither is likely to cut into aviation’s
industry will continue to develop a new genera- long-haul markets, although the industry may
tion of advanced-technology aircraft will de- find it increasingly difficult to compete with the
pend on the potential market, and this in turn automobile and train in short-haul markets
depends on the ability of the airlines to generate (under 200 or perhaps even 300 miles).
profits and/or obtain financing. Several
manufacturers have announced plans for a new Strike Impacts
150-passenger aircraft for the late 1980’s; several
new commuter aircraft will be available even Ironically, the PATCO strike has in effect de-
sooner. Some near-term increases in fleet effi- regulated the industry by imposing traffic re-
58 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
striations on the 22 busiest hubs and by placing Figure 17.–Possible Long-Term Impacts of PATCO
severe constraints on GA traffic. Some obser- Strike on ATC Workload Levels
vers feel that the strike may actually have helped
airline profits by removing overcapacity and
enabling major carriers to ground inefficient air-
craft, lay off personnel, and reduce other costs.
On the other hand, these same restrictions im-
pose constraints on GA traffic and on the expan-
sion of commuter carriers and new entrants.
Strike-related traffic restrictions will probably
continue for at least 2 more years, and adjust-
ments made by users during this period may per-
manently change aviation growth trends and
traffic distribution. As a result, there is little cer-
tainty about the long-term impact on the level of 1981 1984
operations: traffic might rebound rapidly, but A = Built-up demand causes rapid recovery and
previously projected levels might not be reached workload quickly matches projected levels.
B = Steady recovery and projected rate of growth, but
until later than anticipated, if at all (see fig. 17). workload matches projection later than anticipated.
In addition, these traffic restrictions (particu- C = Strike stunts demand growth and ATC workload
larly at major hubs) could be extended or reim- never achieves projected level.
posed in the future as a means of addressing air-
NOTE For Illustrate purposes only, and not based on speclflc FAA forecasts
port congestion and encouraging redistribution SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
of operations to second-tier hubs (see the follow-
ing section).
Table 5.—Aviation Growth Assumptions for “Redistribution” Scenarios, Domestic Service, 48 States
tions’’—landings and takeoffs, or arrivals and Saturation—the level at which delay is chron-
departures (each flight generates two opera- ic— may not occur at a given airport until oper-
tions). Figure 18 illustrates the 1978 mix of air ations are as much as 100 percent a b o v e
activity at the top 50 commercial airports, PANCAP, so that small differences between ac-
ranked by air carrier operations and aggregated tual operations and PANCAP are not necessar-
into sets of 5 airports to simplify presentation. ily significant. Large differences, on the other
Most of the operations at these airports are gen- hand, indicate a rising probability of encounter-
erated by scheduled passenger flights, but al- ing delays at the airport at least part of the time.
though there are few local operations at the top The discrepancy at most of the top 10 airports in
15 airports, GA traffic (predominantly cor- figure 18 represents a significant capacity short-
porate aircraft and air taxis) is seldom less than age relative to demand (the desired level of oper-
10 percent of operations. ations), and in most cases this situation has ex-
isted since the late 1960’s. * It is assumed in the
Figure 18 also shows the estimated airside ca- following discussion that when operations are
pacity of these airports, expressed in terms of the more than 10 percent above PANCAP, the re-
“practical annual capacity” (PANCAP) that can
sult will be airport saturation and chronic delay.
be handled safely, as estimated by FAA in 1978.
Actual airside capacity is variable, however, Figures 19 through 21 show the PANCAP, the
changing with weather conditions or aircraft 1978 level of operations, and the levels of opera-
mix; the balance is a delicate one, and at busy tions in 2000 projected under three aviation
hubs even a slight deterioration from optimum growth scenarios. These projections assume that
conditions can cause long lines of delayed air- traffic growth will occur at the same rate across
craft. PANCAP—the level of operations at existing airports, irrespective of capacity limita-
which 80 percent of aircraft encounter delays of *The discrepancy between PANCAP and actual operations in
4 minutes or longer— thus represents an approx- the sixth airport group (which includes Phoenix, Fort Lauderdale,
imate figure based on assumed average utiliza- Orlando, San Diego, and Portland) does not indicate a significant
tion of the existing number and configuration of capacity problem. These airports handle a large volume of GA
traffic that is discretionary as to time of day and weather condi-
runways, rather than an absolute or reliable tions, both of which increase actual capacity over a PANCAP
measure of capacity. figure.
60 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
500
400
Average
annual
operations 300
(thousands)
per
airport
200
100
A B
Growth unconstrained by capacity Expanded hub structure
(operating 10 percent over PANCAP)
800
2000
600
400
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Airport group Airport group
(5 airports per group)
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.
Ch. 4—Aviation Growth Scenarios • 61
A B
Growth unconstrained by capacity
800
600 600
400 400
200 200
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Airport group Airport group
(5 airports per group)
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.
Figure 21. —Airport Airside Capacity Perspective— High Economic Growth Scenario
(Jets plus propeller service plus 10 percent for general aviation)
600
400
200
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 10
Airport group Airport group
(5 airports per group)
tions. Under conditions of low economic nomic growth would result in 38 airports at 110
growth, desired operations exceed PANCAP percent of PANCAP, instead of 10 airports over
only at the top 10 airports; at the top 5 airports, 150 percent and the top 5 at almost 200 percent
however, demand will be about 50 percent (fig. 20B). High economic growth would result
above PANCAP (fig. 19A). Under conditions of in traffic levels of 113 percent of PANCAP at all
average economic growth, desired operations of the top 50 airports even if redistributed, in-
would exceed PANCAP at the top 20 airports, stead of almost 15 airports at 150 percent and
and traffic at the 5 busiest hubs would be almost the top 5 airports at almost 250 percent; but if
200 percent of PANCAP (fig. 20A). Under con- airlines respond to capacity constraints by in-
ditions of high economic growth, desired opera- creasing aircraft size and dropping some service
tions would be higher than PANCAP at over 30 points, as well as redistributing operations, the
airports, and the tops hubs would experience al- result would be levels of 110 percent of
most 250 percent of PANCAP (fig. 21A). To PANCAP at only 38 of the top so air carrier air-
avoid these conditions, the carriers would prob- ports (fig. 21 B).
ably increase aircraft size and drop service
Such a redistribution would be accomplished
points, particularly in short-haul markets, in
primarily by “rehubbing” airline route struc-
order to reduce overall operations. This adjust-
tures-that is, by moving the interline function
ment, also shown in figure 21A, could reduce
(that of providing a transfer point) from con-
overall traffic levels by roughly 24 percent, but
gested airports to the “second tier” hubs where
there would still be serious congestion problems
excess capacity still exists. There are indications
at the top 10 or 15 hubs.
that such changes in the airline network are
already taking place. United Airlines, for in-
Redistribution of System Operations stance, has been shifting some of its operations
In 1978 the level of scheduled commercial op- from Chicago-O’Hare to St. Louis over the past
erations at the top 50 airports was about 52 per- 5 years; in addition, Denver (the western hub)
cent of their combined PANCAP. However, has been growing in importance relative to
these operations were heavily concentrated Chicago in United’s overall system. Similar
toward the five largest airports (where traffic shifts by other carriers can be detected from
levels exceeded PANCAP by 20 percent), while Chicago to Kansas City, from Atlanta to Birm-
considerable excess capacity existed at the other ingham, from Dallas-Fort Worth to Houston,
45 hubs. In addition, over half of the passengers from Miami to Tampa, and from Memphis to
arriving at the five largest hubs did so only to Nashville. FAA, for its part, has been trying
change planes. for years (with only limited success) to shift
airline operations from Washington-National to
OTA examined the effect of redistributing the Dunes International.
expected increases in operations to these less
crowded airports. In the following discussion it Market forces will continue to promote this
will be assumed that 110 percent of PANCAP— redistribution, as will the traffic restrictions im-
i.e., saturation—represents a desirable level of posed by FAA at the 22 largest hubs as a result
operations (or an acceptable level of delay) at of the PATCO strike. Direct-service links al-
any given airport. The results, shown on the ready exist between most of these new transfer
right side of figures 19 through 21, indicate that hubs, but the frequency and aircraft size of traf-
the combined existing capacity of the top 50 air- fic between them would increase. Nevertheless,
ports could accommodate substantial increases some hub airports will continue to experience
in commercial operations if they were redis- higher than desirable levels of traffic and delays
tributed. unless further measures are employed, such as
peak-hour landing fees, access quotas, or slot-al-
Low economic growth would result in 20 air- location schemes. Commuter airlines would be
ports at 110 percent of PANCAP, instead of 5 hardest hit by these restrictions, and even with
airports at 150 percent (fig. 19 B). Average eco- new hubs available they would be hard pressed
Ch. 4—Aviation Growth Scenarios ● 63
to improve service at existing points or add new control over the level and distribution of airport
service points to their networks. In addition, it operations, rather than the addition of new
would eventually be necessary to shift most GA capacity (see ch. 6).
traffic out of the top 20 or more airports (down
However, both commuter access and overall
to the supposedly “irreducible” 10 percent),
capacity constraints could be addressed by the
which implies the need for improved facilities at
construction of short, independent “stub” run-
reliever and other IFR-equipped airports if fu-
ways for turboprop aircraft where feasible, and
ture GA growth is to be accommodated.
especially at the most congested airports. This
Expanded Capacity and alternative (discussed in detail in ch. 6) would
increase propeller capacity as an addition—
Improved Management rather than a detriment—to jet capacity, thereby
The above scenarios indicate that attempting reducing the severity of hub saturation and
to accommodate expected aviation growth with- allowing GA and commuter aircraft to compete
in the existing airport capacity will have mixed more effectively with jets for airport access. Fig-
effects on the air service network. Although the ure 22 shows the effect of such runways in re-
adverse effects of growth, such as increasing lieving saturation at commercial airports in
delays or reductions in service, might be toler- 2000: by adding about 25 percent to the effective
able, it would nevertheless seem both prudent capacity of an average hub, they would allow a
and desirable to increase capacity, where feasi- considerably higher level of traffic growth or,
ble, if this can be done at a reasonable cost and alternatively, reduce the number of airports sat-
to the benefit of system efficiency. However, it is urated by any given level of economic and traf-
not feasible to supply the amount of new capac- fic growth. However, the addition of stub run-
ity required to eliminate or even appreciably ways would also result in more complex traffic
reduce airside delay, particularly in major urban patterns, which might require new landing sys-
areas. In the short and long term, the alleviation tems and improved traffic management in ter-
of delay will be best achieved through tighter minal areas.
Contents
Page Page
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Mode S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Goals and Services of the ATC System. . . . . 68 Modes B and D......... . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Major Components of the Existing VHF Data Link. ........ . . . . . . . . . . . 87
ATC System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Potential Implications and Issues . . . . . . 87
Surveillance Radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Collision Avoidance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Airborne Transponders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Beacon Collision Avoidance System.. . 89
Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Tri-Modal BCAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 90
Computers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Traffic Alert and Collision
Communication. . + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Avoidance System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Future Requirements, Opportunities, Airborne Collision Avoidance System. . 92
and Constraints. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Microwave Landing System . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Future Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Instrument Landing System. . . . . . . . . . . 92
Technological Opportunities. . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Microwave Landing System . . . . . . . . . . 94
Constraints and Other Factors Potential Implications and Issues . . . . . . 95
Affecting Future Evolution . . . . . . . . . 76 Alternative ATC Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Continuity of Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Role of the Human Operator. . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Timing of Design Decisions and Tactical v. Strategic Control . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
System Implementation. . . . . . . . . . 76 Autonomy and Flexibility of
User Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Locus of Decisionmaking. . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Ground v. Satellite Basing, . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Freedom of Airspace and Equipage. . . . 77 Levels of Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
International Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . 77
Military Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 LIST OF TABLES
Technical Options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Table No. Page
En Route Computer Replacement. . . . . . . . 78 6. Perform ATC Automation Processes. . . . 80
Total Replacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 7. Summary of Functional Characteristics
Hardware-First Replacement of Alternative Collision Avoidance
(“Rehosting”). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Software-First Replacement
(“Offloading”). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 LIST OF FIGURES
Modularity and Other Concerns. . . . . . . 82
Automated En Route Air Traffic Figure No, Page
Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 23. National Airspace System. . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Potential Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 24. Major AERA Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Potential Implications and Issues . . . . . . 84 25. Comparison of Microwave Landing
Data Link. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 System and Instrument Landing
Potential Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Chapter 5
INTRODUCTION
The present air traffic control (ATC) system market forces, and changing Government regu-
has evolved over several decades from the one lation, the requirements for the ATC system will
that was first put in place in the 1930’s. The op- be affected in turn. In addition, new technologi-
erational characteristics and organization of the cal developments will make possible new func-
original system were determined largely by the tions and modes of operation that would have
technologies then available—radio for naviga- been impossible with older equipment and re-
tion and air/ground communication, and tele- sources. The extent to which the system must
phone and teletype networks for distribution of grow depends primarily on the rate at which the
information among ATC ground facilities. New level of air traffic and the demand for ATC serv-
technologies—such as surveillance radar, ices increase. There is considerable uncertainty
Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System on this score. The direction in which the system
(ATCRBS) transponders, microwave relays, and evolves will be influenced by what services are
electronic data processing—were added as de- offered, how they are delivered, and how they
mand increased and the state of the art pro- are paid for. The answers to these questions,
gressed after World War II, but they did not too, are subject to great uncertainty. Budgetary
change the essential characteristics of the earlier constraints and the continuing effects of the air
generation of air traffic control—a ground- traffic controllers’ strike have introduced further
based, labor-intensive, and increasingly cen- complications. In addition, the evolution of the
tralized system. ATC system takes place slowly: some of the
modernization programs now reaching fruition
Advanced data-processing and communica- were first conceived a decade or more ago. Dur-
tion technologies have been introduced to meet ing this period new technologies have become
the growing demand for ATC services* and to available, and there has been continuing contro-
provide the controller with the information versy regarding the technical choices that will
needed to make the decisions required for the determine the character of the future ATC sys-
safe and efficient movement of aircraft. How- tem.
ever, these technologies were applied largely to
improve the acquisition, integration, and dis- This chapter presents an overview of some of
play of information, or to speed its dissemina- the technologies and technological issues that
tion among ATC facilities. Recently, the auto- are of concern in decisions that will soon be
mated transmission of certain types of informa- made about the future development of the ATC
tion to pilots has also been introduced, e.g., system. It is not a detailed treatment of the
weather and terminal area briefings. However, technological and engineering complexities of
the making of ATC decisions and transmission the subject, nor does it attempt to resolve any of
of ATC messages have remained essentially a the related economic and funding controversies.
human function. Instead, this discussion is intended to provide
decisionmakers and the public with useful infor-
As the air transportation network grows and
mation about the implications of some of the ad-
evolves in response to economic conditions,
vances in technology that have occurred or
which are on the horizon. This information
forms a background against which to assess
● These technologies have also found use in the cockpit where
RNAV and other systems have provided capabilities that have in- FAA’s 1982 revision of the National Airspace
directly affected the ATC system. System (NAS) Plan.
67
68 . Airport and Air Traffic Control System
with a minimum of delay. Similarly, clearances One of the Nation’s first air controllers—1929
'Terminal ··Tower" FacRJtleIs . En R4:;)ute "Air Traffic Controlh9r" Facilities Terminal "Tower" Facilities
VFf~ uncontrolled
,
~
~ \ ~IFR control~
VFR controlled ',', .... ~.~"...
.....
."
'.
~-.".....
.. -~:::...
1" I
••
~
69 ●
SOURCE: U,S. Senate Committee on Appropriations; FAA's En Route Air Traffic Control Computer System,
70 • Airport and Air Traffic Control System
Surveillance Radar
Two types of radar are used for the surveil-
lance of aircraft. Primary surveillance radar
(PSR) uses the return from the aircraft structure
to determine range and bearing. Secondary sur-
veillance radar (SSR), triggers a response from
aircraft equipped with an ATCRBS transponder Photo credit: Federal Aviation Administration
and is able to obtain, in addition to range and Air control in the 1940’s using table top plots
bearing, the aircraft’s identity and altitude.**
Because the transponder enhances the return
from primary radar, it improves the controller’s
ability to track individual aircraft. SSR is the
principal aircraft surveillance tool of the ATC
system; PSR is used as a backup for SSR and for
long-range weather data.
Airborne Transponders
The returns to surveillance radar vary consid-
erably with range, aircraft structure, back-
ground clutter, weather, and several other fac-
tors. In addition, the present radar system does
not permit aircraft altitude to be determined
from the ground on the basis of raw return from
primary radar. This makes it difficult to track
specific aircraft using a reflective return alone,
although computer processing can be used to
isolate a moving aircraft from background clut-
ter. Transponders are radio transmitters de-
signed to respond to ground interrogation with a
strong signal that can easily be distinguished Photo credit: Federal Aviation Administration
from a purely reflective return. The ground Air control using a modern console
equipment and airborne transponders constitute
the ATCRBS.
Current procedures require that all aircraft
operating in the busiest terminal control areas
● In a terminal control area, all traffic is controlled by the ATC (TCA), or flying above 12,500 ft must be
system. equipped with a transponder capable of report-
**Altitude data is available only from aircraft equipped with a ing both an aircraft identification code and alti-
transponder having Mode C and an encoding altimeter. Only
about one-third of the transponder-equipped aircraft have altitude tude, Modes A and C, respectively. These de-
reporting capability. vices respond to a Mode C inquiry from an
Ch. 5—Technology and the Evolution of the ATC System ● 71
ATCRBS interrogator by giving the altitude general aviation (GA) aircraft are equipped with
of the aircraft, reported to the nearest 100 ft as inertial navigation systems (INSs) that permit
sensed by an onboard barometric altimeter. them to navigate without primary reference to
Transponders also have the ability to transmit ground-based radio transmitters. INS-equipped
one of 4,096 different identity codes in response aircraft are not completely independent of
to a Mode A query from an ATCRBS interro- ground aids since VOR/DME, LORAN-C, or
gator. Under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) the OMEGA navigation signals are used for periodic
code to be used is specified for each aircraft by crosschecks of INS accuracy and realinement of
the ground controller; for all VFR aircraft inertial platforms.
equipped with a transponder a common iden- A growing number of commercial and GA air-
tifier code (1200) is used. Some blocks of craft are being equipped with navigational com-
numbers within the 4,096 identity codes are puters that enable them to operate off VOR-de-
reserved for classifying traffic such as coast-to- fined airways along direct origin-to-destination
coast flights. Other codes have been set aside for routes. This capability for area navigation
emergency purposes—aircraft that have lost (RNAV) can be achieved either with an INS or
radio communication, aircraft in distress, or hi- with equipment that uses VOR/DME, OMEGA
jacked flights. or other navigation aids as the primary refer-
ence. The ability to fly RNAV makes it possible
Navigation to achieve considerable savings in time and fuel
consumption, and also allows aircraft to avoid
Navigation aids are another important ele- the congestion that sometimes occurs at VOR
ment of the ATC system. Although they are not airway intersections. FAA has begun publishin g
traffic control devices per se, they do have an in- RNAV routes for use by suitably equipped air-
fluence on the structure and the operation of the craft. At present, however, controllers grant
system. * As described in chapter 3, the primary direct clearances only to the extent that they do
radio navigation aid is the very high frequency not conflict with traffic along airways or affect
omnidirectional range (VOR) system that oper- adequate separation. While FAA is making an
ates in the VHF band immediately below the fre- effort to accommodate the increasing demand
quencies used for voice communication. VOR for RNAV clearances, there are still cases in
ground stations provide coverage of nearly all which the limitations imposed by the present
the continental United States and adjacent off- VOR airways system prevent users from realiz-
shore areas, and most aircraft that have commu- ing the full benefit of installed RNAV equip-
nication transceivers also are equipped to use ment.
VOR for navigation. VOR equipment enables
the aircrew to determine the bearing to the
ground station. Distance measuring equipment Computers
(DME), colocated with VORS, emits signals that Computers are used extensively throughout
allow the aircrew to determine the distance to the ATC system to process flight plans, to corre-
the station as well. A station where VOR and late radar and transponder returns, to filter out
TACAN, the military navigation system that is extraneous signals that could obscure controlled
functionally equivalent to VOR/DME but more aircraft, and to generate displays on the control-
accurate, are colocated is called a VORTAC. ler’s console. All control decisions, however, are
Other navigation systems that are available are made by human operators. In the busiest ter-
listed in chapter 3. minal areas, an ARTS II or ARTS III computer
Many large commercial transports, military system combines SSR data and flight plan infor-
aircraft, and a growing number of corporate, mation to create a display on an analog terminal
(see fig. 23). Displayed alongside the position in-
*For example, aircraft will follow radials to or from VOR sta-
dicator for each aircraft is a data block that in-
tions. This tends to add some order to the flow of traffic even if it cludes the transponder code of the aircraft, its
is not operating within the ATC system. altitude and groundspeed, and the aircraft regis-
72 • Airport and Air Traffic Control System
tration number or flight designation to the ex- munications with computers in other en route
tent that they are available, For example, none centers and terminal area control facilities as
of these data will appear for an aircraft flying well as other tasks such as flight plan processing.
