MERCER BEASLEY

LAW REVIEW
VOL. V JANUARY, 1936 No. 1

PRESUMPTION OF DEATH IN NEW JERSEY

Every person must at some time end this mundane exist-
ence in death. After death, a person's estate becomes suscept-
ible to distribution, either by virtue of the terms of that person's
Last Will and Testament or by virtue of our statutes relating
to descent and distribution. The surviving spouse of one who
dies is relieved of the bonds of matrimony and is free to> marry
again. The legal effect of death thus becomes one of the im-
portant phases of the administration of law and of orderly pro
cedure in social affairs.
Where death occurs as an actual provable fact, the legal
incidents of death attach at once and no serious legal questions
arise other than perhaps those relating to interpretation of
Wills or to determination of the persons taking the estate of the
dead person according to our laws and statutes pertaining to
descent and distribution.
There are, however, many instances in which death is not
a provable fact. One may go on a journey and never return.
A man may suddenly disappear from his old haunts and his
relatives and friends may never again see or hear from him. A
man may be a fugitive from justice, or may have had serious
domestic difficulties, or may have brought upon himself some
actual or impending disgrace, or may have become hopelessly
indebted to others. Because of one of these situations or any
other making him desire to avoid contact with others, a man
may mysteriously and completely disappear, never again to
appear or to be heard from. But at some time in his life, death
must come to him.
The first presumption is of course that a person, once
alive, continues to live, until the fact of death is proved or until
2 MERCER BEASLEY LAW REVIEW

that presumption is overcome by a contrary presumption.1 At

early civil and canon law, it was presumed that a person would
be alive until he might have attained the age of 100 years.2
Under this presumption one who disappeared might have many
years of presumed life before death might be presumed. This
resulted in such a ridiculous legal and social predicament that
the common law early altered this presumption to the end that
a person would be presumed alive until the contrary presump
tion arises and then fixed the period for presumption of life at
seven years after disappearance. At the conclusion of such a
seven year period, the presumption of death arose.3 This at
first was considered a presumption of fact but our courts now
regard it as a presumption of law.4 If at any time after the
seven year period, the person presumed to be dead reappears or
is heard from or is proved to be alive, the presumption of death
is of course rebutted.5
This common law presumption of death has now become
fixed by statute in most, if not all, of the states of the United
States. Our first New Jersey statute relating to the subject was
enacted in 1797; it was declarative of the common law at that
time6 and is commonly known as the "Death Act". It provided
as follows:

Sec. 1 Any person who shall remain beyond sea,

or absent himself or herself from this State, or conceal
himself or herself in this State, for seven years succes-
sively, shall be presumed to be dead, in any case where-
1
Meyer v. Madreperla, 68 N.J.L. 258; 8 R.CL. 707; 17 CJ. 1166; 53 Atl.
477 a(E. & A. 1902).
Hoyt v. Newbold, 45 N.J.L. 219; 96 Am. St. Rep. 536; 46 A.R. 757 (N. J.
Sup.s Ct. 1883); 8 R.C.L. 708.
Hoyt v. Newbold, 45 N.J.L. 219; 8 R.C.L. 708; 96 Am. St. Rep. 536;
46 A.R. 757 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1883); Clarke v. Canfield, 15 N.J.Eq. 119; 8
R.C.L. 708 (Ch. 1862); Meyer v. Madreperla, 68 N.J.L. 258; 8 R.CL. 707;
17 CJ. 1166; 53 Atl. 477 (E. & A. 1902).
4
Meyer v. Madreperla, 68 N.J.L. 258; 8 R.C.L. 707; 17 CJ. 1166; 53 Atl.
477 (E. & A. 1902); Osborn v. Allen, 26 N.J.L. 388 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1857).
"Wambaugh v. Schenck, 2 N.J.L. 214 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1807); Meyer v.
Madreperla, 68 N.J.L. 258; 8 R.CL. 707; 17 CJ. 1166; 53 Atl. 477 (E. & A.
1902).
6
Osborn v. Allen, 26 N.J.L. 388 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1857); Armstrong v.
Armstrong, 99 N.J.Eq. 19; 132 Atl. 237 (Ch. 1926); Burkhardt v. Burkhardt,
63 N.J.Eq. 479, 52 Atl. 296 (Ch. 1902).
 PRESUMPTION OF DEATH IN NEW JERSEY 3

in his or her death shall come in question, unless proof

be made that he or she were alive within that time;
but an estate recovered in any such case, if in a subse-
quent action or suit the person so presumed to be dead
shall be proved to be living, shall be restored to him or
her who shall have been evicted; and he or she may also
demand and recover the rents and profits of the estate,
during such time as he or she shall have been deprived
thereof, with costs of suit.

