abda-prama: The question of its reducibility toAnumna

Introduction
In the module 22 of Logic-1 wediscussed how different schools of
Indian philosophy have accepted different numbers of pramas. We
also considered the extreme empiricist C rvka view according to
which only perception is prama. (Module 32 of Logic-I). We also saw
that some Crvkas are ready to accept inference of a certain kind as
prama, in addition to perception (Module 39 of Logic I). There are
other schools of Indian philosophy which accept perception and
inference as the two pramas. Vaie ika and Buddhism are the two
major schools of this category. Here a question can be asked whether
these two pramas exhaust the whole realm of knowledge that we can
have. Here other schools of Indian philosophy come forward with
different forms of knowledge which according to them cannot be
explained fully in terms of perception and inference. For explaining
those forms of knowledge they propose additional pramas such as
Analogy (upamna), Verbal Testimony (abda), Postulation (arthpatti)
and Non-apprehension (anupalabdhi). Among them abdaalso called
gama in some schools) was the additionalprama accepted by all
those schools. They had internal differences, for example, whether
abda is to be regarded as eternal or non- eternal, whether the Vedas
are to be regarded as having an author or they are authorless
(paurueya or apaurueya). But they were one on the point that abda
has to be accepted as an independent pram a. As against this,
Vaieikas, Buddhists (and also Crvkas) would reduce abdato
anumna. The present module is devoted to this controversy. In what
follows, we will discuss the nature of abda-prama as explained in
Mms , Nyya, Advaita-Vednta and Skhya, andalso consider
the Buddhist and the Vaieika view which denies an independent
status to abda and reduces it to anumna.

Part I: The Nature and Defence of abda-prama According to

Different Schools:
1.1. Mmsakas arguments in favour of abda prama

Of all the Vedic schools of philosophy, the Mmsakas championed

the cause of abda or verbal testimony in a unique and unprecedented
manner. abda is knowledge obtained through words. The words have
a double face. On the one side, they are sounds and are perceived by
the sense of hearing. As such they are only objects of perception. But
on the other side, they mean objects as facts other than themselves,
and these objects or facts are not perceived by our ear, but yet
cognized by us through words. Words are understood not as mere
sounds but as meaning objects different from the words. Hence verbal
knowledge becomes a distinct way of knowing. It is not
inferenceeither,for there is no major premise involved in the process of
understanding the meaning of a word. There is no perceivable
invariable connection between a word and the object it means or
denotes, whether the meaning relation is eternal or conventional. We
understand the meaning of a word not by inference, but by being told
so about the meaning.
It is true that through language one can give false information and
mislead a person. That is, verbal knowledge can be false. But the
possibility of being false is not peculiar to verbal knowledge.
Perception and other forms of knowing also may be false. Even if the
person communicating knowledge to us is honest and truthful, he
himself may be mistaken. So the minimum requirement is that the
speaker should be authentic, anpta.
The Mms believed in the eternality of the Vedas, which were
originally orally transmitted. It was thought that the Vedas consisted
of meaning-bearing sounds. As the Vedaswereconsidered to be eternal,
their sounds also were considered to be eternal. So, all the Vedic words
were considered to be eternal and their meanings eternally fixed.
Mms further believes that the Vedasare infallible and absolutely
reliable, as it is apaurueya, it is not composed by any person. Persons
are fallible and not always reliable, because they have self-interests.
But the Vedashaveno self-interest. They are eternally present in the
universe, but are revealed to some persons. What is of primary
importance is whatis
revealed, not the persons to whom it is revealed. Of the four parts of
the Vedas, the Brhmaapart is the most important; its sentences
express commands leading men to action. The injunctions are called
vidhis.
The Vedas manifest their own validity. Thewords we use denote
things that can be cognized by other means of knowledge. If we cannot
know them through other means, then those who utter them must be of
unquestionable authority. So, non-Vedic utterances do not possess any
inherent validity. Prabhkara holds in Prakaraapacikthat non-
Vedic verbal cognition is of the nature of inference. Only the verbal
cognition afforded by the Vedas is strictly verbal. Udayana in
Kusumjali(iii.16)too alludes to such a view. Prabhkara accepts the
theory of anvit bhidhnavda, that is, the view that the meanings of
words can be known only when they occur in a sentence enjoining
some duty, and so words denote objects only as related to the other
factors of such a sentence. According to abhihit nvayavda, accepted
by Kumrilas followers, the knowledge of meanings is due to words,
taken in their denotation. Words denote meanings which, when
combined, give rise to a knowledge of the sentence. We need not go all
the way with the Mms views on the philosophy of language. The
point of importance for our context is the view that the cognition of
meaning of the word is not obtained through sense perception. And
secondly, the words directly mean the universal (jti). The individual
can be referred to a word only through the universal. The expression,
Bring a horse for sacrifice does not mean this or that particular
horse, but any horse. Indeed we do not and cannot bring the universal
horseness, but only an individual horse. This is so because the words
refer to denotation through connotation. Connotation is the primary
meaning of words and is universal. Both Pr bhkara and Kumrila
hold that the individual is not the primary meaning (abhidh), but
brought in (kipta) for completing intelligibility.

