Art. 358. Slander.
Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its No amount of sophistry will take these statements out of the compass of
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a
serious and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall be arresto menor or a
fine not exceeding 200 peso.
What is slander?
Slander is oral defamation.
Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. The
term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the
speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his
reputation, office, trade, business, or means of livelihood.
(Villanueva V People, G.R. No. 160351, April 10, 2006)
Two kinds of oral defamation
1. Simple Slander
2. Grave Slander, when it is of a serious and insulting nature.
Factors that determine the gravity of oral defamation
1. Upon the expressions used
2. On the personal relations of the accused and offended party.
3. The circumstances surrounding the case.
Illustration of grave slander
Grave slander is committed by a woman of violent temper, who hurled at the
complaint, a respectable married lady with young daughters, offensive and
scurrilous epithets, including words imputing unchastity to the mother and
tending to injure the character of the daughters. (US v. Tolosa, 37 Phil. 166)
grave oral defamation.
Note:
The word Puta does not impute that the complainant is a prostitute.
The slander did not be heard by the offended party.
Art. 359. Slander by deed. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200
to 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall perform any act not
included and punished in this title, which shall cast dishonor, discredit or
contempt upon another person. If said act is not of a serious nature, the penalty
shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos
What is slander by deed?
Slander by deed is a crime against honor which is committed by performing any
act which casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another person.
Elements:
1. That the offender performs any act not included in any other crime
against honor.
2. That such act is performed in the presence of other person or persons.
3. That such act casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon the offended
party.
Slander by deed is of two kinds:
 a) Simple slander by deed
b) Grave slander by deed, that is, which is of a serious nature.
Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes a slander by deed of a
serious nature or not depends on the social standing of the offended
party, the circumstances under which act was committed, the occasion,
etc.
Note:
Slander by deed refers to performance of an act, not use of words.
Slapping the face of another is slander by deed if the intention of the
accused is to cause shame and humiliation.
Fighting the offended party with intention to insult him is a slander by
deed.
Pointing a dirty finger constitutes simple slander by deed.
Section Two. General provisions
Art. 360. Persons responsible. Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or
cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar
means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of
a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the
defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author
thereof.
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as
provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the
court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed
and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the
offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the
time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the City of Manila, or of the city or province where the libelous
article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not
hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first
published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the
action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where
he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous matter is printed and first published: Provided, further, That the civil
action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed and vice
versa: Provided, furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or civil
action for damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of
other courts: And, provided, finally, That this amendment shall not apply to
cases of written defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions which have been
filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this law.
Preliminary investigation of criminal action for written defamations as
provided for in the chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of
the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the
province where such action may be instituted in accordance with the provisions
of this article.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except at the instance of
and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party. (As amended by R.A.
1289, approved June 15, 1955, R.A. 4363, approved June 19, 1965).

Persons responsible for libel are:
1. The person who publishes, exhibits, or causes the publication or exhibition
of any defamation in writing or similar (Art. 360, par. 1)
2. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet.
3. The editor or business manager of a daily newspaper magazine or serial
publication (Art. 360, par. 2)
4. The owner of the printing plant which publishes a libelous article with
his consent and all other persons who in any way participate in or have
connection with its publication. (US v Ortiz, 8 Phil, 752)
Note:
Art. 361. Proof of the truth. In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth
may be given in evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged
as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives and
for justifiable ends, the defendants shall be acquitted.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a
crime shall not be admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made against
Government employees with respect to facts related to the discharge of their
official duties.
In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him,
he shall be acquitted.
When proof of truth is admissible.

