A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.

1 1

A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1

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Title:AHistoryofIndianPhilosophy,Vol.1

Author:SurendranathDasgupta

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nikhilamanujachittaMjnastrairnaverya@hsajabhivakusumnMklandhhrairvidhatte/salaghumapi
mamaitaMprAchyavijnatantuMupah@rtamatibhaktymodatMmaig@rhtv//

MayHe,wholinksthemindsofallpeople,throughtheaperturesoftime,withnewthreadsofknowledgelikea
garlandofflowers,bepleasedtoacceptthismythreadofEasternthought,offered,thoughitbesmall,withthe
greatestdevotion.

AHISTORYOFINDIANPHILOSOPHY

SURENDRANATHDASGUPTA

VOLUMEI
FirstEdition:Cambridge,1922

DEDICATION

Theworkandambitionofalifetimeishereinhumblydedicatedwithsupremereverencetothegreatsagesof
India,who,forthefirsttimeinhistory,formulatedthetrueprinciplesoffreedomanddevotedthemselvestothe
holyquestoftruthandthefinalassessmentanddiscoveryoftheultimatespiritualessenceofmanthroughtheir
concretelives,criticalthought,dominantwillandselfdenial.

NOTEONTHEPRONUNCIATIONOFTRANSLITERATEDSANSKRITANDPLIWORDS

ThevowelsarepronouncedalmostinthesamewayasinItalian,exceptthatthesoundofaapproachesthatofo
inbondoruinbut,and__thatofaasinarmy.TheconsonantsareasinEnglish,exceptc,chinchurch;_@t_,
_@d_,_@n_arecerebrals,towhichEnglisht,d,nalmostcorrespond;t,d,narepuredentals;kh,gh,ch,jh,
_@th_,_@dh_,th,dh,ph,bhare the simple sounds plus an aspiration; __ is the French _gn_; _@r_ is
A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 2
usuallypronouncedasri,and_s'_,_@s_assh.

PREFACE

TheoldcivilisationofIndiawasaconcreteunityofmanysideddevelopmentsinart,architecture,literature,
religion,morals,andsciencesofarasitwasunderstoodinthosedays.Butthemostimportantachievementof
Indianthoughtwasphilosophy.Itwasregardedasthegoalofallthehighestpracticalandtheoreticalactivities,
anditindicatedthepointofunityamidstalltheapparentdiversitieswhichthecomplexgrowthofcultureovera
vastareainhabitedbydifferentpeoplesproduced.

Itisnotinthehistoryofforeigninvasions,intheriseofindependentkingdomsatdifferenttimes,inthe
empiresofthisorthatgreatmonarchthattheunityofIndiaistobesought.Itisessentiallyoneofspiritual
aspirationsandobediencetothelawofthespirit,whichwereregardedassuperiortoeverythingelse,andit
hasoutlivedallthepoliticalchangesthroughwhichIndiapassed.

TheGreeks,theHuns,theScythians,thePathansandtheMogulswhooccupiedthelandandcontrolledthe
politicalmachineryneverruledthemindsofthepeople,forthesepoliticaleventswerelikehurricanesorthe
changesofseason,merephenomenaofanaturalorphysicalorderwhichneveraffectedthespiritualintegrityof
Hinduculture.IfafterapassivityofsomecenturiesIndiaisagaingoingtobecomecreativeitismainlyonaccount
ofthisfundamentalunityofherprogressandcivilisationandnotforanythingthatshemayborrowfromother
countries.Itisthereforeindispensablynecessaryforallthosewhowishtoappreciatethesignificanceand
potentialitiesofIndianculturethattheyshouldproperlyunderstandthehistoryofIndianphilosophicalthought
whichisthenucleusroundwhichallthatisbestandhighestinIndiahasgrown.Muchharmhasalreadybeen
donebythecirculationofopinionsthatthecultureandphilosophyofIndiawasdreamyandabstract.Itis
thereforeverynecessarythatIndiansaswellasotherpeoplesshouldbecomemoreandmoreacquaintedwiththe
truecharacteristicsofthepasthistoryofIndianthoughtandformacorrectestimateofitsspecialfeatures.

ButitisnotonlyforthesakeoftherightunderstandingofIndia

viii

thatIndianphilosophyshouldberead,oronlyasarecordofthepastthoughtsofIndia.Formostofthe
problemsthatarestilldebatedinmodernphilosophicalthoughtoccurredinmoreorlessdivergentformstothe
philosophersofIndia.Theirdiscussions,difficultiesandsolutionswhenproperlygraspedinconnectionwiththe
problemsofourowntimesmaythrowlightonthecourseoftheprocessofthefuturereconstructionofmodern
thought.ThediscoveryoftheimportantfeaturesofIndianphilosophicalthought,andadueappreciationof
theirfullsignificance,mayturnouttobeasimportanttomodernphilosophyasthediscoveryofSanskrithas
beentotheinvestigationofmodernphilologicalresearches.Itisunfortunatethatthetaskofreinterpretation
andrevaluationofIndianthoughthasnotyetbeenundertakenonacomprehensivescale.Sanskritistsalsowith
veryfewexceptionshaveneglectedthisimportantfieldofstudy,formostofthesescholarshavebeeninterested
moreinmythology,philology,andhistorythaninphilosophy.Muchworkhoweverhasalreadybeendoneinthe
wayofthepublicationofalargenumberofimportanttexts,andtranslationsofsomeofthemhavealsobeen
attempted.ButowingtothepresenceofmanytechnicaltermsinadvancedSanskritphilosophicalliterature,the
translationsinmostcasesarehardlyintelligibletothosewhoarenotfamiliarwiththetextsthemselves.

Aworkcontainingsomegeneralaccountofthemutualrelationsofthechiefsystemsisnecessaryforthosewho
intendtopursuethestudyofaparticularschool.Thisisalsonecessaryforlayreadersinterestedinphilosophy
andstudentsofWesternphilosophywhohavenoinclinationortimetospecialiseinanyIndiansystem,but
whoareatthesametimeinterestedtoknowwhattheycanaboutIndianphilosophy.InmytwobooksThe
StudyofPatanjaliandYogaPhilosophyinrelationtootherIndianSystemsofThought I have
A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 3
attemptedtointerprettheSmkhyaandYogasystemsbothfromtheirinnerpointofviewandfromthepointof
viewoftheirrelationtootherIndiansystems.Thepresentattemptdealswiththeimportantfeaturesoftheseas
alsoofalltheothersystemsandseekstoshowsomeoftheirinnerphilosophicalrelationsespeciallyinregardto
thehistoryoftheirdevelopment.IhavetriedtobeasfaithfultotheoriginaltextsasIcouldandhavealwaysgiven
theSanskritorPlitechnicaltermsforthehelpofthosewhowanttomakethisbookaguide

ix

forfurtherstudy.Tounderstandsomethingofthesetermsisindeedessentialforanyonewhowishestobesure
thatheisfollowingtheactualcourseofthethoughts.

InSanskrittreatisesthestyleofargumentandmethodsoftreatingthedifferenttopicsarealtogetherdifferent
fromwhatwefindinanymodernworkofphilosophy.Materialshadthereforetobecollectedfromalarge
numberofworksoneachsystemandthesehavebeenknittogetherandgivenashapewhichislikelytobemore
intelligibletopeopleunacquaintedwithSanskriticwaysofthought.ButatthesametimeIconsidereditquite
undesirabletoputanypressureonIndianthoughtsinordertomakethemappearasEuropean.Thiswillexplain
muchofwhatmightappearquainttoaEuropeanreader.Butwhilekeepingallthethoughtsandexpressionsof
theIndianthinkersIhavetriedtoarrangetheminasystematicwholeinamannerwhichappearedtomestrictly
faithfultotheirclearindicationsandsuggestions.ItisonlyinveryfewplacesthatIhavetranslatedsomeofthe
IndiantermsbytermsofEnglishphilosophy,andthisIdidbecauseitappearedtomethatthosewere
approximatelythenearestapproachtotheIndiansenseoftheterm.InallotherplacesIhavetriedtochoose
wordswhichhavenotbeenmadedangerousbytheacquirementoftechnicalsenses.Thishoweverisdifficult,for
thewordswhichareusedinphilosophyalwaysacquiresomesortoftechnicalsense.Iwouldthereforerequestmy
readerstotakethosewordsinanunsophisticatedsenseandassociatethemwithsuchmeaningsasarejustifiedby
thepassagesandcontextsinwhichtheyareused.SomeofwhatwillappearasobscureinanysystemmayIhope
beremovedifitisrereadwithcareandattention,forunfamiliaritysometimesstandsinthewayofright
comprehension.ButImayhavealsomissedgivingthepropersuggestivelinksinmanyplaceswherecondensation
wasinevitableandthesystemsthemselveshavealsosometimesinsolubledifficulties,fornosystemofphilosophy
iswithoutitsdarkanduncomfortablecorners.

ThoughIhavebegunmyworkfromtheVedicandBrhma@nicstage,mytreatmentofthisperiodhasbeen
veryslight.Thebeginningsoftheevolutionofphilosophicalthought,thoughtheycanbetracedinthelater
Vedichymns,areneitherconnectednorsystematic.

More is found in the Brhmanas, but I do not think it worth while to elaborate the broken shreds of thought of this
epoch. I could have dealt with the Upani@sad period more fully, but many works on the subject have already been
published in Europe and those who wish to go into details will certainly go to them. I have therefore limited myself to
the dominant current flowing through the earlier Upani@sads. Notices of other currents of thought will be given in
connection with the treatment of other systems in the second volume with which they are more intimately connected.
It will be noticed that my treatment of early Buddhism is in some places of an inconclusive character. This is largely due
to the inconclusive character of the texts which were put into writing long after Buddha in the form of dialogues and
where the precision and directness required in philosophy were not contemplated. This has given rise to a number of
theories about the interpretations of the philosophical problems of early Buddhism among modern Buddhist scholars
and it is not always easy to decide one way or the other without running the risk of being dogmatic; and the scope of
my work was also too limited to allow me to indulge in very elaborate discussions of textual difficulties. But still I also
have in many places formed theories of my own, whether they are right or wrong it will be for scholars to judge. I had
no space for entering into any polemic, but it will be found that my interpretations of the systems are different in some
cases from those offered by some European scholars who have worked on them and I leave it to those who are
acquainted with the literature of the subject to decide which of us may be in the right. I have not dealt
A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1 4
elaboratelywiththenewschoolofLogic(NavyaNyya)ofBengal,forthesimplereasonthatmostofthe
contributionsofthisschoolconsistintheinventionoftechnicalexpressionsandtheemphasisputonthenecessity
ofstrictexactitudeandabsoluteprecisenessoflogicaldefinitionsanddiscussionsandthesearealmost
untranslatableinintelligibleEnglish.Ihavehoweverincorporatedwhatimportantdifferencesofphilosophical
pointsofviewIcouldfindinit.Discussionsofapurelytechnicalcharactercouldnotbeveryfruitfulinawork
likethis.ThebibliographygivenofthedifferentIndiansystemsinthelastsixchaptersisnotexhaustivebut
consistsmostlyofbookswhichhavebeenactuallystudiedorconsultedinthewritingofthosechapters.Exact
referencestothepagesofthe

xi

textshavegenerallybeengiveninfootnotesinthosecaseswhereadifferenceofinterpretationwasanticipatedor
whereitwasfeltthatareferencetothetextwouldmakethematterclearer,orwheretheopinionsofmodern
writershavebeenincorporated.

ItgivesmethegreatestpleasuretoacknowledgemydeepestgratefulnesstotheHon'bleMaharajaSir
ManindrachandraNundy,K.C.I.E.Kashimbazar,Bengal,whohaskindlypromisedtobeartheentireexpenseof
thepublicationofbothvolumesofthepresentwork.

ThenameofthisnoblemanisalmostahouseholdwordinBengalforthemagnanimousgiftsthathehasmadeto
educationalandothercauses.Uptillnowhehasmadeatotalgiftofabout300,000,ofwhichthosedevotedto
educationcometoabout200,000.Butthemanhimselfisfarabovethegiftshehasmade.Hissterlingcharacter,
universalsympathyandfriendship,hiskindnessandamiabilitymakehimaveritableBodhisattvaoneofthe
noblestofmenthatIhaveeverseen.LikemanyotherscholarsofBengal,Iamdeeplyindebtedtohimforthe
encouragementthathehasgivenmeinthepursuitofmystudiesandresearches,andmyfeelingsofattachment
andgratefulnessforhimaretoodeepforutterance.

IammuchindebtedtomyesteemedfriendsDrE.J.ThomasoftheCambridgeUniversityLibraryandMr
DouglasAinsliefortheirkindlyrevisingtheproofsofthiswork,inthecourseofwhichtheyimprovedmy
Englishinmanyplaces.TotheformerIamalsoindebtedforhisattentiontothetransliterationofalarge
numberofSanskritwords,andalsoforthewholeheartedsympathyandgreatfriendlinesswithwhichhe
assistedmewithhisadviceonmanypointsofdetail,inparticulartheexpositionoftheBuddhistdoctrineofthe
causeofrebirthowessomethingofitstreatmenttorepeateddiscussionswithhim.

IalsowishtoexpressmygratefulnesstomyfriendMrN.K.Siddhanta,M.A.,lateoftheScottishChurches
College,andMademoisellePaulePovieforthekindassistancetheyhaverenderedinpreparingtheindex.My
obligationsarealsoduetotheSyndicsoftheCambridgeUniversityPressforthehonourtheyhavedonemein
publishingthiswork.

ToscholarsofIndianphilosophywhomaydomethehonourofreadingmybookandwhomaybeimpressed
withitsinevitable

xii
shortcomingsanddefects,IcanonlyprayinthewordsofHemacandra:

Pram@nasiddhntaviruddhamatraYatkiciduktammatimndyado@stMtsaryyamutsryya
tadryyacitt@hPrasdamdhyavis'odhayantu.[Footnoteref1]

S.D.
TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.
CHAPTER I 5
February,1922.

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Maythenoblemindedscholarsinsteadofcherishingillfeelingkindlycorrectwhatevererrors
havebeenherecommittedthroughthedullnessofmyintellectinthewayofwronginterpretationsand
misstatements.]

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY........................................................1

CHAPTER II
THEVEDAS,BRHMA@NASANDTHEIRPHILOSOPHY

1TheVedasandtheir .................................102TheplaceoftheVedasinthe
antiquity Hindu
mind...................... 103ClassificationoftheVedicliterature........................ 114The
Sa@mhits.................................................
125TheBrhma@nas................................................ 136The
ra@nyakas................................................
147The@RgVeda,its 148The
civilization................................
Vedicgods................................................
169Polytheism,Henotheism,and 1710
Monotheism........................
GrowthofaMonotheistictendency;Prajpati,Vis'vakarma.....1911
Brahma........................................................
2012Sacrifice;theFirstRudimentsoftheLawof
Karma............ 2113CosmogonyMythologicaland 2314Eschatology;the
Philosophical.....................
Doctrineoftman ............................ 2515Conclusion.................................................... 26

CHAPTER III
THEEARLIERUPANI@SADS(700B.C.600B.C.)
1TheplaceoftheUpani@sadsinVedic 282Thenamesofthe
literature............... Upani@sads;
NonBrahmanicinfluence.......... 303Brhma@nasandtheEarly 314The
Upani@sads...........................
meaningofthewordUpani@sad .............................385Thecompositionandgrowthofdiverse
Upani@sads.............. 386RevivalofUpani@sadstudiesinmoderntimes.................. 397TheUpani@sads
andtheir 418ThequestafterBrahman:thestruggleandthefailures ........429
interpretations......................
UnknowabilityofBrahmanandtheNegative 4410Thetman
Method..............
doctrine............................................ 4511PlaceofBrahmaninthe 4812The
Upani@sads............................
World..................................................... 5113TheWorldSoul................................................ 5214TheTheory
ofCausation....................................... 5215Doctrineof 5316
Transmigration....................................
Emancipation..................................................
58

CHAPTER IV
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SYSTEMS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER IV 6
1InwhatsenseisaHistoryofIndianPhilosophy 622GrowthofthePhilosophic
possible?......
Literature........................... 653TheIndiansystemsofPhilosophy ...............................674Somefundamental
pointsof 711TheKarmatheory......................................... 712TheDoctrineof
agreement...........................
Mukti.................................... 743TheDoctrineofSoul..................................... 755ThePessimisticAttitude
towardstheWorldandtheOptimisticFaithinthe 756UnityinIndian
end...............................................
Sdhana(philosophical,religiousandethical 77
endeavours)....................................................
xiv

CHAPTER V
BUDDHISTPHILOSOPHY
1TheStateofPhilosophyinIndiabefore .................782Buddha:his
Buddha
Life...............................................
813EarlyBuddhistLiterature...................................... 824TheDoctrineof
CausalConnectionofearlyBuddhism ............845The 936Avijj
Khandhas...................................................
andsava...............................................
997SlaandSamdhi.............................................. 1008
Kamma.........................................................
1069Upani@sadsand 10910
Buddhism.......................................
TheSchoolsofTheravda 11211
Buddhism.............................
Mahynism....................................................
12512TheTathatPhilosophyofAs'vagho@sa(80
A.D.)............... 12913TheMdhyamikaortheSnyavdaschoolNihilism.............. 13814Uncompromising
IdealismortheSchoolofVijnavdaBuddhism.14515Sautrntikatheoryof
Perception.............................. 15116SautrntikatheoryofInference............................... 15517TheDoctrine
of 15818TheDoctrineofMomentarinessandtheDoctrineofCausal
Momentariness.................................
Efficiency 16319SomeOntologicalProblemsonwhichthe
(Arthakriykritva)..................................
DifferentIndianSystems 16420BriefSurveyoftheEvolutionof
diverged........................................................
BuddhistThought............. 166

CHAPTER VI
THEJAINAPHILOSOPHY
1TheOriginof 1692TwoSectsof 1703
Jainism.........................................
Jainism..........................................
TheCanonicalandotherLiteratureoftheJains ...............1714SomeGeneralCharacteristicsofthe
Jains..................... 1725LifeofMahvra.............................................. 1736TheFundamentalIdeasofJaina
Ontology....................... 1737TheDoctrineofRelativePluralism(Anekntavda)............. 1758TheDoctrine
ofNyas......................................... 1769TheDoctrineof 17910Knowledge,
Sydvda......................................
itsvalueforus................................... 18111Theoryof 18312
Perception..........................................
NonPerceptualknowledge...................................... 18513Knowledgeas
Revelation....................................... 18614TheJvas..................................................... 18815Karma
Theory..................................................
19016Karma,sravaand 19217
Nirjar.....................................
Pudgala.......................................................
19518Dharma,Adharma, 19719
ks'a.......................................
KlaandSamaya...............................................
19820JainaCosmography............................................. 19921
JainaYoga....................................................
19922JainaAtheism................................................. 20323
Mok@sa 207
(emancipation).........................................
xv
CHAPTER VII 7

CHAPTER VII
THEKAPILAANDTHEPTAJALAS@MKHYA(YOGA)
1AReview...................................................... 2082TheGermsofS@mkhyainthe
Upani@sads...................... 2113S@mkhyaandYogaLiterature.................................. 2124AnEarlySchool
.
ofS@mkhya................................... 2135S@mkhyakrik,S@mkhyastra,VcaspatiMis'raandVijna
Bhiksu.......................................................... 2226Yogaand 2267The
Patajali............................................
S@mkhyaandtheYogadoctrineofSoulorPurusa.......... 2388Thoughtand
Matter............................................ 2419Feelings,theUltimateSubstances............................. 24210The
Gunas..................................................... 24311Prak@@rtianditsevolution................................... 24512
PralayaandthedisturbanceofthePrak@rti 24713Mahatand
Equilibrium.......
Ahamkra............................................ 24814TheTanmtrasandtheParamus............................... 25115
PrincipleofCausationandConservationofEnergy............. 25416Changeastheformationofnew
collocations................... 25517CausationasSatkryavda(thetheorythattheeffectpotentiallyexistsbefore
itisgeneratedbythemovementofthe 25718S@mkhyaAtheismand
cause)...................................................
Yoga 25819BuddhiandPurusa............................................. 25920TheCognitive
Theism..............................
ProcessandsomecharacteristicsofCitta .......26121SorrowanditsDissolution.................................... 26422
Citta......................................................... 26823YogaPurificatoryPractices(Parikarma) .......................27024
TheYoga 271
Meditation...........................................

CHAPTER VIII
THENYYAVAISESIKAPHILOSOPHY

1CriticismofBuddhismandS@mkhyafromtheNyya
standpoint...
stras...................................
PhilosophyintheVais'e@sika
stras...........................
stras.................................
Vais'e@sikaandNyyaLiterature...........................
Philosophy..........
Samavya........................................................
Dissolution(Pralaya)andCreation
(S@r@s@ti).................
Is'vara.............................
Knowledge
(Pram@na)............................
Perception
(Pratyak@sa).......................................
Upamnaand
S'abda............................................
NyyaVais'e@sika.................................
seekerofSalvation.........................................
2742NyyaandVais'e@sika
2763DoesVais'e@sikarepresentanoldschoolofMm@ms? ..........2804
2855PhilosophyintheNyya
2946PhilosophyofNyyastrasandVais'e@sikastras.............. 3017The
3058ThemaindoctrineoftheNyyaVais'e@sika
3109ThesixPadrthas:Dravya,Gu@na,Karma,Smnya,Vis'e@sa,
31310TheTheoryofCausation....................................... 31911
32312ProofoftheExistenceof
32513TheNyyaVais'e@sika 32614TheOriginof
Physics.................................
33015ThefourPram@nasofNyya................................... 33216
33317Inference.....................................................
34318
35419Negationin
35520ThenecessityoftheAcquirementofdebatingdevicesforthe
36021TheDoctrineofSoul.......................................... 36222
s'varaandSalvation......................................... 363
xvi

CHAPTER IX
MM@MSPHILOSOPHY
1AComparative 3672TheMm@ms
Review...........................................
Literature........................................ 3693TheParata@hprm@nyadoctrineofNyyaandthe
Svata@hprm@nyadoctrineofMm@ms ..........................372 4 The place of Sense-organs in
CHAPTER IX 8
Perception........................ 3755IndeterminateandDeterminate 3786Some
Perception.......................
OntologicalProblemsconnectedwiththeDoctrineof 3797The
Perception......................................................
NatureofKnowledge........................................ 3828ThePsychologyofIllusion..................................... 3849
Inference...................................................... 38710Upamna, 39111
Arthpatti...........................................
S'abda 39412ThePram@naofNonperception
pram@na...............................................
(anupalabdhi).................. 39713Self,Salvation,andGod...................................... 39914Mm@msas
PhilosophyandMim@msasRitualism ..............403

CHAPTER X
THES'A@NKARASCHOOLOFVEDNTA

1ComprehensionofthePhilosophicalIssuesmoreessentialthantheDialecticof
Controversy................................... 4062Thephilosophicalsituation:a 4083Vednta
. Review..........................
Literature............................................ 4184Vedntain 4205Vednta
. Gau@dapda..........................................
andSa@nkara(788820A.D.)............................ 4296ThemainideaoftheVednta
philosophy........................ 4397Inwhatsenseistheworldappearancefalse?...................4438Thenatureof
theworldappearance, 4459TheDefinitionofAjna(nescience)........................... 452
phenomena..................
10AjnaestablishedbyPerceptionandInference ................45411LocusandObjectofAjna,Aha@mkra
andAnta@hkara@na....... 45712AnirvcyavdaandtheVedntadialectic.......................46113TheTheory
ofCausation....................................... 46514VedntatheoryofPerceptionand 47015
Inference....................
tman,Jva,Is'vara,EkajvavdaandD@r@s@tis@r@s@tivda....47416Vedntatheoryof
Illusion.................................... 48517VedntaEthicsandVedntaEmancipation....................... 48918
VedntaandotherIndian 492
systems..............................
INDEX............................................................ 495

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY

The achievements of the ancient Indians in the field of philosophy are but very imperfectly known to the world at large,
and it is unfortunate that the condition is no better even in India. There is a small body of Hindu scholars and ascetics
living a retired life in solitude, who are well acquainted with the subject, but they do not know English and are not used
to modern ways of thinking, and the idea that they ought to write books in vernaculars in order to popularize the
subject does not appeal to them. Through the activity of various learned bodies and private individuals both in Europe
and in India large numbers of philosophical works in Sanskrit and Pli have been published, as well as translations of a
few of them, but there has been as yet little systematic attempt on the part of scholars to study them and judge their
value. There are hundreds of Sanskrit works on most of the systems of Indian thought and scarcely a hundredth part of
them has been translated. Indian modes of expression, entailing difficult technical philosophical terms are so different
from those of European thought, that they can hardly ever be accurately translated. It is therefore very difficult for a
person unacquainted with Sanskrit to understand Indian philosophical thought in its true bearing from translations. Pli
is a much easier language than Sanskrit, but a knowledge of Pli is helpful in understanding only the earliest school of
Buddhism, when it was in its semi-philosophical stage. Sanskrit is generally regarded as a difficult language. But no one
from an acquaintance with Vedic or ordinary literary Sanskrit can have any idea of the difficulty of the logical and
abstruse parts of Sanskrit philosophical literature. A man who can easily understand the Vedas. the Upani@sads, the
Purnas, the Law Books and the literary works, and is also well
CHAPTER I 9
acquaintedwithEuropeanphilosophicalthought,mayfinditliterallyimpossibletounderstandevensmall
portionsofaworkofadvancedIndianlogic,orthedialecticalVednta.Thisisduetotworeasons,theuseof
technicaltermsandofgreatcondensationinexpression,andthehiddenallusionstodoctrinesofothersystems.
The

tendencytoconceivingphilosophicalproblemsinaclearandunambiguousmannerisanimportantfeatureof
Sanskritthought,butfromtheninthcenturyonwards,thehabitofusingclear,definite,andpreciseexpressions,
begantodevelopinaverystrikingmanner,andasaresultofthatalargenumberoftechnicaltermsbegantobe
invented.Thesetermsareseldomproperlyexplained,anditispresupposedthatthereaderwhowantstoread
theworksshouldhaveaknowledgeofthem.Anyoneinoldentimeswhotooktothestudyofanysystemof
philosophy,hadtodosowithateacher,whoexplainedthosetermstohim.Theteacherhimselfhadgotitfrom
histeacher,andhefromhis.Therewasnotendencytopopularizephilosophy,fortheideathenprevalentwas
thatonlythechosenfewwhohadotherwiseshowntheirfitness,deservedtobecomefitstudents(_adhikr_)of
philosophy,underthedirectionofateacher.Onlythosewhohadthegritandhighmoralstrengthtodevotetheir
wholelifetothetrueunderstandingofphilosophyandtherebuildingoflifeinaccordancewiththehightruthsof
philosophywereallowedtostudyit.

Anotherdifficultywhichabeginnerwillmeetisthis,thatsometimesthesametechnicaltermsareusedin
extremelydifferentsensesindifferentsystems.Thestudentmustknowthemeaningofeachtechnicaltermwith
referencetothesysteminwhichitoccurs,andnodictionarywillenlightenhimmuchaboutthematter[Footnote
ref1].Hewillhavetopickthemupasheadvancesandfindsthemused.Allusionstothedoctrinesofother
systemsandtheirrefutationsduringthediscussionsofsimilardoctrinesinanyparticularsystemofthoughtare
oftenverypuzzlingeventoawellequippedreader;forhecannotbeexpectedtoknowallthedoctrinesofother
systemswithoutgoingthroughthem,andsoitoftenbecomesdifficulttofollowtheseriesofanswersand
refutationswhicharepouredforthinthecourseofthesediscussions.Therearetwoimportantcompendiumsin
SanskritgivingasummaryofsomeoftheprincipalsystemsofIndianthought,viz.the
_Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_,andthe_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ofHaribhadrawiththecommentaryof
Gu@naratna;buttheformerisverysketchyandcanthrowverylittlelightontheunderstandingofthe
ontologicalorepistemologicaldoctrinesofanyofthesystems.IthasbeentranslatedbyCowellandGough,butI

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:RecentlyaveryableSanskritdictionaryoftechnicalphilosophicaltermscalledNyyakos'ahas
beenpreparedbyM.M.BhmcryaJhalkikar,Bombay,Govt.Press.]

am afraid the translation may not be found very intelligible. Gu@naratna's commentary is excellent so far as Jainism is
concerned, and it sometimes gives interesting information about other systems, and also supplies us with some short
bibliographical notices, but it seldom goes on to explain the epistemological or ontological doctrines or discussions
which are so necessary for the right understanding of any of the advanced systems of Indian thought. Thus in the
absence of a book which could give us in brief the main epistemological, ontological, and psychological positions of the
Indian thinkers, it is difficult even for a good Sanskrit scholar to follow the advanced philosophical literature, even
though he may be acquainted with many of the technical philosophical terms. I have spoken enough about the
difficulties of studying Indian philosophy, but if once a person can get himself used to the technical terms and the
general positions of the different Indian thinkers and their modes of expression, he can master the whole by patient
toil. The technical terms, which are a source of difficulty at the beginning, are of inestimable value in helping us to
understand the precise and definite meaning of the writers who used them, and the chances of misinterpreting or
misunderstanding them
CHAPTER I 10
arereducedtoaminimum.ItisIthinkwellknownthatavoidanceoftechnicaltermshasoftenrendered
philosophicalworksundulyverbose,andliabletomisinterpretation.Theartofclearwritingisindeedarare
virtueandeveryphilosophercannotexpecttohaveit.Butwhentechnicalexpressionsareproperlyformed,even
abadwritercanmakehimselfunderstood.IntheearlydaysofBuddhistphilosophyinthePliliterature,this
difficultyisgreatlyfelt.Therearesometechnicaltermsherewhicharestillveryelasticandtheirrepetitionin
differentplacesinmoreorlessdifferentsensesheightenthedifficultyofunderstandingtherealmeaningintended
tobeconveyed.

ButisitnecessarythatahistoryofIndianphilosophyshouldbewritten?Therearesomepeoplewhothinkthat
theIndiansneverrosebeyondthestageofsimplefaithandthatthereforetheycannothaveanyphilosophyatall
inthepropersenseoftheterm.ThusProfessorFrankThillyoftheCornellUniversitysaysinhisHistoryof
Philosophy[Footnoteref1],"Auniversalhistoryofphilosophywouldincludethephilosophiesofallpeoples.Not
allpeoples,however

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:NewYork,1914,p.3.]

haveproducedrealsystemsofthought,andthespeculationsofonlyafewcanbesaidtohavehadahistory.Many
donotrisebeyondthemythologicalstage.EventhetheoriesofOrientalpeoples,theHindus,Egyptians,Chinese,
consist,inthemain,ofmythologicalandethicaldoctrines,andarenotthoroughgoingsystemsofthought:they
areshotthroughwithpoetryandfaith.Weshall,therefore,limitourselvestothestudyoftheWesterncountries,
andbeginwiththephilosophyoftheancientGreeks,onwhosecultureourowncivilizationinpart,rests."There
aredoubtlessmanyotherpeoplewhoholdsuchuninformedanduntruebeliefs,whichonlyshowtheirignorance
ofIndianmatters.Itisnotnecessarytosayanythinginordertorefutetheseviews,forwhatfollowswillIhope
showthefalsityoftheirbeliefs.Iftheyarenotsatisfied,andwanttoknowmoredefinitelyandelaboratelyabout
thecontentsofthedifferentsystems,Iamafraidtheywillhavetogototheoriginalsreferredtointhe
bibliographicalnoticesofthechapters.

Thereisanotheropinion,thatthetimehasnotyetcomeforanattempttowriteahistoryofIndianphilosophy.
Twodifferentreasonsaregivenfromtwodifferentpointsofview.ItissaidthatthefieldofIndianphilosophyis
sovast,andsuchavastliteratureexistsoneachofthesystems,thatitisnotpossibleforanyonetocollecthis
materialsdirectlyfromtheoriginalsources,beforeseparateaccountsarepreparedbyspecialistsworkingineach
oftheparticularsystems.Thereissometruthinthisobjection,butalthoughinsomeoftheimportantsystemsthe
literaturethatexistsisexceedinglyvast,yetmanyofthemaremoreorlessrepetitionsofthesamesubjects,anda
judiciousselectionoftwentyorthirtyimportantworksoneachofthesystemscouldcertainlybemade,which
wouldgiveafairlycorrectexposition.InmyownundertakinginthisdirectionIhavealwaysdrawndirectlyfrom
theoriginaltexts,andhavealwaystriedtocollectmymaterialsfromthosesourcesinwhichtheyappearattheir
best.MyspacehasbeenverylimitedandIhavechosenthefeatureswhichappearedtometobethemost
important.Ihadtoleaveoutmanydiscussionsofdifficultproblemsanddiverseimportantbearingsofeachofthe
systemstomanyinterestingaspectsofphilosophy.ThisIhopemaybeexcusedinahistoryofphilosophywhich
doesnotaimatcompleteness.Thereareindeedmanydefectsandshortcomings,and

these would have been much less in the case of a writer abler than the present one. At any rate it may be hoped that
the imperfections of the present attempt will be a stimulus to those whose better and more competent efforts will
supersede it. No attempt ought to be called impossible on account of its imperfections.
CHAPTER I 11
InthesecondplaceitissaidthattheIndianshadnoproperandaccuratehistoricalrecordsandbiographiesandit
isthereforeimpossibletowriteahistoryofIndianphilosophy.Thisobjectionisalsopartiallyvalid.Butthisdefect
doesnotaffectussomuchasonewouldatfirstsightsuppose;for,thoughthedatesoftheearlierbeginningsare
veryobscure,yet,inlatertimes,weareinapositiontoaffirmsomedatesandtopointoutpriorityand
posteriorityinthecaseofotherthinkers.Asmostofthesystemsdevelopedsidebysidethroughmanycenturies
theirmutualrelationsalsodeveloped,andthesecouldbewellobserved.Thespecialnatureofthisdevelopment
hasbeentouchedoninthefourthchapter.Mostofthesystemshadveryearlybeginningsandacontinuouscourse
ofdevelopmentthroughthesucceedingcenturies,anditisnotpossibletotakethestateofthephilosophyofa
particularsystemataparticulartimeandcontrastitwiththestateofthatsystematalatertime;forthelater
statedidnotsupersedethepreviousstate,butonlyshowedamorecoherentformofit,whichwasgenerallytrueto
theoriginalsystembutwasmoredeterminate.EvolutionthroughhistoryhasinWesterncountriesoftenbrought
forththedevelopmentofmorecoherenttypesofphilosophicthought,butinIndia,thoughthetypesremainedthe
same,theirdevelopmentthroughhistorymadethemmoreandmorecoherentanddeterminate.Mostoftheparts
wereprobablyexistentintheearlierstages,buttheywereinanundifferentiatedstate;throughthecriticismand
conflictofthedifferentschoolsexistingsidebysidethepartsofeachofthesystemsofthoughtbecamemoreand
moredifferentiated,determinate,andcoherent.Insomecasesthisdevelopmenthasbeenalmostimperceptible,
andinmanycasestheearlierformshavebeenlost,orsoinadequatelyexpressedthatnothingdefinitecouldbe
madeoutofthem.Whereversuchadifferentiationcouldbemadeintheinterestsofphilosophy,Ihavetriedtodo
it.ButIhaveneverconsidereditdesirablethatthephilosophicalinterestshouldbesubordinatedtothe
chronological.Itisno

doubttruethatmoredefinitechronologicalinformationwouldbeaverydesirablething,yetIamofopinionthat
thelittlechronologicaldatawehavegiveusafairamountofhelpinformingageneralnotionaboutthegrowth
anddevelopmentofthedifferentsystemsbymutualassociationandconflict.Iftheconditionofthedevelopment
ofphilosophyinIndiahadbeenthesameasinEurope,definitechronologicalknowledgewouldbeconsidered
muchmoreindispensable.For,whenonesystemsupersedesanother,itisindispensablynecessarythatweshould
knowwhichprecededandwhichsucceeded.Butwhenthesystemsaredevelopingsidebyside,andwhenweare
gettingthemintheirricherandbetterforms,theinterestwithregardtotheconditions,natureandenvironment
oftheirearlyoriginhasratherahistoricalthanaphilosophicalinterest.IhavetriedasbestIcouldtoform
certaingeneralnotionsasregardstheearlierstagesofsomeofthesystems,butthoughthevariousfeaturesof
thesesystemsatthesestagesindetailmaynotbeascertainable,yetthis,Ithink,couldneverbeconsideredas
invalidatingthewholeprogramme.Moreover,evenifweknewdefinitelythecorrectdatesofthethinkersofthe
samesystemwecouldnottreatthemseparately,asisdoneinEuropeanphilosophy,withoutunnecessarily
repeatingthesamethingtwentytimesover;fortheyalldealtwiththesamesystem,andtriedtobringoutthe
sametypeofthoughtinmoreandmoredeterminateforms.

TheearliestliteratureofIndiaistheVedas.Theseconsistmostlyofhymnsinpraiseofnaturegods,suchasfire,
wind,etc.Exceptinginsomeofthehymnsofthelaterpartsofthework(probablyabout1000B.C.),thereisnot
muchphilosophyintheminoursenseoftheterm.Itisherethatwefirstfindintenselyinterestingphilosophical
questionsofamoreorlesscosmologicalcharacterexpressedintermsofpoetryandimagination.Inthelater
VedicworkscalledtheBrhmaf@nasandthera@nyakaswrittenmostlyinprose,whichfollowedtheVedic
hymns,therearetwotendencies,viz.onethatsoughttoestablishthemagicalformsofritualisticworship,andthe
otherwhichindulgedinspeculativethinkingthroughcrudegeneralizations.Thislattertendencywasindeed
muchfeeblerthantheformer,anditmightappearthattheritualistictendencyhadactuallyswallowedupwhat
littleofphilosophythelaterpartsoftheVedichymnsweretryingtoexpress,butthereareunmistakablemarks
thatthistendency

7
existed and worked. Next to this come certain treatises written in prose and verse called the Upani@sads,
CHAPTER I 12
whichcontainvarioussortsofphilosophicalthoughtsmostlymonisticorsingularisticbutalsosomepluralistic
anddualisticones.Thesearenotreasonedstatements,bututterancesoftruthsintuitivelyperceivedorfeltas
unquestionablyrealandindubitable,andcarryinggreatforce,vigour,andpersuasivenesswiththem.Itisvery
probablethatmanyoftheearliestpartsofthisliteratureareasoldas500B.C.to700B.C.Buddhistphilosophy
beganwiththeBuddhafromsometimeabout500B.C.ThereisreasontobelievethatBuddhistphilosophy
continuedtodevelopinIndiainoneorotherofitsvigorousformstillsometimeaboutthetenthoreleventh
centuryA.D.TheearliestbeginningsoftheotherIndiansystemsofthoughtarealsotobesoughtchieflybetween
theageoftheBuddhatoabout200B.C.JainaphilosophywasprobablypriortotheBuddha.Butexceptinits
earlierdays,whenitcameinconflictwiththedoctrinesoftheBuddha,itdoesnotseemtomethattheJaina
thoughtcamemuchincontactwithothersystemsofHinduthought.ExceptinginsomeformsofVai@s@nava
thoughtinlatertimes,JainathoughtisseldomalludedtobytheHinduwritersorlaterBuddhists,thoughsome
JainslikeHaribhadraandGu@naratnatriedtorefutetheHinduandBuddhistsystems.Thenonaggressive
natureoftheirreligionandidealmaytoacertainextentexplainit,buttheremaybeotherreasonstoowhichitis
difficultforustoguess.Itisinterestingtonotethat,thoughtherehavebeensomedissensionsamongsttheJains
aboutdogmasandcreeds,Jainaphilosophyhasnotsplitintomanyschoolsofthoughtmoreorlessdifferingfrom
oneanotherasBuddhistthoughtdid.

ThefirstvolumeofthisworkwillcontainBuddhistandJainaphilosophyandthesixsystemsofHinduthought.
ThesesixsystemsoforthodoxHinduthoughtaretheS@mkhya,theYoga,theNyya,theVais'e@sika,the
Mim@ms(generallyknownasPrvaMim@ms),andtheVednta(knownalsoasUttaraMim@ms).Of
thesewhatisdifferentlyknownasS@mkhyaandYogaarebutdifferentschoolsofonesystem.TheVais'e@sika
andtheNyyainlatertimesbecamesomixedupthat,thoughinearlytimesthesimilarityoftheformerwith
Mim@mswasgreaterthanthatwithNyya,theycametoberegardedasfundamentallyalmostthesame
systems.NyyaandVais'e@sikahavethereforebeentreated

together.InadditiontothesesystemssometheisticsystemsbegantogrowprominentfromtheninthcenturyA.D.
TheyalsoprobablyhadtheirearlybeginningsatthetimeoftheUpani@sads.Butatthattimetheirinterestwas
probablyconcentratedonproblemsofmoralityandreligion.Itisnotimprobablethatthesewereassociatedwith
certainmetaphysicaltheoriesalso,butnoworkstreatingtheminasystematicwayarenowavailable.Oneoftheir
mostimportantearlyworksisthe_Bhagavadgt_.Thisbookisrightlyregardedasoneofthegreatest
masterpiecesofHinduthought.Itiswritteninverse,anddealswithmoral,religious,andmetaphysicalproblems,
inalooseform.Itisitslackofsystemandmethodwhichgivesititspeculiarcharmmoreakintothepoetryofthe
Upani@sadsthantothedialecticalandsystematicHinduthought.Fromtheninthcenturyonwardsattemptswere
madetosupplementtheseloosetheisticideaswhichwerefloatingaboutandformingintegralpartsofreligious
creeds,bymetaphysicaltheories.Theismisoftendualisticandpluralistic,andsoareallthesesystems,whichare
knownasdifferentschoolsofVai@s@navaphilosophy.MostoftheVai@s@navathinkerswishedtoshowthat
theirsystemsweretaughtintheUpani@sads,andthuswrotecommentariesthereontoprovetheir
interpretations,andalsowrotecommentariesonthe_Brahmastra_,theclassicalexpositionofthephilosophyof
theUpani@sads.InadditiontotheworksoftheseVai@s@navathinkerstheresprangupanotherclassoftheistic
workswhichwereofamoreeclecticnature.ThesealsohadtheirbeginningsinperiodsasoldastheUpani@sads.
TheyareknownastheS'aivaandTantrathought,andaredealtwithinthesecondvolumeofthiswork.

We thus see that the earliest beginnings of most systems of Hindu thought can be traced to some time between 600
B.C. to 100 or 200 B.C. It is extremely difficult to say anything about the relative priority of the systems with any degree
of certainty. Some conjectural attempts have been made in this work with regard to some of the systems, but how far
they are correct, it will be for our readers to judge. Moreover during the earliest manifestation of a system some crude
outlines only are traceable. As time went on the systems of thought began to develop side by side. Most of them were
taught from the time in which they were first conceived to about the seventeenth century A.D. in an unbroken chain of
teachers and pupils. Even now each system of
CHAPTER II 13
Hinduthoughthasitsownadherents,thoughfewpeoplenow

caretowriteanynewworksuponthem.InthehistoryofthegrowthofanysystemofHinduthoughtwefindthat
astimewenton,andasnewproblemsweresuggested,eachsystemtriedtoanswerthemconsistentlywithitsown
doctrines.Theorderinwhichwehavetakenthephilosophicalsystemscouldnotbestrictlyachronologicalone.
ThusthoughitispossiblethattheearliestspeculationsofsomeformofS@mkhya,Yoga,andMm@mswere
priortoBuddhismyettheyhavebeentreatedafterBuddhismandJainism,becausetheelaborateworksofthese
systemswhichwenowpossessarelaterthanBuddhism.InmyopiniontheVais'e@sikasystemisalsoprobably
preBuddhistic,butithasbeentreatedlater,partlyonaccountofitsassociationwithNyya,andpartlyon
accountofthefactthatallitscommentariesareofamuchlaterdate.Itseemstomealmostcertainthatenormous
quantitiesofoldphilosophicalliteraturehavebeenlost,whichiffoundcouldhavebeenofusetousinshowingthe
stagesoftheearlygrowthofthesystemsandtheirmutualrelations.Butastheyarenotavailablewehavetobe
satisfiedwithwhatremains.TheoriginalsourcesfromwhichIhavedrawnmymaterialshaveallbeenindicated
inthebriefaccountsoftheliteratureofeachsystemwhichIhaveputinbeforebeginningthestudyofany
particularsystemofthought.

InmyinterpretationsIhavealwaystriedtofollowtheoriginalsourcesasaccuratelyasIcould.Thishas
sometimesledtooldandunfamiliarmodesofexpression,butthiscourseseemedtometobepreferabletothe
adoptionofEuropeanmodesofthoughtfortheexpressionofIndianideas.Buteveninspiteofthisstriking
similaritiestomanyofthemodernphilosophicaldoctrinesandideaswilldoubtlessbenoticed.Thisonlyproves
thatthehumanmindfollowsmoreorlessthesamemodesofrationalthought.Ihavenevertriedtocompareany
phaseofIndianthoughtwithEuropean,forthisisbeyondthescopeofmypresentattempt,butifImaybe
allowedtoexpressmyownconviction,ImightsaythatmanyofthephilosophicaldoctrinesofEuropean
philosophyareessentiallythesameasthosefoundinIndianphilosophy.Themaindifferenceisoftenthe
differenceofthepointofviewfromwhichthesameproblemsappearedinsuchavarietyofformsinthetwo
countries.MyownviewwithregardtothenetvalueofIndianphilosophicaldevelopmentwillbeexpressedinthe
concludingchapterofthesecondvolumeofthepresentwork.

10

CHAPTER II
THEVEDAS,BRHMANASANDTHEIRPHILOSOPHY
TheVedasandtheirantiquity.

The sacred books of India, the Vedas, are generally believed to be the earliest literary record of the Indo-European race.
It is indeed difficult to say when the earliest portions of these compositions came into existence. Many shrewd guesses
have been offered, but none of them can be proved to be incontestably true. Max Mller supposed the date to be 1200
B.C., Haug 2400 B.C. and Bl Ga@ngdhar Tilak 4000 B.C. The ancient Hindus seldom kept any historical record of their
literary, religious or political achievements. The Vedas were handed down from mouth to mouth from a period of
unknown antiquity; and the Hindus generally believed that they were never composed by men. It was therefore
generally supposed that either they were taught by God to the sages, or that they were of themselves revealed to the
sages who were the "seers" (_mantradra@s@t_) of the hymns. Thus we find that when some time had elapsed after
the composition of the Vedas, people had come to look upon them not only as very old, but so old that they had,
theoretically at least, no beginning in time, though they were believed to have been revealed at some unknown remote
period at the beginning of each creation.
CHAPTER II 14
TheplaceoftheVedasintheHindumind.

WhentheVedaswerecomposed,therewasprobablynosystemofwritingprevalentinIndia.Butsuchwasthe
scrupulouszealoftheBrahmins,whogotthewholeVedicliteraturebyheartbyhearingitfromtheirpreceptors,
thatithasbeentransmittedmostfaithfullytousthroughthecourseofthelast3000yearsormorewithlittleor
nointerpolationsatall.ThereligioushistoryofIndiahadsufferedconsiderablechangesinthelatterperiods,
sincethetimeoftheVediccivilization,butsuchwasthereverencepaidtotheVedasthattheyhadeverremained
asthehighestreligiousauthorityforallsectionsoftheHindusatalltimes.Evenatthisdayalltheobligatory
dutiesoftheHindusatbirth,marriage,death,etc.,areperformedaccordingtotheold

11

Vedicritual.TheprayersthataBrahminnowsaysthreetimesadayarethesameselectionsofVedicversesas
wereusedasprayerversestwoorthreethousandyearsago.AlittleinsightintothelifeofanordinaryHinduof
thepresentdaywillshowthatthesystemofimageworshipisonethathasbeengrafteduponhislife,theregular
obligatorydutiesofwhichareorderedaccordingtotheoldVedicrites.ThusanorthodoxBrahmincandispense
withimageworshipifhelikes,butnotsowithhisdailyVedicprayersorotherobligatoryceremonies.Evenat
thisdaytherearepersonswhobestowimmensesumsofmoneyfortheperformanceandteachingofVedic
sacrificesandrituals.MostoftheSanskritliteraturesthatflourishedaftertheVedasbaseuponthemtheirown
validity,andappealtothemasauthority.SystemsofHinduphilosophynotonlyowntheirallegiancetotheVedas,
buttheadherentsofeachoneofthemwouldoftenquarrelwithothersandmaintainitssuperioritybytryingto
provethatitanditalonewasthefaithfulfolloweroftheVedasandrepresentedcorrectlytheirviews.Thelaws
whichregulatethesocial,legal,domesticandreligiouscustomsandritesoftheHinduseventothepresentdayare
saidtobebutmeresystematizedmemoriesofoldVedicteachings,andareheldtobeobligatoryontheir
authority.EvenunderBritishadministration,intheinheritanceofproperty,adoption,andinsuchotherlegal
transactions,HinduLawisfollowed,andthisclaimstodrawitsauthorityfromtheVedas.Toenterintodetailsis
unnecessary.ButsufficeittosaythattheVedas,farfrombeingregardedasadeadliteratureofthepast,arestill
lookeduponastheoriginandsourceofalmostallliteraturesexceptpurelysecularpoetryanddrama.Thusin
shortwemaysaythatinspiteofthemanychangesthattimehaswrought,theorthodoxHindulifemaystillbe
regardedinthemainasanadumbrationoftheVediclife,whichhadneverceasedtosheditslightallthroughthe
past.

ClassificationoftheVedicliterature.

AbeginnerwhoisintroducedforthefirsttimetothestudyoflaterSanskritliteratureislikelytoappear
somewhatconfusedwhenhemeetswithauthoritativetextsofdiversepurportandsubjectshavingthesame
genericname"Veda"or"S'ruti"(from_s'ru_tohear);forVedainitswidersenseisnotthenameofany

12

particularbook,butoftheliteratureofaparticularepochextendingoveralongperiod,saytwothousandyears
orso.AsthisliteraturerepresentsthetotalachievementsoftheIndianpeopleindifferentdirectionsforsucha
longperiod,itmustofnecessitybeofadiversifiedcharacter.Ifweroughlyclassifythishugeliteraturefromthe
pointsofviewofage,language,andsubjectmatter,wecanpointoutfourdifferenttypes,namelytheSa@mhit
orcollectionofverses(samtogether,hitaput),Brhma@nas,ra@nyakas("foresttreatises")andthe
Upani@sads.Alltheseliteratures,bothproseandverse,werelookeduponassoholythatinearlytimesitwas
thoughtalmostasacrilegetowritethem;theywerethereforelearntbyheartbytheBrahminsfromthemouthof
theirpreceptorsandwerehencecalled_s'ruti_(literallyanythingheard)[Footnoteref1].

TheSa@mhits.
There are four collections or Sa@mhits, namely @Rg-Veda, Sma-Veda, Yajur-Veda and Atharva-Veda. Of
CHAPTER II 15
thesethe@RgVedaisprobablytheearliest.TheSmaVedahaspracticallynoindependentvalue,foritconsists
ofstanzastaken(exceptingonly75)entirelyfromthe@RgVeda,whichweremeanttobesungtocertainfixed
melodies,andmaythusbecalledthebookofchants.TheYajurVedahowevercontainsinadditiontotheverses
takenfromthe@RgVedamanyoriginalproseformulas.ThearrangementoftheversesoftheSmaVedais
solelywithreferencetotheirplaceanduseintheSomasacrifice;thecontentsoftheYajurVedaarearrangedin
theorderinwhichtheverseswereactuallyemployedinthevariousreligioussacrifices.Itisthereforecalledthe
VedaofYajussacrificialprayers.Thesemaybecontrastedwiththearrangementinthe@RgVedainthis,that
theretheversesaregenerallyarrangedinaccordancewiththegodswhoareadoredinthem.Thus,forexample,
firstwegetallthepoemsaddressedtoAgniortheFiregod,thenallthosetothegodIndraandsoon.Thefourth
collection,theAtharvaVeda,probablyattaineditspresentformconsiderablylaterthanthe@RgVeda.Inspirit,
however,asProfessorMacdonellsays,"ItisnotonlyentirelydifferentfromtheRigvedabutrepresentsamuch
moreprimitivestageofthought.WhiletheRigvedadealsalmostexclusivelywiththehighergodsasconceivedby
a

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:P@nini,III.iii.94.]

13

comparativelyadvancedandrefinedsacerdotalclass,the_AtharvaVeda_is,inthemainabookofspellsand
incantationsappealingtothedemonworld,andteemswithnotionsaboutwitchcraftcurrentamongthelower
gradesofthepopulation,andderivedfromanimmemorialantiquity.Thesetwo,thuscomplementarytoeach
otherincontentsareobviouslythemostimportantofthefourVedas[Footnoteref1]."

TheBrhma@nas.[Footnoteref2]

AftertheSa@mhitstheregrewupthetheologicaltreatisescalledtheBrhma@nas,whichwereofadistinctly
differentliterarytype.Theyarewritteninprose,andexplainthesacredsignificanceofthedifferentritualsto
thosewhoarenotalreadyfamiliarwiththem."Theyreflect,"saysProfessorMacdonell,"thespiritofanagein
whichallintellectualactivityisconcentratedonthesacrifice,describingitsceremonies,discussingitsvalue,
speculatingonitsoriginandsignificance."Theseworksarefullofdogmaticassertions,fancifulsymbolismand
speculationsofanunboundedimaginationinthefieldofsacrificialdetails.Thesacrificialceremonialswere
probablyneversoelaborateatthetimewhentheearlyhymnswerecomposed.Butwhenthecollectionsofhymns
werebeinghandeddownfromgenerationtogenerationtheceremonialsbecamemoreandmorecomplicated.
Thustherecameaboutthenecessityofthedistributionofthedifferentsacrificialfunctionsamongseveraldistinct
classesofpriests.Wemayassumethatthiswasaperiodwhenthecastesystemwasbecomingestablished,and
whentheonlythingwhichcouldengagewiseandreligiousmindswassacrificeanditselaboraterituals.Free
speculativethinkingwasthussubordinatedtotheserviceofthesacrifice,andtheresultwastheproductionofthe
mostfancifulsacramentalandsymbolic

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:A.A.Macdonell'sHistoryofSanskritLiterature,p.31.]

[Footnote2:Weber(_Hist.Ind.Lit_.,p.11,note)saysthatthewordBrhma@nasignifies"thatwhichrelatesto
prayerbrahman." Max Muller (_S.B.E._, I.p. lxvi) says that Brhma@na meant "originally the sayings of Brahmans,
whether in the general sense of priests, or in the more special sense of Brahman-priests." Eggeling (S.B.E. XII. Introd. p.
xxii) says that the Brhma@nas were so called "probably either because they were intended for the instruction and
guidance of priests (brahman) generally; or because they were, for the most part, the authoritative utterances of such
as were thoroughly versed in Vedic and sacrificial lore and competent to act as Brahmans or superintending priests."
But in view of the fact that the Brhma@nas were
CHAPTER II 16
alsosupposedtobeasmuchrevealedastheVedas,thepresentwriterthinksthatWeber'sviewisthecorrect
one.]

14

system,unparalleledanywherebutamongtheGnostics.Itisnowgenerallybelievedthatthecloseofthe
Brhma@naperiodwasnotlaterthan500B.C.

Thera@nyakas.

AsafurtherdevelopmentoftheBrhma@nashoweverwegetthera@nyakasorforesttreatises.These
workswereprobablycomposedforoldmenwhohadretiredintotheforestandwerethusunableto
performelaboratesacrificesrequiringamultitudeofaccessoriesandarticleswhichcouldnotbeprocured
inforests.Inthese,meditationsoncertainsymbolsweresupposedtobeofgreatmerit,andtheygradually
begantosupplantthesacrificesasbeingofasuperiororder.Itisherethatwefindthatamongstacertain
sectionofintelligentpeopletheritualisticideasbegantogiveway,andphilosophicspeculationsaboutthe
natureoftruthbecamegraduallysubstitutedintheirplace.Totakeanillustrationfromthebeginningofthe
B@rhadra@nyakawefindthatinsteadoftheactualperformanceofthehorsesacrifice(_as'vamedha_)
therearedirectionsformeditatinguponthedawn(_U@sas_)astheheadofthehorse,thesunastheeyeof
thehorse,theairasitslife,andsoon.Thisisindeedadistinctadvancementoftheclaimsofspeculationor
meditationovertheactualperformanceofthecomplicatedceremonialsofsacrifice.Thegrowthofthe
subjectivespeculation,asbeingcapableofbringingthehighestgood,graduallyresultedinthesupersession
ofVedicritualismandtheestablishmentoftheclaimsofphilosophicmeditationandselfknowledgeasthe
highestgoaloflife.Thuswefindthatthera@nyakaagewasaperiodduringwhichfreethinkingtried
graduallytoshakeofftheshacklesofritualismwhichhadfettereditforalongtime.Itwasthusthatthe
ra@nyakascouldpavethewayfortheUpani@sads,revivethegermsofphilosophicspeculationinthe
Vedas,anddeveloptheminamannerwhichmadetheUpani@sadsthesourceofallphilosophythatarosein
theworldofHinduthought.

The@RgVeda,itscivilization.

Thehymnsofthe@RgVedaareneithertheproductionsofasinglehandnordotheyprobablybelongtoany
singleage.Theywerecomposedprobablyatdifferentperiodsbydifferentsages,anditisnotimprobablethat
someofthemwerecomposed

15

before the Aryan people entered the plains of India. They were handed down from mouth to mouth and gradually
swelled through the new additions that were made by the poets of succeeding generations. It was when the collection
had increased to a very considerable extent that it was probably arranged in the present form, or in some other
previous forms to which the present arrangement owes its origin. They therefore reflect the civilization of the Aryan
people at different periods of antiquity before and after they had come to India. This unique monument of a long
vanished age is of great aesthetic value, and contains much that is genuine poetry. It enables us to get an estimate of
the primitive society which produced it--the oldest book of the Aryan race. The principal means of sustenance were
cattle-keeping and the cultivation of the soil with plough and harrow, mattock and hoe, and watering the ground when
necessary with artificial canals. "The chief food consists," as Kaegi says, "together with bread, of various preparations of
milk, cakes of flour and butter, many sorts of vegetables and fruits; meat cooked on the spits or in pots, is little used,
and was probably eaten only at the great feasts and family gatherings. Drinking plays throughout a much more
important part than eating [Footnote ref 1]." The wood-worker built war-chariots and wagons, as also more delicate
carved works and artistic cups. Metal-workers, smiths and potters continued their trade. The women understood the
plaiting of mats, weaving and sewing; they manufactured the wool of the sheep into clothing for men and covering for
CHAPTER II 17
animals.Thegroupofindividualsformingatribewasthehighestpoliticalunit;eachofthedifferentfamilies
formingatribewasundertheswayofthefatherortheheadofthefamily.Kingshipwasprobablyhereditaryand
insomecaseselectoral.Kingshipwasnowhereabsolute,butlimitedbythewillofthepeople.Mostdeveloped
ideasofjustice,rightandlaw,werepresentinthecountry.ThusKaegisays,"thehymnsstronglyprovehow
deeplytheprominentmindsinthepeoplewerepersuadedthattheeternalordinancesoftherulersoftheworld
wereasinviolableinmentalandmoralmattersasintherealmofnature,andthateverywrongact,eventhe
unconscious,waspunishedandthesinexpiated."[Footnoteref2]Thusitisonlyrightandpropertothinkthat
theAryanshadattainedaprettyhighdegree

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:TheRigveda,byKaegi,1886edition,p.13.]

[Footnote2:Ibid.p.18.]

16

ofcivilization,butnowherewasthesincerespiritoftheAryansmoremanifestedthaninreligion,whichwasthe
mostessentialanddominantfeatureofalmostallthehymns,exceptafewsecularones.ThusKaegisays,"The
wholesignificanceoftheRigvedainreferencetothegeneralhistoryofreligion,ashasrepeatedlybeenpointed
outinmoderntimes,restsuponthis,thatitpresentstousthedevelopmentofreligiousconceptionsfromthe
earliestbeginningstothedeepestapprehensionofthegodheadanditsrelationtoman[Footnoteref1]."

TheVedicGods.

Thehymnsofthe@RgVedawerealmostallcomposedinpraiseofthegods.Thesocialandothermaterialsareof
secondaryimportance,asthesereferenceshadonlytobementionedincidentallyingivingventtotheirfeelingsof
devotiontothegod.Thegodsherearehoweverpersonalitiespresidingoverthediversepowersofnatureor
formingtheirveryessence.Theyhavethereforenodefinite,systematicandseparatecharactersliketheGreek
godsorthegodsofthelaterIndianmythicalworks,thePur@nas.Thepowersofnaturesuchasthestorm,the
rain,thethunder,arecloselyassociatedwithoneanother,andthegodsassociatedwiththemarealsosimilarin
character.Thesameepithetsareattributedtodifferentgodsanditisonlyinafewspecificqualitiesthatthey
differfromoneanother.InthelatermythologicalcompositionsofthePur@nasthegodslosttheircharacteras
hypostaticpowersofnature,andthusbecameactualpersonalitiesandcharactershavingtheirtalesofjoyand
sorrowlikethemortalherebelow.TheVedicgodsmaybecontrastedwiththeminthis,thattheyareofan
impersonalnature,asthecharacterstheydisplayaremostlybutexpressionsofthepowersofnature.Totakean
example,thefireorAgniisdescribed,asKaegihasit,asonethat"liesconcealedinthesofterwood,asina
chamber,until,calledforthbytherubbingintheearlymorninghour,hesuddenlyspringsforthingleaming
brightness.Thesacrificertakesandlayshimonthewood.Whenthepriestspourmeltedbutteruponhim,he
leapsupcracklingandneighinglikeahorsehewhommenlovetoseeincreasingliketheirownprosperity.They
wonderathim,when,deckinghimselfwith

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:TheRigveda,byKaegi,p.26.]
17

changingcolorslikeasuitor,equallybeautifulonallsides,hepresentstoallsideshisfront.
"All-searching is his beam, the gleaming of his light, His, the all-beautiful, of beauteous face and glance, The
CHAPTER II 18
changingshimmerlikethatfloatsuponthestream,SoAgni'sraysgleamoverbrightandnevercease."

[Footnoteref1]R.V.I.143.3.

Theywoulddescribethewind(Vta)andadorehimandsay

"Inwhatplacewasheborn,andfromwhencecomeshe?Thevitalbreathofgods,theworld'sgreatoffspring,
TheGodwhere'erhewillmovesathispleasure:Hisrushingsoundwehearwhathisappearance,noone."

[Footnoteref2]R.V.X.168.3,4.

Itwastheforcesofnatureandhermanifestations,onearthhere,theatmospherearoundandaboveus,orinthe
HeavenbeyondthevaultoftheskythatexcitedthedevotionandimaginationoftheVedicpoets.Thuswiththe
exceptionofafewabstractgodsofwhomweshallpresentlyspeakandsomedualdivinities,thegodsmaybe
roughlyclassifiedastheterrestrial,atmospheric,andcelestial.

Polytheism,HenotheismandMonotheism.

ThepluralityoftheVedicgodsmayleadasuperficialenquirertothinkthefaithoftheVedicpeoplepolytheistic.
Butanintelligentreaderwillfindhereneitherpolytheismnormonotheismbutasimpleprimitivestageofbelief
towhichbothofthesemaybesaidtoowetheirorigin.Thegodsheredonotpreservetheirproperplacesasina
polytheisticfaith,buteachoneofthemshrinksintoinsignificanceorshinesassupremeaccordingasitisthe
objectofadorationornot.TheVedicpoetswerethechildrenofnature.Everynaturalphenomenonexcitedtheir
wonder,admirationorveneration.Thepoetisstruckwithwonderthat"theroughredcowgivessoftwhitemilk."
TheappearanceorthesettingofthesunsendsathrillintothemindsoftheVedicsageandwithwondergazing
eyesheexclaims:

"Undroppedbeneath,notfastenedfirm,howcomesitThatdownwardturnedhefallsnotdownward?The
guideofhisascendingpath,whosawit?"

[FootnoteRef1]R.V.IV.13.5.

Thesageswonderhow"thesparklingwatersofallriversflowintooneoceanwithouteverfillingit."The
mindsoftheVedic

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:TheRigveda,byKaegi,p.35.]
[Footnote2:Ibid,p.38.]

18

people as we find in the hymns were highly impressionable and fresh. At this stage the time was not ripe enough for
them to accord a consistent and well-defined existence to the multitude of gods nor to universalize them in a
monotheistic creed. They hypostatized unconsciously any force of nature that overawed them or filled them with
gratefulness and joy by its beneficent or aesthetic character, and adored it. The deity which moved the devotion or
admiration of their mind was the most supreme for the time. This peculiar trait of the Vedic hymns Max Muller has
called Henotheism or Kathenotheism: "a belief in single gods, each in turn standing out as the highest. And since the
gods are thought of as specially ruling in their own spheres, the singers, in their special concerns and desires, call most
of all on that god to whom they ascribe the most power in the matter,--to whose department if I may say so, their wish
belongs. This god alone is present to the mind
CHAPTER II 19
ofthesuppliant;withhimforthetimebeingisassociatedeverythingthatcanbesaidofadivinebeing;heisthe
highest,theonlygod,beforewhomallothersdisappear,therebeinginthis,however,nooffenceordepreciationof
anyothergod[Footnoteref1].""Againstthistheoryithasbeenurged,"asMacdonellrightlysaysinhisVedic
Mythology[Footnoteref2],"thatVedicdeitiesarenotrepresentedas'independentofalltherest,'sinceno
religionbringsitsgodsintomorefrequentandvariedjuxtapositionandcombination,andthateventhemightiest
godsoftheVedaaremadedependentonothers.ThusVaru@naandSryaaresubordinatetoIndra(I.101),
Varu@naandtheAs'vinssubmittothepowerofVi@s@nu(I.156)....Evenwhenagodisspokenofasuniqueor
chief(_eka_),asisnaturalenoughinlaudations,suchstatementslosetheirtemporarilymonotheisticforce,
throughthemodificationsorcorrectionssuppliedbythecontextorevenbythesameverse[FootnoteRef3].
"Henotheismisthereforeanappearance,"saysMacdonell,"ratherthanareality,anappearanceproducedbythe
indefinitenessduetoundevelopedanthropomorphism,bythelackofanyVedicgodoccupyingthepositionofa
Zeusastheconstantheadofthepantheon,bythenaturaltendencyofthepriestorsingerinextollingaparticular
godtoexaggeratehisgreatnessandtoignoreothergods,andbythe

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:TheRigveda,byKaegi,p.27.]

[Footnote2:See_Ibid._p.33.SeealsoArrowsmith'snoteonitforotherreferencestoHenotheism.]

[Footnote3:Macdonell'sVedicMythology,pp.16,17.]
19

growingbeliefintheunityofthegods(cf.therefrainof3,35)eachofwhommightberegardedasatypeofthe
divine[Footnoteref1]."ButwhetherwecallitHenotheismorthemeretemporaryexaggerationofthepowers
ofthedeityinquestion,itisevidentthatthisstagecanneitherbeproperlycalledpolytheisticnormonotheistic,
butonewhichhadatendencytowardsthemboth,althoughitwasnotsufficientlydevelopedtobeidentifiedwith
eitherofthem.Thetendencytowardsextremeexaggerationcouldbecalledamonotheisticbiasingerm,whereas
thecorrelationofdifferentdeitiesasindependentofoneanotherandyetexistingsidebysidewasatendency
towardspolytheism.

GrowthofaMonotheistictendency;Prajpati,Vis'vakarma.

Thistendencytowardsextollingagodasthegreatestandhighestgraduallybroughtforththeconceptionofa
supremeLordofallbeings(Prajpati),notbyaprocessofconsciousgeneralizationbutasanecessarystageof
developmentofthemind,abletoimagineadeityastherepositoryofthehighestmoralandphysicalpower,
thoughitsdirectmanifestationcannotbeperceived.ThustheepithetPrajpatiortheLordofbeings,whichwas
originallyanepithetforotherdeities,cametoberecognizedasaseparatedeity,thehighestandthegreatest.Thus
itissaidinR.V.x.121[FootnoteRef2]:

InthebeginningroseHira@nyagarbha,Bornastheonlylordofallexistence.Thisearthhesettledfirmand
heavenestablished:Whatgodshallweadorewithouroblations?Whogivesusbreath,whogivesusstrength,
whosebiddingAllcreaturesmustobey,thebrightgodseven;Whoseshadeisdeath,whoseshadowlifeimmortal:
Whatgodshallweadorewithouroblations?WhobyhismightalonebecamethemonarchOfallthatbreathes,of
allthatwakesorslumbers,Ofall,bothmanandbeast,thelordeternal:Whatgodshallweadorewithour
oblations?Whosemightandmajestythesesnowymountains,Theoceanandthedistantstreamexhibit;Whose
armsextendedarethesespreadingregions:Whatgodshallweadorewithouroblations?Whomadetheheavens
bright,theearthenduring,Whofixedthefirmament,theheavenofheavens;Whomeasuredouttheair's
extendedspaces:Whatgodshallweadorewithouroblations?
_________________________________________________________________
CHAPTER II 20
[Footnote1:Macdonell'sVedicMythology,p.17.]

[Footnote2:TheRigveda,byKaegi,pp.88,89.]

20

SimilarattributesarealsoascribedtothedeityVis'vakarma(Allcreator)[Footnoteref1].Heissaidtobe
fatherandprocreatorofallbeings,thoughhimselfuncreated.Hegeneratedtheprimitivewaters.Itistohim
thatthesagesays,

Whoisourfather,ourcreator,maker,Whoeveryplacedothknowandeverycreature,Bywhomaloneto
godstheirnamesweregiven,Tohimallothercreaturesgotoaskhim[Footnoteref2]R.V.x.82.3.

Brahma.

TheconceptionofBrahmanwhichhasbeenthehighestgloryfortheVedntaphilosophyoflaterdayshad
hardlyemergedinthe@RgVedafromtheassociationsofthesacrificialmind.ThemeaningsthatSya@nathe
celebratedcommentatoroftheVedasgivesofthewordascollectedbyHaugare:(_a_)food,foodoffering,(_b_)
thechantofthesmasinger,(_c_)magicalformulaortext,(_d_)dulycompletedceremonies,(_e_)thechantand
sacrificialgifttogether,(_f_)therecitationofthehot@rpriest,(_g_)great.Rothsaysthatitalsomeans"the
devotionwhichmanifestsitselfaslongingandsatisfactionofthesoulandreachesforthtothegods."Butitisonly
intheS'atapathaBrhma@nathattheconceptionofBrahmanhasacquiredagreatsignificanceasthesupreme
principlewhichisthemovingforcebehindthegods.ThustheS'atapathasays,"Verilyinthebeginningthis
(universe)wastheBrahman(neut.).Itcreatedthegods;and,havingcreatedthegods,itmadethemascendthese
worlds:Agnithis(terrestrial)world,Vyutheair,andSryathesky....ThentheBrahmanitselfwentuptothe
spherebeyond.Havinggoneuptothespherebeyond,itconsidered,'HowcanIdescendagainintotheseworlds?'
Itthendescendedagainbymeansofthesetwo,FormandName.Whateverhasaname,thatisname;andthat
againwhichhasnonameandwhichoneknowsbyitsform,'thisis(ofacertain)form,'thatisform:asfaras
thereareFormandNamesofar,indeed,extendsthis(universe).Theseindeedarethetwogreatforcesof
Brahman;and,verily,hewhoknowsthesetwogreatforcesofBrahmanbecomeshimselfagreatforce[Footnote
ref3].InanotherplaceBrahmanissaidtobetheultimatethingintheUniverseandisidentifiedwithPrajpati,
Puru@saandPr@na

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:SeeTheRigveda,byKaegi,p.89,andalsoMuir'sSanskritTexts,vol.IV.pp.511.]

[Footnote2:Kaegi'stranslation.]
[Footnote3:SeeEggeling'stranslationofS'atapathaBrhmana_S.B.E._vol.XLIV.pp.27,28.]

21

(thevitalair[Footnoteref1]).InanotherplaceBrahmanisdescribedasbeingtheSvayambh(selfborn)
performingausterities,whoofferedhisownselfinthecreaturesandthecreaturesinhisownself,andthus
compassedsupremacy,sovereigntyandlordshipoverallcreatures[Footnoteref2].Theconceptionofthe
suprememan(Puru@sa)inthe@RgVedaalsosupposesthatthesuprememanpervadestheworldwithonlya
fourthpartofHimself,whereastheremainingthreepartstranscendtoaregionbeyond.Heisatoncethe
present,pastandfuture[Footnoteref3].
Sacrifice; the First Rudiments of the Law of Karma.
CHAPTER II 21
Itwillhoweverbewrongtosupposethatthesemonotheistictendenciesweregraduallysupplantingthe
polytheisticsacrifices.Ontheotherhand,thecomplicationsofritualismweregraduallygrowingintheir
elaboratedetails.Thedirectresultofthisgrowthcontributedhowevertorelegatethegodstoarelatively
unimportantposition,andtoraisethedignityofthemagicalcharacteristicsofthesacrificeasaninstitutionwhich
couldgivethedesiredfruitsofthemselves.Theofferingsatasacrificewerenotdictatedbyadevotionwithwhich
wearefamiliarunderChristianorVai@s@navainfluence.ThesacrificetakenasawholeisconceivedasHaug
notes"tobeakindofmachineryinwhicheverypiecemusttallywiththeother,"theslightestdiscrepancyinthe
performanceofevenaminuteritualisticdetail,sayinthepouringofthemeltedbutteronthefire,ortheproper
placingofutensilsemployedinthesacrifice,oreventhemisplacingofamerestrawcontrarytotheinjunctions
wassufficienttospoilthewholesacrificewithwhatsoeverearnestnessitmightbeperformed.Evenifawordwas
mispronouncedthemostdreadfulresultsmightfollow.ThuswhenTva@s@t@rperformedasacrificeforthe
productionofademonwhowouldbeabletokillhisenemyIndra,owingtothemistakenaccentofasingleword
theobjectwasreversedandthedemonproducedwaskilledbyIndra.Butifthesacrificecouldbedulyperformed
downtotheminutestdetail,therewasnopowerwhichcouldarrestordelaythefruitionoftheobject.Thusthe
objectsofasacrificewerefulfillednotbythegraceofthegods,butasanaturalresultofthesacrifice.The
performanceoftheritualsinvariablyproducedcertainmysticormagicalresultsbyvirtueofwhichtheobject
desired

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_S.B.E._XLIII.pp.59,60,400andXLIV.p.409.]

[Footnote2:SeeIbid.,XLIV,p.418.]
[Footnote3:R.V.x.90,Puru@saSkta.]

22

bythesacrificerwasfulfilledinduecourselikethefulfilmentofanaturallawinthephysicalworld.Thesacrifice
wasbelievedtohaveexistedfrometernityliketheVedas.Thecreationoftheworlditselfwasevenregardedasthe
fruitofasacrificeperformedbythesupremeBeing.ItexistsasHaugsays"asaninvisiblethingatalltimesandis
likethelatentpowerofelectricityinanelectrifyingmachine,requiringonlytheoperationofasuitableapparatus
inordertobeelicited."Thesacrificeisnotofferedtoagodwithaviewtopropitiatehimortoobtainfromhim
welfareonearthorblissinHeaven;theserewardsaredirectlyproducedbythesacrificeitselfthroughthecorrect
performanceofcomplicatedandinterconnectedceremonieswhichconstitutethesacrifice.Thoughineach
sacrificecertaingodswereinvokedandreceivedtheofferings,thegodsthemselveswerebutinstrumentsin
bringingaboutthesacrificeorincompletingthecourseofmysticalceremoniescomposingit.Sacrificeisthus
regardedaspossessingamysticalpotencysuperioreventothegods,whoitissometimesstatedattainedtotheir
divinerankbymeansofsacrifice.Sacrificewasregardedasalmosttheonlykindofduty,anditwasalsocalled
karma or _kriy_ (action) and the unalterable law was, that these mystical ceremonies for good or for bad, moral or
immoral (for there were many kinds of sacrifices which were performed for injuring one's enemies or gaining worldly
prosperity or supremacy at the cost of others) were destined to produce their effects. It is well to note here that the first
recognition of a cosmic order or law prevailing in nature under the guardianship of the highest gods is to be found in the
use of the word @Rta (literally the course of things). This word was also used, as Macdonell observes, to denote the
"'order' in the moral world as truth and 'right' and in the religious world as sacrifice or 'rite'[Footnote ref 1]" and its
unalterable law of producing effects. It is interesting to note in this connection that it is here that we find the first germs
of the law of karma, which exercises such a dominating control over Indian thought up to the present day. Thus we find
the simple faith and devotion of the Vedic hymns on one hand being supplanted by the growth of a complex system of
sacrificial rites, and on the other bending their course towards a monotheistic or philosophic knowledge of the ultimate
reality of the universe.
CHAPTER II 22
____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Macdonell'sVedicMythology,p.11.]

23

CosmogonyMythologicalandphilosophical.

Thecosmogonyofthe@RgVedamaybelookedatfromtwoaspects,themythologicalandthephilosophical.The
mythologicalaspecthasingeneraltwocurrents,asProfessorMacdonellsays,"Theoneregardstheuniverseas
theresultofmechanicalproduction,theworkofcarpenter'sandjoiner'sskill;theotherrepresentsitastheresult
ofnaturalgeneration[Footnoteref.1]."Thusinthe@RgVedawefindthatthepoetinoneplacesays,"whatwas
thewoodandwhatwasthetreeoutofwhichtheybuiltheavenandearth[Footnoteref.2]?"Theanswergivento
thisquestioninTaittiryaBrhma@nais"BrahmanthewoodandBrahmanthetreefromwhichtheheavenand
earthweremade[Footnoteref3]."HeavenandEartharesometimesdescribedashavingbeensupportedwith
posts[Footnoteref4].Theyarealsosometimesspokenofasuniversalparents,andparentageissometimes
attributedtoAditiandDak@sa.

UnderthisphilosophicalaspectthesemipantheisticManhymn[Footnoteref5]attractsournotice.Thesupreme
manaswehavealreadynoticedaboveistheresaidtobethewholeuniverse,whateverhasbeenandshallbe;he
isthelordofimmortalitywhohasbecomediffusedeverywhereamongthingsanimateandinanimate,andall
beingscameoutofhim;fromhisnavelcametheatmosphere;fromhisheadarosethesky;fromhisfeetcamethe
earth;fromhisearthefourquarters.AgainthereareotherhymnsinwhichtheSuniscalledthesoul(_tman_)
ofallthatismovableandallthatisimmovable[Footnoteref6].Therearealsostatementstotheeffectthatthe
Beingisone,thoughitiscalledbymanynamesbythesages[Footnoteref7].Thesupremebeingissometimes
extolledasthesupremeLordoftheworldcalledthegoldenegg(Hira@nyagarbha[Footnoteref8]).Insome
passagesitissaid"Brahma@naspatiblewforththesebirthslikeablacksmith.Intheearliestageofthegods,the
existentsprangfromthenonexistent.Inthefirstageofthegods,theexistentsprangfromthenonexistent:
thereaftertheregionssprang,thereafter,fromUttnapada[Footnoteref9]."Themostremarkableandsublime
hymninwhichthefirstgermsofphilosophicspeculation

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Macdonell'sVedicMythology,p.11.]
[Footnote2:R.V.x.81.4.]

[Footnote3:Taitt.Br.II.8.9.6.]
[Footnote4:Macdonell'sVedicMythology,p.11;alsoR.V.II.15andIV.56.]

[Footnote5:R.V.x.90.]

[Footnote6:R.V.I.115.]
[Footnote7:R.V.I.164.46.]
[Footnote8:R.V.X.121.]

[Footnote9:Muir'stranslationofR.V.x.72;Muir'sSanskritTexts,vol.v.p.48.]
24
CHAPTER II 23
withregardtothewonderfulmysteryoftheoriginoftheworldarefoundisthe129thhymnofR.V.x.

1. Thentherewasneitherbeingnornotbeing.Theatmospherewasnot,norskyaboveit.Whatcoveredall?
andwhere?bywhatprotected?Wastherethefathomlessabyssofwaters?

2. Thenneitherdeathnordeathlessexisted;Ofdayandnighttherewasyetnodistinction.Alonethatone
breathedcalmly,selfsupported,OtherthanItwasnone,noraughtaboveIt.

3. Darknesstherewasatfirstindarknesshidden;Theuniversewasundistinguishedwater.Thatwhichinvoid
andemptinesslayhiddenAlonebypoweroffervorwasdeveloped.

4. Thenforthefirsttimetherearosedesire,Whichwastheprimalgermofmind,withinit.Andsages,
searchingintheirheart,discoveredInNothingtheconnectingbondofBeing.

6. Whoisitknows?WhoherecantellussurelyFromwhatandhowthisuniversehasrisen?Andwhethernottill
afteritthegodslived?Whothencanknowfromwhatithasarisen?

7. Thesourcefromwhichthisuniversehasrisen,Andwhetheritwasmade,oruncreated,Heonlyknows,
whofromthehighestheavenRules,theallseeinglordordoesnotHeknow[Footnoteref1]?

TheearliestcommentaryonthisisprobablyapassageintheS'atapathaBrhma@na(x.5.3.I)whichsaysthat
"inthebeginningthis(universe)wasasitwereneithernonexistentnorexistent;inthebeginningthis(universe)
wasasitwere,existedanddidnotexist:therewasthenonlythatMind.Whereforeithasbeendeclaredbythe
Rishi(@RgVedaX.129.I),'Therewasthenneitherthenonexistentnortheexistent'forMindwas,asitwere,
neitherexistentnornonexistent.ThisMindwhencreated,wishedtobecomemanifest,moredefined,more
substantial:itsoughtafteraself(abody);itpractisedausterity:itacquiredconsistency[Footnoteref2]."Inthe
AtharvaVedaalsowefinditstatedthatallformsoftheuniversewerecomprehendedwithinthegodSkambha
[Footnoteref3].

ThuswefindthatevenintheperiodoftheVedastheresprangforthsuchaphilosophicyearning,atleast
amongsomewhocould

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:TheRigveda,byKaegi,p.90.R.V.x.129.]
[Footnote2:SeeEggeling'stranslationof_S'.B.,S.B.E._vol.XLIII.pp.374,375.]

[Footnote3:_A.V._x.7.10.]
25

questionwhetherthisuniversewasatallacreationornot,whichcouldthinkoftheoriginoftheworldasbeing
envelopedinthemysteryofaprimalnondifferentiationofbeingandnonbeing;andwhichcouldthinkthatit
wastheprimalOnewhichbyitsinherentfervourgaverisetothedesireofacreationasthefirstmanifestationof
thegermofmind,fromwhichtheuniversesprangforththroughaseriesofmysteriousgradualprocesses.Inthe
Brhma@nas,however,wefindthatthecosmogonicviewgenerallyrequirestheagencyofacreator,whoisnot
howeveralwaysthestartingpoint,andwefindthatthetheoryofevolutioniscombinedwiththetheoryof
creation,sothatPrajpatiissometimesspokenofasthecreatorwhileatothertimesthecreatorissaidtohave
floatedintheprimevalwaterasacosmicgoldenegg.
Eschatology; the Doctrine of tman.
CHAPTER II 24
ThereseemstobeabeliefintheVedasthatthesoulcouldbeseparatedfromthebodyinstatesofswoon,and
thatitcouldexistafterdeath,thoughwedonotfindthereanytraceofthedoctrineoftransmigrationina
developedform.IntheS'atapathaBrhma@naitissaidthatthosewhodonotperformriteswithcorrect
knowledgearebornagainafterdeathandsufferdeathagain.Inahymnofthe@RgVeda(X.58)thesoul
(_manas_)ofamanapparentlyunconsciousisinvitedtocomebacktohimfromthetrees,herbs,thesky,thesun,
etc.Inmanyofthehymnsthereisalsothebeliefintheexistenceofanotherworld,wherethehighestmaterial
joysareattainedasaresultoftheperformanceofthesacrificesandalsoinahellofdarknessunderneathwhere
theevildoersarepunished.IntheS'atapathaBrhma@nawefindthatthedeadpassbetweentwofireswhich
burntheevildoers,butletthegoodgoby[Footnoteref1];itisalsosaidtherethateveryoneisbornagainafter
death,isweighedinabalance,andreceivesrewardorpunishmentaccordingashisworksaregoodorbad.Itis
easytoseethatscatteredideaslikethesewithregardtothedestinyofthesoulofmanaccordingtothesacrifice
thatheperformsorothergoodorbaddeedsformthefirstrudimentsofthelaterdoctrineofmetempsychosis.
Theideathatmanenjoysorsuffers,eitherinanotherworldorbybeingborninthisworldaccordingtohisgood
orbaddeeds,isthefirstbeginningofthemoralidea,thoughintheBrahmanicdaysthegooddeedswere

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_S.B._I.9.3,andalsoMacdonell'sVedicMythology,pp.166,167.]

26

moreoftenofthenatureofsacrificialdutiesthanordinarygoodworks.Theseideasofthepossibilitiesofa
necessaryconnectionoftheenjoymentsandsorrowsofamanwithhisgoodandbadworkswhencombinedwith
thenotionofaninviolablelawororder,whichwehavealreadyseenwasgraduallygrowingwiththeconceptionof
@rta,andtheunalterablelawwhichproducestheeffectsofsacrificialworks,ledtotheLawofKarmaandthe
doctrineoftransmigration.Thewordswhichdenotesoulinthe@RgVedaaremanas,_tman_andasu.The
word_tman_howeverwhichbecamefamousinlaterIndianthoughtisgenerallyusedtomeanvitalbreath.
Manasisregardedastheseatofthoughtandemotion,anditseemstoberegarded,asMacdonellsays,asdwelling
intheheart[Footnoteref1].Itishoweverdifficulttounderstandhowtmanasvitalbreath,orasaseparablepart
ofmangoingoutofthedeadmancametoberegardedastheultimateessenceorrealityinmanandtheuniverse.
Thereishoweveratleastonepassageinthe@RgVedawherethepoetpenetratingdeeperanddeeperpasses
fromthevitalbreath(_asu_)totheblood,andthencetotmanastheinmostselfoftheworld;"Whohasseen
howthefirstborn,beingtheBonepossessing(theshapedworld),wasbornfromtheBoneless(theshapeless)?
wherewasthevitalbreath,theblood,theSelf(_tman_)oftheworld?Whowenttoaskhimthatknowsit
[Footnoteref2]?"InTaittryara@nyakaI.23,however,itissaidthatPrajpatiafterhavingcreatedhisself(as
theworld)withhisownselfenteredintoit.InTaittryaBrhma@nathetmaniscalledomnipresent,anditis
saidthathewhoknowshimisnomorestainedbyevildeeds.ThuswefindthatinthepreUpani@sadVedic
literaturetmanprobablywasfirstusedtodenote"vitalbreath"inman,thentheselfoftheworld,andthenthe
selfinman.Itisfromthislaststagethatwefindthetracesofagrowingtendencytolookingattheselfofmanas
theomnipresentsupremeprincipleoftheuniverse,theknowledgeofwhichmakesamansinlessandpure.

Conclusion.

Lookingattheadvancementofthoughtinthe@RgVedawefindfirstthatafabricofthoughtwasgradually
growingwhichnotonlylookedupontheuniverseasacorrelationofpartsora

____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:Macdonell'sVedicMythology, p.166 and R.V. viii.89.]
CHAPTER III 25
[Footnote2:R.V.i.164.4andDeussen'sarticleontmaninEncyclopaediaofReligionandEthics.

27

constructionmadeofthem,butsoughttoexplainitashavingemanatedfromonegreatbeingwhois
sometimesdescribedasonewiththeuniverseandsurpassingit,andatothertimesasbeingseparatefromit;
theagnosticspiritwhichisthemotherofphilosophicthoughtisseenattimestobesoboldastoexpress
doubtsevenonthemostfundamentalquestionsofcreation"Whoknowswhetherthisworldwasever
createdornot?"Secondlythegrowthofsacrificeshashelpedtoestablishtheunalterablenatureofthelaw
bywhichthe(sacrificial)actionsproducedtheireffectsofthemselves.Italsolessenedtheimportanceof
deitiesasbeingthesuprememastersoftheworldandourfate,andthetendencyofhenotheismgradually
diminishedtheirmultiplecharacterandadvancedthemonotheistictendencyinsomequarters.Thirdly,the
soulofmanisdescribedasbeingseparablefromhisbodyandsubjecttosufferingandenjoymentinanother
worldaccordingtohisgoodorbaddeeds;thedoctrinethatthesoulofmancouldgotoplants,etc.,orthatit
couldagainberebornonearth,isalsohintedatincertainpassages,andthismayberegardedassowingthe
firstseedsofthelaterdoctrineoftransmigration.Theself(_tman_)isspokenofinoneplaceastheessence
oftheworld,andwhenwetracetheideaintheBrhma@nasandthera@nyakasweseethattmanhas
beguntomeanthesupremeessenceinmanaswellasintheuniverse,andhasthusapproachedthegreat
tmandoctrineoftheUpani@sads.

CHAPTER III
THEEARLIERUPANI@SADS[Footnoteref1].(700B.C.600B.C.)
TheplaceoftheUpani@sadsinVedicliterature.

ThoughitisgenerallyheldthattheUpani@sadsareusuallyattachedasappendicestothera@nyakaswhich
areagainattachedtotheBrhma@nas,yetitcannotbesaidthattheirdistinctionasseparatetreatisesisalways
observed.ThuswefindinsomecasesthatsubjectswhichweshouldexpecttobediscussedinaBrhma@naare
introducedintothera@nyakasandthera@nyakamaterialsaresometimesfusedintothegreatbulkof
Upani@sadteaching.Thisshowsthatthesethreeliteraturesgraduallygrewupinone

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: There are about 112 Upani@sads which have been published by the "Nir@naya-Sgara" Press, Bombay,
1917. These are 1 s, 2 Kena, 3 Katha, 4 Pras'na, 5 Mun@daka, 6 M@n@dukya, 7 Taittirya, 7 Aitareya, 9 Chndogya,
10 B@rhadra@nyaka, 11 S'vets'vatara, 12 Kau@sitaki, 13 Maitrey, 14 Kaivalya, 15 Jbla, 16 Brahmabindu, 17
Ha@msa, 18 ru@nika, 19 Garbha, 20 Nrya@na, 21 Nrya@na, 22 Paramaha@msa, 23 Brahma, 24 Am@rtanda,
25 Atharvas'iras, 26 Atharvas'ikh, 27 Maitrya@n, 28 B@rhajjbla, 29 N@rsi@mhaprvatpin, 30
N@rsi@mhottaratpin, 31 Klgnirudra, 32 Subla, 33 K@surik, 34 Yantrik, 35 Sarvasra, 36 Nirlamba, 37
S'ukarahasya, 38 Vajrascik, 39 Tejobindu, 40 Ndabindu, 41 Dhynabindu, 42 Brahmavidy, 43 Yogatattva, 44
Atmabodha, 45 Nradaparivrjaka, 46 Tris'ikhibrhma@na, 47 St, 48 Yogac@dama@ni, 49 Nirvna, 50
Ma@ndalabrhma@na, 51 Dak@si@nmrtti, 52 S'arabha, 53 Skanda, 54 Tripdvibhtimahnrya@na, 55
Advayatraka, 56 Ramarahasya, 57 Rmaprvatpin, 58 Rmottaratpin, 59 Vsudeva, 60 Mudgala, 61 S@n@dilya,
62 Pai@ngala, 63 Bhik@suka, Mah, 65 S'rraka, 66 Yogas'ikh, 67 Turiytta, 68 Sa@mnysa, 69
Paramaha@msaparivrjaka, 70 Ak@saml, 71 Avyakta, 72 Ekk@sara, 73 Annaprn, 74 Srya, 75 Aksi, 76
Adhytma, 77 Ku@n@dika, 78 Svitr, 79 tman, 80 P'supatabrahma, 81 Parabrahma, 82 Avadhta, 83 Tripurrpini,
84 Dev, 85 Tripur, 86 Ka@tharudra, 87 Bhvan, 88 Rudrah@rdaya, 89 Yogaku@n@dali, 90 Bhasmajbla, 91
Rudrk@sajbla, 92 Ga@napati, 93 Jbladars'ana, 94 Tiasra, 95 Mahvakya, 96 Paficabrahma, 97
Pr@ngnihotra, 98 Goplaprvatpin, 99 Goplottaratpin, 100 K@r@s@na, 101
CHAPTER III 26
Yjavalkya,102Varha,103S'thyyanya,104Hayagrva,105Datttreya,106Garu@da,107
Kalisantara@na,108Jbli,109Saubhgyalak@sm,110Sarasvatrahasya,111Bahvrca,112Muktika.

ThecollectionofUpani@sadstranslatedbyDarashiko,Aurangzeb'sbrother,contained50Upani@sads.The
MuktikaUpani@sadgivesalistof108Upani@sads.Withtheexceptionofthefirst13Upani@sadsmostofthem
areofmoreorlesslaterdate.TheUpani@sadsdealtwithinthischapteraretheearlierones.Amongstthelater
onestherearesomewhichrepeatthepurportofthese,thereareotherswhichdealwiththeS'aiva,S'kta,the
YogaandtheVai@s@navadoctrines.Thesewillbereferredtoinconnectionwiththeconsiderationofthose
systemsinVolumeII.ThelaterUpani@sadswhichonlyrepeatthepurportofthosedealtwithinthischapterdo
notrequirefurthermention.SomeofthelaterUpani@sadswerecomposedevenaslateasthefourteenthorthe
fifteenthcentury.]

29

processofdevelopmentandtheywereprobablyregardedaspartsofoneliterature,inspiteofthe
differencesintheirsubjectmatter.Deussensupposesthattheprincipleofthisdivisionwastobefoundin
this,thattheBrhma@naswereintendedforthehouseholders,thera@nyakasforthosewhointheirold
agewithdrewintothesolitudeoftheforestsandtheUpani@sadsforthosewhorenouncedtheworldto
attainultimatesalvationbymeditation.Whatevermightbesaidabouttheseliteraryclassificationsthe
ancientphilosophersofIndialookedupontheUpani@sadsasbeingofanentirelydifferenttypefromthe
restoftheVedicliteratureasdictatingthepathofknowledge(_jnamrga_)asopposedtothepathof
works(_karmamrga_)whichformsthecontentofthelatter.Itisnotoutofplaceheretomentionthatthe
orthodoxHinduviewholdsthatwhatevermaybewrittenintheVedaistobeinterpretedascommandments
toperformcertainactions(_vidhi_)orprohibitionsagainstcommittingcertainothers(_ni@sedha_).Even
thestoriesorepisodesaretobesointerpretedthattherealobjectsoftheirinsertionmightappearasonlyto
praisetheperformanceofthecommandmentsandtoblamethecommissionoftheprohibitions.Noperson
hasanyrighttoarguewhyanyparticularVediccommandmentistobefollowed,fornoreasoncanever
discoverthat,anditisonlybecausereasonfailstofindoutwhyacertainVedicactleadstoacertaineffect
thattheVedashavebeenrevealedascommandmentsandprohibitionstoshowthetruepathofhappiness.
TheVedicteachingbelongsthereforetothatoftheKarmamrgaortheperformanceofVedicdutiesof
sacrifice,etc.TheUpani@sadshoweverdonotrequiretheperformanceofanyaction,butonlyrevealthe
ultimatetruthandreality,aknowledgeofwhichatonceemancipatesaman.ReadersofHinduphilosophy
areawarethatthereisaverystrongcontroversyonthispointbetweentheadherentsoftheVednta
(_Upani@sads_)andthoseoftheVeda.ForthelatterseekinanalogytotheotherpartsoftheVedic
literaturetoestablishtheprinciplethattheUpani@sadsshouldnotberegardedasanexception,butthat
theyshouldalsobesointerpretedthattheymightalsobeheldoutascommendingtheperformanceof
duties;buttheformerdissociatetheUpani@sadsfromtherestoftheVedicliteratureandassertthatthey
donotmaketheslightestreferencetoanyVedicduties,butonlydelineatetheultimaterealitywhichreveals
thehighestknowledgeinthemindsofthedeserving.

30

S'a@nkarathemosteminentexponentoftheUpani@sadsholdsthattheyaremeantforsuchsuperiormenwho
arealreadyaboveworldlyorheavenlyprosperities,andforwhomtheVedicdutieshaveceasedtohaveany
attraction.Wheresoevertheremaybesuchadeservingperson,beheastudent,ahouseholderoranascetic,for
himtheUpani@sadshavebeenrevealedforhisultimateemancipationandthetrueknowledge.Thosewho
performtheVedicdutiesbelongtoastageinferiortothosewhonolongercareforthefruitsoftheVedicduties
butareeagerforfinalemancipation,anditisthelatterwhoalonearefittoheartheUpani@sads[Footnoteref
1].
The names of the Upani@sads; Non-Brahmanic influence.
CHAPTER III 27
TheUpani@sadsarealsoknownbyanothernameVednta,astheyarebelievedtobethelastportionsofthe
Vedas(_vedaanta_,end);itisbythisnamethatthephilosophyoftheUpani@sads,theVedntaphilosophy,isso
familiartous.AmodernstudentknowsthatinlanguagetheUpani@sadsapproachtheclassicalSanskrit;the
ideaspreachedalsoshowthattheyaretheculminationoftheintellectualachievementofagreatepoch.Asthey
thusformedtheconcludingpartsoftheVedastheyretainedtheirVedicnameswhichtheytookfromthenameof
thedifferentschoolsorbranches(_s'kh_)amongwhichtheVedaswerestudied[Footnoteref2].
ThustheUpani@sadsattachedtotheBrhma@nasoftheAitareyaandKau@stakischoolsarecalled
respectivelyAitareyaandKau@stakiUpani@sads.ThoseoftheT@n@dinsandTalavakrasoftheSmaveda
arecalledtheChndogyaandTalavakra(orKena)Upani@sads.ThoseoftheTaittiryaschooloftheYajurveda

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Thisiswhatiscalledthedifferenceoffitness(_adhikribheda_).Thosewhoperformthesacrifices
arenotfittoheartheUpani@sadsandthosewhoarefittoheartheUpani@sadshavenolongeranynecessityto
performthesacrificialduties.]

[Footnote2:WhentheSa@mhittextshadbecomesubstantiallyfixed,theywerecommittedtomemoryin
differentpartsofthecountryandtransmittedfromteachertopupilalongwithdirectionsforthepractical
performanceofsacrificialduties.Thelatterformedthematterofprosecompositions,theBrhma@nas.These
howeverweregraduallyliabletodiversekindsofmodificationsaccordingtothespecialtendenciesandneedsof
thepeopleamongwhichtheywererecited.Thusafteratimethereoccurredagreatdivergenceinthereadingsof
thetextsoftheBrhma@nasevenofthesameVedaamongdifferentpeople.Thesedifferentschoolswereknown
bythenameofparticularS'khs(e.g.Aitareya,Kau@staki)withwhichtheBrhma@naswereassociatedor
named.AccordingtothedivergenceoftheBrhma@nasofthedifferentS'khsthereoccurredthedivergences
ofcontentandthelengthoftheUpani@sadsassociatedwiththem.]

31

formtheTaittiryaandMahnraya@na,oftheKa@thaschooltheK@thaka,oftheMaitrya@nschoolthe
Maitrya@n.TheB@rhadra@nyakaUpani@sadformspartoftheS'atapathaBrhma@naoftheVjasaneyi
schools.Thes'Upani@sadalsobelongstothelatterschool.ButtheschooltowhichtheS'vets'vatarabelongs
cannotbetraced,andhasprobablybeenlost.ThepresumptionwithregardtotheseUpani@sadsisthatthey
representtheenlightenedviewsoftheparticularschoolsamongwhichtheyflourished,andunderwhosenames
theypassed.AlargenumberofUpani@sadsofacomparativelylateragewereattachedtotheAtharvaVeda,
mostofwhichwerenamednotaccordingtotheVedicschoolsbutaccordingtothesubjectmatterwithwhichthey
dealt[Footnoteref1].

ItmaynotbeoutofplaceheretomentionthatfromthefrequentepisodesintheUpani@sadsinwhichthe
BrahminsaredescribedashavinggonetotheK@sattriyasforthehighestknowledgeofphilosophy,aswellas
fromthedisparatenessoftheUpani@sadteachingsfromthatofthegeneraldoctrinesoftheBrhma@nasand
fromtheallusionstotheexistenceofphilosophicalspeculationsamongstthepeopleinPliworks,itmaybe
inferredthatamongtheK@sattriyasingeneralthereexistedearnestphilosophicenquirieswhichmustbe
regardedashavingexertedanimportantinfluenceintheformationoftheUpani@saddoctrines.Thereisthus
someprobabilityinthesuppositionthatthoughtheUpani@sadsarefounddirectlyincorporatedwiththe
Brhma@nasitwasnottheproductionofthegrowthofBrahmanicdogmasalone,butthatnonBrahmanic
thoughtaswellmusthaveeithersettheUpani@saddoctrinesafoot,orhaverenderedfruitfulassistancetotheir
formulationandcultivation,thoughtheyachievedtheirculminationinthehandsoftheBrahmins.

Brhma@nasandtheEarlyUpani@sads.
The passage of the Indian mind from the Brhmanic to the Upani@sad thought is probably the most
CHAPTER III 28
remarkableeventinthehistoryofphilosophicthought.WeknowthatinthelaterVedichymnssome
monotheisticconceptionsofgreatexcellenceweredeveloped,butthesedifferintheirnaturefromthe
absolutismoftheUpani@sadsasmuchasthePtolemaicandtheCopernican

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:GarbhaUpani@sad,tmanUpani@sad,Pras'naUpani@sad,etc.Therewerehoweversome
exceptionssuchastheM@n@dkya,Jbla,Pai@ngala,S'aunaka,etc.]

32

systemsinastronomy.ThedirecttranslationofVis'vakarmanorHira@nyagarbhaintothetmanandthe
BrahmanoftheUpani@sadsseemstometobeveryimprobable,thoughIamquitewillingtoadmitthatthese
conceptionswereswallowedupbythetmandoctrinewhenithaddevelopedtoaproperextent.Throughoutthe
earlierUpani@sadsnomentionistobefoundofVis'vakarman,Hira@nyagarbhaorBrahma@naspatiandno
referenceofsuchanatureistobefoundascanjustifyusinconnectingtheUpani@sadideaswiththose
conceptions[Footnoterefl].Thewordpuru@sanodoubtoccursfrequentlyintheUpani@sads,butthesenseand
theassociationthatcomealongwithitarewidelydifferentfromthatofthepuru@saofthePuru@sasktaofthe
@RgVeda.