The distinctive features of the Mms view of abda are: the

eternal character of the words, their being authorless1, and hence, their
infallibility. The view that the kernel of the Vedas consists of the
declarations in injunctive form is not wholly shared by the Vednta. Its
adherents also admit the authority of the non-injunctive Vedic texts. As
for the eternality of the words, we have the dissidence of the
Naiyyikas, who contended that the Vedas had an author. This was in
accordance with their causal view of existence. We shall consider the
Nyya view of abdaa little later. But in the meantime we propose to
have a look at some other views on the matter.
1.2. Concept of gama for scriptural knowledge elucidated by the
Jainas
The Jainas have the concept of gama for scriptural knowledge.
gama is knowledge obtained from words. Ordinary verbal knowledge
is direct cognition, while gama in the sense of scriptural knowledge is
indirect cognition. Yoovijaya in the Jainatarkabh says that the
knowledge obtained from my friends statement, There is a pen in the
desk is valid for ordinary purposes, but not for cognizing the ultimate
truth, tattvata. According to the Jaina view, scripture or gama is
composed by a person, who is omniscient, dispassionate, and beyond
ignorance. The words of only such a person are absolutely true and
valid. The scriptures of Jainism alone are absolutely true, and not
those of others. This idea is put forward by ntisri in Nyyvatra-
stra-vrtikvtti. What appears curious and interesting is that the
Jainas starting as a sect of the bookless (nirgrantha2), not accepting the
authority of the extant Vedic scriptures, ended up regarding scriptural
knowledge as the most reliable of all forms of indirect cognition
(parokaj na). Like the Nyya and the Vaieika, the Jainas say that
scriptures must have been composed by some person (purua), but
unlike them, they say that this person was not God, but the leader of
their own religion. Their doctrine of verbal knowledge (ruta) is,
however, interesting in that they treat part of it as coming under direct
cognition and part under indirect, and of the latter, agreed, a part as
fallible and the other (gama) as infallible. But verbal knowledge as
direct cognition (vaiadya), as when a man points a pen to a child and
says that its name is pen--- is not mere verbal knowledge, but a
combination of verbal knowledge and perception. One is justified also
in saying that what the child here learns is not about the object