VFR without an operating transponder unless In case of an IBM 9020 failure, the controllers
they are entered manually. have a backup system, called Direct Access Ra-
The principal computer used at the 20 en route dar Channel (DARC), that digitizes the raw data
ATC centers is the IBM 9020, an assemblage of from the secondary surveillance radar to create a
IBM 360 components that have been modified comparatively clean image on the control con-
for ATC applications. The technology incorpo- soles. However, to use DARC, the controllers
rated in these machines is of 1962 vintage, and must manually shift their display screens from
there have been considerable advances in the de- the vertical to the horizontal position and make
sign and construction of computers since they plastic markers (“shrimp boats”) to identify the
were first built and installed. The IBM 9020s are targets on the screen, because the DARC system
tied to either IBM or Raytheon digital display cannot obtain the clearance data from which to
subsystems that present radar surveillance and generate a display of the aircraft call sign or in-
clearance information in a brighter, sharper im- tended route. If the DARC system is inoperable,
age than the analog displays used in the terminal controllers have a second backup, a broad-band
control facilities. In addition to driving the con- system that displays radar data without com-
troller displays, the IBM 9020s also handle com- puter enhancement and thus provides no data
block for individual targets. FAA has indicated “party line” feature has certain advantages, since
that it plans to remove the broad-band capabil- it permits pilots to develop a sense of what is
ity when sufficient operational experience with happening in the surrounding airspace. Never-
DARC has been established. theless, a “discrete address” technology that per-
mits messages to be sent to a specific recipient
FAA is considering the option of installing
can be more effective than broadcast for proc-
compatible computer and display systems in the
esses that require computer-to-computer com-
en route and terminal area control facilities. If munication. This is the underlying principle of
this were done, much of the line of demarcation
the Mode S data link (formerly the Discrete Ad-
between these classes of facilities could be re- dress Beacon System, or DABS), which is an im-
moved.
portant building block in FAA’s plans for future
system development.
Communication
In the future, with the introduction of a digital
Communication is a key element in the pres-
data link capable of selective address, two dis-
ent ATC system, and advances in communica-
tinct modes of communication can be expected.
tion technology may open new options for con-
Broadcast, the mode now used, will continue for
figuring the system in the future. Historically,
voice or digital transmissions of general interest,
voice radio has been the primary and almost ex-
such as weather, airport status, and traffic ad-
clusive means of communicating between air-
visories. Other transmissions, pertinent only to
craft and the ground. Digital communication—
specific aircraft, will be sent by a discrete-
the transmission of data in the form of machine-
address digital data link that allows isolation of
readable binary signals—has come into use for
specific receiving stations. However to the ex-
linking ground stations (particularly for com-
tent that communication relative to position and
puter-to-computer interchanges), but it has not
intent uses a discrete address data link rather
yet been applied for air-ground messages, except
than broadcast, the side benefits of the part y line
in the limited case of transmitting aircraft iden-
would be diminished.
tity and altitude by means of ATCRBS trans-
ponders. In the future, it is expected that an air- The application of a digital data link is not
ground digital data link will play an increasingly limited to air-ground communication; it could
important role as the automation of ATC func- also be used for exchange of messages between
tions requires more direct communication be- aircraft. For instance, most of the air-to-air com-
tween airborne and ground-based computers. munication in proposed collision avoidance sys-
Another important advantage of the digital tems would be digitized; and by allowing air-
data link is that it permits messages to be trans- borne computers to direct messages to specific
mitted selectively. The present voice-radio aircraft, maneuvers intended to resolve conflicts
method is broadcast—i. e., available to any and could be coordinated between aircraft. Alterna-
all aircraft equipped with an appropriate receiv- tive plans for the implementation of a digital
er, regardless of the intended recipient. This data link are discussed later in this chapter.
tions. In general, however, prospective changes more general opportunities created by advanced
in the system will be dictated by three related technology are discussed below.
technical requirements:
● replacement of obsolete equipment, which Technological Opportunities
will become increasingly difficult to main- The development of microelectronics has been
tain and repair, with more modern equip- a primary source of expanded technological op-
ment that offers higher reliability and might portunities for the ATC system. Data-processing
also provide greater flexibility, higher capa- capabilities can now be tailored to meet virtually
city, or lower costs; any computational requirement, hardware costs
● increase of system capacity in order to ac- have fallen significantly, and reliability contin-
commodate growth when and where it oc- ues to increase. The ATC system as presently
curs, by improving the management of ex- constituted is highly labor-intensive; and since
isting resources where feasible and by add- the PATCO walkout, the system has been kept
ing new resources where necessary; and operating with a greatly reduced work force
● addition of new capabilities in order to sup- only by administratively limiting traffic. Some
port improvements in efficiency and pro- observers have suggested that the current situa-
ductivity by automating more functions tion presents an opportunity to review the basic
and by introducing features that make it structure of the system and to apply new tech-
possible to take advantage of improvements nology so as to make it less labor-intensive and
in avionics and other newly available tech- less dependent on (or vulnerable to) the actions
nologies. of any specific group within the work force.
Advances in technology have increased the Computer software figures prominently in the
number of options that could meet these require- present ATC system and will have an even more
ments. Computers will probably assume roles of significant role in the future as the need for new
increasing importance, both in the air and on the capabilities expands. Many systems related to
ground, because they present opportunities to the safety of flight, both ground based and air-
increase efficiency, productivity, or capacity by borne, will be “software driven, ” in that the
relieving human participants in the system of processing of sensor data and the generation of
routine tasks, by facilitating human decisions, displays will be more dependent on computer
and by improving the timeliness and quality of programs than is now the case. Processes run-
information. As a result, the human operator’s ning on different computers will communicate
role will become more that of a manager of sys- directly with one another. There will thus be a
tem resources than that of a direct controller of need for systems with the ability to identify er-
aircraft. Communications will also be a critical rors and to take compensator action automat-
element, and digital communication between ically. * Present ATC software uses a combina-
machines (computers and various avionic de- tion of computer languages, but new high-level
vices) will be at least as important as voice com- languages that are now available (like those used
munications between humans. Future systems, for military command and control) and those
therefore, may have to provide for one or more that will be developed in the future may make it
high-speed data links of sufficient capacity to easier and cheaper to implement, modify, and
handle the large volumes of data and messages maintain ATC software.
that will be generated. Collision avoidance will
receive increasing attention as the volume of Commitment to a highly automated mode of
traffic grows, and both navigation and landing operation is not without risk. When there is a
aids may need to be upgraded in order to main- computer failure in the present system, the con-
tain safety and improve the efficiency with trollers can revert to manual methods and keep
which airways and airports are utilized. Specific traffic flowing. However, experiments with
technical options for each of these functions are ● Systems with this type of capability are within the state of the
discussed in later sections of this chapter. The art and some are available “of f-the-shelf.”
Ch. 5—Technology and the Evolution of the ATC System . 75
more highly automated systems have shown processors have become integral elements of air-
that traffic levels can reach a point that, al- craft instrumentation, and modern aircraft can
though well within the capabilities of the auto- and do carry general-purpose computers that
mated system, is beyond the point where they can be used for a variety of applications, such as
can be handled manually. At these traffic levels, flight management, processing digital communi-
controllers experience considerable difficulty in cations with the ground or other aircraft, up-
reverting to manual operations during computer dating the navigation system, developing alter-
outages. ’ This suggests that even though com- native flight plans, or driving multifunction
puter technology offers promise for the future, cockpit displays that replace several electrome-
there may be a point of no return beyond which chanical instruments. The introduction of these
the commitment to automation is absolute—the airborne capabilities means that ATC functions
only backup system for a highly automated need no longer be wholly resident in ground-
ATC system is another highly automated based computers. As a result, it might be possi-
system. ble to improve system operation and safety by
redistributing these functions among the various
Decreasing size and costs of computers also participants in the ATC process. Many of these
mean, however, that data-processing capability functions will be critical to the safety of flight
can be located anywhere in a system, and that and, therefore, the computer based systems that
redundancy can be provided where exceptional- perform them will fall within the airworthiness
ly high degrees of reliability are required. Micro- certification program of FAA.
1
Leonard Tobias and Paul J. O’Brian, “Real-Time Manned Sim- An ATC system that places more information
ulation of Advanced Terminal Area Guidance Concepts for Short and functions in the cockpit will also require
Haul Operations, ” Ames Research Center, August 1977, NASA- changes in communication technology. As ATC
TN-D-B499.
The experiments, conducted in 1971 at the Ames Research Cen- automation becomes more widespread and more
ter and jointly sponsored by FAA and NASA, were to deter- integrated into the system, digital data commu-
mine the comparative utility of 3-D and 4-D RNAV as aids to fly- nication will come into greater use. Transmis-
ing landing approaches. Controllers and pilots were placed in a
simulated high traffic environment and required to control traffic sions directed to a specific receiver—the princi-
and fly approaches in STOL [short takeoff and landing] aircraft ple underlying the proposed Mode S data link
equipped with the two onboard navigation aids. Results showed described later—would facilitate communica-
that the performance of both controllers and pilots improved
although the controllers were only secondary beneficiaries of the tion between ground-based and airborne com-
equipment installed in the aircraft. puters. They would also allow a computer to
Generally, when the effects of 4-D RNAV were compared with continue with other functions once it determines
those of 3-D RNAV, two types of effects were observed. The first
related to improvements in the effectiveness of both pilots and that it is not the intended recipient, a feature that
controllers. Pilots were able to fly a better track when assigned a increases the effective capacity of a processor.
route and a time to arrive at a checkpoint. The range of deviations The capacity required for data links between
of arrival time at a checkpoint from the time assigned dropped
from about 4 minutes to about 30 seconds. Requirements for voice ground facilities would also need to increase.
communication between controllers and aircraft under their con- While telephone and other ground links are used
trol were cut by more than half. Traffic flows were more orderly, at present, point-to-point satellite channels
and the number of aircraft in the system increased by about 25 per-
cent. might provide an alternative in the future.
A second major conclusion was that there maybe a point in the
development of automated systems beyond which it is no longer Satellites could also be used for aeronautical
possible to return to a manual back-up. At higher levels of traffic, navigation and surveillance. Singly or in con-
it was more difficult for controllers to make the adjustments re- stellations, satellites with accurate sensors and
quired to handle an emergency and restore traffic once the emer-
gency had been resolved. Controllers expressed a definite need for computing capabilities can be used to determine
more automated support for handling emergencies and restoring aircraft position and relay the information to
traffic afterwards. other aircraft and ground stations. Satellite-
From this it seems that automated systems may have to be built
so that they are self-diagnosing, self-correcting and/or backed up based collision avoidance systems have been
with other automated systems. Such back-up systems may not of- suggested. Large satellites that support a number
fer all of the features of the primary system but would be adequate
for an interim period while repairs to the primary system are un-
of functions are also being considered for civil
derway. aviation, notably in the Aerosat system of the
76 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
European Space Agency. The reliability and amount of time. In periods of rapid technologi-
longevity of satellites are high and likely to in- cal progress, new equipment or facilities may
crease in the future. The space shuttle makes it become obsolescent before the implementation
possible to recover, refurbish, and relaunch phase is completed. Redesigning the system to
satellites, or even make repairs while in orbit. incorporate newer technologies, however, may
However, the leadtimes for scheduling shuttle take so long that a badly needed function re-
payloads will preclude its use in responding mains unavailable, or that a deteriorating
rapidly to unforeseen emergencies. In addition, system is kept in place long after it has become
frequencies and orbital slots are limited and inadequate. At some point, therefore, the deci-
ATC applications must compete with other po- sion to go ahead with system enhancements
tential users of space technology, Both NASA must be made, despite the realization that the in-
and FAA have spent considerable amounts on corporation of newer technologies will have to
R&D for ATC satellite applications, but no sig- be deferred until a later cycle of system
nificant U.S. program is currently under way. modifications.
Much of the required technology is available,
The design and development of some prospec-
but it has not yet reached the point of being a
tive ATC systems and facilities began over 10
cost-effective alternative to ground-based ATC
years ago, and it will be late in the present dec-
facilities and configurations. At some point in
ade or early in the next before implementation
the future, however, this may change and the can be completed. A substantial portion of the
option of using satellites in ATC applications
needed ground facilities would have to be in-
may have to be reevaluated.
stalled before users would begin to install the re-
quired equipment on their aircraft, since they
Constraints and Other Factors would see little benefit in spending money for
Affecting Future Evolution equipment before it is of practical value. The
rate of installation of airborne components
Continuity of Service would also be limited by the rate at which they
ATC is an ongoing activity that cannot be in- can be produced, and the avionics industry
terrupted while a replacement system is put into would be unlikely to commit to production until
place. Any changes in the system must therefore it foresees a market of sufficient size to assure
be implemented gradually, and new and old profitability.
equipment will have to be operated in parallel to
assure continuity of service throughout the tran- User Costs
sition period. FAA can reduce the length of this FAA is responsible for the design, procure-
transition period by mandating equipage by cer-
ment, installation, operation, and maintenance
tain dates. If installation is voluntary, however, of equipment used in ATC installations and for
some users will hold off replacing existing equip-
establishing standards for the equipment to be
ment until it wears out, and some users might
carried on aircraft. However, the responsibility
never make the change. At a minimum, parallel
for and costs of procuring, installing, operating,
operation will be needed for perhaps as long as a
and maintaining the airborne equipment rests
decade while users install new equipment. In
with the users. Any adverse impacts on aircraft
some cases, it could be in the best interest of all
performance resulting from the installation of
parties to establish a firm date on which existing
airborne equipment also translates into in-
services will terminate and by which all users
creased user costs. Decisions about changes to
will have to be equipped to use the new service.
the ATC system must consider these user costs
and the effect that required equipment might
Timing of Design Decisions have on aircraft performance.
and System Implementation
Large aircraft have the space to accommodate
Identifying future needs and installing the fa- new avionics, but in small GA aircraft or dense-
cilities to meet those needs take a considerable ly packed tactical military aircraft space is at a
Ch. 5—Technology and the Evolution of the ATC System . 77
premium, and room for additional equipment to of ground control is becoming excessive and that
meet the needs of the ATC system may be hard they are burdened with the responsibility of
to find. Antenna location, in particular, often operating the aircraft safely without having
involves a tradeoff between aerodynamic and available the information required to meet that
electromagnetic characteristics. For instance, the responsibility. Technologies now available or
small blade antenna used for a standard under development could make additional infor-
ATCRBS transponder has little effect on aerody- mation available to both ground controllers and
namics, but the larger direction-finding antennas aircrew and might permit redistribution of the
required for some collision avoidance systems decisionmaking function. These alternative con-
may adversely affect aircraft performance or cepts have not yet been validated and tested; but
even structural integrity when retrofitted into they could lead to an ATC system that is less de-
existing aircraft. pendent on ground-based equipment and con-
trol decisions.
Not all new functions require the replacement
of existing equipment. Some experts suggest that
Freedom of Airspace and Equipage
the capabilities in existing equipment are ample
for future needs and that new or upgraded The passage of time has also brought increas-
equipment is not required. Some entrepreneurs ing limitations on the amount of airspace avail-
have been successful in adapting existing equip- able for VFR operations. The GA community
ment to new purposes without making any fun- (traditionally vocal in this matter) has been
damental changes. RNAV, as mentioned, uses joined by the military services, who believe that
VOR/DME signals and existing receivers to ob- access to suitable training areas is becomin g ex-
tain the data required for navigation outside the cessively restricted. The airlines, faced with high
defined system of airways. Tri-Modal BCAS, a fuel prices and low profitability, have also ar-
collision avoidance system, is designed to oper- gued that they should be permitted to fly the
ate with the installed ATCRBS transponders and most fuel-efficient routes possible between
interrogators. points served.
In addition, the ATC system serves a broad While FAA has not required all aircraft to be
mix of users who operate aircraft having a wide equipped to participate in the ATC system, it
range of performance characteristics and who has imposed limitations on the operations of air-
use the airspace for a variety of purposes. Over craft lacking specific pieces of equipment. While
half of all air operations are not under the con- the requirements are still minimal, freedom of
trol of FAA terminal and en route facilities, but airspace is already directly affected by the
the ATC system must recognize the existence of amount of avionics an operator is able and will-
these “off system” activities so that the available ing to install on an airplane. As more airspace
airspace and airport facilities are used in a safe, becomes congested, the areas in which unre-
efficient, and equitable manner. The heterogene- stricted VFR flight is permitted may have to be
ity of the user mix complicates both the design reduced, or some other method be found to as-
and the implementation of new systems, and the sure separation and preserve safety of flight. It
GA community is particularly sensitive to the ma y not be possible in the future to permit the
issues of user costs and mandatory equipage. some degree of flexibility and freedom of air-
space use that has been accorded in the past to
Locus of Decisionmaking those operating outside of positive control by
the ATC system.
Decisionmaking in the ATC system is distrib-
uted between ground controllers and aircrew.
Ultimate responsibility resides with the pilot,
International Requirements
but controller-supplied services are particularly The United States is party to a number of in-
important in high-density traffic and at times of ternational agreements that affect the operation
poor visibility. Some pilots feel that the amount of the air transportation system. It is legally obli-
78 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
gated to provide ATC services that conform to applications is intense. Aeronautical radio has
international standards at gateway facilities un- been assigned bands that are of sufficient capac-
less airspace users are notified that particular ex- ity to meet present needs, but it may be difficult
ceptions are taken to the applicable agreements. to obtain additional spectrum allocations for
Foreign-flag carriers enter U.S. airspace at gate- new aeronautical applications in the future.
way facilities with the understanding that they However, it may be feasible to reduce the chan-
will receive full services if they are equipped in nel spacing in bands that are currently allocated
accordance with international standards. U.S. and thus increase total effective capacity. One
aircraft similarly expect a full range of services area where there is significant pressure is in the
from foreign controllers. There is no legal allocation of spectrum to satellite applications;
obligation to operate the domestic ATC system and this may be a factor that could limit the de-
in conformity with international standards, velopment of ATC services that use satellites. 2
although many nations (including the United
States) find it desirable to do so. Military Requirements
Two international bodies establish standards The ATC system will be constrained by na-
that affect aeronautical operations. The Interna- tional security considerations. In time of war the
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) pro- system must meet the needs of the military with-
mulgates standards that establish flight proce- out aiding an enemy in locating and hitting tar-
dures and aircraft equipment specifications. For gets in the United States. In addition, ATC
example, one ICAO standard governs the signal equipment and facilities must not compromise
format used by each mode of the ATCRBS the operational integrity of military equipment.
transponder. Mode S, the signal format of the The military is a full participant in the ATC sys-
DABS data link, is currently being considered tem, and FAA is charged by law with ensuring
for establishment as an ICAO standard, without that the system meets both civil and military re-
which it cannot be implemented for interna- quirements. Some arrangements for coordinat-
tional operations. ing the activities of FAA and the Department of
The second organization, the International Defense (DOD) have been established, but these
Telecommunication Union (ITU), also estab- have not been completely formalized.
lishes conventions that affect aeronautical oper-
ations, but the relationship is not as close as that
of ICAO. ITU assigns portions of the radio fre- ‘For further information on this subject see OTA’S assessment,
quency spectrum to various applications Radio frequency Use and Management: impacts From the World
Administratiz]e Rudio C o n f e r e n c e o f 1979, OTA-CIT-163
throughout the world. The spectrum is a finite (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January
resource, and competitition among alternative 1982).
TECHNICAL OPTIONS
computers is not a practical alternative, since the ● place initial emphasis on the replacement of
IBM 360 has been out of production for several the hardware; or
years. Buying used IBM 360s and modifying ● place initial emphasis on the replacement of
them to make them IBM 9020s would be expen- the software.
sive in the short term and would provide, at
The first strategy—total replacement— implies
best, only a stopgap solution.
that the present system, with minor modifica-
The reliability of the IBM 9020 hardware and tions needed to keep it operating, will be kept in
software has also been troublesome, giving rise place until the replacement hardware and soft-
to concern that the cost of repairing and main- ware are ready for commissioning. The latter
taining the system will become excessive. As two strategies are incremental approaches that
time passes and existing stocks of spare parts are provide for a transition to the new system in
exhausted, maintenance of the computers could comparatively small steps over an extended peri-
become very expensive because spares would od. Some believe that either of these strategies, if
have to be fabricated to order. Similarly, the successful, could provide relief from the most
task of modifying and maintaining software to pressing problems within a period of 3 to 5
meet evolving needs is likely to be increasingly years, as opposed to the more than 8 years re-
difficult to perform. In the future, it will be diffi- quired for the total simultaneous replacement
cult to recruit and retain programmers capable option.
of maintaining the software because those who
The en route computer replacement strategy
are best able to do this job prefer to work on
has been reviewed as part of the FAA effort to
more modern equipment. Further, there is ample
produce a revised NASP. Implicit in past FAA
demand for their talents outside of FAA. statements is the presumption that the replace-
FAA is now in the process of planning the pro- ment computer, like the IBM 9020s, would have
curement of a replacement computer system that to be uniquely designed for ATC applications.
will overcome present operational problems and Critics of the full replacement strategy have put
provide additional capacity to meet the needs of forth options that would effect the replacement
the en route centers during the last decade of this of the computers incrementally.3 Generally,
century and into the next. Plans are to use the in- these plans envision using off-the-shelf equip-
creased capacity of the replacement computers ment to replace the IBM 9020s rather than ob-
to provide a variety of new and improved serv- taining a computer that has been designed or
ices, as well as to satisfy the requirements gen- modified specifically for ATC applications.
erated by the anticipated increase in aviation ac-
tivity. Table 6 indicates the range of services and Total Replacement
activities FAA expects to support with the re-
placement computer system. These applications The total replacement strategy has much to
fall in three major areas: control of individual recommend it. First, FAA has learned from its
aircraft, conflict alert and resolution, and man- experiences with the present system and, given
agement of traffic flow. the opportunity to make a fresh start, would be
in a position to design a replacement that would
The basic technical issue is not whether the correct present weaknesses. Second, advances in
9020 system needs to be replaced—there is wide hardware, software, and communication tech-
agreement that it does—but what replacement nologies have created new options that were not
strategy should be pursued. available when the present system was installed.