This act remained in effect until 1895 when the Legislature

amended it by enlarging its provisions to apply to any person
"whether a resident of this State or not" who shall remain
beyond sea, "absent himself or herself from this state or from
the place of his or her last known residence or conceal himself
or herself in the state or in the place of his or her last known
residence, for seven years successively".7 It further provided
that if an executor or administrator should pay over any
legacy or distributive share of an estate to which the presumed
dead person would have been entitled, he or she shall be fully
discharged of any liability therefor upon filing with the surro-
gate of the proper County releases and refunding bonds of the
persons entitled to take if the presumed dead person were actu
ally dead.
In 1911 the Legislature passed a supplement to the "Death
Act," which supplement first provided for a decree declaring
a person to be dead.8 This statute limited its provisions to
a person, "being a resident of this State" who shall remain
beyond the seas, absent himself or conceal himself for seven
years successively. It further provided that the ordinary or
the surrogate of the county in which the person had resided
at the time of disappearance, shall, upon application "by any
next of kin of such person," make an order to show cause,
returnable at a definite place and time not less than thirty
days or more than three months from the date of the order
why a decree should not be made declaring said person to

'2 N. J. COMP. STAT. (1910), p. 1904; P.L. 1895, p. 751.

8
P.L. 1911, p. 538.
4 MERCER BEASLEY LAW REVIEW

be dead, or, if there be personal property belonging to such per-

son, why letters of administration should not be granted; such
order shall be published in such manner as the ordinary or
surrogate may direct and if it be proven to the satisfaction of
the ordinary or surrogate that such person has remained beyond
the sea, or absented himself from the State or concealed himself
within the State "for seven years then last past successively, or
has not been heard of or from during said period," the ordinary
or surrogate may make a decree declaring the said person to be
dead and may grant letters of administration upon the filing of
the usual bond of an administrator.
In 1926 the Legislature amended the supplement of 1911,**
by inserting in the act that the application to the ordinary or
surrogate might be made "by the husband, wife or next of kin
of such person" instead of "next of kin" alone as in the 1911
Act and that administration might be granted "to the husband,
wife or next of kin making the application" or to some other fit
and proper person.
In 1927 the Legislature passed another supplement10 to the
"Death Act" which is similar to the Acts of 1911 and 1926,
except that it provides that the application to the ordinary or
surrogate for the order to show cause may be made "by any
next of kin, creditor, executor, administrator, or any beneficiary
or beneficiaries under a policy of life insurance" and that the
letters of administration may be granted "to the next of kin
making the application or to such fit and proper person as the
said ordinary or surrogate may deem advisable".
It will be noted that the "Death Act" (Acts of 1797 and
1895) provides that the person who has disappeared shall b?
presumed to be dead and that its terms apply to any person,
whether a resident or not, and further provides for the restora-
tion of his estate to the person presumed dead, if he returns
alive. The supplements to the "Death Act" (Acts of 1911, 1926
and 1927) provide for a decree "declaring the said person to be
dead" designate the class of persons who may make application
for the order to show cause for such decree and provide for the
8
P.L. 1926, ch. 37.
10
P.L. 1927, ch. 275, p. 508.
 PRESUMPTION OF DEATH IN NEW JERSEY 5

