CASE DIGEST

GARCIA V. RECIO

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing
personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on
March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of
divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian
Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.6 Petitioner a Filipina and respondent were
married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.7 In their
application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."8

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution
of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16,
1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.9

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a
quo, on the ground of bigamy respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he
married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to Editha
Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior
marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen
had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989;12 thus, he was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1wphi1.nt

On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of
nullity was pending respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated no
cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court marked and
admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted their respective
memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.17

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was
valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any
defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to
remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian
divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.

Hence, this Petition.

ISSUES:

(1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.

(2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.

RULING:

1st issue:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of respondents marriage to
Samson is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it. Furthermore, the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic
one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

2nd issue:

Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party
has died) commits the offence of bigamy.
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorrecce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence
on this matter.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence. The
Court mentioned that they cannot grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null
and void because of the question on latters legal capacity to marry.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.

CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse
likewise remarry under Philippine law?

FACTS;

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ
in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter,
Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut
Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted
the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

HELD:

Yes.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.

The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice.

A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent. The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it.

NIAL V BAYADOG

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his
death?
FACTS:

Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8
months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December
11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their
fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional
rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they
are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the
Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the
petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following
issues:

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is null and void ab
initio;

(2) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the
filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;

HELD:

1.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of However, there are several
instances recognized by the Civil Code,[6] the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio
pursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58.[8]

Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,[14]
referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with
each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos
first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had
elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito
and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains
that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law.

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

2.Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be
questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.

And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in
which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any
parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and
upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-
existent by the courts."