There are many strategies for replacing the A complete replacement of the present system
IBM 9020s, but all can be placed in one of three
groups: ‘See, for example, FAA Air Traffic Control Computer Moderni-
zation, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Transportation,
• replace all hardware and software simulta- Aviation, and Materials of the Committee on Science and Tech-
neously; nology, U.S. House of Representatives, June 16-18, 1981.
80 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
offers the opportunity to explore all of these op- be kept in operation to meet the ongoing needs
tions fully and to select the one that best suits for ATC services—a task that could become in-
ATC requirements in terms of both technical creasingly difficult and costly.
characteristics and overall system productivity.
Critics of FAA have pointed out that the num-
On the other hand, the total replacement op- ber of interruptions to service experienced with
tion would do little or nothing to relieve the defi- the present computers constitutes a threat to the
ciencies of the present system in the short term. safety of flight. ’ A more recent study by the Na-
If procurement were to start immediately, it is
unlikely that the first replacement computers
*Air Traffic Control Computer Failures, Committee on Govern-
would be in operation before the end of the dec- ment Operations, U.S. House of Representatives, House Report
ade. In the interim, the IBM 9020s would have to No. 97-137, June 11, 1981.
Ch. 5—Technology and the Evolution of the ATC System • 81
tional Transportation Safety Board 5 indicates a too could cause severe problems in rehosting the
significant decrease in the number of computer software. There could also be problems in meet-
outages since the controller strike in the summer ing the requirements of the interface between the
of 1981 due in part to the subsequent reduction main processor and the IBM or Raytheon sys-
in the level of traffic. Concern with the reliabil- tems that drive the displays used by the control-
ity of the ATC computers remains, however, lers. However, there are probably technical so-
and FAA has pointed out that some of the en lutions to these problems given enough time and
route centers were approaching capacity limits resources to work them out.
at the time of the strike. This last consideration Even though there may be problems with re-
would favor a conversion strategy that will have hosting the existing software in a new processor,
a positive short-term effect on en route traffic there are several points that recommend this
capacity. strategy. Some suggest that this approach could
be implemented by 1985. Second, once the con-
Hardware= First Replacement (“Rehosting”) straint of machine capacity has been relieved, it
Either of the alternative strategies for the in- would be possible to begin restructuring the soft-
cremental replacement of the computers entails a ware to improve its maintainability and reliabil-
number of assumptions about the structure and ity. Finally, the replacement computer could be
operational characteristics of the present system. selected with a view toward providing enough
For example, a proposal to move some of the additional capacity to support the new functions
functions from the IBM 9020s to an auxiliary and services planned by FAA as part of longer
computer assumes that it is possible to isolate term improvements of the ATC system.
the software elements that perform those func- The “hardware-first” approach does not rest
tions from the rest of the IBM 9020 software. A on the assumption that the processor to which
proposal to move the existing software to a new the ATC software is moved would necessarily be
processor assumes that interface problems aris- the long-term replacement for the IBM 9020. It
ing from differences in the internal timing of the could be viewed as an interim replacement that
machines can be overcome. Such assumptions would serve while FAA proceeded with a pro-
are critical both to the feasibility of incremental curement program for a totally new hardware
replacement strategies and to the schedule and and software package, to be commissioned
budget to carry them out. around the turn of the century and intended to
The second option —incremental replacement serve well beyond the year 2000. On the other
with initial emphasis on substituting new hard- hand, the procurement of an interim computer
ware—would “rehost” or move the existing soft- replacement would involve a sizable investment
ware to a new processor capable of supporting that might, for budgetary reasons, effectivel y
the IBM 360 instruction set. Several manufac- foreclose the option of initiating a second round
turers produce machines with this capability, of computer replacement after the interim sys-
but in every case some modification of the exist- tem was put in place.
ing software would be required. * At a mini-
mum, some allowance would have to be made
Software-First Replacement (“offloading”)
for handling the instructions unique to the IBM
9020. Real-time applications, such as the ATC The strategy emphasizing the replacement of
software, are characteristically sensitive to the the software first would involve separating indi-
timing of internal machine operations, and this vidual functions of the existing software. This of
itself would be beneficial, since it would make it
‘Air Traffic Control System, Special Investigative Report, easier to maintain the existing software and pro-
NTSB-SIR-81-7 (Washington, D. C.: National Transportation vide an opportunity to increase overall operat-
Safety Board, December 1981). ing efficiency. Weaknesses in the software that
*The ability to modify software rests on an understanding of the
existing structure and the procedure it executes in performing re- are known to have contributed to service inter- “
quired functions. ruptions could also be corrected during this ini-
●
82 • Airport and Air Traffic Control System
tial reworking of the existing software. Once this erals, as well as the 9020 mainframe. ETABS, the
initial phase had been completed, the software electronic display of flight strip information,
could either be rehosted intact in a new com- and other display features planned for the con-
puter, or some functions could be offloaded troller suite require replacing not only the main
from the IBM 9020 to another processor. The computer but the computers that generate dis-
offloading approach would free capacity on the plays as well. In addition, FAA is contemplating
IBM 9020, allowing it to absorb increases in eventual replacement of the ARTS II and ARTS
workload due to higher traffic levels. 111 computers now used in the terminal areas.
In the short run, this strategy makes no provi- The ATC functions performed by computers
sion for adding the new functions envisioned by in the en route centers and those performed in
FAA. However, as various functions are moved the terminal areas are similar. Therefore, one
from the IBM 9020s to other processors, there might consider procuring a computer for the en
would in effect be an incremental replacement of route centers that could also be used in the ter-
the present computer. This would offer consid- minal areas. Most manufacturers produce lines
erable latitude in specifying the replacement of compatible machines with a considerable
processor. It could be a large main-frame proces- range of capacity. Thus, the concept of using a
sor to which elements of the ATC system could smaller version of the en route computer in the
slowly migrate. Alternatively, the migration terminal areas could be attractive. In fact, such a
could be to several smaller processors, so that strategy could reduce the overall costs of soft-
the system would finally evolve into a network ware maintenance for the ATC system because
of distributed, modular processors. Compared there would be fewer software packages in use.
to the hardware-first strategy, this one offers the At some point, FAA will incur the cost of re-
opportunity to migrate to a system that has been placing the IBM 9020s now installed in the en
selected specifically to meet the requirements of
route centers. Operational factors create consid-
the ATC application. Since the software would
erable pressure to begin doing so in the near
be designed first, and then a computer con-
term. However, once the initial conversion has
figuration suited to supporting it selected, it
been completed, future steps to upgrade or to
would be less likely that a second conversion
modify the system could be accomplished at a
would be required or that the resulting system
slower pace. Manufacturers of computers gener-
would be less than optimal in terms of its ability
ally design them so as to provide paths by which
to meet the long-term needs of the ATC system.
users can upgrade capabilities incrementally
A potential disadvantage of this strategy, without large-scale rebuilding of software. Such
however, it that it depends on being able to sep- avenues would be available to FAA in the future
arate specific functions in the existing software. so long as off-the-shelf hardware was selected to
There are indications that the subroutines within replace the IBM 9020s. If, on the other hand, a
the present ATC programs are strongly interde- unique processor were to be selected, it is likely
pendent, and that it might therefore be very dif- that second conversion—of a magnitude similar
ficult to modularize the present software system. to the one now being undertaken—would be re-
If this is true, then it might be necessary to essen- quired at some point in the future to support
tially rebuild the existing software in order to new ATC services and capabilities.
implement this strategy; and the cost of doing
this could be prohibitive relative to other avail-
able options. Automated En Route Air Traffic Control
Modularity and Other Concerns Another factor influencing the selection of the
en route computer replacement is its compatibil-
The total system replacement strategy advo- ity with the long-term evolution of the ATC sys-
cated by FAA in the past recognizes the need to tem. The future requirements and operational
replace the controller displays and other periph- characteristics of the en route portion of the
Ch. 5—Technology and the Evolution of the ATC System ● 83
ATC system are currently defined by FAA under those plans and clearances as necessary to ensure
the concept of automated en route air traffic continued freedom from conflicts. Major AERA
control (AERA). functions are summarized in figure 24.
The essence of FAA’s AERA concept is to As currently envisioned, AERA would be a
automate the functions of maintaining aircraft continuation and extension of the present
separation, metering traffic flow, delivering ground-based ATC system. It could be imple-
clearances, and transmitting ATC messages. mented incrementally over an extended period
These functions would be assigned to comput- automating first those functions that are most
ers, thereby relieving the controller of many routine and repetitive for the human controller.
routine tasks. The controller’s role would then Instructions to ensure separation and coordinate
be primarily to handle exceptions and emergen- traffic flow would still come from ground facili-
cies and oversee (manage) the operation of auto- ties. However, these instructions would be for-
mated ATC equipment. Operationally, AERA mulated and issued by computers operating
would perform four principal functions: 1) auto- under the supervision of human controllers, Fur-
matically produce a clearance for each aircraft ther, the control instructions would be derived
operating in positive control airspace that would from a more extensive data base (geographically
ensure a conflict-free, fuel-efficient flight path; broader and covering a greater span of time)
2) formulate messages to aircraft needed to exe- than the present system. In effect, the AERA
cute the planned flight profile and to assure sep- system would operate strategically—planning
aration; 3) transmit those messages by data link overall traffic flow as well as individual aircraft
or VHF voice radio; 4) and monitor actual flight movements so that conflicts do not arise—al-
movements relative to flight plans, revising though some form of tactical control would also
Current Coordination
I
Alerts
I
Feedback Alerts
trajectories to
i I control I
—Surveillance
data
SOURCE: Federal Aviation Administration.
84 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
be provided in order to resolve potential con- in itself would not necessarily increase the ca-
flicts before backup collision avoidance systems pacity of the system, but it could significantly
would be activated. G reduce future operating costs. One recent esti-
mate places these savings at $300 million annu-
While AERA would entail extensive ground- ally (1979 dollars), g but these preliminary figures
based data-processing capability, detailed analy- would need to be refined as the AERA program
sis of aircraft flight plans, and close surveillance progresses and a more precise picture of its oper-
of actual flight paths, it would not necessarily ational characteristics is obtained.
lead to undue restrictions on aircraft move-
ments. As envisioned, AERA could in fact re- A third advantage of AERA—and a strong
duce or eliminate many of the procedural con- part of the rationale for seeking a high level of
straints now imposed on the use of airspace. It automation—is that it would help reduce system
would be a system of management by exception, errors. * In the present ATC system about 60
in which controller intervention would be lim- percent of these errors are attributable to mis-
ited to situations (or localities) where conflicts takes on the part of controllers: improper coor-
could not be reliably resolved by computer rou- dination between controllers, inattention, for-
tines. The controller would not have to visualize getting, failure to communicate, poor judgment,
or direct overall traffic patterns, as in the present and the like. 10 The underlying causes of many of
system, because the AERA concept envisions these errors can be traced to the nature of ATC
automated planning, monitoring, and metering as a work activity—routine, repetitive tasks re-
of traffic flow in a four-dimensional region made quiring vigilance and close attention to detail,
up of several airspace sectors over an extended and often conducted at a forced pace. Comput-
period of time. ’ ers are ideally suited to this kind of activity; and
if the tasks to be automated are judiciously se-
Potential Benefits lected and the software carefully designed, an
automated system such as AERA could elimi-
Initial estimates of the benefits of AERA indi- nate a major part of system errors, or at least
cate important savings in two areas: fuel savings provide a backstop to the shortcomings of hu-
due to more direct routings and reduced labor man operators. In this sense, AERA is expected
costs. The fuel savings for domestic airlines to be safer than the present system of traffic con-
could be on the order of 3 percent; at present trol.
fuel prices, this would amount to a $250 million
reduction in annual fuel costs. Potential Implications and Issues
The principal benefit to the Government It must be emphasized that AERA is still in the
would come in the form of increased controller early stage of engineering development. Exten-
productivity and the attendant reduction in op- sive effort, over perhaps 5 to 10 years, will be
erating costs: the volume of airspace assigned to needed to bring AERA to a precise and detailed
a control team could be greatly enlarged; it definition of requirements and equipment speci-
might also be possible to reduce the size of the fications. Installation, test, and full operational
control team by automating the routine tasks of deployment will take an additional 5 to 8 years.
clearance coordination and flight data entry.
Preliminary estimates are that controller produc- ‘Goldmuntz, op. cit. This benefit is calculated by taking the
tivity could be doubled, i.e. that individual en $375 million annual expense (1979) to operate ARTCCS, increasing
it by a factor of 1.6 to account for traffic growth by the time AERA
route controllers could handle perhaps twice as would become operational taking so percent of that as the benefit
many aircraft as with the present system. a This due to AERA productivity improvements.
● By FAA definition, a “system error” occurs whenever the ac-
‘R. A. Rucker, Automated En Route A TC (A ERA): Operational tual horizontal or vertical separation between aircraft is less than
conce~fs, MTR 79WO0167, The Mitre Corp., May 1979. prescribed minima.
‘L. Goldmuntz, et al., The AERA Concept, Economic and Sci- ‘OGoldmuntz, op. cit.; and G. C. Kinney, M. J. Spahn, and R.
ence Planning, Inc., for the Federal Aviation Administration, A. Amato, The Human Element in ATC: Observations and
December 1980. Analyses of the Performance of Controllers and Supervisors in
‘Personal communication, S. B. Poritzky, Director, FAA Office P r o v i d i n g ATC Seruicest MTR-7655, The MITRE C o r p . ,
of Systems Engineering Management, Dec. 21, 1981. December 1977.
Ch. 5—Technology and the Evolution of the ATC System • 85
Thus, AERA cannot be expected to replace the The development and implementation of
present generation of en route ATC until some- AERA is likely to raise several important issues.
time near the end of the century. Similarly, the Some are technical and concern the reliability
development costs and subsequent expenditures and safety of AERA, specifically its vulnerabil-
for facilities and equipment (F&E) have not yet ity to undetected software errors or hardware
been estimated, except in the most general failures, and the adequacy of current hardware
terms. The latest available projections of R&D and software design techniques. The degree of
expenditures for en route control systems over automation envisioned for AERA may also be
the coming 10 years, much of which would be controversial, and this could give rise to issues
for AERA, show a total outlay of $170 million pertaining to the division of tasks between hu-
(1980 dollars).11 As of the writing of this report, man operators and computers or the design of
detailed estimates of the required F&E invest- the man/machine interface. The design will have
ments and costs to users for avionics appropriate to include features that keep the controller’s at-
to AERA have not been published. tention and insure that he has enough informa-
Three major implications of AERA are al- tion to deal promptly with anomalous situations
as they arise. Acceptance of the system by both
ready apparent, however. One is that AERA
controllers and airspace users may prove to be
would require computer capacity and software
far beyond what is now available in ATC appli- troublesome.
cations, although not beyond the present or A third set of issues pertains to the costs and
foreseeable state of computer technology. Sec- benefits of AERA, especially the savings in oper-
ond, AERA will require a two-way data link ca- ational costs ascribed to AERA in comparison
pable of rapid and high-volume exchange of in- with the investments needed to implement the
formation between the air and the ground. FAA system. A corollary question will be the costs
now envisions that Mode S will provide this and benefits to various classes of airspace users,
data link, and plans for AERA are predicated on especially if AERA entails mandatory equippage
the availability and widespread use of Mode S with data link or other avionics in order to par-
by the early 1990’s. (See the discussion of “data ticipate in the automated ATC environment.
link” in the following section.) Third, AERA im- Resolution of these issues, rather than the some-
plies equally extensive automation in terminal what narrower questions of technical feasibility
areas and in a central flow management facility or system design, may prove to be critical to the
capable of coordinating traffic throughout the acceptance and success of the AERA concept.
ATC system.
This last point is particularly important both
for the immediate plans to replace en route com- Data Link
puters and for the design of the entire ATC sys-
tem over the long term. It implies a modular Potential Benefits
computer architecture, in which en route and Communication is central to the ATC proc-
terminal facilities utilize similar hardware and ess, and at present voice communication is the
software. This would make possible a flexible primary medium even for messages that involve
system design, in which individual modules computers processes. For example, a controller
would be capable of mutual support and backup reads data from a computer-generated display,
in the event of local equipment or software fail- transmits it by voice radio to an aircraft, and the
ure. Human controllers would have difficulty crew then enters the data manually into an on-
operating the ATC system manually in the event board computer. This process wastes crew and
of a failure of AERA if adequate automated controller time and is prone to reading or trans-
backup were not provided. mission errors. As the ATC system changes to
incorporate higher levels of automation, there-
‘‘National Aviation System Development and Capital Needs for
the Decade 1982-1991 (Washington, D. C.: Federal Aviation Ad- fore, great benefits could be gained from a digi-
ministration, December 1980). tal data link that permits direct communication
86 • Airport and Air Traffic Control System
great majority of the message traffic is “up”- Another important aspect of the data link de-
from ground to air— the ground station could cision concerns the avionics equipment that air-
assume responsibility for allocating time among space users will have to install in order to take
users. If there is a substantial flow of informa- advantage of the services that data link offers.
tion in the opposite direction—air to ground, The data link is more than just a special kind of
with a large part of it initiated by aircraft—the high-speed receiver-transmitter: to make any
task of coordinating the activities of the users meaningful use of this capability, aircraft will
would become much more difficult. The latter also have to be equipped with processors to en-
situation would be complicated further by the code and decode messages, and with some kind
introduction of substantial amounts of air-to-air of input-output device (displays and controls)
traffic, as in the Traffic Alert and Collision that presents information to the aircrew and al-
Avoidance System (TCAS) concept (described lows them to interact with the onboard proces-
later). sors and ground stations. Such equipment is
costly to acquire (about $10,000 for a commer-
In considering the candidate forms of data cial aircraft, but somewhat less for GA) and
link, another important consideration to keep in would require special maintenance. For com-
mind is that the data link is not an isolated sub- mercial and corporate operators the expenses of
system of ATC, nor does it provide any unique acquisition and maintenance could be absorbed
service. Some form of data link is indispensable without great difficulty, and the costs would
to the future scheme of operation and services probably be offset by operating benefits such as
envisioned by FAA, such as AERA and the col- fuel savings, avoidance of delay, and greater
lateral improvements of terminal area control flexibility of flight planning. For smaller GA op-
and central flow management. The level of auto- erators, on the other hand, the cost-benefit
mation and the degree of strategic and tactical equation may not be as favorable, and they may
control that AERA would bring about requires a consequently conclude that the expense is not
high-speed and high-volume flow of informa- justified by the improved services or operational
tion, decisions, and replies between the air and savings made available to them.
the ground. Thus, even though FAA is com- The matter could become particularly acute
mitted to Mode S, it is important that all ques- for GA if equipage with data link avionics were
tions about data link be promptly resolved and to be made mandatory for access to airspace or
that the necessary ground facilities and aircraft for receipt of essential ATC services. FAA cur-
avionics be put in place so as to keep pace with rently envisions a tiered program of services in
the parallel computer replacement program. which users receive progressively more extensive
Both of these resources will have to be available service in relation to the sophistication of the
within a decade if longer range improvements avionics carried on the aircraft. The concern of
are to be accomplished in the 1990’s. GA is that the areas in which they will be al-
lowed to operate with only minimal equipment
It is also important to recognize that the data (that is, without a two-way data link) will be-
link decision is not one where the United States come so restricted that small GA aircraft will be
can act with complete independence. ATC re- effectively excluded from the Nation’s airspace.
quirements and development programs of other The extent to which these concerns are war-
nations must also be considered, and the di- ranted will depend heavily on the type of data
rection chosen by FAA must be coordinated link that is selected and how it is to be incorpo-
through ICAO to ensure compatibility of signal rated in various classes of aircraft.
format, modes of operation, equipment charac-
teristics, and the like. On balance, a data link Collision Avoidance
system that is compatible with the needs of other
ICAO member nations is preferable to one that A primary function of the ATC system is pro-
is unique to the United States. viding separation assurance. Ground-based sur-
Ch. 5—Technology and the Evolution of the ATC System • 89
veillance equipment and computer software in- would provide some protection regardless of the
clude features that will alert the controller to sit- number of users who install the equipment.
uations where separation standards have been
violated or are about to be violated. Neverthe- Beacon Collision Avoidance System
less, a small number of midair collisions and
near misses continues to occur, most of them in- The Beacon Collision Avoidance System
volving aircraft not under positive control. At (BCAS) is one that had been under development
the present level of traffic, the probability of col- by FAA for some time and was nearing the point
lision is very low, but as traffic density in- of implementation when FAA made the deci-
creases, so does the threat of collision. The few sion, in the summer of 1981, to adopt another
accidents suffered by commercial carriers have system that is a derivation of BCAS (see below).
heightened public awareness of the conse- The initial version of BCAS, known as Active
quences of a midair collision involving large pas- BCAS, would have been implemented first; and
senger aircraft. This common concern has led to Full BCAS, a more complex version designed to
significant public and private efforts to develop operate in congested airspace, would have fol-
collision avoidance systems that would give the lowed several years later.
aircrew direct warning of the threat of collision. In operation, Active BCAS on board aircraft
A collision avoidance system is conceived as a would emit interrogation pulses to which
ATCRBS and Mode S transponders on the other
last-resort measure to protect against collisions;
it would come into play only after all other aircraft would reply in the same manner as they
would reply to an interrogation from a ground
means to ensure separation have failed. A colli-
station. The BCAS concept offered immediate
sion avoidance system is not intended to be the
protection against aircraft equipped with Mode
primary method of ensuring the separation of
C ATCRBS transponders and altitude encoders
aircraft. But the extra margin of safety provided
and promised more efficient performance and
by a collision avoidance system could lead to
broader protection against aircraft equipped
changes in ATC procedures for separation assur-
with Mode S Transponders. The BCAS system
ance. For example, a reliable collision avoidance
used the elapsed time between interrogation and
system could justify a reduction in separation
reply to determine the range to other aircraft,
standards, thus effectively increasing the capaci-
and by calculating the rate of closure it deter-
ty of the airway and airport system. This section
discusses some of the alternative collision avoid- mined the potential for collision. If a collision
threat were detected, an indicator would advise
ance systems that have been proposed over the
years in order to give the reader an awareness of the pilot whether to climb or descend to resolve
their relative merits and implications. the conflict. The DABS data link was to be used
to coordinate the maneuvers of two BCAS-
In general, two major classes of collision equipped aircraft. Active BCAS did not, how-
avoidance systems have been proposed: those ever, provide the pilot with the relative bearing
that depend on ground facilities; and those that of the intruder aircraft. * Full BCAS, in addition
require only airborne equipment. Ground-based to originating interrogations, also gathered data
collision avoidance systems characteristically re- by listening to replies to interrogations from the
quire the expenditure of Government funds for ground and correlated these replies to determine
facilities and equipment, while airborne systems bearing as well as range.
do not. Some of the so-called airborne systems,
however, are in fact passive users of ATC equip- There was little question that BCAS would be
ment—that is, they “eavesdrop” on replies to effective in low-density airspace, but there was
ATCRBS interrogations from ground surveil- considerable concern that the system would be-
lance stations in order to obtain the data needed come saturated in areas of high-traffic density
to locate nearby aircraft. Some systems would where a collision avoidance system is most
be effective only when a large portion of the air- ● A proposed follow-on version of Active BCAS would have
craft in the fleet are equipped, while others provided direction-finding capability.