granting of administration of the personal property of the per-

son so declared to be dead.
The Orphans' Court Act/ 1 as enacted in 1898, contains
three sections relating to the estates of persons presumed to be
dead. Section 30 relates to any person, being a resident of this
state, who remains beyond the seas, absents himself from the
state or conceals himself within the state for seven years suc-
cessively and provides for the granting of letters of administra-
tion to the next of kin; this section was amended in 192612 to
provide that letters might be issued "to the husband, wife, or
next of kin making the application or to such fit or proper per-
son as the ordinary or surrogate shall deem advisable". This
section is very similar in its wording to the supplements of
1911, 1926 and 1927 of the "Death Act," except that it does not
provide for the making of a decree declaring such disappeared
person to be dead. Section 31 relates to a person, not a resident
of New Jersey, but having goods, chattels, moneys and effects in
this state who "shall absent himself or herself from the place of
his or her domicile for seven years successively"; it does not
provide for a decree declaring such person to be dead but it
permits the ordinary or surrogate to grant letters of administra-
tion to the next of kin making application therefor if the proof
is satisfactory that such person has absented himself or herself
from the place of his or her domicile for seven years then last
past successively; this section was also amended in 192613 so as
to permit the application to be made by, and letters granted to,
"the husband, wife or next of kin". Section 32 provides that
any administrator appointed under the two preceding sections
shall administer the estate as if the presumed dead person had
died intestate and after payment of debts, etc., shall make dis-
tribution to those persons entitled by law to receive the estate
upon "his, her or their giving to the administrator a bond or
bonds, with good and sufficient sureties, upon condition to re-
fund and pay back to the administrator the share received by
them, respectively, with the accumulations thereof," if the per-
son presumed to be dead shall, at any time afterward, reappear
n
P . L . 1898, p. 715; 3 N. J. COMP. STAT. (1910) p. 3809.
ia
13
P.L. 1926, ch. 38, p. 73.
P.L. 1926, ch. 38, p. 74.
6 MERCER BEASLEY LAW REVIEW

and claim the same, which bond or bonds shall be full protec
tion to the administrator if such person does reappear and claim
the estate after distribution made thereof and that such admin
istrator shall assign such bond or bonds to the person so reap-
pearing and claiming the estate, after which the administrator
shall not be liable for any act done by him under and by virtue
of his office as administrator.
The presumption of death does not arise where the supposed
decedent has been heard from or there is reliable information
that he was alive within seven years.14 The primary burden is
of course on the person asserting that the absent person has not
been seen or heard from for seven years then last past succes
sively to produce evidence to sustain that assertion before the
presumption of death will arise.15 This evidence must disclose
that he has been absent from his last known residence for the
prescribed period and that all available sources of information
as to his whereabouts have been exhausted.16 Ordinarily the
evidence given by his family, relatives, friends and former asso-
ciates, together with inquiries made by them, will satisfy this
requirement as to evidence. But if a person, absenting himself,
has not been heard from in seven years last past successively,
the presumption of death arises at the end of that period17 and
a person seeking to rebut that presumption must show that the
person was alive or heard from within that seven year period
The burden of proof is then upon the person asserting a continu-
ance of life.18 Thus the case of Eoyt v. Newbold was brought
to recover possession of an undivided one-seventh of a lot of
land. The land had been owned by one Tuers who had seven
children and who died intestate. One of his children left home
in 1852 to go to California and was never seen or heard from
thereafter. By partition suit, this son's interest in the land was
set off to his children. Twenty-two years after this son's disap-
pearance, the plaintiff produced a deed signed by a person of
14
Spiltoir v. Spiltoir, 72 NJ.Eq. 50, 64 Atl. 96 (Ch. 1906).
15
17 CJ. 1174.
18
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 99 NJ.Eq. 19; 17 CJ. 1174; 132 Atl. 237
(Ch. 1926).
"Smith
18
v. Smith, 5 NJ.Eq. 484 (Ch. 1846).
Hoyt v. Newbold, 45 NJ.L. 219; 8 R.C.L. 708; 96 Am. St. Rep. 536;
46 A.R. 757 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1883); Smith v. Smith, 5 NJ.Eq. 484 (Ch. 1846).
 PRESUMPTION OF DEATH IN NEW JERSEY 7

the same name as the son who had disappeared. The court held
that the burden was on the plaintiif to prove that this son was
still alive and said :19
"The mere fact that deeds were signed in California
in 1874 by a person named Abraham A. Tuers, or using
that name, does not prove that such person was the son of
Abraham A. Tuers, Sr., or that he was then living or that
he signed the deed. There should be something more than
similarity of name to overcome the presumption of death
raised by the statute."
The court further stated that it would be necessary to prove
the identity of the one signing the deed, either by evidence of
those who knew him, or evidence giving a definite description
of him, or, at least, proof of his handwriting.
In some states the presence of a motive for disappearance
has some effect upon the presumption of death after seven years
absence. In New Jersey, our statutes make no reference to
motive for disappearance. It would therefore seem that the
only necessary proof is that the resident of the state has re-
mained beyond the seas, or absented himself from the state or
concealed himself within the state for seven years then last past
successively. The fact that he is a fugitive from justice, or has
had family or domestic difficulties, or has fled from the stigma
of some disgrace has no effect upon the presumption of death if
he has disappeared and not been heard from for the statutory
period of seven years.20
Our statute reads that there shall be a presumption of
death where a person, a resident of this state, "shall remain
beyond the seas, or absent himself or herself from this state or
conceal himself or herself in this state for seven years succes-
sively". The disjunctive wording of this statute was discussed
in the case of 0shorn v. Allen,21 where it was claimed that the
statute had altered the common law rule and made it necessary