The person who publishes libelous letter written by the offended party Proof of truth is admissible in any of the following:
is liable.
1. When the act or omission imputed constitutes a crime regardless of
Liability of the editor is the same as that of the author.
whether offended party is a private individual or a public officer.
Lack of participation in the preparation of libelous articles does not
2. When offended party is a Government employee, even if the act or
shield the persons responsible for libel from liability.
omission imputed does not constitute a crime, provided, it is related to
Municipal court cannot conduct preliminary investigation of criminal
the discharge of his official duties. (see Ocampo v Evangelista, et al., C.A.,
action for written defamation.
37 O.G. 2196; Tumang v People, 73 Phil 700)
Venue of criminal and civil actions for damages in cases written
In such cases if the defendant proves truth of the imputation made by him,
defamation.
he shall be acquitted.
The criminal and civil actions for damages in cases written defamation
Three requisites of defense in Defamation:
shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the
province or city- 1. If it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true
The proof of the truth in defamation is limited only
1. Where the libelous article is printed and first published; or
1. To act or omission constituting a crime
2. Where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
2. To act or omission of a public officer which, although not
commission of the offense.
constituting a crime a crime, is related to the discharge of his duties.
2. It was published with good motives
3. And for justifiable ends
Note:

Retraction may mitigate the damages.

That the publication of the article was an honest mistake is not a
complete defense but serves only to mitigate damages where the article
is libelous per se.

Art. 362. Libelous remarks. Libelous remarks or comments connected with

the matter privileged under the provisions of Article 354, if made with malice,
shall not exempt the author thereof nor the editor or managing editor of a
newspaper from criminal liability.

Libelous remarks or comments on matters privileged, if made with malice in

fact, do not exempt the author and editor.
Liability of newspaper reporter for distorting facts connected with official
proceedings.