90 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
needed. For this reason, FAA planned to install would enable it to determine both range and
ground equipment (an RBX transmitter) to sup- bearing in airspace adequately covered by
press BCAS and prevent system saturation in ground interrogators and, thus, to generate the
areas of high-traffic density where it planned to data needed to support a CDTI.
rely instead on a ground-based system called the
Automatic Traffic Advisory and Resolution Advocates of Tri-Modal BCAS cited the fol-
Service (ATARS) to resolve conflicts. ATARS lowing advantages of this system:
would use ATCRBS and Mode S interrogations ● It does not require the Mode S transponder
and replies to gather traffic data and convey and provides full protection from all air-
traffic information to suitably equipped aircraft craft equipped only with a standard
by means of the Mode S data link; ATARS was ATCRBS transponder.
designed to provide a turning manuever as well ● In airspace where the geometry of the distri-
as the climb or descend maneuver of BCAS.
bution of ground-based interrogators is ap-
While ATARS would overcome the major propriate, it provides bearing without re-
weakness of BCAS, however, it would also re- quiring the directional antenna that is
quire considerable expenditure for both ground needed for TCAS (discussed next) and Full
and airborne equipment. Both BCAS and BCAS.
ATARS planned to use the Mode S transponder ● It requires no change to the ground facilities
as a key element, and both therefore were except for the activation of the north pulse
caught in the debate that surrounded the Mode S on the secondary surveillance radars now
data link concept. Some critics have claimed installed.
that Full BCAS would be required to support a
cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI),
● It can operate independently of all ground
since the simpler Active BCAS provided no in- facilities in the same manner as active
truder bearing and thus could not provide the BCAS.
aircrew with a picture of surrounding traffic
NASA, with the sponsorship of FAA, success-
analogous to that available to ground control-
fully tested Tri-Modal BCAS, but its report indi-
lers. In many cases it was difficult to separate the
cated that the tests were not exhaustive because
arguments for and against DABS from those
a working model that included all of the features
pertaining to a collision avoidance system. of the system was not available. However, the
developers of the system have continued their
Tri-Modal BCAS
work since the NASA tests and claim that their
Tri-Modal BCAS was one proposed alterna- system is ready for certification and operational
tive to the BCAS program. It was similar to use.
BCAS in concept but based on the existing
ATCRBS transponder rather than the new Mode Traffic Alert and Collision
S capability, and it would operate in three differ- Avoidance System
ent modes. In areas of high traffic density, Tri-
After supporting the development of BCAS
Modal BCAS would operate passively, generat-
for several years, FAA announced in the sum-
ing all of the required information by analyzing
mer of 1981 its decision to adopt an enhanced
standard ATCRBS transponder replies to inter-
air-to-air version of BCAS, the Traffic Alert and
rogations from ground surveillance stations. In
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). The ab-
areas without coverage by ground radar, it
ruptness of this change has led to controversy in
would operate like Active BCAS. Where cover-
the aviation community, and various observers
age was provided by only one ground radar sta-
have questioned both the suitability of TCAS
tion, it would operate in a semiactive mode to
and its superiority to alternative systems.
generate its own interrogations while also listen-
ing to replies to interrogations from the ground TCAS is a direct derivative of BCAS and is
station. The logic used by Tri-Modal BCAS designed to meet the following criteria:
Ch. 5—Technology and the Evolution of the ATC System ● 91
● It does not require ground-based equip- relative location and the intended maneuver
ment. to resolve a conflict.
● It is compatible with the present ATC sys-
tem and a logical extension of it. Initially, the TCAS 11 antenna will provide bear-
● It is more suitable for use in high-density
ing information accurate to within 300, suffi-
traffic than BCAS. cient to provide the pilot with an “o’clock” indi-
● It offers a range of capabilities suitable to
cation of relative bearing and activate a climb or
the needs of various classes of airspace descend indicator. In later versions, FAA plans
users. to specify an antenna with much higher angular
resolution (1° to 2o), which would permit the
To meet the last criterion, two versions of system to generate a command for a horizontal
TCAS have been specified; both include the as well as a vertical maneuver. The improved
Mode S data link as an integral component. version would also support a CDTI.
TCAS I is designed for use by general aviation
FAA has issued a contract for the develop-
and the basic system is estimated by FAA to cost
in the range of $2,500 to $3,500 per aircraft. ment of the high resolution antenna to determine
if or when an antenna with this degree of resolu-
TCAS I would indicate to the pilot the presence
tion, yet suitable for installation on commercial
of a transponder-equipped aircraft without pro-
aircraft, can be designed and tested. One early
viding either range or bearing information; it
version of the sector scan TCAS II antenna was
would be the responsibility of the pilot to locate
approximately 18 inches in diameter and extend
the intruder by visual means and to take the ap-
slightly above the fuselage contour. Mounting
propriate action. An upgraded version of this
such an antenna might require significant modi-
basic system would provide the pilot with in-
fications of aircraft structure even on a large air-
truder range and bearing and with information
craft; the problem would be more severe in the
describing the maneuver that a TCAS II-
case of small GA or tactical military aircraft.
equipped aircraft intended to execute. TCAS I
Further, if a large antenna were to result from
estimates range by the strength of the signal re-
the development efforts, it could have detrimen-
ceived from another aircraft, at best an impre-
tal effects on aerodynamics, aircraft perform-
cise measure, and in high-density airspace the
ance, and fuel consumption.
proximity-warning indicator tends to be trig-
gered repeatedly, thus minimizing its value as a The adoption of TCAS means that the DABS
warning device (if the false alarm rate is high, pi- transponder remains a key element in FAA
lots might tend to ignore the warning). The addi- plans. However, the fact that TCAS is ground-
tion of an altitude stratified in TCAS I, however, independent and capable of operating in air-
appears effective in minimizing high alarm rates. space with high-traffic density puts in question
TCAS II is a more sophisticated version de- the need for ATARS, one of the key applications
signed for use by air carriers and larger corpo- heretofore envisioned for DABS. There are
rate GA aircraft. FAA estimates that the neces- strong indications that FAA will drop ATARS
sary avionics will cost on the order of $45,000 to from its plans and that, as a result, the level of
$50,000 per aircraft, slightly more than the pro- expenditures on ground equipment will be sig-
jected cost of an Active BCAS unit. TCAS II op- nificantly less than they would have been had
erates in the same way as Active BCAS, but with the ATARS program been implemented.
two major enhancements:
FAA has also made a point of leaving the way
● A directional send-receive antenna that will open for entrepreneurial innovation in the devel-
provide both range and bearing without opment of TCAS, Thus, it is conceivable that
creating the interference in areas of high FAA might certify other collision avoidance sys-
traffic density expected with Active BCAS. tems if their capabilities were demonstrated and
● The ability to transmit to TCAS I and other if they would not interfere with TCAS or other
TCAS II aircraft information regarding its elements of the ATC system.
92 • Airport and Air Traffic Control System
For instance, TCAS and Tri-Modal BCAS it is presented here to illustrate another group of
could operate in the same environment because alternatives that have been explored in the past.
both depend primarily on responses from air-
borne equipment and neither requires the instal- Microwave Landing System
lation of equipment on the ground. However, as
noted above, the TCAS concept contains a pro- Instrument Landing System
vision for coordinating conflict-resolution Providing precise and reliable guidance for
maneuvers of TCAS-equipped aircraft. Such approach and landing in conditions of reduced
coordination would not be possible between an visibility is a prime consideration for safety of
aircraft equipped with TCAS and one equipped flight, but it also has important implications for
with Tri-Modal BCAS as these systems are the efficient use of terminal area airspace and
presently designed. On the other hand, the airport runways. Generally, the highest runway
TCAS concept does not assume that it will utilization rates are achieved under VFR. When
always be possible to coordinate the maneuvers restricted visibility or weather conditions dictate
of aircraft in a conflict situation. Therefore, the increased separation and the use of instrument
inability to coordinate the maneuvers of TCAS approaches, one consequence is a reduction in
and Tri-Modal BCAS aircraft does not present the number of aircraft that can be landed in a
an insurmountable barrier to operation of the given space of time.
two systems in the same environment.
In part, this reduction in airport capacity utili-
Airborne Collision Avoidance System zation is a result of the guidance system in use.
The present Instrument Landing System (ILS),
All of the alternative collision avoidance sys- which has been the standard U.S. system since
tems that have been discussed to this point are 1941, provides guidance along a straight path at
capable of providing users some level of protec- a fixed slope of 3° or less extending 5 to 7 miles
tion from aircraft that are not similarly from the runway threshold. All aircraft ap-
equipped. The Airborne Collision Avoidance proaching the airport must merge to follow this
System (ACAS), which was developed and dem- path in single file, spaced at intervals dictated by
onstrated in the 1970’s, was not based on the separation minima and the need to avoid wake
ATCRBS transponder and could have been vortex. Aircraft flying at different speeds along
made available for about $1,500 per aircraft this single fixed path complicate the controllers
(1977 dollars), considerably less than the alter- task in achieving a uniform rate of traffic flow
natives being considered at that time. A major and diminish the capability to use the full capac-
drawback of this system, however, was that it ity of the runway served by ILS.
would not be effective unless a substantial por-
tion of the aircraft operating in a given area were The runway utilization rate under IFR could
ACAS-equipped. come closer to that attainable under VFR if air-
craft could be permitted to follow multiple ap-
Conceptually, the operation of the ACAS sys- proach paths, descend at different flight angles,
tem was simple. It generated interrogations to fly at different approach speeds, or aim at differ-
which all aircraft within a specified altitude ent touchdown points on the runway—none of
band would respond. Range was determined which can be done with ILS. If these variations
from the delay between interrogation and reply, were possible, as they are under VFR, the IFR
and when an aircraft was detected at close capacity of the airport would be increased to a
range, subsequent interrogations narrowed the limit determined almost solely by the rate at
altitude band from which a reply was requested which successive aircraft could touch down, de-
in order to determine whether a detected aircraft celerate, and clear the runway. *
presented a threat of collision.
● Wake vortex, for example, would remain a constraint on ca-
ACAS is no longer being actively considered pacity even if MLS with curved and variable glide slope ap-
as an alternative collision avoidance system, but proaches were installed.
Table 7.-Summary of Functional Characteristics of Alternative Collision Avoidance Systems
PrOXimity trom SSR response Range, range rate, bearing Range, range rate, bearing
for allcraft In radar cOllerage traffiC advisory tra'flc advisory
tbe.frng)
ATCRBS
None
ATCRBS
ALT ENC
None
DABS
TCAS I"~
TCAS II
BCAS'
Acllve
Range, Ranoe,
ranlle rate range r.t.
(bearing) .IIitude Iraffic (be.rlng) altitude traffic
and coordinated collision and coordinated COlliSion
avo.dance adVisories alloidance adllisories
Microwave Landing System (see fig. 25). This capability is useful in avoiding
noise-sensitive areas on approach paths and re-
A precision approach and landing system that
overcomes these inherent disadvantages of ILS is ducing the impact of the wake vortex problem.
the Microwave Landing System (MLS). Because MLS offers other important advantages in
MLS uses a scanning beam, rather than a fixed comparison with ILS. The reliability of the MLS
beam like ILS, it allows aircraft to fly any of signal is not influenced by ground-plane effects
several approach angles (including two-step (snow buildup, soil moisture, tidal effects, etc.);
glide slopes) and, in the lateral plane, to ap- this permits MLS to be installed at sites where
proach along complex paths that intersect the ILS will not function properly. Fixed or moving
alinement of the runway at any selected point obstacles in the approach zone do not interfere
Middle
marker
with MLS signals to the same degree as with ILS. sumed rates of user equipage. Each strategy was
In addition, MLS also provides precision analyzed to estimate costs, benefits, and opera-
guidance for departures and missed approaches, tional effects. All strategies yielded favorable net
a feature of particular importance when traffic benefits in the range of $2.4 billion to $2.7
patterns of closely located airports are in con- billion. The costs of the 10 strategies varied nar-
flict. MLS operates in a frequency band that pro- rowly ($1.20 billion to $1.35 billion for ground
vides 200 transmission channels; ILS has used units), as did the benefits ($3.65 billion to $4.05
only 20 of the 40 channels theoretically available billion). These results led FAA to conclude that
to it, and these are very near saturation in large “there is no clear-cut economic rationale for
hubs such as New York and Los Angeles. Final- choosing among the MLS implementation strat-
ly, ILS does not meet the joint civil/military egies” and that “the choice should be based upon
operational requirement for precision approach, operational considerations or on the special op-
since it does not afford the tactical flexibility portunities for improved precision guidance
needed by military aircraft. MLS does. service created by the installation of MLS equip-
ment .“l 4 The strategy selected by FAA reflects
For these reasons, FAA has designated MLS as these considerations.
the precision approach guidance system to re-
place ILS. The MLS transition plan, published
Potential Implications and Issues
by FAA in 1981,12 calls for 1,425 installations to
be carried out in three phases over the next 20 There are two factors that may complicate the
years. In the first phase, between 10 and 25 sys- MLS transition plan, both of them involving the
tems will be installed over a period of 2 years at replacement of the existing ILS. As of March
selected airports in order to develop a base of ex- 1981 there were 653 ILS units in commission at
perience and reach an operational confirmation 458 airports, and an additional 155 units were in
of the benefits that MLS can provide. The sec- various stages of procurement or installation.
ond phase will see the installation of 900 addi- Thus, the MLS transition plan has to take into
tional MLS units at a rate of 100 to 150 per year account how these ILS sites, many of them re-
over a period of 6 to 9 years, with priority given cently commissioned and with many years of
to large and medium hub airports. The third service life remaining, are to be phased out. ILS
phase involves installation of an additional 300 and MLS can be colocated and operated simulta-
to 500 units to meet the growth in demand antic- neously without signal interference or procedur-
ipated by the end of this century. FAA estimates al difficulty, but the length of the period of joint
the cost of purchasing and installing 1,425 MLS operation and the timing of ILS decommission at
ground units to be $1.332 billion (1981 dollars); specific sites could create difficulties for some
the cost to users to equip their aircraft with MLS classes of airport users. FAA transition plan stip-
is estimated to be an additional $895 million, ulates that no ILS will be removed until all of the
yielding a total cost of roughly $2.2 billion.l 3 network’s Ill-equipped airports have operation-
al MLS and at least 60 percent of the equipped
In selecting the transition plan, FAA worked aircraft routinely using the ILS/MLS runway are
in consultation with various user groups under MLS-equipped. When this occurs however, 40
the auspices of Radio Technical Commission for percent of the regular users of a given airport
Aeronautics, and considered 10 deployment could lose the precision-landing service, even
strategies—9 submitted by FAA and 1 developed though they continue to operate with function-
by RTCA Special Committee 125. These strat- ing ILS equipment.
egies differed in terms of the order and rate of The second complication is that, by ICAO
deployment at various sites, the length of the pe-
agreement, the United States is committed to re-
riod of duplicative operation with ILS, and as-
tain ILS service at international gateway airports
‘ ‘ M i c r o u u m w LandirIg Syst~m Trnmsition Plan, APO-8 I-I through 1995. There are 75 such airports at pres-
(Washington, D. C.: Federal Aviation Administration, May 1981).
“Ibid. “Microuun~e La)ldit~g Systetn Transition Pla/1, op. cit
96 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
ent, and generally they are among the busiest tion seeks to have MLS first installed at hub air-
U.S. airports. The retention of ILS service at ports on runways not now Ill-equipped. Other
these sites may cause some users to delay pur- user groups, for example the Air Transport
chasing MLS equipment, since the installed ILS Association, recommend an installation strategy
equipment will still be usable for another 10 that would create a network connecting major
years or more. airports (including many now equipped with
ILS), in order to encourage users who fly these
Despite the overall favorable benefit-cost
routes frequently to install MLS equipment on
ratio of MLS indicated by FAA analysis, the spe-
their aircraft. Another, slightly different, recom-
cific benefits and costs to various classes of
mendation would involve establishment of a
airspace users remains a subject of controversy.
major-city network but with priority also given
FAA’s analysis showed high positive net benefits
to installation at sites where it is not possible to
to air carriers and commuters largely due to the
locate an ILS and at small community airports
value attributed to passenger time saved. For
that have commercial service but not an ILS.
general aviation as a whole, the costs exceeded
the benefits for all 10 deployment strategies, AS a final point, the MLS transition plan pro-
although some classes of GA (notably corporate posed by FAA may encounter administrative
GA operating multiengined piston and jet air- and budgetary difficulties. The plan, particular-
craft) were shown to derive substantial benefits ly Phase II, is highly ambitious in that it calls for
from MLS. Thus, there is likely to be continued installation of 900 units at a rate of 100 to 150
resistance to MLS from some GA operators, per year. It may be technically and administra-
probably in the form of opposition to decom- tively difficult to sustain such a pace, and it
missioning ILS at specific sites and reluctance to might be even more difficult to justify the re-
purchase MLS equipment (at a cost of $5,000 or quired annual outlay of funds in a time of
more) so long as ILS is available. budget austerity. Implementation of Phase II
would entail annual expenditures of $125 million
It is also likely that specific details of the MLS
on a 6-year schedule, or $85 million on a 9-year
transition plan will continue to arouse debate.
schedule. Stretching out Phase II, in order to
Comment received by the FAA during the
hold it within some imposed budgetary limit, is
course of preparing the plan indicates that there
an alternative that may have to be adopted,
are several sensitive points. One potential issue
even though it might increase overall program
is the priority given to installation of MLS at dif-
costs and defer realization of the full benefits of
ferent types of airports. For example, commuter
MLS.
airlines favor early deployment at small commu-
nity airports, while the Airline Pilots Associa-
trol facilities, either replacing or supplementing mediate levels of ATC services between these
surveillance radar. two extremes. The level of service could vary ac-
cording to 1) the density of traffic; 2) the mix of
Levels of Service aircraft; 3) the avionics carried by those aircraft;
4) flight conditions; and 5) the ground-based
Under the present ATC system there are only capability for separation assurance and traffic
two forms of operation—controlled (corre- management. The result could be a more varied
spending roughly to IFR) and uncontrolled (cor- range of services, more closely tailored to the
responding roughly to VFR). In the future, im- needs and capabilities of the airspace users, than
provements in ground-based and airborne tech- is now the case.
nologies could make it possible to provide inter-
Chapter 6
AIRPORT CAPACITY
ALTERNATIVES
Dunes International
Photo credit: Federal Aviation Administration
I
Contents
Page Page
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Automated Metering and Spacing . . . . . . 118
Airside Components. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Cockpit Engineering. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Limitations on Airside Capacity. . . . . . . . . . 103 Summary of Alternatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Aircraft Performance Characteristics. . . . 103 Future Research Needs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Wake Vortex... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Wake Vortex Avoidance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Wake Vortex Alleviation. . . . . ........ 121
Airfield/Airspace Configuration. . . . . . . 105 Noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Aircraft Noise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Airport Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
ATC Equipment and Procedures.. . . . . . 107 Ground Access. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Demand Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Delay and Delay Reduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Demand-Related Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 LIST OF TABLES
Peak-Hour Pricing. ......... . . . . . . . . . 109
Table No. Page
Quotas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
8. ’’Top’’ U.S. Airports, by Enplaned
Balanced Use of Metropolitan Area
Passengers, by Air Carrier Operations,
Airports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
and by Reported Delays.. . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Restructuring Airline Service Patterns. . . 111
9. Arrival and Departure Separations. . . . 104
Reliever Airports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
10. Operational Characteristics of Airports
Airport Development Alternatives. . . . . . . . 113
With Potential Benefits From a
Expanding Existing Airports. ....... . . 113
Separate General Aviation Runway. . . 115
Development of Secondary Runway
11. Summary of Alternatives.. . . . . . . . . . . 119
Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Building New Airports. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
ATC Improvement Alternatives. . . . . . . . . . 116
LIST OF FIGURES
Airfield/Airspace Configuration
Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 Figure No. Page
Wake Vortex Prediction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 26. AirportHourly Capacity Varies
Microwave Landing System . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Strongly With Weather. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Reducing Separation or Spacing 27. Runway Configuration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Minimums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 28. Typical Distributions of Delay. . . . . . . . 108
Chapter 6
INTRODUCTION
The ability of airports to accommodate traffic an airport’s landside capacity, and in some cases
can be expressed in terms of “airside” or “land- has become a limiting factor on an airport’s abil-
side” capacity. “Airside” capacity is defined here ity to handle passengers. Recent discussion
as the number of air operations—landings and about putting a quota on operations at Los An-
takeoffs—that the airport and the supporting air geles International Airport, for example, is re-
traffic control (ATC) system can accommodate lated to growing ground access problems, not
in a unit of time, such as an hour. The capacity lack of airside capacity.