1 apaureeyavkyaveda-Arthasagraha
2 This is one meaning more relevant in the present context. The
generally accepted meaning, however, is free from all ties.
through the word, but about the word through the object. This shows
the Jaina awareness of the inter-relationship among the different
means and of shading off of some into others.
1.3. Debate between the Mmsakas and the Naiyyikas in the
context of accepting abda as a prama
Like the Mmsakas and, to a great extent, following them, the
Naiyyikas gave much attention to cognition obtained through words
and sentences, and thus to semantics. The classic statement of the view
is found in Jagadas abdaaktiprak ik. Regarding the meaning of
words, while the Mmsakas hold that the word means primarily the
universal (jti), the Naiyyikas maintained that it means the universal,
the structure (sasthna) that goes with the universal, and also the
individual. Otherwise, if we ask a man to bring a cow, he will not be
able to understand that he has to bring an individual cow. He brings
the animal because he understands by the word an individual object
characterized by a particular structure (samsthna) and a particular
universal (j ti), cowness. The meaning of a word is grasped in several
ways: from grammar, from similarity, from the lexicon, from the
information of a reliable person (pta), from practice (vyavahra);
from the rest of the sentence in which the word occurs, that is,from the
context; from the explanations of difficult terms; and from the
nearness to a significant word.3 The Naiyyika view is called the
doctrine of the relation of meanings of uttered words
(abhihitnvyavda) as against Prabhkaras view which is called the
doctrine of the uttering words, the meanings of which have already
been related (anvit bhidhnavda). At times we may cognize the
meaning of words and know what is being said, but do not accept their
truth. Hence arises the question of the validity, or the truth- value of
the meaning. The Naiy yikas, like all others who accept this kind of
cognition, say that the words must be the words of one who is
interested in our welfare and is trustworthy. The most trustworthy of
all persons is God, who composed the Vedic scriptures. Since God
composed them, they are absolutely true and reliable. Other persons
are reliable to a degree. Accordingly the Naiyyika classifies words in
two ways. According to one classification, words are divided into those
that are of the world, laukika and those that belong to the Vedas,
vaidika. The words of the Vedas, being the words of God himself, are
absolutely trustworthy. Their meanings are fixed by God and are,
therefore, not conventional. While the Mmsakas hold that the
Vedas are not composed by anyone, not even by God, and are eternal,
the Naiyyikas maintained that God is the author of the Vedas and
that they are eternal in the sense that their composer is eternal. The
words of the conventional language are not always trustworthy
because the conventions are created by ordinary people.
The second classification is that which differentiates words meaning
perceivable objects, (drtha), and those meaning imperceptible
realities (adrtha), like vara, merit and demerit. The words of the
is deal with the latter4. abda, when used as a source of knowledge,
means ptopadea or the assertion of a reliable person. Later
Naiyyikas, like Udayana and Annabhaa, and the Vaieika
thinkers, regard vara as the eternal author of the Vedas. Udayana
sets aside the view that the authoritativeness of the Vedas is to be
inferred from eternality, freedom from defects and acceptance by great
saints. The M ms argument of the eternality of the Vedas is
controverted by Udayana. He argues that there is no continuous
tradition to indicate eternality, since such a tradition must have been
interrupted at the dissolution of the world which preceded the existing
creation. Vatsyayana, however, accepts the continuity of tradition, in
the sense that vara,at the beginning of every epoch, recomposes the
Vedas and keeps up the tradition5.
(22.1.4) Rejection of the thesis of apaurueyatva of the Vedas by the
Skhya
We may note in passing theposition of the Skhya as regards
abda. The Skhya accepts nearly the whole doctrine of the Ny
ya,butmaintains that the Vedaswere not composed by any one person,
or that they are apaurueya, but embody the insights of many great
seers or is.The Skhya rejects all arguments for the existence of
God--the Vedas are not eternal as the Mmsakas contend. No sound,
3 See Vivantha, Krikval
4 See Nyyabhya, 1.1.8
5
Nyyabhya and Nyyabhyattparyatk, II. 1.68
not even the word of the Vedas, is eternal. This part of the view is the
same as that of the Nyya. The Skhya accepts the three pramnas:
perception, inference and scriptural testimony6. There is a novelty in
the Skhya rejection of the thesis of apauru eyatva of the Vedas. The
Vedas are not the composition of persons, since there are no persons
who can be their authors7. The released have no concern with the