19
45 N.J.L. 219, at p. 223.
"Mckert v. Prudential Ins. Co., 114 N J . L . 320, 176 Atl. 587 (E. & A.
1934).
a
Osborn v. Allen, 26 NJ.L. 388, 389.
8 MERCER BEASLEY LAW REVIEW

to prove one of the alternatives specified in the statute. Chief

Justice Green comments on this argument as follows:
"It is obvious that this construction of the statute
would totally defeat its object. Evidence that the party
was actually absenting himself from the state or was con-
cealing himself within the state, would necessarily prove
that he was living, and would, consequently, rebut the very
presumption that the statute was designed to create. All
the proof that can be required or expected is, that the party
has been absent from the state or from his family at home
and has not been heard from within the period prescribed
by the statute."
There is a contrariety of opinion as to the time when death
is fixed under the presumption of death theory.22 In some juris-
dictions, it is held that there is a presumption that death oc
curred on the date of disappearance, especially where circum-
stances indicated the probability.23 The apparent weight of
authority, including the English decisions, is that the presump-
tion is only as to the death and does not fix the time of death,
which is left to be determined by all the facts and circumstances
of a particular case.2* The rule in New Jersey, however, has
been established that it will be presumed that death occurred
at the expiration of the seven year period.25 In Clarke v. Can
field, Chancellor Green says:
"The legal presumption, independent of the statute, is
that life continues until the contrary is shown, or until a
different presumption is raised. In the absence of the
statute the presumption would be that the legatee is still
alive. The design of the statute, was, by an arbitrary rule,
to fix a definite limit to that presumption of the continuance
of life by a contrary presumption that life had ceased. But
"17
23
C J . 1174.
14
17 CJ. 1175.
25
17 CJ. 1175.
Clarke v. Canfield, 15 N.J.Eq. 119; 8 R.C.L. 708 (Ch. 1862); Osborn v.
Allen, 26 NJ.L. 388 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1857) ; Hoyt v. Newbold, 45 N.J.L. 219,
8 R.C.L. 708; 96 Am. St. Rep. 536 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1883) ; Meyer v. Madreperla,
68 NJ.L. 258, 8 R.C.L. 707; 17 CJ. 1166, 53 Atl. 477 (E. & A. 1902).
 PRESUMPTION OF DEATH IN NEW JERSEY 9

the presumption of life ceases only when it is overcome by

the countervailing presumption of death. And the real
question is not whether the statute furnishes any evidence
of the precise time of the death, but whether it furnishes
any evidence of the occurrence of death before the end of
the seven years. If it does not, the presumption of life
continues, by well settled rules of evidence, independent of
the statute. The presumption of death which arises upon
the expiration of seven years cannot operate retrospectively.
* * * It is no answer to say that the probabilities are that
the death did not occur at the expiration of seven years but
at some other time within that period. The time of death,
as well as the fact of death, are presumptuous not of fact
but of law. The law regards neither as certain. It simply
declares that the party shall be presumed to be dead at the
expiration of seven years, whenever his death shall come in
question."
And in Meyer v. Madreperla/6 Chancellor Green, speaking:
for the Court of Errors and Appeals, says:
"The presumption raised by the statute, upon such
proof, is not mere presumption of death, but is also a pre-
sumption fixing the time of death at the expiration of the
seven successive years of absence unheard from."
As above stated, the burden primarily rests with the person
seeking to establish the presumption of death of another.27 Evi-
dence should be adduced from the relatives and friends of the
absentee.28 Inquiries should be made at the places where people
might logically have heard of or from him. The court should
seek to obtain evidence from all who might reasonably, naturally
and logically have knowledge of the absentee or his whereabuots.
Evidence as to the health, habits, character, affections, domestic
difficulties should be presented as an indication to the court of
the probability of life or death; such information might also
28
Meyer v. Madreperla, 68 NJ.L. 258, 8 R.C.L. 707; 17 C J . 1166, 53 Atl.
477 (E. & A. 1902).
" Armstrong v. Armstrong, 99 NJ.Eq. 19, 132 Atl. 237 (Ch. 1926); \T
CJ. M
1174.
Smith v. Combs, 49 NJ.Eq. 420, 24 Atl. 9 (Ch. 1892).
10 MERCER BEASLEY LAW REVIEW