of an airport is not a single number, but will
vary with the number of runways in use, the vis- This chapter discusses alternatives to increase
ual or electronic landing aids available, the types airport airside capacity. Landside problems will
of aircraft being accommodated, the distance only be treated here as they affect airside capa-
between aircraft in the approach pattern, and city.
the noise abatement procedures in effect. The When the traffic demand for an airport ap-
time each aircraft occupies the runway and the proaches or exceeds its capability, the result is
facilities for handling aircraft on the ground, on
delay. Delay has been a major problem at the
taxiways, or at gates also affect airside capacity. Nation’s busiest airports, resulting in millions of
All of these factors will vary depending on the dollars of increased operating costs for air carri-
weather. ers and wasted time for travelers. Although sev-
“Landside” considerations, such as the size eral different methods of measuring delay exist
and number of lounges or the adequacy of bag- (as will be discussed later) it is generally agreed
gage-handling equipment, affect the number of that the six airports most affected by delay in
passengers an airport terminal can accommo- 1980 were: O’Hare (Chicago), Stapleton (Den-
date. Ground access, including the adequacy of ver), La Guardia and JFK (New York), Harts-
transit connections, roadways, and parking field (Atlanta), and Logan (Boston). As shown
areas for passengers’ cars, is an important part of in table 8, most of the airports which report
Table 8.— “Top” U.S. Airports, by Enplaned Passengers, by Air Carrier Operations,
and by Reported Delays
101
102 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
serious delay problems rank among the top 15 mating its costs. The next sections outline some
airports in terms of both enplaned passengers alternative methods for reducing delay or in-
and air carrier operations. creasing the airside capacity. These include
changing the pattern of traffic demand, expand-
This chapter first describes the airside compo-
ing the runway system, or modifying the termi-
nents in the operation of a typical airport. It
nal area air traffic control procedures and equip-
then reviews those major factors which influence
ment. Finally, some suggestions for future re-
or limit airside capacity. Next the chapter dis-
search are made.
cusses the problem of delay—how it comes
about and the methods for measuring it and esti-
AIRSIDE COMPONENTS
The airside capacity of an airport is governed Controllers use both vertical and horizontal
by factors related to its runway system and the separation to maintain safe distances between
airspace above and around the airport, as well aircraft, a task that is complicated by their dif-
as the terminal area ATC and navigation equip- ferent performance characteristics. Jets flying at
ment and procedures. a very slow (for a jet) 160 knots will nevertheless
The number of runways, their layout, length, overtake and pass slower aircraft. The controller
may assign different altitudes so that this can
and strength will in large measure determine the
take place safely, or he may vector the faster air-
kinds of aircraft that can use the airport and
craft along a longer path so that it will safely
how many aircraft can be accommodated in any
overtake and pass around the one ahead.
given time period. The layout depends on a
number of factors including the local terrain and In good visibility conditions, tower control-
predominant direction of the wind. Federal Avi- lers may clear aircraft, once they are in sight of
ation Administration (FAA) safety regulations the airport, to make a visual landing under
dictate how close the runways may be to one an- tower control. The pilot assumes responsibility
other and to buildings, trees, or other obstruc- for separating himself from other aircraft, with
tions. the controller standing by to warn pilots to “go
around” in case of a potential conflict. During
In order to land on a runway, aircraft ap-
proach the runway in single file, with a safe dis- times of poor visibility the ATC team retains re-
tance between them. Air traffic may enter the sponsibility for separating the aircraft on final
airspace around the airport (“terminal area”) approach. In this case the Instrument Flight Rule
(IFR) radar minimum separation is observed, so
from many directions at a number of different
points (“entry fixes”), and in many metropolitan
areas the aircraft may be destined for one of sev-
eral different airports. Thus, the task of deliver-
ing aircraft one by one to a particular runway at
a particular airport must begin many miles from
the airport itself, and controllers must orches-
trate the orderly merging and diverging of many
different traffic streams until each aircraft
reaches the final approach to its destination run-
way. By the same token, departing aircraft must
be safely routed from the airport to the “depar-
Photo credit Neal Callahan
ture fix” where they leave the terminal area and
join the en route ATC system. The variety of airspace system users .
Ch. 6—Airport Capacity Alternatives ● 103
that distances between aircraft are greater than convenient to most of the aircraft using a run-
in good weather. Under IFR conditions, pilots way is important for getting maximum capacity
are much more dependent on landing aids such from the runway system.
as the Instrument Landing System (ILS) to guide
Departures from the airport may take place
them to the runway. on a separate runway or may be “interleaved”
An aircraft is considered to be on the runway between arrivals on the same runway. Aircraft
from the moment it flies over the runway thresh- preparing to depart can wait beside the runway
old until it turns off onto a taxiway. Angled on holding aprons until the runway is clear; then
“high-speed” turnoffs can allow aircraft to leave they can then taxi onto the runway and take off
the runway at higher speeds than perpendicular fairly quickly—the time spent on the runway for
ones. Placing the turnoffs where they will be departure is on the order of 30 seconds.
s L H s L H
Lead Lead
s 1.9 1.9 1.9 s 3 3 3
L 2.7 1.9 1.9 L 4 3 3
H 4.5 3.6 2.7 H 6 5 4
Lead
s L H s L H
Lead
s 35 45 50 s 60 60 60
L 50 60 60 L 60 60 60
H 120 120 90 H 120 120 90
“VFR separations are not operational minima but rather reflect what field data show under saturated condition. Adapted from
Parameters of future ATC Systems Re/atirrgr to A/rport Capacify/De/ay (Washington, D. C.: Federal Aviation Administration,
June 1978), PP. 3.3, 3.5.
“capacity coverage curve” for any given airport Figure 26.—Airport Hourly Capacity Varies Strongly
can be constructed. With Weather
SOURCE: Federal Awatlon Admlnlstration, Techniques for Determinmg Awport Alrside Capacity and Lle/ay, FAA-RD-74-124, June 1976,
106 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
Aircraft Noise
Aircraft noise, especially the noise of jet air-
craft, has made airports unpopular with their
neighbors. The greatest noise impact is usually
in the areas just beyond the ends of the runways,
where arriving and departing aircraft fly at low
altitudes. If a high-noise area is occupied by a
factory or a highway cloverleaf there maybe lit-
tle difficulty, but such land uses as residences,
hospitals, and schools are not compatible with
Photo credit: Federal Aviation Administration
the amount of noise generated by an airport. In
some areas, ineffective or nonexistent zoning Air use and land use
and land use controls over the years have al-
lowed these incompatible land uses to occupy
high noise impact areas near many airports. The FAA has established very few mandatory noise-
courts have generally found that the airport op- abatement procedures. Over the past few years
erator is responsible for injury due to reduced some operators have conducted airport noise
property value, and owners of nearby prop- compatibility and land use studies for use as a
erty have been able to collect damages in some basis for their own noise planning. The new
cases. In Los Angeles, the courts have recently Federal Aviation Regulation, Part 150, required
awarded nuisance damages as well. In some under the Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement
areas, including Atlanta, St. Louis, and Los An- Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-193), provides
geles, airport operators have been required to operators with guidelines for voluntary noise-
purchase noise-impacted property and either use abatement standards and establishes a standard-
it as a buffer zone or resell it for a more compat- ized method for measuring noise exposure.
ible use.
Many of these noise-control procedures have
One method for reducing noise is to introduce a negative effect on capacity, and airports with
quieter aircraft or, as many air carriers have both capacity and noise problems have found
begun doing, to re-equip old aircraft with that the available solutions to one problem often
quieter engines. FAA has set standards for new aggravate the other. The highest capacity run-
aircraft that are much quieter than in the past, way configuration, for instance, may be one
but noisy aircraft will remain in the fleet for which requires an unacceptable number of
many years. The increasing sensitivity of the flights over a residential area. Enforcing noise-
public to noise may have offset much of the re- abatement procedures may also cause an unac-
cent improvement. ceptable level of delay at peak hours. Thus, air-
ports must balance tradeoffs between usable ca-
FAA, at the request of individual airport oper-
pacity and environmental concerns.
ators, has also developed operational proce-
dures that reduce noise impact. For example, use The FAA Administrator recently reempha-
of certain runways may be preferred, or pilots sized that the responsibility for establishing
may be required to make approaches over less proper land-use controls around airports rests
sensitive areas, weather permitting. However, with local government. He also predicted that
Ch. 6—Airport Capacity Alternatives ● 107
more communities will be establishing local The limitations in the accuracy of surveillance
noise limits by ordinance or statute. f equipment also can influence how airports are
constructed and how they may be used. For ex-
A local government, whether or not it is the
ample, the spacing requirement between inde-
owner of the airport, can exercise some control
pendent IFR runways was developed based on
over noise, but must do so in a manner that is the limitations of surveillance, navigation, and
nondiscriminatory and does not place an undue communications equipment. Improvements in
burden on interstate commerce. For example, a
equipment and procedures have allowed this
city may select a reasonable noise exposure limit minimum to be reduced over the years.
and exclude or fine aircraft exceeding that limit.
However, the total ban on jet aircraft in Santa Constraints on capacity can arise when
Monica, Calif., was overturned by the courts as airspace near one airport must be reserved to
unduly discriminatory against one class of air- protect operations at another airport. This is an
craft (some new jets are quieter than propeller- especially pressing problem in some busy areas.
driven aircraft). There is such an airspace conflict between La
Guardia and Kennedy in certain weather condi-
ATC Equipment and Procedures tions, for example.
creases rapidly with traffic density, so that aver- of the 30-minute delays in 1976 to 84 percent in
age delay per aircraft increases exponentiall y 1979 in the NASCOM system. The total number
well before traffic levels reach capacity levels. of delays reported also increased, from approxi-
mately 36,200 in 1976 to approximately 61,600
A typical variation of delay with operation in 1979. It must be emphasized that while
rates is shown in figure 28. When the traffic level weather may indeed be the primary cause, the
is above capacity, the accumulation of aircraft ability of the system to anticipate, adjust to, and
awaiting service is directly proportional to the recover from weather-related problems is de-
excess of traffic over capacity. For example, if pendent on a number of the other determinants
the capacity of a runway system is 60 operations of airside capacity.
per hour and traffic rates are averaging 70 opera-
tions per hour, then every hour will add an aver- Another major delay-reporting system is
age of 10 aircraft to the queues for service, and sponsored by FAA and three airlines—Eastern,
10 minutes to the delay for any subsequent ar- United, and American—which have been pool-
rival or departure. Even if the traffic level drops ing their operational flight-time data since 1976.
to 40 operations per hour, delays will persist for This Standard Air Carrier Delay Reporting
some period since the queues will be depleted at System (SACDRS) covers 36 airports and meas-
a rate of only 20 aircraft per hour. ures taxi times, gate holds, and flight times
against standard values in an attempt to deter-
The principal delay-reporting systems of FAA mine delay. Unfortunately, an error in this
currently measure only the occurrence of large method causes an overestimation of delay: for
delays. The National Airspace Communications example, the standard times used for taxi in and
System (NASCOM) delay reports record in- out are based on the average over all runways at
stances of delays of 30 minutes or more at 46 a given airport, but at some airports there is
participating airports. The Performance Measur- wide variation in taxi times for different run-
ing System (PMS) records delays of 15 minutes ways and terminals; some percentage of these
or more at 15 major airports. The PMS also at- longer taxi times are always counted as delay
tempts to estimate “average delay per aircraft under the SACDRS. FAA recognizes the defi-
delayed.” Both NASCOM and PMS rely on con- ciency in this system, but no correction has yet
troller’s manual recording of instances and
been devised. Estimates of the annual cost of
causes of delays during periods when he is al- delay based on SACDRS have ranged as high as
ready busy. Weather is listed as the primary 237 million gallons of fuel and $273 million of
cause for these delays, ranging from 76 percent additional operating costs to the three airlines
involved, although these costs too are overesti-
Figure 28.—Typical Distributions of Delay mated. 2 The PMS and NASCOM systems, on
the other hand, because they only count long de-
lays, probably underestimate delay. The true
value of delay lies somewhere in between and
has not been determined with accuracy. Thus,
estimates of the cost of delay based on any of
these reporting systems have to be viewed with
some caution. However, all observers agree that
delay is a serious and expensive problem at some
airports, especially in light of the high cost of
fuel in recent years.
One method of dealing with delay is to con-
strain traffic to manageable levels. This is the
50 percent 100 percent
‘Virginia C. Lopez (cd.), Airport and Airway Congestion, A Se-
Traffic rate capacity
n“ous Threat to Safety and the Growth of Air Transportation
SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment. (Washington, D. C.: Aerospace Research Center, July 1980).
Ch. 6—Airport Capacity Alternatives ● 109
origin of the quota systems which have been im- there by waiting on the ground at other cities.
posed at a few major airports. Each carrier has Waiting on the ground is much less wasteful of
representatives on the “scheduling committees” fuel than waiting in holding patterns in the air.
to negotiate the carrier’s share of allowed peak
hour operations. FAA, through its flow control Although the lengthy delays of the late 1960’s
center, also works to ameliorate the costs of are no longer typical, delay remains a major
delays by forewarning air carriers when delay problem at many airports. Further, the number
conditions develop at major airports. For ex- of operations will increase as air traffic grows,
ample, when weather deteriorates and capacity and additional airports may experience this
goes down in Chicago, FAA may advise aircraft problem. Some possible approaches to dealing
scheduled into Chicago to delay their arrival with delay are discussed below.
primarily high-performance turboprop aircraft or allowing existing carriers to exchange slots are
used for corporate travel; corporations, like the still under development.
airlines, may be willing to absorb a fairly large
increase in fees in order to use specific airports One objection to quota systems is that the al-
during peak hours. locations are made without any price signals to
show that the capacity is being used efficiently.
One problem with a peak-hour pricing system Thus, although the quota may provide some
is that it is difficult in practice to determine stop-gap congestion relief, it does not provide
precisely what the marginal cost of an airport any long-run guide for allocating resources as
operation is; several years of trial and error the system grows or changes. It has been sug-
would be necessary to settle on a pricing scheme gested that this problem could be overcome by
which both controlled delay and allowed the air- auctioning the reservation slots among the carri-
port to cover its costs. However, if the same fee ers or by combining the quota system with some
were charged to air carrier, commuter, and GA sort of peak-hour pricing scheme.
aircraft, peak-hour pricing might be strongly
resisted. Proportionately different fees for dif-
ferent categories of users might therefore be Balanced Use of Metropolitan
necessary. Area Airports
Many major metropolitan areas are served by
Quotas two or more large airports. Where one or more
An alternative method for managing demand of these airports is underutilized, possibilities ex-
is to set a quota on the number of operations ist for increasing airside capacity through a more
which can take place during a peak hour. The balanced use of the region’s airports. Examples
quota can be placed on total operations, or a include: Newark Airport, which is underutilized
certain number of operations can be allocated to compared to Kennedy and La Guardia; Oakland
different classes of users. The quota levels are Airport, which could relieve San Francisco;
usually set between the IFR and VFR capacity of Midway Airport, which is practically empty
the airport; thus, in VFR conditions, additional while Chicago-O’Hare has delay problems; and
aircraft could easily be accommodated. When Baltimore-Washington and Dunes Airports,
capacity is reduced, users without reservations which might relieve Washington National. The
have to use the airport at another time or use problem of balancing use of metropolitan air-
another airport. ports presents a chicken/egg dilemma: airlines
Although reservations (slots) for GA or even won’t serve the underutilized airport because
air taxis might be allocated on a first-come, first- there are so few passengers, and passengers
served basis, slots for scheduled carriers present don’t go there because there is so little service. It
a more complex problem. At major airports is difficult to foresee when congestion in itself
where quotas have been in effect for some time will become great enough to cause redistribu-
(O’Hare, JFK, La Guardia, and Washington Na- tion, or to what extent the process can or should
tional) representatives of the air carriers are al- be managed by local or even Federal authorities.
lowed (with antitrust immunity) to meet as In some cases, better transportation between air-
ports might make it easier to transfer between
scheduling committees to negotiate how many
slots will be allocated to each carrier. Although flights and to attract passengers to underutilized
new entrants are able to participate in these ne- airports.
gotiations, quota systems do tend to favor the The Washington, D. C., area is illustrative of
status quo. Since the air traffic controllers strike the problems of imbalance airport use. Wash-
in August, 22 airports have been brought under ington National Airport, operating since the
a quota system designed principally to ease mid-1940’s, is convenient to the downtown area.
peaks of demand on the en route ATC system. National has three runways (all under 7,000 ft)
The methods for assigning slots to new entrants and does not accept wide-body jets. Both its air-
Ch. 6—Airport Capacity Alternatives . 111
side and landside capacity are severely limited more and better space for future growth at
and a quota system and airline scheduling com- Newark. In addition to People Express, New
mittee are used to ration peak-hour operations. York Air has located part of its operation at
Expansion is difficult due to surrounding devel- Newark. Now that permission has been gained
opment and the Potomac River. Complaints to use Newark as a international airport, several
about the airport’s noise have led to a 10 p.m. established airlines are also bidding to offer
curfew among other noise abatement policies. transatlantic service from there.
From time to time some groups even call for the
airport to be closed. Restructuring Airline Service Patterns
Many of these problems could be alleviated if When delay becomes intolerable at busy hub
some operations were transferred to Dunes In- airports, users themselves may voluntarily move
ternational Airport, 26 miles from Washington. their operations to another facility. This move-
Dunes, opened in 1962, has two 11,500-ft run- ment might be to an underutilized airport near-
ways, one 10,000-ft runway and capacity to by (e.g., Newark), but it could also be to a medi-
spare. FAA (which operates both airports) has um or small hub located at some distance from
repeatedly attempted to induce carriers to use the congested hub. This is especially likel y for
Dunes more; for example, only Dunes can transfer traffic. (See ch. 4 for a discussion of the
receive international and long-range domestic growth and capacity impacts of this redistribu-
flights. Despite the constraints of the quota tion scenario. )
system, the curfew, and the restrictions on wide-
body and long-range flights, however, National Many major airports currently serve as hubs
handled nearly 4 times the operations and 4½ for a large amount of transfer traffic. Three-
times the passengers that Dunes did in 1980. Fur- fourths of the arriving passengers at Atlanta and
ther, National generated a net profit of $10 mil- about one-half the passengers at O’Hare, Dallas-
lion that year, while Dunes incurred a net loss of Fort Worth and Denver pass through these air-
$3 million. ’ The principal problem is ground ac- ports only to change planes for somewhere else.
cess; it is more convenient to fly from National Carriers choose to establish their hubs at these
than from Dunes. busy airports so that passengers can choose from
many transfer flights. However, when the trans-
Some new airlines beginning service since de- fer airport becomes too congested the disadvan-
regulation have sometimes deliberately chosen tages of delay may begin to outweigh the advan-
to operate out of underutilized airports to avoid tages of convenience, for airlines as well as
congestion and delay. One example is Midway passengers. Hence carriers may decide to locate
Airlines, which uses the nearly abandoned Mid- their new transfer operations, and even move
way Airport for its Chicago service. Midway’s their existing hubbing activities, to other cities
problem is also related to ground access: con- that have more room for growth.
gested highways make trips to the airport long
even though Midway is closer to downtown Redistribution of operations appears to be oc-
Chicago than O’Hare. Another example is Peo- curring under the new routing freedom available
ple Express, which serves the New York area under the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Car-
from Newark. The Port Authority of New York riers are finding it easier to change their routes
and New Jersey has been offering incentives to and establish new “second-tier” hubs at less con-
passengers as well as airlines to increase the use gested airports. Between 1978 and 1980 the num-
of Newark Airport: improved ground access by ber of large hubs (handling more than 1 percent
train and express bus allows New York City pas- of total U.S. passenger traffic) fell from 26 to 24,
sengers to get to Newark without paying high in- while the number of medium hubs (handling
terstate taxi fares, and new airlines are offered 0,25 to 0.99 percent) increased from 33 to 36—a
market shift reflecting the distribution of opera-
51nterviews, FAA, Metropolitan Washington Airports, July 6, tions over more airports. This trend may accel-
1981. erate as regional carriers modify their patterns of
112 . Airport and Air Traffic Control System
service, and even the busiest airports such as gins or destinations in the local region; business
Atlanta and O’Hare, may see actual declines in and commercial GA (i.e., corporate aircraft and
both enplaned passengers and operations in the air taxis) delivering or picking up airline passen-
next 10 years. A similar decline in operations oc- gers will probably continue to use the major
curred at Kennedy Airport when international commercial airport.
flights were allowed to enter the United States at The process of diverting the personal GA traf-
other gateway cities. fic has already occurred at the Nation’s largest
major commercial airports. The fraction of GA
Reliever Airports activity at Atlanta, O’Hare, Kennedy, Los An-
In metropolitan areas where there is conges- geles International, etc., is very small (about 10
tion at the main airport and excess capacity at percent) because these regions have good alter-
surrounding airports, diversion of GA traffic nate secondary airports with high levels of traf-
would be effective in improving the use of air- fic. In fact, some of the large relievers such as
side capacity in the whole region. It would allow Van Nuys and Long Beach, Calif., Opa Locka,
a higher level of service for both air carrier and Fla., and Teterboro, N. Y., are among the busiest
general aviation, and in most metropolitan areas airports in the country in terms of annual opera-
there are smaller airports which might potential- tions. This trend toward establishing a system of
ly attract some GA traffic away from the main reliever airports is underway and has been en-
airport. For example, FAA lists 27 airports in the dorsed by many user groups and observers,
Chicago area, 51 around Los Angeles, and 52 in most recently the President’s Task Force on Air-
the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area. How- craft Crew Complement. e
ever, most of these airports are quite small, and
To be of maximum benefit the reliever airport
only a few have runways long enough to accom-
should be located so that approach and airspace
modate business jets or instrument landing
conflicts between the reliever and the commer-
equipment for bad-weather operations.
cial airport do not place capacity limits on both.