Vedas, and the unreleased are not competent for the work 8. Nor are the
Vedas eternal, since they possess the character of effects. Letters perish
after they are pronounced. When we say It is the same letter, we
mean that it belongs to the same genus 9. Sound, on account of its
character as effect, is said to be non-eternal. Simply because the Vedas
are not of personal origin, we cannot infer that they are eternal, since a
sprout is not eternal, though it has no personal origin 10. Their objects
are supersensuous, yet there can be intuition even in the case of
supersensuous objects, by means of the universal forms which
determine the character of being a padrtha, or an object denoted by a
word 11 . Vcaspati warns us that systems become invalid due to their
making unreasonable assertions, to the lack of sufficient support, to
their making statements opposed to the canons of logic 12. Aniruddha
quotes a verse in his Vtti to the effect: Huge giants do not drop from
heaven because an pta says so. Only sayings which are supported by
reason should be accepted. The interesting point is that even though
Skhya implicitly accepts the Veda as a means of knowledge, it
adopts the process of sapping its very foundations.
1.5. Advaita arguments in favour of abda prama
The Advaitins generally follow the Mms in their explanations of
the forms of the valid means of cognition. But there is one doctrine
peculiar to the Advaita. If there is conflict between perception and
inference, they say, we should accept inference and reject perception.
Similarly, if there is conflict between inference and scriptural
testimony, we should accept the latter and reject the former. The other
Vedantins such as Rmnuja do not want to reject any of the valid
means of cognition, and say that, in case of conflict, they should be
reconciled and none of them should be treated as false at any level.
Through his critiques of rival systems of thought akara brings
into focus the inadequacy of the dialectical method. At least this is so
notably in respect of Buddhism. He adduces the inter-relationship of
anubhava (intuition), tarka (intellect) and ruti (scriptural testimony).
For the ordinary man the central truth of the ultimate consciousness is
essentially revealed, and not ascertained by any human evidence like
that of perception and inference. He holds that the Vedic testimony is
superior to the evidence of the senses or the conclusions of reason,
though, of course, it is useless in the regions open to perception and
inference. A hundred texts cannot make fire cold13. akaras
philosophical understanding is intended to disillusion us with
systematic philosophy and make out that logic by itself leads to
scepticism. His use of the term tarka is different from that of Nyya. By
tarka he means reason that has not been restrained by the lessons of
history. Such individualistic reasoning cannot lead to the establishment
of truth on account of the endless diversity in the power of
apprehension14. But akara recognizes the need of reason for testing
scriptural views. He tries to confirm scriptural statement by rational
arguments. In commenting on iii.1 of Gaudapdas M kya-Krik,
akara says his position can be demonstrated by reason. Tarka, for
him, works as an auxiliary of anubhava (intuition), and it is
commended by him15. Anubhava is the vital spiritual experience which
can be communicated only through the language of imagination, and
ruti is the written code embodying it.
6
SkhyaKrik, 4
7
SkhyapravacanaStra, V.46
8
Ibid., 47
9
SkhyapravacanaStra, Vtti, V. 45
10
Ibid., V. 48
11
Atndriyevapipadrthatvacchedakenasmnyar
peavakyamatvd, Skhyapravacanabhya., V.
42
12
SkhyapravacanaStra, III, 81
13
akaras Bhya on the Brahma Stra, iii. 2.21
14 Ibid, ii. 1.1
15 Ibid., ii. 1.6; ii. 1.11
Without the background of the experience the statement of the ruti is
mere sound without sense. As Vcaspati says in the Bhmat: Mere
ruti is not superior to the evidence of perception; a thousand
scriptures cannot make a jar into a cloth. The highest evidence is
perception, whether it is spiritual or sensuous, and is capable of being
experienced by us on compliance with certain conditions. The
authoritativeness of the ruti is derived from the fact that it is but the
expression of experience, and since experience is of a self-certifying
character, the Vedas are said to be their own proof, requiring no
support from anywhere prmnyanirapeka.
The Vedantic standpoint highlights the point that ruti, even though
a distinct means of valid cognition, having for its domain the
supersensuous realities, is not altogether unrelated to other pram nas
like perception and inference. A mysticism which ignores the claims of
the understanding would no doubt be doomed. Rm nuja admits that
reason may be employed in support of scripture. Yamuncrya has
remarked in the Siddhitraya that we require logic to convince us. To
realise the truth the mind must explore all its resources and act at the
highest level of its life. Mind at its fullest stretch is suffused with
reason as well asfeeling.