lead to other evidence showing the absentee was alive within the
seven year period or even at the time of the hearing. The
nature of the inquiry to determine the existence of the presump-
tion makes it necessary to admit into evidence a certain amount
of hearsay evidence,29 such as the result of personal inquiries
made, letters from third parties relating to having seen or heard
of or from the absentee and declarations of the missing person
made at or about the time of his disappearance,30 but efforts
should be made to confine the testimony as nearly as possible
within the rules of evidence relating to hearsay testimony.
Under our statutes, if the presumption of death be estab-
lished, the ordinary or the surrogate may appoint an admin-
istrator of the estate of the one presumed to be dead. The
duties of such an administrator are similar to> those of any
general administrator of an estate, except that in making dis-
tribution to those entitled by law to receive the estate of the
presumed dead person, he must take from each such beneficiary
a refunding bond, with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned
to refund to the administrator the share of the estate received,
plus accumulations thereof, in case the presumed dead person
reappears and claims the same. Such a bond gives to the ad-
ministrator full and complete protection but he shall assign such
bond to the returned absentee who claims his estate. If the
person presumed to be dead left a last will and testament at the
time of his disappearance, his will may be probated31 and his
estate distributed in accordance therewith but the executor
should also obtain the refunding bond which may be assigned
to the presumed dead person if he returns and claims the
estate.
In a considerable number of proceedings brought to estab-
lish the presumption of death, the purpose is to collect life
insurance upon the life of the absentee or presumed dead per-
son. A practice has developed in Essex County and a few other
counties to provide in the rule to show cause that a copy of the
order be served upon the insurance company which issued the
policy or policies in question. This practice has resulted, upon
M
30
17 C J . 1176.
31
State v. Hunter,40 NJ.L. 495 (E. & A. 1878).
In re Sternkopf's Will, 72 NJ.Eq. 356, 65 Atl. 177 (Prerog. 1906).
 PRESUMPTION OF DEATH IN NEW JERSEY 11

a number of occasions, in having the insurance company produce

evidence that the person in question is either then alive or has
been seen or heard from within the seven year period. In such
cases the insurance company is not a party to the proceeding;
it acts as an amicus curiae and is not necessarily bound by the
determination of the court that the person is presumed or
declared to be dead.32 But life insurance policies have been held
to be subject to statutory provisions giving rise to a presumption
of death, and payment of the policies may be ordered as a result
of that presumption.33 If the insurer has knowledge of the claim
based on the presumption of death and denies liability, it is held
to dispense with the ordinary proof of death.34
Under the provisions of our statutes permitting a decree
declaring the absentee to be dead, it is necessary that the person
be a resident of this state at the time of disappearance and that
his disappearance be from his home or last known abode.35
Where a person formerly lived in New Jersey but moved to
Brooklyn and disappeared from the latter jurisdiction, it was
held that the Surrogate in New Jersey lacked authority to
declare death.36 Other sections of the statutes provide for the
presumption of death in cases where a non-resident disappears
from his residence in the other jurisdiction, owning personal
property in New Jersey.37 In these cases the evidence is avail
able only in the non-resident jurisdiction and it is the practice
to obtain and present as conclusive evidence as may be obtain-
able as to the disappearance and continued, unexplained absence
from the foreign jurisdiction.
While the presumption of death after seven years absence
is one of law, there are situations, nevertheless, in which it is not
conclusive. Thus a marriage is not definitely dissolved by this
presumption, even though the surrogate or ordinary enter a
decree declaring the absent spouse to be dead. If the absent
spouse returns, the marriage relation continues, unless an actual
82
S3
Apfelbaum v. Prudential Ins. Co., 10 NJ.Misc. 874 (1932).
34
Apfelibaum v. Prudential Ins. Co., 12 NJ.Misc. 62.
35
Apfelbaum v. Prudential Ins. Co., 12 NJ.Misc. 62.
86
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 99 NJ.Eq. 19, 132 Atl. 237 (Ch. 1926).
In re Curran, 94 NJ.Eq. 723, 120 Atl. 786 (Prerog. 1923) ; In re Van
Pelt,37 11 NJ.Misc. 214, 164 Atl. 574 (1931).
Orphan's Court Act, sec. 31, 3 N. J. COMP. STAT. (1910), p 3824.
12 MERCER BEASLEY LAW REVIEW