The FAA’s National Airport Systems Plan In the New York area, for example, instrument
(NASP) designates 155 airports as “satellites” or operations at Linden and Teterboro reliever air-
“relievers” to major airports, and NASP pro- ports must alternate with operations at the New-
vides for separate Airport Development Aid ark Airport. In addition, the noise consequences
Program (ADAP) funding to be set aside for re- of increasing operations at the reliever airport
lievers. Publicly owned reliever airports may use must be considered. Most reliever airports have,
ADAP funds for construction, installation of or will soon have, IFR landing aids and runway
safety equipment, and other eligible expendi- systems capable of handling sophisticated GA
tures. The 25 or so privately owned reliever air- aircraft. To be most attractive to users, airports
ports, although they presumably provide the should also have commercial services for aircraft
same benefit in terms of diverting traffic from servicing, repair and maintenance, ground
congested air carrier airports, are not eligible for transportation, and flight crew amenities. With
aid. Local and State governments may, how- sufficient amenities, such an airport might even
ever, use ADAP funds to help purchase private- attract some commuter airline service, although
ly owned reliever airports, and at least five transfers and interlining would be difficult un-
reliever airports have changed from private to less the airport is served by several carriers or
public ownership since 1973. One privately has excellent ground access to a major hub. In
owned reliever, Chicagoland (a reliever for some cases, however, the provision of better fa-
O’Hare) closed in 1978. Although the FAA re- cilities may not be sufficient to divert additional
liever program was initiated largely to segregate GA traffic away from major hub airports. In-
training activities from major commercial air- creased landing fees at the major airport can
ports in the interests of safety, it also provides
additional airport capacity for a certain type of ‘Report of the President’s Task Force on Aircraft Creu) Comple-
traffic—namely, personal GA aircraft with ori- ment (Washington, D. C.: July 2, 1981).
Ch. 6—Airport Capacity Alternatives ● 113
provide additional incentives for this shift, looked upon as a complement to the Federal pro-
and such pricing policies—the domain of local gram of investment in satellite airports.
government and airport authorities—could be
Expanding Existing Airports signers foresaw the need for growth and most
major airports were built where land was plenti-
Because runway availability is the major con- ful, but sites that were on the edge of town in
straint on airside capacity, one way to increase 1925 or 1948 are now in the middle of urban de-
capacity is to add more runways. A new long velopment. In some cases the airport itself at-
runway, properly equipped for independent IFR tracted businesses; in other cases development
operations can increase an airport’s capacity by simply resulted from good highways, suburbani-
20 to 50 percent depending on the original run- zation, and all the other forces which have
way configuration. caused urban areas to expand over the years.
Adding another runway, however, requires a Developed land tends to be expensive to buy: a
large amount of land. One 11,000-ft runway for recent study of the cost to acquire and clear land
large jet operations with its basic safety areas around some major air carrier airports estimated
covers 130 acres, and when other necessary these costs at between $100,000 and $200,000
“clear zones” are considered, an area three to per acre.8 Noise is among the largest environ-
four times that size would be directly affected. mental obstacles to airport expansion. Chicago-
Further, the additional operations enabled by O’Hare has sufficient land for an additional run-
the new runway would probably require land- way, but the runway has not been built in part
side additions such as new gates, terminal space, because it would cause unacceptable noise expo-
and parking for more passengers. Few airports sure in nearby neighborhoods. JFK Airport in
have the necessary land for this kind of expan- New York is surrounded by intensive develop-
sion, which could add approximately 10 percent ment on one side and a National Park and Wild-
to their present area, and for some airports like life Sanctuary on the other, making expansion
Washington National and La Guardia, the pros- unlikely. Dallas-Fort Worth, on the other hand,
pect is especially bleak. Even for larger airports, is planning an additional major new runway
obtaining proper spacing from other runways that is expected to ease some of the capacity lim-
would be extremely difficult. itations imposed by noise abatement procedures
and airspace conflicts with nearby Love Field.
A 1977 report by the Department of Trans-
portation (DOT) studied the possibility of major
expansion at 24 airports to meet projected needs Development of Secondary
for 1985-2000. Expansion was found to be “feasi- Runway Operations
ble” in only four of these cases, and none of At some airports where major expansion is
these four airports (Detroit, Houston, Minne- unlikely it may still be possible to add one short
apolis, and Pittsburgh) are among those which runway for smaller, slow-moving commuter and
are experiencing the greatest capacity problems. GA aircraft. This could improve airport capaci-
In 9 other cities the DOT study found expansion ty by diverting traffic from the longer runways
“feasible within major constraints,” and in 11 and may also provide a partial solution to the
cases it was considered “not feasible.” Both wake vortex problem (previously discussed).
economic and environmental reasons were cited Many airports routinely use short runways, or
for preventing the land acquisition. ’ Airport de- sections of long runways, for small aircraft dur-
‘Establishment of New Major Public Airports in the United t
States (Washington, D. C.: Federal Aviation Administration, ‘Louis H. Mayo, Jr., “Noise Compatible Land Uses in Airport
August 1977), p. 6-5. Environments, ” Environmental Comment, March 1979, p. 9.
114 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
ing good weather, but because of inadequate ture needs, rather than making do with what has
landing aids or spacing these runways cannot be evolved over time. Sufficient land could be pur-
used during bad weather; all-weather operations chased to allow for future growth and proper
would require additional navigational and ap- land-use controls could be applied so that noise
proach guidance equipment. compatibility problems do not arise again. In
some recent airport relocations, however, this
One study found that the use of short IFR run-
did not work as well as hoped. For example, at
ways for small aircraft was feasible at 11 of 30
both Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport and
major airports. Of these 11, suitable runways al-
Kansas City International Airport, built in the
ready existed at 3 airports, existing runways
mid-1970’s, encroachment by other land uses is
could be extended for use at 2 others, and at 6
again leading to complaints about airport noise.
airports space was available for short runways
On the other hand, Montreal’s new Mirabel Air-
to be constructed. The study estimated that the
port seems to have little problem with noise
value of reduced delays brought about by the
incompatibility; the airport itself covers 17,000
addition of such runways might be $450 million
acres, and is surrounded by an additional 21,000
to $810 million in current dollars between 1980
acres controlled by a specially created municipal
and 1990 at the airports shown in table 10. The
authority. However, its distance from the city
benefits would be unevenly distributed: Chi-
makes access a problem.
cago, Atlanta, Philadelphia, and Denver would
receive 80 to 85 percent of the estimated savings; Building a new airport also provides an op-
among the users, 86 to 89 percent of the savings portunity to add a large amount of new airside
from reduced delays would accrue to the air car- capacity to a region. The opening of Kansas City
riers. 9 International, for example, more than doubled
the available capacity in that hub from the esti-
A detailed study of the airfield and airspace at mated 195,000 operations at the old municipal
each airport would be needed to see if the short airport to about 445,000 with the new airport.
runway could really be constructed. Such stud- Love Field in Dallas handled 410,000 operations
ies done at Denver revealed two possible loca- in 1972; in 1977, after air carrier operations were
tions for a short GA runway. Construction of transferred to Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Air-
either one could lead to a 35 to 70 percent in- port, Love Field still had 310,000 operations
crease in hourly operations, depending on (mostly GA), while the new airport had 385,000.
weather conditions. Total cost was estimated at A 1977 investigation by DOT found that any-
about $10.8 million. 0 where from 2 to 19 new airports might be needed
in the United States by the year 2000, depending
Building New Airports on the growth rate assumed. When the study
examined the feasibility of new airport construc-
Another way to increase airport capacity is to
tion for 10 hub areas, it found it to be “feasible”
build a completely new airport to replace or sup-
in four instances, “doubtful” in four, and “not
plement the existing one, an alternative that is
feasible” in two. The reasons for the “doubtful”
especially attractive where landside facilities
and “not feasible” findings are related primarily
(terminals, baggage equipment, parking) are to site location, land acquisition, funding prob-
also outmoded or inadequate. A new site would lems, and the difficulty of providing adequate
provide the opportunity to design and build run- ground access to a remote location. The FAA’s
ways, terminals, and parking space to meet fu-
1980 NASP foresees the possibility of a new air-
port opening at Palmdale, Calif. (near Los Ange-
‘John D. Gardner, Feasibility of a Separate Short Runway for
Commuter and GeneraZ Aviation Traffic at Denz~er, prepared for
les), within the next 10 years; some initial work
the Federal Aviation Administration by The Mitre Corporation, on new airports at Atlanta and San Diego might
McLean, Va., May 1980, pp. 1-1. also be expected within the next decade. ’ 2
‘“John D. Gardner, Extensions to the Feasibility Study of a Sep-
arate Short Runway for Commuter and General Auiation Traffic ‘ ‘Establishment of New Major Public Airports, op. cit., p. 7-16.
at Denuer, prepared for the Federal Aviation Administration by “National Airport System Plan, Revised Statistics 1980-1989
The Mitre Corp., McLean, Va., September 1980, pp. 4-3 and 7-1. (Washington, D. C., Federal Aviation Administration, 1980) p. vi.
Ch. 6—Airport Capacity Alternatives • 115
SOURCE: J. D. Gardner, “Feasibility of a Separate Short Runway For Commuter and General Awatlon Traffic at Denver, ”
prepared for the Federal Aviation Administration by Mltre Corp., McLean, Va., May 1980.
Building a new airport is a huge undertaking. (which did not want the city to give up the close-
A new air carrier airport can represent an invest- in Lambert Airport). The project was debated
ment of $5 billion, to be shared among the air- for several years, but it was shelved after a
port sponsor (and local taxpayers), airport con- change in the St. Louis city government.
cessionaires, the airlines (through their landing
fees), and the Federal Government. Even a mod-
est-sized GA airport would cost several hundred
million dollars. The length of time required for
planning and construction of a large airport—
up to 10 years —can also add substantially to
costs. Political and institutional factors can also
pose substantial difficulties. Building an airport
requires agreement from existing air carriers to
move to the new facilities, but while a new air-
port can reduce delays it will also increase airline
costs, and they must be convinced that the bene-
fits will outweigh the costs. Further, approval
and support of a number of State, county, and
municipal governments, not to mention high-
way districts, zoning commissions, and various
citizens’ interest groups, must also be secured.
In some cases the divergent interests of dif-
ferent governments and constituencies can snarl
the process. In St. Louis, for example, a site for a
new airport was selected across the Mississippi
River in Illinois. The Illinois State government
was a major supporter of the project, as were the
St. Louis city government and FAA. The oppo-
nents included citizens groups of the county
where the new airport would be located (who
objected on environmental grounds), the State
of Missouri (which did not want the airport Photo credit: Federal Aviation Adrninistration
moved out of the State), and groups in St. Louis The design of a modern airport: Dallas-Fort Worth
116 • Airport and Air Traffic Control System
predict the likelihood of wake vortexes at tury. One reason for this delayed schedule may
greater distances and higher altitudes than the be the international agreement to maintain ILS
Chicago system now does. However even this until 1995; and another reason is the reluctance
prototype system has been credited with allow- of users, principally the airlines, to install MLS
ing reduced average separations, and thus more avionics in aircraft already equipped with ILS
operations per hour, at O’Hare. There are no avionics.
current FAA plans for implementing full scale
wake vortex advisory systems at other airports. Reducing Separation or
Spacing Minimums
Microwave Landing System (MLS) Several studies have suggested that where
wake vortex is not a problem (for example,
As discussed in chapter 5, MLS allows air- where aircraft have similar performance charac-
space to be used more efficiently than the cur- teristics) it maybe possible to reduce separations
rent ILS, since aircraft would be able to ap- from 3 nmi to as little as 2.5 or 2 nmi. The
proach the airport on curved paths, as they do amount of time each aircraft spends on the run-
under visual conditions, and turn onto their way is another constraint in reducing separa-
final approach much closer to the runway.” tions, and depends on such factors as the num-
Variable MLS glide slope angles could also pro- ber and spacing of the exits, visibility, runway
vide a partial solution to the long separations surface conditions, and the performance charac-
required to avoid wake vortex; with MLS, the teristics of the aircraft. In general, small, light
trailing aircraft could avoid the vortex by ap- aircraft spend less time on the runway than
proaching the runway at a steeper angle than the large, heavy ones. According to surveys, most
lead aircraft. airports have an average runway occupancy
Models suggest that where the traffic mix con- time of between 41 and 63 seconds for landing,
tains a variety of fast and slow aircraft, the use although these figures do not include the rare
of variable glide slopes could allow some capaci- snowy or icy days when separations might have
ty improvements—perhaps around 10 to 15 per- to be extended to allow time for aircraft to brake
cent. However, where aircraft have similar per- safely and exit the runway. Where the average
formance characteristics, MLS landing proce- runway occupancy time is so seconds or less, it
dures would offer about the same capacity as has been suggested that the minimum separation
current ILS procedures. MLS would also allow could safely be reduced to 2.5 nmi instead of 3
the restructuring of airspace at some airports, so nmi. Greater reductions might be possible
that small aircraft can approach the airport in a through automated metering and spacing.
separate arrival stream from jets and make use Another way of increasing airfield capacity is
of a separate short runway. The Dash-7 aircraft to reduce the required spacing between run-
in Ransome Airlines’ Washington-Philadelphia ways. For example, runways must be 4,300 ft
service use MLS equipment to land on short run- apart for simultaneous IFR operations to take
ways. place. Reduction of this minimum to 3,500 or
MLS equipment has been developed, tested, 3,000 ft would enable some airports to make use
and accepted for international use. Field evalua- of more of their runways during IFR conditions.
tion is taking place at such airports as Washing- Minimum spacing standards have been reduced
ton National, and FAA has published a plan for before (e.g., from 5,000 to 4,300 ft for independ-
full-scale implementation beginning in the ent parallel IFR runways in the early 1960’s) as a
mid-1980’s and to continuing into the next cen- result of improvements in surveillance equip-
ment and procedures.
“An Analysis of the Requirements For and the Benefits and “William J. Swedish, Evaluation of the Potential for Reduced
Costs of the National Microwave Landing System, Volume 1 Longitudinal Sparing on Final Approach, prepared for the Federal
(Washington, D. C.: Federal Aviation Administration, June 1980), Aviation Administration by The Mitre Corp., McLean, Va., p.
p. 2-3. 4-1.
118 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
FAA is also investigating the possibility of al- instructions to change speed or direction in
lowing instrument approaches to triple parallel order to arrive at the runway threshold at the
runways during poor visibility. Currently triple proper time. Using this manual system the con-
parallels can be used only during good visibility. troller’s training and experience allow him to
One of these three runways might be a short deliver aircraft to the runway threshold with an
runway for commuter or GA aircraft. Efficient error (standard deviation) of about 18 seconds.l9
use of triple parallels would require redesign of
It has been suggested that an automated sys-
the airspace and approach patterns, a higher
tem could provide more accurate metering and
degree of coordination between approach con-
spacing. In such a system, the ATC computer
trollers than is currently the case, and possible
could analyze radar and transponder data di-
modifications to the ILS. MLS, with its greater
rectly and compute future aircraft location with
flexibility and navigational precision, might be
great accuracy, then generate commands de-
useful in bringing this procedure into practical
signed to deliver each aircraft at a specific time
use. Use of triple parallels could make it possible
and thereby optimize the use of the runway’s
to make use of more existing runways during
capacity. It has been suggested that an auto-
poor weather, as at O’Hare, or even to allow
mated system could reduce the delivery error to
construction of new runways which are infeasi-
ble under current procedures. Capacity im- about 11 seconds.20 The automated concept has
been under development at FAA for about 10
provements would depend on traffic mix and on
years but has not yet been approved for imple-
whether the runways had sufficient spacing to
mentation. FAA states that the computerized
allow independent operations. Models indicate
methods developed so far are not as reliable as a
that triple parallel runway systems might handle
human controller. In addition, FAA believes
up to 50 percent more IFR operations than dou-
automated terminal metering and spacing will
ble parallels with traffic mixes typical of today’s
not be of much value unless it can be tied in with
major airports.l 7
en route metering and other aspects of ATC
A number of airports have been identified automation now under development (see ch. 5).
which might benefit from either reduced spacing
standards or from use of triple parallel ap-
preaches. 18 However, site-specific analyses of Cockpit Engineering
the airfield and airspace of each candidate air-
Advances in technology are in fact changing
port are needed to measure the capacity benefits,
costs, and safety effects of these proposed the basic character of the cockpit. Electrome-
changes. chanical instruments are being replaced with
electronic displays that present full-color images
Automated Metering and Spacing with a very high degree of resolution. Comput-
ers are also expanding the range of functions
The controller’s ability to meter aircraft—to that can be performed by aircrew. Advanced
deliver them to a specific point at a specific navigation aids such as area naviation (RNAV)
time—is based on aircraft speed and position as make it possible to navigate from point to point
shown on the radar screen and the controller’s without following established airways. The FAA
has suggested the use of a data link to improve
‘ ‘T. N. Shimi, W. J. Swedish, and L. C. Newman, Requirements the quality of the information available in the
for lnstrurnent Approaches to Triple Parallel Runways, prepared
for the Federal Aviation Administration by The Mitre Corp., cockpit. A cockpit display of traffic information
McLean, Va., 1981, p, E-7. (CDTI), currently under investigation at the Na-
‘“L. C. Newman, T. N. Shimi, and W. J. Swedish, Sur-ocy of 101
U.S. Airports for New Multipfe Approach Concepts, prepared for “New Engineering and Development initiatives—Polic y and
the Federal Aviation Administration by The Mitre Corp., McLean, Technology Choices, coordinated by Economic and Science Plan-
Va., 1981, p. xxiv, 5-4, 6-2; and A. L, Haines and W. J. Swedish, ning, Inc. (Washington, D. C.: Federal Aviation Administration,
Requirements for Independent and Dependent Parallel instrument March 1979) p. 107.
Approaches at Reduced Runway Spacing, prepared for the Federal 20
Parameters of Future A TC Systems Relating to Airport Capac-
Aviation Administration by The Mitre Corp., McLean, Va., 1981, ity/Delay (Washington, D. C.: Federal Aviation Administration,
passim. June 1978).
Ch. 6—Airport Capacity Alternatives ● 119
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration airport and airway facilities are used. There
could show pilots the locations of nearby air- have been suggestions that the distribution of
craft, thus reducing their dependence on ground the decisionmaking function in the ATC system
surveillance. Both RNAV and CDTI offer pilots must or should be changed to take advantage of
significant independence from controllers, and the capabilities these technological advances
this could increase the effectiveness with which have made possible (see ch. 5).
SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVES
The alternatives discussed above all make use the other hand, rely on the application and en-
of some combination of economic, regulatory, forcement of regulatory measures to deal with
or technological tools to reduce delay or increase the delay problem. Automated metering and
airside capacity. For example, peak-hour pricing spacing is a technological tool, but its use will re-
is an economic alternative—allowing the market quire changes in existing rules and standards.
to allocate scarce airport capacity. Quotas, on Table 11 summarizes the alternatives discussed
Economic
Alternative incentives Regulation Technology Comments
Demand-related
Peak hour pricing ● Could be implemented by local airport authority.
Devising and managing the pricing scheme may
be complex, but it could provide a substantial
long-term payoff in reduced delay.
Quotas ● Could be implemented by local authority or FAA.
Would provide some short-term relief for con-
gestion and delay problems but is an inefficient
long-term solution. FAA has already imposed
quotas at 4 airports since 1969.
Balanced use of ● Could be implemented by local authority which
metropolitan airports might use economic incentives, improved ac-
cess, and better facilities to encourage use of
underutilized airports; or could use regulation to
impose it.
Change of airline ● Airlines may voluntarily shift some of their
service patterns hubbing activities to less congested airports to
save delay. (This trend seems to already be
underway.) The FAA might also be able to
achieve this redistribution by regulation. This
would make better use of airport capacity na-
tionwide, but might do little to reduce delays at
congested airports.
Reliever airports ● FAA has already designated reliever airports.
Many are well used by GA traffic. Local
authorities encourage this trend with pricing
strategies, better facilities, or regulations requir-
ing use of relievers by certain classes of users.
Relievers have been and will continue to be suc-
cessful in providing capacity for GA operations
away from congested commercial airports.
Airport development
Airport expansion ● Responsibility of local authorities, possibly with
Federal aid. Could greatly increase capacity,
but is unlikely in many locations because of sur-
rounding development or environmental prob-
lems.