Whenthe@RgVedadescribesVis'vakarmanitdescribeshimasacreatorfromoutside,acontrollerof
mundaneevents,towhomtheyprayforworldlybenefits."Whatwastheposition,whichandwhencewasthe
principle,fromwhichtheallseeingVis'vakarmanproducedtheearth,anddisclosedtheskybyhismight?The
onegod,whohasoneverysideeyes,oneverysideaface,oneverysidearms,oneverysidefeet,whenproducing
theskyandearth,shapesthemwithhisarmsandwithhiswings....Dothou,Vis'vakarman,granttothyfriends
thosethyabodeswhicharethehighest,andthelowest,andthemiddle...mayageneroussonremainheretous
[Footnoteref2]";againinR.V.X.82wefind"Vis'vakarmaniswise,energetic,thecreator,thedisposer,andthe
highestobjectofintuition....Hewhoisourfather,ourcreator,disposer,whoknowsallspheresandcreatures,
whoaloneassignstothegodstheirnames,tohimtheothercreaturesresortforinstruction[Footnoteref3]."
AgainaboutHira@nyagarbhawefindinR.V.I.121,"Hira@nyagarbhaaroseinthebeginning;born,hewasthe
onelordofthingsexisting.Heestablishedtheearthandthissky;towhatgodshallweofferouroblation?...May
henotinjureus,hewhoisthegeneratoroftheearth,whorulingbyfixedordinances,producedtheheavens,who
producedthegreatandbrilliantwaters!towhatgod,etc.?Prajpati,nootherthanthouislordoverallthese
createdthings:mayweobtainthat,throughdesireofwhichwehaveinvokedthee;maywebecomemastersof
riches[Footnoteref4]."Speakingofthepuru@sathe@RgVeda

__________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ThenameVis'vakarmaappearsinS'vet.IV.17.Hira@nyagarbhaappearsinS'vet.III.4and
IV.12,butonlyasthefirstcreatedbeing.ThephraseSarvhammnHira@nyagarbhawhichDeussen
referstooccursonlyinthelaterN@rsi@m@h.9.ThewordBrahma@naspatidoesnotoccuratallinthe
Upani@sads.]

[Footnote2:Muir'sSanskritTexts,vol.IV.pp.6,7.]
[Footnote3:_Ibid._p,7.]
[Footnote4:_Ibid._pp.16,17.]

33
says "Purusha has a thousand heads...a thousand eyes, and a thousand feet. On every side enveloping the earth
CHAPTER III 29
hetranscended[it]byaspaceoftenfingers....Heformedthoseaerialcreatures,andtheanimals,bothwild
andtame[Footnoteref1],"etc.Eventhatfamoushymn(R.V.x.129)whichbeginswith"Therewasthen
neitherbeingnornonbeing,therewasnoairnorskyabove"endswithsaying"Fromwhencethiscreation
cameintobeing,whetheritwascreatedornothewhoisinthehighestsky,itsruler,probablyknowsor
doesnotknow."

IntheUpani@sadshowever,thepositionisentirelychanged,andthecentreofinterestthereisnotinacreator
fromoutsidebutintheself:thenaturaldevelopmentofthemonotheisticpositionoftheVedascouldhavegrown
intosomeformofdevelopedtheism,butnotintothedoctrinethattheselfwastheonlyrealityandthateverything
elsewasfarbelowit.Thereisnorelationhereoftheworshipperandtheworshippedandnoprayersareoffered
toit,butthewholequestisofthehighesttruth,andthetrueselfofmanisdiscoveredasthegreatestreality.This
changeofphilosophicalpositionseemstometobeamatterofgreatinterest.Thischangeofthemindfromthe
objectivetothesubjectivedoesnotcarrywithitintheUpani@sadsanyelaboratephilosophicaldiscussions,or
subtleanalysisofmind.Itcomesthereasamatterofdirectperception,andtheconvictionwithwhichthetruth
hasbeengraspedcannotfailtoimpressthereaders.Thatoutoftheapparentlymeaninglessspeculationsofthe
Brhma@nasthisdoctrinecouldhavedeveloped,mightindeedappeartobetooimprobabletobebelieved.

OnthestrengthofthestoriesofBlkiGa'rgyaandAjtas'atru(B@rh.II.i),S'vetaketuandPravha@na
Jaibali(Ch.V.3andB@rh.VI.2)andru@niandAs'vapatiKaikeya(Ch.V.11)Garbethinks"thatitcanbe
proventhattheBrahman'sprofoundestwisdom,thedoctrineofAllone,whichhasexercisedanunmistakable
influenceontheintellectuallifeevenofourtime,didnothaveitsorigininthecircleofBrahmansatall[Footnote
ref2]"andthat"ittookitsriseintheranksofthewarriorcaste[Footnoteref3]."Thisiftruewouldofcourse
leadthedevelopmentoftheUpani@sadsawayfromtheinfluenceoftheVeda,Brhma@nasandthe
ra@nyakas.Butdothefactsprovethis?LetusbrieflyexaminetheevidencesthatGarbehimself

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Muir'sSanskritTexts,vol.v.pp.368,371.]

[Footnote2:Garbe'sarticle,"HinduMonism,"p.68.]

[Footnote3:_Ibid._p.78.
34

selfhasproduced.InthestoryofBlkiGrgyaandAjtas'atru(B@rh.II.1)referredtobyhim,BlkiGrgya
isaboastfulmanwhowantstoteachtheK@sattriyaAjtas'atruthetrueBrahman,butfailsandthenwantsitto
betaughtbyhim.TothisAjtas'atrureplies(followingGarbe'sowntranslation)"itiscontrarytothenatural
orderthataBrahmanreceiveinstructionfromawarriorandexpectthelattertodeclaretheBrahmantohim
[Footnoterefl]."DoesthisnotimplythatinthenaturalorderofthingsaBrahminalwaystaughttheknowledge
ofBrahmantotheK@sattriyas,andthatitwasunusualtofindaBrahminaskingaK@sattriyaaboutthetrue
knowledgeofBrahman?Atthebeginningoftheconversation,Ajtas'atruhadpromisedtopayBlkione
thousandcoinsifhecouldtellhimaboutBrahman,sinceallpeopleusedtoruntoJanakatospeakabout
Brahman[Footnoteref2].ThesecondstoryofS'vetaketuandPravha@naJaibaliseemstobefairlyconclusive
withregardtothefactthatthetransmigrationdoctrines,thewayofthegods(_devayna_)andthewayofthe
fathers(_pit@ryna_)hadoriginatedamongtheK@sattriyas,butitiswithoutanyrelevancywithregardtothe
originofthesuperiorknowledgeofBrahmanasthetrueself.

The third story of ru@ni and As'vapati Kaikeya (Ch. V. 11) is hardly more convincing, for here five Brahmins wishing
to know what the Brahman and the self were, went to Uddlaka ru@ni; but as he did not
CHAPTER III 30
knowsufficientlyaboutitheaccompaniedthemtotheK@sattriyakingAs'vapatiKaikeyawhowasstudyingthe
subject.ButAs'vapatiendstheconversationbygivingthemcertaininstructionsaboutthefiredoctrine
(_vaisvnaraagni_)andtheimportofitssacrifices.HedoesnotsayanythingaboutthetrueselfasBrahman.
WeoughtalsotoconsiderthatthereareonlythefewexceptionalcaseswhereK@sattriyakingswereinstructing
theBrahmins.ButinallothercasestheBrahminswerediscussingandinstructingthetmanknowledge.Iam
thusledtothinkthatGarbeowingtohisbitternessoffeelingagainsttheBrahminsasexpressedintheearlier
partoftheessayhadbeentoohastyinhisjudgment.TheopinionofGarbeseemstohavebeensharedtosome
extentbyWinternitzalso,andthereferencesgivenbyhimtotheUpani@sadpassagesarealsothesameaswe

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Garbe'sarticle,"HinduMonism,"p.74.]

[Footnote2:B@rh.II.,comparealsoB@rh.IV.3,howYjavalkyaspeakstoJanakaaboutthe
_brahmavidy_.]

35

justexamined[Footnoteref1].Thetruthseemstometobethis,thattheK@sattriyasandevensomewomen
tookinterestinthereligiophilosophicalquestmanifestedintheUpani@sads.Theenquirersweresoeagerthat
eitherinreceivingtheinstructionofBrahmanorinimpartingittoothers,theyhadnoconsiderationsofsexand
birth[Footnoteref2];andthereseemstobenodefiniteevidenceforthinkingthattheUpani@sadphilosophy
originatedamongtheK@sattriyasorthatthegermsofitsgrowthcouldnotbetracedintheBrhma@nasand
thera@nyakaswhichweretheproductionsoftheBrahmins.

ThechangeoftheBrhma@naintothera@nyakathoughtissignifiedbyatransferenceofvaluesfromthe
actualsacrificestotheirsymbolicrepresentationsandmeditationswhichwereregardedasbeingproductiveof
variousearthlybenefits.ThuswefindintheB@rhadra@nyaka(I.1)thatinsteadofahorsesacrificethevisible
universeistobeconceivedasahorseandmeditateduponassuch.Thedawnistheheadofthehorse,thesunis
theeye,windisitslife,fireisitsmouthandtheyearisitssoul,andsoon.Whatisthehorsethatgrazesinthefield
andtowhatgoodcanitssacrificelead?Thismovinguniverseisthehorsewhichismostsignificanttothemind,
andthemeditationofitassuchisthemostsuitablesubstituteofthesacrificeofthehorse,themereanimal.
Thoughtactivityasmeditation,isheretakingtheplaceofanexternalworshipintheformofsacrifices.The
materialsubstancesandthemostelaborateandaccuratesacrificialritualslosttheirvalueandbaremeditations
tooktheirplace.SidebysidewiththeritualisticsacrificesofthegeneralityoftheBrahmins,wasspringingupa
systemwherethinkingandsymbolicmeditationsweretakingtheplaceofgrossmatterandactioninvolvedin
sacrifices.Thesesymbolswerenotonlychosenfromtheexternalworldasthesun,thewind,etc.,fromthebodyof
man,hisvariousvitalfunctionsandthesenses,butevenarbitraryalphabetsweretakenupanditwasbelieved
thatthemeditationoftheseasthehighestandthegreatestwasproductiveofgreatbeneficialresults.Sacrificein
itselfwaslosingvalueintheeyesofthesemenanddiversemysticalsignificancesandimportswerebeginningto
beconsideredastheirrealtruth[Footnoteref3].

_______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Winternitz'sGeschichtederindischenLitteratur,I.pp.197ff.]

[Footnote2:ThestoryofMaitryandYjavalikya(B@rh.II.4)andthatofSatyakmasonofJablandhis
teacher(Ch.IV.4).]
[Footnote 3: Ch. V. II.]
CHAPTER III 31
36

TheUktha(verse)of@RgVedawasidentifiedintheAitareyara@nyakaunderseveralallegoricalformswith
thePr@na[Footnoteref1],theUdgthaoftheSmavedawasidentifiedwithOm,Pr@na,sunandeye;in
ChndogyaII.theSmanwasidentifiedwithOm,rain,water,seasons,Pr@na,etc.,inChndogyaIII.1617
manwasidentifiedwithsacrifice;hishunger,thirst,sorrow,withinitiation;laughing,eating,etc.,withthe
utteranceoftheMantras;andasceticism,gift,sincerity,restraintfrominjury,truth,withsacrificialfees
(_dak@si@n_).ThegiftedmindoftheseculturedVedicIndianswasanxioustocometosomeunity,butlogical
precisionofthoughthadnotdeveloped,andasaresultofthatwefindinthera@nyakasthemostgrotesqueand
fancifulunificationsofthingswhichtooureyeshavelittleornoconnection.Anykindofinstrumentalityin
producinganeffectwasoftenconsideredaspureidentity.ThusinAit.ra@n.II.1.3wefind"Thencomesthe
originoffood.TheseedofPrajpatiarethegods.Theseedofthegodsisrain.Theseedofrainisherbs.Theseed
ofherbsisfood.Theseedoffoodisseed.Theseedofseediscreatures.Theseedofcreaturesistheheart.Theseed
oftheheartisthemind.Theseedofthemindisspeech.Theseedofspeechisaction.Theactdoneisthismanthe
abodeofBrahman[Footnoteref2]."

ThewordBrahmanaccordingtoSya@nameantmantras(magicalverses),theceremonies,thehot@rpriest,the
great.HillebrandtpointsoutthatitisspokenofinR.V.asbeingnew,"asnothavinghithertoexisted,"andas
"comingintobeingfromthefathers."Itoriginatesfromtheseatofthe@Rta,springsforthatthesoundofthe
sacrifice,beginsreallytoexistwhenthesomajuiceispressedandthehymnsarerecitedatthesavanarite,
endureswiththehelpofthegodseveninbattle,andsomaisitsguardian(R.V.VIII.37.I,VIII.69.9,VI.23.5,1.
47.2,VII.22.9,VI.52.3,etc.).OnthestrengthoftheseHillebrandtjustifiestheconjectureofHaugthatit
signifiesamysteriouspowerwhichcanbecalledforthbyvariousceremonies,andhisdefinitionofit,asthe
magicalforcewhichisderivedfromtheorderlycooperationofthehymns,thechantsandthesacrificialgifts
[Footnoteref3].Iamdisposedtothinkthatthismeaningiscloselyconnectedwiththemeaningaswefinditin
manypassagesinthera@nyakasandtheUpani@sads.Themeaninginmanyoftheseseemstobemidway
between

________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:Ait.ra@n.II13.]

[Footnote2:Keith's_TranslationofAitareyaranyaka_.]
[Footnote3:Hillebrandt'sarticleonBrahman,_E.R.E._.]
37

"magicalforce"and"great,"transitionbetweenwhichisrathereasy.Evenwhenthesacrificesbegantobe
replacedbymeditations,theoldbeliefinthepowerofthesacrificesstillremained,andasaresultofthatwe
findthatinmanypassagesoftheUpani@sadspeoplearethinkingofmeditatinguponthisgreatforce
"Brahman"asbeingidentifiedwithdiversesymbols,naturalobjects,partsandfunctionsofthebody.

When the main interest of sacrifice was transferred from its actual performance in the external world to certain forms
of meditation, we find that the understanding of particular allegories of sacrifice having a relation to particular kinds of
bodily functions was regarded as Brahman, without a knowledge of which nothing could be obtained. The fact that
these allegorical interpretations of the Pacgnividy are so much referred to in the Upani@sads as a secret doctrine,
shows that some people came to think that the real efficacy of sacrifices depended upon such meditations. When the
sages rose to the culminating conception, that he is really ignorant who thinks the gods to be different from him, they
thought that as each man was nourished by many beasts, so the gods were nourished by each man, and as it is
unpleasant for a man if any of his beasts are taken away, so it is unpleasant for the gods that men should know this
great truth. [Footnote ref 1].
CHAPTER III 32
IntheKenawefinditindicatedthatallthepowersofthegodssuchasthatofAgni(fire)toburn,Vyu(wind)to
blow,dependeduponBrahman,andthatitisthroughBrahmanthatallthegodsandallthesensesofmancould
work.ThewholeprocessofUpani@sadthoughtshowsthatthemagicpowerofsacrificesasassociatedwith@Rta
(unalterablelaw)wasbeingabstractedfromthesacrificesandconceivedasthesupremepower.Therearemany
storiesintheUpani@sadsofthesearchafterthenatureofthisgreatpowertheBrahman,whichwasatfirstonly
imperfectlyrealized.Theyidentifieditwiththedominatingpowerofthenaturalobjectsofwonder,thesun,the
moon,etc.withbodilyandmentalfunctionsandwithvarioussymbolicalrepresentations,anddeludedthemselves
foratimewiththeideathattheseweresatisfactory.Butastheseweregraduallyfoundinadequate,theycameto
thefinalsolution,andthedoctrineoftheinnerselfofmanasbeingthehighesttruththeBrahmanoriginated.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:B@rh.I.4.10.]

38

ThemeaningofthewordUpani@sad.

ThewordUpani@sadisderivedfromtherootsadwiththeprefixni(tosit),andMaxMullersaysthattheword
originallymeanttheactofsittingdownnearateacherandofsubmissivelylisteningtohim.Inhisintroductionto
theUpani@sadshesays,"ThehistoryandthegeniusoftheSanskritlanguageleavelittledoubtthatUpani@sad
meantoriginallysession,particularlyasessionconsistingofpupils,assembledatarespectfuldistanceroundtheir
teacher[Footnoteref1]."Deussenpointsoutthatthewordmeans"secret"or"secretinstruction,"andthisis
borneoutbymanyofthepassagesoftheUpani@sadsthemselves.MaxMulleralsoagreesthatthewordwasused
inthissenseintheUpani@sads[Footnoteref2].Therewefindthatgreatinjunctionsofsecrecyaretobe
observedforthecommunicationofthedoctrines,anditissaidthatitshouldonlybegiventoastudentorpupil
whobyhissuprememoralrestraintandnobledesiresproveshimselfdeservingtohearthem.S'ankarahowever,
thegreatIndianexponentoftheUpani@sads,derivesthewordfromtherootsadtodestroyandsupposesthatit
issocalledbecauseitdestroysinbornignoranceandleadstosalvationbyrevealingtherightknowledge.Butifwe
comparethemanytextsinwhichthewordUpani@sadoccursintheUpani@sadsthemselvesitseemsthat
Deussen'smeaningisfullyjustified[Footnoteref3].

ThecompositionandgrowthofdiverseUpani@sads.

TheoldestUpani@sadsarewritteninprose.Nexttothesewehavesomeinversesverysimilartothosethatare
tobefoundinclassicalSanskrit.Asiseasytosee,theoldertheUpani@sadthemorearchaicisitinitslanguage.
TheearliestUpani@sadshaveanalmostmysteriousforcefulnessintheirexpressionsatleasttoIndianears.
Theyaresimple,pithyandpenetratetotheheart.Wecanreadandreadthemoveragainwithoutgettingtired.
Thelinesarealwaysasfreshasever.Assuchtheyhaveacharmapartfromthevalueoftheideastheyintendto
convey.ThewordUpani@sadwasused,aswehaveseen,inthesenseof"secretdoctrineorinstruction";the
Upani@sadteachingswerealsointendedtobeconveyedinstrictestsecrecytoearnestenquirersofhighmorals
andsuperiorselfrestraintforthepurposeofachieving

______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:MaxMuller's_TranslationoftheUpanishads,S.B.E._vol.I.p.lxxxi.]

[Footnote2:_S.B.E._vol.I,plxxxi.]
[Footnote 3: Deussen's _Philosophy of the Upanishads,_ pp. 10-15.]
CHAPTER III 33
39

emancipation.ItwasthusthattheUpani@sadstyleofexpression,whenitoncecameintouse,cameto
possessthegreatestcharmandattractionforearnestreligiouspeople;andasaresultofthatwefindthat
evenwhenotherformsofproseandversehadbeenadaptedfortheSanskritlanguage,theUpani@sad
formofcompositionhadnotstopped.ThusthoughtheearliestUpani@sadswerecompiledby500BC.,
theycontinuedtobewrittenevensolateasthespreadofMahommedaninfluenceinIndia.Theearliestand
mostimportantareprobablythosethathavebeencommenteduponbyS'ankaranamely
B@rhadra@nyaka,Chndogya,Aitareya,Taittiriya,s'a,Kena,Katha,Pras'na,Mundakaand
Mndkya[Footnoteref1].ItisimportanttonoteinthisconnectionthattheseparateUpani@sadsdiffer
muchfromoneanotherwithregardtotheircontentandmethodsofexposition.Thuswhilesomeofthem
arebusylayinggreatstressuponthemonisticdoctrineoftheselfastheonlyreality,thereareotherswhich
laystressuponthepracticeofYoga,asceticism,thecultofS'iva,ofVisnuandthephilosophyoranatomyof
thebody,andmaythusberespectivelycalledtheYoga,S'aiva,VisnuandS'rraUpani@sads.Theseinall
makeupthenumbertoonehundredandeight.

RevivalofUpani@sadstudiesinmoderntimes.

HowtheUpani@sadscametobeintroducedintoEuropeisaninterestingstoryDraShikotheeldestsonofthe
EmperorShahJahanheardoftheUpani@sadsduringhisstayinKashmirin1640.HeinvitedseveralPandits
fromBenarestoDelhi,whoundertooktheworkoftranslatingthemintoPersian.In1775AnquetilDuperron,
thediscovereroftheZendAvesta,receivedamanuscriptofitpresentedtohimbyhisfriendLeGentil,the
FrenchresidentinFaizabadatthecourtofShujuddaulah.AnquetiltranslateditintoLatinwhichwas
publishedin18011802.ThistranslationthoughlargelyunintelligiblewasreadbySchopenhauerwithgreat
enthusiasm.Ithad,asSchopenhauerhimselfadmits,profoundlyinfluencedhisphilosophy.Thushe

______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:DeussensupposesthatKaustakiisalsooneoftheearliest.MaxMllerandSchroederthinkthat
Maitry@analsobelongstotheearliestgroup,whereasDeussencountsitasacomparativelylaterproduction.
WinternitzdividestheUpani@sadsintofourperiods.InthefirstperiodheincludesB@rhadra@nyaka,
Chndogya,Taittirya,Aitareya,KaustakiandKena.InthatsecondheincludesK@thaka,s',S'vets'vatara,
Mu@ndaka,Mahnryana,andinthethirdperiodheincludesPras'na,Maitrya@nandMn@dkya.The
restoftheUpani@sadsheincludesinthefourthperiod.]

40

writesintheprefacetohisWeltalsWilleundVorstellung [Footnote ref 1], "And if, indeed, in addition to this he is a

partaker of the benefit conferred by the Vedas, the access to which, opened to us through the Upanishads, is in my
eyes the greatest advantage which this still young century enjoys over previous ones, because I believe that the
influence of the Sanskrit literature will penetrate not less deeply than did the revival of Greek literature in the fifteenth
century: if, I say, the reader has also already received and assimilated the sacred, primitive Indian wisdom, then is he
best of all prepared to hear what I have to say to him....I might express the opinion that each one of the individual and
disconnected aphorisms which make up the Upanishads may be deduced as a consequence from the thought I am
going to impart, though the converse, that my thought is to be found in the Upanishads is by no means the case."
Again, "How does every line display its firm, definite, and throughout harmonious meaning! From every sentence deep,
original, and sublime thoughts arise, and the whole is pervaded by a high and holy and earnest spirit....In the whole
world there is no study, except that of the originals, so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Oupanikhat. It has
been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death! [Footnote ref 2]" Through Schopenhauer the study of the
Upani@sads attracted much attention in Germany and with the growth of a general interest in the study of Sanskrit,
they found their way into other parts of Europe as well.
CHAPTER III 34
ThestudyoftheUpani@sadshashowevergainedagreatimpetusbytheearnestattemptsofourRamMohan
RoywhonotonlytranslatedthemintoBengali,HindiandEnglishandpublishedthemathisownexpense,but
foundedtheBrahmaSamajinBengal,themainreligiousdoctrinesofwhichwerederiveddirectlyfromthe
Upani@sads.

______________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:TranslationbyHaldaneandKemp,vol.I.pp.xiiandxiii.]

[Footnote2:MaxMullersaysinhisintroductiontotheUpanishada(_S.B.E._Ip.lxii;seealsopp.lx,lxi)"that
SchopenhauershouldhavespokenoftheUpanishadsas'productsofthehighestwisdom'...thatheshouldhave
placedthepantheismtheretaughthighabovethepantheismofBruno,Malebranche,SpinozaandScotus
Erigena,asbroughttolightagainatOxfordin1681,mayperhapssecureamoreconsideratereceptionforthose
relicsofancientwisdomthananythingthatIcouldsayintheirfavour."]

41

TheUpani@sadsandtheirinterpretations.

BeforeenteringintothephilosophyoftheUpani@sadsitmaybeworthwhiletosayafewwordsastothe
reasonwhydiverseandevencontradictoryexplanationsastotherealimportoftheUpani@sadshadbeen
offeredbythegreatIndianscholarsofpasttimes.TheUpani@sads,aswehaveseen,formedtheconcluding
portionoftherevealedVedicliterature,andwerethuscalledtheVednta.Itwasalmostuniversallybelieved
bytheHindusthatthehighesttruthscouldonlybefoundintherevelationoftheVedas.Reasonwas
regardedgenerallyasoccupyingacomparativelysubservientplace,anditsproperusewastobefoundinits
judiciousemploymentingettingouttherealmeaningoftheapparentlyconflictingideasoftheVedas.The
highestknowledgeofultimatetruthandrealitywasthusregardedashavingbeenonceforalldeclaredin
theUpani@sads.Reasonhadonlytounravelitinthelightofexperience.Itisimportantthatreadersof
Hinduphilosophyshouldbearinmindthecontrastthatitpresentstotherulingideaofthemodernworld
thatnewtruthsarediscoveredbyreasonandexperienceeveryday,andeveninthosecaseswheretheold
truthsremain,theychangetheirhueandcharactereveryday,andthatinmattersofultimatetruthsno
finalitycaneverbeachieved;wearetobecontentonlywithasmuchascomesbeforethepurviewofour
reasonandexperienceatthetime.Itwasthereforethoughttobeextremelyaudaciousthatanyperson
howsoeverlearnedandbrillianthemightbeshouldhaveanyrighttosayanythingregardingthehighest
truthssimplyontheauthorityofhisownopinionorthereasonsthathemightoffer.Inordertomake
himselfhearditwasnecessaryforhimtoshowfromthetextsoftheUpani@sadsthattheysupportedhim,
andthattheirpurportwasalsothesame.ThusitwasthatmostschoolsofHinduphilosophyfounditoneof
theirprincipaldutiestointerprettheUpani@sadsinordertoshowthattheyalonerepresentedthetrue
Vedntadoctrines.Anyonewhoshouldfeelhimselfpersuadedbytheinterpretationsofanyparticular
schoolmightsaythatinfollowingthatschoolhewasfollowingtheVednta.

Thedifficultyofassuringoneselfthatanyinterpretationisabsolutelytherightoneisenhancedbythefactthat
germsofdiversekindsofthoughtsarefoundscatteredovertheUpani@sads

42

whicharenotworkedoutinasystematicmanner.Thuseachinterpreterinhisturnmadethetextsfavourableto
hisowndoctrinesprominentandbroughtthemtotheforefront,andtriedtorepressothersorexplainthemaway.
But comparing the various systems of Upani@sad interpretation we find that the interpretation offered by
S'a@nkaraverylargelyrepresentstheviewofthegeneralbodyoftheearlierUpani@saddoctrines,thoughthere
aresomewhichdistinctlyforeshadowthedoctrinesofothersystems,butinacrudeandgerminalform.
It is thus that Vednta is generally associated with the interpretation of S'a@nkara and S'a@nkara's system of
CHAPTER III 35
thoughtiscalledtheVedntasystem,thoughtherearemanyothersystemswhichputforththeirclaimas
representingthetrueVedntadoctrines.

UnderthesecircumstancesitisnecessarythatamoderninterpreteroftheUpani@sadsshouldturnadeafearto
theabsoluteclaimsoftheseexponents,andlookupontheUpani@sadsnotasasystematictreatisebutasa
repositoryofdiversecurrentsofthoughtthemeltingpotinwhichalllaterphilosophicideaswerestillinastate
offusion,thoughthemonisticdoctrineofS'a@nkara,orratheranapproachthereto,mayberegardedasthe
purportofbyfarthelargestmajorityofthetexts.Itwillbebetterthatamoderninterpretershouldnotagreeto
theclaimsoftheancientsthatalltheUpani@sadsrepresentaconnectedsystem,buttakethetextsindependently
andseparatelyanddeterminetheirmeanings,thoughkeepinganattentiveeyeonthecontextinwhichthey
appear.ItisinthiswayalonethatwecandetectthegermsofthethoughtsofotherIndiansystemsinthe
Upani@sads,andthusfindinthemtheearliestrecordsofthosetendenciesofthoughts.

ThequestafterBrahman:thestruggleandthefailures.

ThefundamentalideawhichrunsthroughtheearlyUpani@sadsisthatunderlyingtheexteriorworldofchange
thereisanunchangeablerealitywhichisidenticalwiththatwhichunderliestheessenceinman[Footnoteref1].
IfwelookatGreekphilosophyinParmenidesorPlatooratmodernphilosophyinKant,wefindthesame
tendencytowardsglorifyingoneunspeakableentityastherealityortheessence.Ihavesaidabovethatthe
Upani@sadsare

_______________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:B@rh.IV.4.5.22.

43

nosystematictreatisesofasinglehand,butarerathercollationsorcompilationsoffloatingmonologues,
dialoguesoranecdotes.Therearenodoubthereandtheresimplediscussionsbutthereisnopedantryor
gymnasticsoflogic.Eventhemostcasualreadercannotbutbestruckwiththeearnestnessandenthusiasmofthe
sages.Theyrunfromplacetoplacewithgreateagernessinsearchofateachercompetenttoinstructthemabout
thenatureofBrahman.WhereisBrahman?Whatishisnature?

WehavenoticedthatduringtheclosingperiodoftheSa@mhittherewerepeoplewhohadrisentothe
conceptionofasinglecreatorandcontrolleroftheuniverse,variouslycalledPrajpati,Vis'vakarman,Puru@sa,
Brahma@naspatiandBrahman.Butthisdivinecontrollerwasyetonlyadeity.Thesearchastothenatureofthis
deitybeganintheUpani@sads.Manyvisibleobjectsofnaturesuchasthesunorthewindononehandandthe
variouspsychologicalfunctionsinmanweretried,butnonecouldrendersatisfactiontothegreatidealthathad
beenaroused.ThesagesintheUpani@sadhadalreadystartedwiththeideathattherewasasupremecontroller
oressencepresidingovermanandtheuniverse.Butwhatwasitsnature?Coulditbeidentifiedwithanyofthe
deitiesofNature,wasitanewdeityorwasitnodeityatall?TheUpani@sadspresenttousthehistoryofthis
questandtheresultsthatwereachieved.

When we look merely to this quest we find that we have not yet gone out of the ra@nyaka ideas and of symbolic
(_pratka_) forms of worship. _Pr@na_ (vital breath) was regarded as the most essential function for the life of man,
and many anecdotes are related to show that it is superior to the other organs, such as the eye or ear, and that on it all
other functions depend. This recognition of the superiority of pr@na brings us to the meditations on pr@na as
Brahman as leading to the most beneficial results. So also we find that owing to the presence of the exalting characters
of omnipresence and eternality _ks'a_ (space) is meditated upon as Brahman. So also manas and ditya (sun) are
meditated upon as Brahman. Again side by side with the visible material representation of Brahman as the pervading
Vyu, or the sun and the immaterial representation as ks'a, manas or pr@na, we find also the various kinds of
meditations as substitutes for actual sacrifice. Thus
CHAPTER III 36
itisthattherewasanearnestquestafterthediscoveryofBrahman.Wefindastratumofthought

44

whichshowsthatthesageswerestillblindedbytheoldritualisticassociations,andthoughmeditationhad
takentheplaceofsacrificeyetthiswashardlyadequateforthehighestattainmentofBrahman.

NexttothefailureofthemeditationswehavetonoticethehistoryofthesearchafterBrahmaninwhichthesages
soughttoidentifyBrahmanwiththepresidingdeityofthesun,moon,lightning,ether,wind,fire,water,etc.,and
failed;fornoneofthesecouldsatisfytheidealtheycherishedofBrahman.Itisindeedneedlessheretomultiply
theseexamples,fortheyaretiresomenotonlyinthissummarytreatmentbutintheoriginalaswell.Theyareof
valueonlyinthisthattheyindicatehowtoilsomewastheprocessbywhichtheoldritualisticassociationscouldbe
gotridof;whatstrugglesandfailuresthesageshadtoundergobeforetheyreachedaknowledgeofthetrue
natureofBrahman.

UnknowabilityofBrahmanandtheNegativeMethod.

Itisindeedtruethatthemagicalelementinvolvedinthedischargeofsacrificialdutieslingeredforawhileinthe
symbolicworshipofBrahmaninwhichHewasconceivedalmostasadeity.ThemindsoftheVedicpoetssolong
accustomedtoworshipdeitiesofvisiblemanifestationcouldnoteasilydispensewiththeideaofseekingaftera
positiveanddefinitecontentofBrahman.Theytriedsomeofthesublimepowersofnatureandalsomany
symbols,butthesecouldnotrenderultimatesatisfaction.TheydidnotknowwhattheBrahmanwaslike,forthey
hadonlyadimanddreamyvisionofitinthedeepcravingoftheirsoulswhichcouldnotbetranslatedinto
permanentterms.Butthiswasenoughtoleadthemontothegoal,fortheycouldnotbesatisfiedwithanything
shortofthehighest.

Theyfoundthatbywhatevermeanstheytriedtogiveapositiveanddefinitecontentoftheultimatereality,the
Brahman,theyfailed.Positivedefinitionswereimpossible.TheycouldnotpointoutwhattheBrahmanwas
likeinordertogiveanutterancetothatwhichwasunutterable,theycouldonlysaythatitwasnotlikeaught
thatwefindinexperience.Yjavalkyasaid"Hethetmanisnotthis,northis(_netineti_).Heis
inconceivable,forhecannotbeconceived,unchangeable,forheisnotchanged,untouched,fornothingtouches
him;hecannotsufferbyastroke

45

ofthesword,hecannotsufferanyinjury[Footnoteref1]."Heisasat,nonbeing,forthebeingwhichBrahmanis,
isnottobeunderstoodassuchbeingasisknowntousbyexperience;yetheisbeing,forhealoneissupremely
real,fortheuniversesubsistsbyhim.Weourselvesarebuthe,andyetweknownotwhatheis.Whateverwecan
experience,whateverwecanexpress,islimited,butheistheunlimited,thebasisofall."Thatwhichisinaudible,
intangible,invisible,indestructible,whichcannotbetasted,norsmelt,eternal,withoutbeginningorend,greater
thanthegreat(_mahat_),thefixed.Hewhoknowsitisreleasedfromthejawsofdeath[Footnoteref2]."Space,
timeandcausalitydonotappertaintohim,forheatonceformstheiressenceandtranscendsthem.Heisthe
infiniteandthevast,yetthesmallestofthesmall,atoncehereasthere,thereashere;nocharacterisationofhim
ispossible,otherwisethanbythedenialtohimofallempiricalattributes,relationsanddefinitions.Heis
independentofalllimitationsofspace,time,andcausewhichrulesallthatisobjectivelypresented,andtherefore
theempiricaluniverse.WhenBhvawasquestionedbyVa@skali,heexpoundedthenatureofBrahmantohim
bymaintainingsilence"Teachme,"saidVa@skali,"mostreverentsir,thenatureofBrahman."Bhvahowever
remainedsilent.Butwhenthequestionwasputforthasecondorthirdtimeheanswered,"Iteachyouindeedbut
youdonotunderstand;thetmanissilence[Footnoteref3]."Thewaytoindicateitisthusbynetineti, it is not
this, it is not this. We cannot describe it by any positive content which is always limited by conceptual thought.
CHAPTER III 37
Thetmandoctrine.

ThesumandsubstanceoftheUpani@sadteachingisinvolvedintheequationtman=Brahman.Wehavealready
seenthatthewordtmanwasusedinthe@RgVedatodenoteontheonehandtheultimateessenceofthe
universe,andontheotherthevitalbreathinman.LateronintheUpani@sadsweseethatthewordBrahmanis
generallyusedintheformersense,whilethewordtmanisreservedtodenotetheinmostessenceinman,andthe

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:B@rh.IV.5.15.Deussen,MaxMullerandRoerhaveallmisinterpretedthispassage; asito has

beeninterpretedasanadjectiveorparticiple,thoughnoevidencehaseverbeenadduced;itisevidentlythe
ablativeofasi,asword.]

[Footnote2:Ka@thaIII.15.]

[Footnote3:Sa@nkaraon_Brahmastra_,III.2.17,andalsoDeussen,PhilosophyoftheUpanishads,p.
156.]

46

Upani@sadsareemphaticintheirdeclarationthatthetwoareoneandthesame.Butwhatistheinmostessence
ofman?Theselfofmaninvolvesanambiguity,asitisusedinavarietyofsenses.Thussofarasmanconsistsof
theessenceoffood(i.e.thephysicalpartsofman)heiscalledannamaya.Butbehindthesheathofthisbodythere
istheotherselfconsistingofthevitalbreathwhichiscalledtheselfasvitalbreath(_pr@namayatman_).
Behindthisagainthereistheotherself"consistingofwill"calledthe_manomayatman_.Thisagaincontains
withinittheself"consistingofconsciousness"calledthe_vijnamayatman_.Butbehinditwecometothefinal
essencetheselfaspurebliss(the_nandamayatman_).Thetextssay:"Trulyheistherapture;forwhoevergets
thisrapturebecomesblissful.Forwhocouldlive,whocouldbreatheifthisspace(_ks'a_)wasnotbliss?Foritis
hewhobehavesasbliss.ForwhoeverinthatInvisible,Selfsurpassing,Unspeakable,Supportlessfindsfearless
support,hereallybecomesfearless.Butwhoeverfindsevenaslightdifference,betweenhimselfandthistman
thereisfearforhim[Footnoteref1]."

AgaininanotherplacewefindthatPrajpatisaid:"Theself(_tman_)whichisfreefromsin,freefromold
age,fromdeathandgrief,fromhungerandthirst,whosedesiresaretrue,whosecogitationsaretrue,thatis
tobesearchedfor,thatistobeenquired;hegetsallhisdesiresandallworldswhoknowsthatself[Footnote
ref2]."ThegodsandthedemonsonhearingofthissentIndraandVirocanarespectivelyastheir
representativestoenquireofthisselffromPrajpati.Heagreedtoteachthem,andaskedthemtolookintoa
vesselofwaterandtellhimhowmuchofselftheycouldfind.Theyanswered:"Wesee,thisourwholeself,
eventothehair,andtothenails."Andhesaid,"Well,thatistheself,thatisthedeathlessandthefearless,
thatistheBrahman."Theywentawaypleased,butPrajpatithought,"Theretheygoaway,withouthaving
discovered,withouthavingrealizedtheself."Virocanacameawaywiththeconvictionthatthebodywasthe
self;butIndradidnotreturnbacktothegods,hewasafraidandpesteredwithdoubtsandcamebackto
Prajpatiandsaid,"justastheselfbecomesdecoratedwhenthebodyisdecorated,welldressedwhenthe
bodyiswelldressed,wellcleanedwhenthebodyiswellcleaned,evensothatimageselfwillbeblindwhen
thebodyisblind,injuredinoneeyewhenthebodyisinjuredinoneeye,andmutilatedwhenthebodyis
mutilated,anditperishes

_____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: Taitt. II. 7.]
CHAPTER III 38
[Footnote2:Ch.VIII.7.1.]

47

whenthebodyperishes,thereforeIcanseenogoodinthistheory."Prajpatithengavehimahigherinstruction
abouttheself,andsaid,"Hewhogoesaboutenjoyingdreams,heistheself,thisisthedeathless,thefearless,this
isBrahman."Indradepartedbutwasagaindisturbedwithdoubts,andwasafraidandcamebackandsaid"that
thoughthedreamselfdoesnotbecomeblindwhenthebodyisblind,orinjuredinoneeyewhenthebodyisso
injuredandisnotaffectedbyitsdefects,andisnotkilledbyitsdestruction,butyetitisasifitwasoverwhelmed,
asifitsufferedandasifitweptinthisIseenogood."Prajpatigaveastillhigherinstruction:"Whenaman,
fastasleep,intotalcontentment,doesnotknowanydreams,thisistheself,thisisthedeathless,thefearless,this
isBrahman."Indradepartedbutwasagainfilledwithdoubtsontheway,andreturnedagainandsaid"theself
indeepsleepdoesnotknowhimself,thatIamthis,nordoesheknowanyotherexistingobjects.Heisdestroyed
andlost.Iseenogoodinthis."AndnowPrajpatiafterhavinggivenacourseofsuccessivelyhigherinstructions
asselfasthebody,astheselfindreamsandastheselfindeepdreamlesssleep,andhavingfoundthatthe
enquirerineachcasecouldfindoutthatthiswasnottheultimatetruthabouttheselfthathewasseeking,
ultimatelygavehimtheultimateandfinalinstructionaboutthefulltruthabouttheself,andsaid"thisbodyis
thesupportofthedeathlessandthebodilessself.Theselfasembodiedisaffectedbypleasureandpain,theself
whenassociatedwiththebodycannotgetridofpleasureandpain,butpleasureandpaindonottouchthe
bodilessself[Footnoteref1]."

Astheanecdoteshows,theysoughtsuchaconstantandunchangeableessenceinmanaswasbeyondthelimitsof
anychange.Thisinmostessencehassometimesbeendescribedaspuresubjectobjectlessconsciousness,the
reality,andthebliss.Heistheseerofallseeing,thehearerofallhearingandtheknowerofallknowledge.He
seesbutisnotseen,hearsbutisnotheard,knowsbutisnotknown.Heisthelightofalllights.Heislikealumpof
salt,withnoinnerorouter,whichconsiststhroughandthroughentirelyofsavour;asintruththistmanhasno
innerorouter,butconsiststhroughandthroughentirelyofknowledge.Blissisnotanattributeofitbutitisbliss
itself.ThestateofBrahmanisthuslikeneduntothestateofdreamlesssleep.Andhewhohasreachedthisblissis
beyondanyfear.Itisdearertousthan

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Ch.VIII.712.]
48

son,brother,wife,orhusband,wealthorprosperity.Itisforitandbyitthatthingsappeardeartous.Itisthe
dearestparexcellence,ourinmosttman.Alllimitationisfraughtwithpain;itistheinfinitealonethatisthe
highestbliss.Whenamanreceivesthisrapture,thenishefullofbliss;forwhocouldbreathe,wholive,ifthat
blisshadnotfilledthisvoid(_ks'a_)?Itishewhobehavesasbliss.Forwhenamanfindshispeace,hisfearless
supportinthatinvisible,supportless,inexpressible,unspeakableone,thenhasheattainedpeace.

PlaceofBrahmanintheUpani@sads.

Thereisthetmannotinmanalonebutinallobjectsoftheuniverse,thesun,themoon,theworld;and
Brahmanisthistman.Thereisnothingoutsidethetman,andthereforethereisnopluralityatall.Asfroma
lumpofclayallthatismadeofclayisknown,asfromaningotofblackironallthatismadeofblackironis
known,sowhenthistmantheBrahmanisknowneverythingelseisknown.Theessenceinmanandtheessence
oftheuniverseareoneandthesame,anditisBrahman.

Now a question may arise as to what may be called the nature of the phenomenal world of colour, sound, taste, and
smell. But we must also remember that the Upani@sads do not represent so much a conceptional
CHAPTER III 39
systemofphilosophyasvisionsoftheseerswhoarepossessedbythespiritofthisBrahman.Theydonotnotice
eventhecontradictionbetweentheBrahmanasunityandnatureinitsdiversity.Whentheempiricalaspectof
diversityattractstheirnotice,theyaffirmitandyetdeclarethatitisallBrahman.FromBrahmanithascome
forthandtoitwillitreturn.Hehashimselfcreateditoutofhimselfandthenenteredintoitasitsinnercontroller
(_antarymin_).HereisthusaglaringdualistictraitoftheworldofmatterandBrahmanasitscontroller,though
inotherplaceswefinditassertedmostemphaticallythatthesearebutnamesandforms,andwhenBrahmanis
knowneverythingelseisknown.Noattemptsatreconciliationaremadeforthesakeoftheconsistencyof
conceptualutterance,asS'a@nkarathegreatprofessorofVedntadoesbyexplainingawaythedualistictexts.
Theuniverseissaidtobeareality,buttherealinitisBrahmanalone.ItisonaccountofBrahmanthatthefire
burnsandthewindblows.Heistheactiveprincipleintheentireuniverse,andyetthemostpassiveandunmoved.
The

49

worldishisbody,yetheisthesoulwithin."Hecreatesall,willsall,smellsall,tastesall,hehaspervadedall,
silentandunaffected[Footnoteref1]."Heisbelow,above,intheback,infront,inthesouthandinthenorth,he
isallthis[Footnoteref2]."Theseriversintheeastandinthewestoriginatingfromtheocean,returnbackintoit
andbecometheoceanthemselves,thoughtheydonotknowthattheyareso.Soalsoallthesepeoplecominginto
beingfromtheBeingdonotknowthattheyhavecomefromtheBeing...Thatwhichisthesubtlestthatistheself,
thatisallthis,thetruth,thatselfthouartOS'vetaketu[Footnoteref3].""Brahman,"asDeussenpointsout,
"wasregardedasthecauseantecedentintime,andtheuniverseastheeffectproceedingfromit;theinner
dependenceoftheuniverseonBrahmananditsessentialidentitywithhimwasrepresentedasacreationofthe
universebyandoutofBrahman."ThusitissaidinMund.I.I.7:

Asaspiderejectsandretracts(thethreads),Astheplantsshootforthontheearth,Asthehairsontheheadand
bodyofthelivingman,Sofromtheimperishableallthatishere.Asthesparksfromthewellkindledfire,In
natureakintoit,springforthintheirthousands,So,mydearsir,fromtheimperishableLivingbeingsofmany
kindsgoforth,Andagainreturnintohim[Footnoteref4].

YetthisworldprincipleisthedearesttousandthehighestteachingoftheUpani@sadsis"Thatart
thou."

AgainthegrowthofthedoctrinethatBrahmanisthe"innercontroller"inallthepartsandforcesofnatureand
ofmankindasthetmanthereof,andthatalltheeffectsoftheuniversearetheresultofhiscommandswhichno
onecanoutstep,gaverisetoatheisticcurrentofthoughtinwhichBrahmanisheldasstandingaloofasGodand
controllingtheworld.Itisbyhisordaining,itissaid,thatthesunandmoonareheldtogether,andtheskyand
earthstandheldtogether[Footnoteref5].Godandsoularedistinguishedagaininthefamousverseof
S'vets'vatara[Footnoteref6]:

TwobrightfeatheredbosomfriendsFlitaroundoneandthesametree;Oneofthemtastesthesweetberries,
Theotherwithouteatingmerelygazesdown.

______________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Ch.III.14.4.]

[Footnote2:_Ibid._VII.25.i;alsoMu@n@dakaII.2.ii.]
[Footnote3:Ch.VI.10.]

[Footnote4:Deussen'stranslationinPhilosophyoftheUpanishads,p.164.]
[Footnote 5: B@rh. III. 8. i.]
CHAPTER III 40
[Footnote6:S'vets'vataraIV.6,andMu@n@dakaIII.i,1,alsoDeussen'stranslationinPhilosophyofthe
Upanishads,p.177.]

50

Butinspiteofthisapparenttheistictendencyandtheoccasionaluseoftheword_s'a_or_s'na_,thereseems
tobenodoubtthattheisminitstruesensewasneverprominent,andthisacknowledgementofasupremeLord
wasalsoanoffshootoftheexaltedpositionofthetmanasthesupremeprinciple.ThuswereadinKau@staki
Upani@sad3.9,"Heisnotgreatbygooddeedsnorlowbyevildeeds,butitishemakesonedogooddeedswhom
hewantstoraise,andmakeshimcommitbaddeedswhomhewantstolowerdown.Heistheprotectorofthe
universe,heisthemasteroftheworldandthelordofall;heismysoul(_tman_)."Thusthelordinspiteofhis
greatnessisstillmysoul.ThereareagainotherpassageswhichregardBrahmanasbeingatonceimmanentand
transcendent.Thusitissaidthatthereisthateternallyexistingtreewhoserootsgrowupwardandwhose
branchesgrowdownward.Alltheuniversesaresupportedinitandnoonecantranscendit.Thisisthat,"...from
itsfearthefireburns,thesunshines,andfromitsfearIndra,VyuandDeaththefifth(withtheothertwo)run
on[Footnoteref1]."

IfweoverlookthedifferentshadesinthedevelopmentoftheconceptionofBrahmanintheUpani@sadsandlook
tothemaincurrents,wefindthatthestrongestcurrentofthoughtwhichhasfoundexpressioninthemajorityof
thetextsisthisthatthetmanortheBrahmanistheonlyrealityandthatbesidesthiseverythingelseisunreal.
Theothercurrentofthoughtwhichistobefoundinmanyofthetextsisthepantheisticcreedthatidentifiesthe
universewiththetmanorBrahman.ThethirdcurrentisthatoftheismwhichlooksuponBrahmanastheLord
controllingtheworld.Itisbecausetheseideaswerestillinthemeltingpot,inwhichnoneofthemwere
systematicallyworkedout,thatthelaterexponentsofVednta,S'a@nkara,Rmnuja,andothersquarrelled
overthemeaningsoftextsinordertodevelopaconsistentsystematicphilosophyoutofthem.Thusitisthatthe
doctrineofMywhichisslightlyhintedatonceinB@rhadra@nyakaandthriceinS'vets'vatara,becomesthe
foundationofS'a@nkara'sphilosophyoftheVedntainwhichBrahmanaloneisrealandallelsebesidehimis
unreal[Footnoteref2].

_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:Ka@thaII.6.1and3.]

[Footnote2:B@rh.II.5.19,S'vet.I.10,IV.9,10.]
51

TheWorld.

WehavealreadyseenthattheuniversehascomeoutofBrahman,hasitsessenceinBrahman,andwillalso
returnbacktoit.ButinspiteofitsexistenceasBrahmanitscharacterasrepresentedtoexperiencecouldnotbe
denied.S'a@nkaraheldthattheUpani@sadsreferredtotheexternalworldandaccordedarealitytoit
consciouslywiththepurposeoftreatingitasmerelyrelativelyreal,whichwilleventuallyappearasunrealas
soonastheultimatetruth,theBrahman,isknown.Thishoweverremainstobemodifiedtothisextentthatthe
sageshadnotprobablyanyconsciouspurposeofaccordingarelativerealitytothephenomenalworld,butin
spiteofregardingBrahmanasthehighestrealitytheycouldnotignoretheclaimsoftheexteriorworld,andhad
toaccordarealitytoit.Theinconsistencyofthisrealityofthephenomenalworldwiththeultimateandonly
realityofBrahmanwasattemptedtobereconciledbyholdingthatthisworldisnotbesidehimbutithascome
outofhim,itismaintainedinhimanditwillreturnbacktohim.

The world is sometimes spoken of in its twofold aspect, the organic and the inorganic. All organic things, whether
plants, animals or men, have souls [Footnote ref 1]. Brahman desiring to be many created fire
CHAPTER III 41
(_tejas_),water(_ap_)andearth(_k@siti_).ThentheselfexistentBrahmanenteredintothesethree,anditisby
theircombinationthatallotherbodiesareformed[Footnoteref2].Soallotherthingsareproducedasaresultof
analloyingorcompoundingofthepartsofthesethreetogether.Inthistheoryofthethreefolddivisionofthe
primitiveelementsliestheearliestgermofthelaterdistinction(especiallyintheS@mkhyaschool)ofpure
infinitesimalsubstances(_tanmtra_)andgrosselements,andthetheorythateachgrosssubstanceiscomposedof
theatomsoftheprimaryelements.AndinPras'naIV.8wefindthegrosselementsdistinguishedfromtheir
subtlernatures,e.g.earth(_p@rthiv_),andthesubtlerstateofearth(_p@rthivmtra_).IntheTaittirya,II.1,
however,ether(_ks'a_)isalsodescribedasproceedingfromBrahman,andtheotherelements,air,fire,water,
andearth,aredescribedaseachproceedingdirectlyfromtheonewhichdirectlyprecededit.

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Ch.VI.11.]

[Footnote2:_ibid._VI.2,3,4.]

52
TheWorldSoul.

Theconceptionofaworldsoulrelatedtotheuniverseasthesoulofmantohisbodyisfoundforthefirsttimein
R.V.X.121.I,whereheissaidtohavesprungforthasthefirstbornofcreationfromtheprimevalwaters.This
beinghastwicebeenreferredtointheS'vets'vatara,inIII.4andIV.12.Itisindeedverystrangethatthisbeing
isnotreferredtoinanyoftheearlierUpani@sads.Inthetwopassagesinwhichhehasbeenspokenof,his
mythicalcharacterisapparent.Heisregardedasoneoftheearlierproductsintheprocessofcosmiccreation,but
hisimportancefromthepointofviewofthedevelopmentofthetheoryofBrahmanortmanisalmostnothing.
ThefactthatneitherthePuru@sa,northeVis'vakarma,northeHira@nyagarbhaplayedanimportantpartin
theearlierdevelopmentoftheUpani@sadsleadsmetothinkthattheUpani@saddoctrineswerenotdirectly
developedfromthemonotheistictendenciesofthelater@RgVedaspeculations.ThepassagesinS'vets'vatara
clearlyshowhowfromthesupremeeminencethathehadinR.V.X.121,Hira@nyagarbhahadbeenbroughtto
thelevelofoneofthecreatedbeings.DeusseninexplainingthephilosophicalsignificanceoftheHira@nyagarbha
doctrineoftheUpani@sadssaysthatthe"entireobjectiveuniverseispossibleonlyinsofarasitissustainedbya
knowingsubject.Thissubjectasasustaineroftheobjectiveuniverseismanifestedinallindividualobjectsbutis
bynomeansidenticalwiththem.Fortheindividualobjectspassawaybuttheobjectiveuniversecontinuestoexist
withoutthem;thereexiststhereforetheeternalknowingsubjectalso(_hira@nyagarbha_)bywhomitis
sustained.Spaceandtimearederivedfromthissubject.Itisitselfaccordinglynotinspaceanddoesnotbelongto
time,andthereforefromanempiricalpointofviewitisingeneralnonexistent;ithasnoempiricalbutonlya
metaphysicalreality[Footnoteref1]."Thishoweverseemstometobewhollyirrelevant,sincethe
Hira@nyagarbhadoctrinecannotbesupposedtohaveanyphilosophicalimportanceintheUpani@sads.

TheTheoryofCausation.

TherewaspracticallynosystematictheoryofcausationintheUpani@sads.S'a@nkara,thelaterexponentof
Vedntaphilosophy,alwaystriedtoshowthattheUpani@sadslookeduponthecause

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Deussen'sPhilosophyoftheUpanishads,p.201.]
53
CHAPTER III 42
asmeregroundofchangewhichthoughunchangedinitselfinrealityhadonlyanappearanceofsufferingchange.
ThishedidonthestrengthofaseriesofexamplesintheChndogyaUpani@sad(VI.1)inwhichthematerial
cause,e.g.theclay,isspokenofastheonlyrealityinallitstransformationsasthepot,thejugortheplate.Itis
saidthatthoughtherearesomanydiversitiesofappearancethatoneiscalledtheplate,theotherthepot,andthe
otherthejug,yettheseareonlyemptydistinctionsofnameandform,fortheonlythingrealinthemistheearth
whichinitsessenceremainseverthesamewhetheryoucallitthepot,plate,orJug.Soitisthattheultimate
cause,theunchangeableBrahman,remainseverconstant,thoughitmayappeartosufferchangeasthemanifold
worldoutside.Thisworldisthusonlyanunsubstantialappearance,amirageimposeduponBrahman,thereal
parexcellence.

ItseemshoweverthatthoughsuchaviewmayberegardedashavingbeenexpoundedintheUpani@sadsinan
imperfectmanner,thereisalsosidebysidetheotherviewwhichlooksupontheeffectastheproductofareal
changewroughtinthecauseitselfthroughtheactionandcombinationoftheelementsofdiversityinit.
Thuswhenthedifferentobjectsofnaturehavebeenspokenofinoneplaceastheproductofthecombinationof
thethreeelementsfire,waterandearth,theeffectsignifiesarealchangeproducedbytheircompounding.This
isingerm(asweshallseehereafter)thePari@nmatheoryofcausationadvocatedbytheS@mkhyaschool
[Footnoteref1].

DoctrineofTransmigration.

WhentheVedicpeoplewitnessedtheburningofadeadbodytheysupposedthattheeyeofthemanwenttothe
sun,hisbreathtothewind,hisspeechtothefire,hislimbstothedifferentpartsoftheuniverse.Theyalso
believedaswehavealreadyseenintherecompenseofgoodandbadactionsinworldsotherthanourown,and
thoughwehearofsuchthingsasthepassageofthehumansoulintotrees,etc.,thetendencytowards
transmigrationhadbutlittledevelopedatthetime.

IntheUpani@sadshoweverwefindacleardevelopmentinthedirectionoftransmigrationintwodistinct
stages.IntheonetheVedicideaofarecompenseintheotherworldiscombinedwith

____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:Ch.VI.24.]

54

thedoctrineoftransmigration,whereasintheotherthedoctrineoftransmigrationcomestotheforefrontin
supersessionoftheideaofarecompenseintheotherworld.Thusitissaidthatthosewhoperformedcharitable
deedsorsuchpublicworksasthediggingofwells,etc.,followafterdeaththewayofthefathers(_pit@ryna_),
inwhichthesoulafterdeathentersfirstintosmoke,thenintonight,thedarkhalfofthemonth,etc.,andatlast
reachesthemoon;afteraresidencethereaslongastheremnantofhisgooddeedsremainshedescendsagain
throughether,wind,smoke,mist,cloud,rain,herbage,foodandseed,andthroughtheassimilationoffoodby
manheentersthewombofthemotherandisbornagain.Hereweseethatthesoulhadnotonlyarecompensein
theworldofthemoon,butwasrebornagaininthisworld[Footnoteref1].

Theotherwayisthewayofgods(_devayna_),meantforthosewhocultivatefaithandasceticism(_tapas_).
Thesesoulsatdeathentersuccessivelyintoflame,day,brighthalfofthemonth,brighthalfoftheyear,sun,
moon,lightning,andthenfinallyintoBrahmannevertoreturn.Deussensaysthat"themeaningofthewholeis
thatthesoulonthewayofthegodsreachesregionsofeverincreasinglight,inwhichisconcentratedallthatis
brightandradiantasstationsonthewaytoBrahmanthe'lightoflights'"(_jyoti@s@mjyoti@h_)[Footnote
ref2].
The other line of thought is a direct reference to the doctrine of transmigration unmixed with the idea of
CHAPTER III 43
reapingthefruitsofhisdeeds(_karma_)bypassingthroughtheotherworldsandwithoutreferencetothe
doctrineofthewaysofthefathersandgods,the_Ynas_.ThusYjavalkyasays,"whenthesoulbecomesweak
(apparentweaknessowingtotheweaknessofthebodywithwhichitisassociated)andfallsintoaswoonasit
were,thesesensesgotowardsit.It(Soul)takestheselightparticleswithinitselfandcentresitselfonlyinthe
heart.Thuswhenthepersonintheeyeturnsback,thenthesoulcannotknowcolour;(thesenses)becomeone
(withhim);(peopleabouthim)sayhedoesnotsee;(thesenses)becomeone(withhim),hedoesnotsmell,(the
senses)becomeone(withhim),hedoesnottaste,(thesenses)becomeone(withhim),hedoesnotspeak,(the
senses)becomeone(withhim),hedoesnothear,(thesenses)becomeone(withhim),hedoesnotthink,(the
senses)becomeonewithhim,hedoesnottouch,(thesenses)becomeonewithhim,hedoesnotknow,theysay.
The

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Ch.V.10.]

[Footnote2:Deussen'sPhilosophyoftheUpanishads,p.335.]

55

tipofhisheartshinesandbythatshiningthissoulgoesout.Whenhegoesouteitherthroughtheeye,the
head,orbyanyotherpartofthebody,thevitalfunction(_pr@na_)followsandallthesensesfollowthe
vitalfunction(_pr@na_)incomingout.Heisthenwithdeterminateconsciousnessandassuchhecomes
out.Knowledge,thedeedsaswellaspreviousexperience(_praj_)accompanyhim.Justasacaterpillar
goingtotheendofabladeofgrass,byundertakingaseparatemovementcollectsitself,sothisselfafter
destroyingthisbody,removingignorance,byaseparatemovementcollectsitself.Justasagoldsmithtaking
asmallbitofgold,givestoitanewerandfairerform,sothesoulafterdestroyingthisbodyandremoving
ignorancefashionsanewerandfairerformasofthePit@rs,theGandharvas,thegods,ofPrajpatior
Brahmaorofanyotherbeing....Asheactsandbehavessohebecomes,goodbygooddeeds,badbybad
deeds,virtuousbyvirtuousdeedsandviciousbyvice.Themanisfullofdesires.Ashedesiressohewills,as
hewillssoheworks,astheworkisdonesoithappens.Thereisalsoaverse,beingattachedtothathewants
togainbykarmathattowhichhewasattached.Havingreapedthefullfruit(lit.gonetotheend)ofthe
karmathathedoeshere,hereturnsbacktothisworldfordoingkarma[Footnoteref1].Soitisthecase
withthosewhohavedesires.Hewhohasnodesires,whohadnodesires,whohasfreedhimselffromall
desires,issatisfiedinhisdesiresandinhimself,hissensesdonotgoout.HebeingBrahmaattains
Brahmahood.Thustheversesays,whenallthedesiresthatareinhisheartaregotridof,themortal
becomesimmortalandattainsBrahmahere"(B@rh.IV.iv.17).

Acloseconsiderationoftheabovepassageshowsthattheselfitselfdestroyedthebodyandbuiltupanewerand
fairerframebyitsownactivitywhenitreachedtheendofthepresentlife.Atthetimeofdeath,theselfcollected
withinitselfallsensesandfacultiesandafterdeathallitspreviousknowledge,workandexperienceaccompanied
him.Thefallingoffofthebodyatthetimeofdeathisonlyforthebuildingofanewerbodyeitherinthisworld
orintheotherworlds.Theselfwhichthustakesrebirthisregardedasanaggregationofdiversecategories.Thus
itissaidthat"heisoftheessenceofunderstanding,

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Itispossiblethatthereisavagueandobscurereferenceheretothedoctrinethatthefruitsofour
deedsarereapedinotherworlds.]

56
of the vital function, of the visual sense, of the auditory sense, of the essence of the five elements (which
CHAPTER III 44
wouldmakeupthephysicalbodyinaccordancewithitsneeds)ortheessenceofdesires,oftheessenceof
restraintofdesires,oftheessenceofanger,oftheessenceofturningofffromallanger,oftheessenceofdharma,
oftheessenceofadharma,oftheessenceofallthatisthis(manifest)andthatisthat(unmanifestorlatent)"
(B@rh.IV.iv.5).Theselfthatundergoesrebirthisthusaunitynotonlyofmoralandpsychologicaltendencies,
butalsoofalltheelementswhichcomposethephysicalworld.Thewholeprocessofhischangesfollowsfrom
thisnatureofhis;forwhateverhedesires,hewillsandwhateverhewillsheacts,andinaccordancewithhisacts
thefruithappens.Thewholelogicofthegenesisofkarmaanditsfruitsisheldupwithinhim,forheisaunityof
themoralandpsychologicaltendenciesontheonehandandelementsofthephysicalworldontheother.

Theselfthatundergoesrebirthbeingacombinationofdiversepsychologicalandmoraltendenciesandthe
physicalelementsholdswithinitselftheprincipleofallitstransformations.Therootofallthisisthedesire
oftheselfandtheconsequentfruitionofitthroughwillandact.Whentheselfcontinuestodesireandact,it
reapsthefruitandcomesagaintothisworldforperformingacts.Thisworldisgenerallyregardedasthe
fieldforperformingkarma,whereasotherworldsareregardedasplaceswherethefruitsofkarmaare
reapedbythosebornascelestialbeings.ButthereisnoemphasisintheUpani@sadsonthispoint.The
Pit@rynatheoryisnotindeedgivenup,butitseemsonlytoformapartinthelargerschemeofrebirthin
otherworldsandsometimesinthisworldtoo.Allthecourseoftheserebirthsiseffectedbytheselfitselfby
itsowndesires,andifitceasestodesire,itsuffersnorebirthandbecomesimmortal.Themostdistinctive
featureofthisdoctrineisthis,thatitreferstodesiresasthecauseofrebirthandnotkarma.Karmaonly
comesastheconnectinglinkbetweendesiresandrebirthforitissaidthatwhateveramandesireshewills,
andwhateverhewillsheacts.

Thusitissaidinanotherplace"hewhoknowinglydesiresisbornbyhisdesiresinthoseplaces(accordingly),but
forhimwhosedesireshavebeenfulfilledandwhohasrealizedhimself,allhisdesiresvanishhere"(Mu@n@dIII.
2.2).Thisdestructionofdesiresiseffectedbytherightknowledgeoftheself."Hewhoknows

57

hisselfas'Iamtheperson'forwhatwishandforwhatdesirewillhetroublethebody,...evenbeinghereifwe
knowit,wellifwedonot,whatagreatdestruction"(B@rh.IV.iv.12and14)."Informertimesthewisemendid
notdesiresons,thinkingwhatshallwedowithsonssincethisourselfistheuniverse"(B@rh.IV.iv.22).Noneof
thecomplexitiesofthekarmadoctrinewhichwefindlateroninmorerecentdevelopmentsofHinduthoughtcan
befoundintheUpani@sads.Thewholeschemeisworkedoutontheprincipleofdesire(_kma_)andkarma
onlyservesasthelinkbetweenitandtheactualeffectsdesiredandwilledbytheperson.

It is interesting to note in this connection that consistently with the idea that desires (_kma_) led to rebirth, we find
that in some Upani@sads the discharge of the semen in the womb of a woman as a result of desires is considered as
the first birth of man, and the birth of the son as the second birth and the birth elsewhere after death is regarded as the
third birth. Thus it is said, "It is in man that there comes first the embryo, which is but the semen which is produced as
the essence of all parts of his body and which holds itself within itself, and when it is put in a woman, that is his first
birth. That embryo then becomes part of the woman's self like any part of her body; it therefore does not hurt her; she
protects and develops the embryo within herself. As she protects (the embryo) so she also should be protected. It is the
woman who bears the embryo (before birth) but when after birth the father takes care of the son always, he is taking
care only of himself, for it is through sons alone that the continuity of the existence of people can be maintained. This is
his second birth. He makes this self of his a representative for performing all the virtuous deeds. The other self of his
after realizing himself and attaining age goes away and when going away he is born again that is his third birth"
(Aitareya, II. 1-4) [Footnote ref 1]. No special emphasis is given in the Upani@sads to the sex-desire or the desire for a
son; for, being called kma, whatever was the desire for a son was the same as the desire for money and the desire for
money was the same as any other worldly desire (B@rh. IV. iv. 22), and hence sex-desires stand on the same plane as
any other desire.
CHAPTER III 45
_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:SeealsoKau@staki,II.15.]

58

Emancipation.

Thedoctrinewhichnextattractsourattentioninthisconnectionisthatofemancipation(_mukti_).Alreadywe
knowthatthedoctrineofDevaynaheldthatthosewhowerefaithfulandperformedasceticism(_tapas_)wentby
thewayofthegodsthroughsuccessivestagesnevertoreturntotheworldandsufferrebirth.Thiscouldbe
contrastedwiththewayofthefathers(_pit@ryna_)wherethedeadwereforatimerecompensedinanother
worldandthenhadtosufferrebirth.Thuswefindthatthosewhoarefaithfulandperform_s'raddh_hada
distinctlydifferenttypeofgoalfromthosewhoperformedordinaryvirtues,suchasthoseofageneralaltruistic
nature.Thisdistinctionattainsitsfullestdevelopmentinthedoctrineofemancipation.EmancipationorMukti
meansintheUpani@sadsthestateofinfinitenessthatamanattainswhenheknowshisownselfandthus
becomesBrahman.Theceaselesscourseoftransmigrationisonlyforthosewhoareignorant.Thewiseman
howeverwhohasdivestedhimselfofallpassionsandknowshimselftobeBrahman,atoncebecomesBrahman
andnobondageofanykindcaneveraffecthim.

Hewhobeholdsthatloftiestanddeepest,Forhimthefettersoftheheartbreakasunder,Forhimalldoubtsare
solved,Andhisworksbecomenothingness[Footnoteref1].

Theknowledgeoftheselfrevealsthefactthatallourpassionsandantipathies,allourlimitationsof
experience,allthatisignobleandsmallinus,allthatistransientandfiniteinusisfalse.We"donotknow"
butare"pureknowledge"ourselves.Wearenotlimitedbyanything,forwearetheinfinite;wedonot
sufferdeath,forweareimmortal.Emancipationthusisnotanewacquisition,product,aneffect,orresult
ofanyaction,butitalwaysexistsastheTruthofournature.Wearealwaysemancipatedandalwaysfree.
Wedonotseemtobesoandseemtosufferrebirthandthousandsofothertroublesonlybecausewedonot
knowthetruenatureofourself.Thusitisthatthetrueknowledgeofselfdoesnotleadtoemancipationbut
isemancipationitself.Allsufferingsandlimitationsaretrueonlysolongaswedonotknowourself.
Emancipationisthenaturalandonlygoalofmansimplybecauseitrepresentsthetruenatureandessence
ofman.Itistherealizationofourownnaturethat

_____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:Deussen'sPhilosophyoftheUpanishads,p.352.]

59

is called emancipation. Since we are all already and always in our own true nature and as such emancipated, the only
thing necessary for us is to know that we are so. Self-knowledge is therefore the only desideratum which can wipe off
all false knowledge, all illusions of death and rebirth. The story is told in the Ka@tha Upani@sad that Yama, the lord of
death, promised Naciketas, the son of Gautama, to grant him three boons at his choice. Naciketas, knowing that his
father Gautama was offended with him, said, "O death let Gautama be pleased in mind and forget his anger against
me." This being granted Naciketas asked the second boon that the fire by which heaven is gained should be made
known to him. This also being granted Naciketas said, "There is this enquiry, some say the soul exists after the death of
man; others say it does not exist. This I should like to know instructed by thee. This is my third boon." Yama said, "It was
inquired of old, even by the gods; for it is not easy to understand it. Subtle is its nature, choose another boon. Do not
compel me to this." Naciketas said, "Even by the gods was it inquired before, and even thou O Death sayest that it is not
easy to understand it, but there is no other speaker to be found like thee. There is no other boon like this." Yama said,
"Choose
CHAPTER III 46
sonsandgrandsonswhomayliveahundredyears,chooseherdsofcattle;chooseelephantsandgoldand
horses;choosethewideexpandedearth,andlivethyselfasmanyyearsasthouwishest.Orifthouknowesta
boonlikethischooseittogetherwithwealthandfarextendinglife.Beakingonthewideearth.Iwillmake
theetheenjoyerofalldesires.Allthosedesiresthataredifficulttogainintheworldofmortals,allthoseask
thouatthypleasure;thosefairnymphswiththeirchariots,withtheirmusicalinstruments;thelikeofthem
arenottobegainedbymen.Iwillgivethemtothee,butdonotaskthequestionregardingdeath."
Naciketasreplied,"Allthoseenjoymentsareoftomorrowandtheyonlyweakenthesenses.Alllifeisshort,
withtheethedanceandsong.Mancannotbesatisfiedwithwealth,wecouldobtainwealth,aslongaswe
didnotreachyouweliveonlyaslongasthoupleasest.TheboonwhichIchooseIhavesaid."Yamasaid,
"Onethingisgood,anotherispleasant.Blessedishewhotakesthegood,buthewhochoosesthepleasant
losestheobjectofman.Butthouconsideringtheobjectsofdesire,hastabandonedthem.Thesetwo,
ignorance(whoseobjectis

60

whatispleasant)andknowledge(whoseobjectiswhatisgood),areknowntobefarasunder,andtoleadto
differentgoals.Believingthatthisworldexistsandnottheother,thecarelessyouthissubjecttomysway.That
knowledgewhichthouhastaskedisnottobeobtainedbyargument.Iknowworldlyhappinessistransientfor
thatfirmoneisnottobeobtainedbywhatisnotfirm.Thewisebyconcentratingonthesoul,knowinghimwhom
itishardtobehold,leavesbothgriefandjoy.TheeONaciketas,Ibelievetobelikeahousewhosedoorisopento
Brahman.Brahmanisdeathless,whoeverknowshimobtainswhateverhewishes.Thewisemanisnotborn;he
doesnotdie;heisnotproducedfromanywhere.Unborn,eternal,thesoulisnotslain,thoughthebodyisslain;
subtlerthanwhatissubtle,greaterthanwhatisgreat,sittingitgoesfar,lyingitgoeseverywhere.Thinkingthe
soulasunbodilyamongbodies,firmamongfleetingthings,thewisemancastsoffallgrief.Thesoulcannotbe
gainedbyeloquence,byunderstanding,orbylearning.Itcanbeobtainedbyhimalonewhomitchooses.Tohim
itrevealsitsownnature[Footnoteref1]."SolongastheSelfidentifiesitselfwithitsdesires,hewillsandacts
accordingtothemandreapsthefruitsinthepresentandinfuturelives.Butwhenhecomestoknowthehighest
truthabouthimself,thatheisthehighestessenceandprincipleoftheuniverse,theimmortalandtheinfinite,he
ceasestohavedesires,andrecedingfromalldesiresrealizestheultimatetruthofhimselfinhisowninfinitude.
Manisasitweretheepitomeoftheuniverseandheholdswithinhimselfthefineconstituentsofthegrossbody
(_annamayako@sa_),thevitalfunctions(_pr@namayako@sa_)oflife,thewillanddesire(_manomaya_)and
thethoughtsandideas(_vijnamaya_),andsolongashekeepshimselfinthesespheresandpassesthrougha
seriesofexperiencesinthepresentlifeandinotherlivestocome,theseexperiencesarewilledbyhimandinthat
sensecreatedbyhim.Hesufferspleasuresandpains,diseaseanddeath.Butifheretiresfromtheseintohistrue
unchangeablebeing,heisinastatewhereheisonewithhisexperienceandthereisnochangeandnomovement.
Whatthisstateiscannotbeexplainedbytheuseofconcepts.Onecouldonlyindicateitbypointingoutthatitis
notanyofthoseconceptsfoundinordinaryknowledge;itisnot

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Ka@thaII.Thetranslationisnotcontinuous.Therearesomepartsintheextractwhichmaybe
differentlyinterpreted.]

61

whateveroneknowsasthisandthis(_netineti_).Inthisinfiniteandtrueselfthereisnodifference,nodiversity,
nomeumandtuum. It is like an ocean in which all our phenomenal existence will dissolve like salt in water. "Just as a
lump of salt when put in water will disappear in it and it cannot be taken out separately but in whatever portion of
water we taste we find the salt, so, Maitrey, does this great reality infinite and limitless consisting only of pure
intelligence manifesting itself in all these (phenomenal existences) vanish in them and there is then no phenomenal
knowledge" (B@rh. II. 4. 12). The true self manifests itself in all the processes of
CHAPTER IV 47
ourphenomenalexistences,butultimatelywhenitretiresbacktoitself,itcannolongerbefoundinthem.Itisa
stateofabsoluteinfinitudeofpureintelligence,purebeing,andpureblessedness.

62

CHAPTER IV
GENERALOBSERVATIONSONTHESYSTEMSOFINDIANPHILOSOPHY

InwhatSenseisaHistoryofIndianPhilosophypossible?

ItishardlypossibletoattemptahistoryofIndianphilosophyinthemannerinwhichthehistoriesofEuropean
philosophyhavebeenwritten.InEuropefromtheearliesttimes,thinkerscameoneafteranotherandoffered
theirindependentspeculationsonphilosophy.Theworkofamodernhistorianconsistsinchronologically
arrangingtheseviewsandincommentingupontheinfluenceofoneschooluponanotheroruponthegeneral
changefromtimetotimeinthetidesandcurrentsofphilosophy.HereinIndia,however,theprincipalsystemsof
philosophyhadtheirbeginningintimesofwhichwehavebutscantyrecord,anditishardlypossibletosay
correctlyatwhattimetheybegan,ortocomputetheinfluencethatledtothefoundationofsomanydivergent
systemsatsoearlyaperiod,forinallprobabilitythesewereformulatedjustaftertheearliestUpani@sadshad
beencomposedorarranged.

Thesystematictreatiseswerewritteninshortandpregnanthalfsentences(_stras_)whichdidnotelaboratethe
subjectindetail,butservedonlytoholdbeforethereaderthelostthreadsofmemoryofelaboratedisquisitions
withwhichhewasalreadythoroughlyacquainted.Itseems,therefore,thatthesepithyhalfsentenceswerelike
lecturehints,intendedforthosewhohadhaddirectelaborateoralinstructionsonthesubject.Itisindeed
difficulttoguessfromthestrastheextentoftheirsignificance,orhowfarthediscussionswhichtheygaveriseto
inlaterdayswereoriginallyintendedbythem.ThestrasoftheVedntasystem,knownastheS'rrakastras
orBrahmastrasofBdarya@naforexamplewereofsoambiguousanaturethattheygaverisetomorethan
halfadozendivergentinterpretations,eachoneofwhichclaimedtobetheonlyfaithfulone.Suchwasthehigh
esteemandrespectinwhichthesewritersofthestraswereheldbylaterwritersthatwhenevertheyhadany
newspeculationsto

63

offer, these were reconciled with the doctrines of one or other of the existing systems, and put down as faithful
interpretations of the system in the form of commentaries. Such was the hold of these systems upon scholars that all
the orthodox teachers since the foundation of the systems of philosophy belonged to one or other of these schools.
Their pupils were thus naturally brought up in accordance with the views of their teachers. All the independence of
their thinking was limited and enchained by the faith of the school to which they were attached. Instead of producing a
succession of free-lance thinkers having their own systems to propound and establish, India had brought forth schools
of pupils who carried the traditionary views of particular systems from generation to generation, who explained and
expounded them, and defended them against the attacks of other rival schools which they constantly attacked in order
to establish the superiority of the system to which they adhered. To take an example, the Nyya system of philosophy
consisting of a number of half-sentences or stras is attributed to Gautama, also called Ak@sapda. The earliest
commentary on these stras, called the _Vtsyyana bh@sya_, was written by Vtsyyana. This work was sharply
criticized by the Buddhist Di@nnga, and to answer these criticisms Udyotakara wrote a commentary on this
commentary called the _Bh@syavttika_ [Footnote ref 1]. As time went on the original force of this work was lost, and
it failed to maintain the old dignity of the school. At this Vcaspati Mis'ra wrote a commentary called _Vrttika-
ttparya@tk_ on this second commentary, where he tried to refute all objections against the Nyya system made by
other rival schools and particularly by the Buddhists. This commentary, called
CHAPTER IV 48
_Nyyattparya@tk_,hadanothercommentarycalled_Nyyattparya@tkparis'uddhi_writtenby
thegreatUdayana.Thiscommentaryhadanothercommentarycalled_Nyyanibandhapraks'a_written
byVarddhamnathesonoftheillustriousGa@nges'a.Thisagainhadanothercommentarycalled
_Varddhamnendu_uponitbyPadmanbhaMis'ra,andthisagainhadanothernamed_Nyya
ttparyama@n@dana_byS'a@nkaraMis'ra.ThenamesofVtsyyana,Vcaspati,andUdayanaare
indeedverygreat,buteventheycontentedthemselvesbywritingcommentariesoncommentaries,anddid
nottrytoformulateany

_______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:IhavepreferredtospellDi@nngaafterVcaspati's_Ttparyatk_(p.I)andnotDignngaasitis
generallyspelt.]

64

originalsystem.EvenS'a@nkara,probablythegreatestmanofIndiaafterBuddha,spenthislifeinwriting
commentariesonthe_Brahmastras_,theUpani@sads,andthe_Bhagavadgt_.

Asasystempassedonithadtomeetunexpectedopponentsandtroublesomecriticismsforwhichitwasnotinthe
leastprepared.Itsadherentshadthereforetousealltheiringenuityandsubtletyinsupportoftheirown
positions,andtodiscoverthedefectsoftherivalschoolsthatattackedthem.Asystemasitwasoriginally
formulatedinthestrashadprobablybutfewproblemstosolve,butasitfoughtitswayintheteethofopposition
ofotherschools,ithadtoofferconsistentopinionsonotherproblemsinwhichtheoriginalviewsweremoreor
lessinvolvedbuttowhichnoattentionhadbeengivenbefore.

Thecontributionsofthesuccessivecommentatorsservedtomakeeachsystemmoreandmorecompleteinallits
parts,andstrongerandstrongertoenableittoholditsownsuccessfullyagainsttheoppositionandattacksofthe
rivalschools.Asysteminthestrasisweakandshapelessasanewbornbabe,butifwetakeitalongwithits
developmentsdowntothebeginningoftheseventeenthcenturyitappearsasafullydevelopedmanstrongand
harmoniousinallitslimbs.ItisthereforenotpossibletowriteanyhistoryofsuccessivephilosophiesofIndia,but
itisnecessitythateachsystemshouldbestudiedandinterpretedinallthegrowthithasacquiredthroughthe
successiveagesofhistoryfromitsconflictswiththerivalsystemsasonewhole[Footnoteref1].Inthehistoryof
Indianphilosophywehavenoplaceforsystemswhichhadtheirimportanceonlysolongastheylivedandwere
thenforgottenorrememberedonlyastargetsofcriticism.Eachsystemgrewanddevelopedbytheuntiring
energyofitsadherentsthroughallthesuccessiveagesofhistory,andahistoryofthisgrowthisahistoryofits
conflicts.NostudyofanyIndiansystemisthereforeadequateunlessitistakenthroughoutallthegrowthit
attainedbytheworkofitschampions,thecommentatorswhoseselflesstoilforithadkeptitlivingthroughthe
agesofhistory.

______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Inthecaseofsomesystemsitisindeedpossibletosuggestoneortwoearlierphasesofthesystem,
butthisprinciplecannotbecarriedallthrough,forthesupplementaryinformationandargumentsgivenbythe
latercommentatorsoftenappearasharmoniouselaborationsoftheearlierwritingsandareveryseldomin
conflictwiththem.]

65

GrowthofthePhilosophicLiterature.

It is difficult to say how the systems were originally formulated, and what were the influences that led to it. We know
that a spirit of philosophic enquiry had already begun in the days of the earliest Upani@sads. The
CHAPTER IV 49
spiritofthatenquirywasthatthefinalessenceortruthwasthetman,thatasearchafteritwasourhighest
duty,andthatuntilweareultimatelymergedinitwecanonlyfeelthistruthandremainuncontentedwith
everythingelseandsaythatitisnotthetruthwewant,itisnotthetruthwewant(_netineti_).Philosophical
enquireswerehowevercontinuingincirclesotherthanthoseoftheUpani@sads.ThustheBuddhawho
closelyfollowedtheearlyUpani@sadperiod,spokeofandenumeratedsixtytwokindsofheresies[Footnote
ref1],andthesecanhardlybetracedintheUpani@sads.TheJainaactivitieswerealsoprobablygoingon
contemporaneouslybutintheUpani@sadsnoreferencetothesecanbefound.Wemaythusreasonably
supposethatthereweredifferentformsofphilosophicenquiryinspheresotherthanthoseoftheUpani@sad
sages,ofwhichwehavebutscantyrecords.ItseemsprobablethattheHindusystemsofthoughtoriginated
amongthesageswhothoughattachedchieflytotheUpani@sadcirclesusedtotakenoteofthediscussions
andviewsoftheantagonisticandhereticalphilosophiccircles.Intheassembliesofthesesagesandtheir
pupils,theviewsofthehereticalcircleswereprobablydiscussedandrefuted.Soitcontinuedprobablyfor
sometimewhensomeillustriousmemberoftheassemblysuchasGautamaorKanadacollectedthepurport
ofthesediscussionsonvarioustopicsandproblems,filledupmanyofthemissinglinks,classifiedand
arrangedtheseintheformofasystemofphilosophyandrecordeditinstras.Thesestraswereintended
probablyforpeoplewhohadattendedtheelaborateoraldiscussionsandthuscouldeasilyfollowthe
meaningofthesuggestivephrasescontainedintheaphorisms.Thestrasthuscontainsometimesallusions
totheviewsoftherivalschoolsandindicatethewayinwhichtheycouldberefuted.Thecommentatorswere
possessedofthegeneraldriftofthedifferentdiscussionsalludedtoandconveyedfromgenerationto
generationthroughanunbrokenchainofsuccessionofteachersandpupils.Theywerehoweverfreeto
supplementthesetraditionaryexplanationswiththeirown

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Brahmajlasutta,Dgha_,1.p.12ff.]
66

viewsortomodifyandevensuppresssuchofthetraditionaryviewswithwhichtheydidnotagreeorwhichthey
founditdifficulttomaintain.Brilliantoppositionsfromtheopposingschoolsoftenmadeitnecessaryforthemto
offersolutionstonewproblemsunthoughtofbefore,butputforwardbysomeillustriousadherentofarival
school.Inordertoreconcilethesenewsolutionswiththeotherpartsofthesystem,thecommentatorsnever
hesitatedtooffersuchslightmodificationsofthedoctrinesascouldharmonizethemintoacompletewhole.These
elaborationsormodificationsgenerallydevelopedthetraditionarysystem,butdidnoteffectanyseriouschangein
thesystemasexpoundedbytheolderteachers,forthenewexponentsalwaysboundthemselvestothe
explanationsoftheolderteachersandnevercontradictedthem.Theywouldonlyinterpretthemtosuittheirown
ideas,orsaynewthingsonlyinthosecaseswheretheolderteachershadremainedsilent.Itisnottherefore
possibletodescribethegrowthofanysystembytreatingthecontributionsoftheindividualcommentators
separately.Thiswouldonlymeanunnecessaryrepetition.Exceptwhenthereisaspeciallynewdevelopment,the
systemistobeinterpretedonthebasisofthejointworkofthecommentatorstreatingtheircontributionsas
formingonewhole.

The fact that each system had to contend with other rival systems in order to hold its own has left its permanent mark
upon all the philosophic literatures of India which are always written in the form of disputes, where the writer is
supposed to be always faced with objections from rival schools to whatever he has got to say. At each step he supposes
certain objections put forth against him which he answers, and points out the defects of the objector or shows that the
objection itself is ill founded. It is thus through interminable byways of objections, counter-objections and their
answers that the writer can wend his way to his destination. Most often the objections of the rival schools are referred
to in so brief a manner that those only who know the views can catch them. To add to these difficulties the Sanskrit
style of most of the commentaries is so condensed and different from literary Sanskrit, and aims so much at precision
and brevity, leading to the use of technical words current in the diverse systems, that a study of these becomes often
impossible without the
CHAPTER IV 50
aidofanexpertpreceptor;itisdifficultthereforeforallwhoarenotwidelyreadinallthedifferentsystemsto
followanyadvanced

67

workofanyparticularsystem,asthedeliberationsofthatparticularsystemareexpressedinsuchclose
interconnectionwiththeviewsofothersystemsthatthesecanhardlybeunderstoodwithoutthem.Each
systemofIndiahasgrown(atleastinparticularepochs)inrelationtoandinoppositiontothegrowthof
othersystemsofthought,andtobeathoroughstudentofIndianphilosophyoneshouldstudyallthe
systemsintheirmutualoppositionandrelationfromtheearliesttimestoaperiodatwhichtheyceasedto
growandcametoastopapurposeforwhichaworklikethepresentonemayonlyberegardedasforming
apreliminaryintroduction.

Besidesthestrasandtheircommentariestherearealsoindependenttreatisesonthesystemsinversecalled
_kriks_,whichtrytosummarizetheimportanttopicsofanysysteminasuccinctmanner;the_S@mkhya
krik_maybementionedasaworkofthiskind.Inadditiontothesetherewerealsolongdissertations,
commentaries,orgeneralobservationsonanysystemwritteninversescalledthevrttikas;the_S'lokavrttika_,
ofKumarilaorthe_Vrttika_ofSures'varamaybementionedasexamples.Alltheseofcoursehadtheir
commentariestoexplainthem.Inadditiontothesetherewerealsoadvancedtreatisesonthesystemsinprosein
whichthewriterseithernominallyfollowedsomeselectedstrasorproceededindependentlyofthem.Ofthe
formerclassthe_Nyyamajar_ofJayantamaybementionedasanexampleandofthelatterthe
_Pras'astapdabh@sya_,theAdvaitasiddhiofMadhusdanaSarasvatorthe_Vedntaparibh@s_of
Dharmarjdhvarndra.Themoreremarkableofthesetreatiseswereofamasterlynatureinwhichthewriters
representedthesystemstheyadheredtoinahighlyforcibleandlogicalmannerbydintoftheirowngreatmental
powersandgenius.Thesealsohadtheircommentariestoexplainandelaboratethem.Theperiodofthegrowth
ofthephilosophicliteraturesofIndiabeginsfromabout500B.C.(aboutthetimeoftheBuddha)andpractically
endsinthelaterhalfoftheseventeenthcentury,thoughevennowsomeminorpublicationsareseentocomeout.

TheIndianSystemsofPhilosophy.

TheHindusclassifythesystemsofphilosophyintotwoclasses,namely,the_nstika_andthe_stika_.The
nstika(naasti"itisnot")viewsarethosewhichneitherregardtheVedasasinfallible

68

nortrytoestablishtheirownvalidityontheirauthority.Theseareprincipallythreeinnumber,theBuddhist,
JainaandtheCrvka.Thestikamataororthodoxschoolsaresixinnumber,S@mkhya,Yoga,Vednta,
Mm@ms,NyyaandVais'e@sika,generallyknownasthesixsystems(_@sa@ddars'ana_[Footnoteref1]).

The S@mkhya is ascribed to a mythical Kpila, but the earliest works on the subject are probably now lost. The Yoga
system is attributed to Patajali and the original stras are called the _Ptajala Yoga stras_. The general metaphysical
position of these two systems with regard to soul, nature, cosmology and the final goal is almost the same, and the
difference lies in this that the Yoga system acknowledges a god (_s'vara_) as distinct from tman and lays much
importance on certain mystical practices (commonly known as Yoga practices) for the achievement of liberation,
whereas the S@mkhya denies the existence of s'vara and thinks that sincere philosophic thought and culture are
sufficient to produce the true conviction of the truth and thereby bring about liberation. It is probable that the system
of S@mkhya associated with Kpila and the Yoga system associated with Patajali are but two divergent modifications
of an original S@mkhya school, of which we now get only references here and there. These systems therefore though
generally counted as two should more properly be looked upon as two different schools of the same S@mkhya
system--one may be
CHAPTER IV 51
calledtheKpilaS@mkhyaandtheotherPtajalaS@mkhya.

ThePrvaMm@ms(fromtherootmantothinkrationalconclusions)cannotproperlybespokenofasa
systemofphilosophy.ItisasystematizedcodeofprinciplesinaccordancewithwhichtheVedictextsaretobe
interpretedforpurposesofsacrifices.

______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Theword"_dars'ana_"inthesenseoftruephilosophicknowledgehasitsearliestuseinthe
_Vais'e@sikastras_ofKa@nda(IX.ii.13)whichIconsideraspreBuddhistic.TheBuddhistpi@takas(400
B.C.)calledthehereticalopinions"_ditthi_"(Sanskritdr@stifromthesameroot_d@rs'_fromwhichdars'ana
isformed).Haribhadra(fifthcenturyA.D.)usesthewordDars'anainthesenseofsystemsofphilosophy
(_sarvadars'anavcyo'rtha@h@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_I.).Ratnakrtti(endofthetenthcenturyA.D.)uses
thewordalsointhesamesense("_Yadinmadars'anedars'anennprakramsattvatak@sanamuktamasti._"
_K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi_in_SixBuddhistNyyatracts_,p.20).Mdhava(1331A.D.)callshisCompendium
ofallsystemsofphilosophy,_Sarvadars'anasa@mgra@na_.Theword"_mata_"(opinionorview)wasalsofreely
usedinquotingtheviewsofothersystems.Butthereisnowordtodenote'philosophers'inthetechnicalsense.
TheBuddhistsusedtocallthosewhoheldhereticalviews"_tairthika._"Thewords"siddha,""_jnin_,"etc.do
notdenotephilosophers,inthemodernsense,theyareusedratherinthesenseof"seers"or"perfects."]

69

TheVedictextswereusedasmantras(incantations)forsacrifices,andpeopleoftendisputedastothe
relationofwordsinasentenceortheirmutualrelativeimportancewithreferencetothegeneraldriftofthe
sentence.Therewerealsodifferencesofviewwithregardtothemeaningofasentence,theusetowhichit
maybeappliedasamantra,itsrelativeimportanceortheexactnatureofitsconnectionwithothersimilar
sentencesinacomplexVediccontext.TheMm@msformulatedsomeprinciplesaccordingtowhichone
couldarriveatrationalanduniformsolutionsforallthesedifficulties.Preliminarytotheseitsmainobjects,
itindulgesinspeculationswithregardtotheexternalworld,soul,perception,inference,thevalidityofthe
Vedas,orthelike,forinorderthatamanmightperformsacrificeswithmantras,adefiniteorderofthe
universeanditsrelationtomanorthepositionandnatureofthemantrasoftheVedamustbedemonstrated
andestablished.Thoughitsinterestinsuchabstractspeculationsisbutsecondaryyetitbrieflydiscusses
theseinordertopreparearationalgroundforitsdoctrineofthemantrasandtheirpracticalutilityforman.
ItisonlysofarastherearethesepreliminarydiscussionsintheMm@msthatitmaybecalledasystemof
philosophy.Itsprinciplesandmaximsfortheinterpretationoftheimportofwordsandsentenceshavea
legalvalueeventothisday.ThestrasofMm@msareattributedtoJaimini,andS'abarawrotea
bh@syauponit.ThetwogreatnamesinthehistoryofMm@msliteratureafterJaiminiandS'abaraare
KumrilaBha@t@taandhispupilPrabhkara,whocriticizedtheopinionsofhismastersomuch,thatthe
masterusedtocallhimguru(master)insarcasm,andtothisdayhisopinionspassas_gurumata_,whereas
theviewsofKumrilaBha@t@tapassas_bha@t@tamata_[Footnoteref1].Itmaynotbeoutofplaceto
mentionherethatHinduLaw(_sm@rti_)acceptswithoutanyreservationthemaximsandprinciplessettled
andformulatedbytheMm@ms.

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ThereisastorythatKumrilacouldnotunderstandthemeaningofaSanskritsentence"_Atra
tunoktamtatrpinoktamitipaunaraktam_"(hencespokentwice).Tunoktamphoneticallyadmitsoftwo
combinations,tunoktam(butnotsaid)and_tunuktam_(saidbytheparticle_tu_)and_tatrpinoktam_astatra
apinauktam(notsaidalsothere)and_tatraapinuktam_(saidtherebytheparticle_api_).Underthefirst
interpretation the sentence would mean, "Not spoken here, not spoken there, it is thus spoken twice." This puzzled
Kumrila, when Prabhkara taking the second meaning pointed out to him that the meaning was "here
CHAPTER IV 52
itisindicatedbytuandthereby_api,_andsoitisindicatedtwice."Kumrilawassopleasedthathecalledhis
pupil"Guru"(master)atthis.]

70

The_Vedntastras_,alsocalledUttaraMm@ms,writtenbyBdarya@na,otherwiseknownasthe
_Brahmastras_,formtheoriginalauthoritativeworkofVednta.ThewordVedntameans"endoftheVeda,"
i.e.theUpani@sads,andthe_Vedntastras_aresocalledastheyarebutasummarizedstatementofthe
generalviewsoftheUpani@sads.Thisworkisdividedintofourbooksoradhyyasandeachadhyyaisdivided
intofourpdasorchapters.Thefirstfourstrasoftheworkcommonlyknownas_Catu@hstr_are
(1)HowtoaskaboutBrahman,(2)Fromwhomproceedbirthanddecay,(3)Thisisbecausefromhimthe
Vedashavecomeforth,(4)ThisisshownbytheharmonioustestimonyoftheUpani@sads.Thewholeofthe
firstchapterofthesecondbookisdevotedtojustifyingthepositionoftheVedntaagainsttheattacksofthe
rivalschools.Thesecondchapterofthesecondbookisbusyindealingblowsatrivalsystems.Alltheother
partsofthebookaredevotedtosettlingthedisputedinterpretationsofanumberofindividualUpani@sad
texts.Thereallyphilosophicalportionoftheworkisthuslimitedtothefirstfourstrasandthefirstand
secondchaptersofthesecondbook.TheotherportionsarelikecommentariestotheUpani@sads,which
howevercontainmanytheologicalviewsofthesystem.Thefirstcommentaryofthe_Brahmastra_was
probablywrittenbyBaudhyana,whichhoweverisnotavailablenow.Theearliestcommentarythatisnow
foundisthatofthegreatS'a@nkara.Hisinterpretationsofthe_Brahmastras_togetherwithallthe
commentariesandotherworksthatfollowhisviewsarepopularlyknownasVedntaphilosophy,though
thisphilosophyoughtmoreproperlytobecalledVis'uddhdvaitavdaschoolofVedntaphilosophy(i.e.the
Vedntaphilosophyoftheschoolofabsolutemonism).Variantformsofdualisticphilosophyasrepresented
bytheVai@s@navas,S'aivas,Rmyatas,etc.,alsoclaimtoexpresstheoriginalpurportoftheBrahma
stras.WethusfindthatapostlesofdualisticcreedssuchasRmnuja,Vallabha,Madhva,S'rka@n@tha,
Baladeva,etc.,havewrittenindependentcommentariesonthe_Brahmastra_toshowthatthephilosophy
aselaboratedbythemselvesistheviewoftheUpani@sadsandassummarizedinthe_Brahmastras_.
ThesedifferedlargelyandoftenvehementlyattackedS'a@nkara'sinterpretationsofthesamestras.These
systemsasexpoundedbythemalsopassbythenameofVedntaasthesearealsoclaimedtobethereal
interpretationsintendedbytheVednta(Upani@sads)

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andthe_Vedntastras_.OfthesethesystemofRmnujahasgreatphilosophicalimportance.

The_Nyyastras_attributedtoGautama,calledalsoAk@sapda,andthe_Vais'e@sikastras_attributedto
Ka@nda,calledalsoUlka,representthesamesystemforallpracticalpurposes.Theyareinlatertimes
consideredtodifferonlyinafewpointsofminorimportance.Sofarasthestrasareconcernedthe_Nyya
stras_layparticularstressonthecultivationoflogicasanart,whilethe_Vais'e@sikastras_dealmostlywith
metaphysicsandphysics.Inadditiontothesesixsystems,theTantrashadalsophilosophiesoftheirown,which
howevermaygenerallybelookeduponlargelyasmodificationsoftheS@mkhyaandVedntasystems,though
theirowncontributionsarealsonoteworthy.

SomefundamentalPointsofAgreement.

I._TheKarmaTheory._

It is, however, remarkable that with the exception of the Crvka materialists all the other systems agree on some
fundamental points of importance. The systems of philosophy in India were not stirred up merely by the speculative
demands of the human mind which has a natural inclination for indulging in abstract thought, but by a deep craving
after the realization of the religious purpose of life. It is surprising to note that the postulates, aims and conditions for
such a realization were found to be identical in all the conflicting systems.
CHAPTER IV 53
Whatevermaybetheirdifferencesofopinioninothermatters,sofarasthegeneralpostulatesforthe
realizationofthetranscendentstate,the summumbonum oflife,wereconcerned,allthesystemswere
practicallyinthoroughagreement.Itmaybeworthwhiletonotesomeofthematthisstage.

First,thetheoryofKarmaandrebirth.AlltheIndiansystemsagreeinbelievingthatwhateveractionisdoneby
anindividualleavesbehinditsomesortofpotencywhichhasthepowertoordainforhimjoyorsorrowinthe
futureaccordingasitisgoodorbad.Whenthefruitsoftheactionsaresuchthattheycannotbeenjoyedinthe
presentlifeorinahumanlife,theindividualhastotakeanotherbirthasamanoranyotherbeinginorderto
sufferthem.

TheVedicbeliefthatthemantrasutteredinthecorrectaccentatthesacrificeswiththeproperobservanceof
allritualistic

72

details,exactlyaccordingtothedirectionswithouttheslightesterroreveninthesmallesttrifle,hadsomething
likeamagicalvirtueautomaticallytoproducethedesiredobjectimmediatelyorafteralapseoftime,was
probablytheearliestformoftheKarmadoctrine.Itpostulatesasemiconsciousbeliefthatcertainmystical
actionscanproduceatadistanttimecertaineffectswithouttheordinaryprocessoftheinstrumentalityofvisible
agentsofordinarycauseandeffect.Whenthesacrificeisperformed,theactionleavessuchanunseenmagical
virtue,calledthe_ad@r@s@ta_(theunseen)orthe_aprva_(new),thatbyitthedesiredobjectwillbeachieved
inamysteriousmanner,forthemodusoperandiofthe_aprva_isunknown.Thereisalsothenotionprevalentin
theSa@mhits,aswehavealreadynoticed,thathewhocommitswickeddeedssuffersinanotherworld,whereas
hewhoperformsgooddeedsenjoysthehighestmaterialpleasures.Thesewereprobablyassociatedwiththe
conceptionof_@rta_,theinviolableorderofthings.Thustheseareprobablytheelementswhichbuiltupthe
KarmatheorywhichwefindprettywellestablishedbutnotemphasizedintheUpani@sads,whereitissaidthat
accordingtogoodorbadactionsmenwillhavegoodorbadbirths.

TonoticeotherrelevantpointsinconnectionwiththeKarmadoctrineasestablishedinthestikasystemswe
findthatitwasbelievedthattheunseen(_ad@r@s@ta_)potencyoftheactiongenerallyrequiredsometime
beforeitcouldbefitforgivingthedoerthemeritedpunishmentorenjoyment.Thesewouldoftenaccumulate
andpreparetheitemsofsufferingandenjoymentforthedoerinhisnextlife.Onlythefruitsofthoseactions
whichareextremelywickedorparticularlygoodcouldbereapedinthislife.Thenatureofthenextbirthofa
manisdeterminedbythenatureofpleasurableorpainfulexperiencesthathavebeenmadereadyforhimbyhis
maturingactionsofthislife.Iftheexperiencesdeterminedforhimbyhisactionaresuchthattheyarepossibleto
berealizedinthelifeofagoat,themanwilldieandbebornasagoat.Asthereisnoultimatebeginningintime
ofthisworldprocess,sothereisnotimeatwhichanypersonfirstbeganhisactionsorexperiences.Manhashad
aninfinitenumberofpastlivesofthemostvariednature,andtheinstinctsofeachkindoflifeexistdormantin
thelifeofeveryindividual,andthuswheneverhehasanyparticularbirthasthisorthatanimalorman,

73

the special instincts of that life (technically called _vsan_) come forth. In accordance with these vsans the person
passes through the painful or pleasurable experiences as determined for him by his action. The length of life is also
determined by the number and duration of experiences as preordained by the fructifying actions of his past life. When
once certain actions become fit for giving certain experiences, these cannot be avoided, but those actions which have
not matured are uprooted once for all if the person attains true knowledge as advocated by philosophy. But even such
an emancipated (_mukta_) person has to pass through the pleasurable or painful experiences ordained for him by the
actions just ripened for giving their fruits. There are four kinds of actions, white or virtuous (_s'ukla_), black or wicked
(_k@r@s@na_), white-black or partly virtuous and partly vicious (_s'ukla-k@r@s@na_) as most of our actions are,
neither black nor white
CHAPTER IV 54
(_as'uklk@r@s@na_),i.e.thoseactsofselfrenunciationormeditationwhicharenotassociatedwithany
desiresforthefruit.Itisonlywhenapersoncansorestrainhimselfastoperformonlythelastkindofaction
thatheceasestoaccumulateanynewkarmaforgivingfreshfruits.Hehasthusonlytoenjoythefruitsofhis
previouskarmaswhichhaveripenedforgivingfruits.Ifinthemeantimeheattainstrueknowledge,allhispast
accumulatedactionsbecomedestroyed,andashisactsareonlyoftheas'uklk@r@s@natypenofreshkarma
forripeningisaccumulated,andthushebecomesdivestedofallkarmaafterenjoyingthefruitsoftheripened
karmasalone.