divorce has been obtained by either party to the marriage during

the interval.38 However, under the bigamy section of the
Crimes Act,39 a husband or wife is not guilty of that crime
where the other spouse remains without the United States or
absents himself or herself within New Jersey or the United
States for five years, "the party marrying again being ignorant
that the other was living within that time". This section of the
act merely absolves the person from criminal punishment;40 it
does not validate the second marriage. Although a marriage
by the remaining spouse after a seven year disappearance of the
other spouse may be voided by the reappearance of the person
presumed dead, nevertheless a marriage by the surviving spouse
will be considered valid in the absence of the reappearance of
the first spouse or lack of knowledge of his continued life.41
Indeed, our courts, having regard for the necessity or desira-
bility of upholding the marriage relationship, will sometimes
sustain the validity of a second marriage, upon the theory of
presumed death of the first spouse, where the disappearance is
for less than the seven year period.42 Another instance in which
the presumption is not conclusive arises when an action is
brought in equity for specific performance of a contract to sell
real estate and the title rests upon reliance on the presumption
of death.43 In these cases, the courts have held that a buyer
will not be compelled to perform under these circumstances,
because if the one presumed to be dead should return, the buyer
might be compelled to defend his title against the returned
absentee. I t is however possible to foreclose the rights, as to
real estate, of one presumed to be dead if the provisions of Sec-
tion 2 of the Death Act be followed.44 It provides that the heirs
or devisees of a person presumed to be dead may present a peti-
tion to the Court of Chancery, which court, after being satisfied

38
Wambaugh v. Schenck, 2 NJ.L. 214 (N. J. Sup. C t 1807); Spiltoir v.
Spiltoir, 72 NJ.Eq. 50, 64 Atl. 96 (Ch. 1906).
39
2 N. J. COMP. STAT. (1910), sec. 52, p. 1762.
40
Spiltoir v. Spiltoir, 72 NJ.Eq. 50, 64 Atl. 96 (Ch. 1906); State v. Reilly,
88 NJ.L.
41
104, 95 Atl. 1005 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1915).
42
Burkhardt v. Burkhardt, 63 NJ.Eq. 479, 52 Atl. 296 (Ch. 1902).
43
Burkhardt v. Burkhardt, 63 NJ.Eq. 479, 52 Atl. 296 (Ch. 1902).
Potter v. Ogden, 68 NJ.Eq. 409, 59 Atl. 673 (Ch. 1905)4
" 2 N. J. COMP. STAT. (1910), p. 1905.
 PRESUMPTION OF DEATH IN NEW JERSEY 13

as to the facts and upon bond to the State for double the value
of the land conditioned that the proceeds, with interest, shall be
paid, upon demand, to the person presumed to be dead in case
he or she shall appear and claim it, may order the sale of such
lands and that thereafter the person presumed to be dead shall
be forever barred from any claim or title to the real estate and
entitled only to the proceeds thereof.
Sections 4 and 545 of the Death Act provide for the sale of
lands devised to or inherited by persons presumed to be dead,
the procedure for such a sale being specified. Likewise Section
6 of the Death Act46 and the supplement thereto enacted in
192747 provides for the sale of lands free from the rights of
dower or curtesy of one who is presumed to be dead. Distribu-
tion of personal property given or bequeathed to one presumed
to be dead may be made in accordance with the provisions and
procedure specifically outlined in Section 3 of the Death Act ;48
under this section those entitled to take in the case of actual
death may receive the gift to the one presumed to be dead, upon
giving to the executor, administrator or trustee a refunding
bond or bonds, without sureties.
PRESUMPTION AS TO SURVIVORSHIP
There are instances where two or more persons are lost as
the result of a common accident or catastrophe, and no evidence
is available as to which of them survived the other. In these
cases, it may be important to try to ascertain which died first,
in order to determine the rights of descent or distribution. In
a few jurisdictions, and at civil law, presumptions of survivor-
ship arose, based upon the sex, age and strength of those who
perished.49 Thus far there has been no reported case in New
Jersey relative to a presumption in such cases nor is there any
statute pertinent to this situation. However, the general rule is
that, where there is no evidence as to which person survived, no
presumption of survivorship arises and the situation is consid-