120 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
Economic
Alternative incentives Regulation Technology Comments
above and indicates generally what types of local conditions of runway configuration and
tools—economic, regulatory, or technological— traffic mix. The addition of new runways is
would be required to implement them. The com- clearly effective in increasing capacity, but this
ments in table 11 touch on several points—who option is available to only a limited number of
can implement the change, whether it would airports. In a few cases, short runways could be
make a large or small change in capacity, and constructed to increase capacity by separating
how likely it is to take place in the short or long jet and propellor traffic. New airport construc-
term. tion also offers large capacity gains, but they
would likely be further from cities and therefore
In general, the demand-related alternatives do
face the problem of ground access. Reliever or
not increase capacity; rather, they reduce delay
satellite airports to move GA out of air carrier
by molding traffic activity to fit existing capaci-
airports are necessary unless the growth of both
ty. Modest capacity gains are available through
user groups is to be severely limited, but reliever
ATC improvements that increase the efficiency
airports will also be constrained by land prices,
with which airfield and airspace are used, espe-
noise impacts, and community acceptance.
cially under IFR conditions, but the benefit
available to each airport is heavily dependent on
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Contents
Page
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Air System Growth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Airport Capacity Alternatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
ATC System Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Computer Replacement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Automated En Route Air Traffic Control (AERA). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Mode S Data Link. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Collision Avoidance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Microwave Landing System (MLS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Funding and Cost Allocation Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
General Fund.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Trust Fund. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Operating Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Pending Legislation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
System Modernization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Airport Development Aid. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Trust Fund Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
User Taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
FIGURE
Figure No. Page
29. Airport and AirwaysTrust Fund Expenditures, 1971-80. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Chapter 7
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The letter from the House Committee on Ap- aspects of air system evolution that may be of
propriations requesting this assessment indicated particular concern to the Congress in evaluating
the following areas of concern: the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA)
1982 National Airspace System (NAS) Plan .
● scenarios of future air transportation
growth; The following discussion is organized under
● alternative ways to increase airport and ter- three major headings. Under each heading is a
minal capacity; brief statement of findings followed by a discus-
● proposed modifications of air traffic control sion of specific problems and implications. A
(ATC) system technology; and fourth section deals briefly with the related ques-
● alternatives to the present ATC process. tions of funding and cost allocation, which must
OTA’s analysis of these subjects is presented in also be addressed in the years ahead. The final
chapters 4, 5, and 6; this chapter summarizes the section reviews recent congressional reports on
major points emerging from those analyses and these subjects and identifies the relevant legisla-
examines their implications in terms of congres- tion now pending before Congress.
sional interests. The intent is to highlight those
125
126 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
● There is disagreement about the exact distri- use of automated and remote facilities
bution of this future growth among user will be required.
groups, but the forecasts generally agree
that general aviation (GA), and especially Discussion
air taxis and corporate aircraft equipped for
IFR operations, will be the fastest growing Forecasts of aviation activity are subject to
category. GA may account for as much as three principal kinds of uncertainties, all of
75 percent of the increase in tower work- which affect the accuracy and usefulness of the
load, particularly if FAA (as planned) in- resulting projections of airport and ATC system
creases the number of towered GA and re- demands:
liever airports. Commuter operations will ● There is no common purpose or focus—
increase moderately, on the other hand, airline forecasts concentrate primarily on
and air carrier operations (not passenger measures of carrier profitability, aerospace
traffic) may actually decline at some hubs. forecasts on potential aircraft markets, and
• The relatively rapid growth of GA demand, FAA forecasts on ATC workloads.
● All of the projections nevertheless employ a
combined with the slower growth of com-
muter and air carrier operations, could similar methodology and rely on similar
have several effects on the U.S. airport and demographic and economic expectations.
ATC system: Specifically, the forecasts assume a continu-
—Unconstrained growth of operations at ation of the past relationship between gross
major hubs would lead to saturation at 15 national product growth and increased de-
to 20 airports by 2000, compared with 5 mand for air travel. As a result, common-
to 10 airports today. Growth rates above mode failure is possible—the forecasts
4 percent annually, which are possible could all be wrong for the same reason.
● All of the forecasts are subject to factors
but unlikely, might result in saturation at
whose future influence can only be guessed
—all 50 of the top air carrier airports by the
at, including the price and availability of
end of the century.
fuel, the effects of airline deregulation, the
—In the absence of capacity improvements
resulting changes in industry structure, the
at saturated hubs, increasing congestion
long-term impacts of the air controllers
and delay will probably result in further
redistribution of air carrier operations strike, the uncertain availability of financ-
(especially transfer functions) away from ing for reequipping airline fleets, and future
changes in Federal aviation policy or cost
saturated major hubs to “second tier”
hubs where surplus capacity still exists. allocation.
–Similarly, GA traffic is likely to be As a result, there is general agreement on the
shifted out of more and more air carrier likelihood of future growth, but little certainty
hubs to reliever and other GA airports. about its magnitude, and still less about the
This will create a demand for improved more important questions of when and where
facilities at those airports. growth will occur or what its impact will be on
—As a result, the principal opportunities the Nation’s airport and ATC system.
for capacity expansion will come not at
the major hub airports but rather at the Continued growth along historic patterns
second-tier hubs and at GA and reliever would exacerbate congestion and delay at hubs
that are already saturated and would probably
airports, as well as at the air route traffic
spread these problems to additional airports.
control centers and flight service stations.
This would present two possible courses of re-
If these increases in ATC system capacity
sponse:
are to be provided without greatly in-
creasing FAA’s operation and mainte- . accommodate the growth wherever it oc-
nance (O&M) expenditures, expanded curs (as FAA has done in the past) by at-
Ch. 7—Policy /replications . 127
tempting to expand the capacity of affected basing their operations at second-tier hubs. Al-
hubs; or though this trend may involve a small decrease
● channel the growth, either actively or pas- in the operational efficiency of system users, it
sively, so that it can be accommodated at would greatly increase the efficiency with which
other hubs. the airport and ATC system’s aggregate capacity
is utilized.
Neither of these courses will be applicable in all
situations, and in most cases the solution will in- Growing congestion could have serious impli-
volve some combination of the two; finding the cations for commuter and GA users, who would
proper balance will require a case-by-case analy- beat a considerable disadvantage in any compe-
sis of their relative costs and benefits. tition for access to congested hubs. Neither user
group is likely to be completely priced or regu-
Adding new capacity at congested hubs—in
lated out of major hubs, but growing congestion
the form of new runways or entirely new air-
may nevertheless prove to be a significant con-
ports—could be extremely expensive in relation
straint on their future growth. Additional GA
to the number of additional operations that can
operations might be accommodated at reliever
be accommodated. There are, however, a num-
and other GA airports; this would make more
ber of traffic management techniques that could
capacity available at existing hubs, but it could
increase the efficiency with which existing ca- also lead to additional FAA investments and
pacity is utilized at airports and terminal areas operating costs for new towers at lightly used
that are already saturated. GA airports. (FAA plans have called for as
There are clear indications that market forces many as 50 new towers by 1993, but its experi-
have already begun to alter the historical pat- ence in closing over 60 low-volume towers since
terns of demand distribution. Some airlines, the PATCO walkout justifies a review of these
faced with high delay costs and strike-related re- plans. ) Commuter carriers, on the other hand,
strictions at congested hubs, are finding it attrac- will continue to require access to hub airports,
tive to move some of their “hubbing” or transfer since most of their passengers transfer to other
operations to well-equipped second-tier hubs flights, Rehubbing by major airlines will not
where available capacity exists and delay costs change this requirement and might even create
can be avoided. Local service airlines, with the additional complications in commuter routes
new route and entry freedom of deregulation, and operations, although it might also create
are beginning to increase the number of direct- new market opportunities for commuter air-
service flights, and, consequently, to decrease lines. In addition, commuter and GA users will
the number of transfer operations. New entrants generate most of the new demand for en route
and low-cost carriers, unencumbered by large and flight services.
investments in facilities at congested hubs, are
would not necessarily eliminate the prob- of weather and traffic conditions. The Micro-
lem of delay: latent demand at a popular wave Landing System (MLS) might also allow a
airport could quickly consume new capaci- small increase in the number of Instrument
ty, and the length of delay would remain Flight Rules (IFR) operations under certain con-
the same. ditions of traffic mix. In general, mostly because
. Major increases in the physical capacity of a of the separation required by the danger of wake
hub would require building new runways or vortex, there will be no significant ATC-related
entire new airports. Such major improve- increase in the number of aircraft operations
ments are unlikely to be made in the near that can be handled by a given runway, airport,
future because of the unavailability or high or terminal area.
price of land, costs of construction, and
noise and other environmental constraints. Past Federal, State, and local airport policy
• If growth continues, however, some new has been to provide new capacity where demand
major airports may have to be built. Since seemed to warrant it, if at all possible. Most of
they are likely to be some distance from the today’s congested airports have gone through
center city, the success of these airports will periods of major expansion, only to become sat-
depend upon suitable high-speed ground ac- urated by subsequent growth. As urban trans-
cess. (Dunes International Airport demon- portation planners have discovered, additional
strates the need for such access. ) capacity is not always the solution to the prob-
● Congestion at large hub airports may in-
lem of delay. Building a new lane does not ap-
duce use of a variety of techniques to maxi- preciably ease traffic jams on a busy freeway,
mize effective capacity, including hourly for instance, because new traffic is attracted by
quotas and peak-hour pricing. GA users are the improved link and delays quickly reach the
likely to be the major losers in competition previous level. The same principle applies to
for slots at congested airports, although many hub airports: the busier an airport is, the
these restrictions might also constrain the more demand there is for access to it, simply be-
growth of commuter carrier operations. cause it is busy and thus offers a wide choice of
● If air carriers continue to redistribute their
connections and services. Adding new capacity
transfer operations to second-tier hubs, may merely tap this latent demand—the airport
some added investment will be required at can accommodate those it couldn’t handle be-
these airports. fore, but the new traffic quickly saturates the ad-
● In the near term, two forms of capacity ex-
ditional capacity and delay soon rises to previ-
pansion can be helpful: 1) construction at ous levels. This doesn’t mean that expansion is
congested airports of separate, short run- futile, but it should be evaluated in terms of its
ways, equipped for instrument operations, benefits and the available alternatives.
for use by small aircraft; and 2) construc- If expansion proves impractical, the 15 to 20
tion or improvement of reliever airports to airports that will become saturated by the end of
accommodate GA traffic diverted from the century will probably have to make wider
congested commercial airports. use of demand-managing alternatives—peak-
hour pricing, quotas, or access restrictions—to
Discussion deal with the problems of congestion and delay.
These tools do not increase peak capacity; they
Some improvements can be expected from shift traffic to a time or place where it can be bet-
changes in ATC equipment or procedures in ter handled, thus increasing effective capacity.
congested terminal areas; but the net effect on Pricing schemes to ration scarce landing slots
delay would be quite small. For instance, com- place the greatest burden on operators of small
puterized airfield/airspace management might aircraft, since they have a smaller base of pas-
allow better utilization of existing physical capa- sengers over which to spread cost. Administra-
city, so that actual operations would approach tive quotas may also tend to favor larger air-
the theoretical maximum for each combination craft, which serve more passengers and generate
Ch. 7—Policy Implications . 129
higher landing fees. In either case, commuters they would add more capacity relative to cost
and GA users will have the greatest difficulty in than a new mixed-traffic runway.
competing for slots at crowded airports. Not all
Another means of separating traffic that will
GA activity could be displaced, since some GA
become increasingly important is the diversion
flights must use the main airport to deliver
of some GA traffic from commercial airports to
passengers connecting with commercial flights.
reliever airports. This technique has some draw-
Even at the busiest airports GA operations cur-
backs. For example, users may resist going to a
rently tend to average about 10 percent of total
“second best” airport which may not offer the
operations.
same services or ground access as the commer-
The separation of fast and slow (or jet and cial airport. On the other hand, a properly
prop) traffic is one ATC procedure that could equipped GA reliever can often provide better
benefit both types of traffic. Most GA and com- service to nonscheduled private traffic than the
muter aircraft can use shorter runways than main airport could. Constructing, improving, or
those required for large jet liners, and at some upgrading these airports would be largely the re-
busy commercial airports the construction of sponsibility of local authorities, but Federal as-
short runways equipped for instrument opera- sistance (in the form of the Airport Development
tions could allow continued accommodation of Aid Program (ADAP) or other grants) is cur-
commuter and GA aircraft, and at the same rently available for the 155 reliever airports in-
time, could also allow some secondary increase cluded in the NAS Plan. The level of funding for
in jet aircraft operations. These separate, short relievers in the recent past has been a little under
runways would be especially important for com- 25 percent of all grants for GA airports, or 4 to 6
muter carriers whose business depends on being percent of all airport grants.
able to land at major airports, and in many cases
of aircraft could thus be handled by a controller to the needed investments in facilities and equip-
team. On the other hand, this load would almost ment to implement the system. A corollary issue
certainly be heavier than human operators could will be the costs and benefits to various classes
handle in the event of computer failure. As a of airspace users. The information to support
result, the AERA concept includes provisions for judgments on these matters is not now available,
automated backup for automated functions, as and OTA can reach no conclusion beyond the
well as a computer design that will allow the general observation that resolving these issues is
system to “coast” safely while backup pro- likely to be far more important than seeking an-
cedures are being initiated. swers to the rather narrow question of technical
It must be emphasized that at present AERA is feasibility.
only in an early stage of development. Extensive
efforts over perhaps 5 to 10 years will be needed Mode S Data Link
to bring AERA to a precise and detailed defini- Another key element in the FAA’s overall plan
tion of requirements and equipment specifica- for improving the ATC system is the Mode S
tions. data link, an improvement to the secondary sur-
veillance radar that allows properly equipped
Three major features of AERA are already ap-
aircraft to be interrogated selectively by ground
parent. First, AERA would require computer
stations. Mode S provides greater surveillance
capacity and software substantially beyond that
accuracy than the present Air Traffic Control
now available in ATC applications, although
Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS) equipment and
not beyond the present or readily foreseeable
avoids the problem of “synchronous garble” that
state of technology. Second, AERA will require
occurs when more than one aircraft respond si-
a two-way data link capable of rapid and exten-
multaneously to interrogation. The discrete
sive exchange of information between the air
address capability also provides a two-way
and the ground. FAA now envisions that Mode
ground-to-air data link to transmit clearances,
S will provide this data link, but other possibili-
weather information, traffic advisories, control
ties could be considered. Third, AERA implies a
instructions, and flight data automatically in a
like degree of automation in the terminal areas
digital format without using VHF voice chan-
and in a central flow management facility
nels. The Mode S data link feature provides the
capable of coordinating traffic throughout the
basis for automation of ATC functions and
ATC system. This last point is particularly im-
other system improvements in the years beyond
portant for both short-term computer replace-
1990.
ment and long-term system design, since it im-
plies the advisability of procuring a computer Mode S has been under development by FAA
having a modular architecture. This would for nearly 10 years at an estimated cost to date
make it possible for en route and terminal facil- of $58 million. The first prototype unit was de-
ities to utilize similar hardware and software; it livered for test and evaluation in 1978, and a
would also encourage a flexible system design, contract for initial production will be awarded
in which individual modules would be capable in 1982. FAA has not yet issued a formal imple-
of mutual support and backup in the event of mentation plan, but the preliminary plan calls
partial equipment failure. for a multiyear procurement and deployment
starting in 1986, at 197 sites—97 in terminal
Close scrutiny by Congress will be needed as
areas and 36 in the en route system, plus 60 for
FAA’s plans mature. One major issue is likely to
low-altitude coverage and 4 at support facilities.
be the acceptability to the users and controllers
of an ATC system automated to the degree envi-
sioned in the AERA concept, especially its safety Deployment at these 197 sites would not con-
and operational reliability. A second major issue stitute full implementation of Mode S. Addi-
will be evaluation of the savings in operation tional installations, which would not be com-
and maintenance ascribed to AERA, compared pleted until early in the next century, might be
732 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
needed at another 100 sites to provide coverage ● it is compatible with the present ATC sys-
down to 6,000 ft for the continental United tem and is a logical extension of it;
States and perhaps portions of Hawaii and ● it offers a range of capabilities suitable to
Alaska. the needs of the various classes of airspace
users; and
An issue that will need to be addressed during ● it is more suitable for use in high-density
examination of the plans for Mode S has to do
traffic than the Beacon Collision Avoidance
with the extent to which a Mode S transponder
System (BCAS), the system that was fa-
would be required before permitting an aircraft
vored by the FAA prior to the TCAS deci-
to enter airspace or receive services (e.g. access
sion.
to and operation in a terminal control area
[TCA]). Mode S and ATCRBS Mode C are com- TCAS provides the user with protection from
patible, so that in the short run either system other aircraft regardless of whether they are
would qualify users to operate in TCA. GA op- equipped with TCAS or the standard ATCRBS
erators, however, have expressed concern that transponder. In the active mode, TCAS interro-
the Mode S format would eventually supplant gates other aircraft to determine whether they
ATCRBS Modes A and C and that they would are threats. TCAS also identifies potential
be required to reequip their aircraft with Mode S threats from ATCRBS-equipped aircraft by
transponders. This concern would be reduced by monitoring their replies to interrogations from
assurances that ATCRBS could be utilized for an the ground. A central feature of TCAS is the use
extended period following the initial implemen- of the Mode S transponder for the communica-
tation of Mode S. tion of data between aircraft. TCAS 1, the sys-
tem intended for use by general aviation, pro-
Collision Avoidance vides general Mode S capability and would cost
$2,500 to $3,500 per aircraft. TCAS II, the ver-
The primary function of air traffic control is sion intended for use by commercial aircraft,
to assure the safe separation of aircraft. In the would cost between $40,000 and $50,000 per set,
present system, this is accomplished by control- plus the cost of antennas and installation. Some
lers on the ground using surveillance radar and believe these estimates to be low. TCAS requires
computer aids; when conflict is detected, the essentially no expenditures by FAA, except for
controllers use voice radio to advise pilots of development and certification costs; but since it
traffic or instruct them to perform appropriate will require Mode S for identification and data
avoidance maneuvers. At present, the pilot has link, aircraft equipped with TCAS will be pre-
no instrument or display in the cockpit to iden- pared to take advantage of any new services re-
tify potential threats or to indicate a maneuver quiring data link that may be offered by FAA.
that would resolve a conflict.
Although FAA has decided that it will certify
For many years, FAA (in cooperation with the TCAS as the collision avoidance system to be
aviation community) has investigated a number used in the United States, not all features of the
of collision avoidance systems that would pro- system have been developed and demonstrated.
vide a backup (rather than a substitute) for the The TCAS II direction-finding antenna is of crit-
current ATC procedures and ground-based sep- ical importance: there is some question regard-
aration assurance service. During the summer of ing the aerodynamic effects of the antenna on
1981, FAA selected a system known as TCAS. aircraft performance, particularly the perform-
FAA plans for TCAS to be operational by the ance of tactical military aircraft. TCAS I, on the
end of 1984, a goal that is considered by some to other hand, has been demonstrated; but it is not
be optimistic. FAA has justified the choice of clear how useful this more basic form will be
TCAS on the following grounds: since it only indicates the proximity of another
. it does not require ground-based equip- aircraft without providing either bearing or
ment; range.