TheJainsthinkthatthroughtheactionsofbody,speechandmindakindofsubtlemattertechnicallycalled
karmaisproduced.Thepassionsofamanactlikeaviscoussubstancethatattractsthiskarmamatter,which
thuspoursintothesoulandstickstoit.Thekarmamatterthusaccumulatedroundthesoulduringtheinfinite
numberofpastlivesistechnicallycalled_krmas'arra_,whichencirclesthesoulasitpassesonfrombirthto
birth.Thiskarmamatterstickingtothesoulgraduallyripensandexhaustsitselfinordainingthesufferanceof
painsortheenjoymentofpleasuresfortheindividual.Whilesomekarmamatterisbeingexpendedinthisway,
otherkarmamattersareaccumulatingbyhisactivities,andthuskeephiminacontinuousprocessofsuffering
andenjoyment.Thekarmamatterthusaccumulatedinthesoulproducesakindofcolorationcalled_les'y_,
suchaswhite,black,etc.,whichmarksthecharacterofthesoul.The

74

ideaofthes'uklaandk@r@s@nakarmasoftheYogasystemwasprobablysuggestedbytheJainaview.But
whenamanisfreefrompassions,andactsinstrictcompliancewiththerulesofconduct,hisactionsproduce
karmawhichlastsbutforamomentandisthenannihilated.Everykarmathatthesagehaspreviouslyearned
hasitspredestinedlimitswithinwhichitmusttakeeffectandbepurgedaway.Butwhenbycontemplationand
thestrictadherencetothefivegreatvows,nonewkarmaisgenerated,andwhenallthekarmasareexhausted
theworldlyexistenceofthepersonrapidlydrawstowardsitsend.Thusinthelaststageofcontemplation,all
karmabeingannihilated,andallactivitieshavingceased,thesoulleavesthebodyandgoesuptothetopofthe
universe,wheretheliberatedsoulsstayforever.

Buddhismalsocontributessomenewtraitstothekarmatheorywhichhoweverbeingintimatelyconnected
withtheirmetaphysicswillbetreatedlateron.

2.TheDoctrineofMukti.

NotonlydotheIndiansystemsagreeastothecauseoftheinequalitiesintheshareofsufferingsandenjoyments
inthecaseofdifferentpersons,andthemannerinwhichthecycleofbirthsandrebirthshasbeenkeptgoing
frombeginninglesstime,onthebasisofthemysteriousconnectionofone'sactionswiththehappeningsofthe
world,buttheyalsoagreeinbelievingthatthisbeginninglesschainofkarmaanditsfruits,ofbirthsand
rebirths,thisrunningonfrombeginninglesstimehassomewhereitsend.Thisendwasnottobeattainedatsome
distanttimeorinsomedistantkingdom,butwastobesoughtwithinus.Karmaleadsustothisendlesscycle,
andifwecoulddivestourselvesofallsuchemotions,ideasordesiresasleadustoactionweshouldfindwithinus
theactionlessselfwhichneithersuffersnorenjoys,neitherworksnorundergoesrebirth.WhentheIndians,
weariedbytheendlessbustleandturmoilofworldlyevents,soughtforandbelievedthatsomewhereapeaceful
goalcouldbefound,theygenerallyhitupontheselfofman.Thebeliefthatthesoulcouldberealizedinsome
stageasbeingpermanentlydivestedofallaction,feelingsorideas,ledlogicallytotheconclusionthatthe
connectionofthesoulwiththeseworldlyelementswasextraneous,artificialorevenillusory.Initstruenature
thesoulisuntouchedbytheimpuritiesofourordinarylife,anditisthroughignorance

75
and passion as inherited from the cycle of karma from beginningless time that we connect it with these. The
CHAPTER IV 55
realizationofthistranscendentstateisthegoalandfinalachievementofthisendlesscycleofbirthsand
rebirthsthroughkarma.TheBuddhistsdidnotadmittheexistenceofsoul,butrecognizedthatthefinal
realizationoftheprocessofkarmaistobefoundintheultimatedissolutioncalledNirv@na,thenatureof
whichweshalldiscusslateron.

3.TheDoctrineofSoul.

AlltheIndiansystemsexceptBuddhismadmittheexistenceofapermanententityvariouslycalledatman,
puru@saorjva.Astotheexactnatureofthissoulthereareindeeddivergencesofview.ThuswhiletheNyya
callsitabsolutelyqualitylessandcharacterless,indeterminateunconsciousentity,S@mkhyadescribesitas
beingofthenatureofpureconsciousness,theVedntasaysthatitisthatfundamentalpointofunityimpliedin
pureconsciousness(_cit_),purebliss(_nanda_),andpurebeing(_sat_).Butallagreeinholdingthatitispure
andunsulliedinitsnatureandthatallimpuritiesofactionorpassiondonotformarealpartofit.Thesummum
bonumoflifeisattainedwhenallimpuritiesareremovedandthepurenatureoftheselfisthoroughlyand
permanentlyapprehendedandallotherextraneousconnectionswithitareabsolutelydissociated.

ThePessimisticAttitudetowardstheWorldandtheOptimisticFaithintheend.

Thoughthebeliefthattheworldisfullofsorrowhasnotbeenequallyprominentlyemphasizedinallsystems,yet
itmaybeconsideredasbeingsharedbyallofthem.ItfindsitsstrongestutteranceinS@mkhya,Yoga,and
Buddhism.Thisinterminablechainofpleasurableandpainfulexperienceswaslookeduponasnearingno
peacefulendbutembroilingandentanglingusinthemeshesofkarma,rebirth,andsorrow.Whatappearas
pleasuresarebutamereappearancefortheattempttokeepthemsteadyispainful,thereispainwhenwelosethe
pleasuresorwhenweareanxioustohavethem.Whenthepleasuresaresomuchassociatedwithpainstheyare
butpainsthemselves.Wearebutdupedwhenweseekpleasures,fortheyaresuretoleadustopain.Allour
experiencesareessentiallysorrowfulandultimatelysorrowbegetting.Sorrowistheultimatetruthofthisprocess
ofthe

76

world.Thatwhichtoanordinarypersonseemspleasurableappearstoawisepersonortoayoginwhohasa
clearervisionaspainful.Thegreatertheknowledgethehigheristhesensitivenesstosorrowanddissatisfaction
withworldexperiences.Theyoginislikethepupiloftheeyetowhicheventhesmallestgrainofdisturbanceis
unbearable.Thissorrowofworldlyexperiencescannotberemovedbybringinginremediesforeachsorrowasit
comes,forthemomentitisremediedanothersorrowcomesin.Itcannotalsobeavoidedbymereinactionor
suicide,forwearecontinuallybeingforcedtoactionbyournature,andsuicidewillbutleadtoanotherlifeof
sorrowandrebirth.Theonlywaytogetridofitisbytheculminationofmoralgreatnessandtrueknowledge
whichuprootsorrowonceforall.Itisourignorancethattheselfisintimatelyconnectedwiththeexperiencesof
lifeoritspleasures,thatleadsustoactionandarousespassioninusfortheenjoymentofpleasuresandother
emotionsandactivities.Throughthehighestmoralelevationamanmayattainabsolutedispassiontowards
worldexperiencesandretireinbody,mind,andspeechfromallworldlyconcerns.Whenthemindissopurified,
theselfshinesinitstruelight,anditstruenatureisrightlyconceived.Whenthisisoncedonetheselfcannever
againbeassociatedwithpassionorignorance.Itbecomesatthisstageultimatelydissociatedfromcitta which
contains within it the root of all emotions, ideas, and actions. Thus emancipated the self for ever conquers all sorrow. It
is important, however, to note in this connection that emancipation is not based on a general aversion to intercourse
with the world or on such feelings as a disappointed person may have, but on the appreciation of the state of mukti as
the supremely blessed one. The details of the pessimistic creed of each system have developed from the logical
necessity peculiar to each system. There was never the slightest tendency to shirk the duties of this life, but to rise
above them through right performance and right understanding. It is only when a man rises to the highest pinnacle of
moral glory that he is fit for aspiring to that realization of selfhood in comparison with which all worldly things or even
CHAPTER V 56
thejoysofHeavenwouldnotonlyshrinkintoinsignificance,butappearintheirtruecharacterassorrowful
andloathsome.Itiswhenhismindhasthusturnedfromallordinaryjoysthathecanstrivetowardshisidealof
salvation.Infactitseemstomethatasincerereligiouscravingaftersome

77

idealblessednessandquietofselfrealizationisindeedthefundamentalfactfromwhichnotonlyherphilosophy
butmanyofthecomplexphenomenaofthecivilizationofIndiacanbelogicallydeduced.Thesorrowaroundus
hasnofearforusifwerememberthatwearenaturallysorrowlessandblessedinourselves.Thepessimisticview
losesallterrorasitclosesinabsoluteoptimisticconfidenceinone'sownselfandtheultimatedestinyandgoalof
emancipation.

UnityinIndianSdhana(philosophical,religiousandethicalendeavours).

AsmightbeexpectedtheIndiansystemsareallagreeduponthegeneralprinciplesofethicalconductwhich
mustbefollowedfortheattainmentofsalvation.Thatallpassionsaretobecontrolled,noinjurytolifein
anyformshouldbedone,andthatalldesireforpleasuresshouldbechecked,areprincipleswhichare
almostuniversallyacknowledged.Whenamanattainsaveryhighdegreeofmoralgreatnesshehasto
strengthenandpreparehismindforfurtherpurifyingandsteadyingitfortheattainmentofhisideal;and
mostoftheIndiansystemsareunanimouswithregardtothemeanstobeemployedforthepurpose.There
areindeeddivergencesincertaindetailsortechnicalnames,butthemeanstobeadoptedforpurification
arealmosteverywhereessentiallythesameasthoseadvocatedbytheYogasystem.Itisonlyinlatertimes
thatdevotion(_bhakti_)isseentooccupyamoreprominentplacespeciallyinVai@s@navaschoolsof
thought.Thusitwasthatthoughthereweremanydifferencesamongthevarioussystems,yettheirgoalof
life,theirattitudetowardstheworldandthemeansfurtheattainmentofthegoal(_sdhana_)being
fundamentallythesame,therewasauniqueunityinthepracticalsdhanaofalmostalltheIndiansystems.
ThereligiouscravinghasbeenuniversalinIndiaandthisuniformityofsdhanahasthereforesecuredfor
Indiaaunityinallheraspirationsandstrivings.

78

CHAPTER V
BUDDHISTPHILOSOPHY

ManyscholarsareofopinionthattheS@mkhyaandtheYogarepresenttheearliestsystematicspeculationsof
India.ItisalsosuggestedthatBuddhismdrewmuchofitsinspirationfromthem.Itmaybethatthereissome
truthinsuchaview,butthesystematicS@mkhyaandYogatreatisesaswehavethemhaddecidedlybeen
writtenafterBuddhism.MoreoveritiswellknowntoeverystudentofHinduphilosophythataconflictwiththe
BuddhistshaslargelystimulatedphilosophicenquiryinmostofthesystemsofHinduthought.Aknowledgeof
Buddhismisthereforeindispensableforarightunderstandingofthedifferentsystemsintheirmutualrelation
andoppositiontoBuddhism.ItseemsdesirablethereforethatIshouldbeginwithBuddhismfirst.

TheStateofPhilosophyinIndiabeforetheBuddha.

It is indeed difficult to give a short sketch of the different philosophical speculations that were prevalent in India before
Buddhism. The doctrines of the Upani@sads are well known, and these have already been briefly described. But these
were not the only ones. Even in the Upani@sads we find references to diverse atheistical creeds [Footnote ref 1]. We
find there that the origin of the world and its processes were sometimes discussed, and some thought that "time" was
the ultimate cause of all, others that all these had sprung forth by their own
CHAPTER V 57
nature(_svabhva_),othersthateverythinghadcomeforthinaccordancewithaninexorabledestinyora
fortuitousconcourseofaccidentalhappenings,orthroughmattercombinationsingeneral.Referencestodiverse
kindsofheresiesarefoundinBuddhistliteraturealso,butnodetailedaccountsoftheseviewsareknown.Ofthe
Upani@sadtypeofmaterialiststhetwoschoolsofCrvkas(DhrttaandSus'ik@sita)arereferredtoinlater
literature,thoughthetimeinwhichtheseflourishedcannotrightlybediscovered[Footnoteref2].Butitseems

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:S'vets'vatara,I.2,_kla@hsvabhboniyatiryad@rcchbhutniyoni@hpuru@saiti
cintyam._]

[Footnote2:Lokyata(literally,thatwhichisfoundamongpeopleingeneral)seemstohavebeenthenameby
whichallcarvkadoctrinesweregenerallyknown.SeeGu@naratnaontheLokyatas.]

79

probablehoweverthattheallusiontothematerialistscontainedintheUpani@sadsreferstotheseortosimilar
schools.TheCrvkasdidnotbelieveintheauthorityoftheVedasoranyotherholyscripture.Accordingtothem
therewasnosoul.Lifeandconsciousnessweretheproductsofthecombinationofmatter,justasredcolourwas
theresultofmixingupwhitewithyelloworasthepowerofintoxicationwasgeneratedinmolasses
(_madas'akti_).Thereisnoafterlife,andnorewardofactions,asthereisneithervirtuenorvice.Lifeisonlyfor
enjoyment.Solongasitlastsitisneedlesstothinkofanythingelse,aseverythingwillendwithdeath,forwhenat
deaththebodyisburnttoashestherecannotbeanyrebirth.Theydonotbelieveinthevalidityofinference.
Nothingistrustworthybutwhatcanbedirectlyperceived,foritisimpossibletodeterminethatthedistributionof
themiddleterm(_hetu_)hasnotdependeduponsomeextraneouscondition,theabsenceofwhichmightdestroy
thevalidityofanyparticularpieceofinference.Ifinanycaseanyinferencecomestobetrue,itisonlyan
accidentalfactandthereisnocertitudeaboutit.TheywerecalledCrvkabecausetheywouldonlyeatbut
wouldnotacceptanyotherreligiousormoralresponsibility.Thewordcomesfromcarvtoeat.TheDhrtta
Crvkasheldthattherewasnothingbutthefourelementsofearth,water,airandfire,andthatthebodywas
buttheresultofatomiccombination.Therewasnoselforsoul,novirtueorvice.TheSus'ik@sitaCrvkasheld
thattherewasasoulapartfromthebodybutthatitalsowasdestroyedwiththedestructionofthebody.The
originalworkoftheCrvkaswaswritteninstrasprobablybyB@rhaspati.JayantaandGu@naratnaquote
twostrasfromit.ShortaccountsofthisschoolmaybefoundinJayanta's_Nyyamajar_,Mdhava's
_Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_andGu@naratna's_Tarkarahasyadpik_._Mahbhrata_givesanaccountofa
mancalledCrvkameetingYudhi@s@thira.

SidebysidewiththedoctrineoftheCrvkamaterialistsweareremindedofthejvakasofwhichMakkhali
Gosla,probablyarenegadediscipleoftheJainsaintMahvraandacontemporaryofBuddhaandMahvra,
wastheleader.Thiswasathoroughgoingdeterminismdenyingthefreewillofmanandhismoralresponsibility
foranysocalledgoodorevil.TheessenceofMakkhali'ssystemisthis,that"thereisnocause,eitherproximate
orremote,forthedepravityofbeingsorfortheirpurity.They

80

becomesowithoutanycause.Nothingdependseitheronone'sowneffortsorontheeffortsofothers,inshort
nothingdependsonanyhumaneffort,forthereisnosuchthingaspowerorenergy,orhumanexertion.The
varyingconditionsatanytimeareduetofate,totheirenvironmentandtheirownnature[Footnoteref1]."

Another sophistical school led by Ajita Kesakambali taught that there was no fruit or result of good or evil deeds;
there is no other world, nor was this one real; nor had parents nor any former lives any efficacy with respect to this
life. Nothing that we can do prevents any of us alike from being wholly brought to an end at death [Footnote ref 2].
CHAPTER V 58
Therewerethusatleastthreecurrentsofthought:firstlythesacrificialKarmabytheforceofthemagical
ritesofwhichanypersoncouldattainanythinghedesired;secondlytheUpani@sadteachingthatthe
Brahman,theself,istheultimaterealityandbeing,andallelsebutnameandformwhichpassawaybutdo
notabide.Thatwhichpermanentlyabideswithoutchangeistherealandtrue,andthisisself.Thirdlythe
nihilisticconceptionsthatthereisnolaw,noabidingreality,thateverythingcomesintobeingbyafortuitous
concourseofcircumstancesorbysomeunknownfate.Ineachoftheseschools,philosophyhadprobably
cometoadeadlock.ThereweretheYogapracticesprevalentinthecountryandthesewereacceptedpartly
onthestrengthoftraditionalcustomamongcertainsections,andpartlybyvirtueofthegreatspiritual,
intellectualandphysicalpowerwhichtheygavetothosewhoperformedthem.Butthesehadnorational
basisbehindthemonwhichtheycouldleanforsupport.Thesewereprobablythenjusttendingtowards
beingaffiliatedtothenebulousS@mkhyadoctrineswhichhadgrownupamongcertainsections.Itwasat
thisjuncturethatwefindBuddhaerectinganewsuperstructureofthoughtonaltogetheroriginallines
whichthenceforthopenedupanewavenueofphilosophyforallposteritytocome.IftheBeingofthe
Upani@sads,thesuperlativelymotionless,wastheonlyreal,howcoulditofferscopeforfurthernew
speculations,asithadalreadydiscardedallothermattersofinterest?Ifeverythingwasduetoareasonless
fortuitousconcourseofcircumstances,reasoncouldnotproceedfurtherinthedirectiontocreateany
philosophyoftheunreason.Themagical

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Smaaphalasutta_,_Dgha_,II.20.Hoernl'sarticleonthejvakas,E.R.E.]
[Footnote2:_Smaaphalasutta_,II.23.]

81

forceofthehocuspocusofsorceryorsacrificehadbutlittlethatwasinvitingforphilosophytoproceedon.Ifwe
thustakeintoaccountthestateofIndianphilosophicculturebeforeBuddha,weshallbebetterableto
understandthevalueoftheBuddhisticcontributiontophilosophy.

Buddha:hisLife.

Gautama the Buddha was born in or about the year 560 B.C. in the Lumbini Grove near the ancient town of Kapilavastu
in the now dense terai region of Nepal. His father was Suddhodana, a prince of the Skya clan, and his mother Queen
Mahmy. According to the legends it was foretold of him that he would enter upon the ascetic life when he should
see "A decrepit old man, a diseased man, a dead man, and a monk." His father tried his best to keep him away from
these by marrying him and surrounding him with luxuries. But on successive occasions, issuing from the palace, he was
confronted by those four things, which filled him with amazement and distress, and realizing the impermanence of all
earthly things determined to forsake his home and try if he could to discover some means to immortality to remove
the sufferings of men. He made his "Great Renunciation" when he was twenty-nine years old. He travelled on foot to
Rjag@rha (Rajgir) and thence to Uruvel, where in company with other five ascetics he entered upon a course of
extreme self-discipline, carrying his austerities to such a length that his body became utterly emaciated and he fell
down senseless and was believed to be dead. After six years of this great struggle he was convinced that the truth was
not to be won by the way of extreme asceticism, and resuming an ordinary course of life at last attained absolute and
supreme enlightenment. Thereafter the Buddha spent a life prolonged over forty-five years in travelling from place to
place and preaching the doctrine to all who would listen. At the age of over eighty years Buddha realized that the time
drew near for him to die. He then entered into Dhyana and passing through its successive stages attained nirvna
[Footnote ref 1]. The vast developments which the system of this great teacher underwent in the succeeding centuries
in India and in other countries have not been thoroughly studied, and it will probably take yet many years more before
even the materials for
CHAPTER V 59
__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Mahparinibbnasuttanta_,_Dgha_,XVI.6,8,9.]

82

suchastudycanbecollected.Butfromwhatwenowpossessitisprovedincontestablythatitisoneofthemost
wonderfulandsubtleproductionsofhumanwisdom.Itisimpossibletooverestimatethedebtthatthe
philosophy,cultureandcivilizationofIndiaowetoitinallherdevelopmentsformanysucceedingcenturies.

EarlyBuddhistLiterature.

TheBuddhistPliScripturescontainthreedifferentcollections:theSutta(relatingtothedoctrines),the
Vinaya(relatingtothedisciplineofthemonks)andtheAbhidhamma(relatinggenerallytothesame
subjectsasthesuttasbutdealingwiththeminascholasticandtechnicalmanner).ScholarsofBuddhistic
religioushistoryofmoderntimeshavefailedasyettofixanydefinitedatesforthecollectionorcomposition
ofthedifferentpartsoftheaforesaidcanonicalliteratureoftheBuddhists.Thesuttaswerehowever
composedbeforetheAbhidhammaanditisveryprobablethatalmostthewholeofthecanonicalworkswere
completedbefore241B.C.,thedateofthethirdcouncilduringthereignofKingAsoka.Thesuttasmainly
dealwiththedoctrine(Dhamma)oftheBuddhisticfaithwhereastheVinayadealsonlywiththeregulations
concerningthedisciplineofthemonks.ThesubjectoftheAbhidhammaismostlythesameasthatofthe
suttas,namely,theinterpretationoftheDhamma.Buddhaghos@ainhisintroductionto_Atthaslin_,the
commentaryonthe_Dhammasa@nga@ni_,saysthattheAbhidhammaissocalled(abhiand_dhamma_)
becauseitdescribesthesameDhammasasarerelatedinthesuttasinamoreintensified(_dhammtireka_)
andspecialized(_dhammavisesatthena_)manner.TheAbhidhammasdonotgiveanynewdoctrinesthatare
notinthesuttas,buttheydealsomewhatelaboratelywiththosethatarealreadyfoundinthesuttas.
Buddhagho@saindistinguishingthespecialfeaturesofthesuttasfromtheAbhidhammassaysthatthe
acquirementoftheformerleadsonetoattainmeditation(_samdhi_)whereasthelatterleadsonetoattain
wisdom(_pasampadam_).Theforceofthisstatementprobablyliesinthis,thatthedialoguesofthe
suttasleaveachasteningeffectonthemind,thelikeofwhichisnottobefoundintheAbhidhammas,which
busythemselvesinenumeratingtheBuddhisticdoctrinesanddefiningtheminatechnicalmanner,whichis
morefittedtoproduceareasoned

85

insightintothedoctrinesthandirectlytogenerateacravingforfollowingthepathofmeditationfortheextinction
ofsorrow.TheAbhidhammaknownasthe_Kathvatthu_differsfromtheotherAbhidhammasinthis,thatit
attemptstoreducetheviewsoftheheterodoxschoolstoabsurdity.Thediscussionsproceedintheformof
questionsandanswers,andtheanswersoftheopponentsareoftenshowntobebasedoncontradictory
assumptions.

ThesuttascontainfivegroupsofcollectionscalledtheNikyas.Theseare(1)_DghaNikya_,calledsoon
accountofthelengthofthesuttascontainedinit;(2)_MajjhimaNikya_(middlingNikya),calledsoon
accountofthemiddlingextentofthesuttascontainedinit;(3)_Sa@myuttaNikya_(Nikyasrelatingto
specialmeetings),calledsa@myuttaonaccountoftheirbeingdeliveredowingtothemeetings(_sa@myoga_)of
specialpersonswhichweretheoccasionsforthem;(4)_A@nguttaraNikya_,socalledbecauseineach
succeedingbookofthisworkthetopicsofdiscussionincreasebyone[Footnoteref1];(5)_KhuddakaNikya_
containing_Khuddakap@tha,Dhammapada,Udna,Itivuttaka,SuttaNipta,Vimnavatthu,Petavatthu,
Theragath,Thergath,Jtaka,Niddesa,Pa@tisambhidmagga,Apadna,Buddhava@msa,Carypi@taka._
The Abhidhammas are _Pa@t@thna, Dhammasa@nga@ni, Dhtukath, Puggalapaatti, Vibha@nga,
CHAPTER V 60
Yamaka_and_Kathvatthu_.Thereexistsalsoalargecommentaryliteratureondiversepartsoftheabove
worksknownasatthakath.Theworkknownas_MilindaPaha_(questionsofKingMilinda),ofuncertain
date,isofconsiderablephilosophicalvalue.

ThedoctrinesandviewsincorporatedintheaboveliteratureisgenerallynowknownasSthaviravdaor
Theravda.OntheoriginofthenameTheravda(thedoctrineoftheelders)_Dpava@msa_saysthatsincethe
Theras(elders)met(atthefirstcouncil)andcollectedthedoctrinesitwasknownastheTheraVda[Footnoteref
2].ItdoesnotappearthatBuddhismasitappearsinthisPliliteraturedevelopedmuchsincethetimeof
Buddhagho@sa(4OOA.D.),thewriterofVisuddhimagga(acompendiumoftheravdadoctrines)andthe
commentatorof_Dghanikya,Dhammasa@nga@ni_,etc.

Hinduphilosophyinlatertimesseemstohavebeeninfluencedbythelateroffshootsofthedifferentschoolsof
Buddhism,butitdoesnotappearthatPliBuddhismhadanyshareinit.I

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:SeeBuddhagho@sa's_Atthaslini_,p.25.]

[Footnote2:Oldenberg's_Dpava@msa_,p.31.]
84
havenotbeenabletodiscoveranyoldHinduwriterwhocouldbeconsideredasbeingacquaintedwithPli.

TheDoctrineofCausalConnectionofearlyBuddhism[Footnoteref1].

ThewordDhammaintheBuddhistscripturesisusedgenerallyinfoursenses:(1)Scripturaltexts,(2)quality
(_gu@na_),(3)cause(_hetu_)and(4)unsubstantialandsoulless(_nissattanijjva_[Footnoteref2]).Oftheseitis
thelastmeaningwhichisparticularlyimportant,fromthepointofviewofBuddhistphilosophy.Theearly
Buddhistphilosophydidnotacceptanyfixedentityasdeterminingallreality;theonlythingswithitwerethe
unsubstantialphenomenaandthesewerecalleddhammas.Thequestionarisesthatifthereisnosubstanceor
realityhowarewetoaccountforthephenomena?Butthephenomenaarehappeningandpassingawayandthe
mainpointofinterestwiththeBuddhawastofindout"Whatbeingwhatelseis,""Whathappeningwhatelse
happens"and"Whatnotbeingwhatelseisnot."Thephenomenaarehappeninginaseriesandweseethatthere
beingcertainphenomenatherebecomesomeothers;bythehappeningofsomeeventsothersalsoareproduced.
Thisiscalled(_pa@ticcasamuppda_)dependentorigination.Butitisdifficulttounderstandwhatistheexact
natureofthisdependence.Thequestionas_Sa@myuttaNikya_(II.5)hasitwithwhichtheBuddhastarted
beforeattainingBuddhahoodwasthis:inwhatmiserableconditionarethepeople!theyareborn,theydecay,they
die,passawayandarebornagain;andtheydonotknowthepathofescapefromthisdecay,deathandmisery.

HowtoknowtheWaytoescapefromthismiseryofdecayanddeath.Thenitoccurredtohimwhatbeingthere,
aredecayanddeath,dependingonwhatdotheycome?Ashethoughtdeeplyintotherootofthematter,it
occurredtohimthatdecayanddeathcanonlyoccurwhenthereisbirth(_jti_),sotheydepend

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: There are some differences of opinion as to whether one could take the doctrine of the twelve links of
causes as we find it in the _Sa@myutta Nikya_ as the earliest Buddhist view, as Sa@myutta does not represent the
oldest part of the suttas. But as this doctrine of the twelve causes became regarded as a fundamental Buddhist
doctrine and as it gives us a start in philosophy I have not thought it fit to enter into conjectural discussions as to
the earliest form. Dr E.J. Thomas drew my attention to this fact.]
CHAPTER V 61
[Footnote2:_Atthastin_,p.38.Therearealsoothersensesinwhichthewordisused,as_dhammadesan_
whereitmeansreligiousteaching.The_La@nkvatra_describedDharmmaas_gu@nadravyaprvak
dharmm_,i.e.Dharmmasarethosewhichareassociatedasattributesandsubstances.]

85

onbirth.Whatbeingthere,istherebirth,onwhatdoesbirthdepend?Thenitoccurredtohimthatbirthcould
onlybeiftherewerepreviousexistence(_bhava_)[Footnoteref1].Butonwhatdoesthisexistencedepend,or
whatbeingthereistherebhava.Thenitoccurredtohimthattherecouldnotbeexistenceunlesstherewere
holdingfast(_updna_)[Footnoteref2].Butonwhatdidupdnadepend?Itoccurredtohimthatitwasdesire
(_ta@nh_)onwhichupdnadepended.Therecanbeupdnaifthereisdesire(_tanh_)[Footnoteref3].But
whatbeingthere,cantherebedesire?Tothisquestionitoccurredtohimthattheremustbefeeling(_vedan_)in
orderthattheremaybedesire.Butonwhatdoesvedandepend,orratherwhatmustbethere,thattheremaybe
feeling(_vedan_)?Tothisitoccurredtohimthattheremustbeasensecontact(_phassa_)inorderthatthere
maybefeeling[Footnoteref4].Ifthereshouldbenosensecontacttherewouldbenofeeling.Butonwhatdoes
sensecontactdepend?Itoccurredtohimthatastherearesixsensecontacts,therearethesixfieldsofcontact
(_yatana_)[Footnoteref5].Butonwhatdothesixyatanasdepend?Itoccurredtohimthattheremustbethe
mindandbody(_nmarpa_)inorderthattheremaybethesixfieldsofcontact[Footnoteref6];butonwhat
doesnmarpadepend?Itoccurredtohimthatwithoutconsciousness(_vina_)therecouldbenonmarpa
[Footnoteref8].Butwhatbeingtherewouldthere

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ThiswordbhavaisinterpretedbyCandrakrttiinhis_Mdhyamkav@rtti,_p.565(LaValle
Poussin'sedition)asthedeedwhichbroughtaboutrebirth(_punarbhavajanaka@mkarmasamutthpayali
kyenavcmanasca_).]

[Footnote2:_Atthaslin_,p.385,updnantida@lhagaha@na@m.Candrakrttiinexplainingupdnasays
thatwhateverthingamandesiresheholdsfasttothematerialsnecessaryforattainingit(_yatravastuni
sat@r@s@nastasyavastuno'rjanyavi@dhapanyaupdnamupdattetatratatraprrthayate_).
_Mdhyamkav@rtti_,p.565.]

[Footnote3:Candrakrttidescribest@r@s@nas
_svadanbhinandandhyavasnasthndtmapriyarpairviyogombht,nityamaparitygobhavediti,yeyam
prrthan_thedesirethattheremaynoteverbeanyseparationfromthosepleasures,etc.,whicharedeartous.
_Ibid._565.]

[Footnote4:Wereadalsoofphassyatanaandphassakya._M.N._II.261,III.280,etc.Candrakrttisaysthat
_@sa@dbhiryatanadvrai@hk@rtyaprak@riy@hpravarttanteprajyante.tannmarpapratyaya@m
@sa@dyatanamucyate.sa@dbhyas`cyatanebhya@h@sa@tspars`aky@hpravarttante.M.V._565.]

[Footnote5:yatanameansthesixsensestogetherwiththeirobjects.yatanaliterallyis"Fieldof
operation."Sa@lyatanameanssixsensesassixfieldsofoperation.Candrakrttihas_yatanadvrai@h_.]

[Footnote6:IhavefollowedthetranslationofAunginrenderingnmarpaasmindandbody,Compendium, p.
271. This seems to me to be fairly correct. The four skandhas are called nma in each birth. These together with rpa
(matter) give us nmarpa (mind and body) which being developed render the activities through the six sense-gates
possible so that there may be knowledge. Cf. _M. V._ 564. Govindnanda, the commentator on S'a@nkara's bhsya on
the _Brahma stras_ (II. ii. 19), gives a different interpretation of Namarpa which may probably refer to the
Vijanavada view though we have no means at hand to verify it. He says--To think the momentary as the permanent is
Avidya; from there come the samskaras of attachment, antipathy or anger, and infatuation; from there the first vijana
or thought of the foetus is produced, from that alayavijnana, and
CHAPTER V 62
thefourelements(whichareobjectsofnameandarehencecallednama)areproduced,andfromthoseare
producedthewhiteandblack,semenandbloodcalledrpa.BothVacaspatiandAmalanandaagreewith
Govindanandainholdingthatnamasignifiesthesemenandtheovumwhilerpameansthevisiblephysical
bodybuiltoutofthem.Vijaaenteredthewombandonaccountofitnamarupawereproducedthroughthe
associationofpreviouskarma.SeeVedantakalpataru,pp274,275.Onthedoctrineoftheentranceofvijaainto
thewombcompareDNII.63.]

86

bevina.Hereitoccurredtohimthatinorderthattheremightbevinatheremustbetheconformations
(_sa@nkhra_)[Footnoteref1].Butwhatbeingtherearetherethesa@nkhras?Hereitoccurredtohimthat
thesa@nkhrascanonlybeifthereisignorance(_avijj_).Ifavijjcouldbestoppedthenthesa@nkhraswill
bestopped,andifthesa@nkhrascouldbestoppedvinacouldbestoppedandsoon[Footnoteref2].

ItisindeeddifficulttobedefiniteastowhattheBuddhaactuallywishedtomeanbythiscycleofdependenceof
existencesometimescalledBhavacakra(wheelofexistence).Decayanddeath(_jarmarana_)couldnothave
happenediftherewasnobirth[Footnoteref3].Thisseemstobeclear.Butatthispointthedifficultybegins.We
mustrememberthatthetheoryofrebirthwas

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Itisdifficulttosaywhatistheexactsenseofthewordhere.TheBuddhawasoneofthefirstfew
earliestthinkerstointroduceproperphilosophicaltermsandphraseologywithadistinctphilosophicalmethod
andhehadoftentousethesamewordinmoreorlessdifferentsenses.Someofthephilosophicaltermsatleast
arethereforeratherelasticwhencomparedwiththetermsofpreciseanddefinitemeaningwhichwefindinlater
Sanskritthought.ThusinSNIII.p.87,"_Sankhata@mabdisa@nkharonta_,"sa@nkharameansthatwhich
synthesisesthecomplexes.IntheCompendiumitistranslatedaswill,action.Mr.Aungthinksthatitmeansthe
sameaskarma;itishereusedinadifferentsensefromwhatwefindinthewordsa@nkhtakhandha(vizmental
states).Wegetalistof51mentalstatesformingsa@nkhtakhandhainDhammaSangam,p18,andanother
differentsetof40mentalstatesinDharmasamgraha,p.6.Inadditiontotheseforty
_cittasamprayuktasa@mskra_,italsocountsthirteen_cittaviprayuktasa@mskara_.Candrakirttiinterpretsit
asmeaningattachment,antipathyandinfatuation,p563.Govindananda,thecommentatoronS'a@nkara's
Brahmasutra(II.ii.19),alsointerpretsthewordinconnectionwiththedoctrineofPratityasamutpadaas
attachment,antipathyandinfatuation.]

[Footnote2:SamyuttaNikaya,II.78.]

[Footnote3:Jaraandmaranabringins'oka(grief),paridevan(lamentation),duhkha(suffering),
daurmanasya(feelingofwretchednessandmiserableness)andupayasa(feelingofextremedestitution)atthe
prospectofone'sdeathorthedeathofotherdearones.Allthesemakeupsufferingandaretheresultsofjti
(birth)._M.V._(B.T.S.p.208).S'a@nkarainhisbhsyacountedallthetermsfromjar,separately.Thewhole
seriesistobetakenasrepresentingtheentiretyofduhkhaskandha.]

87

enunciated in the Upani@sads. The B@rhadra@nyaka says that just as an insect going to the end of a leaf of grass by
a new effort collects itself in another so does the soul coming to the end of this life collect itself in another. This life
thus presupposes another existence. So far as I remember there has seldom been before or after Buddha any serious
attempt to prove or disprove the doctrine of rebirth [Footnote ref 1]. All schools of philosophy except the Crvkas
believed in it and so little is known to us of the Crvka stras that it is difficult to say what they did to refute this
doctrine. The Buddha also accepts it as a fact and does not criticize it. This life therefore comes only as one which had
an infinite number of lives before, and which except in the
CHAPTER V 63
caseofafewemancipatedoneswouldhaveaninfinitenumberoftheminthefuture.Itwasstronglybelieved
byallpeople,andtheBuddhaalso,whenhecametothinktowhatourpresentbirthmightbedue,hadto
fallbackuponanotherexistence(_bhava_).IfbhavameanskarmawhichbringsrebirthasCandrakrtti
takesittomean,thenitwouldmeanthatthepresentbirthcouldonlytakeplaceonaccountoftheworksofa
previousexistencewhichdeterminedit.HerealsoweareremindedoftheUpani@sadnote"asamandoesso
willhebeborn"(Yatkarmakurutetadabhisampadyate,BrhIV.iv.5).Candrakrtti'sinterpretationof
"bhava"asKarma(_punarbhavajanakamkarma_)seemstometosuitbetterthan"existence."Theword
wasprobablyusedratherlooselyforkammabhava.ThewordbhavaisnotfoundintheearlierUpani@sads
andwasusedinthePliscripturesforthefirsttimeasaphilosophicalterm.Butonwhatdoesthisbhava
depend?Therecouldnothavebeenapreviousexistenceifpeoplehadnotbetakenthemselvestothingsor
workstheydesired.Thisbetakingoneselftoactionsorthingsinaccordancewithdesireiscalledupdna.In
theUpani@sadsweread,"whateveronebetakeshimselfto,sodoeshework"(Yatkraturbhavatitatkarmma
kurute,B@rh.IV.iv.5).Asthisbetakingtothethingdependsupondesire{_t@r@s@n_},itissaidthatin
orderthattheremaybeupdnatheremustbetanh.IntheUpani@sadsalsoweread"Whateverone
desiressodoeshebetakehimselfto"(_sayathkmobhavatitatkraturbhavati_).Neitherthewordupdna
nort@rs@n(theSanskritwordcorresponding

______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:TheattemptstoprovethedoctrineofrebirthintheHinduphilosophicalworkssuchastheNyya,
etc.,areslightandinadequate.]

88

tota@nh)isfoundintheearlierUpani@sads,buttheideascontainedinthemaresimilartothewords
"_kratu_"and"_kma_."Desire(ta@nh)isthensaidtodependonfeelingorsensecontact.Sensecontact
presupposesthesixsensesasfieldsofoperation[Footnoteref1].Thesesixsensesoroperatingfieldswouldagain
presupposethewholepsychosisoftheman(thebodyandthemindtogether)callednmarpa.Wearefamiliar
withthiswordintheUpani@sadsbutthereitisusedinthesenseofdeterminateformsandnamesas
distinguishedfromtheindeterminateindefinablereality[Footnoteref2].Buddhagho@saintheVisuddhimagga
saysthatby"Name"aremeantthethreegroupsbeginningwithsensation(i.e.sensation,perceptionandthe
predisposition);by"Form"thefourelementsandformderivativefromthefourelements[Footnoteref3].He
furthersaysthatnamebyitselfcanproducephysicalchanges,suchaseating,drinking,makingmovementsorthe
like.Soformalsocannotproduceanyofthosechangesbyitself.Butlikethecrippleandtheblindtheymutually
helponeanotherandeffectuatethechanges[Footnoteref4].Butthereexistsnoheaporcollectionofmaterialfor
theproductionofNameandForm;"butjustaswhenaluteisplayedupon,thereisnopreviousstoreofsound;
andwhenthesoundcomesintoexistenceitdoesnotcomefromanysuchstore;andwhenitceases,itdoesnotgo
toanyofthecardinalorintermediatepointsofthecompass;...inexactlythesamewayalltheelementsofbeing
boththosewithformandthosewithout,comeintoexistenceafterhavingpreviouslybeennonexistentandhaving
comeintoexistencepassaway[Footnoteref5]."Nmarpatakeninthissensewillnotmeanthewholeofmind
andbody,butonlythesensefunctionsandthebodywhicharefoundtooperateinthesixdoorsofsense
(_sa@lyatana_).Ifwetakenmarpainthissense,wecanseethatitmaybesaidtodependuponthevina
(consciousness).Consciousnesshasbeencomparedinthe_MilindaPaha_withawatchmanatthemiddleof

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ThewordyatanaisfoundinmanyplacesintheearlierUpani@sadsinthesenseof"fieldor
place,"Ch.I.5,B@rh.III.9.10,but@sa@dyatanadoesnotoccur.]

[Footnote 2: Candrakrtti interprets nma as _Vedandayo' rpi@nas'catvra@h skandhstatra tatra bhave

nmayantli nma. saha rpaskandhena ca nma rpam ceti nmarpamucyate._ The four skandhas in each
CHAPTER V 64
specificbirthactasname.Thesetogetherwithrpamakenmarpa._M.V._564.]

[Footnote3:Warren'sBuddhisminTranslations,p.184.]

[Footnote4:_Ibid._p.185,Visuddhimagga,Ch.XVII.]

[Footnote5:_Ibid._pp.185186,Visuddhimagga,Ch.XVII.]

89

thecrossroadsbeholdingallthatcomefromanydirection[Footnoteref1].Buddhagho@sainthe_Atthaslin_
alsosaysthatconsciousnessmeansthatwhichthinksitsobject.Ifwearetodefineitscharacteristicswemustsay
thatitknows(_vijnana_),goesinadvance(_pubba@ngama_),connects(_sandhna_),andstandsonnmarpa
(_nmarpapada@t@thnam_).Whentheconsciousnessgetsadoor,ataplacetheobjectsofsensearediscerned
(_rammanavibhvana@t@thne_)anditgoesfirstastheprecursor.Whenavisualobjectisseenbytheeyeitis
knownonlybytheconsciousness,andwhenthedhammasaremadetheobjectsof(mind)mano,itisknownonly
bytheconsciousness[Footnoteref2].Buddhagho@saalsorefersheretothepassageinthe_MilindaPaha_we
havejustreferredto.Hefurthergoesontosaythatwhenstatesofconsciousnessriseoneafteranother,theyleave
nogapbetweenthepreviousstateandthelaterandconsciousnessthereforeappearsasconnected.Whenthere
aretheaggregatesofthefivekhandhasitislost;buttherearethefouraggregatesasnmarpa,itstandson
nmaandthereforeitissaidthatitstandsonnmarpa.Hefurtherasks,Isthisconsciousnessthesameasthe
previousconsciousnessordifferentfromit?Heanswersthatitisthesame.Justso,thesunshowsitselfwithallits
colours,etc.,butheisnotdifferentfromthoseintruth;anditissaidthatjustwhenthesunrises,itscollected
heatandyellowcolouralsorisethen,butitdoesnotmeanthatthesunisdifferentfromthese.Sothecittaor
consciousnesstakesthephenomenaofcontact,etc.,andcognizesthem.Sothoughitisthesameastheyareyetin
asenseitisdifferentfromthem[Footnoteref3].

Togobacktothechainoftwelvecauses,wefindthatjti(birth)isthecauseofdecayanddeath,
_jarmara@na_,etc.Jtiistheappearanceofthebodyorthetotalityofthefiveskandhas[Footnoteref4].
Comingtobhavawhichdeterminesjti,Icannotthinkofanybetterrationalexplanationofbhava,thanthatI
havealready

________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Warren'sBuddhisminTranslations,p.182,_MilindaPaha_(628).]

[Footnote2:_Atthaslin_,p.112...]

[Footnote3:_Ibid._p.113,_Yathhirpdniupdyapaattsuriydayonaatthatorpdhiaehontiten'
evayasminsamayesuriyoudetitasminsamayetassatejsa@nkhtamrpa@mptieva@mvuccamnepina
rpdihiaosuriyonmaatthi.Tathcittamphassdayodhammeupdyapaapiyati.Atthatopan'ettha
tehiaameva.Tenayasminsamayecittamuppanna@mhotieka@msenevatasminsamayephassdihiatthato
aadevahotti_.]

[Footnote4:"_Jtirdehajanmapacaskandhasamudya@h,_"Govindnanda's_Ratnaprabh_onS'a@nkara's
bh@sya,II.ii.19.]

90

suggested, namely, the works (_karma_) which produce the birth [Footnote ref 1]. Updna is an advanced t@r@s@n
leading to positive clinging [Footnote ref 2]. It is produced by t@r@s@n (desire) which again is
CHAPTER V 65
theresultofvedan(pleasureandpain).Butthisvedanisofcoursevedanwithignorance(_avidy_),for
anArhatmayhavealsovedanbutashehasnoavidy,thevedancannotproducet@r@s@ninturn.On
itsdevelopmentitimmediatelypassesintoupdna.Vedanmeanspleasurable,painfulorindifferent
feeling.Ontheonesideitleadstot@r@s@n(desire)andontheotheritisproducedbysensecontact
(_spars'a_).Prof.DelaVallePoussinsaysthatS'rlbhadistinguishesthreeprocessesintheproductionof
vedan.Thusfirstthereisthecontactbetweenthesenseandtheobject;thenthereistheknowledgeofthe
object,andthenthereisthevedan.Dependingon_MajjhimaNikya_,iii.242,Poussingivestheother
opinionthatjustasinthecaseoftwosticksheattakesplacesimultaneouslywithrubbing,soherealso
vedantakesplacesimultaneouslywithspars'afortheyare"produitsparunmmecomplexedecauses
(_smagr_)[Footnoteref3]."

Spars'aisproducedby@sa@dyatana,@sa@dyatanabynmarpa,andnmarpabyvijna,andissaidto
descendinthewombofthemotherandproducethefiveskandhasasnmarpa,outofwhichthesixsensesare
specialized.

Vijnainthisconnectionprobablymeanstheprincipleorgermofconsciousnessinthewombofthemother
upholdingthefiveelementsofthenewbodythere.Itistheproductofthepastkarmas(_sa@nkhra_)ofthe
dyingmanandofhispastconsciousnesstoo.

WesometimesfindthattheBuddhistsbelievedthatthelastthoughtsofthedyingmandeterminedthenatureof
hisnext

_______________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Govindanandainhis_Ratnaprabh_onS'a@nkara'sbh@sya,II.ii.19,explains"bhava"asthat
fromwhichanythingbecomes,asmeritanddemerit(_dharmdi_).SeealsoVibhanga,p.137andWarren's
BuddhisminTranslations,p.201.MrAungsaysin_Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_,p.189,thatbhavoincludes
kammabhavo(theactivesideofanexistence)andupapattibhavo(thepassiveside).Andthecommentatorssay
thatbhavaisacontractionof"_kammabhava_"orKarmabecomingi.e.karmicactivity.]

[Footnote2:Prof.DelaVallePoussininhis_ThoricdesDouzeCauses_,p.26,saysthat_S'listambhastra_
explainstheword"updna"as"t@r@s@nvaipulya"orhypert@r@s@nandCandrakrttialsogivesthe
samemeaning,_M.V._(B.T.S.p.210).Govmdnandaexplains"updna"asprav@rtti(movement)generatedby
t@r@s@n(desire),i.e.theactivetendencyinpursuanceofdesire.Butifupdnameans"support"itwould
denoteallthefiveskandhas.Thus_Madhyamakav@rtti_says_updnam
pacaskandhalak@sa@nam...pacopdnaskandhkhyamupdnam.M.V._XXVII.6.]

[Footnote3:Poussin's_ThoriedesDouzeCauses_,p.23.
91

birth [Footnote ref 1]. The manner in which the vijna produced in the womb is determined by the past vijna of the
previous existence is according to some authorities of the nature of a reflected image, like the transmission of learning
from the teacher to the disciple, like the lighting of a lamp from another lamp or like the impress of a stamp on wax. As
all the skandhas are changing in life, so death also is but a similar change; there is no great break, but the same
uniform sort of destruction and coming into being. New skandhas are produced as simultaneously as the two scale
pans of a balance rise up and fall, in the same manner as a lamp is lighted or an image is reflected. At the death of the
man the vijna resulting from his previous karmas and vijnas enters into the womb of that mother (animal, man or
the gods) in which the next skandhas are to be matured. This vijna thus forms the principle of the new life. It is in
this vijna that name (_nma_) and form (_rpa_) become associated.
CHAPTER V 66
Thevijnaisindeedadirectproductofthesa@mskrasandthesortofbirthinwhichvijnashouldbring
down(_nmayati_)thenewexistence(_upapatti_)isdeterminedbythesa@mskras[Footnoteref2],forin
realitythehappeningofdeath(_mara@nabhava_)andtheinstillationofthevijnaasthebeginningofthenew
life(_upapattibhava_)cannotbesimultaneous,butthelattersucceedsjustatthenextmoment,anditistosignify
thisclosesuccessionthattheyaresaidtobesimultaneous.Ifthevijnahadnotenteredthewombthenno
nmarpacouldhaveappeared[Footnoteref3].

Thischainoftwelvecausesextendsoverthreelives.Thusavidyandsa@mskraofthepastlifeproducethe
vijna,nmarupa,

_____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Thedeitiesofthegardens,thewoods,thetreesandtheplants,findingthemasterofthehouse,
Citta,illsaid"makeyourresolution,'MayIbeacakravarttkinginanextexistence,'"_Sa@myutta_,IV.
303.]

[Footnote2:"_sacednandavijna@mmtu@hkuk@simnvakrmeta,natatkalalamkalalatvya
sannivartteta_,"_M.V._552.Compare_Caraka,S'rra_,III.58,wherehespeaksofa"upapdukasattva"
whichconnectsthesoulwithbodyandbytheabsenceofwhichthecharacterischanged,thesensesbecome
affectedandlifeceases,whenitisinapureconditiononecanremembereventhepreviousbirths;character,
purity,antipathy,memory,fear,energy,allmentalqualitiesareproducedoutofit.Justasachariotismadeby
thecombinationofmanyelements,soisthefoetus.]

[Footnote3:_Madhyamakav@riti_(B.T.S.202203).Poussinquotesfrom_Dgha_,II.63,"silevijnane
descendaitpasdansleseinmaternellanamarupas'yconstitueraitil?"GovindnandaonS'a@nkara's
commentaryonthe_Brahmastras_(II.ii.19)saysthatthefirstconsciousness(vijna)ofthefoetusis
producedbythesa@mskrasofthepreviousbirth,andfromthatthefourelements(whichhecallsnma)and
fromthatthewhiteandred,semenandovum,andthefirststageofthefoetus(_kalalabudbudvasth_}is
produced.]

92

@sa@dyatana,spars'a,vedan,t@r@s@n,updnaandthebhava(leadingtoanotherlife)ofthepresent
actuallife.Thisbhavaproducesthejtiandjarmara@naofthenextlife[Footnoterefl].

Itisinterestingtonotethatthesetwelvelinksinthechainextendinginthreesectionsoverthreelivesareallbut
themanifestationsofsorrowtothebringinginofwhichtheynaturallydetermineoneanother.Thus
_Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_says"eachofthesetwelvetermsisafactor.Forthecompositeterm'sorrow,'etc.
isonlymeanttoshowincidentalconsequencesofbirth.Againwhen'ignorance'and'theactionsofthemind'
havebeentakenintoaccount,craving(_t@r@s@n_),grasping(_updna_)and(_karma_)becoming
(_bhava_)areimplicitlyaccountedforalso.Inthesamemannerwhencraving,graspingand(_karma_)
becominghavebeentakenintoaccount,ignoranceandtheactionsofthemindare(implicitly)accountedfor,
also;andwhenbirth,decay,anddeatharetakenintoaccount,eventhefivefoldfruit,towit(rebirth),
consciousness,andtherestareaccountedfor.Andthus:

FivecausesinthePastandNowafivefold'fruit.'

Five causes Now and yet to come a fivefold 'fruit' make up the Twenty Modes, the Three Connections (1. sa@nkhra
and vina, 2. vedan and tanh, 3. bhava and jti) and the four groups (one causal group in the Past, one resultant
group in the Present, one causal group in the Present and one resultant group in the Future, each group consisting of
five modes) [Footnote ref 2]."
CHAPTER V 67
Thesetwelveinterdependentlinks(_dvdas'@nga_)representthepa@ticcasamuppda
(_prattyasamutpda_)doctrines(dependentorigination)[Footnoteref3]whicharethemselvesbutsorrow
andleadtocyclesofsorrow.Thetermpa@ticcasamuppdaorprattyasamutpdahasbeendifferently
interpretedinlaterBuddhistliterature[Footnoteref4].

___________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ThisexplanationprobablycannotbefoundintheearlyPlitexts;butBuddhagho@samentionsitin
_Suma@ngalavilsin_on_Mahnidnasuttanta_.Wefinditalsoin_Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_,VIII.3.
Ignoranceandtheactionsofthemindbelongtothepast;"birth,""decayanddeath"tothefuture;the
intermediateeighttothepresent.Itisstyledastri@k@n@daka(havingthreebranches)in_Abhidkarmakos'a_,
III.2024.Twointhepastbranch,twointhefutureandeightinthemiddle"_saprattyasamutpdo
dvdas'@ngastrik@n@daka@hprvparntayordvedvemadhye@s@tau_."]

[Footnote2:AungandMrsRhysDavids'translationof_Abhidhammatthasa@ngaha_,pp.189190.]

[Footnote3:Thetwelvelinksarenotalwaysconstant.ThusinthelistgivenintheDialoguesoftheBuddha,II.
23f.,avijjandsa@nkhrahavebeenomittedandthestarthasbeenmadewithconsciousness,andithasbeen
saidthat"Cognitionturnsbackfromnameandform;itgoesnotbeyond."]

[Footnote4:_M.V._p.5f.]
93

Samutpdameansappearanceorarising(_prdurbhdva_)andprattyameansaftergetting(_prati+i+ya_);
combiningthetwowefind,arisingaftergetting(something).Theelements,dependingonwhichthereissome
kindofarising,arecalledhetu(cause)andpaccaya(ground).Thesetwowordshoweverareoftenusedinthe
samesenseandareinterchangeable.Butpaccayaisalsousedinaspecificsense.Thuswhenitissaidthatavijjis
thepaccayaofsa@nkhraitismeantthatavijjistheground(_@thiti_)oftheoriginofthesa@nkhras,isthe
groundoftheirmovement,oftheinstrumentthroughwhichtheystand(_nimitta@t@thiti_),oftheirayuhana
(conglomeration),oftheirinterconnection,oftheirintelligibility,oftheirconjointarising,oftheirfunctionas
causeandoftheirfunctionasthegroundwithreferencetothosewhicharedeterminedbythem.Avijjinall
theseninewaysisthegroundofsa@nkhrabothinthepastandalsointhefuture,thoughavijjitselfis
determinedinitsturnbyothergrounds[Footnoteref1].Whenwetakethebetuaspectofthecausalchain,we
cannotthinkofanythingelsebutsuccession,butwhenwetakethepaccayaaspectwecanhaveabettervisioninto
thenatureofthecauseasground.Thuswhenavijjissaidtobethegroundofthesa@nkhrasinthenineways
mentionedabove,itseemsreasonabletothinkthatthesa@nkhraswereinsomesenseregardedasspecial
manifestationsofavijj[Footnoteref2].ButasthispointwasnotfurtherdevelopedintheearlyBuddhisttextsit
wouldbeunwisetoproceedfurtherwithit.

TheKhandhas.

Thewordkhandha(Skr.skandha)meansthetrunkofatreeandisgenerallyusedtomeangrouporaggregate
[Footnoteref3].WehaveseenthatBuddhasaidthattherewasnotman(soul).Hesaidthatwhenpeopleheld
thattheyfoundthemuchspokenofsoul,theyreallyonlyfoundthefivekhandhastogetheroranyoneofthem.
Thekhandhasareaggregatesofbodilyandpsychicalstateswhichareimmediatewithusandaredividedintofive

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Pa@tisambhidmagga_, vol. I.p. 50; see also _Majjhima Nikya_, I. 67,
_sa@nkhra...avijjnidn avijjsamuday avijjjtik avijjpabhav_.]
CHAPTER V 68
[Footnote2:IntheYogaderivationofasmit(egoism),rga(attachment),dve@sa(antipathy)andabhinives'a
(selflove)fromavidywefindalsothatallthefiveareregardedasthefivespecialstagesofthegrowthofavidy
(_pacaparvavidy_).]

[Footnote3:ThewordskandhaisusedinChndogya,II.23(_trayodharmaskandh@hyaja@h
adhyayanamdnam_)inthesenseofbranchesandinalmostthesamesenseinMaitr,VII.II.]

94

classes:(1)rpa(fourelements,thebody,thesenses),sensedata,etc.,(2)vedan(feelingpleasurable,painful
andindifferent),(3)sa(conceptualknowledge),(4)sa@nkhra(syntheticmentalstatesandthesynthetic
functioningofcompoundsenseaffections,compoundfeelingsandcompoundconcepts),(5)vina
(consciousness)[Footnoteref1].

Allthesestatesrisedependingoneupontheother(_pa@ticcasamuppanna_)andwhenamansaysthathe
perceivestheselfheonlydeludeshimself,forheonlyperceivesoneormoreofthese.Thewordrpain
rpakhandhastandsformatterandmaterialqualities,thesenses,andthesensedata[Footnoteref2].But
"rpa"isalsousedinthesenseofpureorganicaffectionsorstatesofmindaswefindintheKhandhaYamaka,
I.p.16,andalsoin_Sa@myuttaNikya_,III.86.Rpaskandhaaccordingto_Dharmasa@mgraha_meansthe
aggregateoffivesenses,thefivesensations,andtheimplicatorycommunicationsassociatedinsenseperceptions
_vijapti_).

Theelaboratediscussionof_Dhammasa@nga@ni_beginsbydefiningrpaas"_cattrocamahbht
catunnacamahbhntanamupdyarpam_"(thefourmahbhtasorelementsandthatproceedingfromthe
graspingofthatiscalledrpa)[Footnoteref3].Buddhagho@saexplainsitbysayingthatrpameansthefour
mahbhtasandthosewhicharisedepending(_nissya_)onthemasamodificationofthem.Intherpathesix
sensesincludingtheiraffectionsarealsoincluded.Inexplainingwhythefourelementsarecalledmahbhtas,
Buddhagho@sasays:"Justasamagician(_mykra_)makesthewaterwhichisnothardappearashard,
makesthestonewhichisnotgoldappearasgold;justashehimselfthoughnotaghostnorabirdmakeshimself
appearasaghostorabird,sotheseelementsthoughnotthemselvesbluemakethemselvesappearasblue(_nlam
updrpam_),notyellow,red,orwhitemakethemselvesappearasyellow,redorwhite(odtamupdrpam),
soonaccountoftheirsimilaritytotheappearancescreatedbythemagiciantheyarecalledmahbhta[Footnote
ref4]."

Inthe_Sa@myuttaNikya_wefindthattheBuddhasays,"OBhikkhusitiscalledrpambecauseit
manifests(_rpyati_);how

___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:_Sa@myuttaNikya_,III.86,etc.]

[Footnote2:Abhidhammatthasangaha,J.P.T.S.1884,p.27ff.]

[Footnote3:_Dhammasa@nga@ni_,pp.124179.]
[Footnote4:_Atthaslin_,p.299.]
95

does it manifest? It manifests as cold, and as heat, as hunger and as thirst, it manifests as the touch of gnats,
mosquitos, wind, the sun and the snake; it manifests, therefore it is called rpa [Footnote ref 1]."
CHAPTER V 69
Ifwetakethesomewhatconflictingpassagesreferredtoaboveforourconsiderationandtrytocombine
themsoastounderstandwhatismeantbyrpa,Ithinkwefindthatthatwhichmanifesteditselftothe
sensesandorganswascalledrpa.Nodistinctionseemstohavebeenmadebetweenthesensedataas
colours,smells,etc.,asexistinginthephysicalworldandtheirappearanceassensations.Theywereonly
numericallydifferentandtheappearanceofthesensationswasdependentuponthesensedataandthe
sensesbutthesensedataandthesensationswere"rpa."Undercertainconditionsthesensedatawere
followedbythesensations.Buddhismdidnotprobablystartwiththesamekindofdivisionofmatterand
mindaswenowdo.Anditmaynotbeoutofplacetomentionthatsuchanoppositionanddualitywere
foundneitherintheUpani@sadsnorintheS@mkhyasystemwhichisregardedbysomeaspre
Buddhistic.Thefourelementsmanifestedthemselvesincertainformsandwerethereforecalledrpa;the
formsofaffectionthatappearedwerealsocalledrpa;manyothermentalstatesorfeatureswhich
appearedwiththemwerealsocalledrpa[Footnoteref2].Theyatanasorthesenseswerealsocalledrpa
[Footnoteref3].Themahbhtasorfourelementswerethemselvesbutchangingmanifestations,andthey
togetherwithallthatappearedinassociationwiththemwerecalledrpaandformedtherpakhandha
(theclassesofsensematerials,sensedata,sensesandsensations).

In_Sa@myuttaNikya_(III.101)itissaidthat"thefourmahbhtaswerethehetuandthepaccayaforthe
communicationoftherpakkhandha(_rpakkhandhassapapanya_).Contact(sensecontact,phassa)isthe
causeofthecommunicationoffeelings(_vedan_);sensecontactwasalsothehetuandpaccayaforthe
communicationofthesakkhandha;sensecontactisalsothehetuandpaccayaforthecommunicationofthe
sa@nkhrakkhandha.Butnmarpaisthehetuandthepaccayaforthecommunicationofthe
vinakkhandha."Thusnotonlyfeelingsariseonaccountofthesensecontactbutsaandsa@nkhraalso
arisetherefrom.Saisthatwherespecificknowingor

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Sa@myuttaNikya_,III.86.]

[Footnote2:Khandhayamaka.]
[Footnote3:_Dhammasanga@ni_,p.124ff.]

96

conceivingtakesplace.Thisisthestagewherethespecificdistinctiveknowledgeastheyelloworthered
takesplace.

Mrs.RhysDavidswritingonsasays:"IneditingthesecondbookoftheAbhidhammapi@takaIfounda
classificationdistinguishingbetweensaascognitiveassimilationonoccasionofsense,andsaascognitive
assimilationofideasbywayofnaming.Theformeriscalledperceptionofresistance,oropposition(_patigha
sa_).This,writesBuddhagho@sa,isperceptiononoccasionofsight,hearing,etc.,whenconsciousnessis
awareoftheimpactofimpressions;ofexternalthingsasdifferent,wemightsay.Thelatteriscalledperceptionof
theequivalentwordorname(_adhivachnsa_)andisexercisedbythesensuscommunis(mano),whene.g.
'oneisseated...andasksanotherwhoisthoughtful:"Whatareyouthinkingof?"oneperceivesthroughhis
speech.'Thustherearetwostagesofsaconsciousness,1.contemplatingsenseimpressions,2.abilitytoknow
whattheyarebynaming[Footnoteref1]."

About sa@nkhra we read in _Sa@myutta Nikya_ (III. 87) that it is called sa@nkhra because it synthesises
(_abhisa@nkharonti_), it is that which conglomerated rpa as rpa, conglomerated sa as sa, sa@nkhra as
sa@nkhra and consciousness (_vina_) as consciousness. It is called sa@nkhra because it synthesises the
conglomerated (_sa@nkhatam abhisa@nkharonti_). It is thus a synthetic function which synthesises the passive rpa,
sa, sa@nkhra and vina elements. The fact that we hear of 52 sa@nkhra
CHAPTER V 70
statesandalsothatthesa@nkhraexercisesitssyntheticactivityontheconglomeratedelementsinit,goesto
showthatprobablythewordsa@nkhraisusedintwosenses,asmentalstatesandassyntheticactivity.

VinaorconsciousnessmeantaccordingtoBuddhagho@sa,aswehavealreadyseenintheprevious
section,boththestageatwhichtheintellectualprocessstartedandalsothefinalresultingconsciousness.

Buddhagho@sainexplainingtheprocessofBuddhistpsychologysaysthat"consciousness(_citta_)firstcomesinto
touch(_phassa_)withitsobject(_ramma@na_)andthereafterfeeling,conception(_sa_)andvolition
(_cetan_)comein.Thiscontactislikethepillarsofapalace,andtherestarebutthesuperstructurebuiltuponit
(_dabbasambhrasadis_).Butitshouldnotbethoughtthatcontact

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:BuddhistPsychology,pp.49,50.]

97

isthebeginningofthepsychologicalprocesses,forinonewholeconsciousness(_ekacittasmi@m_)itcannot
besaidthatthiscomesfirstandthatcomesafter,sowecantakecontactinassociationwithfeeling
(_vedan_),conceiving(_sa_)orvolition(_cetan_);itisitselfanimmaterialstatebutyetsinceit
comprehendsobjectsitiscalledcontact.""Thereisnoimpingingononesideoftheobject(asinphysical
contact),neverthelesscontactcausesconsciousnessandobjecttobeincollision,asvisibleobjectandvisual
organs,soundandhearing;thusimpactisits_function_;orithasimpactasitsessentialpropertyinthesense
ofattainment,owingtotheimpactofthephysicalbasiswiththementalobject.Foritissaidinthe
Commentary:"contactinthefourplanesofexistenceisneverwithoutthecharacteristicoftouchwiththe
object;butthefunctionofimpacttakesplaceinthefivedoors.Fortosense,orfivedoorcontact,isgiventhe
name'havingthecharacteristicoftouch'aswellas'havingthefunctionofimpact.'Buttocontactinthe
minddoorthereisonlythecharacteristicoftouch,butnotthefunctionofimpact.AndthenthisSuttais
quoted'Asif,sire,tworamsweretofight,oneramtorepresenttheeye,thesecondthevisibleobject,and
theircollisioncontact.Andasif,sire,twocymbalsweretostrikeagainsteachother,ortwohandswereto
clapagainsteachother;onehandwouldrepresenttheeye,thesecondthevisibleobjectandtheircollision
contact.Thuscontacthasthecharacteristicoftouchandthefunctionofimpact[Footnoteref1]'.Contactis
themanifestationoftheunionofthethree(theobject,theconsciousnessandthesense)anditseffectis
feeling(_vedan_);thoughitisgeneratedbytheobjectsitisfeltintheconsciousnessanditschieffeatureis
experiencing(_anubhava_)thetasteoftheobject.Asregardsenjoyingthetasteofanobject,theremaining
associatedstatesenjoyitonlypartially.Ofcontactthereis(thefunctionof)themeretouching,ofperception
themerenotingorperceiving,ofvolitionthemerecoordinating,ofconsciousnessthemerecognizing.But
feelingalone,throughgovernance,proficiency,mastery,enjoysthetasteofanobject.Forfeelingislikethe
king,theremainingstatesarelikethecook.Asthecook,whenhehaspreparedfoodofdiversetastes,putsit
inabasket,sealsit,takesittotheking,breakstheseal,opensthebasket,takesthebestofallthesoupand
curries,putstheminadish,swallows(aportion)tofindout

____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:_Atthaslin_,p.108;translation,pp.143144.]

98

whether they are faulty or not and afterwards offers the food of various excellent tastes to the king, and the king, being
lord, expert, and master, eats whatever he likes, even so the mere tasting of the food by the cook is like the partial
enjoyment of the object by the remaining states, and as the cook tastes a portion of the food, so the remaining states
enjoy a portion of the object, and as the king, being lord, expert and master, eats the meal
CHAPTER V 71
accordingtohispleasuresofeelingbeinglordexpert,andmaster,enjoysthetasteoftheobjectandthereforeit
issaidthatenjoymentorexperienceisitsfunction[Footnoteref1]."

Thespecialfeatureofsaissaidtobetherecognizing(_paccabhi_)bymeansofasign(_abhinena_).
Accordingtoanotherexplanation,arecognitiontakesplacebytheinclusionofthetotality(ofaspects)
_sabbasa@ngahikavasena_.Theworkofvolition(_cetan_)issaidtobecoordinationorbindingtogether
(_abhisandahana_)."Volitionisexceedinglyenergeticandmakesadoubleeffort,adoubleexertion.Hencethe
Ancientssaid'Volitionislikethenatureofalandowner,acultivatorwhotakingfiftyfivestrongmen,wentdown
tothefieldstoreap.Hewasexceedinglyenergeticandexceedinglystrenuous;hedoubledhisstrengthandsaid
"Takeyoursickles"andsoforth,pointedouttheportiontobereaped,offeredthemdrink,food,scent,flowers,
etc.,andtookanequalshareofthework.'Thesimileshouldbethusapplied:volitionislikethecultivator,the
fiftyfivemoralstateswhichariseasfactorsofconsciousnessarelikethefiftyfivestrongmen;likethetimeof
doublingstrength,doublingeffortbythecultivatoristhedoubledstrength,doubledeffortofvolitionasregards
activityinmoralandimmoralacts[Footnoteref2]."Itseemsthatprobablytheactivesideoperatingin
sa@nkhrawasseparatelydesignatedascetan(volition).

"Whenonesays'I,'whathedoesisthathereferseithertoallthekhandhascombinedoranyoneofthemand
deludeshimselfthatthatwas'I.'Justasonecouldnotsaythatthefragranceofthelotusbelongedtothepetals,
thecolourorthepollen,soonecouldnotsaythattherpawas'I'orthatthevedanwas'I'oranyoftheother
khandhaswas'I.'Thereisnowheretobefoundinthekhandhas'Iam[Footnoteref3]'."

___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:_Atthaslin_,pp.109110;translation,pp.145146.]

[Footnote2:_Ibid._p.111;translation,pp.147148.]
[Footnote3:_SamyuttaNikya_,III.130.]

99
Avijjandsava.

Astothequestionhowtheavijj(ignorance)firststartedtherecanbenoanswer,forwecouldneversaythat
eitherignoranceordesireforexistenceeverhasanybeginning[Footnoteref1].Itsfruitionisseeninthecycleof
existenceandthesorrowthatcomesinitstrain,anditcomesandgoeswiththemall.Thusaswecanneversay
thatithasanybeginning,itdeterminestheelementswhichbringaboutcyclesofexistenceandisitselfdetermined
bycertainothers.Thismutualdeterminationcanonlytakeplaceinandthroughthechangingseriesofdependent
phenomena,forthereisnothingwhichcanbesaidtohaveanyabsolutepriorityintimeorstability.Itissaidthat
itisthroughthecomingintobeingofthesavasordepravitiesthattheavijjcameintobeing,andthatthrough
thedestructionofthedepravities(_sava_)theavijjwasdestroyed[Footnoteref2].Thesesavasareclassifiedin
the_Dhammasa@nga@ni_askmsava,bhavsava,di@t@thsavaandavijjsava.Kmsavameansdesire,
attachment,pleasure,andthirstafterthequalitiesassociatedwiththesenses;bhavsavameansdesire,
attachmentandwillforexistenceorbirth;di@t@thsavameanstheholdingofhereticalviews,suchas,theworld
iseternalornoneternal,orthattheworldwillcometoanendorwillnotcometoanend,orthatthebodyandthe
soulareoneoraredifferent;avijjsavameanstheignoranceofsorrow,itscause,itsextinctionanditsmeansof
extinction._Dhammasa@nga@ni_addsfourmoresupplementaryones,viz.ignoranceaboutthenatureof
anteriormentalkhandhas,posteriormentalkhandhas,anteriorandposteriortogether,andtheirmutual
dependence[Footnoteref3].KmsavaandbhavsavacanasBuddhagho@sasaysbecountedasone,forthey
arebothbutdepravitiesduetoattachment[Footnoteref4].
________________________________________________________________________
CHAPTER V 72
[Footnote1:Warren'sBuddhisminTranslations(Visuddhimagga,chap.XVII.),p.175.]

[Footnote2:_M.N._I.p.54.Childerstranslates"sava"as"depravities"andMrsRhysDavidsas"intoxicants."
Theword"sava"inSkr.means"oldwine."Itisderivedfrom"su"toproducebyBuddhagho@saandthe
meaningthathegivestoitis"_ciraprivsika@t@thena_"(onaccountofitsbeingstoredupforalongtimelike
wine).TheyworkthroughtheeyeandthemindandcontinuetoproduceallbeingsuptoIndra.Asthosewines
whicharekeptlongarecalled"savas"sothesearealsocalledsavasforremainingalongtime.Theother
alternativethatBuddhagho@sagivesisthattheyarecalledsavaonaccountoftheirproducing
sa@msradukkha(sorrowsoftheworld),_Atthaslin_,p.48.ContrastitwithJainasrava(flowinginofkarma
matter).FindingitdifficulttotranslateitinonewordafterBuddhagho@sa,Ihavetranslateditas"depravities,"
afterChilders.]

[Footnote3:See_Dhammasa@nga@ni_,p.195.]

[Footnote4:Buddhagho@sa's_Atthaslin_,p.371.]

100

Thedi@t@thsavasbycloudingthemindwithfalsemetaphysicalviewsstandinthewayofone'sadoptingthe
trueBuddhisticdoctrines.Thekmasvasstandinthewayofone'senteringintothewayofNirv@na
(_angmimagga_)andthebhavsavasandavijjsavasstandinthewayofone'sattainingarhaorfinal
emancipation.Whenthe_MajjhimaNikya_saysthatfromtheriseofthesavasavijjrises,itevidently
countsavijjthereasinsomesenseseparatefromtheothersavas,suchasthoseofattachmentanddesireof
existencewhichveilthetrueknowledgeaboutsorrow.

Theafflictions(_kilesas_)donotdiffermuchfromthesavasfortheyarebutthespecificpassionsinforms
ordinarilyfamiliartous,suchascovetousness(_lobha_),angerorhatred(_dosa_),infatuation(_moha_),
arrogance,prideorvanity(_mna_),heresy(_di@t@thi_),doubtoruncertainty(_vicikicch_),idleness
(_thna_),boastfulness(_udhacca_),shamelessness(_ahirika_)andhardnessofheart_anottapa_);thesekilesas
proceeddirectlyasaresultofthesavas.Inspiteofthesevarietiestheyareoftencountedasthree(lobha,dosa,
moha)andthesetogetherarecalledkilesa.Theyareassociatedwiththevedankkhandha,sakkhandha,
sa@nkhrakkhandhaandvinakkhandha.Fromthesearisethethreekindsofactions,ofspeech,ofbody,
andofmind[Footnoteref1].

SlaandSamdhi.

Weareintertwinedallthroughoutsideandinsidebythetanglesofdesire(_ta@nhja@t_),andtheonlywayby
whichthesemaybeloosenedisbythepracticeofrightdiscipline(_sla_),concentration(_samdhi_)andwisdom
(_pa_).Slabrieflymeansthedesistingfromcommittingallsinfuldeeds(_sabbappassaakara@nam_).With
slathereforethefirststarthastobemade,forbyitoneceasestodoallactionspromptedbybaddesiresand
therebyremovestheinrushofdangersanddisturbances.Thisservestoremovethekilesas,andthereforethe
properperformanceoftheslawouldleadonetothefirsttwosuccessivestagesofsainthood,viz.the
sotpannabhva(thestageinwhichoneisputintherightcurrent)andthesakadgmibhva(thestagewhenone
hasonlyonemorebirthtoundergo).Samdhiisamoreadvancedeffort,forbyitalltheoldrootsoftheold
kilesasaredestroyedandtheta@nhordesireisremovedand

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Dhammasa@nga@ni,_p.180.]
101
CHAPTER V 73

byitoneisledtothemoreadvancedstatesofasaint.Itdirectlybringsinpa(truewisdom)andby
pathesaintachievesfinalemancipationandbecomeswhatiscalledanarhat[Footnoteref1].Wisdom
(_pa_)isrightknowledgeaboutthefourriyasaccas,viz.sorrow,itscause,itsdestructionanditscause
ofdestruction.

Slameansthoseparticularvolitionsandmentalstates,etc.bywhichamanwhodesistsfromcommittingsinful
actionsmaintainshimselfontherightpath.Slathusmeans1.rightvolition(_cetan_),2.theassociatedmental
states(_cetasika_),3.mentalcontrol(_sa@mvara_)and4.theactualnontransgression(inbodyandspeech)of
thecourseofconductalreadyinthemindbytheprecedingthreeslascalledavtikkama.Sa@mvaraisspokenof
asbeingoffivekinds,1.P@timokkhasa@mvara(thecontrolwhichsaveshimwhoabidesbyit),2.
Satisa@mvara(thecontrolofmindfulness),3.nasa@mvara(thecontrolofknowledge),4.Khantisa@mvara
(thecontrolofpatience),5.Viriyasa@mvara(thecontrolofactiveselfrestraint).P@timokkhasa@mvara
meansallselfcontrolingeneral.Satisa@mvarameansthemindfulnessbywhichonecanbringintherightand
goodassociationswhenusingone'scognitivesenses.Evenwhenlookingatanytemptingobjecthewillbyvirtue
ofhismindfulness(_sati_)controlhimselffrombeingtemptedbyavoidingtothinkofitstemptingsideandby
thinkingonsuchaspectsofitasmayleadintherightdirection.Khantisa@mvaraisthatbywhichonecan
remainunperturbedinheatandcold.Bytheproperadherencetoslaallourbodily,mentalandvocalactivities
(_kamma_)aredulysystematized,organized,stabilized(_samdhnam,upadhra@na@m,pati@t@th_)
[Footnoteref2].

Thesagewhoadoptsthefullcourseshouldalsofollowanumberofhealthymonasticruleswithreferenceto
dress,sitting,dining,etc.,whicharecalledthedhta@ngasorpuredisciplinaryparts[Footnoteref3].The
practiceofslaandthedhtangashelpthesagetoadoptthecourseofsamdhi.Samdhiaswehaveseenmeans
theconcentrationofthemindbentonrightendeavours(_kusalacittekaggatsamdhi@h_)togetherwithits
statesupononeparticularobject(_ekramma@na_)sothattheymaycompletelyceasetoshiftandchange
(_sammcaavikkhipamn_)[Footnoteref4].

_______________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:_VisuddhimaggaNidndikath_.]

[Footnote2:_Visuddhimaggaslaniddeso_,pp.7and8.]

[Footnote3:Visuddhimagga,II.]

[Footnote4:Visuddhimagga,pp.8485.]
102

The man who has practised sla must train his mind first in particular ways, so that it may be possible for him to acquire
the chief concentration of meditation called jhna (fixed and steady meditation). These preliminary endeavours of the
mind for the acquirement of jhnasamdhi eventually lead to it and are called upacra samdhi (preliminary samdhi)
as distinguished from the jhnasamdhi called the appansamdhi (achieved samdhi) [Footnote ref 1]. Thus as a
preparatory measure, firstly he has to train his mind continually to view with disgust the appetitive desires for eating
and drinking (_hre pa@tikklasa_) by emphasizing in the mind the various troubles that are associated in seeking
food and drink and their ultimate loathsome transformations as various nauseating bodily elements. When a man
continually habituates himself to emphasize the disgusting associations of food and drink, he ceases to have any
attachment to them and simply takes them as an unavoidable evil, only awaiting the day when the final dissolution of
all sorrows will come [Footnote ref 2]. Secondly he has to habituate his mind to the idea that all the parts of our body
are made up of the four elements, k@siti (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire) and wind (air), like the carcase of a cow at the
butcher's shop. This is technically called catudhtuvavatthnabhvan (the meditation of the body as being
CHAPTER V 74
madeupofthefourelements)[Footnoteref3].Thirdlyhehastohabituatehismindtothinkagainandagain
(_anussati_)aboutthevirtuesorgreatnessoftheBuddha,thesa@ngha(themonksfollowingtheBuddha),the
godsandthelaw(_dhamma_)oftheBuddha,aboutthegoodeffectsofsla,andthemakingofgifts
(_cgnussati_),aboutthenatureofdeath(_mara@nnussati_)andaboutthedeepnatureandqualitiesofthe
finalextinctionofallphenomena(_upasamnussati_)[Footnoteref4].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Asitisnotpossibleformetoenterintodetails,Ifollowwhatappearstometobethemainlineof
divisionshowingtheinterconnectionofjhna(Skr._dhyna_)withitsaccessorystagescalledparikammas
(_Visuddhimagga,_pp.85f.).]

[Footnote2:Visuddhimagga,pp.341347;marktheintensepessimisticattitude,"_Imacapanahre
pa@tikulasa@manuyuttassabhikkhu@norasata@nhyacittampa@tilyati,pa@tiku@t@tati,
pa@tiva@t@tati;so,kantranitthara@na@t@thikoviyaputtama@msa@mvigatamadohra@mhreti
yvadevadukkhassani@t@thara@natthya_,"p.347.Themindofhimwhoinspireshimselfwiththis
supremedisgusttoallfood,becomesfreefromalldesiresforpalatabletastes,andturnsitsbacktothemand
fliesofffromthem.Asameansofgettingridofallsorrowhetakeshisfoodwithoutanyattachmentasone
wouldeatthefleshofhisownsontosustainhimselfincrossingaforest.]

[Footnote3:Visuddhimagga,pp.347370.]
[Footnote4:Visuddhimagga,pp.197294.]
103

Advancingfurtherfromthepreliminarymeditationsorpreparationscalledtheupacrasamdhiwecometo
thoseothersourcesofconcentrationandmeditationcalledtheappansamdhiwhichdirectlyleadtothe
achievementofthehighestsamdhi.Theprocessesofpurificationandstrengtheningofthemindcontinueinthis
stagealso,buttheserepresentthelastattemptswhichleadthemindtoitsfinalgoalNibbna.Inthefirstpartof
thisstagethesagehastogotothecremationgroundsandnoticethediversehorrifyingchangesofthehuman
carcasesandthinkhownauseating,loathsome,unsightlyandimpuretheyare,andfromthishewillturnhismind
tothelivinghumanbodiesandconvincehimselfthattheybeinginessencethesameasthedeadcarcasesareas
loathsomeasthey[Footnoteref.1]Thisiscalledasubhakamma@t@thnaortheendeavourtoperceivethe
impurityofourbodies.Heshouldthinkoftheanatomicalpartsandconstituentsofthebodyaswellastheir
processes,andthiswillhelphimtoenterintothefirstjhnabyleadinghismindawayfromhisbody.Thisis
calledthekayagatasatiorthecontinualmindfulnessaboutthenatureofthebody[Footnoteref2].Asanaidto
concentrationthesageshouldsitinaquietplaceandfixhismindontheinhaling(_passsa_)andtheexhaling
(_sssa_)ofhisbreath,sothatinsteadofbreathinginamoreorlessunconsciousmannerhemaybeaware
whetherheisbreathingquicklyorslowly;heoughttomarkitdefinitelybycountingnumbers,sothatbyfixing
hismindonthenumberscountedhemayfixhismindonthewholeprocessofinhalationandexhalationinall
stagesofitscourse.Thisiscalledtheanapnasatiorthemindfulnessofinhalationandexhalation[Footnoteref3]

Next to this we come to Brahmavihra, the fourfold meditation of metta (universal friendship), karu@n (universal
pity), mudit (happiness in the prosperity and happiness of all) and upekkh (indifference to any kind of preferment
of oneself, his friend, enemy or a third party). In order to habituate oneself to the meditation on universal friendship,
one should start with thinking how he should himself like to root out all misery and become happy, how he should
himself like to avoid death and live cheerfully, and then pass over to the idea that other beings would also have the
same desires. He should thus habituate himself to think that his friends, his enemies, and all those with whom he is
not
CHAPTER V 75
___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Visuddhimagga,_VI.]

[Footnote2:_Ibid._pp.239266.]

[Footnote3:_Ibid._pp.266292.]

104

connectedmightallliveandbecomehappy.Heshouldfixhimselftosuchanextentinthismeditationthathe
wouldnotfindanydifferencebetweenthehappinessorsafetyofhimselfandofothers.Heshouldneverbecome
angrywithanyperson.Shouldheatanytimefeelhimselfoffendedonaccountoftheinjuriesinflictedonhimby
hisenemies,heshouldthinkofthefutilityofdoublinghissadnessbybecomingsorryorvexedonthataccount.He
shouldthinkthatifheshouldallowhimselftobeaffectedbyanger,hewouldspoilallhisslawhichhewasso
carefullypractising.Ifanyonehasdoneavileactionbyinflictinginjury,shouldhehimselfalsodothesameby
beingangryatit?Ifhewerefindingfaultwithothersforbeingangry,couldhehimselfindulgeinanger?
Moreoverheshouldthinkthatallthedhammasaremomentary(_kha@nikatt_);thattherenolongerexistedthe
khandhaswhichhadinflictedtheinjury,andmoreovertheinflictionofanyinjurybeingonlyajointproduct,the
manwhowasinjuredwashimselfanindispensableelementintheproductionoftheinflictionasmuchastheman
whoinflictedtheinjury,andtherecouldnotthusbeanyspecialreasonformakinghimresponsibleandofbeing
angrywithhim.Ifevenafterthinkinginthiswaytheangerdoesnotsubside,heshouldthinkthatbyindulgingin
angerhecouldonlybringmischiefonhimselfthroughhisbaddeeds,andheshouldfurtherthinkthattheother
manbybeingangrywasonlyproducingmischieftohimselfbutnottohim.Bythinkinginthesewaysthesage
wouldbeabletofreehismindfromangeragainsthisenemiesandestablishhimselfinanattitudeofuniversal
friendship[Footnoteref1].Thisiscalledthemettbhvana.Inthemeditationofuniversalpity(_karu@n_)also
oneshouldsympathizewiththesorrowsofhisfriendsandfoesalike.Thesagebeingmorekeensightedwillfeel
pityforthosewhoareapparentlyleadingahappylife,butareneitheracquiringmeritsnorendeavouringto
proceedonthewaytoNibbna,fortheyaretosufferinnumerablelivesofsorrow[Footnoteref2].

WenextcometothejhnaswiththehelpofmaterialthingsasobjectsofconcentrationcalledtheKasi@nam.
Theseobjectsofconcentrationmayeitherbeearth,water,fire,wind,bluecolour,yellowcolour,redcolour,
whitecolour,lightorlimitedspace(_parcchinnksa_).Thusthesagemaytakeabrownballofearthand
concentratehisminduponitasanearthball,sometimes

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Visuddhimagga,pp.295314.]
[Footnote2:_Ibid._pp.314315.]

105

witheyesopenandsometimeswitheyesshut.Whenhefindsthateveninshuttinghiseyeshecanvisualizethe
objectinhismind,hemayleaveofftheobjectandretiretoanotherplacetoconcentrateupontheimageofthe
earthballinhismind.

In the first stages of the first meditation (_pathamam jhnam_) the mind is concentrated on the object in the way of
understanding it with its form and name and of comprehending it with its diverse relations. This state of
concentration is called vitakka (discursive meditation). The next stage of the first meditation is that in which the mind
does not move in the object in relational terms but becomes fixed and settled in it and
CHAPTER V 76
penetratesintoitwithoutanyquivering.Thisstateiscalledvicra(steadilymoving).Thefirststagevitakkahas
beencomparedinBuddhagho@sa'sVisuddhimaggatotheflyingofakitewithitswingsflapping,whereasthe
secondstageiscomparedtoitsflyinginasweepwithouttheleastquiverofitswings.Thesetwostagesare
associatedwithabuoyantexaltation(_pti_)andasteadyinwardblisscalledsukha[Footnoteref1]instillingthe
mind.Theformationofthisfirstjhnarootsoutfivetiesofavijj,kamacchando(dallyingwithdesires),vypdo
(hatred),thinamiddham(slothandtorpor),uddhaccakukkuccam(prideandrestlessness),andvicikicch(doubt).
Thefiveelementsofwhichthisjhnaisconstitutedarevitakka,vicra,plti,sukhamandekaggata(one
pointedness).

Whenthesagemastersthefirstjhnahefindsitdefectiveandwantstoenterintothesecondmeditation
(_dutiyamjhnam_),wherethereisneitheranyvitakkanorvicraofthefirstjhna,butthemindisinone
unruffledstate(_ekodibhvam_).Itisamuchsteadierstateanddoesnotpossessthemovementwhich
characterizedthevitakkaandthevicrastagesofthefirstjhnaandisthereforeaveryplacidstate
(_vitakkavicrakkhobhavirahe@naativiyaacalatsuppasannatca_).Itishoweverassociatedwithpti,
sukhaandekaggatasthefirstjhnawas.

Whenthesecondjhnaismasteredthesagebecomesdisinclinedtowardstheenjoymentoftheptiofthatstage
andbecomesindifferenttothem(_upekkhako_).Asageinthisstageseestheobjectsbutisneitherpleasednor
displeased.Atthisstageallthesavasofthesagebecomeloosened(kh@nsava).Theenjoymentofsukha
howeverstillremainsinthestageandthe

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Wherethereisptithereissukha,butwherethereissukhatheremaynotnecessarilybepti.
_Vsuddhimagga_,p.145.]

106

mindifnotproperlyandcarefullywatchedwouldlikesometimestoturnbacktotheenjoymentofptiagain.
Thetwocharacteristicsofthisjhnaaresukhaandekaggat.Itshouldhoweverbenotedthatthoughthereis
thefeelingofhighestsukhahere,themindisnotonlynotattachedtoitbutisindifferenttoit
(_atimadhhurasukhesukhapramippattepitatiyajjhneupekkhako,natatthasukhbhisangena
ka@d@dhiyati_)[Footnoteref1].Theearthball(_pa@thav_)ishoweverstilltheobjectofthejhna.

Inthefourthorthelastjhnaboththesukha(happiness)andthedukkha(misery)vanishawayandalltheroots
ofattachmentandantipathiesaredestroyed.Thisstateischaracterizedbysupremeandabsoluteindifference
(_upekkh_)whichwasslowlygrowinginallthevariousstagesofthejhnas.Thecharacteristicsofthisjhnaare
thereforeupekkhandekaggat.Withthemasteryofthisjhnacomesfinalperfectionandtotalextinctionofthe
cittacalledcetovimutti,andthesagebecomestherebyanarhat[Footnoteref2].Thereisnofurtherproductionof
thekhandhas,norebirth,andthereistheabsolutecessationofallsorrowsandsufferingsNibbna.

Kamma.

In the Katha (II. 6) Yama says that "a fool who is blinded with the infatuation of riches does not believe in a future life;
he thinks that only this life exists and not any other, and thus he comes again and again within my grasp." In the Digha
Nikya also we read how Pysi was trying to give his reasons in support of his belief that "Neither is there any other
world, nor are there beings, reborn otherwise than from parents, nor is there fruit or result of deeds well done or ill
done [Footnote ref 3]." Some of his arguments were that neither the vicious nor the virtuous return to tell us that they
suffered or enjoyed happiness in the other world, that if the virtuous had a better life in store, and if they believed in it,
they would certainly commit suicide in order to get it at the earliest opportunity, that in spite of taking the best
precautions we do not find at the time of the death
CHAPTER V 77
ofanypersonthathissoulgoesout,orthathisbodyweighslessonaccountofthedepartureofhissoul,andso
on.Kassaparefuteshisargumentswithaptillustrations.Butinspiteofafewagnosticsof

_______________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Visuddhimagga,p.163.]

[Footnote2:_MajjhimaNikya_,I.p.296,andVisuddhimagga,pp.167168.]

[Footnote3:DialoguesoftheBuddha,II.p.349;_D.N._II.pp.317ff.]

107

Pysi'stype,wehaveeveryreasontobelievethatthedoctrineofrebirthinotherworldsandinthiswas
oftenspokenofintheUpani@sadsandtakenasanacceptedfactbytheBuddha.Inthe_MilindaPaha_,
wefindNgasenasaying"itisthroughadifferenceintheirkarmathatmenarenotallalike,butsomelong
lived,someshortlived,somehealthyandsomesickly,somehandsomeandsomeugly,somepowerfuland
someweak,somerichandsomepoor,someofhighdegreeandsomeoflowdegree,somewiseandsome
foolish[Footnoteref1]."Wehaveseeninthethirdchapterthatthesamesoilofviewswasenunciatedby
theUpani@sadsages.

Butkarmacouldproduceitseffectinthislifeoranyotherlifeonlywhentherewerecovetousness,antipathyand
infatuation.But"whenaman'sdeedsareperformedwithoutcovetousness,arisewithoutcovetousnessandare
occasionedwithoutcovetousness,theninasmuchascovetousnessisgonethesedeedsareabandoned,uprooted,
pulledoutofthegroundlikeapalmyratreeandbecomenonexistentandnotliabletospringupagaininthe
future[Footnoteref2]."Karmabyitselfwithoutcraving(_ta@nh_)isincapableofbearinggoodorbadfruits.
Thuswereadinthe_Mahsatipa@t@thnasutta_,"eventhiscraving,potentforrebirth,thatisaccompaniedby
lustandselfindulgence,seekingsatisfactionnowhere,nowthere,towit,thecravingforthelifeofsense,the
cravingforbecoming(renewedlife)andthecravingfornotbecoming(fornonewrebirth)[Footnoteref3]."
"Cravingforthingsvisible,cravingforthingsaudible,cravingforthingsthatmaybesmelt,tasted,touched,for
thingsinmemoryrecalled.Thesearethethingsinthisworldthataredear,thatarepleasant.Theredoescraving
takeitsrise,theredoesitdwell[Footnoteref4]."Preoccupationanddeliberationofsensualgratificationgiving
risetocravingisthereasonwhysorrowcomes.Andthisisthefirstryasatya(nobletruth).

Thecessationofsorrowcanonlyhappenwith"theuttercessationofanddisenchantmentaboutthatvery
craving,givingitup,renouncingitandemancipationfromit[Footnoteref5]."

Whenthedesireorcraving(_ta@nh_)hasonceceasedthesagebecomesanarhat,andthedeedsthathemaydo
afterthatwillbearnofruit.Anarhatcannothaveanygoodorbad

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Warren'sBuddhisminTranslations,p.215.]
[Footnote2:_Ibid._pp.216217.]
[Footnote3:DialoguesoftheBuddha,II.p.340.]

[Footnote4:_Ibid._p.341.]
[Footnote 5: _Ibid._ p. 341.]
CHAPTER V 78
108

fruitsofwhateverhedoes.Foritisthroughdesirethatkarmafindsitsscopeofgivingfruit.Withthecessationof
desireallignorance,antipathyandgraspingceaseandconsequentlythereisnothingwhichcandeterminerebirth.
AnarhatmaysuffertheeffectsofthedeedsdonebyhiminsomepreviousbirthjustasMoggallnadid,butin
spiteoftheremnantsofhispastkarmaanarhatwasanemancipatedmanonaccountofthecessationofhisdesire
[Footnoteref1].

Kammasaresaidtobeofthreekinds,ofbody,speechandmind(_kyika_,_vcika_and_mnasika_).Theroot
ofthiskammaishowevervolition(_cetan_)andthestatesassociatedwithit[Footnoteref2].Ifamanwishingto
killanimalsgoesoutintotheforestinsearchofthem,butcannotgetanyofthemthereevenafteralongsearch,
hismisconductisnotabodilyone,forhecouldnotactuallycommitthedeedwithhisbody.Soifhegivesanorder
forcommittingasimilarmisdeed,andifitisnotactuallycarriedoutwiththebody,itwouldbeamisdeedby
speech(_vcika_)andnotbythebody.Butthemerestbadthoughtorillwillalonewhethercarriedintoeffector
notwouldbeakammaofthemind(_mnasika_)[Footnoteref3].Butthementalkammamustbepresentasthe
rootofallbodilyandvocalkammas,forifthisisabsent,asinthecaseofanarhat,therecannotbeanykammasat
allforhim.

Kammasaredividedfromthepointofviewofeffectsintofourclasses,viz.(1)thosewhicharebadandproduce
impurity,(2)thosewhicharegoodandproductiveofpurity,(3)thosewhicharepartlygoodandpartlybadand
thusproductiveofbothpurityandimpurity,(4)thosewhichareneithergoodnorbadandproductiveneitherof
puritynorofimpurity,butwhichcontributetothedestructionofkammas[Footnoteref4].

Finalextinctionofsorrow(_nibbna_)takesplaceasthenaturalresultofthedestructionofdesires.Scholarsof
Buddhismhavetriedtodiscoverthemeaningofthisultimatehappening,andvariousinterpretationshavebeen
offered.ProfessorDelaVallePoussinhaspointedoutthatinthePlitextsNibbnahassometimesbeen
representedasahappystate,aspureannihilation,asaninconceivableexistenceorasachangelessstate
[Footnoteref5].

__________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_Kathvatthu_andWarren'sBuddhisminTranslations,pp,221ff.]

[Footnote2:_Atthaslin_,p.88.]
[Footnote3:See_Atthaslin_,p.90.]

[Footnote4:See_Atthaslin_,p.89.]

[Footnote5:Prof.DelaVallePoussin'sarticleinthe_E.R.E._onNirv@na.SeealsoCullavagga,IX.i.4;Mrs
RhysDavids'sPsalmsoftheearlyBuddhists,I.andII.,Introduction,p.xxxvii;_Dgha_,II.15;_Udna_,VIII.;
_Sa@myutta_,III.109.]

109

MrSchrader,indiscussingNibbnainPaliTextSocietyJournal, 1905, says that the Buddha held that those who
sought to become identified after death with the soul of the world as infinite space (_ksa_) or consciousness
(_vina_) attained to a state in which they had a corresponding feeling of infiniteness without having really lost their
individuality. This latter interpretation of Nibbna seems to me to be very new and quite against the spirit of the
Buddhistic texts. It seems to me to be a hopeless task to explain Nibbna in terms of worldly experience, and there is
no way in which we can better indicate it than by saying that it is a
CHAPTER V 79
cessationofallsorrow;thestageatwhichallworldlyexperienceshaveceasedcanhardlybedescribedeitheras
positiveornegative.WhetherweexistinsomeformeternallyordonotexistisnotaproperBuddhisticquestion,
foritisaheresytothinkofaTathgataasexistingeternally(_s's'vata_)ornotexisting(_as's'vata_)or
whetherheisexistingaswellasnotexistingorwhetherheisneitherexistingnornonexisting.Anyonewho
seekstodiscusswhetherNibbnaiseitherapositiveandeternalstateoramerestateofnonexistenceor
annihilation,takesaviewwhichhasbeendiscardedinBuddhismasheretical.Itistruethatweinmoderntimes
arenotsatisfiedwithit,forwewanttoknowwhatitallmeans.Butitisnotpossibletogiveanyanswersince
Buddhismregardedallthesequestionsasillegitimate.

LaterBuddhisticwriterslikeNgrjunaandCandrakrttitookadvantageofthisattitudeofearlyBuddhism
andinterpreteditasmeaningthenonessentialcharacterofallexistence.Nothingexisted,andthereforeany
questionregardingtheexistenceornonexistenceofanythingwouldbemeaningless.Thereisnodifference
betweentheworldlystage(_sa@msra_)andNibbna,forasallappearancesarenonessential,theynever
existedduringthesa@msrasothattheycouldnotbeannihilatedinNibbna.

Upani@sadsandBuddhism.

TheUpani@sadshaddiscoveredthatthetrueselfwasnanda(bliss)[Footnoteref1].Wecouldsupposethat
earlyBuddhismtacitlypresupposessomesuchidea.Itwasprobablythoughtthatiftherewastheself(_att_)it
mustbebliss.TheUpani@sadshadassertedthattheself(_tman_)wasindestructibleandeternal[Footnoteref
2].Ifweareallowed

__________________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:Tait,II.5.]

[Footnote2:B@rh.IV.5.14.Ka@thaV.13.]
110

tomakeexplicitwhatwasimplicitinearlyBuddhismwecouldconceiveitasholdingthatiftherewastheselfit
mustbebliss,becauseitwaseternal.Thiscausalconnectionhasnotindeedbeenanywheredefinitelypronounced
intheUpani@sads,buthewhocarefullyreadstheUpani@sadscannotbutthinkthatthereasonwhythe
Upani@sadsspeakoftheselfasblissisthatitiseternal.Buttheconversestatementthatwhatwasnoteternalwas
sorrowdoesnotappeartobeemphasizedclearlyintheUpani@sads.TheimportantpostulateoftheBuddhais
thatthatwhichischangingissorrow,andwhateverissorrowisnotself[Footnoteref1].Thepointatwhich
BuddhismpartedfromtheUpani@sadsliesintheexperiencesoftheself.TheUpani@sadsdoubtlessconsidered
thatthereweremanyexperienceswhichweoftenidentifywithself,butwhichareimpermanent.Butthebeliefis
foundintheUpani@sadsthattherewasassociatedwiththeseapermanentpartaswell,andthatitwasthis
permanentessencewhichwasthetrueandunchangeableself,theblissful.Theyconsideredthatthispermanent
selfaspureblisscouldnotbedefinedasthis,butcouldonlybeindicatedasnotthis,notthis(_netineti_)
[Footnoteref2].ButtheearlyPaliscripturesholdthatwecouldnowherefindoutsuchapermanentessence,any
constantself,inourchangingexperiences.Allwerebutchangingphenomenaandthereforesorrowandtherefore
nonself,andwhatwasnonselfwasnotmine,neitherIbelongedtoit,nordiditbelongtomeasmyself[Footnote
ref3].

The true self was with the Upani@sads a matter of transcendental experience as it were, for they said that it could not
be described in terms of anything, but could only be pointed out as "there," behind all the changing mental categories.
The Buddha looked into the mind and saw that it did not exist. But how was it that the existence of this self was so
widely spoken of as demonstrated in experience? To this the reply of the Buddha was that what people perceived
there when they said that they perceived the self was but the mental experiences either individually or together. The
ignorant ordinary man did not know the noble truths and was
CHAPTER V 80
nottrainedinthewayofwisemen,andconsideredhimselftobeendowedwithform(_rpa_)orfoundthe
formsinhisselfortheselfintheforms.He

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Sa@myuttaNikya_,III.pp.4445ff.]

[Footnote2:SeeB@rh.IV.iv.Chndogya,VIII.712.]

[Footnote3:_Sa@myuttaNikaya_,III45.]

111

experiencedthethought(ofthemoment)asitweretheselforexperiencedhimselfasbeingendowedwith
thought,orthethoughtintheselfortheselfinthethought.Itisthesekindsofexperiencesthatheconsideredas
theperceptionoftheself[Footnoteref1].

TheUpani@sadsdidnottrytoestablishanyschoolofdisciplineorsystematicthought.Theyrevealed
throughoutthedawnofanexperienceofanimmutableRealityastheselfofman,astheonlyabidingtruth
behindallchanges.ButBuddhismholdsthatthisimmutableselfofmanisadelusionandafalseknowledge.
Thefirstpostulateofthesystemisthatimpermanenceissorrow.Ignoranceaboutsorrow,ignoranceabout
thewayitoriginates,ignoranceaboutthenatureoftheextinctionofsorrow,andignoranceaboutthemeans
ofbringingaboutthisextinctionrepresentthefourfoldignorance(_avijj_)[Footnoteref2].Theavidy,
whichisequivalenttothePliwordavijj,occursintheUpani@sadsalso,butthereitmeansignorance
aboutthetmandoctrine,anditissometimescontrastedwithvidyortrueknowledgeabouttheself
(_tman_)[Footnoteref3].WiththeUpani@sadsthehighesttruthwasthepermanentself,thebliss,but
withtheBuddhatherewasnothingpermanent;andallwaschange;andallchangeandimpermanencewas
sorrow[Footnoteref4].Thisis,then,thecardinaltruthofBuddhism,andignoranceconcerningitinthe
abovefourfoldwaysrepresentedthefourfoldignorancewhichstoodinthewayoftherightcomprehension
ofthefourfoldcardinaltruths(_riyasacca_)sorrow,causeoftheoriginationofsorrow,extinctionof
sorrow,andthemeansthereto.

ThereisnoBrahmanorsupremepermanentrealityandnoself,andthisignorancedoesnotbelongtoanyegoor
selfaswemayordinarilybeledtosuppose.

ThusitissaidintheVisuddhimagga"inasmuchhoweverasignoranceisemptyofstabilityfrombeingsubjectto
acomingintoexistenceandadisappearingfromexistence...andisemptyofaselfdeterminingEgofrombeing
subjecttodependence,...orinotherwordsinasmuchasignoranceisnotanEgo,andsimilarlywithreferenceto
Karmaandtherestthereforeisittobeunderstoodofthewheelofexistencethatitisemptywithatwelvefold
emptiness[Footnoteref5]."

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_SamyuttaNikya_,II.46.]

[Footnote2:_MajjhimaNikya_,I.p.54.]

[Footnote3:Ch.I.i.10.B@rh.IV.3.20.Therearesomepassageswherevidyandavidyhavebeenusedina
differentandratherobscuresense,I's'911.]
[Footnote 4: _A@ng. Nikya_, III. 85.]
CHAPTER V 81
[Footnote5Warren'sBuddhisminTranslations(Visuddhimagga,chap.XVII.),p.175.]

112

TheSchoolsofTheravdaBuddhism.