" 2 N. J. COMP. STAT. (1910), pp. 1906-1907.

* 2 N. J. COMP. STAT. (1910), p. 1907.
4T
P.L. 1926, ch. 24, p. 47.
* 2 N. J. COMP. STAT. (1910), p. 1905.
48
17 C.J. 1179; 8 R.C.L. 716.
14 MERCER BEASLEY LAW REVIEW

ered as if the perished persons had died simultaneously and

their respective estates or property rights are administered
accordingly.50 Thus if a husband and wife or a father and son
are lost in a disaster at sea and no evidence can be adduced as
to which died first, no presumption of survivorship arises and
they are presumed to have died at the same moment.
PROCEDURE
Usually, proceedings relating to the presumption of death
are now instituted under the supplements to the Death Act and
ordinarily are brought before the surrogate of the proper county,
this being one of the few instances in New Jersey where the
surrogate presides as a judge in a hearing. A petition is filed
with the surrogate by any next of kin, creditor, executor, admin-
istrator or beneficiary under a policy of life insurance. The
petition should set forth the name and last residence of the per-
son presumed to be dead, his next of kin, the nature and extent
of his property and the facts relating to his disappearance, and
it should pray for an order or decree declaring such person to
be dead; it may also pray for the appointment of an adminis-
trator of his estate or for the probate of his last Will and Testa
ment. The surrogate then issues an order to show cause why
the decree should not be made and letters of administration
should not be granted, which order is served upon the next of
kin and other interested parties and is published in such man-
ner as the surrogate may direct. It must be returnable at a
certain time and place not less than thirty days nor more than
three months from the date of its making. On the return day?
or on any date to which the matter may be adjourned, the surro-
gate hears the testimony of the various sworn witnesses. It has
been said that in some counties of the state, this evidence is
presented in affidavit form; but it is submitted that in a matter
involving the declaration of death of a person and the possible
distribution of his property, the evidence should be adduced
orally from witnesses sworn before the court, in order that the
court might have the advantage of seeing the witnesses, observ-
ing their demeanor and the probability of the truth of their
60
17 CJ. 1179; 8 R.C.L. 717.
 PRESUMPTION OF DEATH IN NEW JERSEY 15

evidence and of further examination by the court, or by an

amicus curiae, to bring out all of the facts connected with the
case. After the hearing is completed, the surrogate, being satis-
fled as to the proof of the requisite facts, jurisdictional and
otherwise, may make an order declaring the person to be dead
and providing that letters of administration be issued for the
personal estate of such person. The administrator then ap-
pointed administers the estate, pays debts, etc., and makes dis-
tribution, in accordance with the statutes relating thereto. If
the order of the surrogate merely declares the person to be dead,
an appeal from his order would lie directly to the prerogative
Court but if his order includes the issuance of letters of admin-
istration, an appeal would lie to the County Orphans' Court,
there then being involved a question of administration of an
estate.61
Under the provisions of the Death Act and of the pertinent
sections of the Orphans' Court Act, the surrogate or ordinary,
after having satisfactory proofs to establish in law the pre-
sumption of death, may issue letters of administration without
holding the hearing (with its attendant order declaring death)
as set forth in the supplements to the Death Act; this procedure
is however rare at this time, and usually the procedure follows
the provisions of the supplements of 1911, 1926 and 1927. The
responsibility of presuming one dead and acting upon that pre-
sumption justifies as complete and satisfactory an investigation
as may be possible and for that reason the latter procedure is
preferable because it permits a more searching investigation
into the facts relating to the disappearance.
ANDREW J. WHINBRY.
NEWARK, N. J.

"Mogna v. Prudential Ins. Co., 96 NJ.Eq. 293, 125 Atl. 99 (E. & A. 1924).