Ch. 7—Policy Implications . 133
Prior to selecting TCAS, FAA was pursuing with 1,200 to 1,400 systems eventually installed.
development of active BCAS. Because there was In the first phase, between 10 and 25 systems
concern that omnidirectional BCAS might inter- will be installed at selected airports in order to
fere with the surveillance system in congested develop a base of experience and reach an empi-
areas by saturating ATCRBS transponders, FAA rical determination of the benefits that can be
was also planning to base conflict resolution in realized. The second phase would be the installa-
areas of high traffic density on DABS/Auto- tion of 900 MLS units at the rate of 100 to 150
matic Traffic Advisory and Resolution Service per year for a period of 6 to 9 years, with prior-
(ATARS), a ground-based system that would re- ity given to large and medium hub airports and
quire expenditures of $518 million to equip ter- those where ILS siting problems exist. The third
minal and en route facilities. The decision to phase would consist of installing of an addition-
adopt TCAS has led FAA to reevaluate the need al 300 to 500 systems to meet the growth in de-
for DABS/ATARS. mand anticipated during the remainder of this
century. FAA estimates the cost of 1,425 MLS
Microwave Landing System ground systems to be $1.332 billion (1981 dol-
lars), and users will be required to spend an ad-
Another important component in the FAA’s ditional $895 million for avionics if they wish to
development plans is MLS, a precision landing take advantage of this service.
aid designed as a replacement for the Instrument OTA finds that the FAA’s analysis of MLS
Landing System (ILS) that has been in use since benefits and costs does not establish a clear and
the early 1940’s. MLS is less sensitive to interfer- universal case for MLS as opposed to ILS, and
ence and distortions than ILS and will work at that for this reason the FAA plan for a first
sites where it is difficult or impossible to install phase to gain the operational experience before
ILS. It is also anticipated that MLS equipment the full deployment of MLS is entirely reason-
will be more reliable than ILS. The chief opera- able. However, at the end of the initial phase, it
tional advantage of MLS is that it permits vari- would be appropriate to conduct a comprehen-
able glide slopes, curved and segmented ap- sive review of the MLS program before proceed-
proaches, and precision missed approaches, ing with further implementation. A part of this
where ILS does not. This would allow traffic to review should be development of additional in-
be routed around noise-sensitive areas and crements or intermediate steps between the 25
would also allow greater flexibility in handling sites planned for Phase I and the 900 planned for
traffic in crowded TCAS. MLS can operate on Phase II. Another part of this review should be
200 channels (compared to 20 for ILS) making it more specific benefit-cost analyses that differen-
possible to provide precision landing aid in areas tiate and specify the benefits at various airports
where closely spaced airports limit the availabil- in terms of levels of traffic, the types of users
ity of ILS channels. served, and the resulting reductions in noise,
FAA has announced plans to implement MLS delay, or fuel consumption.
in three phases over the coming 11 to 16 years,
Historically, such expenditures have been fi- that such a stalemate delays the funding of the
nanced from the Airport and Airways Trust FAA’s proposed programs, some of the follow-
Fund, which lapsed in October 1980 but had an ing courses of action might have to be consid-
uncommitted balance of about $3 billion at the ered:
end of fiscal year 1981. This sum would cover ● keep the existing equipment running as well
less than 20 percent of the 1982-91 programs as possible, with administrative restrictions
contemplated by FAA. on traffic levels as needed to keep demand
within capacity;
Congress has two basic options to provide ● cut back on the proposed plans, dispensing
funding for the developing airports and airways
with some improvements and funding only
over the coming years. One would be to cover
those for which there is the greatest or most
these expenditures wholly by appropriations
immediate need;
from general funds. The other involves funding ● stretch out the procurement process over a
through user charges by reestablishment of the
longer period of time, in order to hold ex-
trust fund in some form, including:
penditures within the available revenues; or
● Reestablishment of the trust fund with a ● consider alternative technologies or funding
revenue and user charges similar to those mechanisms that shift more of the cost of
which existed prior to October 1980. This the system to airspace users.
would not cover the 1982-91 program of
capital spending if—as in the past—some Discussion
trust fund revenues were also spent for
O&M. Capital expenditures for airport capacity im-
● Reestablishment of the trust fund, retaining provements and new ATC technology planned
the present forms of funding but increasing for the coming decade would result in a sharp in-
user charges to make revenues match pro- crease in the FAA budget compared to the fund-
jected expenditures. Rates could be raised ing levels of the past 10 years. The combined
either uniformly (across the board) or selec- expenditures for airport grants-in-aid, for ATC
tively (to alter the mix of contributions facilities and equipment (F&E), and for associ-
from various user classes). ated research, engineering, and development
● Reestablishment of the trust fund, but with (RE&D) were in the range of $0.95 billion to
a different form of user charges. Existing ex- $1.35 billion per year (in constant 1980 dollars)
cise taxes might be replaced with user levies between 1971 and 1980 (see fig. 29). * Capital ex-
that would reflect more accurately the mag- penditures for fiscal year 1982 to fiscal year 1991
nitude of the benefits received by various could total between $16 billion and $19 billion
classes of users, or by a system that would (1980 dollars), with $4.5 billion to $6 billion
charge individual users in relation to the allocated to airport grants in aid, $10 billion to
costs they impose on the airport and air- $11 billion for F&E, and $1.5 billion to $2 billion
ways system. for RE&D. The combined outlay in these cate-
gories would amount to $1.6 billion to $1.9 bil-
All of these options would be controversial lion per year, a real increase of 50 to 75 percent
and would exacerbate many long-standing issues over the 1971-80 average.
pertaining to access to the system, user cost allo-
cation, and subsidies to aviation. The search for A large part of airport expenditures through-
a solution is further complicated by the fact that out the 1982-91 period would be allocated to ca-
the cost of operating the airport and airways pacity increases at congested hub airports and
system would also be rising at the same time. development of GA reliever airports to take
The disagreements over funding airport and some of the pressure off large and medium hubs.
airways improvements are so wide, and the
sums so large, that the debate could conceivably *In fiscal year 1980, the total in these three categories was $950
extend over a number of years. To the degree million; in fiscal year 1981, $885 million.
Ch. 7—Policy Implications ● 135
Many Members of Congress have voiced strong through the annual appropriations process. On
opposition to reestablishing the trust fund or in- the other hand, financing from general revenues
creasing the present user taxes so long as there is has several major disadvantages: it introduces
a large uncommitted balance in the trust fund. additional uncertainty in to the funding process
Sponsors of the various bills have pointed out and might make it difficult to plan and imple-
that reauthorization of trust fund taxes in some ment long-range programs, which might be can-
form will be necessary to provide revenue for celed or delayed during periods of budget auster-
projected airport and ATC capital improve- ity, perhaps to the detriment of the national
ments. They also point out that the trust fund is airspace system. A corollary disadvantage is
consistent with the position of the present Ad- that the FAA’s capital programs might have to
ministration that, e.g., whenever the Federal compete with operational expenses for a share of
Government provides a service directly to a par- the FAA budget and (if a choice had to be made)
ticular industry, those who receive the benefit operational expenditures would probably re-
should bear the cost. ceive first consideration since they cannot be de-
Regardless of the action taken on these pro- ferred or curtailed as easily as capital expendi-
posals, the Administration and Congress will, in tures.
the long run, have to grapple with the question Perhaps the greatest objection to general fund
of how to finance planned airport and ATC cap- financing, however, has been that it would con-
ital expenses. The balance in the trust fund now stitute a subsidy of aviation by the public, many
would cover less than 20 percent of the outlays of whom would receive no direct benefit: one-
by FAA for 1982-91. If these funds were to be ex- third of the adult population in the United States
pended at the fiscal year 1981 rate of $1.6 billion has never flown, and fewer than 10 percent use
annually and no new taxes were authorized, the commercial or general aviation on a regular ba-
trust fund would be exhausted by the end of sis. Such an approach, it is argued, would also
1983. Even if the most ambitious of the current contradict the economic precept that the users of
tax proposals were to be enacted and if trust a special service should bear the cost of that
fund moneys were also used to defray about service—a view that the present Administration
one-quarter of O&M expenses (as they were in has advocated strongly. It is argued by some,
fiscal year 1980), trust fund revenues would however, that the general public also benefits in
probably be insufficient to meet planned capital many indirect ways from services provided to
expenditure and O&M costs beyond 1987 or the aviation community, including mail service
1988. and air freight as well as use of the system by
Some of the implications of providing funding military aircraft.
for FAA airport and airways programs by ap- Trust Fund
propriations from the general fund or, alterna-
tively, by reauthorization of the trust fund are Financing airport and airways improvements
discussed below. from a trust fund, either like that which existed
prior to October 1980 or in a modified form, is
General Fund an approach favored by many observers. It pro-
Capital expenditures for airports and airways vides a continuing and stable source of funds
could be financed from general revenues earmarked for capital programs, and it secures
through annual appropriations. There are those funds directly from users of the system.
numerous precedents for this in other areas On the other hand, it has the general disadvan-
although it runs counter to the 10-year Federal tage of any sort of trust fund: the statutory
policy of financing airport and airways im- restrictions on the purposes for which moneys
provements through a dedicated trust fund sup- may be used might limit Congress’ flexibility in
ported by user charges. Funding from general meeting other, perhaps more pressing, needs.
revenues has the basic advantage of giving the The long-standing controversy over use of Air-
Congress close control of FAA capital programs port and Airways Trust Fund monies for meet-
Ch. 7—Policy Implications ● 137
ing annual O&M expenses of FAA is a clear illus- sales of GA aircraft in the long run. They
tration of this. also state that the ATC system was de-
If Congress elects to continue the trust fund signed to meet the needs of air carriers, and
approach, as most of the pending bills pertaining a few hub airports, with facilities and serv-
to funding FAA’s capital programs now pro- ices that GA users neither asked for, nor
pose, there are several options open: want, nor need. In this sense, some GA
users claim that they subsidize commercial
●Reauthorize the Airport and Airways Trust air traffic. A third, and perhaps more fun-
Fund as it existed before October 1980, This damental, objection raised by GA is that
fund, supported by various user excise there is no accurate method of determining
taxes, would provide for some or all of the value of the benefits received by GA or
FAA’s capital expenditures over the coming any other class of airspace user, and hence
decade. Whether it could also meet some no sound basis for establishing an appropri-
portion of operating expenses would de- ate level of taxation.
pend on the rates established for the various Levy charges on users, either based on the
user taxes. Much of the current debate in actual use they make of the airport and air-
Congress is on this specific point: i.e., the ways system or based on the burden they
appropriate amount of taxation to be im- place on the system to provide various
posed on each class of airspace user. types of services. The United States maybe
• Retain the tax mechanisms of the former the only major nation that does not routine-
trust fund but substantially alter the scheme ly charge for the use of its airspace; many
of taxation, so that each category of users countries in Europe and elsewhere in the
would pay a share more nearly proportion- world levy charges for the use of terminal
ate to the benefits they received. In the trust and en route airspace (based on distance,
fund as constituted before October 1980, time, and type of service provided), in addi-
commercial aviation (domestic and interna- tion to landing fees like those collected in
tional air carriers and air cargo airlines) this country to defray the costs of airport
contributed 93 percent of the revenues but, construction, maintenance, and operation.
according to cost allocation studies by DOT The chief conceptual problem is how to
and FAA, received a smaller share of the quantify user benefits or determine the cost
benefits—in effect, cross-subsidizing GA. of a service. Two major attempts by FAA
Since nearly all of the revenues from com- and the Department of Transportation
mercial aviation were derived from the tax (DOT) to develop such a methodology, the
on airline tickets, the subsidy to GA was ac- cost allocation studies of 1973 and 1978, ’ 2
tually provided by airline passengers, not met with major objections from various
airlines. The Administration’s recent pro- aviation groups on the grounds that costs
posal would redress this imbalance some- could not be determined with sufficient ac-
what by greatly increasing the tax on fuel curacy and that an equitable formula for al-
for GA aircraft, but it would probably still locating costs had not been developed.
fall short of levying charges on GA com-
mensurate with the benefits received, espe- Assuming that the methodological problems
cially by business aircraft operating in and could be overcome, there would still remain
out of hub airports. practical problems of how to assess user charges.
The simplest and most direct method would be a
Private GA operators and the makers of
GA aircraft have vigorously opposed such
tax schemes, on the grounds that Visual ‘Airport and Airway Cost Allocation Study; Determi~?ation,
Flight Rules (VFR) and IFR users impose Allocation, and Recovery of System Costs (Washington, D. C.,
greatly different costs on the ATC system, U.S. Department of Transportation, September 1973).
‘Financing the Airport and Air-may System: Cost Allocation and
and that high fuel taxes would reduce air- Recovery, FAA-AVP-78-14 (Washington, D. C.: Federal Aviation
craft utilization in the short run and reduce Administration, November 1978).
.
charge for service at the time a flight plan is the system. (Many of the planned capital im-
filed. While this would capture fees from IFR provements are intended to reduce these costs in
users, it might encourage some GA operators to the long term. ) If these costs are covered primar-
fly “off the system” (i.e. VFR to smaller airports) ily by appropriations from general revenues (the
in order to avoid airport and airway charges, practice of many years), the taxpayers would be
perhaps to the detriment of safety. It would also subsidizing special services for a mode of trans-
create a bookkeeping and administrative task portation that only a few use directly, although
for FAA in levying charges for use of the system. they may receive some indirect benefit. If paid
wholly or largely by disbursements from the
A second possibility would be to require all
trust fund, as the Administration proposes and
aircraft to have a transponder and to use surveil-
many Members of Congress oppose, the pres-
lance data to compute charges based on the time
sures on the trust fund would be greatly intensi-
in the system and the type of service received.
fied. Over two-thirds of the FAA’s annual budg-
While this would free users from financial trans-
et goes to meet operating costs, but disburse-
actions when they file flight plans, it would still
ments from the trust fund have covered only
impose on the ATC system a requirement for
about 15 percent of these expenses in the past.
recording and billing user charges. In addition,
To take a more substantial portion of opera-
the universal requirement for a transponder
would be viewed by many owners of small GA tional expenses from the trust fund, as it is pres-
aircraft as an extreme form of regimentation. A ently structured, would exhaust the current sur-
plus in a very short time. To prevent this, and at
third possibility involves approximation of user
costs through a combination of fixed and var- the same time provide for needed capital invest-
iable assessments on aircraft owners: fixed ments, the taxes supporting the trust fund would
charges could be collected in the form of annual have to be increased to yield significantly more
revenue than contemplated by any of the legisla-
taxes based on aircraft occupants (including
flight crew) according to aircraft characteristics tive proposals before the Congress at this time.
A tax increase of this magnitude would raise all
or type of use.
of the issues cited earlier in connection with cap-
Operating Costs ital funding options and greatly exacerbate the
conflict among the various stakeholders in the
A corollary problem that Congress will have aviation community.
to deal with is how to meet the operating costs of
PENDING LEGISLATION
Areas of congressional interest in the airport tions. A recurring question has been the FAA’s
and air traffic control system include system ability to plan and manage such a complex pro-
modernization (especially system automation curement.
and the replacement of the en route computers), In October 1980, the investigations staff of the
airport development, trust fund usage, and user Senate Committee on Appropriations released a
charges. This section briefly reviews congres- report criticizing the FAA’s management of the
sional activities in the past 2 years, outlines the existing ATC computer system. The report cited
positions taken by various congressional com- weaknesses in the reporting of equipment out-
mittees on key issues, and identifies the major ages, a lack of planning, and the absence of a
legislation now before Congress. well-defined approach to managing system oper-
ations and software changes. The investigators
System Modernization recommended the Congress withhold funding
Major capital expenditures like the en route for computer replacement until the FAA had
computer replacement have been the subject of demonstrated a better understanding of the ca-
several congressional hearings and investiga- pabilities and limitations of the existing system.
Ch. 7—Policy Implications ● 139
The report outlined specific actions FAA should To give further emphasis to these findings and
take to improve its performance and evaluation recommendations subcommittee chairman, Rep-
methods. 3 resentative Dan Glickman introduced H. Res.
202 in October 1981, which expressed the sense
After two sets of hearings on the safety as- of the House that FAA should consult with the
pects of computer outages, the House Commit- Committee on Science and Technology as it
tee on Government Operations raised many of develops plans for the future ATC system. It
the same questions in October 1981. Their re- also directed FAA to make regular reports to the
port found that the FAA’s management informa- committee, commencing with a system descrip-
tion system did not provide accurate data on tion in December 1981 and a preliminary sub-
which to base important decisions about the reli- system description in June 1982. This resolution
ability of the computer. The committee also was passed by the House on October 19, 1981.
questioned the FAA’s ability to plan and manage
the development and procurement of a new
computer system. The report directed the Airport Development Aid
General Accounting Office (GAO) to initiate a
“comprehensive investigation of the FAA’s plan- The Federal role in airport development was
ning, management, and acquisition of auto- previously governed by the Airport and Air-
mated information systems. ” 4 The GAO final ways Development Act of 1970, which expired
report, due in October 1982, will cover FAA in October 1980 when the Congress could not
planning and management for acquisitions in agree to new authorizing legislation. Projects ex-
three areas: ATC system automation, manage- tending into fiscal year 1981 were funded, but no
ment information systems, and peripheral authorizations have been made for future years.
equipment. In writing new authorizing legislation in 1981,
the question of “defederalization” has been a
The Subcommittee on Transportation of the major issue. Defederalization would remove
House Committee on Science and Technology, large and medium hub airports from eligibility
which has shown a continuing interest in the for ADAP funding, on the grounds that these
ATC computer question, has stated that the cur- airports generate enough revenues to be self-sup-
rent computer system needs to be replaced and porting without Federal aid.
that unnecessary delay in doing so would pose
safety risks and increase the chances of further The Senate version of the authorizing legisla-
breakdowns. in reviewing the alternatives for tion, S.508, would make the top 69 air carrier
replacing the system, the subcommittee’s report airports ineligible for airport development and
of August 1981 favored a full modernization of planning grants. The Administration position,
the computer system, as opposed to an interim as contained in H.R. 2930 called for a more
replacement followed by a long-range procure- modest defederalization measure, making the
ment. The full committee recommended that top 42 airports ineligible for aid. These airports
FAA publish a management plan detailing the would be permitted to impose a limited passen-
costs, schedules, milestones, and funding plans ger facility charge (head tax) to make up lost
for the computer replacement.’ revenues (head taxes are currently forbidden at
all airports that have received Federal aid). The
‘U.S. Congress, Senate Investigations Staff, FAA ErI Route Air report on S.508 by the Senate Committee on
Traffic Co)~trol Computer System, submitted to the Subcommittee Commerce, Science, and Transportation sup-
on Transportation and Related Agencies, Committee on Com-
merce, Science and Transportation, Rpt. No. 80-5, October 1980. ports the defederalization concept and notes that
‘U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, ADAP funds make up a fairly small proportion
Air Traffic Cot~trol Computer Failures, Rpt. No. 97-137, June 11, of the total capital and operating budgets of
1981.
‘U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Technology.
larger airports. If they were made ineligible, the
Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation and Materials, Air report points out, more Federal funds would be
~ra~fic Co)ltrol EtI Route Cot)~pt/trr h~(~cft~rtli:(ltlc)tl, Rpt. N o . available for small airports unable to generate
97-12, August 1981.
their own funds. Because the Senate bill limits
140 ● Airport and Air Traffic Control System
the total authorization to $450 million annually The Senate Committee on Commerce, Sci-
for 5 years (1981-86), it is necessary to make ence, and Transportation stated that the airport
those funds available to those who need them and airway system provides benefit to the gener-
most. 6 al public and therefore the general fund should
continue to contribute to its operation. g Al-
The House version of the authorizing legisla-
though many in Congress agree that something
tion, H.R. 2643, contains no provision for de-
should be done to reduce the balance, some
federalization, and members of the Committee
Members feel that taking operating costs out of
on Public Works who sponsored the House ver-
the trust fund constitutes “raiding” the users’
sion have expressed opposition to the concept.
funds, which were collected for the purpose of
Questions of equity are involved: opponents of
improving the airways system, to subsidize ac-
defederalization are concerned that passengers
tivities that should be paid for out of general
using major airports would have to bear a dou-
revenues. The DOT appropriations bill for fiscal
ble tax—the Federal ticket tax in addition to any
year 1981, in both House and Senate versions,
local passenger facility charge. Further, the tick-
et tax on passengers at large airports already appropriated funds from the trust fund to cover
about one-third of operating costs, about double
generates the bulk of revenues in the Airport and
Airways Trust Fund, and it seems unfair to for- the average share of the past 10 years. H.R.
bid these airports the use of those funds. The 2643, as reported by the Committee on Public
House bill proposes a $450 million annual au- Works, authorizes a ceiling of 50 percent on op-
thorization for 3 fiscal years. ’ erating costs to be taken from the trust fund in
future years; S.508 authorizes a ceiling of about
one-third on operating costs to be taken from
Trust Fund Usage the trust fund.
The uncommitted balance in the trust fund
(about $3 billion at the end of fiscal year 1981) User Taxes
has long been a cause of controversy in Congress
and among users. The Senate Committee on Current proposals for reestablishing the trust
Commerce, Science, and Transportation attrib- fund call for no major changes in the user tax
utes this balance to the fact that the OMB under structure. In general, the House, Senate, and
previous administrations has sought to keep administration positions on user charges have
trust fund revenues high and expenditures low. simply been differences in the level of tax in the
The current administration has proposed draw- traditional categories:
ing down the balance significantly by funding 85 ● The administration proposal, embodied in
to 100 percent of the FAA’s operations and S. 1047, calls for the greatest increase in
maintenance costs out of the trust fund, in addi- user taxes. It differentiates between GA gas
tion to capital costs. For example, the adminis- taxes and GA jet fuel taxes, taxing gas at 12
tration budget recommended financing expendi- cents per gallon (rising to 36 cents in fiscal
tures such as aviation security and aircraft in- year 1986) and jet fuel taxes at 20 cents (ris-
spection from the trust fund. Both Senate and ing to 65 cents). The passenger ticket tax
House Committees on Appropriations, would be set at 6.5 percent, the waybill tax
however, have continued to allow these at 5 percent, and an international facilities
regulatory and police functions to be funded charge of $3 per passenger would be author-
from general funds.8 ized.
‘U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and ● Another bill, S. 1272, cosponsored by sev-
Transportation, Report to Accompany S.508, Airport and Airway eral members of the Senate Committee on
System Development Act of 1981, S. Rpt. 97-97, May 15, 1981.
‘U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Public Works and Trans-
Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
portation, Report to Accompany H.R. 2643, Airport and Airway calls for an 8.5 cent tax for all GA fuels, a 3
Improvement Act of 1981, H. Rpt. 97-24 (Part II), May 19, 1981. percent ticket tax, a 2 percent waybill tax,
‘U.S. Congress, House, Committee of Conference for the De-
partment of Transportation and Related Agencies for the fiscal
and a $1 international facilities charge.
year ending Sept. 30, 1982, Conference Report to Accompany ‘Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation, S. Rpt. 97-97
H.R. 4209, H. Rpt. 97-331, N OV. 13, 1981. op. cit.
Ch. 7—Policy Implications ● 141
● A House bill, H.R. 4800, calls for a 12.5 sharp increases in user charges until some use is
cents tax on all GA fuels, a 5 percent ticket made of the existing balance.10
tax and
. a $5 international facilities tax.
The uncertainty about the costs and timing of
These measures are still under consideration future capital expenditures also clouds the
by the Senate Committee on Finance and House discussion of tax levels. The options appear to
Committee on Ways and Means, and it is uncer- be: 1) increase taxes to maintain a substantial
tain how they will appear after committee mark- balance in the trust fund in anticipation of large
up. Part of the difficulty in reaching a decision future expenditures, recognizing that the current
on the tax level is the current uncommitted bal- balance could not cover the proposed program
ance in the trust fund and the unwillingness of of system modernization; or 2) allow the trust
both past and present administrations to spend fund to be depleted, knowing that revenues will
the money for its specified purposes. Members have to be greatly increased later if these future
of the Senate Commerce Subcommittee on Avia- expenditures are to be paid for by user taxes.
tion and the House Science and Technology
Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation,
and Materials have stated they do not favor ‘OAL,~utjOtl 13aily, Nov. 19, 1981, p. 102.