ThereisreasontobelievethattheoralinstructionsoftheBuddhawerenotcollecteduntilafewcenturies
afterhisdeath.Seriousquarrelsaroseamongsthisdisciplesorratheramongstthesuccessivegenerationsof
thedisciplesofhisdisciplesabouthisdoctrinesandothermonasticruleswhichhehadenjoineduponhis
followers.ThuswefindthatwhenthecouncilofVeslidecidedagainsttheV@rjinmonks,calledalsothe
Vajjiputtakas,theyintheirturnheldanothergreatmeeting(Mahsa@ngha)andcametotheirown
decisionsaboutcertainmonasticrulesandthuscametobecalledastheMahsa@nghikas[Footnoteref1].
AccordingtoVasumitraastranslatedbyVassilief,theMahsa@nghikassecededin400B.C.andduringthe
nextonehundredyearstheygaverisefirsttothethreeschoolsEkavyavahrikas,Lokottaravdins,and
KukkulikasandafterthattheBahus'rutyas.Inthecourseofthenextonehundredyears,otherschoolsrose
outofitnamelythePrajaptivdins,Caittikas,Aparas'ailasandUttaras'ailas.TheTheravdaorthe
SthaviravdaschoolwhichhadconvenedthecouncilofVeslidevelopedduringthesecondandfirstcentury
B.C.intoanumberofschools,viz.theHaimavatas,Dharmaguptikas,Mahs'sakas,Ks'yapyas,
Sa@nkrntikas(morewellknownasSautrntikas)andtheVtsiputtryaswhichlatterwasagainsplitup
intotheDharmottaryas,Bhadraynyas,SammityasandChanngarikas.Themainbranchofthe
TheravdaschoolwasfromthesecondcenturydownwardsknownastheHetuvdinsorSarvstivdins
[Footnoteref2].The_Mahbodhiva@msa_identifiestheTheravdaschoolwiththeVibhajjavdins.The
commentatorofthe_Kathvatthu_whoprobablylivedaccordingtoMrsRhysDavidssometimeinthefifth
centuryA.D.mentionsafewotherschoolsofBuddhists.ButofalltheseBuddhistschoolsweknowvery
little.Vasumitra(100A.D.)givesussomeverymeagreaccountsof

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:The_Mahva@msa_differsfrom_Dpava@msa_inholdingthattheVajjiputtakasdidnotdevelop
intotheMahsa@nghikas,butitwastheMahsa@nghikaswhofirstsecededwhiletheVajjiputtakasseceded
independentlyofthem.The_Mahbodhiva@msa_,whichaccordingtoProfessorGeigerwascomposed975
A.D.1000A.D.,followstheMahava@msainholdingtheMahsa@nghikastobethefirstsecedersand
Vajjiputtakastohavesecededindependently.

VasumitraconfusesthecouncilofVesaliwiththethirdcouncilofP@taliputra.Seeintroductionto
translationof_Kathvatthu_byMrsRhysDavids.]

[Footnote2:ForotheraccountsoftheschismseeMrAungandMrsRhysDavids'stranslationof
_Kathvatthu_,pp.xxxvixlv.]

113

certain schools, of the Mahsa@nghikas, Lokottaravdins, Ekavyavahrikas, Kakkulikas, Prajaptivdins and

Sarvstivdins, but these accounts deal more with subsidiary matters of little philosophical importance. Some of the
points of interest are (1) that the Mahsa@nghikas were said to believe that the body was filled with mind (_citta_)
which was represented as sitting, (2) that the Prajaptivdins held that there was no agent in man, that there was no
untimely death, for it was caused by the previous deeds of man, (3) that the Sarvstivdins believed that everything
existed. From the discussions found in the _Kathvatthu_ also we may know the views of some of the schools on some
points which are not always devoid of philosophical interest. But there is nothing to be found by which we can properly
know the philosophy of these schools. It is quite possible however that these so-called schools of Buddhism were not so
many different systems but only differed from one another on some points of dogma or practice which were considered
as being of sufficient
CHAPTER V 82
interesttothem,butwhichtousnowappeartobequitetrifling.Butaswedonotknowanyoftheir
literatures,itisbetternottomakeanyunwarrantablesurmises.Theseschoolsarehowevernotvery
importantforahistoryoflaterIndianPhilosophy,fornoneofthemareevenreferredtoinanyofthe
systemsofHinduthought.TheonlyschoolsofBuddhismwithwhichotherschoolsofphilosophicalthought
cameindirectcontact,aretheSarvstivdinsincludingtheSautrntikasandtheVaibh@sikas,the
YogcraortheVijnavdinsandtheMdhyamikasortheS'nyavdins.Wedonotknowwhichofthe
diversesmallerschoolsweretakenupintothesefourgreatschools,theSautrntika,Vaibh@sika,
YogcraandtheMdhyamikaschools.Butastheseschoolsweremostimportantinrelationtothe
developmentofthedifferentsystemsinHinduthought,itisbestthatweshouldsetourselvestogatherwhat
wecanaboutthesesystemsofBuddhisticthought.

WhentheHinduwritersrefertotheBuddhistdoctrineingeneraltermssuchas"theBuddhistssay"without
callingthemtheVijnavdinsortheYogcrasandtheS'nyavdins,theyoftenrefertotheSarvstivdinsby
whichtheymeanboththeSautrntikasandtheVaibh@sikas,ignoringthedifferencethatexistsbetweenthese
twoschools.ItiswelltomentionthatthereishardlyanyevidencetoprovethattheHinduwriterswere
acquaintedwiththeTheravdadoctrines

114

asexpressedinthePliworks.TheVaibh@sikasandtheSautrntikashavebeenmoreorlessassociatedwith
eachother.Thusthe_Abhidharmakos'as'stra_ofVasubandhuwhowasaVaibh@sikawascommentedupon
byYas'omitrawhowasaSautrntika.ThedifferencebetweentheVaibh@sikasandtheSautrntikasthat
attractedthenoticeoftheHinduwriterswasthis,thattheformerbelievedthatexternalobjectsweredirectly
perceived,whereasthelatterbelievedthattheexistenceoftheexternalobjectscouldonlybeinferredfromour
diversifiedknowledge[Footnoteref1].Gu@naratna(fourteenthcenturyA.D.)inhiscommentary
_Tarkarahasyadpikon@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_saysthattheVaibhsikawasbutanothernameofthe
ryasammityaschool.AccordingtoGu@naratnatheVaibh@sikasheldthatthingsexistedforfourmoments,
themomentofproduction,themomentofexistence,themomentofdecayandthemomentofannihilation.Ithas
beenpointedoutinVastlbandhu's_Abhidharmakos'a_thattheVaibh@sikasbelievedthesetobefourkindsof
forceswhichbycomingincombinationwiththepermanentessenceofanentityproduceditsimpermanent
manifestationsinlife(seeProf.Stcherbatsky'stranslationofYas'omitraon_Abhidharmakos'akrik_,V.25).
Theselfcalledpudgalaalsopossessedthosecharacteristics.Knowledgewasformlessandwasproducedalong
withitsobjectbytheverysameconditions(_arthasahabhsekasamgryadhnah_).TheSautrntikasaccording
toGu@naratnaheldthattherewasnosoulbutonlythefiveskandhas.Theseskandhastransmigrated.Thepast,
thefuture,annihilation,dependenceoncause,ks'aandpudgalaarebutnames(_sa@mjmtram_),mere
assertions(_pratijmtram_),merelimitations(_samv@rtamtram_)andmerephenomena
(_vyavahramtram_).Bypudgalatheymeantthatwhichotherpeoplecalledeternalandallpervasivesoul.
Externalobjectsareneverdirectlyperceivedbutareonlyinferredasexistingforexplainingthediversityof
knowledge.Definitecognitionsarevalid;allcompoundedthingsaremomentary(_k@sa@nikh
sarvasa@mskrh_).

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Mdhavcrya's_Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_,chapterII._S'stradpik_,thediscussionson
Pratyak@sa,Amalaanda'scommentary(on_Bhmat_)_Vedntakalpataru_,p286."_vaibh@sikasya
bhyo'rtha@hpratyak@sa@h,sautrntikasyajnagatkravaicitrye@nanumeya@h_."Thenatureofthe
inferenceoftheSautrntikasisshownthusbyAmalnanda(12471260A.D.)"_yeyasminsatyapikdcitk@h
tetadatiriktpek@s@h_"(those[i.e.cognitions]whichinspiteofcertainunvariedconditionsareof
unaccounteddiversitymustdependonotherthingsinadditiontothese,i.e.theexternalobjects)
_Vedntakalpataru_,p.289.]
115
CHAPTER V 83
Theatomsofcolour,taste,smellandtouch,andcognitionarebeingdestroyedeverymoment.Themeaningsof
wordsalwaysimplythenegationsofallotherthings,exceptingthatwhichisintendedtobesignifiedbythatword
(_anypoha@hs'abdrtha@h_).Salvation(_mok@sa_)comesastheresultofthedestructionoftheprocessof
knowledgethroughcontinualmeditationthatthereisnosoul[Footnoteref1].

OneofthemaindifferencesbetweentheVibhajjavdins,SautrntikasandtheVaibh@sikasorthe
SarvstivdinsappearstorefertothenotionoftimewhichisasubjectofgreatinterestwithBuddhistphilosophy.
Thus_Abhidharmakos'a_(v.24...)describestheSarvstivdinsasthosewhomaintaintheuniversalexistenceof
everythingpast,presentandfuture.TheVibhajjavdinsarethose"whomaintainthatthepresentelementsand
thoseamongthepastthathavenotyetproducedtheirfruition,areexistent,buttheydenytheexistenceofthe
futureonesandofthoseamongthepastthathavealreadyproducedfruition."Therewerefourbranchesofthis
schoolrepresentedbyDharmatrta,Gho@sa,VasumitraandBuddhadeva.Dharmatrtamaintainedthatwhen
anelemententersdifferenttimes,itsexistencechangesbutnotitsessence,justaswhenmilkischangedintocurd
oragoldenvesselisbroken,theformoftheexistencechangesthoughtheessenceremainsthesame.Gho@saheld
that"whenanelementappearsatdifferenttimes,thepastoneretainsitspastaspectswithoutbeingseveredfrom
itsfutureandpresentaspects,thepresentlikewiseretainsitspresentaspectwithoutcompletelylosingitspastand
futureaspects,"justasamaninpassionatelovewithawomandoesnotlosehiscapacitytoloveotherwomen
thoughheisnotactuallyinlovewiththem.Vasumitraheldthatanentityiscalledpresent,pastandfuture
accordingasitproducesitsefficiency,ceasestoproduceafterhavingonceproduceditorhasnotyetbegunto
produceit.Buddhadevamaintainedtheviewthatjustasthesamewomanmaybecalledmother,daughter,wife,
sothesameentitymaybecalledpresent,pastorfutureinaccordancewithitsrelationtotheprecedingorthe
succeedingmoment.

AlltheseschoolsareinsomesenseSarvstivdins,fortheymaintainuniversalexistence.Butthe
Vaibh@sikafindsthemalldefectiveexceptingtheviewofVasumitra.ForDharmatrta's

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Gu@naratna's_Tarkarahasyadpik_,pp.4647.]
116

view is only a veiled S@mkhya doctrine; that of Gho@sa is a confusion of the notion of time, since it presupposes the
coexistence of all the aspects of an entity at the same time, and that of Buddhadeva is also an impossible situation,
since it would suppose that all the three times were found together and included in one of them. The Vaibh@sika finds
himself in agreement with Vasumitra's view and holds that the difference in time depends upon the difference of the
function of an entity; at the time when an entity does not actually produce its function it is future; when it produces it,
it becomes present; when after having produced it, it stops, it becomes past; there is a real existence of the past and the
future as much as of the present. He thinks that if the past did not exist and assert some efficiency it could not have
been the object of my knowledge, and deeds done in past times could not have produced its effects in the present time.
The Sautrntika however thought that the Vaibh@sika's doctrine would imply the heretical doctrine of eternal
existence, for according to them the stuff remained the same and the time-difference appeared in it. The true view
according to him was, that there was no difference between the efficiency of an entity, the entity and the time of its
appearance. Entities appeared from non-existence, existed for a moment and again ceased to exist. He objected to the
Vaibh@sika view that the past is to be regarded as existent because it exerts efficiency in bringing about the present on
the ground that in that case there should be no difference between the past and the present, since both exerted
efficiency. If a distinction is made between past, present and future efficiency by a second grade of efficiencies, then we
should have to continue it and thus have a vicious infinite. We can know non-existent entities as much as we can know
existent ones, and hence our knowledge of the past does not imply that the past is exerting any efficiency. If a
distinction is made between an efficiency and an entity, then the reason why efficiency started at any particular time
and ceased at another would be inexplicable. Once you admit that
CHAPTER V 84
thereisnodifferencebetweenefficiencyandtheentity,youatoncefindthatthereisnotimeatallandthe
efficiency,theentityandthemomentarealloneandthesame.Whenwerememberathingofthepastwedonot
knowitasexistinginthepast,butinthesamewayinwhichweknewitwhenitwaspresent.Weare

117

neverattractedtopastpassionsastheVaibh@sikasuggests,butpastpassionsleaveresidueswhichbecomethe
causesofnewpassionsofthepresentmoment[Footnoteref.1].

AgainwecanhaveaglimpseoftherespectivepositionsoftheVtsiputtryasandtheSarvstivdinsas
representedbyVasubandhuifweattendtothediscussiononthesubjectoftheexistenceofsoulin
_Abhidharmakos'a_.TheargumentofVasubandhuagainsttheexistenceofsoulisthis,thatthoughitistrue
thatthesenseorgansmayberegardedasadeterminingcauseofperception,nosuchcausecanbefound
whichmayrendertheinferenceoftheexistenceofsoulnecessary.Ifsoulactuallyexists,itmusthavean
essenceofitsownandmustbesomethingdifferentfromtheelementsorentitiesofapersonallife.Moreover,
suchaneternal,uncausedandunchangingbeingwouldbewithoutanypracticalefficiency
(_arthakriykritva_)whichalonedeterminesorprovesexistence.Thesoulcanthusbesaidtohaveamere
nominalexistenceasamereobjectofcurrentusage.Thereisnosoul,butthereareonlytheelementsofa
personallife.ButtheVtsiputtryaschoolheldthatjustasfirecouldnotbesaidtobeeitherthesameasthe
burningwoodorasdifferentfromit,andyetitisseparatefromit,sothesoulisanindividual(_pudgala_)
whichhasaseparateexistence,thoughwecouldnotsaythatitwasaltogetherdifferentfromtheelementsof
apersonallifeorthesameasthese.Itexistsasbeingconditionedbytheelementsofpersonallife,butit
cannotfurtherbedefined.Butitsexistencecannotbedenied,forwhereverthereisanactivity,theremustbe
anagent(e.g.Devadattawalks).Tobeconsciousislikewiseanaction,hencetheagentwhoisconsciousmust
alsoexist.TothisVasubandhurepliesthatDevadatta(thenameofaperson)doesnotrepresentanunity."It
isonlyanunbrokencontinuityofmomentaryforces(flashingintoexistence),whichsimplepeoplebelieveto
beaunityandtowhichtheygivethenameDevadatta.TheirbeliefthatDevadattamovesisconditioned,and
isbasedonananalogywiththeirownexperience,buttheirowncontinuityoflifeconsistsinconstantly
movingfromoneplacetoanother.Thismovement,thoughregardedas

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:IamindebtedfortheaboveaccounttotheunpublishedtranslationfromTibetanofasmall
portionofAbhidharmakoiabymyesteemedfriendProf.Th.StcherbatskyofPetrograd.Iamgratefultohim
thatheallowedmetoutilizeit.]

118

belongingtoapermanententity,isbutaseriesofnewproductionsindifferentplaces,justastheexpressions
'firemoves,''soundspreads'havethemeaningofcontinuities(ofnewproductionsinnewplaces).Theylikewise
usethewords'Devadattacognises'inordertoexpressthefactthatacognition(takesplaceinthepresent
moment)whichhasacause(intheformermoments,theseformermomentscominginclosesuccessionbeing
calledDevadatta)."

The problem of memory also does not bring any difficulty, for the stream of consciousness being one throughout, it
produces its recollections when connected with a previous knowledge of the remembered object under certain
conditions of attention, etc., and absence of distractive factors, such as bodily pains or violent emotions. No agent is
required in the phenomena of memory. The cause of recollection is a suitable state of mind and nothing else. When the
Buddha told his birth stories saying that he was such and such in such and such a life, he only meant that his past and
his present belonged to one and the same lineage of momentary existences. Just as when we say "this same fire which
had been consuming that has reached this object," we know that the fire is not identical at any two moments, but yet
we overlook the difference and say that it is the
CHAPTER V 85
samefire.Again,whatwecallanindividualcanonlybeknownbydescriptionssuchas"thisvenerableman,
havingthisname,ofsuchacaste,ofsuchafamily,ofsuchanage,eatingsuchfood,findingpleasureor
displeasureinsuchthings,ofsuchanage,themanwhoafteralifeofsuchlength,willpassawayhavingreached
anage."Onlysomuchdescriptioncanbeunderstood,butwehaveneveradirectacquaintancewiththe
individual;allthatisperceivedarethemomentaryelementsofsensations,images,feelings,etc.,andthese
happeningattheformermomentsexertapressureonthelaterones.Theindividualisthusonlyafiction,amere
nominalexistence,amerethingofdescriptionandnotofacquaintance;itcannotbegraspedeitherbythesenses
orbytheactionofpureintellect.Thisbecomesevidentwhenwejudgeitbyanalogiesfromotherfields.Thus
wheneverweuseanycommonnoun,e.g.milk,wesometimesfalselythinkthatthereissuchanentityasmilk,but
whatreallyexistsisonlycertainmomentarycolours,tastes,etc.,fictitiouslyunifiedasmilk;and"justasmilk
andwaterare

119

conventionalnames(forasetofindependentelements)forsomecolour,smell(tasteandtouch)taken
together,soisthedesignation'individual'butacommonnameforthedifferentelementsofwhichitis
composed."

ThereasonwhytheBuddhadeclinedtodecidethequestionwhetherthe"livingbeingisidenticalwiththebody
ornot"isjustbecausetheredidnotexistanylivingbeingas"individual,"asisgenerallysupposed.Hedidnot
declarethatthelivingbeingdidnotexist,becauseinthatcasethequestionerwouldhavethoughtthatthe
continuityoftheelementsofalifewasalsodenied.Intruththe"livingbeing"isonlyaconventionalnamefora
setofconstantlychangingelements[Footnoteref1].

TheonlybookoftheSammityasknowntousandthatbynameonlyisthe_Sammityas'stra_translated
intoChinesebetween350A.D.to431A.D.;theoriginalSanskritworksarehoweverprobablylost[Footnote
ref2].

TheVaibh@sikasareidentifiedwiththeSarvstivdinswhoaccordingto_Dpava@msa_V.47,aspointedout
byTakakusu,branchedofffromtheMahs'sakas,whointheirturnhadseparatedfromtheTheravdaschool.

Fromthe_Kathvatthu_weknow(1)thattheSabbatthivdinsbelievedthateverythingexisted,(2)thatthedawn
ofrightattainmentwasnotamomentaryflashofinsightbutbyagradualprocess,(3)thatconsciousnessoreven
samdhiwasnothingbut

________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Thisaccountisbasedonthetranslationof_A@s@tamakos'asthnanibaddha@h
pudgolavinis'caya@h_,aspecialappendixtotheeighthchapterofAbhidharmakos'a,byProfTh.
Stcherbatsky,_Bulletindel'AcadmiedesSciencesdeRussie_,1919.]

[Footnote 2: Professor De la Valle Poussin has collected some of the points of this doctrine in an article on the
Sammityas in the _E. R.E._ He there says that in the _Abhidharmakos'avykhy_ the Sammityas have been identified
with the Vtsputtryas and that many of its texts were admitted by the Vaibh@sikas of a later age. Some of their views
are as follows: (1) An arhat in possession of nirvna can fall away; (2) there is an intermediate state between death and
rebirth called _antarbhava_; (3) merit accrues not only by gift (_tyagnvaya_) but also by the fact of the actual use and
advantage reaped by the man to whom the thing was given (_paribhognvaya pu@nya_); (4) not only abstention from
evil deeds but a declaration of intention to that end produces merit by itself alone; (5) they believe in a pudgala (soul)
as distinct from the skandhas from which it can be said to be either different or non-different. "The pudgala cannot be
said to be transitory (_anitye_) like the skandhas since it transmigrates laying down the burden (_skandhas_)
shouldering a new
CHAPTER V 86
burden;itcannotbesaidtobepermanent,sinceitismadeoftransitoryconstituents."Thispudgaladoctrineof
theSammityasassketchedbyProfessorDelaVallePoussinisnotinfullagreementwiththepudgaladoctrine
oftheSammityasassketchedbyGu@naratnawhichwehavenoticedabove.]

120

afluxand(4)thatanarhat(saint)mayfallaway[Footnoteref1].TheSabbatthivdinsorSarvstivdinshavea
vastAbhidharmaliteraturestillexistinginChinesetranslationswhichisdifferentfromtheAbhidharmaofthe
Theravdaschoolwhichwehavealreadymentioned[Footnoteref2].Theseare1._JnaprasthnaS'stra_of
Ktyyanputtrawhichpassedbythenameof_MahVibh@s_fromwhichtheSabbatthivdinswhofollowed
itarecalledVaibh@sikas[Footnoteref3].ThisworkissaidtohavebeengivenaliteraryformbyAs'vagho@sa.
2.DharmaskandhabyS'riputtra.3._Dhtukya_byPr@na.4._Prajaptis'stra_byMaudgalyyana.5.
_Vijnakya_byDevak@sema.6._Sa@ngtiparyyya_bySriputtraand_Prakara@napda_byVasumitra.
Vasubandhu(420A.D.500A.D.)wroteaworkontheVaibh@sika[Footnoteref4]systeminverses(_krik_)
knownasthe_Abhidharmakos'a_,towhichheappendedacommentaryofhisownwhichpassesbythename
_AbhidharmaKos'abh@sya_inwhichhepointedoutsomeofthedefectsoftheVaibh@sikaschoolfromthe
Sautrntikapointofview[Footnoteref5].ThisworkwascommenteduponbyVasumitraandGu@namatiand
lateronbyYas'omitrawhowashimselfaSautrntikaandcalledhiswork_Abhidharmakos'avykhy_;
Sa@nghabhadraacontemporaryofVasubandhuwroteSamayapradipaand_Nyynusra_(Chinesetranslations
ofwhichareavailable)onstrictVaibh@sikalines.WehearalsoofotherVaibh@sikawriterssuchas
Dharmatrta,Gho@saka,VasumitraandBhadanta,thewriterof_Sa@myuktbhidharmas'stra_and
_Mahvibh@s_.Di@nnga(480A.D.),thecelebratedlogician,aVaibh@sikaoraSautrntikaandreputedto
beapupilofVasubandhu,wrotehisfamouswork_Pram@nasamuccaya_inwhichheestablishedBuddhistlogic
andrefutedmanyoftheviewsofVtsyyanathecelebratedcommentatorofthe_Nyyastras_;butweregret

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:SeeMrsRhysDavids'stranslation_Kathvatthu_,p.xix,andSectionsI.6,7;II.9andXI.
6.]

[Footnote2:_Mahvyutpatti_givestwonamesforSarvstivda,viz.Mlasarvstivdaandryyasarvstivda.
Itsing(671695A.D.)speaksofryyamlasarvstivdaandMlasarvstivda.Inhistimehefounditprevailing
inMagadha,Guzrat,Sind,S.India,E.India.Takakususays(_P.T.S._19041905)thatParamrtha,inhislifeof
Vasubandhu,saysthatitwaspropagatedfromKashmeretoMiddleIndiabyVasubhadra,whostudieditthere.]

[Footnote3:Takakususays(_P.T.S._19041905)thatKtyyanputtra'sworkwasprobablyacompilation
fromotherVibh@sswhichexistedbeforetheChinesetranslationsandVibh@stextsdated383A.D.]

[Footnote4:SeeTakakusu'sarticle_J.R.A.S._1905.]

[Footnote5:TheSautrntikasdidnotregardtheAbhidharmasoftheVaibh@sikasasauthenticandlaid
stressonthesuttantadoctrinesasgivenintheSuttapi@taka.]

121

tosaythatnoneoftheaboveworksareavailableinSanskrit,norhavetheybeenretranslatedfromChineseor
TibetanintoanyofthemodernEuropeanorIndianlanguages.

The Japanese scholar Mr Yamakami Sogen, late lecturer at Calcutta University, describes the doctrine of the
Sabbatthivdins from the Chinese versions of the _Abhidharmakos'a, Mahvibh@ss'stra_, etc., rather elaborately
[Footnote ref 1]. The following is a short sketch, which is borrowed mainly from the accounts
CHAPTER V 87
givenbyMrSogen.

TheSabbatthivdinsadmittedthefiveskandhas,twelveyatanas,eighteendhtus,thethreeasa@msk@rta
dharmasofpratisa@mkhynirodhaapratisa@mkhynirodhaandks'a,andthesa@msk@rtadharmas(things
compositeandinterdependent)ofrpa(matter),citta(mind),caitta(mental)andcittaviprayukta(nonmental)
[Footnoteref2].Alleffectsareproducedbythecomingtogether(sa@msk@rta)ofanumberofcauses.Thefive
skandhas,andtherpa,citta,etc.,arethuscalledsa@msk@rtadharmas(compositethingsorcollocations
_sambhyakri_).Therpadharmasareeleveninnumber,onecittadharma,46caittadharmasand14
cittaviprayuktasa@mskradharmas(nonmentalcompositethings);addingtothesethethreeasa@msk@rta
dharmaswehavetheseventyfivedharmas.Rpaisthatwhichhasthecapacitytoobstructthesenseorgans.
Matterisregardedasthecollectiveorganismorcollocation,consistingofthefourfoldsubstratumofcolour,smell,
tasteandcontact.Theunitpossessingthisfourfoldsubstratumisknownasparam@nu,whichistheminutest
formofrpa.Itcannotbepiercedthroughorpickeduporthrownaway.Itisindivisible,unanalysable,invisible,
inaudible,untastableandintangible.Butyetitisnotpermanent,butislikeamomentaryflashintobeing.The
simpleatomsarecalled_dravyaparam@nu_andthecompoundones_sa@mghtaparam@nu_.Inthewordsof
Prof.Stcherbatsky"theuniversalelementsofmatteraremanifestedintheiractionsorfunctions.Theyare
consequentlymoreenergiesthansubstances."Theorgansofsensearealsoregardedasmodificationsofatomic
matter.Sevensuchparam@nuscombinetogethertoformana@nu,anditisinthiscombinedformonlythat
theybecomeperceptible.Thecombinationtakesplaceintheformofaclusterhavingoneatomatthecentreand

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:SystemsofBuddhisticThought,publishedbytheCalcuttaUniversity.]

[Footnote2:S'a@nkarainhismeagresketchofthedoctrineoftheSarvstivdinsinhisbh@syaonthe
_Brahmastras_II.2noticessomeofthecategoriesmentionedbySogen.]

122

othersaroundit.Thepointwhichmustberememberedinconnectionwiththeconceptionofmatteristhis,that
thequalitiesofallthemahbhtasareinherentintheparam@nus.Thespecialcharacteristicsofroughness
(whichnaturallybelongstoearth),viscousness(whichnaturallybelongstowater),heat(belongingtofire),
movableness(belongingtowind),combinetogethertoformeachoftheelements;thedifferencebetweenthe
differentelementsconsistsonlyinthis,thatineachofthemitsownspecialcharacteristicswerepredominantand
active,andothercharacteristicsthoughpresentremainedonlyinapotentialform.Themutualresistanceof
materialthingsisduetothequalityofearthorthesolidnessinherentinthem;themutualattractionofthingsis
duetomoistureorthequalityofwater,andsoforth.Thefourelementsaretobeobservedfromthreeaspects,
namely,(1)asthings,(2)fromthepointofviewoftheirnatures(suchasactivity,moisture,etc.),and(3)function
(suchas_dh@rti_orattraction,_sa@mgraha_orcohesion,paktiorchemicalheat,and_vyhana_orclustering
andcollecting).Thesecombinetogethernaturallybyotherconditionsorcauses.Themainpointofdistinction
betweentheVaibh@sikaSarvstivadinsandotherformsofBuddhismisthis,thatherethefiveskandhasand
matterareregardedaspermanentandeternal;theyaresaidtobemomentaryonlyinthesensethattheyare
changingtheirphasesconstantly,owingtotheirconstantchangeofcombination.Avidyisnotregardedhereas
alinkinthechainofthecausalseriesofprattyasamutpda;norisitignoranceofanyparticularindividual,but
isratheridenticalwith"moha"ordelusionandrepresentstheultimatestateofimmaterialdharmas.Avidy,
whichthroughsa@mskra,etc.,producesnmarpainthecaseofaparticularindividual,isnothisavidyin
thepresentexistencebuttheavidyofhispastexistencebearingfruitinthepresentlife.

"The cause never perishes but only changes its name, when it becomes an effect, having changed its state." For
example, clay becomes jar, having changed its state; and in this case the name clay is lost and the name
CHAPTER V 88
jararises[Footnoteref1].TheSarvstivdinsallowedsimultaneousnessbetweencauseandeffectonlyinthe
caseofcompositethings(_sa@mprayuktahetu_)andinthecaseof

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Sogen'squotationfromKumrajva'sChineseversionofryyadeva'scommentaryonthe
_Mdhyamikas'stra_(chapterXX.Krik9).]

123

theinteractionofmentalandmaterialthings.Thesubstratumof"vijna"or"consciousness"isregardedas
permanentandtheaggregateofthefivesenses(_indriyas_)iscalledtheperceiver.Itmustberememberedthat
theindriyasbeingmaterialhadapermanentsubstratum,andtheiraggregatehadthereforealsoasubstratum
formedofthem.

Thesenseofsightgraspsthefourmaincoloursofblue,yellow,red,white,andtheircombinations,asalso
thevisualformsofappearance(_sa@msthna_)oflong,short,round,square,high,low,straight,and
crooked.Thesenseoftouch(_kyendriya_)hasforitsobjectthefourelementsandthequalitiesof
smoothness,roughness,lightness,heaviness,cold,hungerandthirst.Thesequalitiesrepresentthefeelings
generatedinsentientbeingsbytheobjectsoftouch,hunger,thirst,etc.,andarealsocountedunderit,as
theyaretheorganiceffectsproducedbyatouchwhichexcitesthephysicalframeatatimewhentheenergy
ofwindbecomesactiveinourbodyandpredominatesoverotherenergies;soalsothefeelingofthirstis
causedbyatouchwhichexcitesthephysicalframewhentheenergyoftheelementoffirebecomesactive
andpredominatesovertheotherenergies.Theindriyas(senses)canaftergraspingtheexternalobjects
arousethought(_vijna_);eachofthefivesensesisanagentwithoutwhichnoneofthefivevijnaswould
becomecapableofperceivinganexternalobject.Theessenceofthesensesisentirelymaterial.Eachsense
hastwosubdivisions,namely,theprincipalsenseandtheauxiliarysense.Thesubstratumoftheprincipal
sensesconsistsofacombinationofparam@nus,whichareextremelypureandminute,whilethe
substratumofthelatteristheflesh,madeofgrossermaterials.Thefivesensesdifferfromoneanotherwith
respecttothemannerandformoftheirrespectiveatomiccombinations.Inallsenseacts,wheneveranactis
performedandanideaisimpressed,alatentenergyisimpressedonourpersonwhichisdesignatedas
avijaptirpa.Itiscalledrpabecauseitisaresultoreffectofrpacontact;itiscalledavijaptibecauseit
islatentandunconscious;thislatentenergyisboundsoonerorlatertoexpressitselfinkarmaeffectsandis
theonlybridgewhichconnectsthecauseandtheeffectofkarmadonebybodyorspeech.Karmainthis
schoolisconsideredastwofold,namely,thatasthought(_cetanakarma_)andthatasactivity(_caitasika
karma_).Thislast,again,isoftwokinds,viz.

124

thatduetobodymotion(_kyikakarma_)andspeech(_vcikakarma_).Boththesemayagainbelatent
(_avijapti_)andpatent(_vijapti_),givingusthekyikavijnptikarma,kyikvijaptikarma,vcika
vijaptikarmaandvcikvijaptikarma.Avijaptirpaandavijaptikarmaarewhatweshouldcallin
modernphraseologysubconsciousideas,feelingsandactivity.Correspondingtoeachconscioussensation,
feeling,thoughtoractivitythereisanothersimilarsubconsciousstatewhichexpressesitselfinfuture
thoughtsandactions;asthesearenotdirectlyknownbutaresimilartothosewhichareknown,theyare
calledavijapti.

The mind, says Vasubandhu, is called cittam, because it wills (_cetati_), manas because it thinks (_manvate_) and
vijna because it discriminates (_nirdis'ati_). The discrimination may be of three kinds: (1) svabhva nirdes'a (natural
perceptual discrimination), (2) prayoga nirdes'a (actual discrimination as present, past and future), and (3) anusm@rti
nirdes'a (reminiscent discrimination referring only to the past). The senses only possess the _svabhva nirdes'a_, the
other two belong exclusively to manovijna. Each of the vijnas as
CHAPTER V 89
associatedwithitsspecificsensediscriminatesitsparticularobjectandperceivesitsgeneralcharacteristics;the
sixvijnascombinetoformwhatisknownastheVijnaskandha,whichispresidedoverbymind(_mano_).
Therearefortysixcaittasa@msk@rtadharmas.Ofthethreeasa@msk@rtadharmasks'a(ether)isinessence
thefreedomfromobstruction,establishingitasapermanentomnipresentimmaterialsubstance(_nrpkhya_,
nonrpa).Thesecondasa@msk@rtadharma,apratisa@mkhynirodha,meansthenonperceptionofdharmas
causedbytheabsenceofpratyayasorconditions.ThuswhenIfixmyattentionononething,otherthingsarenot
seenthen,notbecausetheyarenonexistentbutbecausetheconditionswhichwouldhavemadethemvisiblewere
absent.Thethirdasa@msk@rtadharma,pratisa@mkhynirodha,isthefinaldeliverancefrombondage.Its
essentialcharacteristiciseverlastingness.Thesearecalledasa@msk@rtabecausebeingofthenatureofnegation
theyarenoncollocativeandhencehavenoproductionordissolution.Theeightfoldnoblepathwhichleadstothis
stateconsistsofrightviews,rightaspirations,rightspeech,rightconduct,rightlivelihood,righteffort,right
mindfulness,rightrapture[Footnoteref1].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:MrSogenmentionsthenameofanotherBuddhistHnaynathinker(about250A.D.),Harivarman,
whofoundedaschoolknownasSatyasiddhischool,whichpropoundedthesamesortofdoctrinesasthose
preachedbyNgrjuna.NoneofhisworksareavailableinSanskritandIhavenevercomeacrossanyallusion
tohisnamebySanskritwriters.]

125
Mahynism.

ItisdifficulttosaypreciselyatwhattimeMahynismtookitsrise.Butthereisreasontothinkthatasthe
Mahsa@nghikasseparatedthemselvesfromtheTheravdinsprobablysometimein400B.C.andsplit
themselvesupintoeightdifferentschools,thoseelementsofthoughtsandideaswhichinlaterdayscametobe
labelledasMahynaweregraduallyonthewaytotakingtheirfirstinception.Wehearinabout100A.D.ofa
numberofworkswhichareregardedasvariousMahynastras,someofwhichareprobablyasoldasatleast
100B.C.(ifnotearlier)andothersaslateas300or400A.D.[Footnoteref1].TheseMahynastras,alsocalled
theVaipulyastras,aregenerallyallintheformofinstructionsgivenbytheBuddha.Nothingisknownabout
theirauthorsorcompilers,buttheyareallwritteninsomeformofSanskritandwereprobablywrittenbythose
whosecededfromtheTheravdaschool.

ThewordHnaynareferstotheschoolsofTheravda,andassuchitiscontrastedwithMahyna.Thewords
aregenerallytranslatedassmallvehicle(_hna_=small,_yna_=vehicle)andgreatvehicle(_mah_=great,
_yna_=vehicle).ButthistranslationbynomeansexpresseswhatismeantbyMahynaandHnayna
[Footnoteref2].Asa@nga(480A.D.)inhis_Mahynastrla@mkra_gives

__________________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:QuotationsandreferencestomanyofthesestrasarefoundinCandrakrtti'scommentaryonthe
_Mdhyamkakriks_ofNgrjuna;someofthesearethefollowing:_A@s@tashasrikprajpramit_
(translatedintoChinese164A.D.167A.D.),_S'atashasrikprajpramit,Gaganagaja,Samdhistra,
Tathgataguhyastra,D@r@dhdhys'ayasacodanstra,Dhyyitamu@s@tistra,Pitputrasamgamastra,
Mahynastra,Mradamanastra,Ratnak@tastra,Ratnac@dparip@rcchstra,Ratnameghastra,
Ratnars`istra,Ratnkarastra,R@s@traplaparip@rcchstra,La@nkvatrastra,Lalitavistarastra,
Vajracchedikstra,Vimalakrttinirdes'astra,S'listambhastra,Samdhirajasutra,Sukhvatvyha,
Suvar@naprabhsastra,Saddharmapu@n@darika(translatedintoChineseA.D.255),Amityurdhynastra,
Hastikkhyastra,etc.]
[Footnote 2: The word Yna is generally translated as vehicle, but a consideration of numerous contexts in
CHAPTER V 90
whichthewordoccursseemstosuggestthatitmeanscareerorcourseorway,ratherthanvehicle(Lalitavistara,
pp.25,38;_Prajpramit_,pp.24,319;_Samdhirjastra_,p.1;_Karu@npu@ndarka_,p.67;
_La@nkvatrastra_,pp.68,108,132).ThewordYnaisasoldastheUpani@sadswherewereadofDevayna
andPit@ryna.Thereisnoreasonwhythiswordshouldbetakeninadifferentsense.Wehearin
_La@nkvatra_ofS'rvakayna(careeroftheS'rvakasortheTheravdinBuddhists),Pratyekabuddhayna
(thecareerofsaintsbeforethecomingoftheBuddha),Buddhayna(careeroftheBuddhas),Ekayna(one
career),Devayna(careerofthegods),Brahmayna(careerofbecomingaBrahm),Tathgatayna(careerofa
Tathgata).Inoneplace_Lankvatra_saysthatordinarilydistinctionismadebetweenthethreecareersand
onecareerandnocareer,butthesedistinctionsareonlyfortheignorant(_Lankvatra_,p.68).]

126

usthereasonwhyoneschoolwascalledHnaynawhereastheother,whichheprofessed,wascalledMahyna.
Hesaysthat,consideredfromthepointofviewoftheultimategoalofreligion,theinstructions,attempts,
realization,andtime,theHnaynaoccupiesalowerandsmallerplacethantheothercalledMah(great)Yna,
andhenceitisbrandedasHna(small,orlow).Thisbringsustooneofthefundamentalpointsofdistinction
betweenHnaynaandMahyna.TheultimategoodofanadherentoftheHnaynaistoattainhisown
nirv@naorsalvation,whereastheultimategoalofthosewhoprofessedtheMahynacreedwasnottoseek
theirownsalvationbuttoseekthesalvationofallbeings.SotheHnaynagoalwaslower,andinconsequenceof
thattheinstructionsthatitsfollowersreceived,theattemptstheyundertook,andtheresultstheyachievedwere
narrowerthanthatoftheMahynaadherents.AHnaynamanhadonlyashortbusinessinattaininghisown
salvation,andthiscouldbedoneinthreelives,whereasaMahynaadherentwaspreparedtoworkforinfinite
timeinhelpingallbeingstoattainsalvation.SotheHnayanaadherentsrequiredonlyashortperiodofworkand
mayfromthatpointofviewalsobecalled_hna,_orlower.

Thispoint,thoughimportantfromthepointofviewofthedifferenceinthecreedofthetwoschools,isnotso
fromthepointofviewofphilosophy.ButthereisanothertraitoftheMahynistswhichdistinguishesthemfrom
theHnaynistsfromthephilosophicalpointofview.TheMahynistsbelievedthatallthingswereofanon
essentialandindefinablecharacterandvoidatbottom,whereastheHnaynistsonlybelievedinthe
impermanenceofallthings,butdidnotproceedfurtherthanthat.

ItissometimeserroneouslythoughtthatNgrjunafirstpreachedthedoctrineofS'nyavda(essencelessnessor
voidnessofallappearance),butinrealityalmostalltheMahynastraseitherdefinitelypreachthisdoctrineor
alludetoit.ThusifwetakesomeofthosestraswhichwereinallprobabilityearlierthanNgrjuna,wefind
thatthedoctrinewhichNgrjunaexpounded

127

with all the rigour of his powerful dialectic was quietly accepted as an indisputable truth. Thus we find Subhti saying to
the Buddha that vedan (feeling), samj (concepts) and the sa@mskras (conformations) are all my (illusion)
[Footnote ref 1]. All the skandhas, dhtus (elements) and yatanas are void and absolute cessation. The highest
knowledge of everything as pure void is not different from the skandhas, dhtus and yatanas, and this absolute
cessation of dharmas is regarded as the highest knowledge (_prajpramit_) [Footnote ref 2]. Everything being void
there is in reality no process and no cessation. The truth is neither eternal (_s's'vata_) nor non-eternal (_as's'vata_)
but pure void. It should be the object of a saint's endeavour to put himself in the "thatness" (_tathat_) and consider all
things as void. The saint (_bodhisattva_) has to establish himself in all the virtues (_pramit_), benevolence
(_dnapramit_), the virtue of character (_s'lapramit_), the virtue of forbearance (_k@sntipramit_), the virtue
of tenacity and strength (_vryyapramit_) and the virtue of meditation (_dhynapramit_). The saint (_bodhisattva_)
is firmly determined that he will help an infinite number of souls to attain nirv@na. In reality, however, there are no
beings, there is no bondage, no salvation; and the saint knows it but too well, yet he is not afraid of this high truth, but
proceeds on his career of attaining for all illusory beings illusory emancipation from illusory
CHAPTER V 91
bondage.Thesaintisactuatedwiththatfeelingandproceedsinhisworkonthestrengthofhispramits,
thoughinrealitythereisnoonewhoistoattainsalvationinrealityandnoonewhoistohelphimtoattainit
[Footnoteref3].Thetrueprajapramitistheabsolutecessationofallappearance(_ya@hanupalambha@h
sarvadharm@nmsaprajpramitityucyate_)[Footnoteref4].

TheMahynadoctrinehasdevelopedontwolines,viz.thatofS'nyavdaortheMdhyamikadoctrineand
Vijnavda.ThedifferencebetweenS'nyavdaandVijnavda(thetheorythatthereisonlythe
appearanceofphenomenaofconsciousness)isnotfundamental,butisratheroneofmethod.Bothofthemagree
inholdingthatthereisnotruthinanything,everythingisonlypassingappearanceakintodreamormagic.But
whiletheS'nyavdinsweremorebusyinshowingthisindefinablenessofallphenomena,theVijnavdins,
tacitlyaccepting

_______________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_A@s@teshasiihprajpramita_,p.16.]

[Footnote2:Ibidp.177.]

[Footnote3:Ibidp.21.]
[Footnote4:Ibidp.177.]

128

thetruthpreachedbytheS'nyavdins,interestedthemselvesinexplainingthephenomenaofconsciousnessby
theirtheoryofbeginninglessillusoryrootideasorinstinctsofthemind(_vsan_).

As'vagho@sa(100A.D.)seemstohavebeenthegreatestteacherofanewtypeofidealism(_vijnavda_)known
astheTathatphilosophy.TrustinginSuzuki'sidentificationofaquotationinAs'vagho@sa's
_S'raddhotpdas'stra_asbeingmadefrom_La@nkvatrastra_,weshouldthinkofthe
_La@nkvatrastra_asbeingoneoftheearlyworksoftheVijnavdins[Footnoteref1].Thegreatestlater
writeroftheVijnavdaschoolwasAsa@nga(400A.D.),towhomareattributedthe_Saptadas'abhmistra,
Mahynastra,Upades'a,Mahynasamparigrahas'stra,Yogcrabhmis'stra_and
_Mahynastrla@mkra_.Noneoftheseworksexceptingthelastoneisavailabletoreaderswhohaveno
accesstotheChineseandTibetanmanuscripts,astheSanskritoriginalsareinallprobabilitylost.The
VijnavdaschoolisknowntoHinduwritersbyanothernamealso,viz.Yogcra,anditdoesnotseeman
improbablesuppositionthatAsa@nga's_Yogcrabhmis'stra_wasresponsibleforthenewname.
Vasubandhu,ayoungerbrotherofAsa@nga,was,asParamrtha(499569)tellsus,atfirstaliberal
Sarvstivdin,butwasconvertedtoVijnavda,lateinhislife,byAsa@nga.ThusVasubandhu,whowrotein
hisearlylifethegreatstandardworkoftheSarvstivdins,_Abhidharmakos'a_,devotedhimselfinhislaterlife
toVijnavda[Footnoteref2].HeissaidtohavecommenteduponanumberofMahynastras,suchas
_Avata@msaka,Nirv@na,Saddharmapu@n@darka,Prajpramit,Vimalakrtti_and
_S'rmlsi@mhanda_,andcompiledsomeMahynastras,suchas_Vijnamtrasiddhi,Ratnatraya_,etc.
TheschoolofVijnavdacontinuedforatleastacenturyortwoafterVasubandhu,butwearenotinpossession
ofanyworkofgreatfameofthisschoolafterhim.

We have already noticed that the S'nyavda formed the fundamental principle of all schools of Mahyna. The most
powerful exponent of this doctrine was Ngrjuna (1OO A.D.), a brief account of whose system will be given in its
proper place. Ngrjuna's kriks (verses) were commented upon by ryyadeva, a disciple of his, Kumrajva (383 A.D.).
Buddhaplita and Candrakrtti (550 A.D.). ryyadeva in addition to this commentary wrote at
CHAPTER V 92
________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:DrS.C.Vidybhshanathinksthat_Lankvatna_belongstoabout300A.D.]

[Footnote2:Takakusu's"AstudyoftheParamrtha'slifeofVasubandhu,"_J.R.A.S_.1905.]

129

leastthreeotherbooks,viz._Catu@hs'ataka,Hastablaprakara@nav@rtti_and_Cittavis`uddhiprakara@na_
[Footnoteref1].Inthesmallworkcalled_Hastablaprakara@nav@rtti_ryyadevasaysthatwhatever
dependsforitsexistenceonanythingelsemaybeprovedtobeillusory;allournotionsofexternalobjectsdepend
onspaceperceptionsandnotionsofpartandwholeandshouldthereforeberegardedasmereappearance.
Knowingthereforethatallthatisdependentonothersforestablishingitselfisillusory,nowisemanshouldfeel
attachmentorantipathytowardsthesemerephenomenalappearances.Inhis_Cittavis'uddhiprakara@na_he
saysthatjustasacrystalappearstobecoloured,catchingthereflectionofacolouredobject,evensothemind
thoughinitselfcolourlessappearstoshowdiversecoloursbycolorationofimagination(_vikalpa_).Inreality
themind(_citta_)withoutatouchofimagination(_kalpan_)initisthepurereality.

ItdoesnotseemhoweverthattheS'nyavdinscouldproduceanygreatwritersafterCandrakrtti.Referencesto
S'nyavdashowthatitwasalivingphilosophyamongsttheHinduwritersuntilthetimeofthegreat
Mm@msauthorityKumrilawhoflourishedintheeighthcentury;butinlatertimestheS'nyavdinswere
nolongeroccupyingthepositionofstrongandactivedisputants.

TheTathataPhilosophyofAs'vagho@sa(80A.D.)[Footnoteref2].

As'vagho@sawasthesonofaBrahminnamedSai@mhaguhyawhospenthisearlydaysintravellingoverthe
differentpartsofIndiaanddefeatingtheBuddhistsinopendebates.HewasprobablyconvertedtoBuddhismby
Pr@svawhowasanimportantpersoninthethirdBuddhistCouncilpromoted,accordingtosomeauthorities,
bytheKingofKashmereandaccordingtootherauthoritiesbyPu@nyayas'as[Footnoteref3].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ryyadeva's_Hastablaprakara@nav@rtti_hasbeenreclaimedbyDr.F.W.Thomas.Fragmentary
portionsofhis_Cittavis'uddhiprakara@na_werepublishedbyMahmahopdhyyaHaraprasdas'strinthe
BengalAsiaticSociety'sjournal,1898.]

[Footnote2:Theabovesectionisbasedonthe AwakeningofFaith,anEnglishtranslationbySuzukiofthe
Chineseversionof_S'raddhotpdas`stra_byAs'vagho@sa,theSanskritoriginalofwhichappearstohave
beenlost.SuzukihasbroughtforwardamassofevidencetoshowthatAs'vagho@sawasacontemporaryof
Kani@ska.]

[Footnote3:TranthasaysthathewasconvertedbyAryadeva,adiscipleofNgrjuna,Geschichtedes
Buddhismus,GermantranslationbySchiefner,pp.8485.SeeSuzuki'sAwakeningofFaith,pp.2432.
As'vagho@sawrotethe_Buddhacaritakvya_,ofgreatpoeticalexcellence,andthe_Mahla@mkras'stra_.
HewasalsoamusicianandhadinventedamusicalinstrumentcalledRstavarathathemightbythatmeans
convertthepeopleofthecity."Itsmelodywasclassical,mournful,andmelodious,inducingtheaudienceto
ponderonthemisery,emptiness,andnontmannessoflife."Suzuki,p.35.]

130
He held that in the soul two aspects may be distinguished --the aspect as thatness (_bhtatathat_) and the
CHAPTER V 93
aspectasthecycleofbirthanddeath(_sa@msra_).Thesoulasbhtatathatmeanstheonenessofthetotalityof
allthings(_dharmadhtu_).Itsessentialnatureisuncreateandexternal.Allthingssimplyonaccountofthe
beginninglesstracesoftheincipientandunconsciousmemoryofourpastexperiencesofmanypreviouslives
(_sm@rti_)appearundertheformsofindividuation[Footnoteref1].Ifwecouldovercomethissm@rti"thesigns
ofindividuationwoulddisappearandtherewouldbenotraceofaworldofobjects.""Allthingsintheir
fundamentalnaturearenotnameableorexplicable.Theycannotbeadequatelyexpressedinanyformof
language.Theypossessabsolutesameness(_samat_).Theyaresubjectneithertotransformationnorto
destruction.Theyarenothingbutonesoul"thatness(_bhtatathat_).This"thatness"hasnoattributeandit
canonlybesomehowpointedoutinspeechas"thatness."Assoonasyouunderstandthatwhenthetotalityof
existenceisspokenoforthoughtof,thereisneitherthatwhichspeaksnorthatwhichisspokenof,thereisneither
thatwhichthinksnorthatwhichisthoughtof,"thisisthestageofthatness."Thisbhtatathatisneitherthat
whichisexistence,northatwhichisnonexistence,northatwhichisatonceexistenceandnonexistence,northat
whichisnotatonceexistenceandnonexistence;itisneitherthatwhichisplurality,northatwhichisatonce
unityandplurality,northatwhichisnotatonceunityandplurality.Itisanegativeconceptinthesensethatitis
beyondallthatisconditionalandyetitisapositiveconceptinthesensethatitholdsallwithinit.Itcannotbe
comprehendedbyanykindofparticularizationordistinction.Itisonlybytranscendingtherangeofour
intellectualcategoriesofthecomprehensionofthelimitedrangeoffinitephenomenathatwecangetaglimpseof
it.Itcannotbecomprehendedbytheparticularizingconsciousnessofallbeings,andwethusmaycallitnegation,
"s'nyat,"inthissense.Thetruthisthatwhich

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Ihaveventuredtotranslate"_sm@rti_"inthesenseofvsaninpreferencetoSuzuki's"confused
subjectivity"becausesm@rtiinthesenseofvsanisnotunfamiliartothereadersofsuchBuddhistworksas
_La@nkvatra_.Theword"subjectivity"seemstobetooEuropeanatermtobeusedasawordtorepresent
theBuddhistsense.]

131

subjectivelydoesnotexistbyitself,thatthenegation(_s'nyat_)isalsovoid(_s'nya_)initsnature,that
neitherthatwhichisnegatednorthatwhichnegatesisanindependententity.Itisthepuresoulthatmanifests
itselfaseternal,permanent,immutable,andcompletelyholdsallthingswithinit.Onthataccountitmaybe
calledaffirmation.Butyetthereisnotraceofaffirmationinit,becauseitisnottheproductofthecreative
instinctivememory(_sm@rti_)ofconceptualthoughtandtheonlywayofgraspingthetruththethatness,isby
transcendingallconceptualcreations.

"Thesoulasbirthanddeath(_sa@msra_)comesforthfromtheTathgatawomb(_tathgatagarbha_),
theultimatereality.Buttheimmortalandthemortalcoincidewitheachother.Thoughtheyarenot
identicaltheyarenotdualityeither.Thuswhentheabsolutesoulassumesarelativeaspectbyitsself
affirmationitiscalledtheallconservingmind(_layavijna_).Itembracestwoprinciples,(1)
enlightenment,(2)nonenlightenment.Enlightenmentistheperfectionofthemindwhenitisfreefromthe
corruptionsofthecreativeinstinctiveincipientmemory(_sm@rti_).Itpenetratesallandistheunityofall
(_dharmadhtu_).Thatistosay,itistheuniversaldharmakyaofallTathgatasconstitutingtheultimate
foundationofexistence.

"When it is said that all consciousness starts from this fundamental truth, it should not be thought that consciousness
had any real origin, for it was merely phenomenal existence--a mere imaginary creation of the perceivers under the
influence of the delusive sm@rti. The multitude of people (_bahujana_) are said to be lacking in enlightenment,
because ignorance (_avidy_) prevails there from all eternity, because there is a constant succession of sm@rti (past
confused memory working as instinct) from which they have never been emancipated. But when they are divested of
this sm@rti they can then recognize that no states of mentation, viz. their appearance, presence, change and
disappearance, have any reality. They are neither in a temporal
CHAPTER V 94
norinaspatialrelationwiththeonesoul,fortheyarenotselfexistent.

"Thishighenlightenmentshowsitselfimperfectlyinourcorruptedphenomenalexperienceaspraj
(wisdom)andkarma(incomprehensibleactivityoflife).Bypurewisdomweunderstandthatwhenone,by
virtueoftheperfumingpowerofdharma,disciplineshimselftruthfully(i.e.accordingtothedharma),and
accomplishesmeritoriousdeeds,themind(i.e.the_layavijna_)

132

whichimplicatesitselfwithbirthanddeathwillbebrokendownandthemodesoftheevolving
consciousnesswillbeannulled,andthepureandthegenuinewisdomoftheDharmakyawillmanifestitself.
Thoughallmodesofconsciousnessandmentationaremereproductsofignorance,ignoranceinitsultimate
natureisidenticalandnonidenticalwithenlightenment;andthereforeignoranceisinonesense
destructible,thoughinanothersenseitisindestructible.Thismaybeillustratedbythesimileofthewater
andthewaveswhicharestirredupintheocean.Herethewatercanbesaidtobebothidenticalandnon
identicalwiththewaves.Thewavesarestirredupbythewind,butthewaterremainsthesame.Whenthe
windceasesthemotionofthewavessubsides,butthewaterremainsthesame.Likewisewhenthemindofall
creatures,whichinitsownnatureispureandclean,isstirredupbythewindofignorance(_avidy_),the
wavesofmentality(_vijna_)maketheirappearance.Thesethree(i.e.themind,ignorance,andmentality)
howeverhavenoexistence,andtheyareneitherunitynorplurality.Whentheignoranceisannihilated,the
awakenedmentalityistranquillized,whilsttheessenceofthewisdomremainsunmolested."Thetruthorthe
enlightenment"isabsolutelyunobtainablebyanymodesofrelativityorbyanyoutwardsignsof
enlightenment.Alleventsinthephenomenalworldarereflectedinenlightenment,sothattheyneitherpass
outofit,norenterintoit,andtheyneitherdisappearnoraredestroyed."Itisforevercutofffromthe
hindrancesbothaffectional(_kles'vara@na_)andintellectual(_jeyvara@na_),aswellasfromthemind
(i.e._layavijna_)whichimplicatesitselfwithbirthanddeath,sinceitisinitstruenatureclean,pure,
eternal,calm,andimmutable.Thetruthagainissuchthatittransformsandunfoldsitselfwherever
conditionsarefavourableintheformofatathgataorinsomeotherforms,inorderthatallbeingsmaybe
inducedtherebytobringtheirvirtuetomaturity.

"Nonelightenmenthasnoexistenceofitsownasidefromitsrelationwithenlightenmentapriori."But
enlightenmentaprioriisspokenofonlyincontrasttononenlightenment,andasnonenlightenmentisanon
entity,trueenlightenmentinturnlosesitssignificancetoo.Theyaredistinguishedonlyinmutualrelationas
enlightenmentornonenlightenment.Themanifestationsofnonenlightenmentaremadeinthreeways:(1)asa
disturbanceofthemind(_layavijna_),bytheavidykarma(ignorant

133

action), producing misery (_du@hkha_); (2) by the appearance of an ego or of a perceiver; and (3) by the creation of an
external world which does not exist in itself, independent of the perceiver. Conditioned by the unreal external world six
kinds of phenomena arise in succession. The first phenomenon is intelligence (sensation); being affected by the
external world the mind becomes conscious of the difference between the agreeable and the disagreeable. The second
phenomenon is succession. Following upon intelligence, memory retains the sensations, agreeable as well as
disagreeable, in a continuous succession of subjective states. The third phenomenon is clinging. Through the retention
and succession of sensations, agreeable as well as disagreeable, there arises the desire of clinging. The fourth
phenomenon is an attachment to names or ideas (_sa@mj_), etc. By clinging the mind hypostatizes all names
whereby to give definitions to all things. The fifth phenomenon is the performance of deeds (_karma_). On account of
attachment to names, etc., there arise all the variations of deeds, productive of individuality. "The sixth phenomenon is
the suffering due to the fetter of deeds. Through deeds suffering arises in which the mind finds itself entangled and
curtailed of its freedom." All these phenomena have thus sprung forth through avidy.
CHAPTER V 95
Therelationbetweenthistruthandavidyisinonesenseamereidentityandmaybeillustratedbythesimileof
allkindsofpotterywhichthoughdifferentareallmadeofthesameclay[Footnoteref1].Likewisetheundefiled
(_ansrava_)andignorance(_avidy_)andtheirvarioustransientformsallcomefromoneandthesameentity.
ThereforeBuddhateachesthatallbeingsarefromalleternityabidinginNirv@na.

Itisbythetouchofignorance(_avidy_)thatthistruthassumesallthephenomenalformsofexistence.

Intheallconservingmind(_layavijna_)ignorancemanifestsitself;andfromnonenlightenmentstartsthat
whichsees,thatwhichrepresents,thatwhichapprehendsanobjectiveworld,andthatwhichconstantly
particularizes.Thisiscalledego(_manas_).Fivedifferentnamesaregiventotheego(accordingtoitsdifferent
modesofoperation).Thefirstnameisactivityconsciousness(_karmavijna_)inthesensethatthroughthe
agencyofignoranceanunenlightenedmindbeginstobedisturbed(or

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[Footnote1:CompareChndogya,VI.1.4.]

134

awakened).Thesecondnameisevolvingconsciousness(_prav@rttiivijna_)inthesensethatwhenthe
mindisdisturbed,thereevolvesthatwhichseesanexternalworld.Thethirdnameisrepresentation
consciousnessinthesensethattheego(_manas_}represents(orreflects)anexternalworld.Asaclean
mirrorreflectstheimagesofalldescription,itisevensowiththerepresentationconsciousness.Whenitis
confronted,forinstance,withtheobjectsofthefivesenses,itrepresentstheminstantaneouslyandwithout
effort.Thefourthisparticularizationconsciousness,inthesensethatitdiscriminatesbetweendifferent
thingsdefiledaswellaspure.Thefifthnameissuccessionconsciousness,inthesensethatcontinuously
directedbytheawakeningconsciousnessofattention(_manaskra_)it(_manas_)retainsallexperiencesand
neverlosesorsuffersthedestructionofanykarma,goodaswellasevil,whichhadbeensowninthepast,
andwhoseretribution,painfuloragreeable,itneverfailstomature,beitinthepresentorinthefuture,and
alsointhesensethatitunconsciouslyrecollectsthingsgonebyandinimaginationanticipatesthingsto
come.Thereforethethreedomains(_kmaloka_,domainoffeeling_rpaloka_,domainofbodily
existence_arpaloka_,domainofincorporeality)arenothingbuttheselfmanifestationofthemind(i.e.
_layavijna_whichispracticallyidenticalwith_bhtatathat_).Sinceallthings,owingtheprincipleof
theirexistencetothemind(_layavijna_),areproducedbysm@rti,allthemodesofparticularizationare
theselfparticularizationsofthemind.Themindinitself(orthesoul)beinghoweverfreefromallattributes
isnotdifferentiated.Thereforewecometotheconclusionthatallthingsandconditionsinthephenomenal
world,hypostatizedandestablishedonlythroughignorance(_avidy_)andmemory(_sm@rti_),haveno
morerealitythantheimagesinamirror.Theyarisesimplyfromtheidealityofaparticularizingmind.
Whenthemindisdisturbed,themultiplicityofthingsisproduced;butwhenthemindisquieted,the
multiplicityofthingsdisappears.Byegoconsciousness(_manovijna_)wemeantheignorantmindwhich
byitssuccessionconsciousnessclingstotheconceptionofIandNotIandmisapprehendsthenatureofthe
sixobjectsofsense.Theegoconsciousnessisalsocalledseparationconsciousness,becauseitisnourishedby
theperfuminginfluenceoftheprejudices(_srava_),intellectualaswellasaffectional.Thusbelievinginthe
externalworldproducedbymemory,themindbecomes

135

obliviousoftheprincipleofsameness(_samat_)thatunderliesallthingswhichareoneandperfectlycalmand
tranquilandshownosignofbecoming.

Non-enlightenment is the _raison d'tre_ of samsra. When this is annihilated the conditions--the external world--
are also annihilated and with them the state of an interrelated mind is also annihilated. But this
CHAPTER V 96
annihilationdoesnotmeantheannihilationofthemindbutofitsmodesonly.Itbecomescalmlikean
unruffledseawhenallwindswhichweredisturbingitandproducingthewaveshavebeenannihilated.

Indescribingtherelationoftheinteractionofavidy(ignorance),karmavijna(activityconsciousnessthe
subjectivemind),vi@saya(externalworldrepresentedbythesenses)andthetathat(suchness),As'vaghosasays
thatthereisaninterperfumingoftheseelements.ThusAs'vaghosasays,"Byperfumingwemeanthatwhileour
worldlyclothes(viz.thosewhichwewear)havenoodouroftheirown,neitheroffensivenoragreeable,theycan
yetacquireoneortheotherodouraccordingtothenatureofthesubstancewithwhichtheyareperfumed.
Suchness(_tathat_)islikewiseapuredharmafreefromalldefilementscausedbytheperfumingpowerof
ignorance.Ontheotherhandignorancehasnothingtodowithpurity.Neverthelesswespeakofitsbeingableto
dotheworkofpuritybecauseitinitsturnisperfumedbysuchness.Determinedbysuchnessignorancebecomes
the_raisond'tre_ofallformsofdefilement.Andthisignoranceperfumessuchnessandproducessm@rti.This
sm@rtiinitsturnperfumesignorance.Onaccountofthis(reciprocal)perfuming,thetruthismisunderstood.On
accountofitsbeingmisunderstoodanexternalworldofsubjectivityappears.Further,onaccountofthe
perfumingpowerofmemory,variousmodesofindividuationareproduced.Andbyclingingtothemvarious
deedsaredone,andwesufferastheresultmiseriesmentallyaswellasbodily."Again"suchnessperfumes
ignorance,andinconsequenceofthisperfumingtheindividualinsubjectivityiscausedtoloathethemiseryof
birthanddeathandtoseekaftertheblessingofNirvna.Thislongingandloathingonthepartofthesubjective
mindinturnperfumessuchness.Onaccountofthisperfuminginfluenceweareenabledtobelievethatwearein
possessionwithinourselvesofsuchnesswhoseessentialnatureispureandimmaculate;andwealsorecognizethat
allphenomenaintheworldarenothing

136

buttheillusorymanifestationsofthemind(_layavijna_)andhavenorealityoftheirown.Sincewethus
rightlyunderstandthetruth,wecanpractisethemeansofliberation,canperformthoseactionswhicharein
accordancewiththedharma.Weshouldneitherparticularize,norclingtoobjectsofdesire.Byvirtueofthis
disciplineandhabituationduringthelapseofinnumerablesa@nkhyeyakalpas[Footnoteref1]wegetignorance
annihilated.Asignoranceisthusannihilated,themind(_layavijna_)isnolongerdisturbed,soastobe
subjecttoindividuation.Asthemindisnolongerdisturbed,theparticularizationofthesurroundingworldis
annihilated.Wheninthiswisetheprincipleandtheconditionofdefilement,theirproducts,andthemental
disturbancesareallannihilated,itissaidthatweattainNirv@naandthatvariousspontaneousdisplaysof
activityareaccomplished."TheNirv@naofthetathatphilosophyisnotnothingness,buttathat(suchnessor
thatness)initspurityunassociatedwithanykindofdisturbancewhichproducesallthediversityofexperience.

Tothequestionthatifallbeingsareuniformlyinpossessionofsuchnessandarethereforeequallyperfumed
byit,howisitthattherearesomewhodonotbelieveinit,whileothersdo,As'vagho@sa'sreplyisthat
thoughallbeingsareuniformlyinpossessionofsuchness,theintensityofignoranceandtheprincipleof
individuation,thatworkfromalleternity,varyinsuchmanifoldgradesastooutnumberthesandsofthe
Ganges,andhencethedifference.Thereisaninherentperfumingprincipleinone'sownbeingwhich,
embracedandprotectedbythelove(_maitr_)andcompassion(_karu@n_)ofallBuddhasand
Bodhisattvas,iscausedtoloathethemiseryofbirthanddeath,tobelieveinnirv@na,tocultivatetheroot
ofmerit(_kus'alamla_),tohabituateoneselftoitandtobringittomaturity.Inconsequenceofthis,oneis
enabledtoseeallBuddhasandBodhisattvasand,receivinginstructionsfromthem,isbenefited,gladdened
andinducedtopractisegooddeeds,etc.,tillonecanattaintoBuddhahoodandenterintoNirv@na.This
impliesthatallbeingshavesuchperfumingpowerinthemthattheymaybeaffectedbythegoodwishesof
theBuddhasandBodhisattvasforleadingthemtothepathofvirtue,andthusitisthatsometimeshearing
theBodhisattvasandsometimesseeingthem,"allbeingstherebyacquire(spiritual)benefits(_hitat_)"and
"enteringintothesamdhiofpurity,they
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CHAPTER V 97
[Footnote1:Technicalnameforaveryvastperiodoftime.]

137

destroyhindranceswherevertheyaremetwithandobtainallpenetratinginsightthatenablesthemtobecome
consciousoftheabsoluteoneness(_samat_)oftheuniverse(_sarvaloka_)andtoseeinnumerableBuddhasand
Bodhisattvas."

Thereisadifferencebetweentheperfumingwhichisnotinunisonwithsuchness,asinthecaseofs'rvakas
(theravdinmonks),pratyekabuddhasandthenovicebodhisattvas,whoonlycontinuetheirreligiousdiscipline
butdonotattaintothestateofnonparticularizationinunisonwiththeessenceofsuchness.Butthose
bodhisattvaswhoseperfumingisalreadyinunisonwithsuchnessattaintothestateofnonparticularizationand
allowthemselvestobeinfluencedonlybythepowerofthedharma.Theincessantperfumingofthedefiled
dharma(ignorancefromalleternity)workson,butwhenoneattainstoBuddhahoodoneatonceputsanendto
it.Theperfumingofthepuredharma(i.e.suchness)howeverworksontoeternitywithoutanyinterruption.For
thissuchnessorthatnessistheeffulgenceofgreatwisdom,theuniversalilluminationofthedharmadhtu
(universe),thetrueandadequateknowledge,themindpureandcleaninitsownnature,theeternal,theblessed,
theselfregulatingandthepure,thetranquil,theinimitableandthefree,andthisiscalledthetathgatagarbha
orthedharmakya.Itmaybeobjectedthatsincethatnessorsuchnesshasbeendescribedasbeingwithout
characteristics,itisnowacontradictiontospeakofitasembracingallmerits,butitisheld,thatinspiteofits
embracingallmerits,itisfreeinitsnaturefromallformsofdistinction,becauseallobjectsintheworldareof
oneandthesametaste;andbeingofonerealitytheyhavenothingtodowiththemodesofparticularizationorof
dualisticcharacter."Thoughallthingsintheir(metaphysical)origincomefromthesoulaloneandintruthare
freefromparticularization,yetonaccountofnonenlightenmentthereoriginatesasubjectivemind
(_layavijna_)thatbecomesconsciousofanexternalworld."Thisiscalledignoranceoravidy.Nevertheless
thepureessenceofthemindisperfectlypureandthereisnoawakeningofignoranceinit.Henceweassignto
suchnessthisquality,theeffulgenceofgreatwisdom.Itiscalleduniversalillumination,becausethereisnothing
forittoillumine.Thisperfumingofsuchnessthereforecontinuesforever,thoughthestageoftheperfumingof
avidycomestoanendwiththeBuddhaswhentheyattaintonirv@na.AllBuddhaswhileat

138

thestageofdisciplinefeeladeepcompassion(_mahkaru@n_)forallbeings,practiseallvirtues(_pramits_)
andmanyothermeritoriousdeeds,treatothersastheirownselves,andwishtoworkoutauniversalsalvationof
mankindinagestocome,throughlimitlessnumbersofkalpas,recognizetruthfullyandadequatelytheprinciple
ofequality(_samat_)amongpeople;anddonotclingtotheindividualexistenceofasentientbeing.Thisiswhat
ismeantbytheactivityoftathat.Themainideaofthistathatphilosophyseemstobethis,thatthis
transcendent"thatness"isatoncethequintessenceofallthoughtandactivity;asavidyveilsitorperfumesit,
theworldappearancespringsforth,butasthepurethatnessalsoperfumestheavidythereisastrivingforthe
goodaswell.Asthestageofavidyispasseditsluminouscharactershinesforth,foritistheultimatetruthwhich
onlyillusorilyappearedasthemanyoftheworld.

This doctrine seems to be more in agreement with the view of an absolute unchangeable reality as the ultimate truth
than that of the nihilistic idealism of _La@nkvatra_. Considering the fact that As'vagho@sa was a learned Brahmin
scholar in his early life, it is easy to guess that there was much Upani@sad influence in this interpretation of Buddhism,
which compares so favourably with the Vednta as interpreted by S'a@nkara. The _La@nkvatra_ admitted a reality
only as a make-believe to attract the Tairthikas (heretics) who had a prejudice in favour of an unchangeable self
(_tman_). But As'vagho@sa plainly admitted an unspeakable reality as the ultimate truth. Ngrjuna's Mdhyamika
doctrines which eclipsed the profound philosophy of As'vagho@sa seem to be more faithful to the traditional Buddhist
creed and to the Vijnavda creed of Buddhism as explained in the La@nkvatra [Footnote ref 1].
CHAPTER V 98
TheMdhyamikaortheS'ntavdaschool.Nihilism.

Candrakrtti,thecommentatorofNgrjuna'sversesknownas"_Mdhyamikakrik_,"inexplainingthe
doctrineofdependentorigination(_prattyasamutpda_)asdescribedbyNgrjunastartswithtwo
interpretationsoftheword.Accordingtoonethewordprattyasamutpdameanstheorigination(_utpda_)of
thenonexistent(_abhva_)dependingon(_prattya_)reasonsandcauses

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[Footnote1:AsIhavenoaccesstotheChinesetranslationofAs'vagho@sa's_S'raddhotpdaS'stra_,Ihadto
dependentirelyonSuzuki'sexpressionsastheyappearinhistranslation.]

139

(hetupratyaya).Accordingtotheotherinterpretationprattyameanseachandeverydestructibleindividual
andprattyasamutpdameanstheoriginationofeachandeverydestructibleindividual.Buthedisapproves
ofboththesemeanings.ThesecondmeaningdoesnotsuitthecontextinwhichthePliScripturesgenerally
speakofprattyasamutpda(e.g._cak@su@hprattyarpnicautpadyantecak@survijnam_)foritdoes
notmeantheoriginationofeachandeverydestructibleindividual,buttheoriginatingofspecificindividual
phenomena(e.g.perceptionofformbytheoperationinconnectionwiththeeye)dependinguponcertain
specificconditions.

Thefirstmeaningalsoisequallyunsuitable.Thusforexampleifwetakethecaseofanyorigination,e.g.thatof
thevisualpercept,weseethattherecannotbeanycontactbetweenvisualknowledgeandphysicalsense,theeye,
andsoitwouldnotbeintelligiblethattheformershoulddependuponthelatter.Ifweinterpretthemaximof
prattyasamutpdaasthishappeningthathappens,thatwouldnotexplainanyspecificorigination.All
originationisfalse,forathingcanneitheroriginatebyitselfnorbyothers,norbyacooperationofbothnor
withoutanyreason.Forifathingexistsalreadyitcannotoriginateagainbyitself.Tosupposethatitisoriginated
byotherswouldalsomeanthattheoriginationwasofathingalreadyexisting.Ifagainwithoutanyfurther
qualificationitissaidthatdependingononetheothercomesintobeing,thendependingonanythinganyother
thingcouldcomeintobeingfromlightwecouldhavedarkness!Sinceathingcouldnotoriginatefromitselfor
byothers,itcouldnotalsobeoriginatedbyacombinationofbothofthemtogether.Athingalsocouldnot
originatewithoutanycause,forthenallthingscouldcomeintobeingatalltimes.Itisthereforetobe
acknowledgedthatwherevertheBuddhaspokeofthissocalleddependentorigination(_prattyasamutpda_)it
wasreferredtoasillusorymanifestationsappearingtointellectsandsensesstrickenwithignorance.This
dependentoriginationisnotthusareallaw,butonlyanappearanceduetoignorance(_avidy_).Theonlything
whichisnotlost(_amo@sadharma_)isnirv@na;butallotherformsofknowledgeandphenomena
(_sa@mskra_)arefalseandarelostwiththeirappearances(_sarvasa@mskrs'ca
m@r@smo@sadharm@na@h_).

Itissometimesobjectedtothisdoctrinethatifallappearances
140

are false, then they do not exist at all. There are then no good or bad works and no cycle of existence, and if such is the
case, then it may be argued that no philosophical discussion should be attempted. But the reply to such an objection is
that the nihilistic doctrine is engaged in destroying the misplaced confidence of the people that things are true. Those
who are really wise do not find anything either false or true, for to them clearly they do not exist at all and they do not
trouble themselves with the question of their truth or falsehood. For him who knows thus there are neither works nor
cycles of births (_sa@msra_) and also he does not trouble himself about the existence or non-existence of any of the
appearances. Thus it is said in the Ratnak@tastra that howsoever carefully one may search one cannot discover
consciousness (_citta_); what
CHAPTER V 99
cannotbeperceivedcannotbesaidtoexist,andwhatdoesnotexistisneitherpast,norfuture,norpresent,andas
suchitcannotbesaidtohaveanynatureatall;andthatwhichhasnonatureissubjectneithertooriginationnor
toextinction.Hewhothroughhisfalseknowledge(_viparyysa_)doesnotcomprehendthefalsehoodofall
appearances,butthinksthemtobereal,worksandsuffersthecyclesofrebirth(_sa@msra_).Likeallillusions,
thoughfalsetheseappearancescanproducealltheharmofrebirthandsorrow.

Itmayagainbeobjectedthatifthereisnothingtrueaccordingtothenihilists(_s'nyavdins_),thentheir
statementthatthereisnooriginationorextinctionisalsonottrue.Candrakirttiinreplyingtothissaysthatwith
s'nyavdinsthetruthisabsolutesilence.WhentheS'nyavdinsagesargue,theyonlyacceptforthemoment
whatotherpeopleregardasreasons,anddealwiththemintheirownmannertohelpthemtocometoaright
comprehensionofallappearances.Itisofnousetosay,inspiteofallargumentstendingtoshowthefalsehoodof
allappearances,thattheyaretestifiedbyourexperience,forthewholethingthatwecall"ourexperience"isbut
falseillusioninasmuchasthesephenomenahavenotrueessence.

Whenthedoctrineofprattyasamutpdaisdescribedas"thisbeingthatis,"whatisreallymeantisthatthings
canonlybeindicatedasmereappearancesoneafteranother,fortheyhavenoessenceortruenature.Nihilism
(_s'nyavda_)alsomeansjustthis.Thetruemeaningofprattyasamutpdaors'nyavdaisthis,thatthereis
notruth,noessenceinallphenomenathat

141

appear[Footnoteref1].Asthephenomenahavenoessencetheyareneitherproducednordestroyed;theyreally
neithercomenorgo.Theyaremerelytheappearanceofmayaorillusion.Thevoid(_s'nya_)doesnotmean
purenegation,forthatisrelativetosomekindofposition.Itsimplymeansthatnoneoftheappearanceshaveany
intrinsicnatureoftheirown(_ni@hsvabhvatvam_).

TheMadhyamakaorS'nyasystemdoesnotholdthatanythinghasanyessenceornature(svabhva)ofitsown;
evenheatcannotbesaidtobetheessenceoffire;forboththeheatandthefirearetheresultofthecombination
ofmanyconditions,andwhatdependsonmanyconditionscannotbesaidtobethenatureoressenceofthething.
Thatalonemaybesaidtobethetrueessenceornatureofanythingwhichdoesnotdependonanythingelse,and
sincenosuchessenceornaturecanbepointedoutwhichstandsindependentlybyitselfwecannotsaythatit
exists.Ifathinghasnoessenceorexistenceofitsown,wecannotaffirmtheessenceofotherthingstoit
(_parabhva_).Ifwecannotaffirmanythingofanythingaspositive,wecannotconsequentlyassertanythingof
anythingasnegative.Ifanyonefirstbelievesinthingspositiveandafterwardsdiscoversthattheyarenotso,he
nodoubtthustakeshisstandonanegation(_abhva_),butinrealitysincewecannotspeakofanythingpositive,
wecannotspeakofanythingnegativeeither[Footnoteref2].

Itisagainobjectedthatweneverthelessperceiveaprocessgoingon.TothistheMadhyamakareplyisthata
processofchangecouldnotbeaffirmedofthingsthatarepermanent.Butwecanhardlyspeakofaprocesswith
referencetomomentarythings;forthosewhicharemomentaryaredestroyedthenextmomentaftertheyappear,
andsothereisnothingwhichcancontinuetojustifyaprocess.Thatwhichappearsasbeingneithercomesfrom
anywherenorgoesanywhere,andthatwhichappearsasdestroyedalsodoesnotcomefromanywherenorgo
anywhere,andsoaprocess(_sa@msra_)cannotbeaffirmedofthem.Itcannotbethatwhenthesecondmoment
arose,thefirstmomenthadsufferedachangeintheprocess,foritwasnotthesameasthesecond,asthereisno
socalledcauseeffectconnection.Infacttherebeingnorelationbetweenthetwo,thetemporaldeterminationas
priorandlateriswrong.Thesuppositionthatthereisaselfwhichsufferschangesisalsonotvalid,forhowsoever
we

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[Footnote 1: See _Mdhyamikav@rtti_ (B.T.S.), p. 50.]
CHAPTER V 100
[Footnote2:Ibid.pp.93100.]

142

maysearchwefindthefiveskandhasbutnoself.Moreoverifthesoulisaunityitcannotundergoanyprocessor
progression,forthatwouldpresupposethatthesoulabandonsonecharacterandtakesupanotheratthesame
identicalmomentwhichisinconceivable[Footnoteref1].

Butthenagainthequestionarisesthatifthereisnoprocess,andnocycleofworldlyexistenceofthousandsof
afflictions,whatisthenthenirv@nawhichisdescribedasthefinalextinctionofallafflictions(_kles'a_)?Tothis
theMadhyamakareplyisthatitdoesnotagreetosuchadefinitionofnirv@na.Nirv@naontheMadhyamaka
theoryistheabsenceoftheessenceofallphenomena,thatwhichcannotbeconceivedeitherasanythingwhich
hasceasedorasanythingwhichisproduced(_aniruddhamanntpannam_}.Innirv@naallphenomenaarelost;
wesaythatthephenomenaceasetoexistinnirv@na,butliketheillusorysnakeintheropetheyneverexisted
[Footnoteref2].Nirv@nacannotbeanypositivethingoranysortofstateofbeing(_bhva_),forallpositive
statesorthingsarejointproductsofcombinedcauses(_sa@msk@rta_)andareliabletodecayanddestruction.
Neithercanitbeanegativeexistence,forsincewecannotspeakofanypositiveexistence,wecannotspeakofa
negativeexistenceeither.Theappearancesorthephenomenaarecommunicatedasbeinginastateofchangeand
processcomingoneafteranother,butbeyondthatnoessence,existence,ortruthcanbeaffirmedofthem.
Phenomenasometimesappeartobeproducedandsometimestobedestroyed,buttheycannotbedeterminedas
existentornonexistent.Nirv@naismerelythecessationoftheseemingphenomenalflow
(_prapacaprav@rtti_).Itcannotthereforebedesignatedeitheraspositiveorasnegativefortheseconceptions
belongtophenomena(_nacprav@rttimatrambhvbhvetiparikalpitumpryyateevamna
bhvbhvanirv@nam_,M.V.197).Inthisstatethereisnothingwhichisknown,andeventheknowledgethat
thephenomenahaveceasedtoappearisnotfound.EventheBuddhahimselfisaphenomenon,amirageora
dream,andsoareallhisteachings[Footnoteref3].

Itiseasytoseethatinthissystemtherecannotexistanybondageoremancipation;allphenomenaarelike
shadows,likethemirage,thedream,themy,andthemagicwithoutanyrealnature(_ni@hsvabhva_).Itis
merefalseknowledgetosupposethat

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[Footnote1:See_Madhyamikav@rtti_(B.T.S.),pp.101102.]

[Footnote2:Ibid.p.194.]

[Footnote3:Ibid.pp.162and201.]
143

oneistryingtowinarealnirv@na[Footnoteref1].Itisthisfalseegoismthatistobeconsideredasavidy.
Whenconsidereddeeplyitisfoundthatthereisnoteventheslightesttraceofanypositiveexistence.Thusitis
seenthatiftherewerenoignorance(_avidy_),therewouldhavebeennoconformations(_sa@mskras_),andif
therewerenoconformationstherewouldhavebeennoconsciousness,andsoon;butitcannotbesaidofthe
ignorance"Iamgeneratingthesa@mskras,"anditcanbesaidofthesa@mskras"wearebeingproducedby
theavidy."Buttherebeingavidy,therecomethesa@mskarsandsoonwithothercategoriestoo.This
characteroftheprattyasamutpdaisknownasthecomingoftheconsequentdependingonanantecedent
reason(_hetpanibandha_).

It can be viewed from another aspect, namely that of dependence on conglomeration or combination
(_pratyayopanibandh_). It is by the combination (_samavya_) of the four elements, space (_ks'a_) and
CHAPTER V 101
consciousness(_vijna_)thatamanismade.Itisduetoearth(_p@rthiv_)thatthebodybecomessolid,it
isduetowaterthatthereisfatinthebody,itisduetofirethatthereisdigestion,itisduetowindthatthere
isrespiration;itisduetoks'athatthereisporosity,anditisduetovijnathatthereismind
consciousness.Itisbytheirmutualcombinationthatwefindamanasheis.Butnoneoftheseelements
thinkthattheyhavedoneanyofthefunctionsthatareconsideredtobeallottedtothem.Noneoftheseare
realsubstancesorbeingsorsouls.Itisbyignorancethatthesearethoughtofasexistentsandattachmentis
generatedforthem.Throughignorancethuscomethesa@mskras,consistingofattachment,antipathyand
thoughtlessness(_rga,dve@sa,moha_);fromtheseproceedthevijnaandthefourskandhas.Thesewith
thefourelementsbringaboutnameandform(_nmarpa_),fromtheseproceedthesenses
(_@sa@dayatana_),fromthecomingtogetherofthosethreecomescontact(_spars'a_);fromthatfeelings,
fromthatcomesdesire(_tr@s@n_)andsoon.Theseflowonlikethestreamofariver,butthereisno
essenceortruthbehindthemallorasthegroundofthemall[Footnoteref2].Thephenomenatherefore
cannotbesaidtobeeitherexistentornonexistent,andnotruthcanbeaffirmedofeithereternalism
(_s's'vatavda_)ornihilism(_ucchedavda_),anditisforthisreason

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[Footnote1:See_Mdhyamikav@rtti_(B.T.S.),pp.101108.]

[Footnote:_Ibid._pp.209211,quotedfrom_Slistambhastra_.Vcaspatimis'raalsoquotesthispassageinhis
_Bhmat_onS'a@nkara's_Brahmastra_.]

144

thatthisdoctrineiscalledthemiddledoctrine(_madhyamaka_)[Footnoteref1].Existenceandnonexistence
haveonlyarelativetruth(_samv@rtisatya_)inthem,asinallphenomena,butthereisnotruereality
(_paramrthasatya_)inthemoranythingelse.Moralityplaysashighapartinthisnihilisticsystemasitdoesin
anyotherIndiansystem.IquotebelowsomestanzasfromNgrjuna's_Suk@rllekha_astranslatedbyWenzel
(P.T.S.1886)fromtheTibetantranslation.

6. Knowingthatrichesareunstableandvoid(_asra_)giveaccordingtothemoralprecepts,toBhikshus,
Brahmins,thepoorandfriendsforthereisnobetterfriendthangiving.

7. Exhibitmorality(_s'la_)faultlessandsublime,unmixedandspotless,formoralityisthesupportinggroundof
alleminence,astheearthisofthemovingandimmovable.

8. Exercisetheimponderable,transcendentalvirtuesofcharity,morality,patience,energy,meditation,and
likewisewisdom,inorderthat,havingreachedthefarthershoreoftheseaofexistence,youmaybecomea
Jinaprince.

9. Viewasenemies,avarice(_mtsaryya_),deceit(_s'@thya_),duplicity(_my_),lust,indolence
(_kausdya_),pride(_mna_),greed(_rga_),hatred(_dve@sa_)andpride(_mada_)concerningfamily,
figure,glory,youth,orpower.

15.Sincenothingissodifficultofattainmentaspatience,opennodoorforanger;theBuddhahaspronounced
thathewhorenouncesangershallattainthedegreeofanangmin(asaintwhoneversuffersrebirth).

21.Donotlookafteranother'swife;butifyouseeher,regardher,accordingtoage,likeyourmother,
daughterorsister.

24. Of him who has conquered the unstable, ever moving objects of the six senses and him who has overcome the
mass of his enemies in battle, the wise praise the first as the greater hero.
CHAPTER V 102
29.Thouwhoknowesttheworld,beequanimousagainsttheeightworldlyconditions,gainandloss,
happinessandsuffering,fameanddishonour,blameandpraise,fortheyarenotobjectsforyourthoughts.

37.Butone(awoman)thatisgentleasasister,winningasafriend,carefulofyourwellbeingasamother,
obedientasaservanther(youmust)honourastheguardiangod(dess)ofthefamily.

40. Alwaysperfectlymeditateon(turnyourthoughtsto)kindness,pity,joyandindifference;thenifyoudo
notobtainahigherdegreeyou(certainly)willobtainthehappinessofBrahman'sworld(_brahmavihra_).

41. Bythefourdhynascompletelyabandoningdesire(_kma_),reflection(_vicra_),joy(_prti_),and
happinessandpain(_sukha,du@hkha_)youwillobtainasfruitthelotofaBrahman.

49. Ifyousay"Iamnottheform,youtherebywillunderstandIamnotendowedwithform,Idonotdwellin
form,theformdoesnotdwellinme;andinlikemanneryouwillunderstandthevoidnessoftheotherfour
aggregates."

50. Theaggregatesdonotarisefromdesire,norfromtime,norfrom

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_Mdhyamikav@rtti_(B.T.S.),p.160.]

145
nature(_prak@rti_),notfromthemselves(_svabhvt_),norfromtheLord(_s'vara_),noryetarethey
withoutcause;knowthattheyarisefromignorance(_avidy_)anddesire(_t@r@s@n_).

51.Knowthatattachmenttoreligiousceremonies(_s'labrataparmars'a_),wrongviews
(_mithyd@r@s@ti_)anddoubt(_vicikits_)arethethreefetters.

53.Steadilyinstructyourself(moreandmore)inthehighestmorality,thehighestwisdomandthehighest
thought,forthehundredandfiftyonerules(ofthe_prtimok@sa_)arecombinedperfectlyinthesethree.

58.Becausethus(asdemonstrated)allthisisunstable(_anitya_)withoutsubstance(_antma_)withouthelp
(_as'ara@na_)withoutprotector(_antha_)andwithoutabode(_asthna_)thouOLordofmenmustbecome
discontentedwiththisworthless(_asra_)kadalitreeoftheorb.

104. Ifafireweretoseizeyourheadoryourdressyouwouldextinguishandsubdueit,eventhenendeavourto
annihilatedesire,forthereisnootherhighernecessitythanthis.

105. Bymorality,knowledgeandcontemplation,attainthespotlessdignityofthequietingandthesubduing
nirv@nanotsubjecttoage,deathordecay,devoidofearth,water,fire,wind,sunandmoon.

107.Wherethereisnowisdom(_praj_)thereisalsonocontemplation(_dhyana_),wherethereisno
contemplationthereisalsonowisdom;butknowthatforhimwhopossessesthesetwotheseaofexistenceislike
agrove.

UncompromisingIdealismortheSchoolofVijnavdaBuddhism.

The school of Buddhist philosophy known as the Vijnavda or Yogcra has often been referred to by such
prominent teachers of Hindu thought as Kumrila and S'a@nkara. It agrees to a great extent with the S'nyavdins
whom we have already described. All the dharmas (qualities and substances) are but imaginary
CHAPTER V 103
constructionsofignorantminds.Thereisnomovementinthesocalledexternalworldaswesuppose,foritdoes
notexist.Weconstructitourselvesandthenareourselvesdeludedthatitexistsbyitself(_nirmmitapratimohi_)
[Footnoteref1].Therearetwofunctionsinvolvedinourconsciousness,viz.thatwhichholdstheperceptions
(_khytivijna_),andthatwhichordersthembyimaginaryconstructions(_vastuprativikalpavijna_).The
twofunctionshowevermutuallydetermineeachotherandcannotbeseparatelydistinguished
(_abhinnalak@sa@neanyonyahetuke_).Thesefunctionsaresettoworkonaccountofthebeginningless
instinctivetendenciesinherentintheminrelationtotheworldofappearance(_andiklaprapaca
vsanahetukaca_)[Footnoteref2].

Allsenseknowledgecanbestoppedonlywhenthediverse

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Lankvatrastra_,pp.2122.]

[Footnote2_Ibid._p.44.]

146

unmanifestedinstinctsofimaginationarestopped(_abhtaparikalpavsanvaicitranirodha_)[Footnoteref1].
Allourphenomenalknowledgeiswithoutanyessenceortruth(_nihsvabhva_)andisbutacreationofmy,a
mirageoradream.Thereisnothingwhichmaybecalledexternal,butallistheimaginarycreationofthemind
(_svacitta_),whichhasbeenaccustomedtocreateimaginaryappearancesfrombeginninglesstime.Thismindby
whosemovementthesecreationstakeplaceassubjectandobjecthasnoappearanceinitselfandisthuswithout
anyorigination,existenceandextinction(_utpdasthitibha@ngavarjjam_)andiscalledthelayavijna.The
reasonwhythislayavijnaitselfissaidtobewithoutorigination,existence,andextinctionisprobablythis,that
itisalwaysahypotheticalstatewhichmerelyexplainsallthephenomenalstatesthatappear,andthereforeithas
noexistenceinthesenseinwhichthetermisusedandwecouldnotaffirmanyspecialessenceofit.

Wedonotrealizethatallvisiblephenomenaareofnothingexternalbutofourownmind(_svacitta_),and
thereisalsothebeginninglesstendencyforbelievingandcreatingaphenomenalworldofappearance.There
isalsothenatureofknowledge(whichtakesthingsastheperceiverandtheperceived)andthereisalsothe
instinctinthemindtoexperiencediverseforms.Onaccountofthesefourreasonsthereareproducedinthe
layavijna(mind)theripplesofoursenseexperiences(_prav@rttivijana_)asinalake,andtheseare
manifestedassenseexperiences.Allthefiveskandhascalled_pachavijnakya_thusappearinaproper
syntheticform.Noneofthephenomenalknowledgethatappearsiseitheridenticalordifferentfromthe
layavijnajustasthewavescannotbesaidtobeeitheridenticalordifferentfromtheocean.Astheocean
dancesoninwavessothecittaorthelayavijnaisalsodancingasitwereinitsdiverseoperations
(_v@rtti_).Ascittaitcollectsallmovements(_karma_)withinit,asmanasitsynthesizes(_vidhyate_)and
asvijnaitconstructsthefivefoldperceptions(_vijnnvijntid@rs'yamkalpatepacabhi@h_)
[Footnoteref2].

Itisonlyduetomy(illusion)thatthephenomenaappearintheirtwofoldaspectassubjectandobject.This
mustalwaysberegardedasanappearance(_samv@rtisatyat_)whereasintherealaspectwecouldneversay
whethertheyexisted(_bhva_)ordidnotexist[Footnoteref3].

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Pacvatrastra_,p.44.]
[Footnote2:Ibid., pp. 50-55.]
CHAPTER V 104
[Footnote3:Asa@nga's_Mahynastrla@mkra_,pp.5859.]

147

Allphenomenabothbeingandnonbeingareillusory(_sadasanta@hmyopam@h_).Whenwelookdeeplyinto
themwefindthatthereisanabsolutenegationofallappearances,includingevenallnegations,fortheyarealso
appearances.Thiswouldmaketheultimatetruthpositive.Butthisisnotso,foritisthatinwhichthepositive
andnegativeareoneandthesame(_bhvbhvasamnat_)[Footnoteref1].Suchastatewhichiscompletein
itselfandhasnonameandnosubstancehadbeendescribedintheLa@nkvatrastraasthatness(_tathat_)
[Footnoteref2].Thisstateisalsodescribedinanotherplaceinthe_La@nkvatra_asvoidness(_s'nyat_)
whichisoneandhasnooriginationandnoessence[Footnoteref3].Inanotherplaceitisalsodesignatedas
tathgatagarbha[Footnoteref4].

ItmaybesupposedthatthisdoctrineofanunqualifiedultimatetruthcomesneartotheVedantictmanor
BrahmanlikethetathatdoctrineofAs'vagho@sa;andwefindinLa@nkavatrathatRva@naasksthe
Buddha"Howcanyousaythatyourdoctrineoftathgatagarbhawasnotthesameasthetmandoctrineofthe
otherschoolsofphilosophers,forthosehereticsalsoconsiderthetmanaseternal,agent,unqualified,all
pervadingandunchanged?"TothistheBuddhaisfoundtoreplythus"Ourdoctrineisnotthesameasthe
doctrineofthoseheretics;itisinconsiderationofthefactthattheinstructionofaphilosophywhichconsidered
thattherewasnosoulorsubstanceinanything(nairatmya)wouldfrightenthedisciples,thatIsaythatallthings
areinrealitythetathgatagarbha.Thisshouldnotberegardedastman.Justasalumpofclayismadeinto
variousshapes,soitisthenonessentialnatureofallphenomenaandtheirfreedomfromallcharacteristics
(_sarvavikalpalak@sa@navinivrttam_)thatisvariouslydescribedasthegarbhaorthenairtmya
(essencelessness).Thisexplanationoftathgatagarbhaastheultimatetruthandrealityisgiveninordertoattract
toourcreedthosehereticswhoaresuperstitiouslyinclinedtobelieveinthetmandoctrine[Footnoteref5]."

Sofarastheappearanceofthephenomenawasconcerned,theidealisticBuddhists(_vijnavdins_)agreedto
thedoctrineofprattyasamutpdawithcertainmodifications.Therewaswiththemanexternal
prattyasamutpdajustasitappearedinthe

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[Footnote1:Asa@nga's_Mahynastrla@mkra_,p.65.]
[Footnote2:_Lankvatrastra_,p.70.]

[Footnote3:_Ibid._p.78.]
[Footnote4:_Ibid._p.80.]

[Footnote5:_Ibid._pp.8081.]

148

objectiveaspectandaninternalprattyasamutpda.Theexternalprattyasamutpda(dependentorigination)is
representedinthewayinwhichmaterialthings(e.g.ajug)cameintobeingbythecooperationofdiverse
elementsthelumpofclay,thepotter,thewheel,etc.Theinternal(_dhytmika_)prattyasamutpdawas
representedbyavidy,t@r@s@n,karma,theskandhas,andtheyatanasproducedoutofthem[Footnoteref
1].
Ourunderstandingiscomposedoftwocategoriescalledthepravichayabuddhi and the
CHAPTER V 105
_vikalpalak@sa@nagrahbhinives'aprati@s@thapikbuddhi_.Thepravicayabuddhiisthatwhichalwaysseeks
totakethingsineitherofthefollowingfourways,thattheyareeitherthisortheother(_ekatvnyaiva_);either
bothornotboth(_ubhaynubhaya_),eitherareorarenot(_astinsti_),eithereternalornoneternal
(_nitynitya_).Butinrealitynoneofthesecanbeaffirmedofthephenomena.Thesecondcategoryconsistsofthat
habitofthemindbyvirtueofwhichitconstructsdiversitiesandarrangesthem(createdintheirturnbyitsown
constructiveactivity_parikalpa_)inalogicalorderofdiverserelationsofsubjectandpredicate,causalandother
relations.Hewhoknowsthenatureofthesetwocategoriesofthemindknowsthatthereisnoexternalworldof
matterandthattheyareallexperiencedonlyinthemind.Thereisnowater,butitisthesenseconstructionof
smoothness(_sneha_)thatconstructsthewaterasanexternalsubstance;itisthesenseconstructionofactivityor
energythatconstructstheexternalsubstanceoffire;itisthesenseconstructionofmovementthatconstructsthe
externalsubstanceofair.Inthiswaythroughthefalsehabitoftakingtheunrealasthereal
(_mithysatybhinives'a_)fiveskandhasappear.Iftheseweretoappearalltogether,wecouldnotspeakofany
kindofcausalrelations,andiftheyappearedinsuccessiontherecouldbenoconnectionbetweenthem,asthereis
nothingtobindthemtogether.Inrealitythereisnothingwhichisproducedordestroyed,itisonlyour
constructiveimaginationthatbuildsupthingsasperceivedwithalltheirrelations,andourselvesasperceivers.It
issimplyaconvention(_vyavahra_)tospeakofthingsasknown[Footnoteref2].Whateverwedesignateby
speechismerespeechconstruction(_vgvikalpa_)andunreal.Inspeechonecouldnotspeakofanythingwithout
relatingthingsinsomekindofcausal

___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:_La@nkvatrastra_,p.85.]

[Footnote2:_Lankvatrastra_,p.87,comparetheterm"vyavahrika"asusedofthephenomenalandthe
conventionalworldinalmostthesamesensebyS'a@nkara.]

149

relation,butnoneofthesecharactersmaybesaidtobetrue;therealtruth(_paramartha_)canneverbe
referredtobysuchspeechconstruction.

Thenothingness(_s'nyata_)ofthingsmaybeviewedfromsevenaspects(1)thattheyarealways
interdependent,andhencehavenospecialcharacteristicsbythemselves,andastheycannotbedeterminedin
themselvestheycannotbedeterminedintermsofothers,for,theirownnaturebeingundetermined,areferenceto
an"other"isalsoundetermined,andhencetheyareallindefinable(_laksanas'nyata_);(2)thattheyhaveno
positiveessence(_bhvasvabhvas'nyat_),sincetheyspringupfromanaturalnonexistence
(_svabhvbhvotpatti_);(3)thattheyareofanunknowntypeofnonexistence(_apracaritas'nyat_),sinceall
theskandhasvanishinthenirvana;(4)thattheyappearphenomenallyasconnectedthoughnonexistent
(_pracaritas'nyat_),fortheirskandhashavenorealityinthemselvesnoraretheyrelatedtoothers,butyetthey
appeartobesomehowcausallyconnected;(5)thatnoneofthethingscanbedescribedashavinganydefinite
nature,theyareallundemonstrablebylanguage(_nirabhilapyas'nyat_);(6)thattherecannotbeany
knowledgeaboutthemexceptthatwhichisbroughtaboutbythelongstandingdefectsofdesireswhichpolluteall
ourvision;(7)thatthingsarealsononexistentinthesensethatweaffirmthemtobeinaparticularplaceand
timeinwhichtheyarenot(_itaretaras'nyat_).

Thereisthusonlynonexistence,whichagainisneithereternalnordestructible,andtheworldisbutadream
andamy;thetwokindsofnegation(_nirodha_)areks'a(space)andnirvana;thingswhichareneither
existentnornonexistentareonlyimaginedtobeexistentbyfools.

This view apparently comes into conflict with the doctrine of this school, that the reality is called the
tathgatagarbha (the womb of all that is merged in thatness) and all the phenomenal appearances of the clusters
(_skandhas_), elements (_dhtus_), and fields of sense operation (_yatanas_) only serve to veil it
CHAPTER V 106
withimpurities,andthiswouldbringitnearertotheassumptionofauniversalsoulasthereality.Butthe
_La@nkvatra_attemptstoexplainawaythisconflictbysuggestingthatthereferencetothetathgatagarbha
astherealityisonlyasortoffalsebaittoattractthosewhoareafraidoflisteningtothenairtmya(nonsoul
doctrine)[Footnoteref1].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_La@nkvatrastra_,p.80.

150

TheBodhisattvasmayattaintheirhighestbythefourfoldknowledgeof(1)_svacittad@rs'hyabhvan_,(2)
_utpdasthitibha@ngavivarjjanat_,(3)_bhyabhvbhvopalak@sa@nat_and(4)
_svapratyryyajndhigambhinnalak@sa@nat_.Thefirstmeansthatallthingsarebutcreationsofthe
imaginationofone'smind.Thesecondmeansthatasthingshavenoessencethereisnoorigination,existenceor
destruction.Thethirdmeansthatoneshouldknowthedistinctivesenseinwhichallexternalthingsaresaid
eithertobeexistentornonexistent,fortheirexistenceismerelylikethemiragewhichisproducedbythe
beginninglessdesire(_vsan_)ofcreatingandperceivingthemanifold.Thisbringsustothefourthone,which
meanstherightcomprehensionofthenatureofallthings.

Thefourdhynasspokenofinthe_Lankvatra_seemtobedifferentfromthosewhichhavebeendescribedin
connectionwiththeTheravdaBuddhism.Thesedhynasarecalled(1)_blopacrika_,(2)arthapravichaya,(3)
_tathatlambana_and(4)_tathgata_.Thefirstoneissaidtobethatpractisedbythes'rvakasandthe
pratyekabuddhas.Itconsistsinconcentratinguponthedoctrinethatthereisnosoul(_pudgalanairtmya_),and
thateverythingistransitory,miserableandimpure.Whenconsideringallthingsinthiswayfrombeginningto
endthesageadvancesontillallconceptualknowingceases(_sa@mjnirodht_);wehavewhatiscalledthe
vlopacrikadhyna(themeditationforbeginners).