Part II: Reductionism of Buddhism and Vaieika

2.1. Buddhist arguments against verbal knowledge

When we cast our glance at the Buddhist account of scriptural

knowledge we find that they do not accept verbal knowledge as a
distinct means of valid cognition. Hearing the word as a sound is
perception, and knowing its meaning is inference. So, verbal
knowledge is a combination of perception and inference. The M
ms view that the Vedaswere not composed by any person cannot be
true, for there can be no book not composed by any person. The
Buddhists reject the Nyya view that the Veda was composed by God
(vara), for the existence of God cannot be proved. If they accept the
authoritativeness of a book because it was composed by a reliable
person, then there is only one reliable person, the Buddha. Buddhas
teachings or words ought, therefore, to be accepted.
2.2.Arguments byDinga and Dharmakrti against abda prama

It will be of interest to note Dinngas argument that abda is not an

independent source of knowledge. In keeping with his position of
accepting only two pramnas, pratyaka and anum na, he goes on to
argue that when we speak of credible assertion, we mean either that
the person who utters it is credible, or that the fact that he utters is
credible. If it is the former, we have a case of inference; if it is the
latter, we have a case of perception.
Dharmakrti develops Dingas line of argument further. For
Dharmakrti it is not a question of inferring meanings or objects from
words, because in the communication process what the hearer
understands is the intention (vivak: desire to speak) of the speaker.
There is causeeffect relationship between intention and expression. So
the hearer infers the cause (namely intention or intended meaning)
from the effect (uttered sentence).The next stage is that of knowing an
objective truth through the sentence. This is again a case of inference.
Having known the intended meaning, we can infer it to be true if we
know the intended meaning of the speaker, then we can infer that he
was speaking the truth if we are sure that the person is reliable.
Buddhists do not take it for granted that a particular person or a
particular text is reliable as a self-evident truth. For example, the
Buddha was a reliable person. A reliable person, says Prajkaragupta
in Pramnavrtikabhya (following Dharmakirtis Pramavrtika),
is one who has knowledge of the ultimate truth, who knows what is to
be sought for and what is to be avoided, and who is infinitely
compassionate. He is one who has gone the right way (sugata) and who
knows and teaches the four Aryan Truths. Such a person is Buddha
and only his teachings are reliable. Furthermore, his teachings can be
verified by experience and inference. These are the checks and
balances in respect of Dharmakirtis accommodation of abda as one
may have from an pta. There is the great saying of the Buddha,
namely, that just as a
goldsmith cuts, rubs and melts the precious metal, so should one test
the Teachers teachings, without adhering to reverential authority.