G.R. NO. 142509 March 24, 2006
JOSE ALEMANIA BUATIS, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ATTY. JOSE J. PIERAZ, Respondents.
Facts
On August 18, 1995, the wife of private-complainant Atty. Jose J. Pieraz
(Atty. Pieraz), retrieved a letter from their mailbox addressed to her husband. The
letter was open, not contained in an envelope.
In the letter Atty. Pieraz was called stupid and his language as [E]nglish
carabao by the letter sender, Buatis Jr., and even put Yours in Satan name and
his signature on the closing part.
Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis, Jr., Atty. Pieraz filed
a complaint for libel against accused-appellant. Subject letter and its
contents came to the knowledge not only of his wife but of his children as
well and they all chided him telling him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago dito."
The defense forwarded by accused-appellant Buatis, Jr. was denial.
According to him, it was at the behest of the president of the organization
"Nagkakaisang Samahan Ng Mga Taga Manggahan" or NASATAMA, and of a
member, Teresita Quingco, that he had dictated to one of his secretaries, a
comment to the letter of private-complainant in the second week of August 1995.
Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could not recall whether he had signed
that letter-comment or if it was even addressed to Atty. Pieraz. Neither could he
remember if he had made and sent another letter, this time dated August 24,
1995, to Atty. Pieraz.
RTC found him guilty of the crime of LIBEL defined in Art. 353 and
penalized under Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day, as
minimum, to Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Ten (10) Days, as maximum;
to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P20,000.00, by way of
compensatory damages; the amount of P10,000.00, as and for moral damages,
and another amount of P10,000.00, for exemplary damages; to suffer all
accessory penalties provided for by law; and, to pay the costs
Subsequently, petitioner appealed the RTCs decision to the CA which, in
a Decision dated January 18, 2000, affirmed in its entirety the decision of the trial
court.
Issue: The principal issue for resolution is whether or not petitioner is guilty of
the crime of libel.
Ruling: Yes. He is guilty of the crime of libel
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any
act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory
of one who is dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: (a)
it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and
(d) the victim must be identifiable.
The last two elements have been duly established by the prosecution.
There is publication in this case. In libel, publication means making the
defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person
against whom it has been written. Petitioners subject letter-reply itself states
that the same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also, petitioner had dictated
the letter to his secretary. It is enough that the author of the libel complained of
has communicated it to a third person. Furthermore, the letter, when found in the
mailbox, was open, not contained in an envelope thus, open to public.
The victim of the libelous letter was identifiable as the subject letter-reply
was addressed to respondent himself.
It is order then to resolve the issues raised by petitioner as to whether the
imputation is defamatory and malicious.
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to
be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and
ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading
them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.
For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to
be libelous, we laid down the rule in Jimenez v. Reyes,to wit:
In Tawney vs. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co. (109 Minn., 341), the
court had the following to say on this point: "In determining whether the specified
matter is libelous per se, two rules of construction are conspicuously applicable:
(1) That construction must be adopted which will give to the matter such a
meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the
public would naturally understand what was uttered. (2) The published matter
alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole."
Gauging from the abovementioned tests, the words used in the letter
dated August 18, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent is defamatory. In using
words such as "lousy", "inutile", "carabao English", "stupidity", and "satan", the
letter, as it was written, casts aspersion on the character, integrity and reputation
of respondent as a lawyer which exposed him to ridicule. No
evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it. As the CA said, these very words of
petitioner have caused respondent to public ridicule as even his own family have
told him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago dito."
Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory; and, under
the general rule laid down in Article 354, every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable
motive for making it is shown. Thus, when the imputation is defamatory, the
prosecution need not prove malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for
the law already presumes that petitioners imputation is malicious (malice in
law). A reading of petitioners subject letter-reply showed that he malevolently
castigated respondent for writing such a demand letter to Mrs. Quingco. There
was nothing in the said letter which showed petitioners good intention and
justifiable motive for writing the same in order to overcome the legal inference of
malice.
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes libel by means of writings
or similar means with prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or
a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action
which may be brought by the offended party.
The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a single
penalty or conjunctive penalties; that is, whether to impose a penalty of fine, or a
penalty of imprisonment only, or a penalty of both fine and imprisonment.
SC Ruling: the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS that, in lieu of imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed
upon the petitioner shall be a fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The award of compensatory
damages is DELETED.
 after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion remained unresolved.
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner, vs. in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioners loss of standing to
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
RTC: In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803,
Facts narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain
S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-
Due to a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner sought
charged before the MeTC of Pasig, with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless reconsideration but this proved unavailing.
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for
injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and Hence, this petition.
(2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Issue/s:
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his
temporary release in both cases
(1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the
MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Criminal Case No. 82366
Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this
conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366
(2) if in the negative, whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double
for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless
Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
imprudence.
Ruling:
The MeTC refused quashal.
(1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366
Petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803
Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Petitioner also
sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from
including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense
prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
with the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and
ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying
petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until
Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or
violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of
Section 8, Rule 124, in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon
motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant
escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country
during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of
Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes
more evident when one considers the Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant
who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendants absence merely
renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation
should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant
retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and
could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the
bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-
appearance does not ipso facto convert the accuseds status to that of a
fugitive without standing.
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others,
post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. It is not disputed
that petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the
question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve
the "same offense."
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. (See Article 365)
Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the
imprudencia punible," unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional
criminal act.
These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them
apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are
distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework
of our penal laws, is nothing new.
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies,
operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the
mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would
require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the
penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty
for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the
negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the
penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision
correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from
prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual
penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime,
but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state
that their commission results in damage, either to person or property.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-
offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that
conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the
same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this
Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article
365 starting with People v. Diaz, decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to
property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same
accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first
prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the
same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior
conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for
the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges,
the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative.
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which
the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to
harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in
criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and
Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article
48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling
under either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies);
and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The
legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of
serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the
most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined
as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x," a single mental attitude regardless
of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime
resulting in one or more consequences.
By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of
the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of
constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention
that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, SC hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from
a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In
imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under
Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no
splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in
the same first level court.
The ruling secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a
stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double
Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the
favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus
caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-
crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious
consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft
Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so
that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of
all resulting acts, whether penalized as sgrave, less grave or light offenses. This
will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the
lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a
lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
SC GRANT the petition and REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2
May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. Information in
Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner is Dismissed.