Thesecondistheadvancedstatewherenotonlythereisfullconsciousnessthatthereisnoself,butthereisalso
thecomprehensionthatneitherthesenorthedoctrinesofotherhereticsmaybesaidtoexist,andthatthereis
noneofthedharmasthatappears.Thisiscalledthe_arthapravicayadhyna_,forthesageconcentrateshereon
thesubjectofthoroughlyseekingout(_pravichaya_)thenatureofallthings(_artha_).

Thethirddhyna,thatinwhichthemindrealizesthatthethoughtthatthereisnoselfnorthattherearethe
appearances,isitselftheresultofimaginationandthuslapsesintothethatness(_tathat_).Thisdhynais
called_tathatlambana_,becauseithasforitsobjecttathatorthatness.

Thelastorthefourthdhynaisthatinwhichthelapseofthemindintothestateofthatnessissuchthatthe
nothingnessandincomprehensibilityofallphenomenaisperfectlyrealized;

151

andnirvnaisthatinwhichallrootdesires(_vsan_)manifestingthemselvesinknowledgearedestroyedand
themindwithknowledgeandperceptions,makingfalsecreations,ceasestowork.Thiscannotbecalleddeath,
foritwillnothaveanyrebirthanditcannotbecalleddestruction,foronlycompoundedthings
(_sa@msk@rta_)sufferdestruction,sothatitisdifferentfromeitherdeathordestruction.Thisnirvnais
differentfromthatofthes'rvakasandthepratyekabuddhasfortheyaresatisfiedtocallthatstatenirv@na,
inwhichbytheknowledgeofthegeneralcharacteristicsofallthings(transitorinessandmisery)theyarenot
attachedtothingsandceasetomakeerroneousjudgments[Footnoteref1].

Thus we see that there is no cause (in the sense of ground) of all these phenomena as other heretics maintain. When
it is said that the world is my or illusion, what is meant to be emphasized is this, that there is no
CHAPTER V 107
cause,noground.Thephenomenathatseemtooriginate,stay,andbedestroyedaremereconstructionsoftainted
imagination,andthetathatorthatnessisnothingbuttheturningawayofthisconstructiveactivityornatureof
theimagination(_vikalpa_)taintedwiththeassociationsofbeginninglessrootdesires(_vsan_)[Footnoteref2].
Thetathathasnoseparaterealityfromillusion,butitisillusionitselfwhenthecourseoftheconstructionof
illusionhasceased.Itisthereforealsospokenofasthatwhichiscutoffordetachedfromthemind
(_cittavimukta_),forherethereisnoconstructionofimagination(_sarvakalpanavirahitam_)[Footnoteref3].

SautrntikaTheoryofPerception.

Dharmottara(847A.D.),acommentatorofDharmakrtti's[Footnoteref4](about635A.D.)_Nyyabindu_,a
Sautrantikalogicalandepistemologicalwork,describesrightknowledge(_samyagjna_)asaninvariable
antecedenttotheaccomplishmentofallthataman

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Lankvatarastra_,p.100.]

[Footnote2:_Ibid._p.109.]

[Footnote3:ThisaccountoftheVijanavadaschooliscollectedmainlyfrom_Lankvatrastra_,asnoother
authenticworkoftheVijnavdaschoolisavailable.Hinduaccountsandcriticismsofthisschoolmaybehadin
suchbooksasKumarila's_S'lokavrttika_orS'a@nkara'sbhasya,II.ii,etc.Asak@nga's
_Mahynastralamkra_dealsmorewiththedutiesconcerningthecareerofasaint(_Bodhisattva_)thanwith
themetaphysicsofthesystem.]

[Footnote4:DharmakrtticallshimselfanadherentofVijanavdainhis_Santnntarasiddhi_,atreatiseon
solipsism,buthis_Nyyabindu_seemsrightlytohavebeenconsideredbytheauthorof
_Nyyabindu@tk@tippani_(p.19)asbeingwrittenfromtheSautrntikapointofview.]

152

desires to have (_samyagjnaprvik sarvapuru@srthasiddhi_) [Footnote ref 1]. When on proceeding, in accordance
with the presentation of any knowledge, we get a thing as presented by it we call it right knowledge. Right knowledge is
thus the knowledge by which one can practically acquire the thing he wants to acquire (_arthdhigati_). The process of
knowledge, therefore, starts with the perceptual presentation and ends with the attainment of the thing represented by
it and the fulfilment of the practical need by it (_arthdhigamt sampta@h pram@navyprah_). Thus there are
three moments in the perceptual acquirement of knowledge: (1) the presentation, (2) our prompting in accordance
with it, and (3) the final realization of the object in accordance with our endeavour following the direction of
knowledge. Inference is also to be called right knowledge, as it also serves our practical need by representing the
presence of objects in certain connections and helping us to realize them. In perception this presentation is direct, while
in inference this is brought about indirectly through the li@nga (reason). Knowledge is sought by men for the realization
of their ends, and the subject of knowledge is discussed in philosophical works only because knowledge is sought by
men. Any knowledge, therefore, which will not lead us to the realization of the object represented by it could not be
called right knowledge. All illusory perceptions, therefore, such as the perception of a white conch-shell as yellow or
dream perceptions, are not right knowledge, since they do not lead to the realization of such objects as are presented
by them. It is true no doubt that since all objects are momentary, the object which was perceived at the moment of
perception was not the same as that which was realized at a later moment. But the series of existents which started
with the first perception of a blue object finds itself realized by the realization of other existents of the same series
(_nldau ya eva santna@h paricchinno nilajnena sa eva tena prpita@h tena nilajnam pram@nam_) [Footnote
ref 2].
CHAPTER V 108
Whenitissaidthatrightknowledgeisaninvariableantecedentoftherealizationofanydesirablethingorthe
retardingofanyundesirablething,itmustbenotedthatitisnotmeant

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Briefextractsfromtheopinionsoftwoothercommentatorsof_Nyyaybindu_,Vintadevaand
S'antabhadra(seventhcentury),arefoundin_Nyyabindu@tktippan_,acommentaryof_Nyayabindutik_of
Dharmmottara,buttheirtextsarenotavailabletous.]

[Footnote2:_Nyyabindu@tk@tippan_,p.11.]

153

thatrightknowledgeisdirectlythecauseofit;for,withtheriseofanyrightperception,thereisamemory
ofpastexperiences,desireisaroused,throughdesireanendeavourinaccordancewithitislaunched,and
asaresultofthatthereisrealizationoftheobjectofdesire.Thus,lookedatfromthispointofview,right
knowledgeisnotdirectlythecauseoftherealizationoftheobject.Rightknowledgeofcoursedirectly
indicatesthepresentation,theobjectofdesire,butsofarastheobjectisamerepresentationitisnota
subjectofenquiry.Itbecomesasubjectofenquiryonlyinconnectionwithourachievingtheobject
presentedbyperception.

Perception(_pratyaks'a_)hasbeendefinedbyDharmakrttiasapresentation,whichisgeneratedbytheobjects
alone,unassociatedbyanynamesorrelations(_kalpan_)andwhichisnoterroneous
(_kalpanpo@dhamabhrntam_)[Footnoteref1].Thisdefinitiondoesnotindeedrepresenttheactualnature
(_svarpa_)ofperception,butonlyshowstheconditionwhichmustbefulfilledinorderthatanythingmaybe
validperception.Whatismeantbysayingthataperceptionisnoterroneousissimplythis,thatitwillbesuch
thatifoneengageshimselfinanendeavourinaccordancewithit,hewillnotbebaffledintheobjectwhichwas
presentedtohimbyhisperception(_tasmdgrhyearthevasturpeyadaviparyastamtadabhrntamiha
veditavyam_}.Itissaidthatarightperceptioncouldnotbeassociatedwithnames(_kalpan_or_abhilpa_).
Thisqualificationisaddedonlywithaviewofleavingoutallthatisnotdirectlygeneratedbytheobject.Aname
isgiventoathingonlywhenitisassociatedinthemind,throughmemory,asbeingthesameasperceivedbefore.
Thiscannot,therefore,beregardedasbeingproducedbytheobjectofperception.Thesensespresenttheobjects
bycomingincontactwiththem,andtheobjectsalsomustofnecessityallowthemselvestobepresentedasthey
arewhentheyareincontactwiththepropersenses.Buttheworkofrecognitionorgivingnamesisnotwhatis
directlyproducedbytheobjectsthemselves,forthisinvolvestheunificationofpreviousexperiences,andthisis
certainlynotwhatispresented

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Thedefinitionfirstgiveninthe_Pramnasamucaya_(notavailableinSanskrit)ofDi@nnga(500
A.D.)was"_Kalpanpodham_."AccordingtoDharmakirttiitistheindeterminateknowledge(_nirvikalpa
jna_)consistingonlyofthecopyoftheobjectpresentedtothesensesthatconstitutesthevalidelement
presentedtoperception.Thedeterminateknowledge(_savikalpajna_),asformedbytheconceptualactivityof
themindidentifyingtheobjectwithwhathasbeenexperiencedbefore,cannotberegardedastrulyrepresenting
whatisreallypresentedtothesenses.]

154

to the sense (_prvad@r@s@tparad@r@s@tacrthamekkurvadvijnamasannihitavi@sayam

prvad@r@s@tasysannihitatvt_). In all illusory perceptions it is the sense which is affected either by extraneous
or by inherent physiological causes. If the senses are not perverted they are bound to present the object correctly.
Perception thus means the correct presentation through the senses of an object in its own
CHAPTER V 109
uniquenessascontainingonlythosefeatureswhichareitsanditsalone(_svalak@sa@nam_).Thevalidityof
knowledgeconsistsinthesamenessthatithaswiththeobjectspresentedbyit(_arthenasahayatsrpyam
sd@rs'yamasyajnasyatatpram@namiha_).Buttheobjectionhereisthatifourperceptisonlysimilar
totheexternalobjectthenthissimilarityisathingwhichisdifferentfromthepresentation,andthus
perceptionbecomesinvalid.Butthesimilarityisnotdifferentfromtheperceptwhichappearsasbeing
similartotheobject.Itisbyvirtueoftheirsamenessthatwerefertotheobjectbythepercept(_taditi
srpyamtasyavas't_)andourperceptionoftheobjectbecomespossible.Itisbecausewehavean
awarenessofbluenessthatwespeakofhavingperceivedablueobject.Therelation,however,betweenthe
notionofsimilarityoftheperceptionwiththeblueobjectandtheindefiniteawarenessofblueinperception
isnotoneofcausationbutofadeterminantandadeterminate(_vyavasthpyavyavasthpakabhvena_).
Thusitisthesamecognitionwhichinoneformstandsassignifyingthesimilaritywiththeobjectof
perceptionandisinanotherindefiniteformtheawarenessasthepercept(_tataekasyavastuna@h
kicidrpampram@namkicitpram@naphalamnavirudhyate_).Itisonaccountofthissimilaritywith
theobjectthatacognitioncanbeadeterminantofthedefiniteawareness(_vyavasthpanaheturhi
srpyam_),sothatbythedeterminateweknowthedeterminantandthusbythesimilarityofthesense
datumwiththeobject{_pram@na_)wecometothinkthatourawarenesshasthisparticularformas
"blue"(_pram@naphala_).Ifthissamenessbetweentheknowledgeanditsobjectwasnotfeltwecouldnot
havespokenoftheobjectfromtheawareness(_srpyamanubhtamvyavasthpanahetu@h_).Theobject
generatesanawarenesssimilartoitself,anditisthiscorrespondencethatcanleadustotherealizationof
theobjectsopresentedbyrightknowledge[Footnoterefl].

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Seealsopp.340and409.Itisunfortunatethat,exceptingthe_Nyyabindu,Nyyabindu@tk,
Nyyabindu@tk@tippan_(StPetersburg,1909),nootherworksdealingwiththisinterestingdoctrineof
perceptionareavailabletous._Nyyabindu_isprobablyoneoftheearliestworksinwhichwehearofthe
doctrineof_arthakriykritva_(practicalfulfilmentofourdesireasacriterionofrightknowledge).Lateronit
wasregardedasacriterionofexistence,asRatnakrtti'sworksandtheprofusereferencesbyHinduwritersto
theBuddhisticdoctrinesprove.Theword_arthakriy_isfoundinCandrakrtti'scommentaryonNgrjunaand
alsoinsuchearlyworksasLalitavistara(pointedouttomebyDrE.J.ThomasoftheCambridgeUniversity
Library)butthewordhasnophilosophicalsignificancethere.]

155
SautrntikatheoryofInference[Footnoteref1].

AccordingtotheSautrntikadoctrineofBuddhismasdescribedbyDharmakrttiandDharmmottarawhichis
probablytheonlyaccountofsystematicBuddhistlogicthatisnowavailabletousinSanskrit,inference
(_anumna_)isdividedintotwoclasses,calledsvrthnumna(inferentialknowledgeattainedbyaperson
arguinginhisownmindorjudgments),andparrthnumna(inferencethroughthehelpofarticulated
propositionsforconvincingothersinadebate).Thevalidityofinferencedepended,likethevalidityofperception,
oncopyingtheactuallyexistingfactsoftheexternalworld.Inferencecopiedexternalrealitiesasmuchas
perceptiondid;justasthevalidityoftheimmediateperceptionofbluedependsuponitssimilaritytotheexternal
bluethingperceived,sothevalidityoftheinferenceofabluethingalso,sofarasitisknowledge,dependsuponits
resemblancetotheexternalfactthusinferred(_srpyavas'ddhitannlaprattirpamsidhyati_).

The reason by which an inference is made should be such that it may be present only in those cases where the thing to
be inferred exists, and absent in every case where it does not exist. It is only when the reason is tested by both these
joint conditions that an unfailing connection (_pratibandha_) between the reason and the thing to be inferred can be
established. It is not enough that the reason should be present in all cases where the thing to be inferred exists and
absent where it does not exist, but it is necessary that it should be present only in the
CHAPTER V 110
abovecase.Thislaw(_niyama_)isessentialforestablishingtheunfailingconditionnecessaryforinference
[Footnoteref2].Thisunfailingnaturalconnection(_svabhvapratibandha_)isfoundintwotypes

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Asthe_Pram@nasamuccaya_ofDingaisnotavailableinSanskrit,wecanhardlyknow
anythingofdevelopedBuddhistlogicexceptwhatcanbegotfromthe_Nyyabindu@tk_of
Dharmmottara.]

[Footnote2:_tasmtniyamavatorevnvayavyatirekayo@hprayoga@hkarttavya@hyenapratibandho
gamyetasdhanyasasdhyena.Nyyabindu@tk_,p.24.]

156

ofcases.Thefirstisthatwherethenatureofthereasoniscontainedinthethingtobeinferredasapartofits
nature,i.e.wherethereasonstandsforaspeciesofwhichthethingtobeinferredisagenus;thusastupidperson
livinginaplacefulloftallpinesmaycometothinkthatpinesarecalledtreesbecausetheyaretallanditmaybe
usefultopointouttohimthatevenasmallpineplantisatreebecauseitispine;thequalityofpinenessformsa
partoftheessenceoftreeness,fortheformerbeingaspeciesiscontainedinthelatterasagenus;thenatureof
thespeciesbeingidenticalwiththenatureofthegenus,onecouldinferthelatterfromtheformerbutnot_vice
versa_;thisiscalledtheunfailingnaturalconnectionofidentityofnature(_tdtmya_).Thesecondisthatwhere
thecauseisinferredfromtheeffectwhichstandsasthereasonoftheformer.Thusfromthesmokethefirewhich
hasproduceditmaybeinferred.Thegroundoftheseinferencesisthatreasonisnaturallyindissolublyconnected
withthethingtobeinferred,andunlessthisisthecase,noinferenceiswarrantable.

Thisnaturalindissolubleconnection(_svabhvapratibandha_),beitofthenatureofidentityofessenceofthe
speciesinthegenusorinseparableconnectionoftheeffectwiththecause,isthegroundofallinference[Footnote
ref1].Thesvabhvapratibandhadeterminestheinseparabilityofconnection(avinbhvaniyama)andthe
inferenceismadenotthroughaseriesofpremisses,butdirectlybytheli@nga(reason)whichhasthe
inseparableconnection[Footnoteref2].

Thesecondtypeofinferenceknownasparrthnumnaagreeswithsvrthnumnainallessential
characteristics;themaindifferencebetweenthetwoisthis,thatinthecaseofparrthnumna,theinferential
processhastobeputverballyinpremisses.

PanditRatnkarasnti,probablyoftheninthorthetenthcenturyA.D.,wroteapapernamed
_Antarvyptisamarthana_inwhich

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_nahiyoyatrasvabhvenanapratibaddha@hsatamapratibaddhavi@sayamavs'yamevana
vyabhicarattinstitayoravyabhicraniyama.Nyyabindu@tk_,p.29.]

[Footnote2:Theinseparableconnectiondetermininginferenceisonlypossiblewhentheli@ngasatisfiesthe
threefollowingconditions,viz.(1)pak@sasattva(existenceoftheli@ngainthepak@sathethingaboutwhich
somethingisinferred);(2)sapak@sasattva(existenceoftheli@ngainthosecaseswherethesdhyaoc
probandumexisted),and(3)vipak@ssattva(itsnonexistenceinallthoseplaceswherethesdhyadidnotexist).
TheBuddhistsadmittedthreepropositionsinasyllogism,e.g.Thehillhasfire,becauseithassmoke,likea
kitchenbutunlikealake.]
157
CHAPTER V 111
hetriedtoshowthattheconcomitanceisnotbetweenthosecaseswhichpossesstheli@ngaorreasonwiththe
caseswhichpossessthesdhya(probandum)butbetweenthatwhichhasthecharacteristicsoftheli@ngawith
thatwhichhasthecharacteristicsofthesdhya(probandum);orinotherwordstheconcomitanceisnotbetween
theplacescontainingthesmokesuchaskitchen,etc.,andtheplacescontainingfirebutbetweenthatwhichhas
thecharacteristicoftheli@nga,viz.thesmoke,andthatwhichhasthecharacteristicofthesdhya,viz.thefire.
Thisviewofthenatureofconcomitanceisknownasinnerconcomitance(_antarvypti_),whereastheformer,viz.
theconcomitancebetweenthethingpossessingli@ngaandthatpossessingsdhya,isknownasouter
concomitance(_bahirvypti_)andgenerallyacceptedbytheNyyaschoolofthought.Thisantarvyptidoctrine
ofconcomitanceisindeedalaterBuddhistdoctrine.

ItmaynotbeoutofplaceheretoremarkthatevidencesofsomeformofBuddhistlogicprobablygobackatleast
asearlyasthe_Kathvatthu_(200B.C.).ThusAungontheevidenceoftheYamakapointsoutthatBuddhistlogic
atthetimeofAs'oka"wasconversantwiththedistributionofterms"andtheprocessofconversion.Hefurther
pointsoutthatthelogicalpremissessuchastheudhara@na(_Yoyoaggimsosodhmav_whateverisfiery
issmoky),theupanayana(_ayampabbatodhmav_thishillissmoky)andtheniggama(_tasmdayam
aggim_thereforethatisfiery)werealsoknown.(Aungfurthersumsupthemethodoftheargumentswhichare
foundinthe_Kathvatthu_asfollows:

"Adherent.Is_AB_?(_@thpan_).Opponent.Yes.

Adherent.Is_CD_?(_ppan_).Opponent.No.

Adherent.ButifAbeBthen(youshouldhavesaid)CisD.ThatBcanbeaffirmedofAbutDofCisfalse.
Henceyourfirstanswerisrefuted.")

Theantecedentofthehypotheticalmajorpremissistermed@thpan,becausetheopponent'sposition,AisB,
isconditionallyestablishedforthepurposeofrefutation.

Theconsequentofthehypotheticalmajorpremissistermedppanbecauseitisgotfromtheantecedent.And
theconclusion

158
istermedropa@nabecausetheregulationisplacedontheopponent.Next:

"IfDbederivedofC.ThenBshouldhavebeenderivedofA.ButyouaffirmedBofA.(therefore)ThatBcanbe
affirmedofAbutnotofDorCiswrong."

Thisisthepa@tiloma,inverseorindirectmethod,ascontrastedwiththeformerordirectmethod,anuloma.In
bothmethodstheconsequentisderived.Butifwereversethehypotheticalmajorinthelattermethodweget

"IfAisBCisD.ButAisB.ThereforeCisD.

Bythisindirectmethodtheopponent'ssecondanswerisreestablished[Footnoteref1]."
TheDoctrineofMomentariness.

Ratnakrtti (950 A.D.) sought to prove the momentariness of all existence (_sattva_), first, by the concomitance
discovered by the method of agreement in presence (_anvayavypti_), and then by the method of difference by proving
that the production of effects could not be justified on the assumption of things being permanent and hence accepting
the doctrine of momentariness as the only alternative. Existence is defined as the capacity of producing anything
(_arthakriykritva_). The form of the first type of argument by
CHAPTER V 112
anvayavyptimaybegiventhus:"Whateverexistsismomentary,byvirtueofitsexistence,asforexample
thejug;allthingsaboutthemomentarinessofwhichwearediscussingareexistentsandaretherefore
momentary."Itcannotbesaidthatthejugwhichhasbeenchosenasanexampleofanexistentisnot
momentary;forthejugisproducingcertaineffectsatthepresentmoment;anditcannotbeheldthatthese
areallidenticalinthepastandthefutureorthatitisproducingnoeffectatallinthepastandfuture,for
thefirstisimpossible,forthosewhicharedonenowcouldnotbedoneagaininthefuture;thesecondis
impossible,forifithasanycapacityto

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote:1:Seeintroductiontothetranslationof_Kathvatthu_(_PointsofControversy_)byMrsRhys
Davids.]

159

produceeffectsitmustnotceasedoingso,asinthatcaseonemightaswellexpectthatthereshouldnotbeany
effectevenatthepresentmoment.Whateverhasthecapacityofproducinganythingatanytimemustofnecessity
doit.Soifitdoesproduceatonemomentanddoesnotproduceatanother,thiscontradictionwillprovethe
suppositionthatthethingsweredifferentatthedifferentmoments.Ifitisheldthatthenatureofproduction
variesatdifferentmoments,thenalsothethingatthosetwomomentsmustbedifferent,forathingcouldnot
haveinittwocontradictorycapacities.

Sincethejugdoesnotproduceatthepresentmomenttheworkofthepastandthefuturemoments,itcannot
evidentlydoso,andhenceisnotidenticalwiththejuginthepastandinthefuture,forthefactthatthejughas
thecapacityandhasnotthecapacityaswell,provesthatitisnotthesamejugatthetwomoments
(_s'akts'aktasvabhavataypratik@sa@nambheda@h_).Thecapacityofproducingeffects(_arthakriys'akti_),
whichisbuttheothernameofexistence,isuniversallyconcomitantwithmomentariness
(_k@sa@nikatvavypta_).

TheNyyaschoolofphilosophyobjectstothisviewandsaysthatthecapacityofanythingcannotbeknownuntil
theeffectproducedisknown,andifcapacitytoproduceeffectsberegardedasexistenceorbeing,thenthebeing
orexistenceoftheeffectcannotbeknown,untilthathasproducedanothereffectandthatanotheradinfinitum.
Sincetherecanbenobeingthathasnotcapacityofproducingeffects,andasthiscapacitycandemonstrateitself
onlyinaninfinitechain,itwillbeimpossibletoknowanybeingortoaffirmthecapacityofproducingeffectsas
thedefinitionofexistence.Moreoverifallthingsweremomentarytherewouldbenopermanentperceiverto
observethechange,andtherebeingnothingfixedtherecouldhardlybeanymeansevenoftakingtoanykindof
inference.TothisRatnakirttirepliesthatcapacity(_samarthya_)cannotbedenied,foritisdemonstratedeven
inmakingthedenial.Theobservationofanyconcomitanceinagreementinpresence,oragreementinabsence,
doesnotrequireanypermanentobserver,forundercertainconditionsofagreementthereistheknowledgeofthe
concomitanceofagreementinpresence,andinotherconditionsthereistheknowledgeoftheconcomitancein
absence.Thisknowledgeofconcomitanceatthesucceedingmomentholdswithin

160

itselftheexperienceoftheconditionsoftheprecedingmoment,andthisaloneiswhatwefindandnotany
permanentobserver.

The Buddhist definition of being or existence (_sattva_) is indeed capacity, and we arrived at this when it was observed
that in all proved cases capacity was all that could be defined of being;--seed was but the capacity of producing shoots,
and even if this capacity should require further capacity to produce effects, the fact which has been perceived still
remains, viz. that the existence of seeds is nothing but the capacity of producing the
CHAPTER V 113
shootsandthusthereisnoviciousinfinite[Footnoterefl].Thoughthingsaremomentary,yetwecould
haveconcomitancebetweenthingsonlysolongastheirapparentformsarenotdifferent
(_atadrpaparv@rttayorevasdhyasdhanayo@hpratyak@se@navyptigraha@nt_).Thevyptior
concomitanceofanytwothings(e.g.thefireandthesmoke)isbasedonextremesimilarityandnoton
identity.

Anotherobjectionraisedagainstthedoctrineofmomentarinessisthis,thatacause(e.g.seed)mustwaitfora
numberofothercollocationsofearth,water,etc.,beforeitcanproducetheeffect(e.g.theshoots)andhencethe
doctrinemustfail.TothisRatnakrttirepliesthattheseeddoesnotexistbeforeandproducetheeffectwhen
joinedbyothercollocations,butsuchisthespecialeffectivenessofaparticularseedmoment,thatitproduces
boththecollocationsorconditionsaswellastheeffect,theshoot.Howaspecialseedmomentbecameendowed
withsuchspecialeffectivenessistobesoughtinothercausalmomentswhichprecededit,andonwhichitwas
dependent.Ratnakrttiwishestodrawattentiontothefactthatasoneperceptualmomentrevealsanumberof
objects,soonecausalmomentmayproduceanumberofeffects.Thushesaysthattheinferencethatwhatever
hasbeingismomentaryisvalidandfreefromanyfallacy.

ItisnotimportanttoenlargeuponthesecondpartofRatnakrtti'sargumentsinwhichhetriestoshowthatthe
productionofeffectscouldnotbeexplainedifwedidnotsuppose

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ThedistinctionbetweenviciousandharmlessinfiniteswasknowntotheIndiansatleastasearlyas
thesixthortheseventhcentury.Jayantaquotesapassagewhichdifferentiatesthetwoclearly(_Nyyamajar_,
p.22):

"_mlak@satikarmhuranavasthmhid@sa@nam.mlasiddhautvarucypinnavasth
nivryate._"

Theinfiniteregressthathastobegonethroughinordertoarriveattherootmatterawaitingtobesolved
destroystherootandishencevicious,whereasiftherootissavedthereisnoharminaregressthoughone
maynotbewillingtohaveit.]

161

allthingstobemomentary,forthisismoreanattempttorefutethedoctrinesofNyyathananelaborationof
theBuddhistprinciples.

ThedoctrineofmomentarinessoughttobeadirectcorollaryoftheBuddhistmetaphysics.Butitiscuriousthat
thoughalldharmaswereregardedaschanging,thefactthattheywereallstrictlymomentary(_k@sa@nika_
i.e.existingonlyforonemoment)wasnotemphasizedinearlyPliliterature.As'vagho@sainhis
_S'raddhotpdas'stra_speaksofallskandhasask@sa@nika(Suzuki'stranslation,p.105).Buddhaghosaalso
speaksofthemeditationofthekhandhasaskha@nikainhis_Visuddhimagga._Butfromtheseventhcentury
A.D.tillthetenthcenturythisdoctrinetogetherwiththedoctrineofarthakriykritvareceivedgreatattention
atthehandsoftheSautrntikasandtheVaibh@sikas.AlltheNyyaandVedntaliteratureofthisperiodis
fullofrefutationsandcriticismsofthesedoctrines.TheonlyBuddhistaccountavailableofthedoctrineof
momentarinessisfromthepenofRatnakrtti.Someofthegeneralfeaturesofhisargumentinfavouroftheview
havebeengivenabove.ElaborateaccountsofitmaybefoundinanyoftheimportantNyyaworksofthis
periodsuchas_Nynyamanjari,Ttparyya@tk_ofVcaspatiMis'ra,etc.

Buddhism did not at any time believe anything to be permanent. With the development of this doctrine they gave
great emphasis to this point. Things came to view at one moment and the next moment they were destroyed.
Whatever is existent is momentary. It is said that our notion of permanence is derived from the notion of
permanence of ourselves, but Buddhism denied the existence of any such permanent selves. What
CHAPTER V 114
appearsasselfisbutthebundleofideas,emotions,andactivetendenciesmanifestingatanyparticularmoment.
Thenextmomentthesedissolve,andnewbundlesdeterminedbytheprecedingonesappearandsoon.The
presentthoughtisthustheonlythinker.Apartfromtheemotions,ideas,andactivetendencies,wecannot
discoveranyseparateselforsoul.Itisthecombinedproductoftheseideas,emotions,etc.,thatyieldtheillusory
appearanceofselfatanymoment.Theconsciousnessofselfistheresultantproductasitwereofthe
combinationofideas,emotions,etc.,atanyparticularmoment.Astheseideas,emotions,etc.,changeevery
momentthereisnosuchthingasapermanentself.

ThefactthatIrememberthatIhavebeenexistingfor

162

alongtimepastdoesnotprovethatapermanentselfhasbeenexistingforsuchalongperiod.WhenIsaythisis
thatbook,Iperceivethebookwithmyeyeatthepresentmoment,butthat"thisbook"isthesameas"thatbook"
(i.e.thebookarisinginmemory),cannotbeperceivedbythesenses.Itisevidentthatthe"thatbook"ofmemory
referstoabookseeninthepast,whereas"thisbook"referstothebookwhichisbeforemyeyes.Thefeelingof
identitywhichisadducedtoprovepermanenceisthusduetoaconfusionbetweenanobjectofmemoryreferring
toapastanddifferentobjectwiththeobjectasperceivedatthepresentmomentbythesenses[Footnoteref1].
Thisistruenotonlyofallrecognitionofidentityandpermanenceofexternalobjectsbutalsooftheperceptionof
theidentityofself,fortheperceptionofselfidentityresultsfromtheconfusionofcertainideasoremotions
arisinginmemorywithsimilarideasofthepresentmoment.Butsincememorypointstoanobjectofpast
perception,andtheperceptiontoanotherobjectofthepresentmoment,identitycannotbeprovedbyaconfusion
ofthetwo.Everymomentallobjectsoftheworldaresufferingdissolutionanddestruction,butyetthingsappear
topersist,anddestructioncannotoftenbenoticed.Ourhairandnailsgrowandarecut,butyetwethinkthatwe
havethesamehairandnailthatwehadbefore,inplaceofoldhairsnewonessimilartothemhavesprungforth,
andtheyleavetheimpressionasiftheoldoneswerepersisting.Soitisthatthoughthingsaredestroyedevery
moment,otherssimilartotheseoftenriseintobeingandaredestroyedthenextmomentandsoon,andthese
similarthingssucceedinginaseriesproducetheimpressionthatitisoneandthesamethingwhichhasbeen
persistingthroughallthepassingmoments[Footnoteref2].Justastheflameofacandleischangingevery
momentandyetitseemstousasifwehavebeenperceivingthesameflameallthewhile,soallourbodies,our
ideas,emotions,etc.,allexternalobjectsaroundusarebeingdestroyedeverymoment,andnewonesarebeing
generatedateverysucceedingmoment,butsolongastheobjectsofthesucceedingmomentsaresimilartothose
oftheprecedingmoments,itappearstousthatthingshaveremainedthesameandnodestructionhastaken
place.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:SeepratyabhijnirsaoftheBuddhists,_Nyyamajar_,V.S.Series,pp.449,etc.]

[Footnote2:See_Tarkarahasyadpik_ofGu@naratna,p.30,andalso_Nyyamajar,_V.S.edition,p.
450.]

163
TheDoctrineofMomentarinessandtheDoctrineofCausalEfficiency(Arthakriykritva).

It appears that a thing or a phenomenon may be defined from the Buddhist point of view as being the combination
of diverse characteristics [Footnote ref 1]. What we call a thing is but a conglomeration of diverse characteristics
which are found to affect, determine or influence other conglomerations appearing as sentient or as inanimate
bodies. So long as the characteristics forming the elements of any conglomeration remain perfectly the same, the
conglomeration may be said to be the same. As soon as any of these characteristics is supplanted by any other new
characteristic, the conglomeration is to be called a new one
CHAPTER V 115
[Footnoteref2].Existenceorbeingofthingsmeanstheworkthatanyconglomerationdoesortheinfluencethat
itexertsonotherconglomerations.ThisinSanskritiscalled_arthakriykritva_whichliterallytranslated
meansthepowerofperformingactionsandpurposesofsomekind[Footnoteref3].Thecriterionofexistenceor
beingistheperformanceofcertainspecificactions,orratherexistencemeansthatacertaineffecthasbeen
producedinsomeway(causalefficiency).Thatwhichhasproducedsuchaneffectisthencalledexistentorsat.
Anychangeintheeffectthusproducedmeansacorrespondingchangeofexistence.Now,thatselfsamedefinite
specificeffect

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Compare_Milindapaha,_II.I.1TheChariotSimile.]

[Footnote2:Compare_Tarkarahasyadpik_ofGu@naratna,A.S.'sedition,pp.24,28and_Nyyamajar,_
V.S.edition,pp.445,etc.,andalsothepaperon_K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi_byRatnakrttiin_SixBuddhist
Nyyatracts_.]

[Footnote3:Thismeaningoftheword"arthakriykritva"isdifferentfromthemeaningofthewordaswe
foundinthesection"sautrntikatheoryofperception."Butwefindthedevelopmentofthismeaningboth
inRatnakrttiaswellasinNyyawriterswhoreferredtothisdoctrine.WithVintadeva(seventhcentury
A.D.)theword"_arthakrysiddhi_"meantthefulfilmentofanyneedsuchasthecookingofricebyfire
(_arthas'abdenaprayojanamucyatepuru@sasyapraycjana@mdrupkditasyasiddhi@h
ni@spatti@h_thewordarthameansneed;theneedofmansuchascookingbylogs,etc.;siddhiofthat,
meansaccomplishment).WithDharmottarawhoflourishedaboutacenturyandahalflaterarthasiddhi
meansaction(anu@s@thiti)withreferencetoundesirableanddesirableobjects
(_heyopdeyrthavi@say_).ButwithRatnakrtti(950A.D.)theword_arthakriykritva_hasanentirely
differentsense.Itmeanswithhimefficiencyofproducinganyactionorevent,andassuchitisregardedas
thecharacteristicdefinitionofexistence_sattva_).Thushesaysinhis_K@sa@nabha@ngasiddhi,_pp.20,
21,thatthoughindifferentphilosophiestherearedifferentdefinitionsofexistenceorbeing,hewillopenhis
argumentwiththeuniversallyaccepteddefinitionofexistenceas_arthakriykritva_(efficiencyofcausing
anyactionorevent).WheneverHinduwritersafterRatnakrttirefertotheBuddhistdoctrineof
_arthakriykritva_theyusuallyrefertothisdoctrineinRatnakrtti'ssense.]

164

which is produced now was never produced before, and cannot be repeated in the future, for that identical effect which
is once produced cannot be produced again. So the effects produced in us by objects at different moments of time may
be similar but cannot be identical. Each moment is associated with a new effect and each new effect thus produced
means in each case the coming into being of a correspondingly new existence of things. If things were permanent there
would be no reason why they should be performing different effects at different points of time. Any difference in the
effect produced, whether due to the thing itself or its combination with other accessories, justifies us in asserting that
the thing has changed and a new one has come in its place. The existence of a jug for example is known by the power it
has of forcing itself upon our minds; if it had no such power then we could not have said that it existed. We can have no
notion of the meaning of existence other than the impression produced on us; this impression is nothing else but the
power exerted by things on us, for there is no reason why one should hold that beyond such powers as are associated
with the production of impressions or effects there should be some other permanent entity to which the power
adhered, and which existed even when the power was not exerted. We perceive the power of producing effects and
define each unit of such power as amounting to a unit of existence. And as there would be different units of power at
different moments, there should also be as many new existences, i.e. existents must be regarded as momentary, existing
at each moment that exerts a new power. This definition of existence naturally brings in the doctrine of momentariness
shown by Ratnakrtti.
CHAPTER V 116
SomeOntologicalProblemsonwhichtheDifferentIndianSystemsDiverged.

WecannotcloseourexaminationofBuddhistphilosophywithoutbrieflyreferringtoitsviewsonsomeontological
problemswhichwerefavouritesubjectsofdiscussioninalmostallphilosophicalcirclesofIndia.Thesearein
brief:(1)therelationofcauseandeffect,(2)therelationofthewhole(_avayavi_)andthepart(_avayava_),(3)
therelationofgenerality(_samanya_)tothespecificindividuals,(4)therelationofattributesorqualitiesandthe
substanceandtheproblemoftherelationofinherence,(5)the

165

relationofpower(_s'akti_)tothepowerpossessor(_s'aktimn_).Thusontherelationofcauseandeffect,
S'a@nkaraheldthatcausealonewaspermanent,real,andalleffectsassuchwerebutimpermanentillusionsdue
toignorance,S@mkhyaheldthattherewasnodifferencebetweencauseandeffect,exceptthattheformerwas
onlytheearlierstagewhichwhentransformedthroughcertainchangesbecametheeffect.Thehistoryofany
causalactivityisthehistoryofthetransformationofthecauseintotheeffects.Buddhismholdseverythingtobe
momentary,soneithercausenoreffectcanabide.Oneiscalledtheeffectbecauseitsmomentaryexistencehas
beendeterminedbythedestructionofitsmomentaryantecedentcalledthecause.Thereisnopermanentreality
whichundergoesthechange,butonechangeisdeterminedbyanotherandthisdeterminationisnothingmore
than"thathappening,thishappened."Ontherelationofpartstowhole,Buddhismdoesnotbelieveinthe
existenceofwholes.Accordingtoit,itisthepartswhichillusorilyappearasthewhole,theindividualatomsrise
intobeinganddiethenextmomentandthusthereisnosuchthingas"whole[Footnoteref1].TheBuddhistshold
againthattherearenouniversals,foritistheindividualsalonewhichcomeandgo.Therearemyfivefingersas
individualsbutthereisnosuchthingasfingerness(_a@ngulitva_)astheabstractuniversalofthefingers.Onthe
relationofattributesandsubstanceweknowthattheSautrntikaBuddhistsdidnotbelieveintheexistenceofany
substanceapartfromitsattributes;whatwecallasubstanceisbutaunitcapableofproducingaunitofsensation.
Intheexternalworldthereareasmanyindividualsimpleunits(atoms)astherearepointsofsensations.
Correspondingtoeachunitofsensationthereisaseparatesimpleunitintheobjectiveworld.Ourperceptionofa
thingisthustheperceptionoftheassemblageofthesesensations.Intheobjectiveworldalsothereareno
substancesbutatomsorreals,eachrepresentingaunitofsensation,forceorattribute,risingintobeinganddying
thenextmoment.Buddhismthusdeniestheexistenceofanysuchrelationasthatofinherence(_samavya_)in
whichrelationtheattributesaresaidtoexistinthesubstance,forsincetherearenoseparatesubstancesthereis
nonecessityforadmittingtherelationofinherence.FollowingthesamelogicBuddhismalsodoesnot

166
believeintheexistenceofapowerpossessorseparatefromthepower.

BriefsurveyoftheevolutionofBuddhistThought.

IntheearliestperiodofBuddhismmoreattentionwaspaidtothefournobletruthsthantosystematic
metaphysics.Whatwassorrow,whatwasthecauseofsorrow,whatwasthecessationofsorrowandwhatcould
leadtoit?Thedoctrineof_pa@ticcasamuppda_wasofferedonlytoexplainhowsorrowcameinandnotwith
aviewtothesolvingofametaphysicalproblem.Thediscussionofultimatemetaphysicalproblems,suchas
whethertheworldwaseternalornoneternal,orwhetheraTathgataexistedafterdeathornot,were
consideredasheresiesinearlyBuddhism.Greatemphasiswaslaidonsla,samdhiandpaandthedoctrine
thattherewasnosoul.TheAbhidhammashardlygiveusanynewphilosophywhichwasnotcontainedinthe
Suttas.Theyonlyelaboratedthematerialsofthesuttaswithenumerationsanddefinitions.Withtheevolutionof
Mahynascripturesfromsometimeabout200B.C.thedoctrineofthenonessentialnessandvoidnessofall
dhammas began to be preached. This doctrine, which was taken up and elaborated by Nagrjuna, ryyadeva,
Kumrajva and Candrakrtti, is more or less a corollary from the older doctrine of Buddhism. If one could not say
whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a
CHAPTER V 117
Tathgataexistedordidnotexistafterdeath,andiftherewasnopermanentsoulandallthedhammaswere
changing,theonlylegitimatewayofthinkingaboutallthingsappearedtobetothinkofthemasmerevoidand
nonessentialappearances.Theseappearancesappearasbeingmutuallyrelatedbutapartfromtheirappearance
theyhavenootheressence,nobeingorreality.TheTathatdoctrinewhichwaspreachedbyAs'vagho@sa
oscillatedbetweenthepositionofthisabsolutenonessentialnessofalldhammasandtheBrahminicideathat
somethingexistedasthebackgroundofallthesenonessentialdhammas.Thishecalledtathat,buthecouldnot
consistentlysaythatanysuchpermanententitycouldexist.TheVijnavdadoctrinewhichalsotookitsriseat
thistimeappearstometobeamixtureoftheS'nyavdadoctrineandtheTathatdoctrine;butwhencarefully
examineditseemstobenothingbutS'nyavda,withanattemptatexplainingalltheobservedphenomena.If
everythingwas

167

nonessentialhowdiditoriginate?Vijnavdaproposestogiveananswer,andsaysthatthesephenomenaare
allbutideasofthemindgeneratedbythebeginninglessvsan(desire)ofthemind.Thedifficultywhichisfelt
withregardtotheTathatdoctrinethattheremustbesomerealitywhichisgeneratingalltheseideasappearing
asphenomena,isthesameasthatintheVijnavdadoctrine.TheVijnavdinscouldnotadmittheexistence
ofsuchareality,butyettheirdoctrinesledthemtoit.Theycouldnotproperlysolvethedifficulty,andadmitted
thattheirdoctrinewassomesortofacompromisewiththeBrahminicaldoctrinesofheresy,buttheysaidthat
thiswasacompromisetomakethedoctrineintelligibletotheheretics;intruthhowevertherealityassumedin
thedoctrinewasalsononessential.TheVijnavdaliteraturethatisavailabletousisveryscantyandfromthat
wearenotinapositiontojudgewhatanswersVijnavdacouldgiveonthepoint.Thesethreedoctrines
developedalmostaboutthesametimeandthedifficultyofconceivings'nya(void),tathat,(thatness)andthe
layavijnaofVijnavdaismoreorlessthesame.

TheTathatdoctrineofAs'vagho@sapracticallyceasedwithhim.ButtheS'nyavdaandtheVijnavda
doctrineswhichoriginatedprobablyabout200B.C.continuedtodevelopprobablytilltheeighthcenturyA.D.
VigorousdisputeswithS'nyavdadoctrinesarerarelymadeinanyindependentworkofHinduphilosophy,
afterKumrilaandS'a@nkara.FromthethirdorthefourthcenturyA.D.someBuddhiststooktothestudyof
systematiclogicandbegantocriticizethedoctrineoftheHindulogicians.Di@nngatheBuddhistlogician(500
A.D.)probablystartedthesehostilecriticismsbytryingtorefutethedoctrinesofthegreatHindulogician
Vtsyyana,inhisPram@nasamuccaya.Inassociationwiththislogicalactivitywefindtheactivityoftwoother
schoolsofBuddhism,viz.theSarvstivdins(knownalsoasVaibh@sikas)andtheSautrntikas.Boththe
Vaibh@sikasandtheSautrntikasacceptedtheexistenceoftheexternalworld,andtheyweregenerallyin
conflictwiththeHinduschoolsofthoughtNyyaVais'e@sikaandS@mkhyawhichalsoadmittedtheexistence
oftheexternalworld.Vasubandhu(420500A.D.)wasoneofthemostillustriousnamesofthisschool.Wehave
fromthistimeforthanumberofgreatBuddhistthinkerssuchasYas'omitra(commentatorofVasubandhu's
work),

168

Dharmmakrtti(writerofNyyabindu635A.D.),VintadevaandS'ntabhadra(commentatorsofNyyabindu),
Dharmmottara(commentatorofNyyabindu847A.D.),Ratnakrtti(950A.D.),Pa@n@ditaAs'oka,and
RatnkaraS'nti,someofwhosecontributionshavebeenpublishedinthe_SixBuddhistNyyaTracts_,
publishedinCalcuttaintheBibliothecaIndica series. These Buddhist writers were mainly interested in discussions
regarding the nature of perception, inference, the doctrine of momentariness, and the doctrine of causal efficiency
(_arthakriykritva_) as demonstrating the nature of existence. On the negative side they were interested in denying the
ontological theories of Nyya and S@mkhya with regard to the nature of class-concepts, negation, relation of whole
and part, connotation of terms, etc. These problems hardly attracted any notice in the non-Sautrntika and non-
Vaibh@sika schools of Buddhism of earlier times. They of course agreed with the earlier Buddhists in denying the
existence of a permanent soul, but this they did with the help of their doctrine of causal efficiency. The points of
disagreement between Hindu thought up to
CHAPTER VI 118
S'a@nkara(800A.D.)andBuddhistthoughttillthetimeofS'a@nkaraconsistedmainlyinthedenialbythe
Buddhistsofapermanentsoulandthepermanentexternalworld.ForHinduthoughtwasmoreorlessrealistic,
andeventheVedntaofS'a@nkaraadmittedtheexistenceofthepermanentexternalworldinsomesense.With
S'a@nkaratheformsoftheexternalworldwerenodoubtillusory,buttheyallhadapermanentbackgroundin
theBrahman,whichwastheonlyrealitybehindallmentalandthephysicalphenomena.TheSautrntikas
admittedtheexistenceoftheexternalworldandsotheirquarrelwithNyyaandS@mkhyawaswithregardto
theirdoctrineofmomentariness;theirdenialofsoulandtheirviewsonthedifferentontologicalproblemswerein
accordancewiththeirdoctrineofmomentariness.Afterthetwelfthcenturywedonothearmuchofanynew
disputeswiththeBuddhists.FromthistimethedisputesweremainlybetweenthedifferentsystemsofHindu
philosophers,viz.Nyya,theVedntaoftheschoolofS'a@nkaraandtheTheisticVedntaofRmnuja,
Madhva,etc.

169

CHAPTER VI
THEJAINAPHILOSOPHY

TheOriginofJainism.

NotwithstandingtheradicaldifferencesintheirphilosophicalnotionsJainismandBuddhism,whichwere
originallybothordersofmonksoutsidethepaleofBrahmanism,presentsomeresemblanceinoutward
appearance,andsomeEuropeanscholarswhobecameacquaintedwithJainismthroughinadequatesamplesof
JainaliteratureeasilypersuadedthemselvesthatitwasanoffshootofBuddhism,andevenIndiansunacquainted
withJainaliteratureareoftenfoundtocommitthesamemistake.Butithasnowbeenprovedbeyonddoubtthat
thisideaiswrongandJainismisatleastasoldasBuddhism.TheoldestBuddhistworksfrequentlymentionthe
Jainsasarivalsect,undertheiroldnameNiganthaandtheirleaderNtaputtaVarddhamnaMahvra,thelast
prophetoftheJains.ThecanonicalbooksoftheJainsmentionascontemporariesofMahvrathesamekingsas
reignedduringBuddha'scareer.

ThusMahvrawasacontemporaryofBuddha,butunlikeBuddhahewasneithertheauthorofthereligionnor
thefounderofthesect,butamonkwhohavingespousedtheJainacreedafterwardsbecametheseerandthelast
prophet(Trtha@nkara)ofJainism[Footnoteref1].HispredecessorPrs'va,thelastTrtha@nkarabutone,is
saidtohavedied250yearsbeforeMahvra,whilePrs'va'spredecessorAri@s@tanemiissaidtohavedied
84,000yearsbeforeMahvra'sNirv@na.Thestoryin_Uttardhyayanastra_thatadiscipleofPrs'vameta
discipleofMahvraandbroughtabouttheunionoftheoldJainismandthatpropoundedbyMahvraseemsto
suggestthatthisPrs'vawasprobablyahistoricalperson.

AccordingtothebeliefoftheorthodoxJains,theJainareligioniseternal,andithasbeenrevealedagainand
againineveryoneoftheendlesssucceedingperiodsoftheworldbyinnumerableTirthankaras.Inthepresent
periodthefirstTrtha@nkarawas@R@sabhaandthelast,the24th,wasVardhamnaMahvra.All

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:SeeJacobi'sarticleonJainism,_E.R.E._]

170

Trtha@nkaras have reached mok@sa at their death, and they neither care for nor have any influence on worldly
affairs, but yet they are regarded as "Gods" by the Jains and are worshipped [Footnote ref 1].
CHAPTER VI 119
TwoSectsofJainism[Footnoteref2].

TherearetwomainsectsofJains,S'vetmbaras(wearersofwhitecloths)andDigambaras(thenaked).Theyare
generallyagreedonallthefundamentalprinciplesofJainism.ThetenetspeculiartotheDigambarasarefirstly
thatperfectsaintssuchastheTrtha@nkaraslivewithoutfood,secondlythattheembryoofMahvrawasnot
removedfromthewombofDevanandtothatofTris'alastheS'vetmbarascontend,thirdlythatamonkwho
ownsanypropertyandwearsclothescannotreachMok@sa,fourthlythatnowomancanreachMok@sa
[Footnoteref3].TheDigambarasdenythecanonicalworksoftheS'vetmbarasandassertthatthesehadbeen
lostimmediatelyafterMahvra.TheoriginoftheDigambarasisattributedtoS'ivabhti(A.D.83)bythe
S'vetmbarasasduetoaschismintheoldS'vetmbarachurch,ofwhichtherehadalreadybeenprevioustothat
sevenotherschisms.TheDigambarasintheirturndenythis,andsaythattheythemselvesalonehavepreserved
theoriginalpractices,andthatunderBhadrabhu,theeighthsageafterMahvra,thelastTrtha@nkara,there
rosethesectofArdhaphlakaswithlaxerprinciples,fromwhichdevelopedthepresentsectofS'vetmbaras(A.D.
80).TheDigambarashavingseparatedinearlytimesfromtheS'vetmbarasdevelopedpeculiarreligious
ceremoniesoftheirown,andhaveadifferentecclesiasticalandliteraryhistory,thoughthereispracticallyno
differenceaboutthemaincreed.ItmaynotbeoutofplaceheretomentionthattheSanskritworksofthe
DigambarasgobacktoagreaterantiquitythanthoseoftheS'vetmbaras,ifweexceptthecanonicalbooksofthe
latter.Itmaybenotedinthisconnectionthattheredevelopedinlatertimesabout84differentschoolsofJainism
differingfromoneanotheronlyinminutedetailsofconduct.Thesewerecalledgacchas,andthemostimportant
oftheseistheKharataraGaccha,whichhadsplitintomanyminorgacchas.BothsectsofJainshave

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See"_DigumbaraJainIconography(1.A,xxxii[1903]p.459"ofJ.Burgess,andBhler's
"SpecimensofJinasculpturesfromMathur,"inEpigraphicaIndica,II.pp.311etc.SeealsoJacobi'sarticleon
Jainism,_E.R.E._]

[Footnote2:SeeJacobi'sarticleonJainism,_E.R.E._]

[Footnote3:SeeGu@naratna'scommentaryonJainismin_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_.]
171

preservedalistofthesuccessionoftheirteachersfromMahvra(_sthavirvali,pa@t@tvali,gurvvali_)
andalsomanylegendsaboutthemsuchasthoseinthe_Kalpastra_,the_Paris'i@s@taparvan_of
Hemacandra,etc.

TheCanonicalandotherLiteratureoftheJains.

According to the Jains there were originally two kinds of sacred books, the fourteen Prvas and the eleven A@ngas. The
Prvas continued to be transmitted for some time but were gradually lost. The works known as the eleven A@ngas are
now the oldest parts of the existing Jain canon. The names of these are _cra, Strak@rta, Sthna, Samavya
Bhagavat, Jtadharmakaths, Upsakadas's, Antak@rtadas's Anuttaraupaptikadas's, Pras'navykara@na,
Vipka_. In addition to these there are the twelve _Up@ngas_ [Footnote ref 1], the ten _Prakr@nas_ [Footnote ref 2],
six _Chedastras_ [Footnote ref 3], _Nnd_ and _Anuyogadvra_ and four _Mlastras_ (_Uttardhyayana, vas'yaka,
Das'avaiklika_, and _Pi@n@daniryukti_). The Digambaras however assert that these original works have all been lost,
and that the present works which pass by the old names are spurious. The original language of these according to the
Jains was Ardhamgadh, but these suffered attempts at modernization and it is best to call the language of the sacred
texts Jaina Prkrit and that of the later works Jaina Mahr@s@tr. A large literature of glosses and commentaries has
grown up round the sacred texts. And besides these, the Jains possess separate works,
CHAPTER VI 120
whichcontainsystematicexpositionsoftheirfaithinPrkritandSanskrit.Manycommentarieshavealsobeen
writtenupontheseindependenttreatises.OneoftheoldestofthesetreatisesisUmsvti's
_Tattvrthdhigamastra_(185A.D.).SomeofthemostimportantlaterJainaworksonwhichthischapteris
basedare_Vis'e@svas'yakabh@sya_,Jaina_Tarkavrttika_,withthecommentaryofS'ntycryya,
_Dravyasa@mgraha_ofNemicandra(1150A.D.),_Sydvdamajar_ofMalli@sena(1292A.D.),
_Nyyvatra_ofSiddhasenaDivkara(533A.D.),_Park@smukhastralaghuv@rtti_ofAnantavryya(1039
A.D.),_Prameyakamalamrta@n@da_ofPrabhcandra

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Aupaptika,Rjapras'nya,Jvbhigama,Prajpan,Jambudvpaprajapti,
Candraprajapti,Sryaprajapti,Nirayvali,Kalpvata@msik,Pu@spik,Pu@spaclik,
V@r@s@nida@ss_.]

[Footnote2:_Catu@hs'ara@na,Sa@mstra,turapratykhyna,Bhaktparij,Ta@ndulavaiyl,
Ca@n@dvja,Devendrastava,Ga@nivja,Mahpratykhyna,Vrastava_.]

[Footnote3:_Nis'tha,Mahnis'tha,Vyavahra,Das'as'rutaskandha,B@rhatkalpa,Pacakalpa_.]

172

(825A.D.),_Yogas'stra_ofHemacandra(10881172A.D.),and_Pram@nanayatattvlokla@mkra_of
DevaSri(10861169A.D.).IamindebtedforthesedatestoVidybh@sa@na'sIndianLogic.

ItmayherebementionedthattheJainsalsopossessasecularliteratureoftheirowninpoetryandprose,both
SanskritandPrkrit.Therearealsomanymoraltales(e.g._Samariccakah,Upamitabhavaprapacakath_
inPrkrit,andthe_Yas'astilaka_ofSomadevaandDhanapla's_Tilakamajar_);JainaSanskritpoemsboth
inthePur@naandKvyastyleandhymnsinPrkritandSanskritarealsoverynumerous.Therearealso
manyJainadramas.TheJainaauthorshavealsocontributedmanyworks,originaltreatisesaswellas
commentaries,tothescientificliteratureofIndiainitsvariousbranches:grammar,biography,metrics,poetics,
philosophy,etc.ThecontributionsoftheJainstologicdeservespecialnotice[Footnoteref1].

SomeGeneralCharacteristicsoftheJains.

TheJainsexistonlyinIndiaandtheirnumberisalittlelessthanamillionandahalf.TheDigambarasare
foundchieflyinSouthernIndiabutalsointheNorth,intheNorthwesternprovinces,EasternRjputnaand
thePunjab.TheheadquartersoftheS'vetmbarasareinGujaratandWesternRjputna,buttheyaretobe
foundalsoalloverNorthernandCentralIndia.

Theoutfitofamonk,asJacobidescribesit,isrestrictedtobarenecessaries,andthesehemustbegclothes,a
blanket,analmsbowl,astick,abroomtosweeptheground,apieceofclothtocoverhismouthwhenspeaking
lestinsectsshouldenterit[Footnoteref2].Theoutfitofnunsisthesameexceptthattheyhaveadditionalclothes.
TheDigambarashaveasimilaroutfit,butkeepnoclothes,usebroomsofpeacock'sfeathersorhairsofthetailof
acow(_cmara_)[Footnoteref3].Themonksshavetheheadorremovethehairbypluckingitout.Thelatter
methodofgettingridofthehairistobepreferred,andisregardedsometimesasanessentialrite.Thedutiesof
monksareveryhard.Theyshouldsleeponlythreehoursandspendtherestofthetimeinrepentingofand
expiatingsins,meditating,studying,beggingalms(intheafternoon),andcarefulinspectionoftheirclothesand
otherthingsfortheremovalofinsects.Thelaymenshouldtrytoapproachtheidealofconductofthemonks

___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism. _E.R.E._]
CHAPTER VI 121
[Footnote2:SeeJacobi,_loc.cat._]

[Footnote3:See_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_,chapterIV.]

173

bytakinguponthemselvesparticularvows,andthemonksarerequiredtodeliversermonsandexplainthe
sacredtextsintheups'rayas(separatebuildingsformonksliketheBuddhistvihras).Theprincipleofextreme
carefulnessnottodestroyanylivingbeinghasbeeninmonasticlifecarriedouttoitsverylastconsequences,and
hasshapedtheconductofthelaityinagreatmeasure.Nolaymanwillintentionallykillanylivingbeing,noteven
aninsect,howevertroublesome.Hewillremoveitcarefullywithouthurtingit.Theprincipleofnothurtingany
livingbeingthusbarsthemfrommanyprofessionssuchasagriculture,etc.,andhasthrustthemintocommerce
[Footnoteref1].

LifeofMahvra.

Mahvra,thelastprophetoftheJains,wasaK@sattriyaoftheJtaclanandanativeofVais'li(modern
Besarh,27milesnorthofPatna).HewasthesecondsonofSiddhrthaandTrs'al.TheS'vetmbarasmaintain
thattheembryooftheTrtha@nkarawhichfirstenteredthewomboftheBrahminladyDevanandwasthen
transferredtothewombofTrs'al.ThisstorytheDigambarasdonotbelieveaswehavealreadyseen.His
parentsweretheworshippersofPrs'vaandgavehimthenameVarddhamna(VraorMahvra).Hemarried
Yas'odandhadadaughterbyher.Inhisthirtiethyearhisparentsdiedandwiththepermissionofhisbrother
Nandivardhanahebecameamonk.Aftertwelveyearsofselfmortificationandmeditationheattained
omniscience(kevala,cf.bodhioftheBuddhists).Helivedtopreachforfortytwoyearsmore,andattained
mok@sa(emancipation)someyearsbeforeBuddhainabout480B.C.[Footnoteref2].

TheFundamentalIdeasofJainaOntology.

Athing(suchasclay)isseentoassumevariousshapesandtoundergodiversechanges(suchastheformofajug,
orpan,etc.),andwehaveseenthattheChndogyaUpani@sadheldthatsinceinallchangestheclaymatter
remainedpermanent,thatalonewastrue,whereasthechangesofformandstatewerebutappearances,the
natureofwhichcannotberationally

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:SeeJacobi'sarticleonJainism,_E.R.E._]

[Footnote2:SeeHoernl'stranslationof_Uvsagadaso_,Jacobi,_loc.cit_.,andHoernl'sarticleonthe
jvakas,_E.R.E._TheS'vetmbaras,however,saythatthisdatewas527B.C.andtheDigambarasplaceit
eighteenyearslater.]

174

demonstratedorexplained.Theunchangeablesubstance(e.g.theclaymatter)aloneistrue,andthechanging
formsaremereillusionsofthesenses,mereobjectsofname(_nmarpa_)[Footnoteref1].Whatwecall
tangibility,visibility,orothersensequalities,havenorealexistence,fortheyarealwayschanging,andarelike
merephantomsofwhichnoconceptioncanbemadebythelightofreason.

The Buddhists hold that changing qualities can alone be perceived and that there is no unchanging substance behind
them. What we perceive as clay is but some specific quality, what we perceive as jug is also some quality. Apart from
these qualities we do not perceive any qualitiless substance, which the Upani@sads regard as permanent and
unchangeable. The permanent and unchangeable substance is thus a mere fiction of
CHAPTER VI 122
ignorance,asthereareonlythepassingcollocationsofqualities.Qualitiesdonotimplythattherearesubstances
towhichtheyadhere,forthesocalledpuresubstancedoesnotexist,asitcanneitherbeperceivedbythesenses
norinferred.Thereareonlythemomentarypassingqualities.Weshouldregardeachchangeofqualityasanew
existence.

TheJainsweknowwerethecontemporariesofBuddhaandpossiblyofsomeoftheUpani@sadstoo,andthey
hadalsoasolutiontooffer.Theyheldthatitwasnottruethatsubstancealonewastrueandqualitiesweremere
falseandillusoryappearances.FurtheritwasnottrueastheBuddhistssaidthattherewasnopermanent
substancebutmerelythechangeofpassingqualities,forboththeserepresenttwoextremeviewsandarecontrary
toexperience.Bothofthem,however,containsomeelementsoftruthbutnotthewholetruthasgivenin
experience.Experienceshowsthatinallchangestherearethreeelements:(1)thatsomecollocationsofqualities
appeartoremainunchanged;(2)thatsomenewqualitiesaregenerated;(3)thatsomeoldqualitiesaredestroyed.
Itistruethatqualitiesofthingsarechangingeveryminute,butallqualitiesarenotchanging.Thuswhenajugis
made,itmeansthattheclaylumphasbeendestroyed,ajughasbeengeneratedandtheclayispermanent,i.e.all
productionmeansthatsomeoldqualitieshavebeenlost,somenewonesbroughtin,andthereissomepartinit
whichispermanentTheclayhasbecomelostinsomeform,hasgenerateditselfinanother,andremained
permanentinstill

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:SeeChndogya,VI.1.]
175

anotherform.Itisbyvirtueoftheseunchangedqualitiesthatathingissaidtobepermanentthoughundergoing
change.Thuswhenalumpofgoldisturnedintoarodoraring,allthespecificqualitieswhichcomeunderthe
connotationoftheword"gold"areseentocontinue,thoughtheformsaresuccessivelychanged,andwitheach
suchchangesomeofitsqualitiesarelostandsomenewonesareacquired.Suchbeingthecase,thetruthcomesto
this,thatthereisalwaysapermanententityasrepresentedbythepermanenceofsuchqualitiesasleadustocall
itasubstanceinspiteofallitsdiversechanges.Thenatureofbeing(_sat_)thenisneithertheabsolutely
unchangeable,northemomentarychangingqualitiesorexistences,butinvolvesthemboth.Beingthen,asis
testifiedbyexperience,isthatwhichinvolvesapermanentunit,whichisincessantlyeverymomentlosingsome
qualitiesandgainingnewones.Thenotionofbeinginvolvesapermanent(_dhruva_)accessionofsomenew
qualities(_utpda_)andlossofsomeoldqualities(_vyaya_)[Footnoteref.1].ThesolutionofJainismisthusa
reconciliationofthetwoextremesofVedantismandBuddhismongroundsofcommonsenseexperience.

TheDoctrineofRelativePluralism(anekntavda).

Thisconceptionofbeingastheunionofthepermanentandchangebringsusnaturallytothedoctrineof
AnekntavdaorwhatwemaycallrelativepluralismasagainsttheextremeabsolutismoftheUpani@sadsand
thepluralismoftheBuddhists.TheJainsregardedallthingsas_aneknta_(_naeknta_),orinotherwords
theyheldthatnothingcouldbeaffirmedabsolutely,asallaffirmationsweretrueonlyundercertainconditions
andlimitations.Thusspeakingofagoldjug,weseethatitsexistenceasasubstance(_dravya_)isofthenatureof
acollocationofatomsandnotasanyothersubstancesuchasspace(_ks'a_),i.e.agoldjugisadravyaonlyin
onesenseofthetermandnotineverysense;soitisadravyainthesensethatitisacollocationofatomsandnot
adravyainthesenseofspaceortime(_kla_).Itisthusbothadravyaandnotadravyaatoneandthesame
time.Againitisatomicinthesensethatitisacompositeofearthatomsandnotatomicinthesensethatitis
___________________________________________________________________
CHAPTER VI 123
[Footnote:1:See_Tattvrthdhigamastra_,andGu@naratna'streatmentofJainismin
_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_.]

176

notacompositeofwateratoms.Againitisacompositeofearthatomsonlyinthesensethatgoldisametallic
modificationofearth,andnotanyothermodificationofearthasclayorstone.Itsbeingconstitutedofmetal
atomsisagaintrueinthesensethatitismadeupofgoldatomsandnotofironatoms.Itismadeupagainof
goldatomsinthesenseofmeltedandunsulliedgoldandnotasgoldinthenaturalcondition.Itisagainmadeup
ofsuchunsulliedandmeltedgoldashasbeenhammeredandshapedbythegoldsmithDevadattaandnotby
Yajadatta.Itsbeingmadeupofatomsconditionedasaboveisagainonlytrueinthesensethatthecollocation
hasbeenshapedasajugandnotasapotandsoon.ThusproceedinginasimilarmannertheJainssaythatall
affirmationsaretrueofathingonlyinacertainlimitedsense.Allthings(_vastu_)thuspossessaninfinitenumber
ofqualities(_anantadharmtmaka@mvastu_),eachofwhichcanonlybeaffirmedinaparticularsense.Suchan
ordinarythingasajugwillbefoundtobetheobjectofaninfinitenumberofaffirmationsandthepossessorofan
infinitenumberofqualitiesfrominfinitepointsofview,whicharealltrueincertainrestrictedsensesandnot
absolutely[Footnoterefl].Thusinthepositiverelationrichescannotbeaffirmedofpovertybutinthenegative
relationsuchanaffirmationispossibleaswhenwesay"thepoormanhasnoriches."Thepoormanpossesses
richesnotinapositivebutinanegativeway.Thusinsomerelationorotheranythingmaybeaffirmedofany
otherthing,andagaininotherrelationstheverysamethingcannotbeaffirmedofit.Thedifferentstandpoints
fromwhichthings(thoughpossessedofinfinitedeterminations)canbespokenofaspossessingthisorthatquality
orasappearinginrelationtothisorthat,aretechnicallycallednaya[Footnoteref2].

TheDoctrineofNayas.

Inframingjudgmentsaboutthingstherearetwowaysopentous,firstlywemaynoticethemanifoldqualities
andcharacteristicsofanythingbutviewthemasunifiedinthething;thuswhenwesay"thisisabook"wedo
notlookatitscharacteristicqualitiesasbeingdifferentfromit,butratherthequalitiesorcharacteristicsare
perceivedashavingnoseparateexistencefrom

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:SeeGu@naratnaonJainamatain_@Sa@ddarsanasamuccaya_,pp.211.etc.,andalso
_Tattvrthdhigamastra_.]

[Footnote2:See_Tattvrthdhigamastra_,and_Vis'e@svalyakabh@sya_,pp.895923.]

177

thething.Secondlywemaynoticethequalitiesseparatelyandregardthethingasamerenonexistent
fiction(cf.theBuddhistview);thusImayspeakofthedifferentqualitiesofthebookseparatelyandhold
thatthequalitiesofthingsarealoneperceptibleandthebookapartfromthesecannotbefound.Thesetwo
pointsofviewarerespectivelycalleddravyanayaand_paryyanaya_[Footnoteref1].Thedravyanayaagain
showsitselfinthreeforms,andparyayanayainfourforms,ofwhichthefirstformonlyisimportantforour
purposes,theotherthreebeingimportantratherfromthepointofviewofgrammarandlanguagehad
betterbeomittedhere.Thethreenayasunderdravyanayaarecallednaigamanaya,sa@mgrahanayaand
vyavahranaya.

When we speak of a thing from a purely common sense point of view, we do not make our ideas clear or precise.
Thus I may hold a book in my hand and when asked whether my hands are empty, I may say, no, I have something in
my hand, or I may say, I have a book in my hand. It is evident that in the first answer I
CHAPTER VI 124
lookedatthebookfromthewidestandmostgeneralpointofviewasa"thing,"whereasinthesecondI
lookedatitinitsspecialexistenceasabook.AgainImaybereadingapageofabook,andImaysayIam
readingabook,butinrealityIwasreadingonlyoneofthepagesofthebook.Imaybescribblingonloose
sheets,andmaysaythisismybookonJainaphilosophy,whereasinrealitytherewerenobooksbutmerely
someloosesheets.Thislookingatthingsfromtheloosecommonsenseview,inwhichwedonotconsider
themfromthepointofviewoftheirmostgeneralcharacteristicas"being"orasanyoftheirspecial
characteristics,butsimplyastheyappearatfirstsight,istechnicallycalledthenaigamastandpoint.This
empiricalviewprobablyproceedsontheassumptionthatathingpossessesthemostgeneralaswellasthe
mostspecialqualities,andhencewemaylaystressonanyoneoftheseatanytimeandignoretheother
ones.ThisisthepointofviewfromwhichaccordingtotheJainstheNyyaandVais'e@sikaschools
interpretexperience.

Sa@mgrahanayaisthelookingatthingsmerelyfromthemostgeneralpointofview.Thuswemayspeakofall
individualthingsfromtheirmostgeneralandfundamentalaspectas"being."ThisaccordingtotheJainsisthe
Vedntawayoflookingatthings.

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[Footnote1:_Sydvdama@njar_,pp.171173.]
178

Thevyavahranayastandpointholdsthattherealessenceofthingsistoberegardedfromthepointofviewof
actualpracticalexperienceofthething,whichunifieswithinitsomegeneralaswellassomespecialtraits,which
hasbeenexistingfrompasttimesandremaininthefuture,butyetsuffertriflingchangesallthewhile,changes
whichareserviceabletousinathousandways.Thusa"book"hasnodoubtsomegeneraltraits,sharedbyall
books,butithassomespecialtraitsaswell.Itsatomsarecontinuallysufferingsomedisplacementand
rearrangement,butyetithasbeenexistingasabookforsometimepastandwillexistforsometimeinthefuture
aswell.Allthesecharacteristics,gotomakeuptheessenceofthe"book"ofoureverydayexperience,andnoneof
thesecanbeseparatedandheldupasbeingtheconceptofa"book."ThisaccordingtotheJainsistheS@mkhya
wayoflookingatthings.

Thefirstviewofparyyanayacalled_@rjustra_istheBuddhistviewwhichdoesnotbelieveinthe
existenceofthethinginthepastorinthefuture,butholdsthatathingisamereconglomerationof
characteristicswhichmaybesaidtoproduceeffectsatanygivenmoment.Ateachnewmomentthereare
newcollocationsofnewqualitiesanditisthesewhichmayberegardedasthetrueessenceofournotionof
things[Footnoteref1].

Thenayasaswehavealreadysaidarebutpointsofview,oraspectsoflookingatthings,andassuchare
infiniteinnumber.Theabovefourrepresentonlyabroadclassificationofthese.TheJainsholdthatthe
NyyaVais'e@sika,theVednta,theS@mkhya,andtheBuddhist,haveeachtriedtointerpretand
systematizeexperiencefromoneoftheabovefourpointsofview,andeachregardstheinterpretationfrom
hispointofviewasbeingabsolutelytruetotheexclusionofallotherpointsofview.Thisistheirerror
(_naybhsa_),foreachstandpointrepresentsonlyoneofthemanypointsofviewfromwhichathingcan
belookedat.Theaffirmationsfromanypointofviewarethustrueinalimitedsenseandunderlimited
conditions.Infinitenumbersofaffirmationsmaybemadeofthingsfrominfinitepointsofview.
Affirmationsorjudgmentsaccordingtoanynayaorstandpointcannotthereforebeabsolute,foreven
contraryaffirmationsoftheveryselfsame

_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: The other standpoints of paryya-naya, which represent grammatical and linguistic points of
CHAPTER VI 125
view,are_s'abdanaya,samabhir@dhanaya_,and_evambhlanaya_.See_Vis'e@svas'yakabh@sya_,
pp.895923.]

179

thingsmaybeheldtobetruefromotherpointsofview.Thetruthofeachaffirmationisthusonlyconditional,
andinconceivablefromtheabsolutepointofview.Toguaranteecorrectnessthereforeeachaffirmationshouldbe
precededbythephrase_syt_(maybe).Thiswillindicatethattheaffirmationisonlyrelative,madesomehow,
fromsomepointofviewandundersomereservationsandnotinanysenseabsolute.Thereisnojudgmentwhich
isabsolutelytrue,andnojudgmentwhichisabsolutelyfalse.Alljudgmentsaretrueinsomesenseandfalsein
another.ThisbringsustothefamousJainadoctrineofSydvda[Footnoteref1].

TheDoctrineofSydvda.

ThedoctrineofSydvdaholdsthatsincethemostcontrarycharacteristicsofinfinitevarietymaybeassociated
withathing,affirmationmadefromwhateverstandpoint(_naya_)cannotberegardedasabsolute.All
affirmationsaretrue(insome_sydasti_or"maybeitis"sense);allaffirmationsarefalseinsomesense;all
affirmationsareindefiniteorinconceivableinsomesense(_sydavaktavya_);allaffirmationsaretrueaswellas
falseinsomesense(_sydastisynnsti_);allaffirmationsaretrueaswellasindefinite(_sydasti
cvaktavyas'ca_);allaffirmationsarefalseaswellasindefinite;allaffirmationsaretrueandfalseandindefinite
insomesense(_sydastisynnstisydavaktavyas'ca_).Thuswemaysay"thejugis"orthejughasbeing,butit
ismorecorrecttosayexplicitlythat"maybe(syt)thatthejugis,"otherwiseif"being"hereistakenabsolutely
ofanyandeverykindofbeing,itmightalsomeanthatthereisalumpofclayorapillar,oraclothoranyother
thing.Theexistencehereislimitedanddefinedbytheformofthejug."Thejugis"doesnotmeanabsolute
existencebutalimitedkindofexistenceasdeterminedbytheformofthejug,"Thejugis"thusmeansthata
limitedkindofexistence,namelythejugexistenceisaffirmedandnotexistenceingeneralintheabsoluteor
unlimitedsense,forthenthesentence"thejugis"mightaswellmean"theclayis,""thetreeis,""theclothis,"
etc.Againtheexistenceofthejugisdeterminedbythenegationofallotherthingsintheworld;eachqualityor
characteristic(suchasredcolour)ofthejugisapprehendedanddefinedbythenegationofalltheinfinite
varieties(suchasblack,blue,golden),etc.,ofitsclass,anditisbythecombinednegationofall

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[Footnote1:See_Vis'e@svas'yakabh@sya_,pp.895,etc.,and_Sydvdamajar_,pp.170,etc.]

180

the infinite number of characteristics or qualities other than those constituting the jug that a jug may be apprehended
or defined. What we call the being of the jug is thus the non-being of all the rest except itself. Thus though looked at
from one point of view the judgment "the jug is" may mean affirmation of being, looked at from another point of view it
means an affirmation of non-being (of all other objects). Thus of the judgment "the jug is" one may say, may be it is an
affirmation of being (_sydasti_), may be it is a negation of being (_synnsti_); or I may proceed in quite another way
and say that "the jug is" means "this jug is here," which naturally indicates that "this jug is not there" and thus the
judgment "the jug is" (i.e. is here) also means that "the jug is not there," and so we see that the affirmation of the being
of the jug is true only of this place and false of another, and this justifies us in saying that "may be that in some sense
the jug is," and "may be in some sense that the jug is not." Combining these two aspects we may say that in some sense
"may be that the jug is," and in some sense "may be that the jug is not." We understood here that if we put emphasis on
the side of the characteristics constituting being, we may say "the jug is," but if we put emphasis on the other side, we
may as well say "the jug is not." Both the affirmations hold good of the jug according as the emphasis is put on either
side. But if without emphasis on either side we try to comprehend the two opposite and contradictory judgments
regarding the jug, we see that the nature of the jug or of the existence of the jug is indefinite,
CHAPTER VI 126
unspeakableandinconceivable_avaktavya,_forhowcanweaffirmbothbeingandnonbeingofthesame
thing,andyetsuchisthenatureofthingsthatwecannotbutdoit.Thusallaffirmationsaretrue,arenot
true,arebothtrueanduntrue,andarethusunspeakable,inconceivable,andindefinite.Combiningthese
fouragainwederiveanotherthree,(1)thatinsomesenseitmaybethatthejugis,and(2)isyet
unspeakable,or(3)thatthejugisnotandisunspeakable,orfinallythatthejugis,isnot,andis
unspeakable.ThustheJainsholdthatnoaffirmation,orjudgment,isabsoluteinitsnature,eachistruein
itsownlimitedsenseonly,andforeachoneofthemanyoftheabovesevenalternatives(technicallycalled
_saptabha@ng_holdsgood[Footnoteref1].TheJainssaythatotherIndiansystemseachfromitsown
pointofviewassertsitselftobetheabsoluteandtheonly

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_Sydvdamajar_,withHemacandra'scommentary,pp.166,etc.]

181

pointofview.Theydonotperceivethatthenatureofrealityissuchthatthetruthofanyassertionismerely
conditional,andholdsgoodonlyincertainconditions,circumstances,orsenses(_updhi_).Itisthusimpossible
tomakeanyaffirmationwhichisuniversallyandabsolutelyvalid.Foracontraryorcontradictoryaffirmation
willalwaysbefoundtoholdgoodofanyjudgmentinsomesenseorother.Asallrealityispartlypermanentand
partlyexposedtochangeoftheformoflosingandgainingoldandnewqualities,andisthusrelativelypermanent
andchangeful,soallouraffirmationsregardingtrutharealsoonlyrelativelyvalidandinvalid.Being,nonbeing
andindefinite,thethreecategoriesoflogic,areallequallyavailableinsomesenseorotherinalltheir
permutationsforanyandeverykindofjudgment.Thereisnouniversalandabsolutepositionornegation,and
alljudgmentsarevalidonlyconditionally.Therelationofthenayadoctrinewiththesydvdadoctrineis
thereforethis,thatforanyjudgmentaccordingtoanyandeverynayathereareasmanyalternativesasare
indicatedbysydvda.Thevalidityofsuchajudgmentisthereforeonlyconditional.Ifthisisborneinmind
whenmakinganyjudgmentaccordingtoanynaya,thenayaisrightlyused.If,however,thejudgmentsaremade
absolutelyaccordingtoanyparticularnayawithoutanyreferencetoothernayasasrequiredbythesydvda
doctrinethenayasarewronglyusedasinthecaseofothersystems,andthensuchjudgmentsarefalseandshould
thereforebecalledfalsenayas(_naybhsa_)[Footnoteref1].

Knowledge,itsvalueforus.

TheBuddhistDharmottarainhiscommentaryon_Nyyabindu_saysthatpeoplewhoareanxioustofulfil
somepurposeorendinwhichtheyareinterested,valuetheknowledgewhichhelpsthemtoattainthat
purpose.Itisbecauseknowledgeisthusfoundtobeusefulandsoughtbymenthatphilosophytakesuponitthe
taskofexaminingthenatureoftrueknowledge(_samyagjna_or_pram@na_).Themaintestoftrue
knowledgeisthatithelpsustoattainourpurpose.TheJainsalsoareingeneralagreementwiththeaboveview
ofknowledgeoftheBuddhists[Footnoteref2].Theyalso

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Theearliestmentionofthedoctrineofsydvdaandsaptabha@ngprobablyoccursin
Bhadrabhu's(433357B.C.)commentary_Strak@rtnganiryukti_.

[Footnote2:See_Pram@nanayatattvlokla@mkra_(Benares),p.16;also
_Park@smukhasirav@rtti_(AsiaticSociety),ch.I.]

182
say that knowledge is not to be valued for its own sake. The validity (_prm@nya_) of anything consists in
CHAPTER VI 127
this,thatitdirectlyhelpsustogetwhatisgoodforusandtoavoidwhatisbadforus.Knowledgealonehasthis
capacity,forbyitwecanadaptourselvestoourenvironmentsandtrytoacquirewhatisgoodforusandavoid
whatisbad[Footnoteref1].Theconditionsthatleadtotheproductionofsuchknowledge(suchasthepresenceof
fulllightandproximitytotheeyeinthecaseofseeinganobjectbyvisualperception)havebutlittlerelevancyin
thisconnection.Forwearenotconcernedwithhowacognitionisproduced,asitcanbeofnohelptousinserving
ourpurposes.Itisenoughforustoknowthatexternalobjectsundercertainconditionsassumesuchaspecial
fitness(_yogyat_)thatwecanhaveknowledgeofthem.Wehavenoguaranteethattheygenerateknowledgein
us,forweareonlyawarethatundercertainconditionsweknowathing,whereasunderotherconditionswedo
notknowit[Footnoteref2].Theenquiryastothenatureofthespecialfitnessofthingswhichmakesknowledge
ofthempossibledoesnotconcernus.Thoseconditionswhichconfersuchaspecialfitnessonthingsastorender
themperceivablehavebutlittletodowithus;forourpurposeswhichconsistonlyintheacquirementofgoodand
avoidanceofevil,canonlybeservedbyknowledgeandnotbythoseconditionsofexternalobjects.

Knowledgerevealsourownselfasaknowingsubjectaswellastheobjectsthatareknownbyus.Wehaveno
reasontosuppose(liketheBuddhists)thatallknowledgebyperceptionofexternalobjectsisinthefirstinstance
indefiniteandindeterminate,andthatallourdeterminatenotionsofform,colour,sizeandothercharacteristics
ofthethingarenotdirectlygiveninourperceptualexperience,butarederivedonlybyimagination
(_utprek@s_),andthatthereforetrueperceptualknowledgeonlycertifiesthevalidityoftheindefiniteand
indeterminatecrudesensedata(_nirvikalpajna_).Experienceshowsthattrueknowledgeontheonehand
revealsusassubjectsorknowers,andontheotherhandgivesacorrectsketchoftheexternalobjectsinallthe
diversityoftheircharacteristics.Itisforthisreasonthatknowledgeisourimmediateandmostprominentmeans
ofservingourpurposes.

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Pram@nanayatattvlokla@mkra,_p.26.]
[Footnote2:See_Par@samukhastra,_II.9,anditsv@rtti,andalsotheconcludingv@rttiofch.II.]

183

Ofcourseknowledgecannotdirectlyandimmediatelybringtousthegoodwewant,butsinceitfaithfully
communicatestousthenatureoftheobjectsaroundus,itrendersouractionsfortheattainmentofgoodandthe
avoidanceofevil,possible;forifknowledgedidnotpossessthesefunctions,thiswouldhavebeenimpossible.The
validityofknowledgethusconsistsinthis,thatitisthemostdirect,immediate,andindispensablemeansfor
servingourpurposes.Solongasanyknowledgeisuncontradicteditshouldbeheldastrue.Falseknowledgeis
thatwhichrepresentsthingsinrelationsinwhichtheydonotexist.Whenaropeinabadlylightedplacegivesrise
totheillusionofasnake,theillusionconsistsintakingtheropetobeasnake,i.e.perceivingasnakewhereitdoes
notexist.Snakesexistandropesalsoexist,thereisnountruthinthat[Footnoteref1].Theerrorthusconsistsin
this,thatthesnakeisperceivedwheretheropeexists.Theperceptionofasnakeunderrelationsand
environmentsinwhichitwasnotthenexistingiswhatismeantbyerrorhere.Whatwasatfirstperceivedasa
snakewaslateroncontradictedandthusfoundfalse.Falsehoodthereforeconsistsinthemisrepresentationof
objectivefactsinexperience.Trueknowledgethereforeisthatwhichgivessuchacorrectandfaithful
representationofitsobjectasisneverafterwardsfoundtobecontradicted.Thusknowledgewhenimparted
directlyinassociationwiththeorgansinsenseperceptionisveryclear,vivid,anddistinct,andiscalled
perceptional(_pratyak@sa_);whenattainedotherwisetheknowledgeisnotsoclearandvividandisthencalled
nonperceptional(_parok@sa_[Footnoteref2]).

TheoryofPerception.
The main difference of the Jains from the Buddhists in the theory of perception lies, as we have already seen,
CHAPTER VI 128
inthis,thattheJainsthinkthatperception(_pratyak@sa_)revealstoustheexternalobjectsjustastheyare
withmostoftheirdiversecharacteristicsofcolour,form,etc.,andalsointhis,thatknowledgearisesinthe
soul

________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Illusionconsistsinattributingsuchspatial,temporalorotherkindsofrelationstotheobjectsofour
judgmentasdonotactuallyexist,buttheobjectsthemselvesactuallyexistinotherrelations.WhenImistakethe
ropeforthesnake,thesnakeactuallyexiststhoughitsrelationingwiththe"this"as"thisisasnake"doesnot
exist,forthesnakeisnottherope.Thisillusionisthuscalled_satkhyti_ormisrelationingofexistents(_sat_)].

[Footnote2:See_Jainatarkavrttika_ofSiddhasena,ch.I.,andv@rttibyS'antycrya,
Pram@nanayatattvlokla@mkra,ch.I.,_Parksmukhastrav@rtti,_ch.I.]

184

fromwithinitasifbyremovingaveilwhichhadbeencoveringitbefore.Objectsarealsonotmereformsof
knowledge(astheVijnavdinBuddhistthinks)butareactuallyexisting.Knowledgeofexternalobjectsby
perceptionisgainedthroughthesenses.Theexteriorphysicalsensesuchastheeyemustbedistinguishedfrom
theinvisiblefacultyorpowerofvisionofthesoul,whichalonedeservesthenameofsense.Wehavefivesuch
cognitivesenses.ButtheJainsthinkthatsincebyourexperienceweareonlyawareoffivekindsofsense
knowledgecorrespondingtothefivesenses,itisbettertosaythatitisthe"self"whichgainsofitselfthose
differentkindsofsenseknowledgeinassociationwiththoseexteriorsensesasifbyremovalofacovering,on
accountoftheexistenceofwhichtheknowledgecouldnotrevealitselfbefore.Theprocessofexternalperception
doesnotthusinvolvetheexerciseofanyseparateanddistinctsense,thoughtheriseofthesenseknowledgeinthe
soultakesplaceinassociationwiththeparticularsenseorgansuchaseye,etc.Thesoulisintouchwithallparts
ofthebody,andvisualknowledgeisthatknowledgewhichisgeneratedinthesoulthroughthatpartofitwhichis
associatedwith,orisintouchwiththeeye.Totakeanexample,Ilookbeforemeandseearose.Beforelookingat
ittheknowledgeofrosewasinme,butonlyinacoveredcondition,andhencecouldnotgetitselfmanifested.The
actoflookingattherosemeansthatsuchafitnesshascomeintotheroseandintomyselfthattheroseismade
visible,andtheveilovermyknowledgeofroseisremoved.Whenvisualknowledgearises,thishappensin
associationwiththeeye;IsaythatIseethroughthevisualsense,whereasinrealityexperienceshowsthatIhave
onlyaknowledgeofthevisualtype(associatedwitheye).Asexperiencedoesnotrevealtheseparatesenses,itis
unwarrantabletoassertthattheyhaveanexistenceapartfromtheself.ProceedinginasimilarwaytheJains
discardtheseparateexistenceofmanas(mindorgan)also,formanasalsoisnotgiveninexperience,andthe
hypothesisofitsexistenceisunnecessary,asselfalonecanserveitspurpose[Footnoteref1].Perceptionofan
objectmeans

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: _Tanna indriyam bhautikam kim tu tm ca indriyam...anupahatacak@surdides'e@su eva tmana@h

karmak@sayopas'amaslensthagitagavk@satulyni cak@surdni upakara@nni. Jaina-Vttika-V@rtti,_ II. p. 98. In
many places, however, the five senses, such as eye, ear, etc., are mentioned as senses, and living beings are often
classified according to the number of senses they possess. (See _Pram@namm@ms._ See also _Tattvrth-
dhigamastra_, ch. II. etc.) But this is with reference to the sense organs. The denial of separate senses is with
reference to admitting them as entities or capacities having a distinct and separate category of existence from the
soul. The sense organs are like windows for the soul to look out. They cannot thus modify the sense-knowledge which
rises in the soul by inward determination; for it is already existent in it; the perceptual process only means that the
veil which as observing it is removed.]
CHAPTER VI 129
185

thattheveilofignoranceuponthe"self"regardingtheobjecthasbeenremoved.Inwardlythisremovalis
determinedbythekarmaoftheindividual,outwardlyitisdeterminedbythepresenceoftheobjectof
perception,light,thecapacityofthesenseorgans,andsuchotherconditions.ContrarytotheBuddhistsand
manyotherIndiansystems,theJainsdeniedtheexistenceofanynirvikalpa(indeterminate)stageprecedingthe
finalsavikalpa(determinate)stageofperception.Therewasadirectrevelationofobjectsfromwithinandno
indeterminatesensematerialswerenecessaryforthedevelopmentofdeterminateperceptions.Wemustcontrast
thiswiththeBuddhistswhoregardedthatthefirststageconsistingofthepresentationofindeterminatesense
materialswastheonlyvalidpartofperception.Thedeterminatestagewiththemistheresultoftheapplication
ofmentalcategories,suchasimagination,memory,etc.,andhencedoesnottrulyrepresentthepresentativepart
[Footnoteref1].

NonPerceptualKnowledge.

Nonperceptualknowledge(_parok@sa_)differsfrompratyak@sainthis,thatitdoesnotgiveussovivida
pictureofobjectsasthelatter.SincetheJainsdonotadmitthatthesenseshadanyfunctionindeterminingthe
cognitionsofthesoul,theonlydistinctiontheycoulddrawbetweenperceptionandotherformsofknowledgewas
thattheknowledgeoftheformerkind(perception)gaveusclearerfeaturesandcharacteristicsofobjectsthanthe
latter.Parok@sathusincludesinference,recognition,implication,memory,etc.;andthisknowledgeisdecidedly
lessvividthanperception.

Regardinginference,theJainsholdthatitisunnecessarytohavefivepropositions,suchas:(1)"thehillisfiery,"
(2)"becauseofsmoke,"(3)"whereverthereissmokethereisfire,suchasthekitchen,"(4)"thishillissmoky,"
(5)"thereforeitisfiery,"calledrespectively_pratij,hetu,drs@tnta,upanaya_andnigamana,exceptforthe
purposeofexplicitness.Itisonlythefirsttwopropositionswhichactuallyenterintotheinferentialprocess
(_Prameyakamalamrta@n@da,_pp.108,109).Whenwemakean

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[Footnote1_Prameyakamalamrta@n@da,_pp.811.]
186

inferencewedonotproceedthroughthefivepropositionsasabove.Theywhoknowthatthereasonis
inseparablyconnectedwiththeprobandumeitherascoexistence(_sahabhva_)orasinvariableantecedence
(_kramabhva_)willfromthemerestatementoftheexistenceofthereason(e.g.smoke)inthehilljumptothe
conclusionthatthehillhasgotfire.Asyllogismconsistingoffivepropositionsisratherforexplainingthematter
toachildthanforrepresentingtheactualstateofthemindinmakinganinference[Footnoteref1].

AsregardsproofbytestimonytheJainsdonotadmittheauthorityoftheVedas,butbelievethattheJaina
scripturesgiveusrightknowledge,forthesearetheutterancesofpersonswhohavelivedaworldlylifebut
afterwardsbyrightactionsandrightknowledgehaveconqueredallpassionsandremovedallignorance
[Footnoteref2].

KnowledgeasRevelation.

TheBuddhistshadaffirmedthattheproofoftheexistenceofanythingdependedupontheeffectthatitcould
produceonus.Thatwhichcouldproduceanyeffectonuswasexistent,andthat
_____________________________________________________________________
CHAPTER VI 130
[Footnote1:Asregardsconcomitance(_vypti_)someoftheJainalogiciansliketheBuddhistsprefer
_antarvypti_(betweensmokeandfire)tobahirvypt(theplacecontainingsmokewiththeplace
containingfire).Theyalsodivideinferenceintotwoclasses,svrthnumnaforone'sownselfand
_parrthnumna_forconvincingothers.ItmaynotbeoutofplacetonotethattheearliestJainaviewas
maintainedbyBhadrabhuinhisDas'avaiklikaniryuktiwasinfavouroftenpropositionsformakingan
inference;(1)_Pratij_(e.g.noninjurytolifeisthegreatestvirtue),(2)_Pratijvibhakti_(noninjuryto
lifeisthegreatestvirtueaccordingtoJainascriptures),(3)Hetu(becausethosewhoadheretononinjury
arelovedbygodsanditismeritorioustodothemhonour),(4)Hetuvibhakti(thosewhodosoaretheonly
personswhocanliveinthehighestplacesofvirtue),(5)_Vipak@sa_(butevenbydoinginjuryonemay
prosperandevenbyrevilingJainascripturesonemayattainmeritasisthecasewithBrahmins),(6)
_Vipak@saprati@sedha_(itisnotso,itisimpossiblethatthosewhodespiseJainascripturesshouldbe
lovedbygodsorshoulddeservehonour),(7)_D@r@s@nta_(theArhatstakefoodfromhouseholdersas
theydonotliketocookthemselvesforfearofkillinginsects),(8)_s'a@nk(butthesinsofthe
householdersshouldtouchthearhats,fortheycookforthem),(9)_s'a@nkprati@sedha_(thiscannotbe,
forthearhatsgotocertainhousesunexpectedly,soitcouldnotbesaidthatthecookingwasundertakenfor
them),(10)Naigamana(noninjuryisthereforethegreatestvirtue)(Vidybh@sa@na's_IndianLogic_).
Thesearepersuasivestatementswhichareoftenactuallyadoptedinadiscussion,butfromaformalpointof
viewmanyoftheseareirrelevant.WhenVtsyyanainhis_Nyyastrabh@sya_,I.1.32,saysthat
Gautamaintroducedthedoctrineoffivepropositionsasagainstthedoctrineoftenpropositionsasheldby
otherlogicians,heprobablyhadthisJainaviewinhismind.]

[Footnote2:See_Jainatarkavrttika_,and_Park@smukhastrav@rtti_,and_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_
withGu@naratnaonJainism.]

187

whichcouldnotnonexistent.Infactproductionofeffectwaswiththemtheonlydefinitionofexistence(being).
Theoreticallyeachunitofeffectbeingdifferentfromanyotherunitofeffecttheysupposedthattherewasa
successionofdifferentunitsofeffector,whatisthesamething,acknowledgedasuccessionofnewsubstances
everymoment.Allthingswerethusmomentary.TheJainsurgedthatthereasonwhytheproductionofeffect
mayberegardedastheonlyproofofbeingisthatwecanassertonlythatthingtheexistenceofwhichisindicated
byacorrespondingexperience.Whenwehaveaunitofexperiencewesupposetheexistenceoftheobjectasits
ground.Thisbeingso,thetheoreticalanalysisoftheBuddhiststhateachunitofeffectproducedinusisnot
exactlythesameateachnewpointoftime,andthatthereforeallthingsaremomentary,isfallacious;for
experienceshowsthatnotallofanobjectisfoundtobechangingeverymoment;somepartofit(e.g.goldina
goldornament)isfoundtoremainpermanentwhileotherparts(e.g.itsformasearringsorbangles)areseento
undergochange.Howinthefaceofsuchanexperiencecanweassertthatthewholethingvanisheseverymoment
andthatnewthingsarebeingrenewedateachsucceedingmoment?Henceleavingasidemereabstractand
unfoundedspeculations,ifwelooktoexperiencewefindthattheconceptionofbeingorexistenceinvolvesa
notionofpermanenceassociatedwithchange_paryya_(acquirementofnewqualitiesandthelossofoldones).
TheJainsholdthatthedefectsofothersystemslieinthis,thattheyinterpretexperienceonlyfromoneparticular
standpoint(_naya_)whereastheyalonecarefullyweighexperiencefromallpointsofviewandacquiesceinthe
truthsindicatedbyit,notabsolutelybutunderproperreservationsandlimitations.TheJainsholdthatin
formulatingthedoctrineof_arthakriykritva_theBuddhistsatfirstshowedsignsofstartingontheirenquiry
ontheevidenceofexperience,butsoontheybecameonesidedintheiranalysisandindulgedinunwarrantable
abstractspeculationswhichwentdirectlyagainstexperience.Thusifwegobyexperiencewecanneitherreject
theselfnortheexternalworldassomeBuddhistsdid.Knowledgewhichrevealstoustheclearcutfeaturesofthe
externalworldcertifiesatthesametimethatsuchknowledgeispartandparcelofmyselfasthesubject.
Knowledgeisthusfelttobeanexpressionofmyownself.Wedonotperceiveinexperiencethatknowledge
188
CHAPTER VI 131
inusisgeneratedbytheexternalworld,butthereisinustheriseofknowledgeandofcertainobjectsmade
knowntousbyit.Theriseofknowledgeisthusonlyparalleltocertainobjectivecollocationsofthingswhich
somehowhavethespecialfitnessthattheyandtheyaloneareperceivedatthatparticularmoment.Lookedat
fromthispointofviewallourexperiencesarecentredinourselves,fordeterminedsomehow,ourexperiences
cometousasmodificationsofourownself.Knowledgebeingacharacteroftheself,itshowsitselfas
manifestationsoftheselfindependentofthesenses.Nodistinctionshouldbemadebetweenaconsciousandan
unconsciouselementinknowledgeasS@mkhyadoes.Norshouldknowledgeberegardedasacopyofthe
objectswhichitreveals,astheSautrntikasthink,forthenbycopyingthematerialityoftheobject,knowledge
woulditselfbecomematerial.Knowledgeshouldthusberegardedasaformlessqualityoftheselfrevealingall
objectsbyitself.ButtheMm@msviewthatthevalidity(_prm@nya_)ofallknowledgeisprovedby
knowledgeitself_svata@hprm@nya_)iswrong.Bothlogicallyandpsychologicallythevalidityofknowledge
dependsuponoutwardcorrespondence(sa@mvda)withfacts.Butinthosecaseswherebypreviousknowledge
ofcorrespondencearightbeliefhasbeenproducedtheremaybeapsychologicalascertainmentofvalidity
withoutreferencetoobjectivefacts(_prm@nyamutpattauparataevajaptausvakryecasvata@hparatas'ca.
abhysnabhyspek@say_)[Footnoteref1].Theobjectiveworldexistsasitiscertifiedbyexperience.Butthat
itgeneratesknowledgeinusisanunwarrantablehypothesis,forknowledgeappearsasarevelationofourown
self.ThisbringsustoaconsiderationofJainametaphysics.

TheJvas.

TheJainssaythatexperienceshowsthatallthingsmaybedividedintotheliving(_jva_)andthenonliving
(_ajva_).Theprincipleoflifeisentirelydistinctfromthebody,anditismosterroneoustothinkthatlifeiseither
theproductorthepropertyofthebody[Footnoteref2]Itisonaccountofthislifeprinciplethatthebody
appearstobelivingThisprincipleisthesoul.Thesoulisdirectlyperceived(byintrospection)justastheexternal
thingsare.Itisnotameresymbolicalobjectindicatedbyaphraseor

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Prameyakamalamrta@n@da,_pp.3843.]
[Footnote2:See_JainaVrttika,_p.60.]

189

a description. This is directly against the view of the great Mm@msa authority Prabhkara [Footnote ref 1]. The soul
in its pure state is possessed of infinite perception (_ananta-dars'ana_), infinite knowledge (_ananta-jna_), infinite
bliss (_ananta-sukha_) and infinite power (_ananta-vrya_) [Footnote ref 2]. It is all perfect. Ordinarily however, with the
exception of a few released pure souls (_mukta-jva_) all the other jvas (_sa@msrin_) have all their purity and power
covered with a thin veil of karma matter which has been accumulating in them from beginningless time. These souls are
infinite in number. They are substances and are eternal. They in reality occupy innumerable space-points in our
mundane world (_lokks`a_), have a limited size (_madhyama-parim@na_) and are neither all-pervasive (_vibhu_)
nor atomic (_anu_); it is on account of this that _jva_ is called _Jivstikya_. The word _astikya_ means anything that
occupies space or has some pervasiveness; but these souls expand and contract themselves according to the
dimensions of the body which they occupy at any time (bigger in the elephant and smaller in the ant life). It is well to
remember that according to the Jains the soul occupies the whole of the body in which it lives, so that from the tip of
the hair to the nail of the foot, wherever there may be any cause of sensation, it can at once feel it. The manner in
which the soul occupies the body is often explained as being similar to the manner in which a lamp illumines the whole
room though remaining in one corner of the room. The Jains divide the jvas according to the number of sense-organs
they possess. The lowest class consists of plants, which possess only the sense-organ of touch. The next higher class is
that of worms, which possess two sense-organs of touch and taste. Next come the ants, etc., which possess touch,
taste, and smell. The next higher one that of bees, etc., possessing
Chapter III 132
visioninadditiontotouch,taste,andsmell.Thevertebratespossessallthefivesenseorgans.Thehigher
animalsamongthese,namelymen,denizensofhell,andthegodspossessinadditiontotheseaninnersense
organnamelymanasbyvirtueofwhichtheyare

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_Prameyakamalamrta@nda,_p.33.]

[Footnote2:TheJainsdistinguishbetween_dars'ana_and_jna_.Dars'anaistheknowledgeofthingswithout
theirdetails,e.g.Iseeacloth.Jnameanstheknowledgeofdetails,e.g.Inotonlyseethecloth,butknowto
whomitbelongs,ofwhatqualityitis,whereitwasprepared,etc.Inallcognitionwehavefirstdars'anaandthen
jna.Thepuresoulspossessinfinitegeneralperceptionofallthingsaswellasinfiniteknowledgeofallthingsin
alltheirdetails.]

190

calledrational(_sa@mjin_)whiletheloweranimalshavenoreasonandarecalledasamjnin.

ProceedingtowardsthelowestanimalwefindthattheJainsregardallthefourelements(earth,water,air,fire)as
beinganimatedbysouls.Thusparticlesofearth,etc.,arethebodiesofsouls,calledearthlives,etc.Thesewemay
callelementarylives;theyliveanddieandarebornagaininanotherelementarybody.Theseelementarylivesare
eithergrossorsubtle;inthelattercasetheyareinvisible.Thelastclassofoneorganlivesareplants.Ofsome
plantseachisthebodyofonesoulonly;butofotherplants,eachisanaggregationofembodiedsouls,whichhave
allthefunctionsoflifesuchasrespirationandnutritionincommon.Plantsinwhichonlyonesoulisembodiedare
alwaysgross;theyexistinthehabitablepartoftheworldonly.Butthoseplantsofwhicheachisacolonyofplant
livesmayalsobesubtleandinvisible,andinthatcasetheyaredistributedallovertheworld.Thewholeuniverse
isfullofminutebeingscalled_nigodas_;theyaregroupsofinfinitenumberofsoulsformingverysmallclusters,
havingrespirationandnutritionincommonandexperiencingextremepains.Thewholespaceoftheworldis
closelypackedwiththemlikeaboxfilledwithpowder.Thenigodasfurnishthesupplyofsoulsinplaceofthose
thathavereachedMoksa.Butaninfinitesimallysmallfractionofonesinglenigodahassufficedtoreplacethe
vacancycausedintheworldbytheNirvanaofallthesoulsthathavebeenliberatedfrombeginninglesspastdown
tothepresent.Thusitisevidentthesa@msrawillneverbeemptyoflivingbeings.Thoseofthenigodaswholong
fordevelopmentcomeoutandcontinuetheircourseofprogressthroughsuccessivestages[Footnoteref1].

KarmaTheory.