2.4. Reduction of abda to anumna offered by the Vaieika

Of all the Vedic schools, the Vaieika alone has a programmatic
reduction of abda to anumna . The Vaieika practically incorporates
the epistemology of the Nyya. However, Kanda thinks that there are
only two primary means of valid cognition, perception and inference
16
. He accepts the authoritativeness of the Vedas for the reason that
they are the word of vara17, otherwise knowledge obtained from
words is only a combination of perception and inference 18. Weperceive
the sounds that constitute speech and infer their meanings from them.
Kanda contends that verbal knowledge need not, therefore, be given a
separate place or status. For the same reason he does not accept
upamna as understood by either the Nyya or Mmns. He, like the
Nyaya, rejects arthpatti and anupalabdhi which are accepted
byMmns19.
Although Kada accepts two means of valid cognition, he seems to
have no objection to accepting memory or smti20. As he accepts Vedic
testimony for his own reasons, commentators like Praastapda and
akara Misra say that the Vaieika accepts four valid means of
cognition, perception, inference, verbal testimony (Vedic) and memory.
The Nyya does not accept memory because, it is anarthaja, that is, it
does not arise from the object, but from an impression generated by a
previous cognition. Kandas main concern is with metaphysics, and so
his discussion of the epistemological problems is incidental to
metaphysics.
The Vaieika uses the term laigika for inference and rajna
for Vedic testimony. Perception enables us to apprehend substances,
qualities, actions and generalities. Gross substances, which are made
up of parts, are within the reach of perception, while atoms and dyads
are not. The Vaieika admits yogic perception, by which the
perceptual cognition of the soul (tmapratyaka) arises21 . The Vaieika
brings upamna, tradition (aitihya), and verbal knowledge (abda)
under inference22. The validity of scriptural statements is an inference
from the authoritative character of the speakers 23. Like the Nyya, the
Vaieika repudiates the Mms theory of eternality of sound and
the absolute authoritativeness of the Vedas24. While the Nyya bases
the validity of the Vedas on the ground of the direct communication
from seers who had realized the eternal truths and laws, the Vaieika
infers it from the unimpeachable veracity of the inspired seers. The
scriptures give us real knowledge and not mere speculation. It is
knowledge of things as they are, and in this sense has no beginning,
though it is always directly known and realized by some beings in its
entirety and by others in part. The Vedas, as collection of sentences,
presuppose intelligent authors; and they must be possessors of
complete and accurate knowledge of heaven and unseen destiny
(adtam). Gradually this authorship was assigned to God. The
authoritativeness of the Vedas follows from their being the word of
God: tad-vacan dmnyasyaprmnyaiti25. The meaning of words
and sentences must be understood before they give us knowledge.
Since the understanding of meanings depends on the recognition of
universal concomitance or vypti, verbal knowledge is a case of
inference26. It appears that the Vaieika foreshadows a view like
anumitivda, a theory that was proposed with regard to the
rasanipatti or the ultimate essence of the language of poetry. Ce or
gesture, arthpatti or
16
VaieikaStras, V. 4
17 Ibid, 1.1.3
18 Ibid, IX. ii. 3
19 Ibid, IX. ii. 5 and IX. i. 8
20 Ibid, VII. i. 1
21 Ibid, IX. 1. 11-15
22 See
Padrthadharmasgr
aha 23VaieikaStras,
IX. 1. 3
24 Ibid., II. 2. 21-37 and VI. 1. 1
25 Ibid., X. 2. 9
26 Ibid., III, 1. 7-15
implication, sabhava or inclusion, and abhva or negation27 are all
brought under inference. Smti or remembrance is given an
independent place. rajna is the insight of seers. If remembrance is
ignored, since it only reproduces what has already been experienced,
and if intuitive wisdom is brought under perception, we have,
according to the Vaieika, only two sources of knowledge, intuition
and inference 28 . Finally, the Vaieika accepts the Buddhist view of the
sources of knowledge, perception and inference, while it rejects the
latters phenomenalism.
Willy-nilly, we are led to the questions of truth and validity of the
sources or means of valid cognition. Pramnas are so called because
they give us pram 29 . Udayana in his Ttparyapariuddhiremarks that
cognition of the real nature of things is pram, and the means of such
knowledge is pramna. 30. Apprehension of what the object really is,
yathbhta, is the point of epistemological quest. The existence of
things does not depend on pramnas , though their existence as objects
of cognition depends entirely on the operation of the pramnas. As for
the Nyya, the canon of prmnya is unexceptionable. The validity of
knowledge, be it abda or rajna, has to submit to the test of being
proved by something else (parataprmya). No knowledge is self-
established. As when Dinnaga or Kada proposes to reduce abda to
anumna the claims of self-evidence of scriptural testimony are
subjected to the court of reason. Even the Naiyyika engages himself to
derive the vidhis or Vedic injunctions as the conclusions of a syllogism.
This is what is done by Udayana in the context ofvarnumna in the
Kusumjal.