Itisonaccountoftheirmeritsordemeritsthatthejvasarebornasgods,men,animals,ordenizensofhell.
Wehavealreadynoticedin

Chapter III
thatthecauseoftheembodimentofsoulisthepresenceinitofkarmamatter.Thenaturalperfectionsofthe
puresoularesulliedbythedifferentkindsofkarmamatter.Thosewhichobscurerightknowledgeofdetails
(_jna_)arecalled_jnvara@nya_,thosewhichobscurerightperception(_dars'ana_)asinsleepare
called_dars'anvaranya_,thosewhich

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:SeeJacobi'sarticleonJainism,_E.R.E._,and_Lokapraks'a_,VI.pp.31ff.]
191
Chapter III 133
obscuretheblissnatureofthesoulandthusproducepleasureandpainare_vedanya_,andthosewhichobscure
therightattitudeofthesoultowardsfaithandrightconduct_mohanya_[Footnoteref1].Inadditiontothese
fourkindsofkarmathereareotherfourkindsofkarmawhichdetermine(1)thelengthoflifeinanybirth,(2)the
peculiarbodywithitsgeneralandspecialqualitiesandfaculties,(3)thenationality,caste,family,socialstanding,
etc.,(4)theinbornenergyofthesoulbytheobstructionofwhichitpreventsthedoingofagoodactionwhenthere
isadesiretodoit.Thesearerespectivelycalled(1)_yu@skakarma_,(2)_nmakarma_,(3)gotrakarma,(4)
_antaryakarma_.Byouractionsofmind,speechandbody,wearecontinuallyproducingcertainsubtlekarma
matterwhichinthefirstinstanceiscalled_bhvakarma_,whichtransformsitselfintodravyakarmaandpours
itselfintothesoulandstickstherebycomingintocontactwiththepassions(_ka@sya_)ofthesoul.Theseact
likeviscoussubstancesinretainingtheinpouringkarmamatter.Thismatteractsineightdifferentwaysanditis
accordinglydividedintoeightclasses,aswehavealreadynoticed.Thiskarmaisthecauseofbondageandsorrow.
Accordingasgoodorbadkarmamatterstickstothesoulitgetsitselfcolouredrespectivelyasgolden,lotuspink,
whiteandblack,blueandgreyandtheyarecalledthe_les'ys_.Thefeelingsgeneratedbytheaccumulationof
thekarmamatterarecalled_bhvales'y_andtheactualcolorationofthesoulbyitiscalled_dravyales'y_.
Accordingasanykarmamatterhasbeengeneratedbygood,bad,orindifferentactions,itgivesuspleasure,pain,
orfeelingofindifference.Eventheknowledgethatweareconstantlygettingbyperception,inference,etc.,isbut
theresultoftheeffectofkarmasinaccordancewithwhichtheparticularkindofveilwhichwasobscuringany
particularkindofknowledgeisremovedatanytimeandwehaveaknowledgeofacorrespondingnature.Byour
ownkarmastheveilsoverourknowledge,feeling,etc.,aresoremovedthatwehavejustthatkindofknowledge
andfeelingthatwedeservedtohave.Allknowledge,feeling,etc.,arethusinonesensegeneratedfromwithin,the
externalobjectswhichareordinarilysaidtobegeneratingthemallbeingbutmerecoexistentexternalconditions.

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:TheJainsacknowledgefivekindsofknowledge:(1)_matijna_(ordinarycognition),(2)
_s'ruti_ (testimony), (3) avadhi (supernatural cognition), (4) _mana@hparyya_ (thoughtreading), (5)
_kevalajna_(omniscience).]

192

Aftertheeffectofaparticularkarmamatter(_karmavarga@n_)isonceproduced,itisdischargedandpurged
fromoffthesoul.Thisprocessofpurgingoffthekarmasiscalled_nirjar_.Ifnonewkarmamattershould
accumulatethen,thegradualpurgingoffofthekarmasmightmakethesoulfreeofkarmamatter,butasitis,
whilesomekarmamatterisbeingpurgedoff,otherkarmamatteriscontinuallypouringin,andthusthepurging
andbindingprocessescontinuingsimultaneouslyforcethesoultocontinueitsmundanecycleofexistence,
transmigration,andrebirth.Afterthedeathofeachindividualhissoul,togetherwithitskarmicbody
(_krma@nas'arra_),goesinafewmomentstotheplaceofitsnewbirthandthereassumesanewbody,
expandingorcontractinginaccordancewiththedimensionsofthelatter.

Intheordinarycoursekarmatakeseffectandproducesitsproperresults,andatsuchastagethesoulissaidto
beintheaudayikastate.Bypropereffortskarmamayhoweverbepreventedfromtakingeffect,thoughitstill
continuestoexist,andthisissaidtobethe_aupas'amika_stateofthesoul.Whenkarmaisnotonlyprevented
fromoperatingbutisannihilated,thesoulissaidtobeinthe_k@syika_state,anditisfromthisstatethat
Mok@saisattained.Thereis,however,afourthstateofordinarygoodmenwithwhomsomekarmais
annihilated,someneutralized,andsomeactive(_k@syopas'amika_)[Footnoteref1].

Karma,sravaandNirjar.

It is on account of karma that the souls have to suffer all the experiences of this world process, including births and
rebirths in diverse spheres of life as gods, men or animals, or insects. The karmas are certain sorts of infra-atomic
particles of matter (_karma-varga@n_}. The influx of these karma particles into the soul is
Chapter III 134
calledsravainJainism.Thesekarmasareproducedbybody,mind,andspeech.Thesravasrepresentthe
channelsormodesthroughwhichthekarmasenterthesoul,justlikethechannelsthroughwhichwaterenters
intoapond.ButtheJainsdistinguishbetweenthechannelsandthekarmaswhichactually

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Thestagesthroughwhichadevelopingsoulpassesaretechnicallycalled_gu@nasthnas_whichare
fourteeninnumber.ThefirstthreestagesrepresentthegrowthoffaithinJainism,thenextfivestagesarethose
inwhichallthepassionsarecontrolled,inthenextfourstagestheasceticpractisesyogaanddestroysallhis
karmas,atthethirteenthstageheisdivestedofallkarmasbuthestillpractisesyogaandatthefourteenthstage
heattainsliberation(seeDravyasa@mgrahav@rtti,13thverse).]

193

enterthroughthosechannels.Thustheydistinguishtwokindsofsravas,bhvsravaandkarmsrava.
Bhvsravameansthethoughtactivitiesofthesoulthroughwhichoronaccountofwhichthekarmaparticles
enterthesoul[Footnoteref1].ThusNemicandrasaysthatbhvsravaisthatkindofchangeinthesoul(whichis
thecontrarytowhatcandestroythekarmsrava),bywhichthekarmasenterthesoul[Footnoteref2].
Karmsrava,however,meanstheactualentranceofthekarmamatterintothesoul.Thesebhvsravasarein
generaloffivekinds,namelydelusion(_mithytva_),wantofcontrol(_avirati_),inadvertence(_pramda_),the
activitiesofbody,mindandspeech(_yoga_)andthepassions(_ka@syas_).Delusionagainisoffivekinds,
namely_eknta_(afalsebeliefunknowinglyacceptedanduncriticallyfollowed),_viparta_(uncertaintyastothe
exactnatureoftruth),vinaya(retentionofabeliefknowingittobefalse,duetooldhabit),_sa@ms'aya_(doubt
astorightorwrong)and_ajna_(wantofanybeliefduetothewantofapplicationofreasoningpowers).
Aviratiisagainoffivekinds,injury(_hi@ms_),falsehood(_an@rta_),stealing(_cauryya_),incontinence
(_abrahma_),anddesiretohavethingswhichonedoesnotalreadypossess(_parigrahk@nk@s_).Pramda
orinadvertenceisagainoffivekinds,namelybadconversation(_vikath_),passions(_ka@sya_),baduseofthe
fivesenses(_indriya_),sleep(_nidr_),attachment(_rga_)[Footnoteref3].

Comingtodravysravawefindthatitmeansthatactualinfluxofkarmawhichaffectsthesoulineightdifferent
mannersinaccordancewithwhichthesekarmasareclassedintoeightdifferentkinds,namelyjnvara@nya,
dars'anvara@nya,vedanya,mohanya,yu,nma,gotraandantarya.Theseactualinfluxestakeplaceonly
asaresultofthebhvsravaorthereprehensiblethoughtactivities,orchanges(_pari@nma_)ofthesoul.The
statesofthoughtwhichconditionthecominginofthekarmasiscalledbhvabandhaandtheactualbondageof
thesoulbytheactualimpureconnectionsofthekarmasistechnicallycalleddravyabandha.Itisonaccountof
bhvabandhathattheactualconnectionbetweenthekarmasandthesoulcantakeplace[Footnoteref4].The
actualconnectionsofthekarmaswiththesoularelikethesticking

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Dravyasa@mgraha_,S'I.29.]

[Footnote2:Nemicandra'scommentaryon_Dravyasa@mgraha_,S'I.29,editedbyS.C.Ghoshal,Arrah,
1917.]

[Footnote3:SeeNemicandra'scommentaryonS'I.30.]

[Footnote4:Nemicandraon31,and_Vardhamnapur@na_XVI.44,quotedbyGhoshal.]
194
Chapter III 135
ofdustonthebodyofapersonwhoisbesmearedalloverwithoil.ThusGunaratnasays"Theinfluxofkarma
meansthecontactoftheparticlesofkarmamatter,inaccordancewiththeparticularkindofkarma,withthesoul
justlikethestickingofdustonthebodyofapersonbesmearedwithoil.Inallpartsofthesoultherebeinginfinite
numberofkarmaatomsitbecomessocompletelycoveredwiththemthatinsomesensewhenlookedatfromthat
pointofviewthesoulissometimesregardedasamaterialbodyduringitssa@msrastage[Footnoteref1]."
Fromonepointofviewthebondageofkarmaisonlyof_puf@nya_and_ppa_(goodandbadkarmas)[Footnote
ref2].Fromanotherthisbondageisoffourkinds,accordingtothenatureofkarma(_prak@rti_)durationof
bondage(_sthiti_),intensity(_anubhga_)andextension(_prades'a_).Thenatureofkarmareferstotheeight
classesofkarmaalreadymentioned,namelythejanavaraniyakarmawhichobscurestheinfiniteknowledgeof
thesoulofallthingsindetail,dars'anvara@nyakarmawhichobscurestheinfinitegeneralknowledgeofthe
soul,vedanyakarmawhichproducesthefeelingsofpleasureandpaininthesoul,mohanyakarma,whichso
infatuatessoulsthattheyfailtodistinguishwhatisrightfromwhatiswrong,yukarma,whichdeterminesthe
tenureofanyparticularlife,nmakarmawhichgivesthempersonalities,gotrakarmawhichbringsabouta
particularkindofsocialsurroundingforthesoulandantarayakarmawhichtendstoopposetheperformanceof
rightactionsbythesoul.Thedurationofthestayofanykarmainthesouliscalledsthiti.Againakarmamaybe
intense,middlingormild,andthisindicatesthethirdprincipleofdivision,anubhga.Prades'areferstothe
differentpartsofthesoultowhichthekarmaparticlesattachthemselves.Thedurationofstayofanykarmaand
itsvaryingintensityareduetothenatureofthekasayasorpassionsofthesoul,whereasthedifferent
classificationofkarmasasjnvaranya,etc.,areduetothenatureofspecificcontactofthesoulwithkarma
matter[Footnoteref3].

Correspondingtothetwomodesofinrushofkarmas(bhvsravaanddravysrava)aretwokindsofcontrol
opposingthisinrush,byactualthoughtmodificationofacontrarynatureandbytheactualstoppageofthe
inrushofkarmaparticles,andthesearerespectivelycalledbhvasa@mvaraanddravyasa@mvara[Footnote
ref4].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:SeeGu@naratna,p.181]

[Footnote2:Ibid.]
[Footnote3:Nemicandra,33.]

[Footnote4:_Varddham@na_XVI6768,and_Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti_S'I.35.]
195

Thebhvasa@mvarasare(1)thevowsofnoninjury,truthfulness,abstinencefromstealing,sexcontrol,
andnonacceptanceofobjectsofdesire,(2)samitisconsistingoftheuseoftroddentracksinordertoavoid
injurytoinsects(_ry_),gentleandholytalk(_bh@sa_),receivingproperalms(_e@sa@n_),etc,(3)
guptisorrestraintsofbody,speechandmind,(4)dharmas consisting of habits of forgiveness, humility,
straightforwardness, truth, cleanliness, restraint, penance, abandonment indifference to any kind of gain or loss, and
supreme sex-control [Footnote ref 1], (5) _anuprek@s_ consisting of meditation about the transient character of the
world, about our helplessness without the truth, about the cycles of world-existence, about our own responsibilities for
our good and bad actions, about the difference between the soul and the non-soul, about the uncleanliness of our body
and all that is associated with it, about the influx of karma and its stoppage and the destruction of those karmas which
have already entered the soul, about soul, matter and the substance of the universe, about the difficulty of attaining
true knowledge, faith and conduct, and about the essential principles of the world [Footnote ref 2], (6) the
_par@sahajaya_ consisting of the conquering of all kinds of physical troubles of heat, cold, etc, and of feelings of
discomforts of various kinds, (7) _critra_ or right conduct.
Chapter III 136
Nexttothiswecometonirjarorthepurgingoffofthekarmasorrathertheirdestruction.Thisnirjaralsoisof
twokindsbhvanirjaranddravyanirjar.Bhvanirjarmeansthatchangeinthesoulbyvirtueofwhichthe
karmaparticlesaredestroyed.Dravyanirjarmeanstheactualdestructionofthesekarmaparticleseitherbythe
reapingoftheireffectsorbypenancesbeforetheirtimeoffruition,calledsavipkaandavipkanirjars
respectively.Whenallthekarmasaredestroyedmok@saorliberationiseffected.

Pudgala.

The_ajva_(nonliving)isdividedinto_pudgalstikya,dharmastikya,adharmstikya,ks'stikya,kla,
pu@nya,ppa_.Thewordpudgalameansmatter[Footnoteref3],anditiscalled_astikya_inthesensethatit
occupiesspace.Pudgalaismadeupofatoms

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Tattvrthdhigamastra_.]

[Footnote2:Ibid.]

[Footnote3:ThisisentirelydifferentfromtheBuddhistsense.WiththeBuddhistspudgalameansan
individualoraperson.]

196

whicharewithoutsizeandeternal.Mattermayexistintwostates,gross(suchasthingsweseearoundus),and
subtle(suchasthekarmamatterwhichsulliesthesoul).Allmaterialthingsareultimatelyproducedbythe
combinationofatoms.Thesmallestindivisibleparticleofmatteriscalledanatom(_a@nu_).Theatomsareall
eternalandtheyallhavetouch,taste,smell,andcolour.Theformationofdifferentsubstancesisduetothe
differentgeometrical,sphericalorcubicalmodesofthecombinationoftheatoms,tothediversemodesoftheir
innerarrangementandtotheexistenceofdifferentdegreesofinteratomicspace(_ghanapratarabhedena_).
Somecombinationstakeplacebysimplemutualcontactattwopoints(_yugmaprades'a_)whereasinothersthe
atomsareonlyheldtogetherbythepointsofattractiveforce(_oja@hprades'a_)(_Prajpanop@ngastra_,pp.
1012).Twoatomsformacompound(_skandha_),whentheoneisviscousandtheotherdryorbothareof
differentdegreesofviscosityordryness.ItmustbenotedthatwhiletheBuddhiststhoughtthattherewasno
actualcontactbetweentheatomstheJainsregardedthecontactasessentialandastestifiedbyexperience.These
compoundscombinewithothercompoundsandthusproducethegrossthingsoftheworld.Thereare,however,
liabletoconstantchange(_pari@nma_)bywhichtheylosesomeoftheiroldqualities(_gu@nas_)andacquire
newones.Therearefourelements,earth,water,air,andfire,andtheatomsofallthesearealikeincharacter.
Theperceptionofgrossnesshoweverisnotanerrorwhichisimposedupontheperceptionoftheatomsbyour
mind(astheBuddhiststhink)norisitduetotheperceptionofatomsscatteredspatiallylengthwiseand
breadthwise(astheS@mkhyaYogasupposes),butitisduetotheaccessionofasimilarpropertyofgrossness,
bluenessorhardnessinthecombinedatoms,sothatsuchknowledgeisgeneratedinusasisgiveninthe
perceptionofagross,blue,orahardthing.Whenathingappearsasblue,whathappensisthis,thattheatoms
therehaveallacquiredthepropertyofbluenessandontheremovalofthedars'anavara@nyaand
jnavara@nyaveil,therearisesinthesoultheperceptionandknowledgeofthatbluething.Thissameness
(_samnarpat_)oftheaccessionofaqualityinanaggregateofatomsbyvirtueofwhichitappearsasone
object(e.g.acow)istechnicallycalled_tiryaksmnya_.Thissmnyaorgeneralityisthusneitheranimposition
ofthemindnoranabstractentity

197

(as maintained by the Naiyyikas) but represents only the accession of similar qualities by a similar development of
qualities of atoms forming an aggregate. So long as this similarity of qualities continues we
Chapter III 137
perceivethethingtobethesameandtocontinueforsomelengthoftime.Whenwethinkofathingtobe
permanent,wedosobyreferringtothissamenessinthedevelopingtendenciesofanaggregateofatoms
resultingintherelativepermanenceofsimilarqualitiesinthem.AccordingtotheJainsthingsarenot
momentaryandinspiteofthelossofsomeoldqualitiesandtheaccessionofotherones,thethingasawholemay
remainmoreorlessthesameforsometime.Thissamenessofqualitiesintimeistechnicallycalled
_rdhvasmnya_[Footnoteref1].Iftheatomsarelookedatfromthepointofviewofthechangeandaccession
ofnewqualities,theymayberegardedasliabletodestruction,butiftheyarelookedatfromthepointofviewof
substance(_dravya_)theyareeternal.

Dharma,Adharma,ks'a.

TheconceptionofdharmaandadharmainJainismisabsolutelydifferentfromwhattheymeaninother
systemsofIndianphilosophy.Dharmaisdevoidoftaste,touch,smell,soundandcolour;itisconterminous
withthemundaneuniverse(_lokks'a_)andpervadeseverypartofit.Theterm_astikya_istherefore
appliedtoit.Itistheprincipleofmotion,theaccompanyingcircumstanceorcausewhichmakesmotion
possible,likewatertoamovingfish.Thewaterisapassiveconditionorcircumstanceofthemovementofa
fish,i.e.itisindifferentorpassive(_udsna_)andnotanactiveorsolicitous(_preraka_)cause.Thewater
cannotcompelafishatresttomove;butifthefishwantstomove,wateristhenthenecessaryhelptoits
motion.Dharmacannotmakethesoulormattermove;butiftheyaretomove,theycannotdosowithout
thepresenceofdharma.Henceattheextremityofthemundaneworld(_loka_)intheregionoftheliberated
souls,therebeingnodharma,theliberatedsoulsattainperfectrest.Theycannotmovetherebecausethereis
notthenecessarymotionelement,dharma[Footnoteref2].Adharmaisalsoregardedasasimilarpervasive
entitywhich

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_Prameyakamalamrta@n@da_,pp.136143;_Jainatarkavrttika_,p.106.]
[Footnote2:_Dravyasa@mgrahav@rtti_,1720.]

198

helpsjvasandpudgalastokeepthemselvesatrest.Nosubstancecouldmoveiftherewerenodharma,orcould
remainatrestiftherewerenoadharma.Thenecessityofadmittingthesetwocategoriesseemsprobablytohave
beenfeltbytheJainsonaccountoftheirnotionthattheinneractivityofthejvaortheatomsrequiredforits
exteriorrealizationthehelpofsomeotherextraneousentity,withoutwhichthiscouldnothavebeentransformed
intoactualexteriormotion.Moreoversincethejvaswereregardedashavingactivityinherentinthemthey
wouldbefoundtobemovingevenatthetimeofliberation(moksa),whichwasundesirable;thusitwasconceived
thatactualmotionrequiredforitsfulfilmentthehelpofanextraneousentitywhichwasabsentintheregionof
theliberatedsouls.

Thecategoryofks'aisthatsubtleentitywhichpervadesthemundaneuniverse(_loka_)andthetranscendent
regionofliberatedsouls(_aloka_)whichallowsthesubsistenceofallothersubstancessuchasdharma,
adharma,jva,pudgala.Itisnotamerenegationandabsenceofveilorobstruction,ormereemptiness,buta
positiveentitywhichhelpsotherthingstointerpenetrateit.Onaccountofitspervasivecharacteritiscalled
_ks'stikya_[Footnoteref1].

KlaandSamaya.

Time (_kla_) in reality consists of those innumerable particles which never mix with one another, but which help the
happening of the modification or accession of new qualities and the change of qualities of the atoms. Kla does not
bring about the changes of qualities, in things, but just as kas'a helps interpenetration and
Chapter III 138
dharmamotion,soalsoklahelpstheactionofthetransformationofnewqualitiesinthings.Timeperceivedas
moments,hours,days,etc.,iscalledsamaya.Thisistheappearanceoftheunchangeableklainsomanyforms.
Klathusnotonlyaidsthemodificationsofotherthings,butalsoallowsitsownmodificationsasmoments,hours,
etc.Itisthusadravya(substance),andthemoments,hours,etc.,areitsparyyas.Theunitofsamayaisthetime
requiredbyanatomtotraverseaunitofspacebyaslowmovement.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Dravyasamgrahav@rtti_,19.]

199

JainaCosmography.

AccordingtotheJains,theworldiseternal,withoutbeginningorend.Lokaisthatplaceinwhichhappinessand
miseryareexperiencedasresultsofvirtueandvice.Itiscomposedofthreeparts,_rdhva_(wherethegods
reside),madhya(thisworldofours),andadho(wherethedenizensofhellreside).Themundaneuniverse
(_lokkas'a_)ispervadedwithdharmawhichmakesallmovementpossible.Beyondthelokkas'athereisno
dharmaandthereforenomovement,butonlyspace(_kas'a_).Surroundingthislokaks'aarethreelayersof
air.Theperfectedsoulrisingstraightovertherdhvalokagoestothetopofthislokaks'aand(therebeingno
dharma)remainsmotionlessthere.

JainaYoga.

YogaaccordingtoJainismisthecauseofmoksa(salvation).Thisyogaconsistsofjana(knowledgeofrealityasit
is),s'raddh(faithintheteachingsoftheJinas),andcaritra(cessationfromdoingallthatisevil).Thiscaritra
consistsof_ahi@ms_(nottakinganylifeevenbymistakeorunmindfulness),_sn@rta_(speakinginsuchaway
asistrue,goodandpleasing),asteya(nottakinganythingwhichhasnotbeengiven),brahmacaryya(abandoning
lustfoiallkindsofobjects,inmind,speechandbody),andaparigraha(abandoningattachmentforallthings)
[Footnoteref1].

Thesestrictrulesofconductonlyapplytoasceticswhoarebentonattainingperfection.Thestandardproposed
fortheordinaryhouseholdersisfairlyworkable.ThusitissaidbyHemacandra,thatordinaryhouseholders
shouldearnmoneyhonestly,shouldfollowthecustomsofgoodpeople,shouldmarryagoodgirlfromagood
family,shouldfollowthecustomsofthecountryandsoforth.Thesearejustwhatweshouldexpectfromany
goodand

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Certainexternalrulesofconductarealsocalledcaritra.Theseare:_ryy_(togobythepath
alreadytroddenbyothersandilluminatedbythesun'srays,sothatproperprecautionmaybetakenwhile
walkingtopreventoneselffromtreadingoninsects,etc.,whichmaybelyingontheway),_bhas_(tospeakwell
andpleasantlytoallbeings),isana(tobegalmsinthepropermonasticmanner),_dnasamiti_(toinspect
carefullytheseatsavoidingalltransgressionswhentakingorgivinganything),utsargasamiti(totakecarethat
bodilyrefusemaynotbethrowninsuchawayastoinjureanybeing),manogupti(toremoveallfalsethoughts,to
remainsatisfiedwithinoneself,andholdallpeopletobethesameinmind),_vggupti_(absolutesilence),and
_kyagupti_(absolutesteadinessandfixityofthebody).Fiveotherkindsofcaritraarecountedin
_Dravyasamgrahav@rtti_35.]

200
honest householder of the present day. Great stress is laid upon the virtues of ahi@ms, sn@rta, asteya and
Chapter III 139
brahmacaryya,buttherootofalltheseisahi@ms.Thevirtuesofsn@rta,asteyaandbrahmacaryyaaremade
tofollowdirectlyassecondarycorrollariesofahi@ms.Ahi@msmaythusbegeneralizedasthefundamental
ethicalvirtueofJainism;judgmentonallactionsmaybepassedinaccordancewiththestandardofahi@ms;
sn@rta,asteyaandbrahmacaryyaareregardedasvirtuesastheirtransgressionleadstohi@ms(injuryto
beings).Amilderformofthepracticeofthesevirtuesisexpectedfromordinaryhouseholdersandthisiscalled
anubrata(smallvows).Butthosewhoarestrugglingfortheattainmentofemancipationmustpractisethese
virtuesaccordingtothehighestandstricteststandard,andthisiscalledmahbrata(greatvows).Thusfor
examplebrahmacaryyaforahouseholderaccordingtotheanubratastandardwouldbemerecessationfrom
adultery,whereasaccordingtomahbrataitwouldbeabsoluteabstentionfromsexthoughts,sexwordsandsex
acts.Ahi@msaccordingtoahouseholder,accordingtoanubrata,wouldrequireabstinencefromkillingany
animals,butaccordingtomahavrataitwouldentailalltherigourandcarefulnesstopreventoneselffrombeing
thecauseofanykindofinjurytoanylivingbeinginanyway.

Manyotherminordutiesareimposeduponhouseholders,allofwhicharebaseduponthecardinalvirtueof
ahi@ms.Theseare(1)digvirati(tocarryoutactivitieswithinarestrictedareaandtherebydesistfrominjuring
livingbeingsindifferentplaces),(2)_bhogopabhogamna_(todesistfromdrinkingliquors,takingflesh,butter,
honey,figs,certainotherkindsofplants,fruits,andvegetables,toobservecertainotherkindsofrestrictions
regardingtimeandplaceoftakingmeals),(3)_anarthada@n@da_consistingof(a)_apadhyna_(cessationfrom
inflictinganybodilyinjuries,killingofone'senemies,etc.),(b)_ppopades'a_(desistingfromadvisingpeopleto
taketoagriculturewhichleadstothekillingofsomanyinsects),(c)_hi@msopakridna_(desistingfromgiving
implementsofagriculturetopeoplewhichwillleadtotheinjuryofinsects),(d)_pramdacara@na_(todesist
fromattendingmusicalparties,theatres,orreadingsexliterature,gambling,etc.),(4)_s'ik@spadabrata_
consistingof(a)_smayikabrata_(totrytotreatallbeingsequally),(b)des'vaks'ikabrata(graduallytopractise
thedigviratibratamoreandmoreextensively),(c)_po@sadhabrata_

200

(certainotherkindsofrestriction),(d)_atithisa@mvibhgabrata(tomakegiftstoguests).Alltransgressionsof
thesevirtues,called_aticra_,shouldbecarefullyavoided.

Allperception,wisdom,andmoralsbelongtothesoul,andtoknowthesoulaspossessingtheseistheright
knowledgeofthesoul.Allsorrowsproceedingoutofwantofselfknowledgecanberemovedonlybytrue
selfknowledge.Thesoulinitselfispureintelligence,anditbecomesendowedwiththebodyonlyonaccount
ofitskarma.Whenbymeditation,allthekarmasareburnt(_dhyngnidagdhakarma_)theselfbecomes
purified.Thesoulisitselfthesa@msra(thecycleofrebirths)whenitisoverpoweredbythefourka@syas
(passions)andthesenses.Thefourka@syasarekrodha(anger),_mna_(vanityandpride),_my_
(insincerityandthetendencytodupeothers),andlobha(greed).Theseka@syascannotberemovedexcept
byacontrolofthesenses;andselfcontrolaloneleadstothepurityofthemind(_mana@hs'uddhi_).
Withoutthecontrolofthemindnoonecanproceedinthepathofyoga.Allouractsbecomecontrolled
whenthemindiscontrolled,sothosewhoseekemancipationshouldmakeeveryefforttocontrolthemind.
Nokindofasceticism(_tapas_)canbeofanygooduntilthemindispurified.Allattachmentandantipathy
(_rgadvc@sa_)canberemovedonlybythepurificationofthemind.Itisbyattachmentandantipathythat
manloseshisindependence.Itisthusnecessaryfortheyogin(sage)thatheshouldbefreefromthemand
becomeindependentintherealsenseofthetermWhenamanlearnstolookuponallbeingswithequality
(_samatva_)hecaneffectsuchaconquestoverrgaanddve@saasonecouldneverdoevenbythestrictest
asceticismthroughmillionsofyears.Inordertoeffectthissamatvatowardsall,weshouldtaketothe
followingkindsofmeditation(_bhvan_):

We should think of the transitoriness (_anityat_) of all things, that what a thing was in the morning, it is not at mid-
day, what it was at mid-day it is not at night; for all things are transitory and changing. Our body, all our objects of
pleasure, wealth and youth all are fleeting like dreams, or cotton particles in a whirlwind.
Chapter III 140
All,eventhegods,aresubjecttodeath.Allourrelativeswillbytheirworksfallapreytodeath.Thisworldis
thusfullofmiseryandthereisnothingwhichcansupportusinit.Thusin

201

whateverwaywelookforanything,onwhichwecandepend,wefindthatitfailsus.Thisiscalled
as'ara@nabhvan(themeditationofhelplessness).

Someareborninthisworld,somesuffer,somereapthefruitsofthekarmadoneinanotherlife.Weareall
differentfromoneanotherbyoursurroundings,karma,byourseparatebodiesandbyallothergiftswhich
eachofusseverallyenjoy.Tomeditateontheseaspectsiscalledekatvabhvanandanyatvabhvan.

Tothinkthatthebodyismadeupofdefiledthings,theflesh,blood,andbones,andisthereforeimpureis
calledas'ucibhvan(meditationoftheimpurityofthebody).

Tothinkthatifthemindispurifiedbythethoughtsofuniversalfriendshipandcompassionandthepassionsare
removed,thenonlywillgood{_s'ubha_)accruetome,butifonthecontraryIcommitsinfuldeedsandtransgress
thevirtues,thenallevilwillbefallme,iscalledsravabhvan(meditationofthebefallingofevil).Bythecontrol
ofthesrava(inrushofkarma)comesthesa@mvara(cessationoftheinfluxofkarma)andthedestructionofthe
karmasalreadyaccumulatedleadstonrjar(decayanddestructionofkarmamatter).

Againoneshouldthinkthatthepracticeofthetendharmas(virtues)ofselfcontrol(_sa@myama_),
truthfulness(_sn@rta_),purity(_s'auca_),chastity(_brahma_),absolutewantofgreed(_akicanat_),
asceticism(_tapas_),forbearance,patience(_ks'nti_),mildness(_mrdava_),sincerity(_@rjut_),and
freedomoremancipationfromallsins(_mukti_}canalonehelpusintheachievementofthehighestgoal.
Thesearetheonlysupportstowhichwecanlook.Itisthesewhichupholdtheworldorder.Thisiscalled
dharmasvkhytatbhvan.

AgainoneshouldthinkoftheJainacosmologyandalsoofthenatureoftheinfluenceofkarmainproducingall
thediverseconditionsofmen.Thesetwoarecalled_lokabhvan_and_bodhibhvan_.

Whenbythecontinualpracticeoftheabovethoughtsmanbecomesunattachedtoallthingsandadopts
equalitytoallbeings,andbecomesdisinclinedtoallworldlyenjoyments,thenwithamindfullofpeacehegets
ridofallpassions,andthenheshouldtaketotheperformanceofdhynaormeditationbydeepconcentration.
Thesamatvaorperfectequalityofthemindanddhynaareinterdependent,sothatwithoutdhynathereis
nosamatva

203

andwithoutsamatvathereisnodhyna.Inordertomakethemindsteadybydhynaoneshouldthinkof
_maitr_(universalfriendship),pramoda(thehabitofemphasizingthegoodsidesofmen),_karu@n_
(universalcompassion)and_mdhyastha_(indifferencetothewickednessofpeople,i.e.thehabitofnottaking
anynoteofsinners).TheJainadhynaconsistsinconcentratingthemindonthesyllablesoftheJainaprayer
phrases.Thedhynahoweveraswehaveseenisonlypractisedasanaidtomakingthemindsteadyand
perfectlyequalandundisturbedtowardsallthings.Emancipationcomesonlyastheresultofthefinalextinction
ofthekarmamaterials.Jainayogaisthusacompletecourseofmoraldisciplinewhichleadstothepurification
ofthemindandishencedifferentfromthetraditionalHinduyogaofPatajaliorevenoftheBuddhists
[Footnoteref1].

JainaAtheism[Footnoteref2].
The Naiyyikas assert that as the world is of the nature of an effect, it must have been created by an intelligent
Chapter III 141
agentandthisagentiss'vara(God).TothistheJainreplies,"WhatdoestheNaiyyikameanwhenhesays
thattheworldisofthenatureofaneffect"?Doeshemeanby"effect,"(1)thatwhichismadeupofparts
(_svayava_),or,(2)thecoinherenceofthecausesofanonexistentthing,or,(3)thatwhichisregardedby
anyoneashavingbeenmade,or,(4)thatwhichisliabletochange(_vikritvam_).Again,whatismeantby
being"madeupofparts"?Ifitmeansexistenceinparts,thentheclassconcepts(_smnya_)existinginthe
partsshouldalsoberegardedaseffects,andhencedestructible,butthesetheNaiyyikasregardasbeing
partlessandeternal.Ifitmeans"thatwhichhasparts,"theneven"space"(_ks'a_)hastoberegardedas
"effect,"buttheNaiyyikaregardsitaseternal.

Again"effect"cannotmean"coinherenceofthecausesofathingwhichwerepreviouslynonexistent,"forin
thatcaseonecouldnotspeakoftheworldasaneffect,fortheatomsoftheelementsofearth,etc.,areregarded
aseternal.

Againif"effect"means"thatwhichisregardedbyanyoneas

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Yogas'stra,_byHemacandra,editedbyWindisch,in_ZeitschriftderDeutschenMorg.
Gesellschaft_,Leipsig,1874,and_Dravyasa@mgraha_,editedbyGhoshal,1917.]

[Footnote2:SeeGu@naratna's_Tarkarahasyadpik_.]

204

havingbeenmade,"thenitwouldapplyeventospace,forwhenamandigsthegroundhethinksthathehas
madenewspaceinthehollowwhichhedug.

Ifitmeans"thatwhichisliabletochange,"thenonecouldsupposethatGodwasalsoliabletochangeandhe
wouldrequireanothercreatortocreatehimandheanother,andsoonadinfinitum.Moreover,ifGodcreateshe
cannotbutbeliabletochangewithreferencetohiscreativeactivity.

Moreover,weknowthatthosethingswhichhappenatsometimeanddonothappenatothertimesare
regardedas"effects."Buttheworldasawholeexistsalways.Ifitisarguedthatthingscontainedwithinitsuch
astrees,plants,etc.,are"effects,"thenthatwouldapplyeventothishypotheticalGod,for,hiswillandthought
mustbediverselyoperatingatdiversetimesandthesearecontainedinhim.Healsobecomesacreatedbeingby
virtueofthat.Andevenatomswouldbe"effects,"fortheyalsoundergochangesofcolourbyheat.

Let us grant for the sake of argument that the world as a whole is an "effect." And every effect has a cause, and so the
world as a whole has a cause. But this does not mean that the cause is an intelligent one, as God is supposed to be. If it
is argued that he is regarded as intelligent on the analogy of human causation then he might also be regarded as
imperfect as human beings. If it is held that the world as a whole is not exactly an effect of the type of effects produced
by human beings but is similar to those, this will lead to no inference. Because water-vapour is similar to smoke,
nobody will be justified in inferring fire from water-vapour, as he would do from smoke. If it is said that this is so
different an effect that from it the inference is possible, though nobody has ever been seen to produce such an effect,
well then, one could also infer on seeing old houses ruined in course of time that these ruins were produced by
intelligent agents. For these are also effects of which we do not know of any intelligent agent, for both are effects, and
the invisibility of the agent is present in both cases. If it is said that the world is such that we have a sense that it has
been made by some one, then the question will be, whether you infer the agency of God from this sense or infer the
sense of its having been made from the fact of its being made by God, and you have a vicious circle (_anyonys'raya_).
Chapter III 142
205

Again,evenifweshouldgrantthattheworldwascreatedbyanagent,thensuchanagentshouldhaveabodyfor
wehaveneverseenanyintelligentcreatorwithoutabody.Ifitisheldthatweshouldconsiderthegeneral
conditionofagencyonly,namely,thattheagentisintelligent,theobjectionwillbethatthisisimpossible,for
agencyisalwaysassociatedwithsomekindofbody.Ifyoutaketheinstanceswithsomekindofeffectssuchas
theshootsofcorngrowinginthefields,itwillbefoundthatthesehadnointelligentagentsbehindthemtocreate
them.IfitissaidthatthesearealsomadebyGod,thenyouhaveanargumentinacircle(_cakraka_),forthis
wastheverymatterwhichyousoughttoprove.

LetitbegrantedforthesakeofargumentthatGodexists.Doeshismereabstractexistenceproducetheworld?
Well,inthatcase,theabstractexistenceofapottermayalsocreatetheworld,fortheabstractexistenceisthe
sameinbothcases.Doesheproducetheworldbyknowledgeandwill?Well,thatisimpossible,forthere
cannotbeanyknowledgeandwillwithoutabody.Doesheproducetheworldbyphysicalmovementorany
otherkindofmovement?Inanycasethatisimpossible,fortherecannotbeanymovementwithoutabody.If
yousupposethatheisomniscient,youmaydoso,butthatdoesnotprovethathecanbeallcreator.

LetusagaingrantforthesakeofargumentthatabodilessGodcancreatetheworldbyhiswillandactivity.Did
hetaketocreationthroughapersonalwhim?Inthatcasetherewouldbenonaturallawsandorderintheworld.
Didhetaketoitinaccordancewiththemoralandimmoralactionsofmen?Thenheisguidedbyamoralorder
andisnotindependent.Isitthroughmercythathetooktocreation?Wellthen,wesupposethereshouldhave
beenonlyhappinessintheworldandnothingelse.Ifitissaidthatitisbythepastactionsofmenthattheysuffer
painsandenjoypleasure,andifmenareledtodoviciousactionsbypastdeedswhichworklikeblinddestiny,
thensuchablinddestiny(ad@r@s@ta)mighttaketheplaceofGod.IfHetooktocreationasmereplay,thenhe
mustbeachildwhodidthingswithoutapurpose.Ifitwasduetohisdesireofpunishingcertainpeopleand
favouringothers,thenhemustharbourfavouritismonbehalfofsomeandhatredagainstothers.Ifthecreation
tookplacesimplythroughhisownnature,then,whatisthegoodof

206
admittinghimatall?Youmayrathersaythattheworldcameintobeingoutofitsownnature.

ItispreposteroustosupposethatoneGodwithoutthehelpofanyinstrumentsorotheraccessoriesofany
kind,couldcreatethisworld.Thisisagainstallexperience.

Admitting for the sake of argument that such a God exists, you could never justify the adjectives with which you wish to
qualify him. Thus you say that he is eternal. But since he has no body, he must be of the nature of intelligence and will.
But this nature must have changed in diverse forms for the production of diverse kinds of worldly things, which are of
so varied a nature. If there were no change in his knowledge and will, then there could not have been diverse kinds of
creation and destruction. Destruction and creation cannot be the result of one unchangeable will and knowledge.
Moreover it is the character of knowledge to change, if the word is used in the sense in which knowledge is applied to
human beings, and surely we are not aware of any other kind of knowledge. You say that God is omniscient, but it is
difficult to suppose how he can have any knowledge at all, for as he has no organs he cannot have any perception, and
since he cannot have any perception he cannot have any inference either. If it is said that without the supposition of a
God the variety of the world would be inexplicable, this also is not true, for this implication would only be justified if
there were no other hypothesis left. But there are other suppositions also. Even without an omniscient God you could
explain all things merely by the doctrine of moral order or the law of karma. If there were one God, there could be a
society of Gods too. You say that if there were many Gods, then there would be quarrels and differences of opinion.
This is like the story of a miser who for fear of incurring expenses left all his sons and wife and retired into the forest.
When even ants and bees can co-operate together and act harmoniously, the
CHAPTER VII 143
suppositionthatifthereweremanyGodstheywouldhavefallenout,wouldindicatethatinspiteofallthevirtues
thatyouascribetoGodyouthinkhisnaturetobequiteunreliable,ifnotvicious.Thusinwhicheverwayone
triestojustifytheexistenceofGodhefindsthatitisabsolutelyahopelesstask.Thebestwaythenistodispense
withthesuppositionaltogether[Footnoteref1].

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_,_Gu@naratnaonJainism,pp.115124.]

207

Mok@sa(emancipation).

Themotivewhichleadsamantostriveforrelease(_mok@sa_)istheavoidanceofpainandtheattainmentof
happiness,forthestateofmuktiisthestateofthesoulinpurehappiness.Itisalsoastateofpureandinfinite
knowledge(_anantajna_)andinfiniteperception(_anantadars'ana_).Inthesa@msrastateonaccountofthe
karmaveilsthispurityissullied,andtheveilsareonlywornoutimperfectlyandthusrevealthisandthatobject
atthisandthattimeasordinaryknowledge(_mati_),testimony(_s'ruta_),supernaturalcognition,asintranceor
hypnotism(_avadhi_),anddirectknowledgeofthethoughtsofothersorthoughtreading(_mana@hparyya_).
Inthestateofreleasehoweverthereisomniscience(_kevalajna_)andallthingsaresimultaneouslyknownto
theperfect(_kevalin_)astheyare.Inthesa@msrastagethesoulalwaysacquiresnewqualities,andthussuffers
acontinualchangethoughremainingthesameinsubstance.Butintheemancipatedstagethechangesthatasoul
suffersareallexactlythesame,andthusitisthatatthisstagethesoulappearstobethesameinsubstanceaswell
asinitsqualitiesofinfiniteknowledge,etc.,thechangemeaninginthisstateonlytherepetitionofthesame
qualities.

Itmaynotbeoutofplacetomentionherethatthoughthekarmasofmanareconstantlydetermininghimin
variouswaysyetthereisinhiminfinitecapacityorpowerforrightaction(_anantavrya_),sothatkarmacan
neversubduethisfreedomandinfinitecapacity,thoughthismaybesuppressedfromtimetotimebythe
influenceofkarma.Itisthusthatbyanexerciseofthispowermancanovercomeallkarmaandbecomefinally
liberated.Ifmanhadnotthisanantavryainhimhemighthavebeeneternallyundertheswayofthe
accumulatedkarmawhichsecuredhisbondage(_bandha_).Butsincemanistherepositoryofthisindomitable
powerthekarmascanonlythrowobstaclesandproducesufferings,butcanneverpreventhimfromattaining
hishighestgood.

208

CHAPTER VII
THEKAPILAANDTHEPTAJALASA@MKHYA(YOGA)[Footnoteref1].

AReview.

The examination of the two ancient Nstika schools of Buddhism and Jainism of two different types ought to convince
us that serious philosophical speculations were indulged in, in circles other than those of the Upani@sad sages. That
certain practices known as Yoga were generally prevalent amongst the wise seems very probable, for these are not
only alluded to in some of the Upani@sads but were accepted by the two nstika schools of Buddhism and Jainism.
Whether we look at them from the point of view of ethics or metaphysics, the two Nstika schools appear to have
arisen out of a reaction against the sacrificial disciplines of the Brahma@nas. Both these systems originated with the
K@sattriyas and were marked by a strong aversion against the taking of animal life, and against the doctrine of offering
animals at the sacrifices.
CHAPTER VII 144
Thedoctrineofthesacrificessupposedthatasuitablecombinationofrites,rituals,andarticlesofsacrificehad
themagicalpowerofproducingthedesiredeffectashowerofrain,thebirthofason,theroutingofahugearmy,
etc.Thesacrificeswereenjoinedgenerallynotsomuchforanymoralelevation,asfortheachievementofobjects
ofpracticalwelfare.TheVedasweretheeternalrevelationswhichwerecompetentsotodictateadetailed
procedure,thatwecouldbyfollowingitproceedonacertaincourseofactionandrefrainfromotherinjurious
coursesinsuchamannerthatwemightobtaintheobjectswedesiredbytheaccurateperformanceofany
sacrifice.Ifwearetodefinetruthinaccordancewiththephilosophyofsucharitualisticculturewemightsay
that,thataloneistrue,inaccordancewithwhichwemayrealizeourobjectsintheworldaboutus;thetruthof
Vedicinjunctionsisshownbythepracticalattainmentofour

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ThischapterisbasedonmyStudyofPatanjali,publishedbytheCalcuttaUniversity,and
my
YogaphilosophyinrelationtootherIndianSystemsofthought,awaitingpublicationwiththesameauthority.The
systemhasbeentreatedindetailinthosetwoworks.]

209

objects.Truthcannotbedeterminedaprioributdependsuponthetestofexperience[Footnoterefl].

ItisinterestingtonoticethatBuddhismandJainismthoughprobablybornoutofareactionarymovement
againstthisartificialcreed,yetcouldnotbutbeinfluencedbysomeofitsfundamentalprincipleswhich,whether
distinctlyformulatedornot,wereatleasttacitlyimpliedinallsacrificialperformances.Thusweseethat
Buddhismregardedallproductionanddestructionasbeingduetotheassemblageofconditions,anddefined
truthasthatwhichcouldproduceanyeffect.ButtosuchalogicalextremedidtheBuddhistscarrythese
doctrinesthattheyendedinformulatingthedoctrineofabsolutemomentariness[Footnoteref2].Turningtothe
Jainswefindthattheyalsoregardedthevalueofknowledgeasconsistinginthehelpthatitoffersinsecuring
whatisgoodforusandavoidingwhatisevil;truthgivesussuchanaccountofthingsthatonproceeding
accordingtoitsdirectionswemayverifyitbyactualexperience.Proceedingonacorrectestimateofthingswe
mayeasilyavailourselvesofwhatisgoodandavoidwhatisbad.TheJainsalsobelievedthatchangeswere
producedbytheassemblageofconditions,buttheydidnotcarrythisdoctrinetoitslogicalextreme.Therewas
changeintheworldaswellaspermanence.TheBuddhistshadgonesofarthattheyhadevendeniedthe
existenceofanypermanentsoul.TheJainssaidthatnoultimate,onesidedandabsoluteviewofthingscouldbe
taken,andheldthatnotonlythehappeningofeventswasconditional,butevenallourjudgments,aretrueonly
inalimitedsense.Thisisindeedtrueforcommonsense,whichweacknowledgeassuperiortomereapriori
abstractions,whichleadtoabsoluteandonesidedconclusions.Bytheassemblageofconditions,oldqualitiesin
thingsdisappeared,newqualitiescamein,andapartremainedpermanent.Butthiscommonsenseview,though
inagreementwithourordinaryexperience,couldnotsatisfyourinneraprioridemandsforfindingoutultimate
truth,whichwastruenotrelativelybutabsolutely.Whenaskedwhetheranythingwastrue,Jainism

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ThephilosophyoftheVedasasformulatedbytheMm@msofKumrilaandPrabhkara
holdstheoppositeview.Truthaccordingtothemisdeterminedaprioriwhileerrorisdeterminedby
experience.]

[Footnote2:Historicallythedoctrineofmomentarinessisprobablypriortothedoctrineof
_arthakriykritva._ButthelaterBuddhistssoughttoprovethatmomentarinesswasthelogicalresultofthe
doctrineof_arthakriykritva_.]
210
CHAPTER VII 145
wouldanswer,"yes,thisistruefromthispointofview,butuntruefromthatpointofview,whilethatisalso
truefromsuchapointofviewanduntruefromanother."Butsuchananswercannotsatisfythemindwhich
seekstoreachadefinitepronouncement,anabsolutejudgment.

ThemaindepartureofthesystemsofJainismandBuddhismfromthesacrificialcreedconsistedinthis,that
theytriedtoformulateatheoryoftheuniverse,therealityandthepositionofsentientbeingsandmore
particularlyofman.Thesacrificialcreedwasbusywithindividualritualsandsacrifices,andcaredfor
principlesormaximsonlysofarastheywereofusefortheactualperformancesofsacrifices.Againaction
withthenewsystemsdidnotmeansacrificebutanygeneralactionthatwealwaysperform.Actionswere
hereconsideredbadorgoodaccordingastheybroughtaboutourmoralelevationornot.Thefollowersof
thesacrificialcreedrefrainedfromuntruthnotsomuchfromasenseofpersonaldegradation,butbecause
theVedashaddictatedthatuntruthshouldnotbespoken,andtheVedasmustbeobeyed.Thesacrificial
creedwantedmoreandmorehappinesshereorintheotherworld.ThesystemsofBuddhistandJain
philosophyturnedtheirbacksuponordinaryhappinessandwantedanultimateandunchangeablestate
whereallpainsandsorrowswereforeverdissolved(Buddhism)orwhereinfinitehappiness,everunshaken,
wasrealized.Acourseofrightconducttobefollowedmerelyforthemoralelevationofthepersonhadno
placeinthesacrificialcreed,forwithitacourseofrightconductcouldbefollowedonlyifitwassodictated
intheVedas,Karmaandthefruitofkarma(_karmaphala_)onlymeantthekarmaofsacrificeanditsfruits
temporaryhappiness,suchaswasproducedasthefruitofsacrifices;knowledgewiththemmeantonlythe
knowledgeofsacrificeandofthedictatesoftheVedas.Inthesystemshowever,karma,karmaphala,
happiness,knowledge,alltheseweretakenintheirwidestandmostuniversalsense.Happinessorabsolute
extinctionofsorrowwasstillthegoal,butthiswasnonarrowsacrificialhappinessbutinfiniteand
unchangeablehappinessordestructionofsorrow;karmawasstilltheway,butnotsacrificialkarma,forit
meantallmoralandimmoralactionsperformedbyus;knowledgeheremeanttheknowledgeoftruthor
realityandnottheknowledgeofsacrifice.

SuchanadvancehadhoweveralreadybegunintheUpani@shads
211

whichhadanticipatedthenewsystemsinallthesedirections.Thepioneersofthesenewsystemsprobablydrew
theirsuggestionsbothfromthesacrificialcreedandfromtheUpani@sads,andbuilttheirsystemsindependently
bytheirownrationalthinking.ButifthesuggestionsoftheUpani@sadswerethusutilizedbyhereticswho
deniedtheauthorityoftheVedas,itwasnaturaltoexpectthatweshouldfindintheHinducampsuchgermsof
rationalthinkingasmightindicateanattempttoharmonizethesuggestionsoftheUpani@sadsandofthe
sacrificialcreedinsuchamannerasmightleadtotheconstructionofaconsistentandwellworkedsystemof
thought.OurexpectationsareindeedfulfilledintheS@mkhyaphilosophy,germsofwhichmaybediscovered
intheUpani@sads.

TheGermsofS@mkhyaintheUpani@sads.

ItisindeedtruethatintheUpani@sadsthereisalargenumberoftextsthatdescribetheultimaterealityasthe
Brahman,theinfinite,knowledge,bliss,andspeakofallelseasmerechangingformsandnames.Theword
BrahmanoriginallymeantintheearliestVedicliterature,mantra, duly performed sacrifice, and also the power of
sacrifice which could bring about the desired result [Footnote ref l]. In many passages of the Upani@sads this Brahman
appears as the universal and supreme principle from which all others derived their powers. Such a Brahman is sought
for in many passages for personal gain or welfare. But through a gradual process of development the conception of
Brahman reached a superior level in which the reality and truth of the world are tacitly ignored, and the One, the
infinite, knowledge, the real is regarded as the only Truth. This type of thought gradually developed into the monistic
Vedanta as explained by S'ankara. But there was another line of thought which was developing alongside of it, which
regarded the world as having a reality and as being made up of water, fire, and earth. There are also passages in
S'vetas'vatara and particularly in
CHAPTER VII 146
Maitrya@nfromwhichitappearsthattheSmkhyalineofthoughthadconsiderablydeveloped,andmanyof
itstechnicaltermswerealreadyinuse[Footnoteref2].ButthedateofMaitrya@nhasnotyetbeendefinitely
settled,andthedetails

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:SeeHillebrandt'sarticle,"Brahman"(_E.R.E._).]

[Footnote2:KathaIII.10,V.7.S'veta.V.7,8,12,IV.5,I.3.ThishasbeendealtwithindetailinmyYoga
PhilosophyinrelationtootherIndianSystemsofThought,inthefirstchapter.]

212

foundtherearealsonotsuchthatwecanformadistinctnotionoftheS@mkhyathoughtasitdevelopedinthe
Upani@sads.ItisnotimprobablethatatthisstageofdevelopmentitalsogavesomesuggestionstoBuddhismor
Jainism,buttheS@mkhyaYogaphilosophyaswenowgetitisasysteminwhicharefoundalltheresultsof
BuddhismandJainisminsuchamannerthatitunitesthedoctrineofpermanenceoftheUpani@sadswiththe
doctrineofmomentarinessoftheBuddhistsandthedoctrineofrelativismoftheJains.

S@mkhyaandYogaLiterature.

ThemainexpositionofthesystemofS@mkhyaandYogainthissectionhasbeenbasedonthe_S@mkhya
krik_,the_S@mkhyastras_,andthe_Yogastras_ofPatajaliwiththeircommentariesandsub
commentaries.The_S@mkhyakrik_(about200A.D.)waswrittenbys'varak@r@s@na.Theaccountof
S@mkhyagivenbyCaraka(78A.D.)representsprobablyanearlierschoolandthishasbeentreatedseparately.
VcaspatiMis'ra(ninthcenturyA.D.)wroteacommentaryonitknownas_Tattvakaumud_.Butbeforehim
GaudapdaandRjwrotecommentariesonthe_S@mkhyakrik_[Footnoteref1].Nryanatrthawrotehis
_Candrik_onGaudapda'scommentary.The_S@mkhyastras_whichhavebeencommentedonbyVijna
Bhik@su(called_Pravacanabh@sya_)ofthesixteenthcenturyseemstobeaworkofsomeunknownauthor
aftertheninthcentury.Aniruddhaofthelatterhalfofthefifteenthcenturywasthefirstmantowritea
commentaryonthe_S@mkhyastras_.VijnaBhiksuwrotealsoanotherelementaryworkonS@mkhya
knownas_S@mkhyasra_.Anothershortworkoflateoriginis_Tattvasamsa_(probablyfourteenthcentury).
TwootherworksonSm@khya,vizSmnanda's_Smkhyatattvavivecana_andBhvga@nes'a's
_S@mkhyatattvaythrthyadpana_(bothlaterthanVijnabhik@su)ofrealphilosophicalvaluehavealso
beenfreelyconsulted.Patajali's_Yogastra_(notearlierthan147B.C.)wascommentedonbyVysa(400A.D.)
andVysa'sbhsyacommentedonbyVcaspatiMis'raiscalled_Tattvavais'rad_,byVijnaBhik@su
_Yogavrttika_,byBhojainthetenthcentury_Bhojav@rtti_,andbyNges'a(seventeenthcentury)
_Chyvykhy_.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:IsupposethatRj'scommentaryonthe_Krik_wasthesameas_Rjavrttika_quotedby
Vcaspati.Rj'scommentaryonthe_Krik_hasbeenreferredtobyJayantainhis_Nyyamajar_,p.109.
Thisbookisprobablynowlost.]

213

AmongstthemodernworkstowhichIoweanobligationImaymentionthetwotreatises_Mechanical,physical
andchemicaltheoriesoftheAncientHindusandthePositiveSciencesoftheAncientHindus_byDrB.N.Seal
andmytwoworksonYogaStudyofPatanjalipublishedbytheCalcuttaUniversity,andYogaPhilosophyin
relationtootherIndianSystemsofThoughtwhichisshortlytobepublished,andmyNaturalPhilosophyofthe
AncientHindus, awaiting publication with the Calcutta University.
CHAPTER VII 147
Gu@naratnamentionstwootherauthoritativeS@mkhyaworks,viz._M@tharabh@sya_and
_treyatantra_.OfthesethesecondisprobablythesameasCaraka'streatmentofS@mkhya,forweknow
thatthesageAtriisthespeakerinCaraka'sworkandforthatitwascalledtreyasa@mhitortreyatantra.
NothingisknownoftheMtharabhsya[Footnoteref1].

AnEarlySchoolofS@mkhya.

ItisimportantforthehistoryofS@mkhyaphilosophythatCaraka'streatmentofit,whichsofarasIknowhas
neverbeendealtwithinanyofthemodernstudiesofS@mkhya,shouldbebroughtbeforethenoticeofthe
studentsofthisphilosophy.AccordingtoCarakatherearesixelements(_dhtus_),viz.thefiveelementssuchas
ks'a,vyuetc.andcetan,calledalsopuru@sa.Fromotherpointsofview,thecategoriesmaybesaidtobe
twentyfouronly,viz.thetensenses(fivecognitiveandfiveconative),manas,thefiveobjectsofsensesandthe
eightfoldprak@rti(prak@rti,mahat,aha@mkraandthefiveelements)[Footnoteref2].Themanasworks
throughthesenses.Itisatomicanditsexistenceisprovedbythefactthatinspiteoftheexistenceofthesenses
therecannotbeanyknowledgeunlessmanasisintouchwiththem.Therearetwomovementsofmanasas
indeterminatesensing(_ha_)andconceiving(_vicra_)beforedefiniteunderstanding(_buddhi_)arises.Eachof
thefivesensesistheproductofthecombinationoffiveelementsbuttheauditorysenseismadewitha
preponderanceofakasa,thesenseoftouchwithapreponderance

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ReadersunacquaintedwithS@mkhyaYogamayomitthefollowingthreesectionsatthetimeof
firstreading.]

[Footnote2:Puru@aishereexcludedfromthelist.Cakrap@ni,thecommentator,saysthattheprak@rtiand
puru@sabothbeingunmanifested,thetwotogetherhavebeencountedasone.
_Prak@rtivyatiriktacodsna@mpuru@samavyaktatvasdharmytavyaktymprak@rtvevaprak@sipya
avyaktas'avbdenaivag@rh@nti._HarinthaVis'rada'seditionof_Caraka,S'rra_,p.4.]

214

of air, the visual sense with a preponderance of light, the taste with a preponderance of water and the sense of smell
with a preponderance of earth. Caraka does not mention the tanmtras at all [Footnote ref 1]. The conglomeration of
the sense-objects (_indriyrtha_) or gross matter, the ten senses, manas, the five subtle bhtas and prak@rti, mahat
and aha@mkra taking place through rajas make up what we call man. When the sattva is at its height this
conglomeration ceases. All karma, the fruit of karma, cognition, pleasure, pain, ignorance, life and death belongs to this
conglomeration. But there is also the puru@sa, for had it not been so there would be no birth, death, bondage, or
salvation. If the tman were not regarded as cause, all illuminations of cognition would be without any reason. If a
permanent self were not recognized, then for the work of one others would be responsible. This puru@sa, called also
_paramtman_, is beginningless and it has no cause beyond itself. The self is in itself without consciousness.
Consciousness can only come to it through its connection with the sense organs and manas. By ignorance, will,
antipathy, and work, this conglomeration of puru@sa and the other elements takes place. Knowledge, feeling, or
action, cannot be produced without this combination. All positive effects are due to conglomerations of causes and not
by a single cause, but all destruction comes naturally and without cause. That which is eternal is never the product of
anything. Caraka identifies the avyakta part of prak@rti with puru@sa as forming one category. The vikra or
evolutionary products of prak@rti are called k@setra, whereas the avyakta part of prak@rti is regarded as the
k@setraja (_avyaktamasya k@setrasya k@setrajam@r@sayo viduh_). This avyakta and cetan are one and the same
entity. From this unmanifested prak@rti or cetan is derived the buddhi, and from the buddhi is derived the ego
(_aha@mkra_) and from the aha@mkra the five elements and the senses are produced, and when this production is
complete, we say that creation has taken place. At the time of pralaya (periodical cosmic dissolution) all the evolutes
return back to prak@rti, and thus become unmanifest with it, whereas at
CHAPTER VII 148
thetimeofanewcreationfromthepuru@satheunmanifest(_avyakta_),allthemanifestedformsthe
evolutesofbuddhi,aha@mkra,

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Butsomesortofsubtlematter,differentfromgrossmatter,isreferredtoasformingpartof
_prak@rti_whichisregardedashavingeightelementsinit_prak@rtis'ca@s@tadhtuki_),viz.avyakta,
mahat,aha@mkra,andfiveotherelements.Inadditiontotheseelementsformingpartoftheprak@rtiwe
hearofindriyrth,thefivesenseobjectswhichhaveevolvedoutoftheprak@rti.]

215

etc.appear[Footnoteref1].Thiscycleofbirthsorrebirthsorofdissolutionandnewcreationactsthrough
theinfluenceofrajasandtamas,andsothosewhocangetridofthesetwowillneveragainsufferthis
revolutioninacycle.Themanascanonlybecomeactiveinassociationwiththeself,whichistherealagent.
Thisselfofitselftakesrebirthinallkindsoflivesaccordingtoitsownwish,undeterminedbyanyoneelse.It
worksaccordingtoitsownfreewillandreapsthefruitsofitskarma.Thoughallthesoulsarepervasive,yet
theycanonlyperceiveinparticularbodieswheretheyareassociatedwiththeirownspecificsenses.All
pleasuresandpainsarefeltbytheconglomeration(_rs'i_),andnotbythetmanpresidingoverit.From
theenjoymentandsufferingofpleasureandpaincomesdesire(_t@r@s@n_)consistingofwishand
antipathy,andfromdesireagaincomespleasureandpain.Mok@sameanscompletecessationofpleasure
andpain,arisingthroughtheassociationoftheselfwiththemanas,thesense,andsenseobjects.Ifthe
manasissettledsteadilyintheself,itisthestateofyogawhenthereisneitherpleasurenorpain.Whentrue
knowledgedawnsthat"allareproducedbycauses,aretransitory,riseofthemselves,butarenotproduced
bytheselfandaresorrow,anddonotbelongtometheself,"theselftranscendsall.Thisisthelast
renunciationwhenallaffectionsandknowledgebecomefinallyextinct.Thereremainsnoindicationofany
positiveexistenceoftheselfatthistime,andtheselfcannolongerbeperceived[Footnoteref2].Itisthe
stateofBrahman.ThosewhoknowBrahmancallthisstatetheBrahman,whichiseternalandabsolutely
devoidofanycharacteristic.ThisstateisspokenofbytheS@mkhyasastheirgoal,andalsothatofthe
Yogins.Whenrajasandtamasarerootedoutandthekarmaofthepastwhosefruitshavetobeenjoyedare
exhausted,andthereisnonewkarmaandnewbirth,

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ThispassagehasbeendifferentlyexplainedinacommentaryprevioustoCakrap@niasmeaning
thatatthetimeofdeaththeseresolvebackintotheprak@rtithepuru@saandatthetimeofrebirththey
becomemanifestagain.SeeCakrap@nions'rra,I.46.]

[Footnote2:Thoughthisstateiscalledbrahmabhta,itisnotinanysenseliketheBrahmanofVedntawhichis
ofthenatureofpurebeing,pureintelligenceandpurebliss.Thisindescribablestateismorelikeabsolute
annihilationwithoutanysignofexistence(_alak@sa@nam_),resemblingNgrjuna'sNirv@na.ThusCaraka
writes:_tasmi@ms'caramasannysesamlh@hsarvavedan@hasa@mjjnavijnniv@rtti@m
yntyas'e@sata@h.ata@hpara@mbrahmabhtobhttmnopalabhyateni@hs@rta@hsarvabhvebhya@h
cihna@myasyanavidyate.gatirbrahmavid@mbrahmatacck@saramalak@sa@nam.Caraka,S'rra_1.98
100.]

216

the state of mok@sa comes about. Various kinds of moral endeavours in the shape of association with good people,
abandoning of desires, determined attempts at discovering the truth with fixed attention, are spoken of as
indispensable means. Truth (tattva) thus discovered should be recalled again and again [Footnote ref 1] and this will
ultimately effect the disunion of the body with the self. As the self is avyakta (unmanifested) and has
CHAPTER VII 149
nospecificnatureorcharacter,thisstatecanonlybedescribedasabsolutecessation(_mok@se
niv@rttirni@hs'e@s_).

ThemainfeaturesoftheS@mkhyadoctrineasgivenbyCarakaarethus:1.Puru@saisthestateofavyakta.2.
Byaconglomeraofthisavyaktawithitslaterproductsaconglomerationisformedwhichgeneratesthesocalled
livingbeing.3.Thetanmtrasarenotmentioned.4.Rajasandtamasrepresentthebadstatesofthemindand
sattvathegoodones.5.Theultimatestateofemancipationiseitherabsoluteannihilationorcharacterless
absoluteexistenceanditisspokenofastheBrahmanstate;thereisnoconsciousnessinthisstate,for
consciousnessisduetotheconglomerationoftheselfwithitsevolutes,buddhi,aha@mkraetc.6.Thesensesare
formedofmatter(_bhautika_).

ThisaccountofS@mkhyaagreeswiththesystemofS@mkhyapropoundedbyPacas'ikha(whoissaidtobe
thedirectpupilofsurithepupilofKapila,thefounderofthesystem)intheMahbhrataXII.219.Pacas'ikha
ofcoursedoesnotdescribethesystemaselaboratelyasCarakadoes.Butevenfromwhatlittlehesaysitmaybe
supposedthatthesystemofS@mkhyahesketchesisthesameasthatofCaraka[Footnoteref2].Pacas'ikha
speaksoftheultimatetruthasbeingavyakta(atermappliedinallS@mkhyaliteraturetoprak@rti)inthestate
ofpuru@sa(_purusvasthamavyaktam_).Ifmanistheproductofamerecombinationofthedifferentelements,
thenonemayassumethatallceaseswithdeath.Carakainanswertosuchanobjectionintroducesadiscussion,in
whichhetriestoestablishtheexistenceofaselfasthepostulateofallourdutiesandsenseofmoralresponsibility.
ThesamediscussionoccursinPacas'ikhaalso,andtheproofs

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Fourcausesarespokenofhereasbeingcausesofmemory:(1)Thinkingofthecauseleadstothe
rememberingoftheeffect,(2)bysimilarity,(3)byoppositethings,and(4)byacuteattempttoremember.]

[Footnote2:SomeEuropeanscholarshaveexperiencedgreatdifficultyinacceptingPacas'ikha'sdoctrineasa
genuineS@mkhyadoctrine.ThismayprobablybeduetothefactthattheS@mkhyadoctrinessketchedin
Carakadidnotattracttheirnotice.]

217

fortheexistenceoftheselfarealsothesame.LikeCarakaagainPacas'ikhaalsosaysthatallconsciousness
isduetotheconditionsoftheconglomerationofourphysicalbodymind,andtheelementof"cetas."They
aremutuallyindependent,andbysuchindependencecarryontheprocessoflifeandwork.Noneofthe
phenomenaproducedbysuchaconglomerationareself.Alloursufferingcomesinbecausewethinktheseto
betheself.Mok@saisrealizedwhenwecanpractiseabsoluterenunciationofthesephenomena.The
gu@nasdescribedbyPacas'ikhaarethedifferentkindsofgoodandbadqualitiesofthemindasCaraka
hasit.Thestateoftheconglomerationisspokenofasthek@setra,asCarakasays,andthereisno
annihilationoreternality;andthelaststateisdescribedasbeinglikethatwhenallriverslosethemselvesin
theoceananditiscalledali@nga(withoutanycharacteristic)atermreservedforprak@rtiinlater
S@mkhya.Thisstateisattainablebythedoctrineofultimaterenunciationwhichisalsocalledthedoctrine
ofcompletedestruction(_samyagbadha_).

Gu@naratna(fourteenthcenturyA.D.),acommentatorof_@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_,mentionstwoschools
ofS@mkhya,theMaulikya(original)andtheUttaraor(later)[Footnoteref1].Ofthesethedoctrineofthe
MaulikyaS@mkhyaissaidtobethatwhichbelievedthattherewasaseparatepradhnaforeachtman
(_maulikyas@mkhyhytmnamtmnampratip@rthakpradhnamvadanti_).Thisseemstobeareference
totheS@mkhyadoctrineIhavejustsketched.Iamthereforedisposedtothinkthatthisrepresentstheearliest
systematicdoctrineofS@mkhya.
In _Mahbhrata_ XII. 318 three schools of S@mkhya are mentioned, viz. those who admitted twenty-four
CHAPTER VII 150
categories(theschoolIhavesketchedabove),thosewhoadmittedtwentyfive(thewellknownorthodox
S@mkhyasystem)andthosewhoadmittedtwentysixcategories.Thislastschooladmittedasupremebeingin
additiontopuru@saandthiswasthetwentysixthprinciple.ThisagreeswiththeorthodoxYogasystemandthe
formofS@mkhyaadvocatedinthe_Mahbhrata_.TheschoolsofS@mkhyaoftwentyfourandtwentyfive
categoriesareheredenouncedasunsatisfactory.DoctrinessimilartotheschoolofS@mkhyawehavesketched
abovearereferredtoinsomeofthe

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Gu@naratna's_Tarkarahasyadpik_,p.99.]

218

otherchaptersofthe_Mahbhrata_(XII.203,204).Theselfapartfromthebodyisdescribedasthemoonofthe
newmoonday;itissaidthatasRhu(theshadowonthesunduringaneclipse)cannotbeseenapartfromthe
sun,sotheselfcannotbeseenapartfromthebody.Theselfs(_s'arri@na@h_)arespokenofasmanifestingfrom
prak@rti.

WedonotknowanythingaboutsurithedirectdiscipleofKapila[Footnoteref1].Butitseemsprobablethatthe
systemofS@mkhyawehavesketchedherewhichappearsinfundamentallythesameforminthe
_Mahbhrata_andhasbeenattributedtheretoPacas'ikhaisprobablytheearliestformofS@mkhya
availabletousinasystematicform.NotonlydoesGu@naratna'sreferencetotheschoolofMaulikyaS@mkhya
justifyit,butthefactthatCaraka(78A.U.)doesnotrefertotheS@mkhyaasdescribedbys'varak@r@s@na
andreferredtoinotherpartsof_Mahbhrata_isadefiniteproofthats'varak@r@s@na'sS@mkhyaisa
latermodification,whichwaseithernonexistentinCaraka'stimeorwasnotregardedasanauthoritativeold
S@mkhyaview.

WassiliefsaysquotingTibetansourcesthatVindhyavsinalteredtheS@mkhyaaccordingtohisownviews
[Footnoteref2].TakakusuthinksthatVindhyavsinwasatitleofs'varak@r@s@na[Footnoteref3]and
Garbeholdsthatthedateofs'varak@r@s@nawasabout100A.D.Itseemstobeaveryplausibleviewthat
s'varak@r@s@nawasindebtedforhiskrikstoanotherwork,whichwasprobablywritteninastyledifferent
fromwhatheemploys.Theseventhverseofhis_Krik_seemstobeinpurportthesameasapassagewhichis
foundquotedinthe

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:AverseattributedtosuriisquotedbyGu@naratna(_Tarkarahasyadpik,_p.104).Thepurport
ofthisverseisthatwhenbuddhiistransformedinaparticularmanner,it(puru@sa)hasexperience.Itislikethe
reflectionofthemoonintransparentwater.]

[Footnote2:Vassilief's_Buddhismus,_p.240.]

[Footnote3:Takakusu's"AstudyofParamrtha'slifeofVasubandhu,"_J.R.A.S._,1905.Thisidentificationby
Takakusu,however,appearstobeextremelydoubtful,forGu@naratnamentionss'varak@r@s@naand
Vindhyavsinastwodifferentauthorities(_Tarkarahasyadpik,_pp.102and104).Theversequotedfrom
Vindhyavsin(p.104)inanu@s@tubhmetrecannotbetracedasbelongingtos'varak@r@s@n.Itappears
thats'varak@r@s@nawrotetwobooks;oneisthe_S@mkhyakrik_andanotheranindependentworkon
S@mkhya,alinefromwhich,quotedbyGu@naratna,standsasfollows:

"_Pratiniyatdhyavasya@hs'rotrdisamutthaadhyak@sam_"(p.108).
If Vcaspati's interpretation of the classification of anumna in his _Tattvakaumud_ be considered to be a
CHAPTER VII 151
correctexplanationof_S@mkhyakrik_thens'varak@r@s@namustbeadifferentpersonfrom
Vindhyavsinwhoseviewsonanumnaasreferredtoin_S'lokavrttika,_p.393,arealtogetherdifferent.But
Vcaspati'sownstatementinthe_Ttparyya@tk_(pp.109and131)showsthathistreatmenttherewasnot
faithful.]

219

_Mahbhsya_ofPatajalithegrammarian(147B.C.)[Footnoteref1].Thesubjectofthetwopassagesarethe
enumerationofreasonswhichfrustratevisualperception.Thishoweverisnotadoctrineconcernedwiththe
strictlytechnicalpartofS@mkhya,anditisjustpossiblethatthebookfromwhichPatajaliquotedthe
passage,andwhichwasprobablyparaphrasedintherymetrebys'varak@r@s@nawasnotaS@mkhya
bookatall.ButthoughthesubjectoftheverseisnotoneofthestrictlytechnicalpartsofS@mkhya,yetsince
suchanenumerationisnotseeninanyothersystemofIndianphilosophy,andasithassomespecialbearingasa
safeguardagainstcertainobjectionsagainsttheS@mkhyadoctrineofprak@rti,thenaturalandplausible
suppositionisthatitwastheverseofaS@mkhyabookwhichwasparaphrasedbys'varak@r@s@na.

TheearliestdescriptionsofaS@mkhyawhichagreeswiths'varak@r@s@na'sS@mkhya(butwithan
additionofs'vara)aretobefoundinPatajali's_Yogastras_andinthe_Mahbhrata;_butwearepretty
certainthattheS@mkhyaofCarakawehavesketchedherewasknowntoPatajali,forin_Yogastra_I.19a
referenceismadetoaviewofS@mkhyasimilartothis.

FromthepointofviewofhistoryofphilosophytheS@mkhyaofCarakaandPacas'ikhaisveryimportant;
foritshowsatransitionalstageofthoughtbetweentheUpani@sadideasandtheorthodoxS@mkhyadoctrine
asrepresentedbys'varak@r@s@na.Ontheonehanditsdoctrinethatthesensesarematerial,andthateffects
areproducedonlyasaresultofcollocations,andthatthepuru@saisunconscious,bringsitincloserelation
withNyya,andontheotheritsconnectionswithBuddhismseemtobenearerthantheorthodoxS@mkhya.

Wehearofa_Sa@s@titantras'stra_asbeingoneoftheoldestS@mkhyaworks.Thisisdescribedinthe
_AhirbudhnyaSa@mhit_ascontainingtwobooksofthirtytwoandtwentyeightchapters[Footnoteref2].A
quotationfrom_Rjavrttika_(aworkaboutwhichthereisnodefiniteinformation)inVcaspatiMis'ra's
commentaryontheS@mkhyakrika_(72)saysthatitwascalledthe_@Sa@s@titantrabecauseitdealtwiththe
existenceofprak@rti,itsoneness,itsdifferencefrompuru@sas,itspurposefulnessforpuru@sas,themultiplicity
ofpuru@sas,connectionandseparationfrompuru@sas,theevolutionof

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Patajali'sMahbh@sya,IV.I.3._Atisannikar@sdativiprakar@stmrttyantaravyavadhnt
tamasv@rtatvtindriyadaurvalydatipramdt,_etc.(Benaresedition.)]

[Footnote2:_AhirbudhnyaSa@mhit,_pp.108,110.]

220

thecategories,theinactivityofthepuru@sasandthefiveviparyyayas,ninetu@s@tis,thedefectsoforgansof
twentyeightkinds,andtheeightsiddhis[Footnoteref1].

But the content of the _Sa@s@titantra_ as given in _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhit_ is different from it, and it appears from
it that the S@mkhya of the _Sa@s@titantra_ referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhit_ was of a theistic character
resembling the doctrine of the Pacartra Vai@snavas and the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhit_ says that Kapila's theory of
S@mkhya was a Vai@s@nava one. Vijna Bhiksu, the greatest
CHAPTER VII 152
expounderofS@mkhya,saysinmanyplacesofhiswork_Vijnm@rtaBh@sya_thatS@mkhyawas
originallytheistic,andthattheatheisticS@mkhyaisonlya_prau@dhivda_(anexaggeratedattempttoshow
thatnosuppositionofs'varaisnecessarytoexplaintheworldprocess)thoughthe_Mahbhrata_pointsout
thatthedifferencebetweenS@mkhyaandYogaisthis,thattheformerisatheistic,whilethelatteristheistic.
Thediscrepancybetweenthetwoaccountsof_@Sa@s@titantra_suggeststhattheoriginal_Sa@s@titantra_as
referredtointhe_AhirbudhnyaSa@mhit_wassubsequentlyrevisedandconsiderablychanged.This
suppositioniscorroboratedbythefactthatGu@naratnadoesnotmentionamongtheimportantS@mkhya
works_@Sa@s@titantra_but_@Sa@s@titantroddhra_

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Thedoctrineofthe_viparyyaya,tusti_,defectsoforgans,andthesiddhiarementionedinthe
_Karik_ofIs'varakr@sna,butIhaveomittedtheminmyaccountofSmkhyaasthesehavelittlephilosophical
importance.Theviparyyaya(falseknowledge)arefive,viz.avidy(ignorance),asmita(egoism),raga
(attachment),dve@sa(antipathy),abhimives'a(selflove),whicharealsocalled_tamo,moha,mahmoha,
tamisr_,and_andhatmisra_.Theseareofninekindsoftusti,suchastheideathatnoexertionisnecessary,
sinceprak@rtiwillherselfbringoursalvation(_ambhas_),thatitisnotnecessarytomeditate,foritisenoughif
werenouncethehouseholder'slife(_salila_),thatthereisnohurry,salvationwillcomeintime(_megha_),that
salvationwillbeworkedoutbyfate(_bhgya_),andthecontentmentleadingtorenunciationproceedingfrom
fivekindsofcauses,e.g.thetroublesofearning(_para_),thetroublesofprotectingtheearnedmoney(_supara_),
thenaturalwasteofthingsearnedbyenjoyment(_parpara_),increaseofdesiresleadingtogreater
disappointments(_anuttammbhas_),allgainleadstotheinjuryofothers(_uttammbhas_).Thisrenunciation
proceedsfromexternalconsiderationswiththosewhoconsiderprak@rtianditsevolutesastheself.Thesiddhis
orwaysofsuccessareeightinnumber,viz.(1)readingofscriptures(_tra_),(2)enquiryintotheirmeaning
(_sutra_),(3)properreasoning(_tratra_),(4)corroboratingone'sownideaswiththeideasoftheteachersand
otherworkersofthesamefield(_ramyaka_),(5)clearanceofthemindbylongcontinuedpractice
(_sadmudita_).Thethreeothersiddhiscalledpramoda,mudita,andmodamnaleaddirectlytotheseparation
oftheprak@rtifromthepurus'a.Thetwentyeightsensedefectsaretheelevendefectsoftheelevensensesand
seventeenkindsofdefectsoftheunderstandingcorrespondingtotheabsenceofsiddhisandthepresenceoftustis.
Theviparyyayas,tu@stisandthedefectsoftheorgansarehindrancesinthewayoftheachievementofthe
S@mkhyagoal.]

221

(revisededitionof_@Sa@s@titantra_)[Footnoteref1].Probablytheearlier@Sa@s@titantrawaslosteven
beforeVcaspati'stime.

If we believe the @Sa@s@titantra referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhit_ to be in all essential parts the same
work which was composed by Kapila and based faithfully on his teachings, then it has to be assumed that Kapila's
S@mkhya was theistic [Footnote ref 2]. It seems probable that his disciple suri tried to popularise it. But it seems that
a great change occurred when Pacas'ikha the disciple of suri came to deal with it. For we know that his doctrine
differed from the traditional one in many important respects. It is said in _S@mkhya krik_ (70) that the literature
was divided by him into many parts (_tena bahudhk@rtam tantram_). The exact meaning of this reference is difficult
to guess. It might mean that the original _@Sa@s@titantra_ was rewritten by him in various treatises. It is a well-
known fact that most of the schools of Vai@s@navas accepted the form of cosmology which is the same in most
essential parts as the S@mkhya cosmology. This justifies the assumption that Kapila's doctrine was probably theistic.
But there are a few other points of difference between the Kapila and the Ptajala S@mkhya (Yoga). The only
supposition that may be ventured is that Pacas'ikha probably modified Kapila's work in an atheistic way and passed it
as Kapila's work. If this supposition is held reasonable, then we have three strata of S@mkhya, first a theistic one, the
details of which are lost, but which is kept in a modified form by the Ptajala school of S@mkhya, second an atheistic
one as represented by Pacas'ikha, and a third atheistic modification as the orthodox
CHAPTER VII 153
S@mkhyasystem.AnimportantchangeintheS@mkhyadoctrineseemstohavebeenintroducedbyVijna
Bhik@su(sixteenthcenturyA.D.)byhistreatmentofgu@nasastypesofreals.Ihavemyselfacceptedthis
interpretationofS@mkhyaasthemostrationalandphilosophicalone,andhavethereforefolloweditingivinga
connectedsystemoftheacceptedKapilaandthePtajalaschoolofS@mkhya.Butitmustbepointedoutthat
originallythenotionofgu@naswasappliedtodifferenttypesofgoodandbadmentalstates,andthentheywere
supposedinsomemysteriouswaybymutualincreaseanddecreasetoformtheobjectiveworldontheonehand
andthe

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[Footnote1:_Tarkarahasyadpik_,p.109.]

[Footnote2:_eva@msa@dvims'akamprhahs'arramthmnavhs@mkhyamsa@mkhytmakatvcca
kapildibhirucyate.Matsyapurna_,IV.28.]

222

totalityofhumanpsychosisontheother.Asystematicexplanationofthegunaswasattemptedintwodifferent
linesbyVijnaBhik@suandtheVai@s@navawriterVe@nka@ta[Footnoterefl].AstheYogaphilosophy
compiledbyPatajaliandcommentedonbyVysa,VcaspatiandVij@anaBhik@su,agreewiththe
S@mkhyadoctrineasexplainedbyVcaspatiandVijanaBhik@suinmostpointsIhavepreferredtocall
themtheKapilaandthePtajalaschoolsofS@mkhyaandhavetreatedthemtogetheraprinciplewhichwas
followedbyHaribhadrainhis_@Sa@ddars'anasamuaccaya_.

TheotherimportantS@mkhyateachersmentionedbyGaudapdaareSanaka,Sananda,Santanaand
Vo@dhu.Nothingisknownabouttheirhistoricityordoctrines.

S@mkhyakrik,S@mkhyastra,VcaspatiMis'raandVijnaBhik@su.

AwordofexplanationisnecessaryasregardsmyinterpretationoftheS@mkhyaYogasystem.The
_S@mkhyakrik_istheoldestS@mkhyatextonwhichwehavecommentariesbylaterwriters.The
_S@mkhyastra_wasnotreferredtobyanywriteruntilitwascommenteduponbyAniruddha(fifteenth
centuryA.D.).EvenGu@naratnaofthefourteenthcenturyAD.whomadeallusionstoanumberofS@mkhya
works,didnotmakeanyreferencetothe_S@mkhyastra_,andnootherwriterwhoisknowntohave
flourishedbeforeGu@naratnaseemstohavemadeanyreferencetothe_S@mkhyastra_.Thenatural
conclusionthereforeisthatthesestraswereprobablywrittensometimeafterthefourteenthcentury.Butthere
isnopositiveevidencetoprovethatitwassolateaworkasthefifteenthcentury.Itissaidattheendofthe
_S@mkhyakrik_ofs'varak@r@s@nathatthekriksgiveanexpositionoftheS@mkhyadoctrine
excludingtherefutationsofthedoctrinesofotherpeopleandexcludingtheparablesattachedtotheoriginal
S@mkhyaworksthe_@Sa@s@titantras'stra_.The_S@mkhyastras_containrefutationsofother
doctrinesandalsoanumberofparables.Itisnotimprobablethatthesewerecollectedfromsomeearlier
S@mkhyaworkwhichisnowlosttous.Itmaybethatitwasdonefromsomelatereditionofthe
_@Sa@s@titantras'stra_(_@Sa@s@titantroddhra_asmentionedby

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[Footnote1:Venka@ta'sphilosophywillbedealtwithinthesecondvolumeofthepresentwork.]

223

G@naratna), but this is a mere conjecture. There is no reason to suppose that the S@mkhya doctrine found in the
stras differs in any important way from the S@mkhya doctrine as found in the _S@mkhya krik_.
CHAPTER VII 154
Theonlypointofimportanceisthis,thatthe_S@mkhyastras_holdthatwhentheUpani@sadsspokeofone
absolutepureintelligencetheymeanttospeakofunityasinvolvedintheclassofintelligentpuru@sasasdistinct
fromtheclassofthegu@nas.Asallpuru@saswereofthenatureofpureintelligence,theywerespokenofinthe
Upani@sadsasone,fortheyallformthecategoryorclassofpureintelligence,andhencemayinsomesensebe
regardedasone.Thiscompromisecannotbefoundinthe_S@mkhyakrik_.Thisis,however,acaseof
omissionandnotofdifference.VijnaBhik@su,thecommentatorofthe_S@mkhyastra_,wasmoreinclined
totheisticS@mkhyaorYogathantoatheisticS@mkhya.Thisisprovedbyhisownremarksinhis
_Smkhyapravacanabh@sya,Yogavrttika_,and_Vijnm@rtabhasya_(anindependentcommentaryonthe
BrahmastrasofBdaryanaontheisticS@mkhyalines).VijnaBhiksu'sownviewcouldnotproperlybe
calledathoroughYogaview,forheagreedmorewiththeviewsoftheS@mkhyadoctrineofthePura@nas,
whereboththediversepuru@sasandtheprak@rtiaresaidtobemergedintheendins'vara,bywhosewillthe
creativeprocessagainbeganintheprakrtiattheendofeachpralaya.Hecouldnotavoidthedistinctively
atheisticargumentsofthe_S@mkhyastras_,butheremarkedthatthesewereusedonlywithaviewtoshowing
thattheS@mkhyasystemgavesucharationalexplanationthatevenwithouttheinterventionofans'varait
couldexplainallfacts.VijnaBhik@suinhisinterpretationofS@mkhyadifferedonmanypointsfromthose
ofVcaspati,anditisdifficulttosaywhoisright.VijnaBhik@suhasthisadvantagethathehasboldlytriedto
giveinterpretationsonsomedifficultpointsonwhichVcaspatiremainedsilent.Ireferprincipallytothenature
oftheconceptionofthegu@nas,whichIbelieveisthemostimportantthinginS@mkhya.VijnaBhik@su
describedthegu@nasasrealsorsupersubtlesubstances,butVcaspatiandGau@dapda(theother
commentatorofthe_S@mkhyakrik_)remainedsilentonthepoint.Thereisnothing,however,intheir
interpretationswhichwouldmilitateagainsttheinterpretationofVijnaBhik@su,butyetwhiletheyweresilent
astoanydefiniteexplanationsregardingthenatureofthegu@nas,Bhik@sudefinitely

224
cameforwardwithaverysatisfactoryandrationalinterpretationoftheirnature.

Sincenodefiniteexplanationofthegu@nasisfoundinanyotherworkbeforeBhik@su,itisquiteprobablethat
thismattermaynothavebeendefinitelyworkedoutbefore.NeitherCarakanorthe_Mahbhrata_explainsthe
natureofthegu@nas.ButBhik@su'sinterpretationsuitsexceedinglywellallthatisknownofthemanifestations
andtheworkingsofthegu@nasinallearlydocuments.IhavethereforeacceptedtheinterpretationofBhik@su
ingivingmyaccountofthenatureofthegu@nas.The_Krik_speaksofthegu@nasasbeingofthenatureof
pleasure,pain,anddullness(_sattva,rajas_and_tamas_).Italsodescribessattvaasbeinglightandilluminating,
rajasasofthenatureofenergyandcausingmotion,andtamasasheavyandobstructing.Vcaspatimerely
paraphrasesthisstatementofthe_Krik_butdoesnotenterintoanyfurtherexplanations.Bhik@su's
interpretationfitsinwellwithallthatisknownofthegu@nas,thoughitisquitepossiblethatthisviewmightnot
havebeenknownbefore,andwhentheoriginalS@mkhyadoctrinewasformulatedtherewasarealvagueness
astotheconceptionofthegu@nas.

There are some other points in which Bhik@su's interpretation differs from that of Vcaspati. The most important of
these may be mentioned here. The first is the nature of the connection of the buddhi states with the puru@sa.
Vcaspati holds that there is no contact (_sa@myoga_) of any buddhi state with the puru@sa but that a reflection of
the puru@sa is caught in the state of buddhi by virtue of which the buddhi state becomes intelligized and transformed
into consciousness. But this view is open to the objection that it does not explain how the puru@sa can be said to be
the experiencer of the conscious states of the buddhi, for its reflection in the buddhi is merely an image, and there
cannot be an experience (_bhoga_) on the basis of that image alone without any actual connection of the puru@sa
with the buddhi. The answer of Vcaspati Mis'ra is that there is no contact of the two in space and time, but that their
proximity (_sannidhi_) means only a specific kind of fitness (_yogyat_) by virtue of which the puru@sa, though it
remains aloof, is yet felt to be united and identified in the buddhi, and as a result of that the states of the buddhi appear
as ascribed to a person. Vijna Bhik@su differs from Vcaspati and says that if such a special kind of fitness be
admitted,
CHAPTER VII 155
thenthereisno

225

reasonwhypuru@sashouldbedeprivedofsuchafitnessatthetimeofemancipation,andthustherewouldbeno
emancipationatall,forthefitnessbeinginthepuru@sa,hecouldnotbedivestedofit,andhewouldcontinueto
enjoytheexperiencesrepresentedinthebuddhiforever.VijanaBhik@suthusholdsthatthereisarealcontact
ofthepuru@sawiththebuddhistateinanycognitivestate.Suchacontactofthepuru@saandthebuddhidoes
notnecessarilymeanthattheformerwillbeliabletochangeonaccountofit,forcontactandchangearenot
synonymous.Changemeanstheriseofnewqualities.Itisthebuddhiwhichsufferschanges,andwhenthese
changesarereflectedinthepuru@sa,thereisthenotionofapersonorexperiencerinthepuru@sa,andwhenthe
puru@saisreflectedbackinthebuddhithebuddhistateappearsasaconsciousstate.Thesecond,isthe
differencebetweenVcaspatiandBhik@suasregardsthenatureoftheperceptualprocess.Bhik@suthinksthat
thesensescandirectlyperceivethedeterminatequalitiesofthingswithoutanyinterventionofmanas,whereas
Vcaspatiascribestomanasthepowerofarrangingthesensedatainadefiniteorderandofmakingthe
indeterminatesensedatadeterminate.Withhimthefirststageofcognitionisthestagewhenindeterminatesense
materialsarefirstpresented,atthenextstagethereisassimilation,differentiation,andassociationbywhichthe
indeterminatematerialsareorderedandclassifiedbytheactivityofmanascalledsa@mkalpawhichcoordinates
theindeterminatesensematerialsintodeterminateperceptualandconceptualformsasclassnotionswith
particularcharacteristics.Bhik@suwhosupposesthatthedeterminatecharacterofthingsisdirectlyperceivedby
thesenseshasnecessarilytoassignasubordinatepositiontomanasasbeingonlythefacultyofdesire,doubt,and
imagination.

ItmaynotbeoutofplacetomentionherethatthereareoneortwopassagesinVcaspati'scommentaryonthe
_S@mkhyakrik_whichseemtosuggestthatheconsideredtheego(_aha@mkra_)asproducingthe
subjectiveseriesofthesensesandtheobjectiveseriesoftheexternalworldbyasortofdesireorwill,buthedid
notworkoutthisdoctrine,anditisthereforenotnecessarytoenlargeuponit.Thereisalsoadifferenceofview
withregardtotheevolutionofthetanmtrasfromthemahat;forcontrarytotheviewof_Vysabh@sya_and
VijnaBhik@suetc.Vcaspatiholdsthatfromthemahattherewasaha@mkraand

226

fromaha@mkrathetanmtras[Footnoteref1].VijnaBhik@suhoweverholdsthatboththeseparationof
aha@mkraandtheevolutionofthetanmtrastakeplaceinthemahat,andasthisappearedtometobemore
reasonable,Ihavefollowedthisinterpretation.TherearesomeotherminorpointsofdifferenceabouttheYoga
doctrinesbetweenVcaspatiandBhik@suwhicharenotofmuchphilosophicalimportance.

YogaandPatajali.

Thewordyogaoccursinthe@RgVedainvarioussensessuchasyokingorharnessing,achievingthe
unachieved,connection,andthelike.Thesenseofyokingisnotsofrequentastheothersenses;butitis
neverthelesstruethatthewordwasusedinthissensein@RgVedaandinsuchlaterVedicworksasthe
S'atapathaBrhmanaandtheB@rhadra@nyakaUpani@sad[Footnoteref2].Thewordhasanother
derivative"yugya"inlaterSanskritliterature[Footnoteref3].

Withthegrowthofreligiousandphilosophicalideasinthe@RgVeda,wefindthatthereligiousausterities
weregenerallyverymuchvalued.Tapas(asceticism)andbrahmacarya(theholyvowofcelibacyandlife
longstudy)wereregardedasgreatestvirtuesandconsideredasbeingproductiveofthehighestpower
[Footnoteref4].

As these ideas of asceticism and self-control grew the force of the flying passions was felt to be as uncontrollable as that
of a spirited steed, and thus the word yoga which was originally applied to the control of
CHAPTER VII 156
steedsbegantobeappliedtothecontrolofthesenses[Footnoteref5].

InP@nini'stimethewordyogahadattaineditstechnicalmeaning,andhedistinguishedthisroot"_yuj
samdhau_"(yujinthesenseofconcentration)from"_yujiryoge_"(rootyujirinthesenseofconnecting).Yujin
thefirstsenseisseldomusedasaverb.Itismoreorlessanimaginaryrootfortheetymologicalderivationofthe
wordyoga[Footnoteref6].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:SeemyStudyofPatanjali,p.60ff.]

[Footnote2:CompareR.V.I.34.9/VII.67.8/III.27.II/X.30.II/X.114.9/IV.24.4/I.5.3/I.30.7;S'atapatha
Brahma@na14.7.I.II.]

[Footnote3:ItisprobablyanoldwordoftheAryanstock;compareGermanJoch,A.S.geoc.latm
jugum.]

[Footnote4:SeeChandogyaIII.17.4;B@rh.I.2.6;B@rh.III.8.10;Taitt.I.9.I/III.2.I/III.3.I;Taitt,
Brh,II.2.3.3;R.V.x.129;S'atap.Brh.XI.5.8.1.]

[Footnote5:KathaIII.4,_indriy@nihaynhu@hvi@sayte@sugocarn_.Thesensesarethehorsesand
whatevertheygrasparetheirobjects.Maitr.2.6._Karmendriy@nyasyahay@h_theconativesensesareits
horses.]

[Footnote6:_Yugya@h_isusedfromtherootofyujiryogeandnotfrom_yujasamdhau_.Aconsiderationof
Pa@nini'srule"Tadasyabrahmacaryam,"V.i.94showsthatnotonlydifferentkindsofasceticismandrigour
whichpassedbythenameofbrahmacaryawereprevalentinthecountryatthetime(P@niniasGoldstcker
hasprovedisprebuddhistic),butassociatedwiththesehadgrownupadefinitesystemofmentaldisciplinewhich
passedbythenameofYoga.]

227

Inthe_Bhagavadgt_,wefindthatthewordyogahasbeenusednotonlyinconformitywiththeroot"_yuj
samdhau_"butalsowith"_yujiryoge_"Thishasbeenthesourceofsomeconfusiontothereadersofthe
_Bhagavadgt._"Yogin"inthesenseofapersonwhohaslosthimselfinmeditationisthereregardedwith
extremeveneration.Oneofthemainfeaturesoftheuseofthiswordliesinthisthatthe_Bhagavadgt_triedto
markoutamiddlepathbetweentheausteredisciplineofmeditativeabstractionontheonehandandthecourse
ofdutiesofsacrificialactionofaVedicworshipperinthelifeofanewtypeofYogin(evidentlyfrom_yujir
yoge_)ontheother,whoshouldcombineinhimselfthebestpartsofthetwopaths,devotehimselftohisduties,
andyetabstracthimselffromallselfishmotivesassociatedwithdesires.

Kau@tilyainhis_Arthas'stra_whenenumeratingthephilosophicsciencesofstudynamesS@mkhya,Yoga,
andLokyata.TheoldestBuddhiststras(e.g.the_Satipa@t@thnasutta_)arefullyfamiliarwiththestagesof
Yogaconcentration.WemaythusinferthatselfconcentrationandYogahaddevelopedasatechnicalmethodof
mysticabsorptionsometimebeforetheBuddha.

As regards the connection of Yoga with S@mkhya, as we find it in the _Yoga stras_ of Patajali, it is indeed difficult to
come to any definite conclusion. The science of breath had attracted notice in many of the earlier Upani@sads, though
there had not probably developed any systematic form of pr@nyma (a system of breath control) of the Yoga
system. It is only when we come to Maitrya@n that we find that the Yoga method had attained a systematic
development. The other two Upani@sads in which the Yoga ideas can be traced are the S'vets'vatara and the Ka@tha.
It is indeed curious to notice that these three Upani@sads of K@r@s@na Yajurveda, where we find reference to Yoga
methods, are the only ones where we find clear
CHAPTER VII 157
referencesalsototheS@mkhyatenets,thoughtheS@mkhyaandYogaideasdonotappearthereasrelatedto
eachotherorassociatedaspartsofthesamesystem.ButthereisaremarkablepassageintheMaitrya@ninthe
conversationbetweenS'kyyanaandB@rhadrathawherewefindthattheS@mkhyametaphysicswasoffered

228

insomequarterstoexplainthevalidityoftheYogaprocesses,anditseemsthereforethattheassociationand
graftingoftheS@mkhyametaphysicsontheYogasystemasitsbasis,wastheworkofthefollowersofthis
schoolofideaswhichwassubsequentlysystematizedbyPatajali.ThusS'kyyanasays:"Heresomesayitisthe
gu@nawhichthroughthedifferencesofnaturegoesintobondagetothewill,andthatdeliverancetakesplace
whenthefaultofthewillhasbeenremoved,becauseheseesbythemind;andallthatwecalldesire,imagination,
doubt,belief,unbelief,certainty,uncertainty,shame,thought,fear,allthatisbutmind.Carriedalongbythe
wavesofthequalitiesdarkenedinhisimagination,unstable,fickle,crippled,fullofdesires,vacillatingheenters
intobelief,believingIamhe,thisismine,andhebindshisselfbyhisselfasabirdwithanet.Therefore,aman
beingpossessedofwill,imaginationandbeliefisaslave,buthewhoistheoppositeisfree.Forthisreasonleta
manstandfreefromwill,imaginationandbeliefthisisthesignofliberty,thisisthepaththatleadstoBrahman,
thisistheopeningofthedoor,andthroughithewillgototheothershoreofdarkness.Alldesiresarethere
fulfilled.Andforthis,theyquoteaverse:'Whenthefiveinstrumentsofknowledgestandstilltogetherwiththe
mind,andwhentheintellectdoesnotmove,thatiscalledthehigheststate[Footnoteref1].'"

AnexaminationofsuchYogaUpani@sadsasS'@n@dilya,Yogatattva,Dhynabindu,Ha@msa,
Am@rtanda,Varha,Ma@n@dalaBrhma@na,Ndabindu,andYogaku@n@dal,showsthattheYoga
practiceshadundergonediversechangesindiverseschools,butnoneoftheseshowanypredilectionforthe
S@mkhya.ThustheYogapracticesgrewinaccordancewiththedoctrinesofthe

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Vtsyyana,however,inhisbh@syaon_Nyyastra_,I.i29,distinguishesS@mkhyafromYoga
inthefollowingway:TheS@mkhyaholdsthatnothingcancomeintobeingnorbedestroyed,therecannotbe
anychangeinthepureintelligence(_niratis'ay@hcetan@h_).Allchangesareduetochangesinthebody,the
senses,themanasandtheobjects.Yogaholdsthatallcreationisduetothekarmaofthepuru@sa.Do@sas
(passions)andtheprav@rtti(action)arethecauseofkarma.Theintelligencesorsouls(cetana)areassociated
withqualities.Nonbeingcancomeintobeingandwhatisproducedmaybedestroyed.Thelastviewisindeed
quitedifferentfromtheYogaof_Vysabh@sya,_ItisclosertoNyyainitsdoctrines.IfVtsyyana'sstatement
iscorrect,itwouldappearthatthedoctrineoftherebeingamoralpurposeincreationwasborrowedby
S@mkhyafromYoga.Udyotakara'sremarksonthesamestradonotindicateadifferencebutanagreement
betweenS@mkhyaandYogaonthedoctrineoftheindriyasbeing"_abhautika._"Curiouslyenough
Vtsyyanaquotesapassagefrom_Vysabh@sya,_III.13,inhisbh@sya,I.ii.6,andcriticizesitasself
contradictory(_viruddha_).]

229

S'aivas and S'@aktas and assumed a peculiar form as the Mantrayoga; they grew in another direction as the
Ha@thayoga which was supposed to produce mystic and magical feats through constant practices of elaborate nervous
exercises, which were also associated with healing and other supernatural powers. The Yogatattva Upani@sad says that
there are four kinds of yoga, the Mantra Yoga, Laya Yoga, Ha@thayoga and Rjayoga [Footnote ref 1]. In some cases we
find that there was a great attempt even to associate Vedntism with these mystic practices. The influence of these
practices in the development of Tantra and other modes of worship was also very great, but we have to leave out these
from our present consideration as they have little philosophic importance and as they are not connected with our
present endeavour.
CHAPTER VII 158
OfthePtajalaschoolofS@mkhya,whichformsthesubjectoftheYogawithwhichwearenowdealing,
PatajaliwasprobablythemostnotablepersonforhenotonlycollectedthedifferentformsofYogapractices,
andgleanedthediverseideaswhichwereorcouldbeassociatedwiththeYoga,butgraftedthemallonthe
S@mkhyametaphysics,andgavethemtheforminwhichtheyhavebeenhandeddowntous.Vcaspatiand
VijnaBhik@su,thetwogreatcommentatorsonthe_Vysabh@sya_,agreewithusinholdingthatPatajali
wasnotthefounderofYoga,butaneditor.Analyticstudyofthestrasbringstheconvictionthatthestrasdo
notshowanyoriginalattempt,butamasterlyandsystematiccompilationwhichwasalsosupplementedbyfitting
contributions.Thesystematicmanneralsoinwhichthefirstthreechaptersarewrittenbywayofdefinitionand
classificationshowsthatthematerialswerealreadyinexistenceandthatPatajalisystematizedthem.Therewas
nomissionizingzeal,noattempttooverthrowthedoctrinesofothersystems,exceptasfarastheymightcomein
bywayofexplainingthesystem.Patajalisnotevenanxioustoestablishthesystem,butheisonlyengagedin
systematizingthefactsashehadthem.MostofthecriticismagainsttheBuddhistsoccurinthelastchapter.The
doctrinesoftheYogaaredescribedinthefirstthreechapters,andthispartisseparatedfromthelastchapter
wheretheviewsoftheBuddhistare

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:TheYogawriterJaig@savyawrote"_Dhrans'stra_"whichdealtwithYogamoreinthe
fashionofTantrathenthatgivenbyPatajali.Hementionsdifferentplacesinthebody(e.g.heart,throat,tipof
thenose,palate,forehead,centreofthebrain)whicharecentresofmemorywhereconcentrationistobemade.
SeeVcaspati's_Ttparya@tk_orVtsyyana'sbh@syaon_Nyyastra_,III.ii.43.]

230

criticized;theputtingofan"_iti_"(thewordtodenotetheconclusionofanywork)attheendofthethirdchapter
isevidentlytodenotetheconclusionofhisYogacompilation.Thereisofcourseanother"_iti_"attheendofthe
fourthchaptertodenotetheconclusionofthewholework.Themostlegitimatehypothesisseemstobethatthe
lastchapterisasubsequentadditionbyahandotherthanthatofPatajaliwhowasanxioustosupplysomenew
linksofargumentwhichwerefelttobenecessaryforthestrengtheningoftheYogapositionfromaninternal
pointofview,aswellasforsecuringthestrengthoftheYogafromthesupposedattacksofBuddhistmetaphysics.
Thereisalsoamarkedchange(dueeithertoitssupplementarycharacterortothemanipulationofaforeign
hand)inthestyleofthelastchapterascomparedwiththestyleoftheotherthree.

Thestras,3034,ofthelastchapterseemtorepeatwhathasalreadybeensaidinthesecondchapterandsome
ofthetopicsintroducedaresuchthattheycouldwellhavebeendealtwithinamorerelevantmannerin
connectionwithsimilardiscussionsintheprecedingchapters.Theextentofthischapterisalso
disproportionatelysmall,asitcontainsonly34stras,whereastheaveragenumberofstrasinotherchaptersis
between51to55.

WehavenowtomeetthevexedquestionoftheprobabledateofthisfamousYogaauthorPatajali.Weberhad
triedtoconnecthimwithKpyaPata@mchalaofS'atapathaBrhma@na[Footnoterefl];inKtyyana's
VarttikawegetthenamePatajaliwhichisexplainedbylatercommentatorsas_patanta@hajalaya@h
yasmai_(forwhomthehandsarefoldedasamarkofreverence),butitisindeeddifficulttocometoany
conclusionmerelyfromthesimilarityofnames.Thereishoweveranothertheorywhichidentifiesthewriterof
thegreatcommentaryonP@ninicalledthe_Mahbh@sya_withthePatajaliofthe_Yogastra_.This
theoryhasbeenacceptedbymanywesternscholarsprobablyonthestrengthofsomeIndiancommentatorswho
identifiedthetwoPatajalis.Oftheseoneisthewriterofthe_Patajalicarita_(RmabhadraDk@sta)who
couldnothaveflourishedearlierthantheeighteenthcentury.TheotheristhatcitedinS'ivarma'scommentary
on_Vsavadatt_whichAufrechtassignstotheeighteenthcentury.TheothertwoarekingBhojaofDhrand
Cakrap@nidatta,
__________________________________________________________________
CHAPTER VII 159
[Footnote1:Weber'sHistoryofIndianLiterature,p.223n.]

231

thecommentatorof_Caraka,_whobelongedtotheeleventhcenturyA.D.ThusCakrap@nisaysthathe
adorestheAhipati(mythicalserpentchief)whoremovedthedefectsofmind,speechandbodybyhis
_Ptajalamahbh@sya_andtherevisionof_Caraka._Bhojasays:"Victorybetotheluminouswordsof
thatillustrioussovereignRa@nara@nigamallawhobycomposinghisgrammar,bywritinghiscommentary
onthePatajalaandbyproducingatreatiseonmedicinecalled_Rjam@rg@nka_haslikethelordofthe
holderofserpentsremoveddefilementfromspeech,mindandbody."TheadorationhymnofVysa(which
isconsideredtobeaninterpolationevenbyorthodoxscholars)isalsobaseduponthesametradition.Itis
notimpossiblethereforethatthelaterIndiancommentatorsmighthavemadesomeconfusionbetweenthe
threePatajalis,thegrammarian,theYogaeditor,andthemedicalwritertowhomisascribedthebook
knownas_Ptajalatantra,_andwhohasbeenquotedbyS'ivadsainhiscommentaryonCakradattain
connectionwiththeheatingofmetals.

ProfessorJ.H.WoodsofHarvardUniversityisthereforeinawayjustifiedinhisunwillingnesstoidentifythe
grammarianandtheYogaeditorontheslenderevidenceofthesecommentators.Itisindeedcurioustonotice
thatthegreatcommentatorsofthegrammarschoolsuchasBhart@rhari,Kaiyya@ta,Vmana,Jayditya,
Nges'a,etc.aresilentonthispoint.ThisisindeedapointagainsttheidentificationofthetwoPatajalisbysome
Yogaandmedicalcommentatorsofalaterage.Andifotherproofsareavailablewhichgoagainstsuchan
identification,wecouldnotthinkthegrammarianandtheYogawritertobethesameperson.

LetusnowseeifPatajali'sgrammaticalworkcontainsanythingwhichmayleadustothinkthathewasnot
thesamepersonasthewriteronYoga.ProfessorWoodssupposesthatthephilosophicconceptofsubstance
(_dravya_)ofthetwoPatajalisdiffersandthereforetheycannotbeidentified.Heholdsthatdravyais
describedin_Vysabh@sya_inoneplaceasbeingtheunityofspeciesandqualities
(_smnyavis'e@stmaka_),whereasthe_Mahbh@sya_holdsthatadravyadenotesagenusandalso
specificqualitiesaccordingastheemphasisorstressislaidoneitherside.Ifailtoseehowtheseideasaretotally
antagonistic.Moreover,weknowthatthesetwoviewswereheldby

232

Vy@di and Vjapyyana (Vy@di holding that words denoted qualities or dravya and Vjapyyana holding that words
denoted species [Footnote ref 1]). Even P@nini had these two different ideas in "_jtykhyymekasmin
bahuvacanamanyatarasym_" and "_sarpnamekas'e@samekavibhaktau_," and Patajali the writer of the
_Mahbh@sya_ only combined these two views. This does not show that he opposes the view of _Vysabh@sya_,
though we must remember that even if he did, that would not prove anything with regard to the writer of the stras.
Moreover, when we read that dravya is spoken of in the _Mahbh@sya_ as that object which is the specific kind of the
conglomeration of its parts, just as a cow is of its tail, hoofs, horns, etc.--"_yat
ssnl@ngulakakudakhuravi@s@nyartharpam_," we are reminded of its similarity with
"_ayutasiddhvayavabhednugata@h samha@h dravyam_" (a conglomeration of interrelated parts is called dravya) in
the _Vysabhsya_. So far as I have examined the _Mahbh@sya_ I have not been able to discover anything there
which can warrant us in holding that the two Patajalis cannot be identified. There are no doubt many apparent
divergences of view, but even in these it is only the traditional views of the old grammarians that are exposed and
reconciled, and it would be very unwarrantable for us to judge anything about the personal views of the grammarian
from them. I am also convinced that the writer of the _Mahbh@sya_ knew most of the important points of the
S@mkhya-Yoga metaphysics; as a few examples I may refer to the gu@na theory (1. 2. 64, 4. 1. 3), the S@mkhya
dictum of ex nihilo nihil fit (1. 1. 56), the ideas of time (2. 2. 5, 3. 2. 123), the idea of the return of similars into similars
(1. 1. 50), the idea of change _vikra_ as production of new qualities _gu@nntardhna_ (5. 1. 2, 5. 1. 3) and the
distinction of indriya and Buddhi (3. 3. 133). We may add to it that the _Mahbh@sya_ agrees with the Yoga view as
regards the
CHAPTER VII 160
Spho@tavda,whichisnotheldincommonbyanyotherschoolofIndianphilosophy.Thereisalsothis
externalsimilarity,thatunlikeanyotherworktheybothbegintheirworksinasimilarmanner(_atha
yognus'sanam_and_athas'bdnus'sanam_)"nowbeginsthecompilationoftheinstructionsonYoga"
(_Yogastr_)and"nowbeginsthecompilationoftheinstructionsofwords"(_Mahbh@sya_).

Itmayfurtherbenoticedinthisconnectionthatthearguments

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Patajali's_Mahbh@sya,_1.2.64.]

233

whichProfessorWoodshasadducedtoassignthedateofthe_Yogastra_between300and500A.D.are
notatallconclusive,astheystandonaweakbasis;forfirstlyifthetwoPatajaliscannotbeidentified,it
doesnotfollowthattheeditoroftheYogashouldnecessarilybemadelater;secondly,thesupposed
Buddhist[Footnoteref1]referenceisfoundinthefourthchapterwhich,asIhaveshownabove,isalater
interpolation;thirdly,eveniftheywerewrittenbyPatajaliitcannotbeinferredthatbecauseVcaspati
describestheoppositeschoolasbeingoftheVijnavditype,wearetoinferthatthestrasreferto
VasubandhuoreventoNgrjuna,forsuchideasashavebeenrefutedinthestrashadbeendeveloping
longbeforethetimeofNgrjuna.

Thusweseethatthoughthetraditionoflatercommentatorsmaynotbeacceptedasasufficientgroundto
identifythetwoPatajalis,wecannotdiscoveranythingfromacomparativecriticalstudyofthe_Yoga
stras_andthetextofthe_Mahbh@sya,_whichcanleadustosaythatthewriterofthe_Yogastras_
flourishedatalaterdatethantheotherPatajali.

PostponingourviewsaboutthetimeofPatajalitheYogaeditor,IregretIhavetoincreasetheconfusionby
introducingtheotherwork_KitbPtanjal_,ofwhichAlberunispeaks,forourconsideration.Alberuniconsiders
thisworkasaveryfamousoneandhetranslatesitalongwithanotherbookcalled_Snka_(S@mkhya)ascribed
toKapila.Thisbookwaswrittenintheformofdialoguebetweenmasterandpupil,anditiscertainthatthisbook
wasnotthepresent_Yogastra_ofPatajali,thoughithadthesameaimasthelatter,namelythesearchfor
liberationandfortheunionofthesoulwiththeobjectofitsmeditation.ThebookwascalledbyAlberuni_Kitb
Ptanjal_,whichistobetranslatedasthebookofPtajala,becauseinanotherplace,speakingofitsauthor,he
putsinaPersianphrasewhichwhentranslatedstandsas"theauthorofthebookofPtanjal."Ithadalsoan
elaboratecommentaryfromwhichAlberuniquotesmanyextracts,thoughhedoesnottellustheauthor'sname.
IttreatsofGod,soul,bondage,karma,salvation,etc.,aswefindinthe_Yogastra_,butthemannerinwhich
thesearedescribed(so

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ItisimportanttonoticethatthemostimportantBuddhistreference_naraikacittatantramvastu
tadapram@nakamtadkimsyt_(IV.16)wasprobablyalineoftheVysabh@sya,asBhoja,whohad
consultedmanycommentariesashesaysinthepreface,doesnotcountitasstra.]

234

far as can be judged from the copious extracts supplied by Alberuni) shows that these ideas had undergone some
change from what we find in the _Yoga stra_. Following the idea of God in Alberuni we find that he retains his
character as a timeless emancipated being, but he speaks, hands over the Vedas and shows the way to Yoga and
inspires men in such a way that they could obtain by cogitation what he bestowed on them. The name of God proves
his existence, for there cannot exist anything of which the name existed, but not the
CHAPTER VII 161
thing.Thesoulperceiveshimandthoughtcomprehendshisqualities.Meditationisidenticalwith
worshippinghimexclusively,andbypractisingituninterruptedlytheindividualcomesintosupreme
absorptionwithhimandbeatitudeisobtained[Footnoteref1].

Theideaofsoulisthesameaswefindinthe_Yogastra._Theideaofmetempsychosisisalsothesame.He
speaksoftheeightsiddhis(miraculouspowers)atthefirststageofmeditationontheunityofGod.Thenfollow
theotherfourstagesofmeditationcorrespondingtothefourstageswehaveasinthe_Yogastra._Hegivesfour
kindsofwaysfortheachievementofsalvation,ofwhichthefirstisthe_abhysa_(habit)ofPatajali,andthe
objectofthisabhysaisunitywithGod[Footnoteref2].Thesecondstandsforvairgya;thethirdistheworship
ofGodwithaviewtoseekhisfavourintheattainmentofsalvation(cf._Yogastra,_I.23andI.29).Thefourth
isanewintroduction,namelythatofrasyanaoralchemy.Asregardsliberationtheviewisalmostthesameasin
the_Yogastra,_II.25andIV.34,buttheliberatedstateisspokenofinoneplaceasabsorptioninGodorbeing
onewithhim.TheBrahmanisconceivedasan_urddhvamlaavks'khaas'vattha_(atreewithrootsupwards
andbranchesbelow),aftertheUpani@sadfashion,theupperrootispureBrahman,thetrunkisVeda,the
branchesarethedifferentdoctrinesandschools,itsleavesarethedifferentmodesofinterpretation.Its
nourishmentcomesfromthethreeforces;the

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Cf._Yogastra_I.2329andII.1,45.The_Yogastras_speakofIs'vra(God)asaneternally
emancipatedpuru@sa,omniscient,andtheteacherofallpastteachers.Bymeditatingonhimmanyofthe
obstaclessuchasillness,etc.,whichstandinthewayofYogapracticeareremoved.Heisregardedasoneofthe
alternativeobjectsofconcentration.ThecommentatorVysanotesthatheisthebestobject,forbeingdrawn
towardstheYoginbyhisconcentration.Hesowillsthathecaneasilyattainconcentrationandthroughit
salvation.Noargumentisgiveninthe_Yogastras_oftheexistenceofGod.]

[Footnote2:Cf.YogaII.1.]
235

objectoftheworshipperistoleavethetreeandgobacktotheroots.

Thedifferenceofthissystemfromthatofthe_Yogastra_is:(1)theconceptionofGodhasrisenheretosuchan
importancethathehasbecometheonlyobjectofmeditation,andabsorptioninhimisthegoal;(2)theimportance
oftheyama[Footnoteref1]andtheniyamahasbeenreducedtotheminimum;(3)thevalueoftheYoga
disciplineasaseparatemeansofsalvationapartfromanyconnectionwithGodaswefindinthe_Yogastra_has
beenlostsightof;(4)liberationandYogaaredefinedasabsorptioninGod;(5)theintroductionofBrahman;(6)
theverysignificanceofYogaascontrolofmentalstates(_citta@rttinirodha_)islostsightof,and(7)rasyana
(alchemy)isintroducedasoneofthemeansofsalvation.

FromthiswecanfairlyassumethatthiswasanewmodificationoftheYogadoctrineonthebasisofPatajali's
_Yogastra_inthedirectionofVedntaandTantra,andassuchitprobablystandsasthetransitionlinkthrough
whichtheYogadoctrineofthestrasenteredintoanewchannelinsuchawaythatitcouldbeeasilyassimilated
fromtherebylaterdevelopmentsofVednta,TantraandS'aivadoctrines[Footnoteref2].Astheauthor
mentionsrasyanaasameansofsalvation,itisveryprobablethatheflourishedafterNgarjunaandwas
probablythesamepersonwhowrote_Ptajalatantra_,whohasbeenquotedbyS'ivadsainconnectionwith
alchemicalmattersandspokenofbyNges'aas"Carake Patajali@h." We can also assume with some degree of
probability that it is with reference to this man that Cakrapa@ni and Bhoja made the confusion of identifying him with
the writer of the _Mahbh@sya. It is also very probable that Cakrap@ni by his line
"_ptajalamahbh@syacarakapratisa@msk@rtai@h_" refers to this work which was called "Ptajala." The
commentator of this work gives some description of the lokas, dvpas and the sgaras, which runs counter to the
descriptions given in the _Vysabh@sya_, III. 26, and from this we can infer that it was
CHAPTER VII 162
probablywrittenatatimewhenthe_Vysabh@sya_wasnotwrittenorhadnotattainedanygreatsanctityor
authority.Alberuni

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Alberuni,inhisaccountofthebookofS@mkhya,givesalistofcommandmentswhich
practicallyisthesameasyamaandniyama,butitissaidthatthroughthemonecannotattainsalvation.]

[Footnote2:Cf.theaccountof_Ps'upatadars'ana_in_Sarvadas'anasa@mgraha_.]

236

alsodescribedthebookasbeingveryfamousatthetime,andBhojaandCakrap@nialsoprobablyconfused
himwithPatajalithegrammarian;fromthiswecanfairlyassumethatthisbookofPatajaliwasprobably
writtenbysomeotherPatajaliwithinthefirst300or400yearsoftheChristianera;anditmaynotbe
improbablethatwhen_Vysabh@sya_quotesinIII.44as"itiPatajali@h,"hereferstothisPatajali.

TheconceptionofYogaaswemeetitintheMaitrya@naUpani@sadconsistedofsixa@ngasoraccessories,
namelypr@nyma,pratyhra,dhyna,dhara@n,tarkaandsamdhi[Footnoteref1].Comparingthislist
withthatofthelistinthe_Yogastras_wefindthattwonewelementshavebeenadded,andtarkahasbeen
replacedbysana.Nowfromtheaccountofthesixtytwoheresiesgiveninthe_Brahmajlasutta_weknowthat
therewerepeoplewhoeitherfrommeditationofthreedegreesorthroughlogicandreasoninghadcometobelieve
thatboththeexternalworldasawholeandindividualsoulswereeternal.Fromtheassociationofthislast
mentionedlogicalschoolwiththeSamdhiorDhynaschoolasbelongingtooneclassofthinkerscalled
s's'vatavda,andfromtheinclusionoftarkaasana@ngainsamdhi,wecanfairlyassumethatthelastofthe
a@ngasgiveninMaitrya@nUpani@sadrepresentstheoldestlistoftheYogadoctrine,whentheS@mkhya
andtheYogawereinaprocessofbeinggraftedoneachother,andwhentheSa@mkhyamethodofdiscussiondid
notstandasamethodindependentoftheYoga.ThesubstitutionofsanafortarkainthelistofPatajalishows
thattheYogahaddevelopedamethodseparatefromtheSa@mkhya.Theintroductionofahi@ms(noninjury),
satya(truthfulness),asteya(wantofstealing),brahmacaryya(sexcontrol),aparigraha(wantofgreed)asyama
ands'auca(purity),santo@sa(contentment)asniyama,asasystemofmoralitywithoutwhichYogaisdeemed
impossible(forthefirsttimeinthestras),probablymarkstheperiodwhenthedisputesbetweentheHindusand
theBuddhistshadnotbecomesokeen.Theintroductionofmaitr,karu@n,mudit,upek@sisalsoequally
significant,aswedonotfindthemmentionedinsuchaprominentforminanyotherliteratureoftheHindus
dealingwiththesubjectofemancipation.Beginningfromthe_cr@ngastra,Uttardhyayanastra_,

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_pr@nymahpratyhrahdhynamdhara@ntarkahsamdhihsa@da@ngaityucyateyoga_
(Maitr.68).]

237

the _Strak@rt@ngastra,_ etc., and passing through Umsvati's _Tattvrthdhigamastra_ to Hemacandra's

_Yogas'stra_ we find that the Jains had been founding their Yoga discipline mainly on the basis of a system of morality
indicated by the yamas, and the opinion expressed in Alberuni's _Ptanjal_ that these cannot give salvation marks the
divergence of the Hindus in later days from the Jains. Another important characteristic of Yoga is its thoroughly
pessimistic tone. Its treatment of sorrow in connection with the statement of the scope and ideal of Yoga is the same as
that of the four sacred truths of the Buddhists, namely suffering, origin of suffering, the removal of suffering, and of the
path to the removal of suffering [Footnote ref 1]. Again, the metaphysics of the sa@msra (rebirth) cycle in connection
with sorrow, origination, decease, rebirth, etc. is
CHAPTER VII 163
describedwitharemarkabledegreeofsimilaritywiththecycleofcausesasdescribedinearlyBuddhism.
Avidyisplacedattheheadofthegroup;yetthisavidyshouldnotbeconfusedwiththeVedntaavidyof
S'a@nkara,asitisanavidyoftheBuddhisttype;itisnotacosmicpowerofillusionnoranythinglikea
mysteriousoriginalsin,butitiswithintherangeofearthlytangiblereality.Yogaavidyistheignoranceofthe
foursacredtruths,aswehaveinthestra"_anitys'ucidu@hkhntmasu
nityas'ucidu@hkhtmakhytiravidy_"(II.5).

Thegroundofourexistingisourwilltolive(_abhinives'a_)."Thisisourbesettingsinthatwewilltobe,thatwe
willtobeourselves,thatwefondlywillourbeingtoblendwithotherkindsofexistenceandextend.Thenegation
ofthewilltobe,cutsoffbeingforusatleast[Footnoteref2]."ThisistrueasmuchofBuddhismasoftheYoga
abhinives'a,whichisatermcoinedandusedintheYogaforthefirsttimetosuittheBuddhistidea,andwhich
hasneverbeenaccepted,sofarasIknow,inanyotherHinduliteratureinthissense.Mysoleaiminpointingout
thesethingsinthissectionistoshowthatthe_Yogastras_proper(firstthreechapters)werecomposedata
timewhenthelaterformsofBuddhismhadnotdeveloped,andwhenthequarrelsbetweentheHindusandthe
BuddhistsandJainshadnotreachedsuch

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Yogastra,_II.15,16.17._Yathcikitss'stra@mcaturvyha@mrogorogahetuhrogya@m
bhais'ajyamitievamidamapis'stramcaturvyhameva;tadyathsa@msra@h,sa@msrahetu@hmok@sa@h
mok@sopya@h;duhkhabahula@hsa@msroheya@h,pradhnapuru@sayo@hsa@myogoheyahetu@h,
sa@myogasytyantikniv@rttirhna@mhanopya@hsamyagdar`sanam,Vysabh@sya_,II.15]

[Footnote2:Oldenberg'sBuddhism[Footnoteref1].]

238

astagethattheywouldnotliketoborrowfromoneanother.AsthiscanonlybeheldtrueofearlierBuddhismI
amdisposedtothinkthatthedateofthefirstthreechaptersofthe_Yogastras_mustbeplacedaboutthe
secondcenturyB.C.Sincethereisnoevidencewhichcanstandinthewayofidentifyingthegrammarian
PatajaliwiththeYogawriter,Ibelievewemaytakethemasbeingidentical[Footnoteref1].

TheS@mkhyaandtheYogaDoctrineofSoulorPuru@sa.

TheS@mkhyaphilosophyaswehaveitnowadmitstwoprinciples,soulsand_prak@rti_,therootprincipleof
matter.Soulsaremany,liketheJainasouls,buttheyarewithoutpartsandqualities.Theydonotcontractor
expandaccordingastheyoccupyasmalleroralargerbody,butarealwaysallpervasive,andarenotcontained
inthebodiesinwhichtheyaremanifested.Buttherelationbetweenbodyorratherthemindassociatedwithit
andsoulissuchthatwhatevermentalphenomenahappeninthemindareinterpretedastheexperienceofits
soul.Thesoulsaremany,andhaditnotbeenso(theS@mkhyaargues)withthebirthofoneallwouldhave
beenbornandwiththedeathofoneallwouldhavedied[Footnoteref2].

Theexactnatureofsoulishoweververydifficultofcomprehension,andyetitisexactlythiswhichonemust
thoroughlygraspinordertounderstandtheS@mkhyaphilosophy.UnliketheJainasoulpossessing
_anantajna,anantadars'ana,anantasukha_,and_anantavryya_,theS@mkhyasoulisdescribedasbeing
devoidofanyandeverycharacteristic;butitsnatureisabsolutepureconsciousness(_cit_).TheS@mkhyaview
differsfromtheVednta,firstlyinthisthatitdoesnotconsiderthesoultobeofthenatureofpureintelligence
andbliss(_nanda_)[Footnoteref3].BlisswithS@mkhyaisbutanothernameforpleasureandassuchit
belongstoprak@rtianddoesnotconstitutethenatureofsoul;secondly,accordingtoVedntatheindividual
souls(_Jva_)are
___________________________________________________________________
CHAPTER VII 164
[Footnote1:SeeS.N.DasGupta,_YogaPhilosophyinrelationtootherIndiansystemsofthought,_ch.II.The
mostimportantpointinfavourofthisidentificationseemstobethatboththePatajalisasagainsttheother
Indiansystemsadmittedthedoctrineof_spho@ta_whichwasdeniedevenbyS@mkhya.Onthedoctrineof
Spho@taseemyStudyofPatanjali,AppendixI.]

[Footnote2:_Krik_,18.]

[Footnote3:SeeCitsukha's_Tattvapradpik,_IV.]

239

butillusorymanifestationsofonesoulorpureconsciousnesstheBrahman,butaccordingtoS@mkhyatheyare
allrealandmany.

ThemostinterestingfeatureofS@mkhyaasofVedntaistheanalysisofknowledge.S@mkhyaholdsthat
ourknowledgeofthingsaremereideationalpicturesorimages.Externalthingsareindeedmaterial,butthe
sensedataandimagesofthemind,thecomingandgoingofwhichiscalledknowledge,arealsoinsomesense
matterstuff,sincetheyarelimitedintheirnatureliketheexternalthings.Thesensedataandimagescome
andgo,theyareoftentheprototypes,orphotographsofexternalthings,andassuchoughttobeconsidered
asinsomesensematerial,butthematterofwhichthesearecomposedisthesubtlest.Theseimagesofthe
mindcouldnothaveappearedasconscious,iftherewerenoseparateprinciplesofconsciousnessin
connectionwithwhichthewholeconsciousplanecouldbeinterpretedastheexperienceofaperson
[Footnoteref1].WeknowthattheUpani@sadsconsiderthesouloratmanaspureandinfinite
consciousness,distinctfromtheformsofknowledge,theideas,andtheimages.Inourordinarywaysof
mentalanalysiswedonotdetectthatbeneaththeformsofknowledgethereissomeotherprinciplewhich
hasnochange,noform,butwhichislikealightwhichilluminesthemute,pictorialformswhichthemind
assumes.Theselfisnothingbutthislight.Weallspeakofour"self"butwehavenomentalpictureofthe
selfaswehaveofotherthings,yetinallourknowledgeweseemtoknowourself.TheJainshadsaidthatthe
soulwasveiledbykarmamatter,andeveryactofknowledgemeantonlythepartialremovaloftheveil.
S@mkhyasaysthattheselfcannotbefoundasanimageofknowledge,butthatisbecauseitisadistinct,
transcendentprinciple,whoserealnatureassuchisbehindorbeyondthesubtlematterofknowledge.Our
cognitions,sofarastheyaremereformsorimages,aremerelycompositionsorcomplexesofsubtlemind
substance,andthusarelikeasheetofpaintedcanvasimmersedindarkness;asthecanvasgetsprintsfrom
outsideandmoves,thepicturesappearonebyonebeforethelightandarcilluminated.Soitiswithour
knowledge.Thespecialcharacteristicofselfisthatitislikealight,withoutwhichallknowledgewouldbe
blind.Formandmotionarethecharacteristicsofmatter,and

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Tattakaumud_5;_Yogavrttika_,IV.22;_Vijnm@rtabh@sya_,p.74;_Yogavrttika_
and_Tattvavais'rad_,I.4,II.6,18,20;_Vysabh@sya,_I.6,7.]

240

sofarasknowledgeismerelimitedformandmovementitisthesameasmatter;butthereissomeotherprinciple
whichenlivenstheseknowledgeforms,byvirtueofwhichtheybecomeconscious.Thisprincipleofconsciousness
(_cit_)cannotindeedbeseparatelyperceivedperse, but the presence of this principle in all our forms of knowledge
is distinctly indicated by inference. This principle of consciousness has no motion, no form, no quality, no impurity
[Footnote ref 1]. The movement of the knowledge-stuff takes place in relation to it, so that it is illuminated as
consciousness by it, and produces the appearance of itself as undergoing all changes of knowledge and experiences of
pleasure and pain. Each item of knowledge so far as it is an image or a picture of some sort is but a subtle knowledge-
stuff which has been illumined by the principle of
CHAPTER VII 165
consciousness,butsofaraseachitemofknowledgecarrieswithittheawakeningortheenliveningof
consciousness,itisthemanifestationoftheprincipleofconsciousness.Knowledgerevelationisnotjustthe
unveilingorrevelationofaparticularpartoftheself,astheJainssupposed,butitisarevelationoftheself
onlysofarasknowledgeispureawakening,pureenlivening,pureconsciousness.Sofarasthecontentof
knowledgeortheimageisconcerned,itisnottherevelationofselfbutistheblindknowledgestuff.

TheBuddhistshadanalysedknowledgeintoitsdiverseconstituentparts,andhadheldthatthecoming
togetherofthesebroughtabouttheconsciousstates.Thiscomingtogetherwastothemthepointofthe
illusorynotionofself,sincethisunityorcomingtogetherwasnotapermanentthingbutamomentary
collocation.WithS@mkhyahowevertheself,thepurecit,isneitherillusorynoranabstraction;itis
concretebuttranscendent.Comingintotouchwithitgivesunitytoallthemovementsoftheknowledge
compositesofsubtlestuff,whichwouldotherwisehaveremainedaimlessandunintelligent.Itisbycoming
intoconnectionwiththisprincipleofintelligencethattheyareinterpretedasthesystematicandcoherent
experienceofaperson,andmaythusbesaidtobeintelligized.Intelligizingmeanstheexpressionand
interpretationoftheeventsorthehappeningsof

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ItisimportanttonotethatS@mkhyahastwotermstodenotethetwoaspectsinvolvedin
knowledge,viz.therelatingelementofawarenessassuch(_cit_)andthecontent(_buddhi_)whichistheform
ofthemindstuffrepresentingthesensedataandtheimage.Cognitiontakesplacebythereflectionofthe
formerinthelatter.]

241

knowledgeinconnectionwithaperson,soastomakethemasystemofexperience.Thisprincipleofintelligence
iscalledpuru@sa.Thereisaseparatepuru@sainS@mkhyaforeachindividual,anditisofthenatureofpure
intelligence.TheVedntatmanhoweverisdifferentfromtheS@mkhyapuru@sainthisthatitisoneandisof
thenatureofpureintelligence,purebeing,andpurebliss.Italoneistherealityandbyillusorymyitappears
asmany.

ThoughtandMatter.

A question naturally arises, that if the knowledge forms are made up of some sort of stuff as the objective forms of
matter are, why then should the puru@sa illuminate it and not external material objects. The answer that S@mkhya
gives is that the knowledge-complexes are certainly different from external objects in this, that they are far subtler and
have a preponderance of a special quality of plasticity and translucence (_sattva_), which resembles the light of
puru@sa, and is thus fit for reflecting and absorbing the light of the puru@sa. The two principal characteristics of
external gross matter are mass and energy. But it has also the other characteristic of allowing itself to be photographed
by our mind; this thought-photograph of matter has again the special privilege of being so translucent as to be able to
catch the reflection of the _cit_--the super-translucent transcendent principle of intelligence. The fundamental
characteristic of external gross matter is its mass; energy is common to both gross matter and the subtle thought-stuff.
But mass is at its lowest minimum in thought-stuff, whereas the capacity of translucence, or what may be otherwise
designated as the intelligence-stuff, is at its highest in thought-stuff. But if the gross matter had none of the
characteristics of translucence that thought possesses, it could not have made itself an object of thought; for thought
transforms itself into the shape, colour, and other characteristics of the thing which has been made its object. Thought
could not have copied the matter, if the matter did not possess some of the essential substances of which the copy was
made up. But this plastic entity (_sattva_) which is so predominant in thought is at its lowest limit of subordination in
matter. Similarly mass is not noticed in thought, but some such notions as are associated with mass may be discernible
in
CHAPTER VII 166
242

thought;thustheimagesofthoughtarelimited,separate,havemovement,andhavemoreorlessclearcutforms.
Theimagesdonotextendinspace,buttheycanrepresentspace.Thetranslucentandplasticelementofthought
(_sattva_)inassociationwithmovement(_rajas_)wouldhaveresultedinasimultaneousrevelationofallobjects;
itisonaccountofmassortendencyofobstruction(_tamas_)thatknowledgeproceedsfromimagetoimageand
disclosesthingsinasuccessivemanner.Thebuddhi(thoughtstuff)holdswithinitallknowledgeimmersedasit
wereinutterdarkness,andactualknowledgecomesbeforeourviewasthoughbytheremovalofthedarknessor
veil,bythereflectionofthelightofthepuru@sa.Thischaracteristicofknowledge,thatallitsstoresarehiddenas
iflostatanymoment,andonlyonepictureorideacomesatatimetothearenaofrevelation,demonstratesthatin
knowledgethereisafactorofobstructionwhichmanifestsitselfinitsfullactualityingrossmatterasmass.Thus
boththoughtandgrossmatteraremadeupofthreeelements,aplasticityofintelligencestuff(_sattva_),energy
stuff(_rajas_),andmassstuff(_tamas_),orthefactorofobstruction.Ofthesethelasttwoarepredominantin
grossmatterandthefirsttwointhought.

Feelings,theUltimateSubstances[Footnoteref1].

Anotherquestionthatarisesinthisconnectionisthepositionoffeelinginsuchananalysisofthoughtandmatter.
Smkhyaholdsthatthethreecharacteristicconstituentsthatwehaveanalyzedjustnowarefeelingsubstances.
Feelingisthemostinterestingsideofourconsciousness.Itisinourfeelingsthatwethinkofourthoughtsasbeing
partsofourselves.Ifweshouldanalyzeanyperceptintothecrudeandundevelopedsensationsofwhichitis
composedatthefirstmomentofitsappearance,itcomesmoreasashockthanasanimage,andwefindthatitis
feltmoreasafeelingmassthanasanimage.Eveninourordinarylifetheelementswhichprecedeanactof
knowledgeareprobablymerefeelings.Aswegolowerdownthescaleofevolutiontheautomaticactionsand
relationsofmatterareconcomitantwithcrudemanifestationsoffeelingwhichneverrisetothelevelof
knowledge.Thelowerthescaleofevolutionthelessisthekeennessoffeeling,tillatlasttherecomesastagewhere
mattercomplexesdonotgiverisetofeeling

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Krik_,12,withGau@dpdaandNrya@natrtha.]
243

reactions but to mere physical reactions. Feelings thus mark the earliest track of consciousness, whether we look at it
from the point of view of evolution or of the genesis of consciousness in ordinary life. What we call matter complexes
become at a certain stage feeling-complexes and what we call feeling-complexes at a certain stage of descent sink into
mere matter-complexes with matter reaction. The feelings are therefore the things-in-themselves, the ultimate
substances of which consciousness and gross matter are made up. Ordinarily a difficulty might be felt in taking feelings
to be the ultimate substances of which gross matter and thought are made up; for we are more accustomed to take
feelings as being merely subjective, but if we remember the S@mkhya analysis, we find that it holds that thought and
matter are but two different modifications of certain subtle substances which are in essence but three types of feeling
entities. The three principal characteristics of thought and matter that we have noticed in the preceding section are but
the manifestations of three types of feeling substances. There is the class of feelings that we call the sorrowful, there is
another class of feelings that we call pleasurable, and there is still another class which is neither sorrowful nor
pleasurable, but is one of ignorance, depression (_vi@sda_) or dullness. Thus corresponding to these three types of
manifestations as pleasure, pain, and dullness, and materially as shining (_praks'a_), energy (_prav@rtti_), obstruction
(_niyama_), there are three types of feeling-substances which must be regarded as the ultimate things which make up
all the diverse kinds of gross matter and thought by their varying modifications.
CHAPTER VII 167
TheGu@nas[Footnoteref1].

Thesethreetypesofultimatesubtleentitiesaretechnicallycalled_gu@na_inS@mkhyaphilosophy.Gu@nain
Sanskrithasthreemeanings,namely(1)quality,(2)rope,(3)notprimary.Theseentities,however,are
substancesandnotmerequalities.ButitmaybementionedinthisconnectionthatinS@mkhyaphilosophy
thereisnoseparateexistenceofqualities;itholdsthateachandeveryunitofqualityisbutaunitofsubstance.
Whatwecallqualityisbutaparticularmanifestationorappearanceofasubtleentity.Thingsdonotpossess
quality,butquality

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Yogavrttika_,II.18;Bhvga@nes'a's_Tattvaythrthyadpana_,pp.13;
_Vijnm@rtabh@sya_,p.100;_Tattvakaumud_,13;alsoGau@dapdaandNrya@natrtha,13.]

244

signifiesmerelythemannerinwhichasubstancereacts;anyobjectweseeseemstopossessmanyqualities,but
theS@mkhyaholdsthatcorrespondingtoeachandeverynewunitofquality,howeverfineandsubtleitmaybe,
thereisacorrespondingsubtleentity,thereactionofwhichisinterpretedbyusasaquality.Thisistruenotonly
ofqualitiesofexternalobjectsbutalsoofmentalqualitiesaswell.Theseultimateentitieswerethuscalledgu@nas
probablytosuggestthattheyaretheentitieswhichbytheirvariousmodificationsmanifestthemselvesasgu@nas
orqualities.Thesesubtleentitiesmayalsobecalledgu@nasinthesenseofropesbecausetheyarelikeropesby
whichthesoulischaineddownasifitweretothoughtandmatter.Thesemayalsobecalledgu@nasasthingsof
secondaryimportance,becausethoughpermanentandindestructible,theycontinuallysuffermodificationsand
changesbytheirmutualgroupingsandregroupings,andthusnotprimarilyandunalterablyconstantlikethe
souls(_puru@sa_).Moreovertheobjectoftheworldprocessbeingtheenjoymentandsalvationofthepuru@sas,
thematterprinciplecouldnotnaturallyberegardedasbeingofprimaryimportance.Butinwhateversenseswe
maybeinclinedtojustifythenamegu@naasappliedtothesesubtleentities,itshouldbeborneinmindthatthey
aresubstantiveentitiesorsubtlesubstancesandnotabstractqualities.Thesegu@nasareinfiniteinnumber,but
inaccordancewiththeirthreemaincharacteristicsasdescribedabovetheyhavebeenarrangedinthreeclassesor
typescalledsattva(intelligencestuff),rajas(energystuff)andtamas(massstuff).Aninfinitenumberofsubtle
substanceswhichagreeincertaincharacteristicsofselfshiningorplasticityarecalledthe_sattvagu@nas_and
thosewhichbehaveasunitsofactivityarecalledthe_rajogu@nas_andthosewhichbehaveasfactorsof
obstruction,massormaterialityarecalled_tamogu@nas_.Thesesubtlegu@nasubstancesareunitedin
differentproportions(e.g.alargernumberofsattvasubstanceswithalessernumberofrajasortamas,oralarger
numberoftamassubstanceswithasmallernumberofrajasandsattvasubstancesandsooninvarying
proportions),andasaresultofthis,differentsubstanceswithdifferentqualitiescomeintobeing.Thoughattached
tooneanotherwhenunitedindifferentproportions,theymutuallyactandreactupononeanother,andthusby
theircombinedresultantproducenewcharacters,qualitiesandsubstances.Thereishowever

245

one and only one stage in which the gu@nas are not compounded in varying proportions. In this state each of the
gu@na substances is opposed by each of the other gu@na substances, and thus by their equal mutual opposition
create an equilibrium, in which none of the characters of the gu@nas manifest themselves. This is a state which is so
absolutely devoid of all characteristics that it is absolutely incoherent, indeterminate, and indefinite. It is a qualitiless
simple homogeneity. It is a state of being which is as it were non-being. This state of the mutual equilibrium of the
gu@nas is called prak@rti [Footnote ref 1]. This is a state which cannot be said either to exist or to non-exist for it
serves no purpose, but it is hypothetically the mother of all things. This is however the earliest stage, by the breaking of
which, later on, all modifications take place.
CHAPTER VII 168
Prak@rtianditsEvolution.

S@mkhyabelievesthatbeforethisworldcameintobeingtherewassuchastateofdissolutionastateinwhich
thegu@nacompoundshaddisintegratedintoastateofdisunionandhadbytheirmutualoppositionproducedan
equilibriumtheprak@rti.Thenlaterondisturbancearoseintheprak@rti,andasaresultofthataprocessof
unequalaggregationofthegu@nasinvaryingproportionstookplace,whichbroughtforththecreationofthe
manifold.Prak@rti,thestateofperfecthomogeneityandincoherenceofthegu@nas,thusgraduallyevolvedand
becamemoreandmoredeterminate,differentiated,heterogeneous,andcoherent.Thegu@nasarealwaysuniting,
separating,andunitingagain[Footnoteref2].Varyingqualitiesofessence,energy,andmassinvariedgroupings
actononeanotherandthroughtheirmutualinteractionandinterdependenceevolvefromtheindefiniteor
qualitativelyindeterminatethedefiniteorqualitativelydeterminate.Andthoughcooperatingtoproducethe
worldofeffects,thesediversemomentswithdiversetendenciesnevercoalesce.Thusinthephenomenalproduct
whateverenergythereisisduetotheelementofrajasandrajasalone;allmatter,resistance,stability,isdueto
tamas,andallconsciousmanifestationtosattva.Theparticulargu@nawhichhappenstobepredominantinany
phenomenonbecomesmanifestinthatphenomenonandothersbecomelatent,thoughtheirpresenceisinferred
bytheir

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Yogavrttika,_II.19,and_Pravacanabh@sya,_I.61.]
[Footnote2:_Kaumud_1316;_Tattvavais'rad_II.20,IV.13,14;also_Yogavrttika,_IV.13,14.]

246

effect.Thus,forexample,inabodyatrestmassispatent,energylatentandpotentialityofconscious
manifestationsublatent.Inamovingbody,therajasispredominant(kinetic)andthemassispartiallyovercome.
Allthesetransformationsofthegroupingsofthegu@nasindifferentproportionspresupposethestateof
prak@rtiasthestartingpoint.Itisatthisstagethatthetendenciestoconsciousmanifestation,aswellasthe
powersofdoingwork,areexactlycounterbalancedbytheresistanceofinertiaormass,andtheprocessofcosmic
evolutionisatrest.Whenthisequilibriumisoncedestroyed,itissupposedthatoutofanaturalaffinityofallthe
sattvarealsforthemselves,ofrajasrealsforotherrealsoftheirtype,oftamasrealsforothersoftheirtype,there
arisesanunequalaggregationofsattva,rajas,ortamasatdifferentmoments.Whenonegu@naispreponderant
inanyparticularcollocation,theothersarecooperant.Thisevolutionaryseriesbeginningfromthefirst
disturbanceoftheprak@rtitothefinaltransformationastheworldorder,issubjectto"adefinitelawwhichit
cannotoverstep."InthewordsofDrB.N.Seal[Footnoteref1],"theprocessofevolutionconsistsinthe
developmentofthedifferentiated(_vai@samya_)withintheundifferentiated(_smyvasth_)ofthedeterminate
(_vies'a_)withintheindeterminate(_avis'esa_)ofthecoherent(_yutasiddha_)withintheincoherent
(_ayutasiddha_).Theorderofsuccessionisneitherfrompartstowholenorfromwholetotheparts,butever
fromarelativelylessdifferentiated,lessdeterminate,lesscoherentwholetoarelativelymoredifferentiated,
moredeterminate,morecoherentwhole."Themeaningofsuchanevolutionisthis,thatallthechangesand
modificationsintheshapeoftheevolvingcollocationsofgu@narealstakeplacewithinthebodyoftheprak@rti.
Prak@rticonsistingoftheinfiniterealsisinfinite,andthatithasbeendisturbeddoesnotmeanthatthewholeof
ithasbeendisturbedandupset,orthatthetotalityofthegu@nasintheprak@rtihasbeenunhingedfroma
stateofequilibrium.Itmeansratherthataveryvastnumberofgu@nasconstitutingtheworldsofthoughtand
matterhasbeenupset.Thesegu@nasoncethrownoutofbalancebegintogroupthemselvestogetherfirstinone
form,theninanother,theninanother,andsoon.Butsuchachangeintheformationofaggregatesshouldnotbe
thoughttotakeplaceinsuchawaythatthelateraggregatesappearinsupersessionoftheformerones,sothat
whentheformercomesintobeingthelatterceasestoexist.
_____________________________________________________________________
CHAPTER VII 169
[Footnote1:DrB.N.Seal'sPositiveSciencesoftheAncientHindus,1915,p.7.]

247

Forthetruthisthatonestageisproducedafteranother;thissecondstageistheresultofanewaggregationof
someoftherealsofthefirststage.Thisdeficiencyoftherealsofthefirststagewhichhadgoneforthtoformthe
newaggregateasthesecondstageismadegoodbyarefillingfromtheprak@rti.Soalso,asthethirdstageof
aggregationtakesplacefromoutoftherealsofthesecondstage,thedeficiencyoftherealsofthesecondstageis
madegoodbyarefillingfromthefirststageandthatofthefirststagefromtheprak@rti.Thusbyasuccessionof
refillingstheprocessofevolutionproceeds,tillwecometoitslastlimit,wherethereisnorealevolutionofnew
substance,butmerechemicalandphysicalchangesofqualitiesinthingswhichhadalreadyevolved.Evolution
(_tattvntarapari@nma_)inS@mkhyameansthedevelopmentofcategoriesofexistenceandnotmerechanges
ofqualitiesofsubstances(physical,chemical,biologicalormental).Thuseachofthestagesofevolutionremains
asapermanentcategoryofbeing,andoffersscopetothemoreandmoredifferentiatedandcoherentgroupingsof
thesucceedingstages.Thusitissaidthattheevolutionaryprocessisregardedasadifferentiationofnewstagesas
integratedinpreviousstages(_sa@ms@rstaviveka_).

PralayaandthedisturbanceofthePrak@rtiEquilibrium.

Buthoworratherwhyprak@rtishouldbedisturbedisthemostknottypointinS@mkhya.Itispostulated
thattheprak@rtiorthesumtotalofthegu@nasissoconnectedwiththepuru@sas,andthereissuchan
inherentteleologyorblindpurposeinthelifelessprak@rti,thatallitsevolutionandtransformationstike
placeforthesakeofthediversepuru@sas,toservetheenjoymentofpleasuresandsufferanceofpain
throughexperiences,andfinallyleadingthemtoabsolutefreedomormukti.Areturnofthismanifoldworld
intothequiescentstate(_pralaya_)ofprak@rtitakesplacewhenthekarmasofallpuru@sascollectively
requirethatthereshouldbesuchatemporarycessationofallexperience.Atsuchamomentthegu@na
compoundsaregraduallybroken,andthereisabackwardmovement(_pratisacara_)tilleverythingis
reduced,tothegu@nasintheirelementarydisintegratedstatewhentheirmutualoppositionbringsabout
theirequilibrium.Thisequilibriumhoweverisnotamerepassivestate,butoneofutmosttension;thereis
intenseactivity,buttheactivityheredoesnotleadtothegenerationofnewthingsandqualities
(_visad@rs'apari@nma_);thiscourseofnew

248

production being suspended, the activity here repeats the same state (_sad@rs'a-pari@nma_) of equilibrium, so that
there is no change or new production. The state of pralaya thus is not a suspension of the teleology or purpose of the
gu@nas, or an absolute break of the course of gu@na evolution; for the state of pralaya, since it has been generated to
fulfil the demands of the accumulated karmas of puru@sas, and since there is still the activity of the gu@nas in keeping
themselves in a state of suspended production, is also a stage of the sa@msra cycle. The state of mukti (liberation) is
of course quite different, for in that stage the movement of the gu@nas ceases forever with reference to the liberated
soul. But still the question remains, what breaks the state of equilibrium? The S@mkhya answer is that it is due to the
transcendental (non-mechanical) influence of the puru@sa [Footnote ref 1]. This influence of the puru@sa again, if it
means anything, means that there is inherent in the gu@nas a teleology that all their movements or modifications
should take place in such a way that these may serve the purposes of the puru@sas. Thus when the karmas of the
puru@sas had demanded that there should be a suspension of all experience, for a period there was a pralaya. At the
end of it, it is the same inherent purpose of the prak@rti that wakes it up for the formation of a suitable world for the
experiences of the puru@sas by which its quiescent state is disturbed. This is but another way of looking at the inherent
teleology of the prak@rti, which demands that a state of pralaya should cease and a state of world-framing activity
should begin. Since there is a purpose in the gu@nas which brought them to a state of equilibrium, the state of
equilibrium also presupposes that it also may be broken up again when the purpose so demands. Thus the inherent
purpose of the prak@rti brought about the state of pralaya and then broke it up for
CHAPTER VII 170
thecreativeworkagain,anditisthisnaturalchangeintheprak@rtithatmayberegardedfromanotherpoint
ofviewasthetranscendentalinfluenceofthepuru@sas.

MahatandAha@mkra.

Thefirstevoluteoftheprak@rtiisgeneratedbyapreponderanceofthesattva(intelligencestuff).Thisis
indeedtheearlieststatefromwhichalltherestoftheworldhassprungforth;anditisastateinwhichthe
stuffofsattvapredominates.Itthusholds

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:TheYogaanswerisofcoursedifferent.Itbelievesthatthedisturbanceoftheequilibriumof
prak@rtifornewcreationtakesplacebythewillofs'vara(God).]

249

withinittheminds(_buddhi_)ofallpuru@saswhichwerelostintheprak@rtiduringthepralaya.Theveryfirst
workoftheevolutionofprak@rtitoservethepuru@sasisthusmanifestedbytheseparatingoutoftheold
buddhisorminds(ofthepuru@sas)whichholdwithinthemselvestheoldspecificignorance(_avidy_)inherent
inthemwithreferencetoeachpuru@sawithwhichanyparticularbuddhiisassociatedfrombeginninglesstime
beforethepralaya.Thisstateofevolutionconsistingofallthecollectedminds(buddhi)orallthepuru@sasis
thereforecalled_buddhitattva._Itisastatewhichholdsorcomprehendswithinitthebuddhisofallindividuals.
Theindividualbuddhisofindividualpuru@sasareononehandintegratedwiththebuddhitattvaandonthe
otherassociatedwiththeirspecificpuru@sas.Whensomebuddhisoncebegintobeseparatedfromtheprak@rti,
otherbuddhievolutionstakeplace.Inotherwords,wearetounderstandthatoncethetransformationofbuddhis
iseffectedfortheserviceofthepuru@sas,alltheotherdirecttransformationsthattakeplacefromtheprak@rti
takethesameline,i.e.apreponderanceofsattvabeingoncecreatedbythebringingoutofsomebuddhis,other
transformationsofprak@rtithatfollowthemhavealsothesattvapreponderance,whichthushaveexactlythe
samecompositionasthefirstbuddhis.Thusthefirsttransformationfromprak@rtibecomesbuddhi
transformation.Thisstageofbuddhismaythusberegardedasthemostuniversalstage,whichcomprehends
withinitallthebuddhisofindividualsandpotentiallyallthematterofwhichthegrossworldisformed.Looked
atfromthispointofviewithasthewidestandmostuniversalexistencecomprisingallcreation,andisthuscalled
mahat(thegreatone).Itiscalled_li@nga_(sign),astheotherlaterexistencesorevolutesgiveusthegroundof
inferringitsexistence,andassuchmustbedistinguishedfromtheprak@rtiwhichiscalled_ali@nga,_i.e.of
whichnoli@ngaorcharacterisemaybeaffirmed.

Thismahattatvabeingonceproduced,furthermodificationsbegintotakeplaceinthreelinesbythreedifferent
kindsofundulationsrepresentingthesattvapreponderance,rajaspreponderanceandtamapreponderance.This
statewhenthemahatisdisturbedbythethreeparalleltendenciesofapreponderanceoftamas,rajasandsattva's
called_aha@mkra,_andtheabovethreetendenciesarerespectiviycalled_tmasikaaha@mkra_or
_bhtdi_,_rjasika_or_taijasaaha@mra,_and_vaikrikaaha@mkra._Therjasikaaha@mkracannot
makeanewpreponderancebyitself;itonly

250

helps (_sahakri_) the transformations of the sattva preponderance and the tamas preponderance. The development
of the former preponderance, as is easy to see, is only the assumption of a more and more determinate character of
the buddhi, for we remember that buddhi itself has been the resulting transformation of a sattva preponderance.
Further development with the help of rajas on the line of sattva development could only take place when the buddhi
as mind determined itself in specific ways. The first development of the buddhi on this line is called _sttvika_ or
_vaikrika aha@mkra_. This aha@mkra represents the
CHAPTER VII 171
developmentinbuddhitoproduceaconsciousnessstuffasIorrather"mine,"andmustthusbedistinguished
fromthefirststageasbuddhithefunctionofwhichisamereunderstandingandgeneraldatunasthisness.

Theegooraha@mkra(_abhimnadravya_)isthespecificexpressionofthegeneralconsciousnesswhich
takesexperienceasmine.Thefunctionoftheegoisthereforecalled_abhimna_(selfassertion).Fromthis
againcomethefivecognitivesensesofvision,touch,smell,taste,andhearing,thefivecognitivesensesof
speech,handling,footmovement,theejectivesenseandthegenerativesense;the_pr@nas_(biomotor
force)whichhelpbothconationandcognitionarebutaspectsofbuddhimovementaslife.Theindividual
aha@mkrasandsensesarerelatedtotheindividualbuddhisbythedevelopingsattvadeterminationsfrom
whichtheyhadcomeintobeing.Eachbuddhiwithitsowngroupofaka@mkra(ego)andsenseevolutes
thusformsamicrocosmseparatefromsimilarotherbuddhiswiththeirassociatedgroups.Sofartherefore
asknowledgeissubjecttosenseinfluenceandtheego,itisdifferentforeachindividual,butsofarasa
generalmind(_kra@nabuddhi_)apartfromsenseknowledgeisconcerned,thereisacommunityofall
buddhisinthebuddhitattva.Eventherehowevereachbuddhiisseparatedfromotherbuddhisbyitsown
peculiarlyassociatedignorance(_avidy_).Thebuddhianditssattvaevolutesofaha@mkraandthe
sensesaresorelatedthatthoughtheyaredifferentfrombuddhiintheirfunctions,theyareall
comprehendedinthebuddhi,andmarkonlyitsgradualdifferentiationsandmodes.Wemustagain
rememberinthisconnectionthedoctrineofrefilling,forasbuddhiexhaustsitspartingivingriseto
aha@mkra,thedeficiencyofbuddhiismadegoodbyprak@rti;againasaha@mkrapartiallyexhausts
itselfingeneratingsensefaculties,thedeficiency

251

ismadegoodbyarefillingfromthebuddhi.Thusthechangeandwastageofeachofthestadiaarealways
madegoodandkeptconstantbyaconstantrefillingfromeachhigherstateandfinallyfromprak@rti.

TheTanmtrasandtheParam@nus[Footnoteref1].

Theothertendency,namelythatoftamas,hastobehelpedbytheliberatedrajasofaha@mkra,inorderto
makeitselfpreponderant,andthisstateinwhichthetamassucceedsinovercomingthesattvasidewhichwasso
preponderantinthebuddhi,iscalled_bhtdi._Fromthisbhtdiwiththehelpofrajasaregeneratedthe
_tanmtras,_theimmediatelyprecedingcausesofthegrosselements.Thebhtdithusrepresentsonlythe
intermediatestagethroughwhichthedifferentiationsandregroupingsoftamasrealsinthemahatproceedfor
thegenerationofthetanmtras.TherehasbeensomecontroversybetweenS@mkhyaandYogaastowhether
thetanmtrasaregeneratedfromthemahatorfromaha@mkra.Thesituationbecomesintelligibleifwe
rememberthatevolutionheredoesnotmeancomingoutoremanation,butincreasingdifferentiationin
integrationwithintheevolvingwhole.Thustheregroupingsoftamasrealsmarksthedifferentiationwhichtakes
placewithinthemahatbutthroughitsstageasbhtdi.Bhtdiisabsolutelyhomogeneousandinert,devoidof
allphysicalandchemicalcharactersexceptquantumormass.Thesecondstadiumtanmtrarepresentssubtle
matter,vibratory,impingent,radiant,instinctwithpotentialenergy.These"potentials"arisefromtheunequal
aggregationoftheoriginalmassunitsindifferentproportionsandcollocationswithanunequaldistributionof
theoriginalenergy(_rajas_).Thetanmtraspossesssomethingmorethanquantumofmassandenergy;they
possessphysicalcharacters,someofthempenetrability,otherspowersofimpactorpressure,othersradiantheat,
othersagaincapabilityofviscousandcohesiveattraction[Footnoteref.2].

Inintimaterelationwiththosephysicalcharacterstheyalsopossessthepotentialsoftheenergiesrepresentedby
sound,touch,colour,taste,andsmell;but,beingsubtlematter,theyaredevoid

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: I have accepted in this section and in the next many of the translations of Sanskrit terms and expressions
of Dr Seal and am largely indebted to him for his illuminating exposition of this subject as given
CHAPTER VII 172
inRay's_HinduChemistry._ThecreditofexplainingS@mkhyaphysics,inthelightofthetextbelongs
entirelytohim.]

[Footnote2:DrSeal'sPositiveSciencesoftheAncientHindus.]

252

ofthepeculiarformswhichthese"potentials"assumeinparticlesofgrossmatterliketheatomsandtheir
aggregates.Inotherwords,thepotentialslodgedinsubtlemattermustundergopeculiartransformationsbynew
groupingsorcollocationsbeforetheycanactassensorystimuliasgrossmatter,thoughintheminutestparticles
thereofthesensorystimulimaybeinfrasensible(_atndriya_butnot_anudbhta_)[Footnoteref1].

Ofthetanmatrasthe_s'abda_or_ks'atanmtra_(thesoundpotential)isfirstgenerateddirectlyfromthe
bhtdi.Nextcomesthe_spars'a_orthe_vyutanmtra_(touchpotential)whichisgeneratedbytheunionofa
unitoftamasfrombhtdiwiththeks'atanmtra.The_rpatanmtra_(colourpotential)isgenerated
similarlybytheaccretionofaunitoftamasfrombhtdi;the_rasatanmtra_(tastepotential)orthe_ap
tunmtra_isalsosimilarlyformed.Thisaptanmtraagainbyitsunionwithaunitoftamasfrombhtdi
producesthe_gndhatanmtra_(smellpotential)orthe_k@sititanmtra_[Footnoteref2].Thedifferenceof
tanmtrasorinfraatomicunitsandatoms(_param@nu_)isthis,thatthetanmtrashaveonlythepotential
powerofaffectingoursenses,whichmustbegroupedandregroupedinaparticularformtoconstituteanew
existenceasatomsbeforetheycanhavethepowerofaffectingoursenses.Itisimportantinthisconnectionto
pointoutthattheclassificationofallgrossobjectsask@siti,ap,tejas,marutandvyomanisnotbasedupona
chemicalanalysis,butfromthepointsofviewofthefivesensesthroughwhichknowledgeofthemcouldbe
broughthometous.Eachofoursensescanonlyapprehendaparticularqualityandthusfivedifferentultimate
substancesaresaidtoexistcorrespondingtothefivequalitieswhichmaybegraspedbythefivesenses.In
accordancewiththeexistenceofthesefiveelements,theexistenceofthefivepotentialstatesortanmtraswasalso
conceivedtoexistasthegroundofthefivegrossforms.

Thefiveclassesofatomsaregeneratedfromthetanmtrasasfollows:thesoundpotential,withaccretionof
rudimentmatterfrombhtdigeneratestheksaatom.Thetouchpotentialscombinewiththevibratory
particles(soundpotential)togeneratethe

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:DrSeal'sPositiveSciencesoftheAncientHindus.]

[Footnote2:Therewerevariouswaysinwhichthegenesisoftanmtrasandatomswereexplainedin
literaturesotherthanS@mkhya;forsomeaccountofitseeDrSeal's PositiveSciencesoftheAncient
Hindus.]

253

vyu-atom. The light-and-heat potentials combine with touch-potentials and sound-potentials to produce the tejas-
atom. The taste-potentials combine with light-and-heat potentials, touch-potentials and sound-potentials to generate
the ap-atom and the smell-potentials combine with the preceding potentials to generate the earth-atom. The ks'a-
atom possesses penetrability, the vyu-atom impact or mechanical pressure, the tejas-atom radiant heat and light, the
ap-atom viscous attraction and the earth-atom cohesive attraction. The ksa we have seen forms the transition link
from the bhtdi to the tanmtra and from the tanmtra to the atomic production; it therefore deserves a special
notice at this stage. S@mkhya distinguishes between a kra@na-ks'a and kryks'a. The kra@na-ks'a (non-
atomic and all-pervasive) is the formless tamas--the mass in prak@rti or bhtdi; it is indeed all-pervasive, and is not a
mere negation, a mere unoccupiedness (_vara@nbhva_) or vacuum [Footnote ref 1]. When energy is first associated
with this tamas element it
CHAPTER VII 173
givesrisetothesoundpotential;theatomicks'aistheresultoftheintegrationoftheoriginalmassunitsfrom
bhtdiwiththissoundpotential(_s'abdatanmtra_).Suchanks'aatomiscalledthekryks'a;itis
formedeverywhereandheldupintheoriginalkra@naks'aasthemediumforthedevelopmentofvyu
atoms.Beingatomicitoccupieslimitedspace.

Theaha@mkraandthefivetanmtrasaretechnicallycalled_avis'e@sa_orindeterminate,forfurther
determinationsordifferentiationsofthemfortheformationofnewercategoriesofexistencearepossible.The
elevensensesandthefiveatomsarecalled_vis'e@sa,_i.e.determinate,fortheycannotfurtherbesodetermined
astoformanewcategoryofexistence.Itisthusthatthecourseofevolutionwhichstartedintheprak@rti
reachesitsfurthestlimitintheproductionofthesensesontheonesideandtheatomsontheother.Changesno
doubttakeplaceinbodieshavingatomicconstitution,butthesechangesarechangesofqualityduetospatial
changesinthepositionoftheatomsortotheintroductionofnewatomsandtheirrearrangement.Buttheseare
notsuchthatanewercategoryofexistencecouldbeformedbythemwhichwassubstantiallydifferentfromthe
combinedatoms.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:DrB.N.Sealindescribingthisks'asays"ks'acorrespondsinsomerespectstotheetherofthe
physicistsandinotherstowhatmaybecalledprotoatom(protyle)."Ray'sHistoryofHinduChemistry,p.88.]

254

Thechangesthattakeplaceintheatomicconstitutionofthingscertainlydeservetobenoticed.Butbeforewego
ontothis,itwillbebettertoenquireabouttheprincipleofcausationaccordingtowhichtheS@mkhyaYoga
evolutionshouldbecomprehendedorinterpreted.

PrincipleofCausationandConservationofEnergy[Footnoteref1].

Thequestionisraised,howcantheprak@rtisupplythedeficienciesmadeinitsevolutesbytheformationof
otherevolutesfromthem?Whenfrommahatsometanmtrashaveevolved,orwhenfromthetanmtrassome
atomshaveevolved,howcanthedeficiencyinmahatandthetanmtrasbemadegoodbytheprak@rti?

Oragain,whatistheprinciplethatguidesthetransformationsthattakeplaceintheatomicstagewhenonegross
body,saymilk,changesintocurd,andsoon?S@mkhyasaysthat"asthetotalenergyremainsthesamewhile
theworldisconstantlyevolving,causeandeffectareonlymoreorlessevolvedformsofthesameultimateEnergy.
Thesumofeffectsexistsinthesumofcausesinapotentialform.Thegroupingorcollocationalonechanges,and
thisbringsonthemanifestationofthelatentpowersofthegu@nas,butwithoutcreationofanythingnew.Whatis
calledthe(material)causeisonlythepowerwhichisefficientintheproductionorratherthevehicleofthepower.
Thispoweristheunmanifested(orpotential)formoftheEnergysetfree(_udbhtav@rtti_)intheeffect.Butthe
concomitantconditionsarenecessarytocallforththesocalledmaterialcauseintoactivity[Footnoteref2]."The
appearanceofaneffect(suchasthemanifestationofthefigureofthestatueinthemarbleblockbythecausal
efficiencyofthesculptor'sart)isonlyitspassagefrompotentialitytoactualityandtheconcomitantconditions
(_sahakris'akti_)orefficientcause(_nimittakra@na_,suchasthesculptor'sart)isasortofmechanicalhelp
orinstrumentalhelptothispassageorthetransition[Footnoteref3].Therefillingfromprak@rtithusmeans
nothingmorethanthis,thatbytheinherentteleologyoftheprak@rti,therealstherearesocollocatedastobe
transformedintomahatasthoseofthemahathavebeencollocatedtoformthebhtdiorthetanmtras.

____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: _Vysabh@sya_ and _Yogavrttika_, IV. 3; _Tattvavais'rad_, IV. 3.]
CHAPTER VII 174
[Footnote2:Ray,HistoryofHinduChemistry,p.72.]

[Footnote3:_Ibid._p.73.]

255

Yogahoweverexplainsthismorevividlyonthebasisoftransformationoftheliberatedpotentialenergy.Thesum
ofmaterialcausespotentiallycontainstheenergymanifestedinthesumofeffects.Whentheeffectuating
conditionisaddedtothesumofmaterialconditionsinagivencollocation,allthathappensisthatastimulusis
impartedwhichremovesthearrest,disturbstherelativelystableequilibrium,andbringsonaliberationofenergy
togetherwithafreshcollocation(_gu@nasannives'avis'e@sa_).Astheownerofanadjacentfieldintransferring
waterfromonefieldtoanotherofthesameorlowerlevelhasonlytoremovetheobstructingmudbarriers,
whereuponthewaterflowsofitselftotheotherfield,sowhentheefficientorinstrumentalcauses(suchasthe
sculptor'sart)removethebarrierinherentinanycollocationagainstitstransformationintoanyothercollocation,
theenergyfromthatcollocationflowsoutinacorrespondingmanneranddeterminesthecollocation.Thusfor
exampletheenergywhichcollocatedthemilkatomstoformmilkwasinastateofarrestinthemilkstate.Ifby
heatorothercausesthisbarrierisremoved,theenergynaturallychangesdirectioninacorrespondingmanner
andcollocatestheatomsaccordinglyfortheformationofcurd.Soalsoassoonasthebarriersareremovedfrom
theprak@rti,guidedbytheconstantwillofs'vara,therealsinequilibriuminthestateofprak@rtileavetheir
stateofarrestandevolvethemselvesintomahat,etc.

Changeastheformationofnewcollocations.

Itiseasytoseefromwhatwehavealreadysaidthatanycollocationofatomsformingathingcouldnotchange
itsform,unlessthebarrierinherentorcausedbytheformationofthepresentcollocationcouldberemovedby
someotherextraneousinstrumentalcause.Allgrossthingsareformedbythecollocationofthefiveatomsof
k@siti,ap,tejas,marut,andvyoman.Thedifferencebetweenonethingandanotherissimplythis,thatits
collocationofatomsorthearrangementorgroupingofatomsisdifferentfromthatinanother.Theformation
ofacollocationhasaninherentbarrieragainstanychange,whichkeepsthatcollocationinastateof
equilibrium,anditiseasytoseethatthesebarriersexistininfinitedirectionsinwhichalltheotherinfinite
objectsoftheworldexist.Fromwhicheversidethebarrierisremoved,theenergyflowsinthatdirectionand
helpsthe

256

formationofacorrespondingobject.Providedthesuitablebarrierscouldberemoved,anythingcouldbechanged
intoanyotherthing.AnditisbelievedthattheYoginscanacquirethepowersbywhichtheycanremoveany
barriers,andthusmakeanythingoutofanyotherthing.Butgenerallyinthenormalcourseofeventsthelineof
evolutionfollows"adefinitelawwhichcannotbeoverstepped"(_pari@nmakramaniyama_)orinotherwords
therearesomenaturalbarrierswhichcannotberemoved,andthustheevolutionarycoursehastotakeapathto
theexclusionofthoselineswherethebarrierscouldnotberemoved.Thussaffrongrowsincountrieslike
KashmereandnotinBengal,thisislimitationofcountries(_des'pabandha_);certainkindsofpaddygrowinthe
rainyseasononly,thisislimitationofseasonortime(_klpabandha_);deercannotbegetmen,thisislimitation
byform(_krpabandha_);curdcancomeoutofmilk,thisisthelimitationofcauses(_nimittpabandha_).The
evolutionarycoursecanthusfollowonlythatpathwhichisnotbarricadedbyanyoftheselimitationsornatural
obstructions[Footnoteref1].

Changeistakingplaceeverywhere,fromthesmallestandleasttothehighest.Atomsandrealsarecontinually
vibratingandchangingplacesinanyandeveryobject.Ateachmomentthewholeuniverseisundergoingchange,
andthecollocationofatomsatanymomentisdifferentfromwhatitwasatthepreviousmoment.Whenthese
changesareperceivable,theyareperceivedas_dharmapari@nma_orchangesofdharma or quality; but
perceived or unperceived the changes are continually going on. This change of appearance may be
CHAPTER VII 175
viewedfromanotheraspectbyvirtueofwhichwemaycallitpresentorpast,andoldornew,andtheseare
respectivelycalledthe_lak@sa@napari@nma_and_avasthpari@nma_.Ateverymomenteveryobjectofthe
worldisundergoingevolutionorchange,changeaspast,presentandfuture,asnew,oldorunborn.Whenany
changeisinapotentialstatewecallitfuture,whenmanifestedpresent,whenitbecomessublatentagainitis
saidtobepast.Thusitisthatthepotential,manifest,andsublatentchangesofathingarecalledfuture,present
andpast[Footnoteref2].

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Vysabh@sya,Tattvavais'rad_and_Yogavrttika,_III.14.]

[Footnote2:ItiswelltonoteinthisconnectionthatS@mkhyayogadoesnotadmittheexistenceoftimeasan
independententityliketheNyyaVais'e@sika.Timerepresentstheorderofmomentsinwhichthemindgrasps
thephenomenalchanges.Itishenceaconstructionofthemind(_buddhinirm@na_).Thetimerequiredbyan
atomtomoveitsownmeasureofspaceiscalledamoment(_k@sa@na_)oroneunitoftime.VijnaBhik@su
regardsoneunitmovementofthegu@nasorrealsasamoment.Whenbytruewisdomthegu@nasare
perceivedastheyareboththeillusorynotionsoftimeandspacevanish._Vysabh@sya,Tattvavais'rad_,and
_Yogavrttika_,III.52andIII.13.]

257

CausationasSatkryavda(thetheorythattheeffectpotentiallyexistsbeforeitisgeneratedbythemovementof
thecause).

TheaboveconsiderationbringsustoanimportantaspectoftheS@mkhyaviewofcausationas
_satkryavda_.S@mkhyaholdsthattherecanbenoproductionofathingpreviouslynonexistent;
causationmeanstheappearanceormanifestationofaqualityduetocertainchangesofcollocationsinthe
causeswhichwerealreadyheldintheminapotentialform.Productionofeffectonlymeansaninternal
changeofthearrangementofatomsinthecause,andthisexistsinitinapotentialform,andjustalittle
looseningofthebarrierwhichwasstandinginthewayofthehappeningofsuchachangeofarrangement
willproducethedesirednewcollocationtheeffect.Thisdoctrineiscalled_satkryavda,_i.e.thatthe
kryaoreffectissatorexistentevenbeforethecausaloperationtoproducetheeffectwaslaunched.Theoil
existsinthesesarnum,thestatueinthestone,thecurdinthemilk,Thecausaloperation(_krakaiypra_)
onlyrendersthatmanifest(_virbhta_)whichwasformerlyinanunmanifestedcondition(_tirohita_)
[Footnoteref1].

TheBuddhistsalsobelievedinchange,asmuchasS@mkhyadid,butwiththemtherewasnobackgroundtothe
change;everychangewasthusabsolutelyanewone,andwhenitwaspast,thenextmomentthechangewaslost
absolutely.Therewereonlythepassingdharmasormanifestationsofformsandqualities,buttherewasno
permanentunderlyingdharmaorsubstance.S@mkhyaalsoholdsinthecontinualchangeofdharmas,butit
alsoholdsthatthesedharmasrepresentonlytheconditionsofthepermanentreals.Theconditionsand
collocationsoftherealschangeconstantly,buttherealsthemselvesareunchangeable.Theeffectaccordingtothe
Buddhistswasnonexistent,itcameintobeingforamomentandwaslost.Onaccountofthistheoryofcausation
andalsoonaccountoftheirdoctrineofs'nya,theywerecalled_vains'ikas_(nihilists)bytheVedntins.This
doctrineisthereforecontrastedtoS@mkhyadoctrineas_asatkryavda._

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Tattvakaumud,_9.]
258
CHAPTER VII 176
Thejainviewholdsthatboththeseviewsarerelativelytrueandthatfromonepointofviewsatkryavdais
trueandfromanotherasatkryavda.TheS@mkhyaviewthatthecauseiscontinuallytransformingitselfinto
itseffectsistechnicallycalled_pari@nmavda_asagainsttheVedntaviewcalledthe_vivarttavda_:that
causeremainseverthesame,andwhatwecalleffectsarebutillusoryimpositionsofmereunrealappearanceof
nameandformmereMaya[Footnoteref.1].

S@mkhyaAtheismandYogaTheism.

Grantedthattheinterchangeofthepositionsoftheinfinitenumberofrealsproducealltheworldandits
transformations;whencecomesthisfixedorderoftheuniverse,thefixedorderofcauseandeffect,thefixed
orderofthesocalledbarrierswhichpreventthetransformationofanycauseintoanyeffectorthefirst
disturbanceoftheequilibriumoftheprak@rti?S@mkhyadeniestheexistenceofs'vara(God)orany
otherexteriorinfluence,andholdsthatthereisaninherenttendencyintheserealswhichguidesalltheir
movements.Thistendencyorteleologydemandsthatthemovementsoftherealsshouldbeinsuchamanner
thattheymayrendersomeservicetothesoulseitherinthedirectionofenjoymentorsalvation.Itisbythe
naturalcourseofsuchatendencythatprak@rtiisdisturbed,andthegu@nasdevelopontwolinesonthe
mentalplane,cittaormindcomprisingthesensefaculties,andontheobjectiveplaneasmaterialobjects;
anditisinfulfilmentofthedemandsofthistendencythatontheonehandtakeplacesubjectiveexperiences
asthechangesofthebuddhiandontheothertheinfinitemodesofthechangesofobjectivethings.Itisthis
tendencytobeofservicetothepuru@sas(_puru@srthat_)thatguidesallthemovementsofthereals,
restrainsalldisorder,renderstheworldafitobjectofexperience,andfinallyrousesthemtoturnbackfrom
theworldandseektoattainliberationfromtheassociationofprak@rtianditsgratuitousservice,which
causesusallthistroubleofsa@msra.

Yogahereasks,howtheblindtendencyofthenonintelligent
___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:BoththeVedntaandtheS@mkhyatheoriesofcausationaresometimeslooselycalled
_satkryyavda._Butcorrectlyspeakingassomediscerningcommentatorshavepointedout,theVednta
theoryofcausationshouldbecalledsatkra@navdaforaccordingtoitthe_kra@na_(cause)aloneexists
(_sat_)andall_kryyas,_(effects)areillusoryappearancesofthekra@na;butaccordingtoS@mkhyathe
kryyaexistsinapotentialstateinthekra@naandishencealwaysexistingandreal.]

259

prak@rti can bring forth this order and harmony of the universe, how can it determine what course of evolution will be
of the best service to the puru@sas, how can it remove its own barriers and lend itself to the evolutionary process from
the state of prak@rti equilibrium? How too can this blind tendency so regulate the evolutionary order that all men must
suffer pains according to their bad karmas, and happiness according to their good ones? There must be some intelligent
Being who should help the course of evolution in such a way that this system of order and harmony may be attained.
This Being is s'vara. s'vara is a puru@sa who had never been subject to ignorance, afflictions, or passions. His body is of
pure sattva quality which can never be touched by ignorance. He is all knowledge and all powerful. He has a permanent
wish that those barriers in the course of the evolution of the reals by which the evolution of the gu@nas may best serve
the double interest of the puru@sa's experience (_bhoga_) and liberation (_apavarga_) should be removed. It is
according to this permanent will of s'vara that the proper barriers are removed and the gu@nas follow naturally an
intelligent course of evolution for the service of the best interests of the puru@sas. s'vara has not created the prak@rti;
he only disturbs the equilibrium of the prak@rti in its quiescent state, and later on helps it to follow an intelligent order
by which the fruits of karma are properly distributed and the order of the world is brought about. This
acknowledgement of s'vara in Yoga and its denial by S@mkhya marks the main theoretic difference between the two
according to which the Yoga and S@mkhya are distinguished as Ses'vara
CHAPTER VII 177
S@mkhya(S@mkhyawiths'vara)andNirs'varaS@mkhya(AtheisticS@mkhya)[Footnoteref
1].

BuddhiandPuru@sa.

Thequestionagainarisesthatthoughpuru@saispureintelligence,thegu@nasarenonintelligentsubtle
substances,howcanthelattercomeintotouchwiththeformer?Moreover,thepuru@saispureinactive
intelligencewithoutanytouchofimpurityandwhatserviceorneedcansuchapuru@sahaveofthegu@nas?
ThisdifficultyisanticipatedbyS@mkhya,whichhasalreadymaderoomforitsanswerbyassumingthatone
classofthegu@nascalledsattvaissuchthatitresemblesthepurityandtheintelligenceofthepuru@satoavery
highdegree,somuchso

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Tattvavais'rad,_IV.3;_Yogavrttika,_I.24;and_Pravavanabhsya,_V.112.]

260

thatitcanreflecttheintelligenceofthepuru@sa,andthusrenderitsnonintelligenttransformationsto
appearasiftheywereintelligent.Thusallourthoughtsandotheremotionalorvolitionaloperationsare
reallythenonintelligenttransformationsofthebuddhiorcittahavingalargesattvapreponderance;butby
virtueofthereflectionofthepuru@sainthebuddhi,theseappearasiftheyareintelligent.Theself
(puru@sa)accordingtoS@mkhyaYogaisnotdirectlydemonstratedbyselfconsciousness.Itsexistenceis
amatterofinferenceonteleologicalgroundsandgroundsofmoralresponsibility.Theselfcannotbe
directlynoticedasbeingseparatefromthebuddhimodifications.Throughbeginninglessignorancethereis
aconfusionandthechangingstatesofbuddhiareregardedasconscious.Thesebuddhichangesarefurther
soassociatedwiththereflectionofthepuru@sainthebuddhithattheyareinterpretedastheexperiencesof
thepuru@sa.Thisassociationofthebuddhiwiththereflectionofthepuru@sainthebuddhihassucha
specialfitness(_yogyat_)thatitisinterpretedastheexperienceofthepuru@sa.Thisexplanationof
VcaspatiofthesituationisobjectedtobyVijnaBhik@su.VijnaBhik@susaysthattheassociationof
thebuddhiwiththeimageofthepuru@sacannotgiveusthenotionofarealpersonwhoundergoesthe
experiences.Itistobesupposedthereforethatwhenthebuddhiisintelligizedbythereflectionofthe
puru@sa,itisthensuperimposeduponthepuru@sa,andwehavethenotionofanabidingpersonwho
experiences[Footnoteref1].Whatevermaybetheexplanation,itseemsthattheunionofthebuddhiwith
thepuru@saissomewhatmystical.Asaresultofthisreflectionofcitonbuddhiandthesuperimpositionof
thebuddhithepuru@sacannotrealizethatthetransformationsofthebuddhiarenotitsown.Buddhi
resemblespuru@saintransparency,andthepuru@safailstodifferentiateitselffromthemodificationsof
thebuddhi,andasaresultofthisnondistinctionthepuru@sabecomesbounddowntothebuddhi,always
failingtorecognizethetruththatthebuddhianditstransformationsarewhollyalientoit.Thisnon
distinctionofpuru@safrombuddhiwhichisitselfamodeofbuddhiiswhatismeantby_avidy_(non
knowledge)inS@mkhya,andistherootofallexperienceandallmisery[Footnoteref2].

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Tattvavais'rad_and_Yogavrttika_,I.4.]

[Footnote2:ThisindicatesthenatureoftheanalysisofillusionwithS@mkhya.Itisthenonapprehensionofthe
distinctionoftwothings(e.g.thesnakeandtherope)thatisthecauseofillusion;itisthereforecalledthe
_akhyti_(nonapprehension)theoryofillusionwhichmustbedistinguishedfromthe_anyathkhyti_
(misapprehension)theoryofillusionofYogawhichconsistsinpositivelymisapprehendingone(e.g.therope)for
theother(e.g.snake)._Yogavrttika,_I.8.]
261
CHAPTER VII 178
Yogaholdsaslightlydifferentviewandsupposesthatthepuru@sanotonlyfailstodistinguishthedifference
betweenitselfandthebuddhibutpositivelytakesthetransformationsofbuddhiasitsown.Itisnonon
perceptionofthedifferencebutpositivelyfalseknowledge,thatwetakethepuru@satobethatwhichitisnot
(_anyathkhyti_).Ittakesthechanging,impure,sorrowful,andobjectiveprak@rtiorbuddhitobethe
changeless,pure,happinessbegettingsubject.Itwronglythinksbuddhitobetheselfandregardsitaspure,
permanentandcapableofgivingushappiness.ThisistheavidyofYoga.Abuddhiassociatedwithapuru@sais
dominatedbysuchanavidy,andwhenbirthafterbirththesamebuddhiisassociatedwiththesamepuru@sa,it
cannoteasilygetridofthisavidy.Ifinthemeantimepralayatakesplace,thebuddhiissubmergedinthe
prak@rti,andtheavidyalsosleepswithit.Whenatthebeginningofthenextcreationtheindividualbuddhis
associatedwiththepuru@sasemerge,theoldavidysalsobecomemanifestbyvirtueofitandthebuddhis
associatethemselveswiththepuru@sastowhichtheywereattachedbeforethepralaya.Thusproceedsthecourse
ofsa@msra.Whentheavidyofapersonisrootedoutbytheriseoftrueknowledge,thebuddhifailstoattach
itselftothepuru@saandisforeverdissociatedfromit,andthisisthestateofmukti.

TheCognitiveProcessandsomecharacteristicsofCitta.

Ithasbeensaidthatbuddhiandtheinternalobjectshaveevolvedinordertogivingscopetotheexperience
ofthepuru@sa.Whatistheprocessofthisexperience?S@mkhya(asexplainedbyVcaspati)holdsthat
throughthesensesthebuddhicomesintotouchwithexternalobjects.Atthefirstmomentofthistouchthere
isanindeterminateconsciousnessinwhichtheparticularsofthethingcannotbenoticed.Thisiscalled
_nirvikalpapratyak@sa_(indeterminateperception).Atthenextmomentbythefunctionofthe
_sa@mkalpa_(synthesis)andvikalpa(abstractionorimagination)ofmanas(mindorgan)thethingis
perceivedinallitsdeterminatecharacter;themanasdifferentiates,integrates,andassociatesthesensedata
receivedthroughthesenses,and

262

thusgeneratesthedeterminateperception,whichwhenintelligizedbythepuru@saandassociatedwithit
becomesinterpretedastheexperienceoftheperson.Theactionofthesenses,ahamkra,andbuddhi,maytake
placesometimessuccessivelyandatothertimesasincasesofsuddenfearsimultaneously.VijnaBhik@su
differsfromthisviewofVcaspati,anddeniesthesyntheticactivityofthemindorgan(manas),andsaysthatthe
buddhidirectlycomesintotouchwiththeobjectsthroughthesenses.Atthefirstmomentoftouchtheperception
isindeterminate,butatthesecondmomentitbecomesclearanddeterminate[Footnoteref1].Itisevidentthaton
thisviewtheimportanceofmanasisreducedtoaminimumanditisregardedasbeingonlythefacultyofdesire,
doubtandimagination.

Buddhi,includingahamkraandthesenses,oftencalledcittainYoga,isalwaysincessantlysufferingchangeslike
theflameofalamp,itismadeupofalargepreponderanceofthepuresattvasubstances,andisconstantly
mouldingitselffromonecontenttoanother.Theseimagesbythedualreflectionofbuddhiandpuru@saare
constantlybecomingconscious,andarebeinginterpretedastheexperiencesofaperson.Theexistenceofthe
puru@saistobepostulatedforexplainingtheilluminationofconsciousnessandforexplainingexperienceand
moralendeavour.Thebuddhiisspreadalloverthebody,asitwere,foritisbyitsfunctionsthatthelifeofthe
bodyiskeptup;fortheS@mkhyadoesnotadmitanyseparatepranavyu(vitalbreath)tokeepthebodyliving.
Whatarecalled_vyus_(biomotorforce)inVedntaarebutthedifferentmodesofoperationofthiscategoryof
buddhi,whichactsallthroughthebodyandbyitsdiversemovementsperformsthelifefunctionsandsense
functionsofthebody.

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: As the contact of the buddhi with the external objects takes place through the senses, the sense data of
colours, etc., are modified by the senses if they are defective. The spatial qualities of things are however perceived by
the senses directly, but the time-order is a scheme of the citta or the buddhi. Generally
CHAPTER VII 179
speakingYogaholdsthattheexternalobjectsarefaithfullycopiedbythebuddhiinwhichtheyarereflected,
liketreesinalake

"_tasmims'cadarpanesphresamastavastudrstayahimsthpratibimbantisarasivatatadrumh_"
Yogavarttika,I.4.

Thebuddhiassumestheformoftheobjectwhichisreflectedonitbythesenses,orratherthemindflowsout
throughthesensestotheexternalobjectsandassumestheirforms:"_indriynyevapranlik
cittasancaranamargahtaihsamyujyatadgolakadvrbhyavastusparaktasya
cittasyendryasahityenaivrthakarahparinmobhavati_"_Yogavrttika_,I.VI.7.Contrast_Tattvakaumud_,
27and30.]

263

Apartfromtheperceptionsandthelifefunctions,buddhi,orrathercittaasYogadescribesit,containswithinit
therootimpressions(_sa@mskras_)andthetastesandinstinctsortendenciesofallpastlives(_vsan_)
[Footnoteref1].Thesesa@mskrasarerevivedundersuitableassociations.Everymanhadhadinfinitenumbers
ofbirthsintheirpastlivesasmanandassomeanimal.Inalltheselivesthesamecittawasalwaysfollowinghim.
Thecittahasthuscollectedwithinitselftheinstinctsandtendenciesofallthosedifferentanimallives.Itis
knottedwiththesevsanslikeanet.Ifamanpassesintoadoglifebyrebirth,thevsansofadoglife,which
themanmusthavehadinsomeofhispreviousinfinitenumberofbirths,arerevived,andtheman'stendencies
becomelikethoseofadog.Heforgetstheexperiencesofhispreviouslifeandbecomesattachedtoenjoymentin
themannerofadog.Itisbytherevivalofthevsansuitabletoeachparticularbirththattherecannotbeany
collisionsuchasmighthaveoccurrediftheinstinctsandtendenciesofapreviousdoglifewereactivewhenany
onewasbornasman.

Thesa@mskrasrepresenttherootimpressionsbywhichanyhabitoflifethatmanhaslivedthrough,orany
pleasureinwhichhetookdelightforsometime,oranypassionswhichwere

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: The word sa@mskra is used by P@nini who probably preceded Buddha in three different senses (1)
improving a thing as distinguished from generating a new quality (_Sata utkar@sdhna@m sa@mskra@h_, Ks'ila on
P@nini, VI. ii. 16), (2) conglomeration or aggregation, and (3) adornment (P@nini, VI. i. 137, 138). In the Pi@takas the
word sa@nkhra is used in various senses such as constructing, preparing, perfecting, embellishing, aggregation,
matter, karma, the skandhas (collected by Childers). In fact sa@nkhra stands for almost anything of which
impermanence could be predicated. But in spite of so many diversities of meaning I venture to suggest that the
meaning of aggregation (_samavya_ of P@nini) is prominent. The word _sa@mskaroti_ is used in Kau@staki, II. 6,
Chndogya IV. xvi. 2, 3, 4, viii. 8, 5, and B@rhadra@nyaka, VI. iii. 1, in the sense of improving. I have not yet come
across any literary use of the second meaning in Sanskrit. The meaning of sa@mskra in Hindu philosophy is altogether
different. It means the impressions (which exist subconsciously in the mind) of the objects experienced. All our
experiences whether cognitive, emotional or conative exist in subconscious states and may under suitable conditions be
reproduced as memory (sm@rti). The word vsan (_Yoga stra_, IV. 24) seems to be a later word. The earlier
Upanis@sads do not mention it and so far as I know it is not mentioned in the Pli pi@takas. _Abhidhnappadpik_ of
Moggallna mentions it, and it occurs in the Muktika Upani@sad. It comes from the root "_vas_" to stay. It is often
loosely used in the sense of sa@mskra, and in _Vysabh@sya_ they are identified in IV. 9. But vsan generally refers
to the tendencies of past lives most of which lie dormant in the mind. Only those appear which can find scope in this
life. But sa@mskras are the sub-conscious states which are being constantly generated by experience. Vsans are
innate sa@mskras not acquired in this life. See _Vysabh@sya, Tattvvais'rad_ and _Yogavrttika_, II. 13.]
CHAPTER VII 180
264

engrossingtohim,tendtoberevived,forthoughthesemightnotnowbeexperienced,yetthefactthatthey
wereexperiencedbeforehassomouldedandgivenshapetothecittathatthecittawilltrytoreproducethem
byitsownnatureevenwithoutanysucheffortonourpart.Tosafeguardagainsttherevivalofany
undesirableideaortendencyitisthereforenecessarythatitsrootsasalreadyleftinthecittaintheformof
sa@mskrasshouldbeeradicatedcompletelybytheformationofthehabitofacontrarytendency,whichif
madesufficientlystrongwillbyitsownsa@mskranaturallystoptherevivalofthepreviousundesirable
sa@mskras.

Apartfromthesethecittapossessesvolitionalactivity(ce@s@t)bywhichtheconativesensesarebroughtinto
relationtotheirobjects.Thereisalsothereservedpotentpower(s'akti)ofcitta,bywhichitcanrestrainitself
andchangeitscoursesorcontinuetopersistinanyonedirection.Thesecharacteristicsareinvolvedinthevery
essenceofcitta,andformthegroundworkoftheYogamethodofpractice,whichconsistsinsteadyinga
particularstateofmindtotheexclusionofothers.

Meritordemerit(_pu@nya,ppa_)alsoisimbeddedinthecittaasitstendencies,regulatingthemodeofits
movements,andgivingpleasuresandpainsinaccordancewithit.

SorrowanditsDissolution[Footnoteref1].

S@mkhyaandtheYoga,liketheBuddhists,holdthatallexperienceissorrowful.Tamas,weknow,represents
thepainsubstance.Astamasmustbepresentinsomedegreeinallcombinations,allintellectualoperationsare
fraughtwithsomedegreeofpainfulfeeling.Moreovereveninstatesoftemporarypleasure,wehadsorrowatthe
previousmomentwhenwehadsolicitedit,andwehavesorrowevenwhenweenjoyit,forwehavethefearthat
wemayloseit.Thesumtotalofsorrowsisthusmuchgreaterthanthepleasures,andthepleasuresonly
strengthenthekeennessofthesorrow.Thewiserthemanthegreaterishiscapacityofrealizingthattheworld
andourexperiencesareallfullofsorrow.Forunlessamanisconvincedofthisgreattruththatallissorrow,and
thattemporarypleasures,whethergeneratedbyordinaryworldlyexperienceorbyenjoyingheavenlyexperiences
throughtheperformanceofVedicsacrifices,arequiteunableto

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Tattavais'radandYogavrttika,II.15,andTattvakaumud,I.]
265

eradicatetherootsofsorrow,hewillnotbeanxiousformuktiorthefinaluprootingofpains.Amanmustfeel
thatallpleasuresleadtosorrow,andthattheordinarywaysofremovingsorrowsbyseekingenjoymentcannot
removethemultimately;hemustturnhisbackonthepleasuresoftheworldandonthepleasuresofparadise.
TheperformancesofsacrificesaccordingtotheVedicritesmayindeedgivehappiness,butastheseinvolvethe
sacrificeofanimalstheymustinvolvesomesinsandhencealsosomepains.Thustheperformanceofthesecannot
beregardedasdesirable.Itiswhenamanceasesfromseekingpleasuresthathethinkshowbesthecaneradicate
therootsofsorrow.Philosophyshowshowextensiveissorrow,whysorrowcomes,whatisthewaytouprootit,
andwhatisthestatewhenitisuprooted.Themanwhohasresolvedtouprootsorrowturnstophilosophytofind
outthemeansofdoingit.

The way of eradicating the root of sorrow is thus the practical enquiry of the S@mkhya philosophy [Footnote ref 1].
All experiences are sorrow. Therefore some means must be discovered by which all experiences may be shut out for
ever. Death cannot bring it, for after death we shall have rebirth. So long as citta (mind) and puru@sa are associated
with each other, the sufferings will continue. Citta must be dissociated from puru@sa. Citta or buddhi, S@mkhya
says, is associated with puru@sa because of the
CHAPTER VII 181
nondistinctionofitselffrombuddhi[Footnoteref2].Itisnecessarythereforethatinbuddhiweshouldbeableto
generatethetrueconceptionofthenatureofpuru@sa;whenthistrueconceptionofpuru@saarisesinthe
buddhiitfeelsitselftobedifferent,anddistinct,fromandquiteunrelatedtopuru@sa,andthusignoranceis
destroyed.Asaresultofthat,buddhiturnsitsbackonpuru@saandcannolongerbindittoitsexperiences,
whichareallirrevocablyconnectedwithsorrow,andthusthepuru@saremainsinitstrueform.Thisaccording
toS@mkhyaphilosophyisaloneadequatetobeingabouttheliberationofthepuru@sa.Prak@rtiwhichwas
leadingusthroughcyclesofexperiencesfrombirthtobirth,fulfilsitsfinalpurposewhenthistrueknowledge
arisesdifferentiating

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Yogaputsitinaslightlymodifiedform.Itsobjectisthecessationoftherebirthprocesswhichisso
muchassociatedwithsorrow{_du@hkhabahla@hsa@msrahheya@h_).]

[Footnote2:ThewordcittaisaYogaterm.Itissocalledbecauseitistherepositoryofallsubconsciousstates.
Smkhyngenerallyuses,thewordbuddhi.Boththewordsmeanthesamesubstance,themind,butthey
emphasizeitstwodifferentfunctions.Buddhimeansintellection.]

266

puru@safromprak@rti.Thisfinalpurposebeingattainedtheprak@rticanneveragainbindthepurusawith
referencetowhomthisrightknowledgewasgenerated;forotherpuru@sashoweverthebondageremainsas
before,andtheycontinuetheirexperiencesfromonebirthtoanotherinanendlesscycle.

Yoga,however,thinksthatmerephilosophyisnotsufficient.Inordertobringaboutliberationitisnot
enoughthatatrueknowledgedifferentiatingpuru@saandbuddhishouldarise,butitisnecessarythatall
theoldhabitsofexperienceofbuddhi,allitssamskarasshouldbeonceforalldestroyednevertoberevived
again.Atthisstagethebuddhiistransformedintoitspureststate,reflectingsteadilythetruenatureofthe
puru@sa.Thisisthekevala(oneness)stateofexistenceafterwhich(allsa@mskras,allavidybeing
altogetheruprooted)thecittaisimpotentanylongertoholdontothepuru@sa,andlikeastonehurled
fromamountaintop,gravitatesbackintotheprak@rti[Footnoteref1].Todestroytheoldsa@mskras,
knowledgealonenotbeingsufficient,agraduatedcourseofpracticeisnecessary.Thisgraduatedpractice
shouldbesoarrangedthatbygeneratingthepracticeoflivinghigherandbettermodesoflife,and
steadyingthemindonitssubtlerstates,thehabitsofordinarylifemayberemoved.Astheyoginadvances
hehastogiveupwhathehadadoptedasgoodandtryforthatwhichisstillbetter.Continuingthushe
reachesthestatewhenthebuddhiisinitsultimateperfectionandpurity.Atthisstagethebuddhiassumes
theformofthepuru@sa,andfinalliberationtakesplace.

KarmasinYogaaredividedintofourclasses:(1)_s'ukla_orwhite(_pu@nya_,thosethatproduce
happiness),(2)_k@r@s@na_orblack(_ppa_,thosethatproducesorrow),(3)_s'uklak@r@s@na_
(_pu@nyappa_,mostofourordinaryactionsarepartlyvirtuousandpartlyviciousastheyinvolve,ifnot
anythingelse,atleastthedeathofmanyinsects),(4)_as'uklk@r@s@na_(thoseinneractsofself
abnegation,andmeditationwhicharedevoidofanyfruitsaspleasuresorpains).Allexternalactions
involvesomesins,foritisdifficulttoworkintheworldandavoidtakingthelivesofinsects[Footnoteref
2].Allkarmas

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: Both S@mkhya and Yoga speak of this emancipated state a Kaivalya (alone-ness), the former
because all sorrows have been absolutely uprooted, never to grow up again and the latter because at this state
puru@sa remains for ever alone without any association with buddhi, see _S@mkhya krik_, 68 and _Yoga stras_,
IV. 34.]
CHAPTER VII 182
[Footnote2:_Vysabh@sya_and_Tattvavais'rad_,IV.7.]

267

proceedfromthefivefoldafflictions(_kles'as_),namely_avidy,asmit,rga,dve@sa_and_abhinives'a_.

Wehavealreadynoticedwhatwasmeantbyavidy.Itconsistsgenerallyinascribingintelligencetobuddhi,in
thinkingitaspermanentandleadingtohappiness.Thisfalseknowledgewhileremaininginthisformfurther
manifestsitselfintheotherfourformsofasmit,etc.Asmitmeansthethinkingofworldlyobjectsandour
experiencesasreallybelongingtousthesenseof"mine"or"I"tothingsthatreallyarethequalitiesor
transformationsofthegu@nas.Rgameanstheconsequentattachmenttopleasuresandthings.Dve@sameans
aversionorantipathytounpleasantthings.Abhinives'aisthedesireforlifeorloveoflifethewilltobe.We
proceedtoworkbecausewethinkourexperiencestobeourown,ourbodytobeourown,ourfamilytobeour
own,ourpossessionstobeourown;becauseweareattachedtothese;becausewefeelgreatantipathyagainstany
mischiefthatmightbefallthem,andalsobecauseweloveourlifeandalwaystrytopreserveitagainstany
mischief.Theseallproceed,asiseasytosee,fromtheirrootavidy,whichconsistsinthefalseidentificationof
buddhiwithpuru@sa.Thesefive,avidy,asmit,rga,dve@saandabhinives'a,permeateourbuddhi,andlead
ustoperformkarmaandtosuffer.Thesetogetherwiththeperformedkarmaswhichlieinherentinthebuddhias
aparticularmodeofittransmigratewiththebuddhifrombirthtobirth,anditishardtogetridofthem
[Footnoteref1].Thekarmaintheaspectinwhichitliesinthebuddhiasamodeormodificationofitiscalled
_karms'aya_.(thebedofkarmaforthepuru@satoliein).Weperformakarmaactuatedbythevicious
tendencies(_kles'a_)ofthebuddhi.Thekarmawhenthusperformedleavesitsstainormodificationonthe
buddhi,anditissoordainedaccordingtotheteleologyoftheprak@rtiandtheremovalofobstaclesinthecourse
ofitsevolutioninaccordancewithitbythepermanentwillofs'varathateachviciousactionbringssufferance
andavirtuousonepleasure.

Thekarmasperformedinthepresentlifewillgenerallyaccumulate,andwhenthetimeforgivingtheirfruits
comes,suchalifeisordainedfortheperson,suchabodyismadereadyforhimaccordingtotheevolutionof
prak@rtiasshallmakeitpossibleforhimtosufferorenjoythefruitsthereof.Thekarmaofthe

__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:_Vysabh@sya_and_Tattvavais'rad_,II.39.]

268

presentlifethusdeterminestheparticularkindoffuturebirth(asthisorthatanimalorman),theperiodoflife
(_yu@s_)andthepainfulorpleasurableexperiences(_bhoga_)destinedforthatlife.Exceedinglygoodactions
andextremelybadactionsoftenproducetheireffectsinthislife.Itmayalsohappenthatamanhasdonecertain
badactions,fortherealizationofthefruitsofwhichherequiresadoglifeandgoodactionsforthefruitsofwhich
herequiresamanlife.Insuchcasesthegoodactionmayremaininabeyanceandthemanmaysufferthepainsof
adoglifefirstandthenbebornagainasamantoenjoythefruitsofhisgoodactions.Butifwecanremove
ignoranceandtheotherafflictions,allhispreviousunfulfilledkarmasareforeverlostandcannotagainbe
revived.Hehasofcoursetosufferthefruitsofthosekarmaswhichhavealreadyripened.Thisisthe
_jvanmukti_stage,whenthesagehasattainedtrueknowledgeandisyetsufferingmundanelifeinorderto
experiencethekarmasthathavealreadyripened(_ti@s@thatisa@mskravas't
cakrabhramivaddh@rtas'arra@h_).

Citta.

The word Yoga which was formerly used in Vedic literature in the sense of the restraint of the senses is used by
Patajali in his _Yoga stra_ in the sense of the partial or full restraint or steadying of the states of citta.
CHAPTER VII 183
Somesortofconcentrationmaybebroughtaboutbyviolentpassions,aswhenfightingagainstamortalenemy,
orevenbyanignorantattachmentorinstinct.Thecittawhichhastheconcentrationoftheformertypeiscalled
_k@sipta_(wild)andofthelattertype_pram@dha_(ignorant).Thereisanotherkindofcitta,aswithall
ordinarypeople,inwhichconcentrationisonlypossibleforatime,themindremainingsteadyononethingfora
shorttimeleavesthatoffandclingstoanotherthingandsoon.Thisiscalledthe_vik@sipta_(unsteady)stageof
mind(_cittabhmi_).Asdistinguishedfromthesethereisanadvancedstageofcittainwhichitcanconcentrate
steadilyonanobjectforalongtime.Thisisthe_ekgra_(onepointed)stage.Thereisastillfurtheradvanced
stageinwhichthecittaprocessesareabsolutelystopped.Thishappensimmediatelybeforemukti,andiscalled
thenirodha(cessation)stateofcitta.ThepurposeofYogaistoachievetheconditionsofthelasttwostagesof
citta.

Thecittashavefiveprocesses(_v@rtti_),(1)_pram@na_[Footnoteref1](valid

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:S@mkhyaholdsthatbothvalidityandinvalidityofanycognitiondependuponthecognitivestate
itselfandnotoncorrespondencewithexternalfactsorobjects(_svata@hprm@nya@msvata@h
aprm@nya@m_).ThecontributionofS@mkhyatothedoctrineofinferenceisnotdefinitelyknown.What
littleVcaspatisaysonthesubjecthasbeenborrowedfromVtsyyanasuchasthe_prvavat,s'e@savat_and
_smnyatodr@s@ta_typesofinference,andthesemaybetterbeconsultedinourchapteronNyyaorinthe
Ttparya@tk_ofVcaspati.S@mkhyainferencewasprobablyfromparticulartoparticularonthegroundof
sevenkindsofrelationsaccordingtowhichtheyhadsevenkindsofinference
"_mtrnimittasa@myogivirodhisahacribhi@h.Svasvmibadhyaghtdyai@hs@mkhyn@m
saptadhnum_"(_Ttparya@tk_,p.109).S@mkhyadefinitionofinferenceasgivenbyUdyotakara(I.I.V)is
"_sambandhdekasmtpratyak@sacche@sasiddhiranumnam_."]

269

cognitivestatessuchasaregeneratedbyperception,inferenceandscripturaltestimony),(2)viparyaya(false
knowledge,illusion,etc.),(3)vikalpa(abstraction,constructionanddifferentkindsofimagination),(4)_nidr_
(sleep,isavacantstateofmind,inwhichtamastendstopredominate),(5)_sm@rti_(memory).

Thesestatesofmind(_v@rtti_)compriseourinnerexperience.Whentheyleadustowardss@msaraintothe
courseofpassionsandtheirsatisfactions,theyaresaidtobe_kli@s@ta_(afflictedorleadingtoaffliction);when
theyleadustowardsliberation,theyarecalled_akli@s@ta_(unafflicted).Towhicheversidewego,towards
sa@msaraortowardsmukti,wehavetomakeuseofourstatesofmind;thestateswhicharebadoftenalternate
withgoodstates,andwhicheverstateshouldtendtowardsourfinalgood(liberation)mustberegardedasgood.

Thisdrawsattentiontothatimportantcharacteristicofcitta,thatitsometimestendstowardsgood(i.e.
liberation)andsometimestowardsbad(s@msara).Itislikeariver,asthe_Vysabh@syasays,whichflows
bothways,towardssinandtowardsthegood.Theteleologyofprak@rtirequiresthatitshouldproduceinman
thes@msaraaswellastheliberationtendency.

Thusinaccordancewithitinthemidstofmanybadthoughtsandbadhabitstherecomegoodmoralwilland
goodthoughts,andinthemidstofgoodthoughtsandhabitscomealsobadthoughtsandvicioustendencies.The
willtobegoodisthereforeneverlostinman,asitisaninnatetendencyinhimwhichisasstrongashisdesireto
enjoypleasures.Thispointisratherremarkable,foritgivesusthekeyofYogaethicsandshowsthatourdesire
ofliberationisnotactuatedbyanyhedonisticattractionforhappinessorevenremovalofpain,butbyaninnate
tendencyofthemindtofollowthepathofliberation[Footnoteref1].Removalofpains
__________________________________________________________________
CHAPTER VII 184
[Footnote1:S@mkhyahowevermakestheabsoluteandcompletedestructionofthreekindsofsorrows,
_dhytmika_(generatedinternallybytheillnessofthebodyortheunsatisfiedpassionsofthemind),
_dhibhautika_(generatedexternallybytheinjuriesinflictedbyothermen,beasts,etc.)and_dhidaivika_
(generatedbytheinjuriesinflictedbydemonsandghosts)theobjectofallourendeavours(_puru@srtha_).]

270

isofcoursetheconcomitanteffectoffollowingsuchacourse,butstillthemotivetofollowthispathisanatural
andirresistibletendencyofthemind.Manhaspower(_s'akti_)storedupinhiscitta,andhehastouseitinsuch
awaythatthistendencymaygraduallygrowstrongerandstrongerandultimatelyuproottheother.Hemust
succeedinthis,sinceprak@rtiwantsliberationforherfinalrealization[Footnoteref1].

YogaPurificatoryPractices(Parikarma).

ThepurposeofYogameditationistosteadythemindonthegraduallyadvancingstagesofthoughtstowards
liberation,sothatvicioustendenciesmaygraduallybemoreandmoreweakenedandatlastdisappearaltogether.
Butbeforethemindcanbefitforthisloftymeditation,itisnecessarythatitshouldbepurgedofordinary
impurities.Thustheintendingyoginshouldpractiseabsolutenoninjurytoalllivingbeings(_ahi@ms_),
absoluteandstricttruthfulness(_satya_),nonstealing(_asteya_),absolutesexualrestraint(_brahmacarya_)and
theacceptanceofnothingbutthatwhichisabsolutelynecessary(_aparigraha_).Thesearecollectivelycalled
yama.Againsidebysidewiththeseabstinencesonemustalsopractiseexternalcleanlinessbyablutionsandinner
cleanlinessofthemind,contentmentofmind,thehabitofbearingallprivationsofheatandcold,orkeepingthe
bodyunmovedandremainingsilentinspeech(_tapas_),thestudyofphilosophy(_svdhyya_)andmeditationon
s'vara(_s'varapra@nidhna_).Thesearecollectivelycalledniyamas.Tothesearealsotobeaddedcertainother
moraldisciplinessuchas_pratipak@sabhvan,maitr,karu@n,mudit_and_upek@s_.Pratipak@sa
bhvanmeansthatwheneverabadthought(e.g.selfishmotive)maycomeoneshouldpractisetheoppositegood
thought(selfsacrifice);sothatthebadthoughtsmaynotfindanyscope.Mostofourvicesareoriginatedbyour
unfriendlyrelationswithourfellowbeings.Toremovethesethepracticeofmereabstinencemaynotbe
sufficient,andthereforeoneshouldhabituatethemindtokeepitselfinpositivegoodrelationswithourfellow
beings.Thepracticeofmaitrmeanstothinkofallbeingsasfriends.Ifwecontinuallyhabituateourselvesto
thinkthis,wecanneverbedispleasedwiththem.Sotoooneshouldpractisekaru@norkindlyfeelingfor
sufferers,mudit

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Seemy"YogaPsychology,"Quest,October,1921.]
271

orafeelingofhappinessforthegoodofallbeings,andupek@sorafeelingofequanimityandindifferencefor
thevicesofothers.Thelastoneindicatesthattheyoginshouldnottakeanynoteofthevicesofviciousmen.

Whenthemindbecomesdisinclinedtoallworldlypleasures(_vairgya_)andtoallsuchasarepromisedin
heavenbytheperformancesofVedicsacrifices,andthemindpurgedofitsdrossandmadefitforthepracticeof
Yogameditation,theyoginmayattainliberationbyaconstantpractice(_abhysa_)attendedwithfaith,
confidence(_s'raddh_),strengthofpurposeandexecution(_vrya_)aridwisdom(_praj_)attainedateach
advance.

TheYogaMeditation.
When the mind has become pure the chances of its being ruffled by external disturbances are greatly reduced.
CHAPTER VII 185
Atsuchastagetheyogintakesafirmposture(_sana_)andfixeshismindonanyobjecthechooses.Itis,
however,preferablethatheshouldfixitons'vara,forinthatcases'varabeingpleasedremovesmanyofthe
obstaclesinhispath,anditbecomeseasierforhimtoattainsuccess.Butofcoursehemakeshisownchoice,and
canchooseanythinghelikesfortheunifyingconcentration(_samdhi_)ofhismind.Therearefourstatesofthis
unifyingconcentrationnamely_vitarka,vicra,nanda_and_asmit_.Ofthesevitarkaandvicrahaveeachtwo
varieties,_savitarka,nirvitarka,savicra,nirvicra_[Footnoteref1].Whenthemindconcentratesonobjects,
rememberingtheirnamesandqualities,itiscalledthesavitarkastage;whenonthefivetanmtraswitha
remembranceoftheirqualitiesitiscalledsavicra,andwhenitisonewiththetanmtraswithoutanynotionof
theirqualitiesitiscallednirvicra.Higherthanthesearethenandaandtheasmitstates.Inthenandastate
themindconcentratesonthebuddhiwithitsfunctionsofthesensescausingpleasure.Intheasmitstagebuddhi
concentratesonpuresubstanceasdivestedofallmodifications.Inallthesestagesthereareobjectsonwhichthe
mindconsciouslyconcentrates,thesearethereforecalledthe_samprajta_(withknowledgeofobjects)typesof
samdhi.Nexttothiscomesthelaststageofsamdhicalledthe_asamprajta_ornirodhasamdhi,inwhichthe
mindiswithoutanyobject.Byremaining

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Vcaspati,however,thinksthatnandaandasmithavealsotwoothervarieties,whichisdeniedby
Bhik@su.]

272

longinthisstagetheoldpotencies(sa@mskras)orimpressionsduetothecontinuedexperienceofworldly
eventstendingtowardstheobjectiveworldortowardsanyprocessofexperiencinginnerthinkingaredestroyed
bytheproductionofastronghabitofthenirodhastate.Atthisstagedawnsthetrueknowledge,whenthe
buddhibecomesaspureasthepuru@sa,andafterthatthecittanotbeingabletobindthepuru@saanylonger
returnsbacktoprak@rti.

Inordertopractisethisconcentrationonehastoseethattheremaybenodisturbance,andtheyoginshould
selectaquietplaceonahillorinaforest.Oneofthemainobstaclesis,however,tobefoundinourconstant
respiratoryaction.Thishastobestoppedbythepracticeof_pr@nyma_.Pr@nymaconsistsintakingin
breath,keepingitforawhileandthengivingitup.Withpracticeonemayretainbreathsteadilyforhours,days,
monthsandevenyears.Whenthereisnoneedoftakinginbreathorgivingitout,anditcanberetainedsteady
foralongtime,oneofthemainobstaclesisremoved.

Theprocessofpractisingconcentrationisbegunbysittinginasteadyposture,holdingthebreathby
pr@nyma,excludingallotherthoughts,andfixingthemindonanyobject(_dhra@n_).Atfirstitis
difficulttofixsteadilyonanyobject,andthesamethoughthastoberepeatedconstantlyinthemind,thisis
called_dhyna._Aftersufficientpracticeindhynathemindattainsthepowerofmakingitselfsteady;atthis
stageitbecomesonewithitsobjectandthereisnochangeorrepetition.Thereisnoconsciousnessofsubject,
objectorthinking,butthemindbecomessteadyandonewiththeobjectofthought.Thisiscalled_samdhi_
[Footnoteref1].Wehavealreadydescribedthesixstagesofsamdhi.Astheyoginacquiresstrengthinonestage
ofsamdhi,hepassesontoastillhigherstageandsoon.Asheprogressesonwardsheattainsmiraculouspowers
(_vibhti_)andhisfaithandhopeinthepracticeincrease.Miraculouspowersbringwiththemmany
temptations,buttheyoginisfirmofpurposeandeventhoughthepositionofIndraisofferedtohimhedoesnot
relax.Hiswisdom(_praj_)alsoincreasesateachstep.Prajknowledgeisasclearasperception,butwhile
perceptionislimitedto

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: It should be noted that the word _samdhi_ cannot properly be translated either by "concentration" or
by "meditation." It means that peculiar kind of concentration in the Yoga sense by which
CHAPTER VIII 186
themindbecomesonewithitsobjectandthereisnomovementofthemindintoitspassingstates.]

273

certaingrossthingsandcertaingrossqualities[Footnoteref1]prajhasnosuchlimitations,penetratinginto
thesubtlestthings,thetanmtras,thegu@nas,andperceivingclearlyandvividlyalltheirsubtleconditionsand
qualities[Footnoteref2].Asthepotencies(_sa@mskra_)oftheprajwisdomgrowinstrengththepotenciesof
ordinaryknowledgearerootedout,andtheyogincontinuestoremainalwaysinhisprajwisdom.Itisa
peculiarityofthisprajthatitleadsamantowardsliberationandcannotbindhimtosa@msra.Thefinal
prajswhichleadtoliberationareofsevenkinds,namely,(1)Ihaveknowntheworld,theobjectofsuffering
andmisery,Ihavenothingmoretoknowofit.(2)Thegroundsandrootsofsa@msrahavebeenthoroughly
uprooted,nothingmoreofitremainstobeuprooted.(3)Removalhasbecomeafactofdirectcognitionby
inhibitivetrance.(4)Themeansofknowledgeintheshapeofadiscriminationofpuru@safromprak@rtihas
beenunderstood.Theotherthreearenotpsychologicalbutarerathermetaphysicalprocessesassociatedwiththe
situation.Theyareasfollows:(5)Thedoublepurposeofbuddhiexperienceandemancipation(bhogaand
_apavarga_)hasbeenrealized.(6)Thestronggravitatingtendencyofthedisintegratedgu@nasdrivestheminto
prak@rtilikeheavystonesdroppedfromhighhilltops.(7)Thebuddhidisintegratedintoitsconstituentsthe
gu@nasbecomemergedintheprak@rtiandremainthereforever.Thepuru@sahavingpassedbeyondthe
bondageofthegu@nasshinesforthinitspureintelligence.ThereisnoblissorhappinessinthisS@mkhyaYoga
mukti,forallfeelingbelongstoprak@rti.Itisthusastateofpureintelligence.WhattheS@mkhyatriesto
achievethroughknowledge,Yogaachievesthroughtheperfecteddisciplineofthewillandpsychologicalcontrol
ofthementalstates.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Thelimitationswhichbaffleperceptionarecountedinthe_Krik_asfollows:Extremeremoteness
(e.g.alarkhighupinthesky),extremeproximity(e.g.collyriuminsidetheeye),lossofsenseorgan(e.g.ablind
man),wantofattention,extremesmallnessoftheobject(e.g.atoms),obstructionbyotherinterveningobjects(e.g.
bywalls),presenceofsuperiorlights(thestarcannotbeseenindaylight),beingmixedupwithotherthingsofits
ownkind(e.g.waterthrownintoalake).]

[Footnote2:Thoughallthingsarebutthemodificationsofgu@nasyettherealnatureofthegu@nasisnever
revealedbythesenseknowledge.Whatappearstothesensesarebutillusorycharacteristicslikethoseofmagic
(my):

"_Gunn@mparama@mrpamnad@r@s@tipatham@rcchatiYattud@rs@tipathamprptamtanmyeva
sutucchakam._"

_Vysabh@sya_,IV.13.

Therealnatureofthegu@nasisthusrevealedonlyby_praj._]
274

CHAPTER VIII
THENYYAVAIS'E@SIKAPHILOSOPHY
Criticism of Buddhism and S@mkhya from the Nyya standpoint.
CHAPTER VIII 187
TheBuddhistshadupsetallcommonsenseconvictionsofsubstanceandattribute,causeandeffect,and
permanenceofthings,onthegroundthatallcollocationsaremomentary;eachgroupofcollocationsexhausts
itselfingivingrisetoanothergroupandthattoanotherandsoon.Butifacollocationrepresentingmilk
generatesthecollocationofcurditissaidtobeduetoajointactionoftheelementsformingthecausecollocation
andthemodusoperandiisunintelligible;theelementscomposingthecausecollocationcannotseparatelygenerate
theelementscomposingtheeffectcollocation,foronsuchasuppositionitbecomeshardtomaintainthedoctrine
ofmomentarinessastheindividualandseparateexerciseofinfluenceonthepartofthecauseelementsandtheir
coordinationandmanifestationaseffectcannotbuttakemorethanonemoment.Thesuppositionthatthewhole
oftheeffectcollocationistheresultofthejointactionoftheelementsofcausecollocationisagainstouruniversal
uncontradictedexperiencethatspecificelementsconstitutingthecause(e.g.thewhitenessofmilk)arethecause
ofothercorrespondingelementsoftheeffect(e.g.thewhitenessofthecurd);andwecouldnotsaythatthe
hardness,blackness,andotherpropertiesoftheatomsofironinalumpstateshouldnotberegardedasthecause
ofsimilarqualitiesintheironball,forthisisagainstthetestimonyofexperience.Moreovertherewouldbeno
differencebetweenmaterial(_updna_,e.g.clayofthejug),instrumentalandconcomitantcauses(nimittaand
_sahakri_,suchasthepotter,andthewheel,thesticketc.informingthejug),forthecausesjointlyproducethe
effect,andtherewasnoroomfordistinguishingthematerialandtheinstrumentalcauses,assuch.

Againattheverymomentinwhichacausecollocationisbroughtintobeing,itcannotexertitsinfluenceto
produceits

275

effectcollocation.Thusaftercomingintobeingitwouldtakethecausecollocationatleastanothermomentto
exerciseitsinfluencetoproducetheeffect.Howcanthethingwhichisdestroyedthemomentafteritisborn
produceanyeffect?Thetruthisthatcausalelementsremainandwhentheyareproperlycollocatedtheeffectis
produced.Ordinaryexperiencealsoshowsthatweperceivethingsasexistingfromapasttime.Thepasttimeis
perceivedbyusaspast,thepresentaspresentandthefutureasfutureandthingsareperceivedasexistingfroma
pasttimeonwards.

TheS@mkhyaassumptionthateffectsarebuttheactualizedstatesofthepotentialcause,andthatthe
causalentityholdswithinitallthefutureseriesofeffects,andthatthustheeffectisalreadyexistenteven
beforethecausalmovementfortheproductionoftheeffect,isalsobaseless.S@mkhyasaysthattheoilwas
alreadyexistentinthesesamumandnotinthestone,andthatitisthusthatoilcanbegotfromsesamum
andnotfromthestone.Theactionoftheinstrumentalcausewiththemconsistsonlyinactualizingor
manifestingwhatwasalreadyexistentinapotentialforminthecause.Thisisallnonsense.Alumpofclayis
calledthecauseandthejugtheeffect;ofwhatgoodisittosaythatthejugexistsintheclaysincewithclay
wecannevercarrywater?Ajugismadeoutofclay,butclayisnotajug.Whatismeantbysayingthatthe
jugwasunmanifestedorwasinapotentialstatebefore,andthatithasnowbecomemanifestoractual?
Whatdoespotentialstatemean?Thepotentialstateofthejugisnotthesameasitsactualstate;thusthe
actualstateofthejugmustbeadmittedasnonexistentbefore.Ifitismeantthatthejugismadeupofthe
sameparts(theatoms)ofwhichtheclayismadeup,ofcourseweadmitit,butthisdoesnotmeanthatthe
jugwasexistentintheatomsofthelumpofclay.Thepotencyinherentintheclaybyvirtueofwhichitcan
exposeitselftotheinfluenceofotheragents,suchasthepotter,forbeingtransformedintoajugisnotthe
sameastheeffect,thejug.Haditbeenso,thenweshouldratherhavesaidthatthejugcameoutofthejug.
TheassumptionofS@mkhyathatthesubstanceandattributehavethesamerealityisalsoagainstall
experience,forweallperceivethatmovementandattributebelongtosubstanceandnottoattribute.Again
S@mkhyaholdsapreposterousdoctrinethatbuddhiisdifferent

276
from intelligence. It is absolutely unmeaning to call buddhi non-intelligent. Again what is the good of all this
CHAPTER VIII 188
fictitiousfussthatthequalitiesofbuddhiarereflectedonpuru@saandthenagainonbuddhi.Evidentlyinallour
experiencewefindthatthesoul(_tman_)knows,feelsandwills,anditisdifficulttounderstandwhyS@mkhya
doesnotacceptthispatentfactanddeclarethatknowledge,feeling,andwilling,allbelongedtobuddhi.Then
againinordertoexplainexperienceitbroughtforthatheoryofdoublereflection.AgainS@mkhyaprak@rtiis
nonintelligent,andwhereistheguaranteethatshe(prak@rti)willnotbindthewiseagainandwillemancipate
himonceforall?Whydidthepuru@sabecomebounddown?Prak@rtiisbeingutilizedforenjoymentbythe
infinitenumberofpuru@sas,andsheisnodelicategirl(asS@mkhyasupposes)whowillleavethepresenceof
thepuru@saashamedassoonasherrealnatureisdiscovered.Againpleasure(_sukha_),sorrow(_du@hkha_)
andablindingfeelingthroughignorance(_moha_)arebutthefeelingexperiencesofthesoul,andwithwhat
impudencecouldS@mkhyathinkoftheseasmaterialsubstances?Againtheircosmologyofamahat,
aha@mkra,thetanmtras,isallaseriesofassumptionsnevertestifiedbyexperiencenorbyreason.Theyareall
aseriesofhopelessandfoolishblunders.Thephenomenaofexperiencethuscallforanewcarefulreconstruction
inthelightofreasonandexperiencesuchascannotbefoundinothersystems.(See_Nyyamajar,_pp.452466
and490496.)

NyyaandVais'e@sikastras.

ItisveryprobablethattheearliestbeginningsofNyyaaretobefoundinthedisputationsanddebatesamongst
scholarstryingtofindouttherightmeaningsoftheVedictextsforuseinsacrificesandalsointhosedisputations
whichtookplacebetweentheadherentsofdifferentschoolsofthoughttryingtodefeatoneanother.Isuppose
thatsuchdisputationsoccurredinthedaysoftheUpani@sads,andtheartofdisputationwasregardedeventhen
asasubjectofstudy,anditprobablypassedthenbythename_vkovkya_.MrBodashaspointedoutthat
pastambawhoaccordingtoBhlerlivedbeforethethirdcenturyB.C.usedthewordNyyainthesenseof
Mm@ms[Footnoteref1].ThewordNyyaderived

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[Footnote1_pastamba,_trans.byBhler,Introduction,p.XXVII.,andBodas'sarticleontheHistorical
SurveyofIndianLogicintheBombayBranchofJ.R.A.S.,vol.XIX.]

277

fromtheroot_n_issometimesexplainedasthatbywhichsentencesandwordscouldbeinterpretedashaving
oneparticularmeaningandnotanother,andonthestrengthofthisevenVedicaccentsofwords(whichindicate
themeaningofcompoundwordsbypointingouttheparticularkindofcompoundinwhichthewordsentered
intocombination)werecalledNyya[Footnoteref1].Prof.JacobionthestrengthofKau@tilya'senumerationof
the_vidy_(sciences)asnvk@sik(thescienceoftestingtheperceptualandscripturalknowledgebyfurther
scrutiny),_tray_(thethreeVedas),_vrtt_(thesciencesofagriculture,cattlekeepingetc.),and
_da@n@danti_(polity),andtheenumerationofthephilosophiesasS@mkhya,Yoga,Lokyataand
nvk@sik,supposesthatthe_Nyyastra_wasnotinexistenceinKau@tilya'stime300B.C.)[Footnoteref2].
Kau@tilya'sreferencetoNyyaasnvk@sikonlysuggeststhatthewordNyyawasnotafamiliarnamefor
nvk@sikinKau@tilya'stime.HeseemstomisunderstandVtsyyanainthinkingthatVtsyyana
distinguishesNyyafromthenvk@sikinholdingthatwhilethelatteronlymeansthescienceoflogicthe
formermeanslogicaswellasmetaphysics.WhatappearsfromVtsyyana'sstatementin_Nyyastra_I.i.1is
thisthathepointsoutthatthesciencewhichwasknowninhistimeasNyyawasthesameaswasreferredtoas
nvk@sikbyKau@tilya.HedistinctlyidentifiesNyyavidywithnvk@sik,butjustifiestheseparate
enumerationofcertainlogicalcategoriessuchas_sa@ms'aya_(doubt)etc.,thoughthesewerealreadycontained
withinthefirsttwoterms_pram@na_(meansofcognition)andprameya (objects of cognition), by holding that
unless these its special and separate branches (_p@rthakprasthna_) were treated, Nyyavidy would simply become
metaphysics (_adhytmavidy_) like the Upani@sads. The old meaning of Nyya as the means of determining the right
meaning or the right thing is also agreed upon by Vtsyyana and is sanctioned by Vcaspati in his
_Nyyavrttikattparya@tk_ I.i. 1).
CHAPTER VIII 189
HecomparesthemeaningofthewordNyya(_pram@nairarthapark@sa@nam_toscrutinizeanobjectby
meansoflogicalproof)withtheetymologicalmeaningofthewordnvk@sik(toscrutinizeanythingafterithas
beenknownbyperceptionandscriptures).Vtsyyanaofcoursepointsoutthatsofarasthislogicalsideof
Nyyaisconcernedithasthewidestscopefor

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[Footnote1:Klidsa's_Kumrasambhava"Udghtopra@navaysmnyyaistribhirudra@nam_,"also
Mallintha'sglossonit.]

[Footnote2:Prof.Jacobi's"_TheearlyhistoryofIndianPhilosophy,"IndianAntiquary_,1918.]

278

itselfasitincludesallbeings,alltheiractions,andallthesciences[Footnoteref1].HequotesKau@tilyato
showthatinthiscapacityNyyaislikelightilluminingallsciencesandisthemeansofallworks.Inits
capacityasdealingwiththetruthsofmetaphysicsitmayshowthewaytosalvation.IdonotdisputeProf.
Jacobi'smainpointthatthemetaphysicalportionoftheworkwasalateraddition,forthisseemstometobe
averyprobableview.InfactVtsyyanahimselfdesignatesthelogicalportionasap@rthakprasthna
(separatebranch).ButIdonotfindthatanystatementofVtsyyanaorKau@tilyacanjustifyusin
concludingthatthisadditionwasmadeafterKau@tilya.Vtsyyanahasnodoubtputmorestressonthe
importanceofthelogicalsideofthework,butthereasonofthatseemstobequiteobvious,forthe
importanceofmetaphysicsor_adhytmavidy_wasacknowledgedbyall.Buttheimportanceofthemere
logicalsidewouldnotappealtomostpeople.Noneofthedharmas'stras(religiousscriptures)ortheVedas
wouldlendanysupporttoit,andVtsyyanahadtoseekthesupportofKau@tilyainthematterasthelast
resource.ThefactthatKau@tilyawasnotsatisfiedbycountingnvk@sikasoneofthefourvidysbut
alsonameditasoneofthephilosophiessidebysidewithS@mkhyaseemstoleadtothepresumptionthat
probablyeveninKau@tilya'stimeNyyawascomposedoftwobranches,oneasadhytmavidyand
anotherasascienceoflogicorratherofdebate.Thiscombinationisonthefaceofitlooseandexternal,and
itisnotimprobablethatthemetaphysicalportionwasaddedtoincreasethepopularityofthelogicalpart,
whichbyitselfmightnotattractsufficientattention.MahmahopdhyyaHaraprasdaS'strinanarticle
intheJournaloftheBengalAsiaticSociety1905saysthatasVcaspatimadetwoattemptstocollectthe
_Nyyastras_,oneas_Nyyasci_andtheotheras_Nyyastroddhra_,itseemsthateveninVcaspati's
timehewasnotcertainastotheauthenticityofmanyofthe_Nyyastras_.Hefurtherpointsoutthatthere
areunmistakablesignsthatmanyofthestraswereinterpolated,andrelatestheBuddhisttraditionfrom
ChinaandJapanthatMirokmingledNyyaandYoga.Healso

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Yenaprayukta@hpravarttatetatprayojanam_(thatbywhichoneisledtoactiscalled
_prayojanam_);_yamarthamabhpsanjihsanvkarmarabhatetennenasarvepr@nina@hsarv@ni
karm@nisarvs'cavidy@hvypt@htads'rays'canyya@hpravarttate_(allthosewhichonetriesto
haveortoflyfromarecalledprayojana,thereforeallbeings,alltheiractions,andallsciences,areincluded
withinprayojana,andallthesedependonNyya)._Vtsyyanabhs'ya_,I.i.1.]

279

thinks that the stras underwent two additions, one at the hands of some Buddhists and another at the hands of some
Hindu who put in Hindu arguments against the Buddhist ones. These suggestions of this learned scholar seem to be very
probable, but we have no clue by which we can ascertain the time when such additions were made. The fact that there
are unmistakable proofs of the interpolation of many of the stras makes the fixing of the date of the original part of the
_Nyya stras_ still more difficult, for the Buddhist references can hardly
CHAPTER VIII 190
beofanyhelp,andProf.Jacobi'sattempttofixthedateofthe_Nyyastras_onthebasisofreferencesto
S'nyavdanaturallylosesitsvalue,exceptonthesuppositionthatallreferencestoS'nyavdamustbelater
thanNgrjuna,whichisnotcorrect,sincethe_Mahynastras_writtenbeforeNgrjunaalsoheldthe
S'nyavdadoctrine.

ThelateDrS.C.Vidybh@sa@nain_J.R.A.S._1918thinksthattheearlierpartofNyyawaswrittenby
Gautamaabout550B.C.whereasthe_Nyyastras_ofAk@sapdawerewrittenabout150A.D.andsaysthat
theuseofthewordNyyainthesenseoflogicin_Mahbhrata_I.I.67,I.70.4251,mustberegardedas
interpolations.He,however,doesnotgiveanyreasonsinsupportofhisassumption.Itappearsfromhis
treatmentofthesubjectthatthefixingofthedateofAk@sapdawasmadetofitinsomehowwithhisideathat
Ak@sapdawrotehis_Nyyastras_undertheinfluenceofAristotleasuppositionwhichdoesnotrequire
seriousrefutation,atleastsofarasDrVidybh@sa@nahasprovedit.Thusafterallthisdiscussionwehavenot
advancedasteptowardstheascertainmentofthedateoftheoriginalpartoftheNyya.Goldstckersaysthat
bothPatajali(140B.C.)andKtyyana(fourthcenturyB.C.)knewthe_Nyyastras_[Footnoteref1].We
knowthatKau@tilyaknewtheNyyainsomeformasnvk@sikin300B.C.,andonthestrengthofthiswe
mayventuretosaythattheNyyaexistedinsomeformasearlyasthefourthcenturyB.C.Butthereareother
reasonswhichleadmetothinkthatatleastsomeofthepresentstraswerewrittensometimeinthesecond
centuryA.D.BodaspointsoutthatBdarya@na'sstrasmakeallusionstotheVais'e@sikadoctrinesandnotto
Nyya.Onthisgroundhethinksthat_Vais'e@sikastras_werewrittenbeforeBdaryana's_Brahmastras_,
whereastheNyyastraswerewrittenlater.CandrakntaTarkla@mkraalsocontendsinhis

____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:Goldstcker's_P@nini_,p.157.]

280

editionofVais'e@sikathatthe_Vais'e@sikastras_wereearlierthantheNyya.Itseemstometobeperfectly
certainthatthe_Vais'e@sikastras_werewrittenbeforeCaraka(80A.D.);forhenotonlyquotesoneofthe
_Vais'e@sikastras_,butthewholefoundationofhismedicalphysicsisbasedontheVais`e@sikaphysics
[Footnoteref1].The_La@nkvatrastra_(whichasitwasquotedbyAs'vagho@saisearlierthan80A.D.)also
makesallusionstotheatomicdoctrine.Thereareotherweightiergrounds,asweshallseelateron,forsupposing
thatthe_Vais'e@sikastras_areprobablypreBuddhistic[Footnoteref2].

Itiscertainthateventhelogicalpartofthepresent_Nyyastras_wasprecededbypreviousspeculationson
thesubjectbythinkersofotherschools.ThusincommentingonI.i.32inwhichthestrastatesthatasyllogism
consistsoffivepremisses(_avayava_)Vtsyyanasaysthatthisstrawaswrittentorefutetheviewsofthose
whoheldthatthereshouldbetenpremisses[Footnoteref3].The_Vais'e@sikastras_alsogiveussomeofthe
earliesttypesofinference,whichdonotshowanyacquaintancewiththetechnicoftheNyyadoctrineof
inference[Footnoteref4].

DoesVais'e@sikarepresentanOldSchoolofMm@ms?

The Vais'e@sika is so much associated with Nyya by tradition that it seems at first sight quite unlikely that it could be
supposed to represent an old school of Mm@ms, older than that represented in the _Mm@ms stras._ But a
closer inspection of the _Vais'e@sika stras_ seems to confirm such a supposition in a very remarkable way. We have
seen in the previous section that Caraka quotes a _Vais'e@sika stra._ An examination of Caraka's _Strasthna_ (I.35-
38) leaves us convinced that the writer of the verses had some compendium of Vais'e@sika such as that of the
_Bh@spariccheda_ before him. _Caraka stra_ or _krik_ (I.i. 36) says that the gu@nas are those which have been
enumerated such as heaviness, etc., cognition, and those which begin with the gu@na "_para_" (universality) and end
with "_prayatna_" (effort) together with
CHAPTER VIII 191
thesensequalities(_srth_).Itseemsthatthisisareferencetosomewellknownenumeration.Butthis
enumerationisnottobefoundinthe_Vais'e@sikastra_(I.i.6)whichleavesoutthesixgu@nas,

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Caraka,S'rra_,39.]

[Footnote2:Seethenextsection.]

[Footnote3:Vtsyyana'sBh@syaonthe_Nyyastras,_I.i.32.ThisisundoubtedlyareferencetotheJaina
viewasfoundin_Das'avaiklikaniryukti_asnotedbefore.]

[Footnote4:_Nyyastra_I.i.5,and_Vais'e@sikastras_IX.ii.12,45,andIII.i.817.]

281

heaviness(_gurutva_),liquidity(_dravatva_),oiliness(_sneha_),elasticity(_sa@mskra_),merit(_dharma_)and
demerit(_adharma_);inonepartofthestratheenumerationbeginswith"para"(universality)andendsin
"prayatna,"butbuddhi(cognition)comeswithintheenumerationbeginningfromparaandendinginprayatna,
whereasinCarakabuddhidoesnotformpartofthelistandisseparatelyenumerated.Thisleadsmetosuppose
thatCaraka'sstrawaswrittenatatimewhenthesixgu@nasleftoutintheVais'e@sikaenumerationhadcome
tobecountedasgu@nas,andcompendiumshadbeenmadeinwhichthesewereenumerated.
_Bh@spariccheda_(alaterVais'e@sikacompendium),isacompilationfromsomeveryoldkrikswhichare
referredtobyVis'vanthaasbeingcollectedfrom"_atisa@mk@siptacirantanoktibhi@h_"(fromveryancient
aphorisms[Footnoteref1]);Caraka'sdefinitionofsmnyaandvis'e@sashowsthattheyhadnotthenbeen
countedasseparatecategoriesasinlaterNyyaVais'e@sikadoctrines;butthoughslightlydifferentitisquitein
keepingwiththesortofdefinitiononefindsinthe_Vais'e@sikastra_thatsmnya(generality)andvi'se@sa
arerelativetoeachother[Footnoteref2].Caraka'sstraswerethereforeprobablywrittenatatimewhenthe
Vais'e@sikadoctrineswereundergoingchanges,andwellknowncompendiumswerebeginningtobewrittenon
them.

The_Vais'e@sikastras_seemtobeignorantoftheBuddhistdoctrines.Intheirdiscussionsontheexistenceof
soul,thereisnoreferencetoanyviewastononexistenceofsoul,buttheargumentturnedonthepointasto
whethertheselfistobeanobjectofinferenceorrevealedtousbyournotionof"I."Thereisalsonoother
referencetoanyothersystemsexcepttosomeMm@msdoctrinesandoccasionallytoS@mkhya.Thereisno
reasontosupposethattheMm@msdoctrinesreferredtoalludetothe_Mm@msstras_ofJaimini.The
mannerinwhichthenatureofinferencehasbeentreatedshowsthattheNyyaphraseologyof"_prvavat_"and
"_s'e@savat_"wasnotknown._Vais'e@sikastras_inmorethanoneplacerefertotimeastheultimatecause
[Footnoteref3].WeknowthattheS'vets'vataraUpani@sadreferstothosewhoregardtimeasthecauseofall
things,butinnoneofthe

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[Footnote1:ProfessorVanamlVedntatrtha'sarticlein_J.A.S.B._,1908.]

[Footnote2:Caraka(I.i.33)saysthatsmnyaisthatwhichproducesunityandvis'e@saisthatwhich
separates.V.S.II.ii.7.Smnyaandvis'e@sadependuponourmodeofthinking(asunitedorasseparate).]

[Footnote3:_Vais'e@sikastra_(II.ii.9andV.ii.26).]
282
CHAPTER VIII 192
systemsthatwehavecanwetraceanyupholdingofthisancientview[Footnoteref1].Theseconsiderationsas
wellasthegeneralstyleoftheworkandthemethodsofdiscussionleadmetothinkthatthesestrasare
probablytheoldestthatwehaveandinallprobabilityarepreBuddhistic.

The_Vais'e@sikastra_beginswiththestatementthatitsobjectistoexplainvirtue,"dharma"Thisisweknow
themanifestdutyofMm@msandweknowthatunlikeanyothersystemJaiminibeginshis_Mm@ms
stras_bydefining"dharma".ThisatfirstseemsirrelevanttothemainpurposeofVais'e@sika,viz,the
descriptionofthenatureofpadartha[Footnoteref2].Hethendefinesdharmaasthatwhichgivesprosperityand
ultimategood(_nihsreyasa_)andsaysthattheVedamustberegardedasvalid,sinceitcandictatethis.Heends
hisbookwiththeremarksthatthoseinjunctions(ofVedicdeeds)whichareperformedforordinaryhuman
motivesbestowprosperityeventhoughtheirefficacyisnotknowntousthroughourordinaryexperience,andin
thismattertheVedamustberegardedastheauthoritywhichdictatesthoseacts[Footnoteref3].Thefactthat
theVais'e@sikabeginswithapromisetodescribedharmaandafterdescribingthenatureofsubstances,
qualitiesandactionsandalsothe_ad@r@s@ta_(unknownvirtue)duetodharma(meritaccruingfromthe
performanceofVedicdeeds)bywhichmanyofourunexplainedexperiencesmaybeexplained,endshisbookby
sayingthatthoseVedicworkswhicharenotseentoproduceanydirecteffect,willproduceprosperitythrough
adrsta,showsthatKa@nda'smethodofexplainingdharmahasbeenbyshowingthatphysicalphenomena
involvingsubstances,qualities,andactionscanonlybeexplaineduptoacertainextentwhileagoodnumber
cannotbeexplainedatallexceptontheassumptionofad@r@s@ta(unseenvirtue)producedbydharma.The

___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:S'vets'vataraI.i.2]

[Footnote2:Irememberaversequotedinanoldcommentaryofthe_KalpaVykara@na_,inwhichitissaid
thatthedescriptionofthesixcategoriesbyKa@ndainhis_Vais'e@sikastras_,afterhavingproposedto
describethenatureofdharma,isasirrelevantastoproceedtowardstheseawhileintendingtogotothe
mountainHimavat(Himlaya).

"_Dnarma@mvykhytukmasya@sa@tpadrthopavar@nana@mHimavadgantukmasya
sgaragamanopamam_."]

[Footnote3:Thesutra"_Tadvacandmnyasyaprm@nyam_(I.i.3andX.ii.9)hasbeenexplainedby
_Upaskra_asmeaning"TheVedabeingthewordofs'vara(God)mustberegardedasvalid,"butsincethereis
nomentionofs'varaanywhereinthetextthisissimplyreadingthelaterNyyaideasintotheVais'e@sika.Stra
X.ii.8isonlyarepetitionofVI.ii.1.]

283

description of the categories of substance is not irrelevant, but is the means of proving that our ordinary experience of
these cannot explain many facts which are only to be explained on the supposition of ad@r@s@ta proceeding out of
the performance of Vedic deeds. In V.i. 15 the movement of needles towards magnets, in V. ii. 7 the circulation of water
in plant bodies, V. ii. 13 and IV. ii. 7 the upward motion of fire, the side motion of air, the combining movement of
atoms (by which all combinations have taken place), and the original movement of the mind are said to be due to
ad@r@s@ta. In V. ii. 17 the movement of the soul after death, its taking hold of other bodies, the assimilation of food
and drink and other kinds of contact (the movement and development of the foetus as enumerated in _Upaskara_) are
said to be due to ad@r@s@ta. Salvation (moksa) is said to be produced by the annihilation of ad@r@s@ta leading to
the annihilation of all contacts and non production of rebirths Vais'esika marks the distinction between the drsta
(experienced) and the ad@r@s@ta. All the categories that he describes are founded on drsta (experience) and those
unexplained by known experience are due to ad@r@s@ta These are the acts on which depend all life-process of
animals
CHAPTER VIII 193
andplants,thecontinuationofatomsortheconstructionoftheworlds,naturalmotionoffireandair,deathand
rebirth(VI.ii.15)andeventhephysicalphenomenabywhichourfortunesareaffectedinsomewayorother(V.
ii.2),infactallwithwhichwearevitallyinterestedinphilosophy.Ka@nda'sphilosophygivesonlysomefactsof
experienceregardingsubstances,qualitiesandactions,leavingallthegraverissuesofmetaphysicsto
ad@r@s@taButwhatleadstoad@r@s@ta?Inanswertothis,Ka@ndadoesnotspeakofgoodorbador
virtuousorsinfuldeeds,butofVedicworks,suchasholyablutions(_snana_),fasting,holystudentlife
(_brahmacarya_),remainingatthehouseoftheteacher(_gurukulavasa_),retiredforestlife(_vanaprastha_),
sacrifice(_yaja_),gifts(_dana_),certainkindsofsacrificialsprinklingandrulesofperformingsacrificialworks
accordingtotheprescribedtimeofthestars,theprescribedhymns(mantras)(VI.ii.2).

Hedescribedwhatispureandwhatisimpurefood,purefoodbeingthatwhichissacrificiallypurified(VI.ii.5)
thecontrarybeingimpure,andhesaysthatthetakingofpurefoodleadstoprosperitythroughad@r@s@ta.He
alsodescribedhow

284

feelingsofattachmenttothingsarealsogeneratedbyad@r@s@ta.ThroughoutalmostthewholeofVI.i
Ka@ndaisbusyinshowingthespecialconditionsofmakinggiftsandreceivingthem.Areferencetoour
chapteronMm@mswillshowthatthelaterMm@mswritersagreedwiththeNyyaVais`e@sika
doctrinesinmostoftheirviewsregardingsubstance,qualities,etc.Someofthemainpointsinwhich
Mm@msdiffersfromNyyaVais`e@sikaare(1)selfvalidityoftheVedas,(2)theeternalityofthe
Vedas,(3)disbeliefinanycreatororgod,(4)eternalityofsound(s'abda),(5)(accordingtoKumrila)direct
perceptionofselfinthenotionoftheego.Ofthesethefirstandthesecondpointsdonotformanysubjectof
discussionintheVais'e@sika.Butasnos'varaismentioned,andasallad@r@s@tadependsuponthe
authorityoftheVedas,wemayassumethatVais'e@sikahadnodisputewithMm@ms.Thefactthat
thereisnoreferencetoanydissensionisprobablyduetothefactthatreallynonehadtakenplaceatthetime
ofthe_Vais`e@sikastras._ItisprobablethatKa@ndabelievedthattheVedaswerewrittenbysome
personssuperiortous(II.i.18,VI.i.12).Butthefactthatthereisnoreferencetoanyconflictwith
Mm@mssuggeststhatthedoctrinethattheVedaswereneverwrittenbyanyonewasformulatedata
laterperiod,whereasinthedaysofthe_Vais'e@sikastras,_theviewwasprobablywhatisrepresentedin
the_Vais'e@sikastras._Asthereisnoreferencetos`varaandasad@r@s@taproceedingoutofthe
performanceofactionsinaccordancewithVedicinjunctionsismadethecauseofallatomicmovements,we
canverywellassumethatVais'e@sikawasasatheisticornontheisticasthelaterMm@msphilosophers.
Asregardstheeternalityofsound,whichinlaterdayswasoneofthemainpointsofquarrelbetweenthe
NyyaVais'e@sikaandtheMm@ms,wefindthatinII.ii.2532,Ka@ndagivesreasonsinfavourof
thenoneternalityofsound,butafterthatfromII.ii.33tilltheendofthechapterheclosestheargumentin
favouroftheeternalityofsound,whichisthedistinctiveMm@msviewasweknowfromthelater
Mm@mswriters[Footnoteref1].Nextcomesthequestionoftheproofoftheexistenceofself.The
traditionalNyyaviewis

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ThelasttwoconcludingstrasII.ii.36and37areinmyopinionwronglyinterpretedbyS'a@nkara
Mis'rainhis_Upaskra_(II.ii.36byaddingan"_api_"tothestraandtherebychangingtheissue,andII.ii.
37bymisreadingthephoneticcombination"samkhyabhava"ass@mkhyaandbhavainsteadofs@mkhyaand
abhava,whichinmyopinionistherightcombinationhere)infavourofthenoneternalityofsoundaswefindin
thelaterNyyaVais'e@sikaview.]

285
that the self is supposed to exist because it must be inferred as the seat of the qualities of pleasure, pain,
CHAPTER VIII 194
cognition,etc.TraditionallythisisregardedastheVais'e@sikaviewaswell.ButinVais'e@sikaIII.ii.4the
existenceofsoulisfirstinferredbyreasonofitsactivityandtheexistenceofpleasure,pain,etc.,inIII.ii.67this
inferenceischallengedbysayingthatwedonotperceivethattheactivity,etc.belongstothesoulandnottothe
bodyandsonocertaintycanbearrivedatbyinference,andinIII.ii.8itissuggestedthatthereforetheexistence
ofsoulistobeacceptedontheauthorityofthescriptures(_gama_).TothisthefinalVais'e@sikaconclusionis
giventhatwecandirectlyperceivetheselfinourfeelingas"I"(_aham_),andwehavethereforenottodependon
thescripturesfortheproofoftheexistenceoftheself,andthustheinferenceoftheexistenceoftheselfisonlyan
additionalproofofwhatwealreadyfindinperceptionas"I"(_aham_)(III.ii.1018,alsoIX.i.11).

TheseconsiderationsleadmetothinkthattheVais'e@sikarepresentedaschoolofMm@msthoughtwhich
supplementedametaphysicstostrengthenthegroundsoftheVedas.

PhilosophyintheVais'e@sikastras.

The_Vais'e@sikastras_beginwiththeostensiblepurposeofexplainingvirtue(_dharma_)(I.i.1)anddharma
accordingtoitisthatbywhichprosperity(_abhyudaya_)andsalvation(_ni@hs'reyasa_)areattained.Thenit
goesontosaythatthevalidityoftheVedasdependsonthefactthatitleadsustoprosperityandsalvation.Then
itturnsbacktothesecondstraandsaysthatsalvationcomesastheresultofrealknowledge,producedby
specialexcellenceofdharma,ofthecharacteristicfeaturesofthecategoriesofsubstance(_dravya_),quality
(_gu@na_),classconcept(_smdnya_),particularity(_vis'e@sa_),andinherence(_samavyay_)[Footnoteref
1].Thedravyasareearth,water,fire,air,ether,time,space,soul,andmind.Thegu@nasarecolour,taste,odour,
touch,number,measure,separations,contact,disjoining,qualityofbelongingtohighgenusortospecies
[Footnoteref2].Action(_karma_)meansupwardmovement

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Upaskra_notesthatvis'e@saherereferstotheultimatedifferencesofthingsandnottospecies.
Aspecialdoctrineofthissystemisthis,thateachoftheindivisibleatomsofeventhesameelementhasspecific
featuresofdifference.]

[Footnote2:Herethewellknownqualitiesofheaviness(_gurutva_),liquidity(_dravatva_),oiliness(_sneha_),
elasticity(_sa@mskra_),merit(_dharma_),anddemerit(_adharma_)havebeenaltogetheromitted.Theseare
allcountedinlaterVais'e@sikacommentariesandcompendiums.Itmustbenotedthat"_gu@na_"in
Vas'e@sikameansqualitiesandnotsubtlerealsorsubstancesasinS@mkhyaYoga.Gu@nainVas'e@sika
wouldbeakintowhatYogawouldcalldharma.]

286

downward movement, contraction, expansion and horizontal movement. The three common qualities of dravya,
gu@na and karma are that they are existent, non-eternal, substantive, effect, cause, and possess generality and
particularity. Dravya produces other dravyas and the gu@nas other gu@nas. But karma is not necessarily produced by
karma. Dravya does not destroy either its cause or its effect but the gu@nas are destroyed both by the cause and by
the effect. Karma is destroyed by karma. Dravya possesses karma and gu@na and is regarded as the material
(_samavayi_) cause. Gu@nas inhere in dravya, cannot possess further gu@nas, and are not by themselves the cause of
contact or disjoining. Karma is devoid of gu@na, cannot remain at one time in more than one object, inheres in dravya
alone, and is an independent cause of contact or disjoining. Dravya is the material cause (samavayi) of (derivative)
dravyas, gu@na, and karma, gu@na is also the non-material cause (_asamavayi_) of dravya, gu@na and karma. Karma
is the general cause of contact, disjoining, and inertia in motion (_vega_). Karma is not the cause of dravya. For dravya
may be produced even without karma [Footnote ref 1]. Dravya is the general effect of dravya. Karma is dissimilar to
gu@na in this that it does not produce karma. The numbers two, three, etc, separateness, contact and disjoining are
CHAPTER VIII 195
effectedbymorethanonedravya.Eachkarmanotbeingconnectedwithmorethanonethingisnotproducedby
morethanonething[Footnoteref2].Adravyaistheresultofmanycontacts(oftheatoms).Onecolourmaybe
theresultofmanycolours.Upwardmovementistheresultofheaviness,effortandcontact.Contactand
disjoiningarealsotheresultofkarma.Indenyingthecausalityofkarmaitismeantthatkarmaisnotthecause
ofdravyaandkarma[Footnoteref3].

InthesecondchapterofthefirstbookKa@ndafirstsaysthatifthereisnocause,thereisnoeffect,butthere
maybethecauseeventhoughtheremaynotbetheeffect.Henextsaysthatgenus(_samanya_)andspecies
(_visesa_)arerelativetotheunderstanding;

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Itisonlywhenthekaryaceasesthatdravyaisproduced.SeeUpaskaraI.i.22.]

[Footnote2:Ifkarmaisrelatedtomorethanonething,thenwiththemovementofoneweshouldhavefelt
thattwoormorethingsweremoving.]

[Footnote3:Itmustbenotedthatkarmainthissenseisquitedifferentfromthemoreextensiveuseofkarmaas
meritoriousorviciousactionwhichisthecauseofrebirth.]

287

being(_bhva_)indicatescontinuityonlyandishenceonlyagenus.Theuniversalsofsubstance,qualityand
actionmaybebothgenusandspecies,butvisesaasconstitutingtheultimatedifferences(ofatoms)exists
(independentofanypercipient).Inconnectionwiththishesaysthattheultimategenusisbeing(_satt_)invirtue
ofwhichthingsappearasexistent,allothergeneramayonlyrelativelyberegardedasrelativegeneraorspecies.
Beingmustberegardedasaseparatecategory,sinceitisdifferentfromdravya,gu@naandkarma,andyetexists
inthem,andhasnogenusorspecies.Itgivesusthenotionthatsomethingisandmustberegardedasacategory
existingasoneidenticalentityinalldravya,gu@na,andkarma,forinitsuniversalnatureasbeingithasno
specialcharacteristicsinthedifferentobjectsinwhichitinheres.Thespecificuniversalsofthingness
(_dravyatva_)qualitiness(_gu@natva_)oractionness(_karmatva_)arealsocategorieswhichareseparatefrom
universalbeing(_bhva_or_satt_)fortheyalsohavenoseparategenusorspeciesandyetmaybedistinguished
fromoneanother,butbhvaorbeingwasthesameinall.

InthefirstchapterofthesecondbookKa@ndadealswithsubstances.Earthpossessescolour,taste,smell,and
touch,water,colour,taste,touch,liquidity,andsmoothness(_snigdha_),fire,colourandtouch,air,touch,but
noneofthesequalitiescanbefoundinether(_ks'a_).Liquidityisaspecialqualityofwaterbecausebutter,lac,
wax,lead,iron,silver,gold,becomeliquidsonlywhentheyareheated,whilewaterisnaturallyliquiditself
[Footnoteref1].Thoughaircannotbeseen,yetitsexistencecanbeinferredbytouch,justastheexistenceofthe
genusofcowsmaybeinferredfromthecharacteristicsofhorns,tails,etc.Sincethisthinginferredfromtouch
possessesmotionandquality,anddoesnotitselfinhereinanyothersubstance,itisasubstance(dravya)andis
eternal[Footnoteref2].Theinferenceofairisofthetypeofinferenceofimperceptiblethingsfromcertainknown
characteristicscalled_smnyatod@r@s@ta_.Thenameofair"_vyu_"isderivedfromthescriptures.The
existenceofothersdifferentfromushas(_asmadvis'i@s@tn@m_)tobeadmittedforaccountingforthe

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Itshouldbenotedthatmercuryisnotmentioned.Thisisimportantformercurywasknownata
timelaterthanCaraka.]
[Footnote 2: Substance is that which possesses quality and motion. It should be noted that the word
CHAPTER VIII 196
"_adravyatvena_"inII.i.13hasbeeninterpretedbymeas"adravyavattvena."]

288

givingofnamestothings(_sa@mjkarma_).Becausewefindthatthegivingofnamesisalreadyinusage(and
notinventedbyus)[Footnoteref1].Onaccountofthefactthatmovementsrestonlyinonething,the
phenomenonthatathingcanenterintoanyunoccupiedspace,wouldnotleadustoinfertheexistenceofks'a
(ether).ks'ahastobeadmittedasthehypotheticalsubstanceinwhichthequalityofsoundinheres,because,
sincesound(aquality)isnotthecharacteristicofthingswhichcanbetouched,theremustbesomesubstanceof
whichitisaquality.Andthissubstanceisks'a.Itisasubstanceandeternallikeair.Asbeingisonesoks'a
isone[Footnoteref2].

InthesecondchapterofthesecondbookKa@ndatriestoprovethatsmellisaspecialcharacteristicofearth,
heatoffire,andcoldnessofwater.Timeisdefinedasthatwhichgivesthenotionofyouthintheyoung,
simultaneity,andquickness.Itisonelikebeing.Timeisthecauseofallnoneternalthings,becausethenotionof
timeisabsentineternalthings.Spacesuppliesthenotionthatthisissofarawayfromthisorsomuchnearerto
this.Likebeingitisone.Onespaceappearstohavediverseinterspacerelationsinconnectionwiththemotionof
thesun.Asapreliminarytodiscussingtheproblemwhethersoundiseternalornot,hediscussesthenotionof
doubt,whichariseswhenathingisseeninageneralway,buttheparticularfeaturescomingunderitarenot
seen,eitherwhentheseareonlyremembered,orwhensomesuchattributeisseenwhichresemblessomeother
attributeseenbefore,orwhenathingisseeninonewaybutappearsinanother,orwhenwhatisseenisnot
definitelygrasped,whetherrightlyseenornot.Hethendiscussesthequestionwhethersoundiseternalornon
eternalandgiveshisreasonstoshowthatitisnoneternal,butconcludesthediscussionwithanumberofother
reasonsprovingthatitiseternal.

Thefirstchapterofthethirdbookisentirelydevotedtotheinferenceoftheexistenceofsoulfromthefactthat
theremustbesomesubstanceinwhichknowledgeproducedbythecontactofthesensesandtheirobject
inheres.

Theknowledgeofsenseobjects(_indriyrtha_)isthereasonby

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Ihavedifferedfrom_Upaskra_ininterpreting"_sa@mjkarma_"inII.i.18,19asagenitive
compoundwhile_Upaskra_makesitadvandvacompound.Upaskra'sinterpretationseemstobefarfetched.
HewantstotwistitintoanargumentfortheexistenceofGod.]

[Footnote2:ThisinterpretationisaccordingtoS'a@nkaraMis'ra's_Upaskra._]
289

whichwecaninfertheexistenceofsomethingdifferentfromthesensesandtheobjectswhichappearin
connectionwiththem.Thetypesofinferencesreferredtoare(1)inferenceofnonexistenceofsomethingsfrom
theexistenceofsomethings,(2)oftheexistenceofsomethingsfromthenonexistenceofsomethings,
(3)oftheexistenceofsomethingsfromtheexistenceofothers.Inallthesecasesinferenceispossibleonlywhen
thetwoareknowntobeconnectedwitheachother(_prasiddhiprvakatvtapades'asya_)[Footnoteref1].When
suchaconnectiondoesnotexistorisdoubtful,wehave_anapades'a_(fallaciousmiddle)andsandigdha(doubtful
middle);thus,itisahorsebecauseithasahorn,oritisacowbecauseithasahornareexamples of fallacious
reason. The inference of soul from the cognition produced by the contact of soul, senses and objects is not fallacious in
the above way. The inference of the existence of the soul in others may be made in a similar way in which the existence
of one's own soul is inferred [Footnote ref 2], i.e. by virtue of the existence of movement and cessation of movement.
In the second chapter it is said that the fact that there
CHAPTER VIII 197
iscognitiononlywhenthereiscontactbetweentheself,thesensesandtheobjectsprovesthatthereismanas
(mind),andthismanasisasubstanceandeternal,andthiscanbeprovedbecausethereisnosimultaneityof
productionofeffortsandvariouskindsofcognition;itmayalsobeinferredthatthismanasisone(witheach
person).

Thesoulmaybeinferredfrominhalation,exhalation,twinklingoftheeye,life,themovementofthemind,the
senseaffectionspleasure,pain,will,antipathy,andeffort.Thatitisasubstanceandeternalcanbeprovedafter
themannerofvyu.AnobjectorissupposedtosaythatsincewhenIseeamanIdonotseehissoul,theinference
ofthesoulisofthetypeof_smnyatod@r@s@ta_inference,i.e.,fromtheperceivedsignsofpleasure,pain,
cognitiontoinferanunknownentitytowhichtheybelong,butthatthiswastheselfcouldnotbeaffirmed.Sothe
existenceofsoulhastobeadmittedonthestrengthofthescriptures.ButtheVais'e@sikareplyisthatsincethere
isnothingelsebutselftowhichtheexpression"I"maybeapplied,thereisnoneedoffallingbackonthe
scripturesfortheexistenceofthesoul.But

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:InconnectionwiththisthereisashortreferencetothemethodsoffallacyinwhichGautama's
terminologydoesnotappear.Thereisnogeneralisedstatement,butspecifictypesofinferenceareonly
pointedoutasthebasis.]

[Footnote2:TheformsofinferenceusedshowthatKa@ndawasprobablynotawareofGautama's
terminology.]

290

thenitissaidthatiftheselfisdirectlyperceivedinsuchexperiencesas"IamYajadatta"or"IamDevadatta,"
whatisthegoodofturningtoinference?Thereplytothisisthatinferencelendingitsaidtothesameexistence
onlystrengthenstheconviction.WhenwesaythatDevadattagoesorYajadattagoes,therecomesthedoubt
whetherbyDevadattaorYajadattathebodyaloneismeant;butthedoubtisremovedwhenwethinkthatthe
notionof"I"referstotheselfandnottoanythingelse.Asthereisnodifferenceregardingtheproductionof
pleasure,pain,andcognition,thesoulisoneinall.Butyetitismanybyspeciallimitationsasindividualsandthis
isalsoprovedonthestrengthofthescriptures[Footnoteref1].

Inthefirstchapterofthefourthbookitissaidthatthatwhichisexistent,butyethasnocause,shouldbe
consideredeternal(_nitya_).Itcanbeinferredbyitseffect,fortheeffectcanonlytakeplacebecauseofthe
cause.Whenwespeakofanythingasnoneternal,itisonlyanegationoftheeternal,sothatalsoprovesthat
thereissomethingeternal.Thenoneternalisignorance(_avidy_)[Footnoteref2].Colourisvisibleinathing
whichisgreat(_mahat_)andcompounded.Air(_vyu_)isnotperceivedtohavecolour,thoughitisgreatand
madeupofparts,becauseithasnottheactualityofcolour(_rpasamskra_i.e.inairthereisonlycolourinits
unmanifestedform)init.Colouristhusvisibleonlywhenthereiscolourwithspecialqualificationsand
conditions[Footnoteref3].Inthiswaythecognitionoftaste,smell,andtouchisalsoexplained.Number,
measure,separateness,contact,anddisjoining,thequalityofbelongingtoahigherorlowerclass,action,all
theseastheyabideinthingspossessingcolourarevisibletotheeye.Thenumberetc.ofthosewhichhaveno
colourarenotperceivedbytheeye.Butthenotionofbeingandalsoofgenusofquality(gunatva)

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: I have differed here from the meaning given in _Upaskra_. I think the three stras
"_Sukhaduhkhajananispattyavis'esadekatmyam," "vyavasthato nana,"_ and _"vastrasmarthyat ca"_ originally meant
that the self was one, though for the sake of many limitations, and also because of the need of the performance of acts
enjoined by the scriptures, they are regarded as many.]
CHAPTER VIII 198
[Footnote2:Ihavedifferedherealsoinmymeaningfromthe_Upaskra,_whichregardsthisstra
"_avidya_"tomeanthatwedonotknowofanyreasonswhichleadtothenoneternalityoftheatoms.]

[Footnote3:Thisiswhatismeantinthelaterdistinctionsof_udbhtarpavattva_and_anudbhtarpavattva_.
Theword_samskra_inVais'e@sikahasmanysenses.Itmeansinertia,elasticity,collection(_samavaya_),
production(_udbhava_)andnotbeingovercome(_anabhibhava_).Forthelastthreesensessee_Upaskra_IV.i.
7.]

291

areperceivedbyallthesenses(justascolour,taste,smell,touch,andsoundareperceivedbyonesense,
cognition,pleasure,pain,etc.bythemanasandnumberetc.bythevisualandthetactilesense)[Footnoteref1].

Inthesecondchapterofthefourthbookitissaidthattheearth,etc.existinthreeforms,body,sense,andobjects.
Therecannotbeanycompoundingofthefiveelementsorevenofthethree,buttheatomsofdifferentelements
maycombinewhenoneofthemactsasthecentralradicle(_upa@s@tambhaka_).Bodiesareoftwokinds,those
producedfromovariesandthosewhichareotherwiseproducedbythecombinationoftheatomsinaccordance
withspecialkindsofdharma.Allcombinationsofatomsareduetospecialkindsofdharmas.Suchsuper
mundanebodiesaretobeadmittedforexplainingthefactthatthingsmusthavebeengivennamesbybeings
havingsuchsupermundanebodies,andalsoonaccountoftheauthorityoftheVedas.

Inthefirstchapterofthefifthbookaction(_karma_)isdiscussed.Takingtheexampleofthreshingthecorn,
itissaidthatthemovementofthehandisduetoitscontactwiththesoulinastateofeffort,andthe
movementoftheflailisduetoitscontactwiththehand.Butinthecaseoftheuprisingoftheflailinthe
threshingpotduetoimpactthemovementisnotduetocontactwiththehands,andsotheupliftingofthe
handintouchwiththeflailisnotduetoitscontactwiththesoul;foritisduetotheimpactoftheflail.On
accountofheaviness(_gurutva_)theflailwillfallwhennotheldbythehand.Thingsmayhaveanupwardor
sidemotionbyspeciallydirectedmotions(_nodanavis'e@sa_)whicharegeneratedbyspecialkindsof
efforts.Evenwithouteffortthebodymaymoveduringsleep.Themovementofneedlestowardsmagnetsis
duetoanunknowncause(_adr@s@takranaka_).Thearrowfirstacquiresmotionbyspeciallydirected
movement,andthenonaccountofitsinertia(_vegasamskra_)keepsonmovingandwhenthatceasesit
fallsdownthroughheaviness.

Thesecondchapteraboundswithextremelycrudeexplanations
__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Thisportionhasbeentakenfromthe_Upaskra_ofS'ankaraMis'raonthe_Vais'e@sikastras_of
Ka@nda.ItmustbenotedherethatthenotionofnumberaccordingtoVais'e@sikaisduetomentalrelativityor
oscillation(_apeksabuddhijanya_).Butthismentalrelativitycanonlystartwhenthethinghavingnumberis
eitherseenortouched;anditisinthissensethatnotionofnumberissaidtodependonthevisualorthetactual
sense.]

292

of certain physical phenomena which have no philosophical importance. All the special phenomena of nature are
explained as being due to unknown cause (_ad@r@s@takritam_) and no explanation is given as to the nature of this
unknown (_ad@r@s@ta_). It is however said that with the absence of _ad@r@s@ta_ there is no contact of body with
soul, and thus there is no rebirth, and therefore mok@sa (salvation); pleasure and pain are due to contact of the self,
manas, senses and objects. Yoga is that in which the mind is in contact with the self alone, by which the former
becomes steady and there is no pain in the body. Time, space, ks'a are
CHAPTER VIII 199
regardedasinactive.

Thewholeofthesixthbookisdevotedtoshowingthatgiftsaremadetoproperpersonsnotthrough
sympathybutonaccountoftheinjunctionofthescriptures,theenumerationofcertainVedicperformances,
whichbringsinad@r@s@ta,purificationandimpuritiesofthings,howpassionsareoftengeneratedby
ad@r@s@ta,howdharmaandadharmaleadtobirthanddeathandhowmok@satakesplaceasaresultof
theworkofthesoul.

Intheseventhbookitissaidthatthequalitiesineternalthingsareeternalandinnoneternalthingsnon
eternal.Thechangeofqualitiesproducedbyheatinearthhasitsbeginninginthecause(theatoms).
Atomicsizeisinvisiblewhilegreatsizeisvisible.Visibilityisduetoathing'sbeingmadeupofmanycauses
[Footnoteref1],buttheatomisthereforedifferentfromthosethathavegreatsize.Thesamethingmaybe
calledgreatandsmallrelativelyatthesametime.Inaccordancewitha@nutva(atomic)andmahattva
(great)therearealsothenotionsofsmallandbig.Theeternalsizeof_parima@n@dala_(round)belongsto
theatoms.ks'aandtmanarecalled_mahn_or_paramamahn_(thesupremelygreatorall
pervasive);sincemanasisnotofthegreatmeasureitisofatomicsize.Spaceandtimearealsoconsidered
asbeingofthemeasure"supremelygreat"(paramamahat),Atomicsize(parima@n@dala)belongingto
theatomsandthemind(manas)andthesupremelygreatsizebelongingtospace,time,soulandether
(ks'a)areregardedaseternal.

Inthesecondchapteroftheseventhbookitissaidthatunityandseparatenessaretobeadmittedasentities
distinctfromotherqualities.Thereisnonumberinmovementandquality;theappearanceofnumberinthemis
false.Causeandeffectare

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Ihavedifferedfromthe_Upaskra_intheinterpretationofthisstra.]
293

neitherone,norhavetheydistinctiveseparateness(_ekap@rthaktva_).Thenotionofunityisthecauseofthe
notionofduality,etc.Contactmaybeduetotheactionofoneortwothings,ortheeffectofanothercontactandso
isdisjoining.Thereisneithercontactnordisjoiningincauseandeffectsincetheydonotexistindependently
(_yutasiddhyabhvt_).Intheeighthbookitissaidthatsoulandmanasarenotperceptible,andthatinthe
apprehensionofqualities,action,generality,andparticularityperceptionisduetotheircontactwiththething.
Earthisthecauseofperceptionofsmell,andwater,fire,andairarethecauseoftaste,colourandtouch[Footnote
ref1].Intheninthbooknegationisdescribed;nonexistence(_asat_)isdefinedasthattowhichneitheractionnor
qualitycanbeattributed.Evenexistentthingsmaybecomenonexistentandthatwhichisexistentinonewaymay
benonexistentinanother;butthereisanotherkindofnonexistencewhichisdifferentfromtheabovekindsof
existenceandnonexistence[Footnoteref2].Allnegationcanbedirectlyperceivedthroughthehelpofthe
memorywhichkeepsbeforethemindthethingtowhichthenegationapplies.Allusionisalsomadeinthis
connectiontothespecialperceptualpowersoftheyogins(sagesattainingmysticalpowersthroughYoga
practices).

In the second chapter the nature of hetu (reason) or the middle term is described. It is said that anything connected
with any other thing, as effect, cause, as in contact, or as contrary or as inseparably connected, will serve as li@nga
(reason). The main point is the notion "this is associated with this," or "these two are related as cause and effect," and
since this may also be produced through premisses, there may be a formal syllogism from propositions fulfilling the
above condition. Verbal cognition comes without inference. False knowledge (_avidy_) is due to the defect of the
senses or non-observation and mal-observation due to wrong expectant impressions. The opposite of this is true
knowledge (_vidy_). In the tenth it is said that pleasure and pain are not cognitions, since they are not related to
doubt and certainty.
CHAPTER VIII 200
____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Upaskra_hereexplainsthatitisintendedthatthesensesareproducedbythosespecific
elements,butthiscannotbefoundinthestras.]

[Footnote2:Inthepreviousthreekindsofnonexistence,_prgabhva_(negationbeforeproduction),
_dhvamsbhva_(negationafterdestruction),andanyonyabhava(mutualnegationofeachotherineach
other),havebeendescribed.Thefourthoneis_smnybhva_(generalnegation).]

294

Adravyamaybecausedbytheinheringoftheeffectinit,forbecauseofitscontactwithanotherthingtheeffect
isproduced.Karma(motion)isalsoacausesinceitinheresinthecause.Contactisalsoacausesinceitinheresin
thecause.Acontactwhichinheresinthecauseofthecauseandtherebyhelpstheproductionoftheeffectisalsoa
cause.Thespecialqualityoftheheatoffireisalsoacause.

Worksaccordingtotheinjunctionsofthescripturessincetheyhavenovisibleeffectarethecauseof
prosperity,andbecausetheVedasdirectthem,theyhavevalidity.

PhilosophyintheNyyastras[Footnoteref1].

The_Nyyastras_beginwithanenumerationofthesixteensubjects,viz.meansofrightknowledge
(_pram@na_),objectofrightknowledge(_prameya_),doubt(_sa@ms'aya_),purpose(_prayojana_),illustrative
instances(_d@r@s@tnta_),acceptedconclusions(_siddhnta_),premisses(_avayava_),argumentation
(_tarka_),ascertainment(_nir@naya_),debates(_vda_),disputations(_jalpa_),destructivecriticisms
(_vita@n@d_),fallacy(_hetvbhsa_),quibble(_chala_),refutations(_jti_),pointsofopponent'sdefeat
(_nigrahasthna_),andholdthatbyathoroughknowledgeofthesethehighestgood(_nihs'reyasa_),isattained.
Inthesecondstraitissaidthatsalvation(_apavarga_)isattainedbythesuccessivedisappearanceoffalse
knowledge(_mithyjna_),defects(_do@sa_),endeavours(_prav@rtti_,birth(_janma_),andultimatelyof
sorrow.Thenthemeansofproofaresaidtobeoffourkinds,perception(_pratyak@sa_),inference(_anumna_),
analogy(_upamana_),andtestimony(_s'abda_).Perceptionisdefinedasuncontradicteddeterminateknowledge
unassociatedwithnamesproceedingoutofsensecontactwithobjects.Inferenceisofthreekinds,fromcauseto
effect(_prvavat_),effecttocause(_s'e@savat_),andinferencefromcommoncharacteristics(_smnyato
d@r@s@ta_).Upamnaistheknowingofanythingbysimilaritywithanywellknownthing.

S'abdaisdefinedasthetestimonyofreliableauthority(pta)[Footnoteref2].

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Thisisabriefsummaryofthedoctrinesfoundin_Nyyastras_,supplementedhereandthere
withtheviewsofVtsyyana,thecommentator.Thisfollowstheorderofthestras,andtriestopresenttheir
ideaswithaslittleadditionsfromthoseoflaterdayNyyaaspossible.ThegeneraltreatmentofNyya
Vais'e@sikaexpoundsthetwosystemsinthelightoflaterwritersandcommentators.]

[Footnote2:ItiscurioustonoticethatVtsyyanasaysthatanrya,a@r@sioramleccha(foreigner),maybe
anpta(reliableauthority).]

295

Such a testimony may tell us about things which may be experienced and which are beyond experience. Objects of
knowledge are said to be self (_tman_), body, senses, sense-objects, understanding (_buddhi_),
CHAPTER VIII 201
mind(_manas_},endeavour(prav@rtti),rebirths,enjoymentofpleasureandsufferingofpain,sorrowand
salvation.Desire,antipathy,effort(_prayatna_),pleasure,pain,andknowledgeindicatetheexistenceoftheself.
Bodyisthatwhichupholdsmovement,thesensesandtheriseofpleasureandpainasarisingoutofthecontactof
sensewithsenseobjects[Footnoterefl];thefivesensesarederivedfromthefiveelements,suchasprthivi,ap,
tejas,vyuandks'a;smell,taste,colour,touch,andsoundarethequalitiesoftheabovefiveelements,andthese
arealsotheobjectsofthesenses.Thefactthatmanycognitionscannotoccuratanyonemomentindicatesthe
existenceofmind(_manas_).Endeavourmeanswhatisdonebyspeech,understanding,andbody.Do@sas
(attachment,antipathy,etc)arethosewhichleadmentovirtueandvice.Painisthatwhichcausessuffering
[Footnoteref2].Ultimatecessationfrompainiscalledapavarga[Footnoteref3].Doubtariseswhenthrough
confusionofsimilarqualitiesorconflictingopinionsetc.,onewantstosettleoneofthetwoalternatives.Thatfor
attainingwhich,orforgivingupwhichonesetshimselftoworkiscalledprayojana.

Illustrativeexample(_d@r@s@tnta_)isthatonwhichboththecommonmanandtheexpert(_park@saka_)
holdthesameopinion.Establishedtextsorconclusions(_siddhnta_)areoffourkinds,viz(1)thosewhichare
acceptedbyallschoolsofthoughtcalledthe_sarvatantrasiddhnta_;(2)thosewhichareheldbyoneschoolor
similarschoolsbutopposedbyotherscalledthe_pratitantrasiddhnta_;(3)thosewhichbeingacceptedother
conclusionswillalsonaturallyfollowcalled_adhikara@nasiddhnta_;(4)thoseoftheopponent'sviewswhichare
uncriticallygrantedbyadebater,whoproceedsthentorefutetheconsequencesthatfollowandtherebyshowhis
ownspecialskillandbringtheopponent'sintellecttodisrepute(_abhyupagamasiddhnta_)[Footnoteref4].The
premissesarefive:

__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:HereIhavefollowedVtsyyana'smeaning.]

[Footnote2:Vtsyyanacommentsherethatwhenonefindsallthingsfullofmisery,hewishestoavoid
misery,andfindingbirthtobeassociatedwithpainbecomesunattachedandthusisemancipated.]

[Footnote3:Vtsyyanawantstoemphasisethatthereisnoblissinsalvation,butonlycessationfrompain.]

[Footnote4:IhavefollowedVtsyyana'sinterpretationhere.]

296

(1)_pratij_(thefirstenunciationofthethingtobeproved);(2)hetu(thereasonwhichestablishesthe
conclusiononthestrengthofthesimilarityofthecaseinhandwithknownexamplesornegativeinstances);
(3)_udhara@na_(positiveornegativeillustrativeinstances);(4)upanaya(corroborationbytheinstance);
(5)nigamana(toreachtheconclusionwhichhasbeenproved).Thencomethedefinitionsoftarka,nir@naya,
vda,jalpa,vita@n@d,thefallacies(hetvbhsa),chala,jti,andnigrahasthna,whichhavebeenenumerated
inthefirststra.

The second book deals with the refutations of objections against the means of right knowledge (pramna). In refutation
of certain objections against the possibility of the happening of doubt, which held that doubt could not happen, since
there was always a difference between the two things regarding which doubt arose, it is held that doubt arises when
the special differentiating characteristics between the two things are not noted. Certain objectors, probably the
Buddhists, are supposed to object to the validity of the pram@na in general and particularly of perceptions on the
ground that if they were generated before the sense-object contact, they could not be due to the latter, and if they are
produced after the sense-object contact, they could not establish the nature of the objects, and if the two happened
together then there would be no notion of succession in our cognitions. To this the Nyya reply is that if there were no
means of right knowledge, then there would be no means of knowledge by means of which the objector would refute
all means of right knowledge; if the objector presumes to have any means of valid knowledge then he cannot say that
there are no means of valid
CHAPTER VIII 202
knowledgeatall.Justasfromthediversekindsofsoundsofdifferentmusicalinstruments,onecaninferthe
previousexistenceofthosedifferentkindsofmusicalinstruments,sofromourknowledgeofobjectswecan
inferthepreviousexistenceofthoseobjectsofknowledge[Footnoteref1].

Thesamethings(e.g.thesenses,etc.)whichareregardedasinstrumentsofrightknowledgewithreferencetothe
rightcognitionofotherthingsmaythemselvesbetheobjectsofright

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Yathpas'ctsiddhenas'abdenaprvasiddhamtodyamanumyatesdhyamcatodyam
sdhanamcas'abda@hantarhitehytodyesvanata@hanumnambhavatti,v@nvdyateve@nu@h
pryyateitisvanavis'e@se@natodyavis'e@sampratipadyatetathprvasiddhamupalabdhivi@sayam
pas'ctsiddhenaupalabdhihetunpratipadyate.Vtsyyanabh@sya,_II.i.15.]

297

knowledge.Therearenohardandfastlimitsthatthosewhichareinstrumentsofknowledgeshouldalwaysbe
treatedasmereinstruments,fortheythemselvesmaybeobjectsofrightknowledge.Themeansofright
knowledge(pram@na)donotrequireothersetsofmeansforrevealingthem,fortheylikethelightofalampin
revealingtheobjectsofrightknowledgerevealthemselvesaswell.

Comingtothequestionofthecorrectnessofthedefinitionofperception,itisheldthatthedefinitionincludesthe
contactofthesoulwiththemind[Footnoteref1].Thenitissaidthatthoughweperceiveonlypartsofthings,yet
sincethereisawhole,theperceptionofthepartwillnaturallyrefertothewhole.Sincewecanpullanddraw
thingswholesexist,andthewholeisnotmerelythepartscollectedtogether,forwereitsoonecouldsaythatwe
perceivedtheultimatepartsortheatoms[Footnoteref2].Someobjectorsholdthatsincetheremaybeaplurality
ofcausesitiswrongtoinferparticularcausesfromparticulareffects.TothistheNyyaansweristhatthereis
alwayssuchadifferenceinthespecificnatureofeacheffectthatifproperlyobservedeachparticulareffectwill
leadustoacorrectinferenceofitsownparticularcause[Footnoteref3].Inrefutingthosewhoobjecttothe
existenceoftimeonthegroundofrelativity,itissaidthatifthepresenttimedidnotexist,thennoperceptionofit
wouldhavebeenpossible.Thepastandfuturealsoexist,forotherwiseweshouldnothaveperceivedthingsas
beingdoneinthepastorasgoingtobedoneinthefuture.Thevalidityofanalogy(upamna)asameansof
knowledgeandthevalidityoftheVedasisthenproved.Thefourpram@nasofperception,inference,analogy,
andscripture

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Herethestras,II.i.2028,areprobablylaterinterpolationstoanswercriticisms,notagainstthe
Nyyadoctrineofperception,butagainstthewordingofthedefinitionofperceptionasgiveninthe,_Nyya
stra_,II.i.4.]

[Footnote2:ThisisarefutationofthedoctrinesoftheBuddhists,whorejectedtheexistenceofwholes
(avayav).OnthissubjectalaterBuddhistmonographbyPanditaAs'oka(9thcenturyA.D.),
_Avayavinirkara@na_in_SixBuddhistNyyaTracts_,maybereferredto.]

[Footnote 3: _Prvodakavis'i@s@tam khalu var@sodakan s'ghrataram srotas

bahutaraphenaphalapar@naks@thdivahanacopalabhamna@h pr@natvena, nadya upari v@r@sto deva
ityanuminoti nodakab@rddhimtre@na. V@atsyyana bh@sya_, II. i. 38. The inference that there has been rain up
the river is not made merely from seeing the rise of water, but from the rainwater augmenting the previous water of
the river and carrying with its current large quantities of foam, fruits, leaves, wood, etc. These characteristics,
associated with the rise of water, mark it as a special kind of rise of water, which can only be due to the happening of
rain up the river].
CHAPTER VIII 203
298

arequitesufficientanditisneedlesstoacceptarthpatti(implication),aitihya(tradition),sambhava(whena
thingisunderstoodintermsofhighermeasurethelowermeasurecontainedinitisalsounderstoodifweknow
thatthereisabushelofcornanywhereweunderstandthatthesamecontainseightgallonsofcornaswell)and
abhva(nonexistence)asseparatepram@nasforthetraditionisincludedinverbaltestimonyandarthpatti,
sambhavaandabhvaareincludedwithininference.

Thevalidityoftheseaspram@nasisrecognized,buttheyaresaidtobeincludedinthefourpram@nas
mentionedbefore.Thetheoryoftheeternityofsoundisthenrefutedandthenoneternityprovedingreatdetail.
Themeaningofwordsissaidtorefertoclassnotions(_jti_),individuals(_vyakti_),andthespecificpositionof
thelimbs(_k@rti_),bywhichtheclassnotionismanifested.Class(_jti_}isdefinedasthatwhichproduces
thenotionofsameness(_samnaprasavtmikjti@h_).

Thethirdbookbeginswiththeproofsfortheexistenceoftheselfortman.Itissaidthateachofthesensesis
associatedwithitsownspecificobject,buttheremustexistsomeotherentityinuswhichgatheredtogetherthe
differentsensecognitionsandproducedtheperceptionofthetotalobjectasdistinguishedfromtheseparate
senseperceptions.Iftherewerenoselfthentherewouldbenosinininjuringthebodiesofmen:againifthere
werenopermanentself,noonewouldbeabletorecognizethingsashavingseenthembefore;thetwoimages
producedbytheeyesinvisualperceptioncouldnotalsohavebeenunitedtogetherasonevisualperceptionofthe
things[Footnoteref1];moreoveriftherewerenopermanentcognizerthenbythesightofasourfruitonecould
notberemindedofitssourtaste.Ifconsciousnessbelongedtothesensesonly,thentherewouldbenorecognition,
fortheexperienceofonecouldnotberecognizedbyanother.Ifitissaidthattheunityofsensationscouldaswell
beeffectedbymanas(mind),thenthemanaswouldservethesamepurposeasselfanditwouldonlybeaquarrel
overaname,forthisentitytheknowerwouldrequiresomeinstrumentbywhichitwouldcoordinatethe
sensationsandcognize;unlessmanasisadmittedasaseparateinstrumentofthesoul,thenthoughthesense
perceptionscouldbeexplainedasbeingtheworkofthe

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:AccordingtoVtsyyana,inthetwoeyeswehavetwodifferentsenses.Udyotakara,however,
thinksthatthereisonevisualsensewhichworksinbotheyes.]

299

senses,yetimagining,thinking,etc.,couldnotbeexplained.Anotherargumentfortheadmissionofsoulisthis,
thatinfantsshowsignsofpleasureandpaininquiteearlystagesofinfancyandthiscouldnotbeduetoanything
butsimilarexperiencesinpreviouslives.Moreovereverycreatureisbornwithsomedesires,andnooneisseen
tobebornwithoutdesires.Allattachmentsanddesiresareduetopreviousexperiences,andthereforeitis
arguedthatdesiresininfantsareduetotheirexperienceinpreviousexistences.

Thebodyismadeupofthek@sitielement.Thevisualsenseismaterialandsoalsoareallothersenses[Footnote
refl].Incidentallytheviewheldbysomethattheskinistheonlyorganofsensationisalsorefuted.Theearth
possessesfourqualities,waterthree,firetwo,airone,andetherone,butthesenseofsmell,taste,eye,andtouch
whicharemaderespectivelybythefourelementsofearth,etc.,canonlygraspthedistinctivefeaturesofthe
elementsofwhichtheyaremade.Thusthoughtheorganofsmellismadebyearthwhichcontainsfourqualities,
itcanonlygraspthedistinctivequalityofearth,viz.smell.

AgainsttheS@mkhyadistinctionofbuddhi(cognition)andcit(pureintelligence)itissaidthatthereisno
differencebetweenthebuddhiandcit. We do not find in our consciousness two elements of a phenomenal and a
non-phenomenal consciousness, but only one, by whichever name it may be called. The S@mkhya epistemology
that the anta@hkara@na assumes diverse forms in cognitive acts is also denied, and these are
CHAPTER VIII 204
explainedonthesuppositionofcontactsofmanaswiththesenses,tmanandexternalobjects.TheBuddhist
objectionagainsttheS@mkhyaexplanationthattheanta@hkara@nascatchreflectionfromtheexternalworld
justasacrystaldoesfromthecolouredobjectsthatmaylienearit,thattherewerereallymomentary
productionsofcrystalsandnopermanentcrystalcatchingdifferentreflectionsatdifferenttimesisrefutedby
Nyya;foritsaysthatitcannotbesaidthatallcreationsaremomentary,butitcanonlybeagreedtointhose
caseswheremomentarinesswasactuallyexperienced.Inthecaseofthetransformationofmilkintocurdthereis
nocominginofnewqualitiesanddisappearanceofoldones,but

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ItiswelltorememberthatS@mkhyadidnotbelievethatthesenseswereconstitutedofthe
grosselements.ButtheS@mkhyaYogaviewrepresentedin_treyasa@mhit_(Caraka)regardedthe
sensesasbhautikaorconstitutedofthegrosselements.]

300

theoldmilkisdestroyedandthecurdoriginatesanew.Thecontactofmanaswithsoul(_tman_)takesplace
withinthebodyandnotinthatpartoftmanwhichisoutsidethebody;knowledgebelongstotheselfandnotto
thesensesortheobjectforevenwhentheyaredestroyedknowledgeremains.Newcognitionsdestroytheold
ones.Notworecollectionscanbesimultaneous.Desireandantipathyalsobelongtothesoul.Noneofthesecan
belongeithertothebodyortothemind(manas).Manascannotbeconsciousforitisdependentuponself.Again
ifitwasconsciousthentheactionsdonebyitwouldhavetobebornebytheselfandonecannotreapthefruitsof
theactionsofanother.Thecausesofrecollectiononthepartofselfaregivenasfollows:(1)attention,(2)context,
(3)repetition,(4)sign,(5)association,(6)likeness,(7)associationofthepossessorandthepossessedormasterand
servant,orthingswhicharegenerallyseentofolloweachother,(8)separation(asofhusbandandwife),(9)
simpleremployment,(10)opposition,(11)excess,(12)thatfromwhichanythingcanbegot,(13)coverand
covered,(14)pleasureandpaincausingmemoryofthatwhichcausedthem,(15)fear,(16)entreaty,(17)action
suchasthatofthechariotremindingthecharioteer,(18)affection,(19)meritanddemerit[Footnoteref1].Itis
saidthatknowledgedoesnotbelongtobody,andthenthequestionoftheproductionofthebodyasdueto
ad@r@s@taisdescribed.Salvation(_apavarga_)iseffectedbythemanasbeingpermanentlyseparatedfromthe
soul(tman)throughthedestructionofkarma.

Inthefourthbookincourseoftheexaminationofdo@sa(defects),itissaidthatmoha(ignorance),isattheroot
ofallotherdefectssuchasrga(attachment)anddve@sa(antipathy).AsagainsttheBuddhistviewthatathing
couldbeproducedbydestruction,itissaidthatdestructionisonlyastageintheprocessoforigination.s'varais
regardedasthecauseoftheproductionofeffectsofdeedsperformedbymen'sefforts,formanisnotalways
foundtoattainsuccessaccordingtohisefforts.Areferenceismadetothedoctrineofthosewhosaythatallthings
havecomeintobeingbynocause(_animitta_),forthennocausewouldbethecause,whichisimpossible.

Thedoctrineofsomethatallthingsareeternalisnextrefutedonthegroundthatwealwaysseethings
producedanddestroyed.

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Nyyastra_III.ii.44.]
301

The doctrine of the nihilistic Buddhists (s'nyavdin Bauddhas) that all things are what they are by virtue of their
relations to other things, and that of other Buddhists who hold that there are merely the qualities and parts but no
substances or wholes, are then refuted. The fruits of karmas are regarded as being like the fruits of
CHAPTER VIII 205
treeswhichtakesometimebeforetheycanripen.Eventhoughtheremaybepleasureshereandthere,birth
meanssorrowformen,foreventhemanwhoenjoyspleasureistormentedbymanysorrows,andsometimesone
mistakespainsforpleasures.Asthereisnosorrowinthemanwhoisindeepdreamlesssleep,sothereisno
affliction(_kles'a_)inthemanwhoattainsapavarga(salvation)[Footnoteref1].Whenoncethisstateisattained
allefforts(_prav@rtti_)ceaseforever,forthougheffortswerebeginninglesswithustheywerealldueto
attachment,antipathy,etc.Thenthereareshortdiscussionsregardingthewayinwhichegoism(_aha@mkra_)
ceaseswiththeknowledgeofthetruecausesofdefects(_do@sa_);aboutthenatureofwholeandpartsandabout
thenatureofatoms(_a@nus_)whichcannotfurtherbedivided.Adiscussionisthenintroducedagainstthe
doctrineoftheVijnavdinsthatnothingcanberegardedashavinganyrealitywhenseparatedfromthoughts.
IncidentallyYogaismentionedasleadingtorightknowledge.

Thewholeofthefifthbookwhichseemstobealateradditionisdevotedtotheenumerationofdifferentkindsof
refutations(_nigrahasthna_)andfutilities(_jti_).

Caraka,NyyastrasandVais'e@sikastras.

Whenwecomparethe_Nyyastras_withthe_Vais'e@sikastras_wefindthatintheformertwoorthree
differentstreamsofpurposeshavemet,whereasthelatterismuchmorehomogeneous.Thelargeamountof
materialsrelatingtodebatestreatedasapracticalartfordefeatinganopponentwouldleadonetosupposethatit
wasprobablyoriginallycompiledfromsomeotherexistingtreatiseswhichwereusedbyHindusandBuddhists
alikeforrenderingthemselvesfittoholdtheirownindebateswiththeiropponents[Footnoteref2].This
assumptionisjustifiedwhen

____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:VtsyyananotesthatthisisthesalvationofhimwhohasknownBrahman,IV.i.63.]

[Footnote2:Areferencetothe_Suvar@naprabhsastra_showsthattheBuddhistmissionariesusedtoget
certainpreparationsforimprovingtheirvoiceinordertobeabletoarguewithforce,andtheytooktothe
worshipofSarasvat(goddessoflearning),whotheysupposedwouldhelptheminbringingreadilybeforetheir
mindalltheinformationandideasofwhichtheystoodsomuchinneedatthetimeofdebates.]

302

wecomparethefutilities(jti)quibbles(chala),etc.,relatingtodisputationsasfoundinthe_Nyyastra_with
thosethatarefoundinthemedicalworkofCaraka(78A.D.),III.viii.TherearenootherworksinearlySanskrit
literature,exceptingthe_Nyyastra_and_Carakasa@mhit_whichhavetreatedofthesematters.Caraka's
descriptionofsomeofthecategories(e.g.d@r@s@tnta,prayojana,pratijandvita@n@d)followsvery
closelythedefinitionsgivenofthoseinthe_Nyyastras_.Thereareotherssuchasthedefinitionsofjalpa,chala,
nigrahasthna,etc.,wherethedefinitionsoftwoauthoritiesdiffermore.Therearesomeotherlogicalcategories
mentionedinCaraka(e.g._prati@s@thpan,jijs,vyavasya,vkyado@sa,vkyapras'a@ms,upalambha,
parihra,abhyanuj_,etc.)whicharenotfoundinthe_Nyyastra_[Footnoteref1].Again,thevarioustypes
offutilities(jti)andpointsofopponent'srefutation(nigrahasthna)mentionedinthe_Nyyastra_arenot
foundinCaraka.Therearesometermswhicharefoundinslightlyvariantformsinthetwoworks,e.g.aupamya
in_Caraka,upamna_in_Nyyastra,arthpatti_in_Nyyastra_and_arthaprpti_inCaraka.Carakadoes
notseemtoknowanythingabouttheNyyaworkonthissubject,anditisplainthatthetreatmentoftheseterms
ofdisputationsintheCaraka is much simpler and less technical than what we find in the _Nyya stras_. If we leave
out the varieties of jti and nigrahasthna of the fifth book, there is on the whole a great agreement between the
treatment of Caraka and that of the _Nyya stras_. It seems therefore in a high degree probable that both Caraka and
the _Nyya stras_ were indebted for their treatment of these terms of disputation to some other earlier work. Of
these, Caraka's compilation was earlier, whereas the compilation of the _Nyya stras_ represents a later work when a
hotter atmosphere
CHAPTER VIII 206
ofdisputationshadnecessitatedtheuseofmoretechnicaltermswhichareembodiedinthiswork,butwhich
werenotcontainedintheearlierwork.Itdoesnotseemthereforethatthispartoftheworkcouldhavebeen
earlierthanthesecondcenturyA.D.Anotherstreamflowingthroughthe_Nyyastras_isthatofapolemic
againstthedoctrineswhichcouldbeattributedtotheSautrntikaBuddhists,theVijnavdaBuddhists,the
nihilists,theS@mkhya,theCrvka,andsomeotherunknownschoolsofthoughttowhichwefindno

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:LikeVais'e@sika,Carakadoesnotknowthethreefolddivisionofinference(_anumna_)as
_prvavat,s'e@savatandsmnyatod@r@s@ta_.]

303

furtherallusionelsewhere.The_Vais'e@sikastras_aswehavealreadyseenhadarguedonlyagainstthe
Mm@ms,andultimatelyagreedwiththemonmostpoints.ThedisputewithMm@msinthe_Nyya
stras_isthesameasintheVais'e@sikaoverthequestionofthedoctrineoftheeternalityofsound.Thequestion
oftheselfvalidityofknowledge(_svata@hprm@nyavda_)andtheakhytidoctrineofillusionofthe
Mm@msists,whichformthetwochiefpointsofdiscussionbetweenlaterMm@msandlaterNyya,are
neveralludedtointhe_Nyyastras_.TheadvocacyofYogamethods(_Nyyastras_,IV.ii.3842and46)seems
alsotobeanalienelement;thesearenotfoundinVais'e@sikaandarenotinkeepingwiththegeneraltendency
ofthe_Nyyastras_,andtheJapanesetraditionthatMirokaddedthemlateronasMahmahopdhyya
HaraprasdaS'astrihaspointedout[Footnoterefl]isnotimprobable.

The_Vais'e@sikastras_,III.i.18andIII.ii.1,describeperceptionalknowledgeasproducedbytheclose
proximityoftheself(tman),thesensesandtheobjectsofsense,andtheyalsoadheretothedoctrine,thatcolour
canonlybeperceivedunderspecialconditionsofsa@mskra(conglomerationetc.).Thereasonforinferringthe
existenceofmanasfromthenonsimultaneity(_ayaugapadya_)ofknowledgeandeffortsisalmostthesamewith
Vais'e@sikaaswithNyya.The_Nyyastras_giveamoretechnicaldefinitionofperception,butdonotbringin
thequestionsofsa@mskraorudbhtarpavattvawhichVais'e@sikadoes.OnthequestionofinferenceNyya
givesthreeclassificationsasprvavat,s'e@savatandsamnyatod@r@s@ta,butnodefinition.The_Vais'e@sika
stras_donotknowoftheseclassifications,andgiveonlyparticulartypesorinstancesofinference(V.S.III.i.7
17,IX.ii.12,45).Inferenceissaidtobemadewhenathingisincontactwithanother,orwhenitisinarelation
ofinherenceinit,orwhenitinheresinathirdthing;onekindofeffectmayleadtotheinferenceofanotherkind
ofeffect,andsoon.Thesearebutmerecollectionsofspecificinstancesofinferencewithoutreachingageneral
theory.Thedoctrineofvypti(concomitanceofhetu(reason)and_sdhya_(probandum))whichbecameso
importantinlaterNyyahasneverbeenproperlyformulatedeitherinthe_Nyyastras_orintheVais'e@sika.
_Vais'e@sikasutra_,III.i.24,nodoubtassumestheknowledgeofconcomitancebetweenhetuandsadhya
(_prasiddhiprvakatvtapades'asya_),

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_J.A.S.B._1905.]

304

butthetechnicalvyptiisnotknown,andtheconnotationoftheterm_prasiddhiprvakatva_ofVais'e@sika
seemstobemoreloosethantheterm_vypti_asweknowitinthelaterNyya.The_Vais'e@sikastras_donot
countscriptures(_s'abda_)asaseparatepram@na,buttheytacitlyadmitthegreatvalidityoftheVedas.With
_Nyyastras_s'abdaasapram@naappliesnotonlytotheVedas,buttothetestimonyofanytrustworthy
person,andVtsyyanasaysthattrustworthypersonsmaybeofthreekinds_@r@si,rya_andmleccha
(foreigners).UpamnawhichisregardedasameansofrightcognitioninNyyaisnotevenreferredto in the
_Vais'e@sika stras_. The _Nyya stras_ know of other pram@nas, such as _arthpatti,
CHAPTER VIII 207
sambhava_andaitihya,butincludethemwithinthepram@nasadmittedbythem,butthe_Vais'e@sikastras_
donotseemtoknowthematall[Footnoteref1].The_Vais'e@sikastras_believeintheperceptionofnegation
(abhva)throughtheperceptionofthelocustowhichsuchnegationrefers(IX.i.110).The_Nyyastras_(II.ii.
1,2,712)considerthatabhvaasnonexistenceornegationcanbeperceived;whenoneasksanotherto"bring
theclotheswhicharenotmarked,"hefindsthatmarksareabsentinsomeclothesandbringsthem;soitis
arguedthatabsenceornonexistencecanbedirectlyperceived[Footnoteref2].Thoughthereisthusan
agreementbetweentheNyyaandthe_Vais'e@sikastras_abouttheacceptanceofabhvaasbeingdueto
perception,yettheirmethodofhandlingthematterisdifferent.The_Nyyastras_saynothingaboutthe
categoriesof_dravya,gu@na,karma,vis'e@sa_and_samavya_whichformthemainsubjectsofVais'e@ska
discussions[Footnoteref3].The_Nyyastras_takemuchpainstoprovethematerialityofthesenses.Butthis
questiondoesnotseemtohavebeenimportantwithVais'e@sika.TheslightreferencetothisquestioninVIII.ii.
56canhardlyberegardedassufficient.The_Vais'e@sikastras_donotmentionthenameof"s'vara,"
whereasthe_Nyyastras_trytoprovehisexistenceoneschatologicalgrounds.Thereasonsgiveninsupportof
theexistenceofselfinthe_Nyyastras_aremainlyonthegroundoftheunityofsensecognitionsandthe
phenomenonofrecognition,whereasthe

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Theonlyoldauthoritywhichknowsthesepram@nasisCaraka.Buthealsogivesan
interpretationofsambhavawhichisdifferentfromNyyaandcalls_arthpattiarthaprpti_(CarakaIII.
viii.).]

[Footnote2:ThedetailsofthisexamplearetakenfromVtsyyana'scommentary.]

[Footnote3:The_Nyyastra_nodoubtincidentallygivesadefinitionofjtias"_samnaprasavtmik
jti@h_"(II.ii.71).]

305

Vaisesikalaysitsmainemphasisonselfconsciousnessasafactofknowledge.BoththeNyyaandthe
_Vais'e@sikastras_admittheexistenceofatoms,butallthedetailsofthedoctrineofatomicstructureinlater
NyyaVais'e@sikaareabsentthere.TheVai'se@sikacallssalvation_ni@hs'reyasa_or_mok@sa_andthe
Nyyaapavarga.Mok@sawithVais'e@sikaisthepermanentcessationofconnectionwithbody;theapavarga
withNyyaiscessationofpain[Footnoterefl].Inlatertimesthemainpointsofdifferencebetweenthe
Vais'e@sikaandNyyaaresaidtoliewithregardtotheoryofthenotionofnumber,changesofcolourinthe
moleculesbyheat,etc.Thustheformeradmittedaspecialprocedureofthemindbywhichcognitionsofnumber
aroseinthemind(e.g.atthefirstmomentthereisthesensecontactwithanobject,thenthenotionofoneness,
thenfromasenseofrelativenessapek@sbuddhinotionoftwo,thenanotionoftwoness,andthenthenotion
oftwothings);again,thedoctrineofpilupka(changesofqualitiesbyheatareproducedinatomsandnotin
moleculesasNyyaheld)washeldbyVais'e@sika,whichtheNaiyyikasdidnotadmit[Footnoteref2].Butas
the_Nyyastras_aresilentonthesepoints,itisnotpossibletosaythatsuchwerereallythedifferencesbetween
earlyNyyaandearlyVaise@sika.Thesedifferencesmaybesaidtoholdbetweenthelaterinterpretersof
Vais'e@sikaandthelaterinterpretersofNyya.TheVais'e@sikaaswefinditinthecommentaryof
Pras'astapda(probablysixthcenturyA.D.),andtheNyyafromthetimeofUdyotakarahavecometobetreated
asalmostthesamesystemwithslightvariationsonly.Ihavethereforepreferredtotreatthemtogether.Themain
presentationoftheNyyaVais'e@sikaphilosophyinthischapteristhatwhichisfoundfromthesixthcentury
onwards.

TheVais'e@sikaandNyyaLiterature.

It is difficult to ascertain definitely the date of the _Vais'e@sika stras_ by Ka@nda, also called Aulkya the son of
Ulka, though there is every reason to suppose it to be pre-Buddhistic. It
CHAPTER VIII 208
____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ProfessorVanamlVedntatrthaquotesapassagefrom_Sa@mk@sepas'a@nkarajaya_,XVI.68
69in_J.A.S.B._,1905,andanotherpassagefromaNyyawriterBhsarvaja,pp.3941,in_J.A.S.B._,1914,to
showthattheoldNaiyyikasconsideredthattherewasanelementofhappiness(_sukha_)inthestateofmukti
(salvation)whichtheVais'e@sikasdenied.NoevidenceinsupportofthisopinionisfoundintheNyyaorthe
_Vais'e@sikastras_,unlessthecessationofpainwithNyyaisinterpretedasmeaningtheresenceofsomesort
ofblissorhappiness.]

[Footnote2:SeeMdhava's_Sarvadars'anasa@mgrahaAulkyadars'ana_.]

306

appearsfromthe_Vyupurna_thathewasborninPrabhsanearDvrak,andwasthediscipleof
Somas'arm.ThetimeofPras'astapdawhowroteabh@sya(commentary)ofthe_Vais'e@sikastras_cannot
alsounfortunatelybeascertained.ThepeculiarityofPras'astapda'sbh@syaisthisthatunlikeotherbh@syas
(whichfirstgivebriefexplanationsofthetextofthestrasandthencontinuetoelaborateindependent
explanationsbyexplainingthefirstbriefcomments),itdoesnotfollowthestrasbutisanindependent
dissertationbasedontheirmaincontents[Footnoteref1].Thereweretwootherbh@syasonthe_Vais'e@sika
stras_,namely_Rva@nabh@sya_and_Bhardvjav@rtti_,butthesearenowprobablylost.Referencesto
theformerarefoundin_Kira@nvalbhskara_ofPadmanbhaMis'raandalsoin_Ratnaprabh_2.2.II.Four
commentarieswerewrittenonthisbh@sya,namely_Vyomavat_byVyomas'ekharcrya,_Nyyakandal_by
S'ridhara,_Kira@nval_byUdayana(984A.D.)and_Llvat_S'rvatscrya.InadditiontotheseJagads'a
Bha@t@tcryaofNavadvpaandS'a@nkaraMis'rawrotetwoothercommentariesonthe_Pras'astapda
bhsya_,namely_Bhsyaskti_and_Ka@ndarahasya_.S'a@nkaraMis'ra(1425A.D.)alsowrotea
commentaryonthe_Vais'e@sikastras_calledthe_Upaskra_.Ofthese_Nyyakandal_ofS'rdharaon
accountofitssimplicityofstyleandelaboratenatureofexpositionisprobablythebestforamodernstudentof
Vais'e@sika.ItsauthorwasanativeofthevillageofBhris@r@s@tiinBengal(R@dha).Hisfather'snamewas
Baladevaandmother'snamewasAcchokandhewrotehisworkin913S'akaera(990A.D.)ashehimselfwrites
attheendofhiswork.

The_Nyyastra_waswrittenbyAk@sapdaorGautama,andtheearliestcommentaryonitwrittenby
Vtsyyanaisknownasthe_Vtsyyanabh@sya_.ThedateofVtsyyanahasnot

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Thebh@syaofPras'astapdacanhardlyhecalledabh@sya(elaboratecommentary).Hehimself
makesnosuchclaimandcallshisworkacompendiumofthepropertiesofthecategories
(_Padrthadharmasa@mgraha_).Hetakesthecategoriesof_dravya,gu@na,karma,smnya,vis'e@sa_and
_samavya_inorderandwithoutraisinganydiscussionsplainlynarrateswhathehasgottosayonthem.Some
ofthedoctrineswhichareimportantinlaterNyyaVais'e@sikadiscussions,suchasthedoctrineofcreationand
dissolution,doctrineofnumber,thetheorythatthenumberofatomscontributestotheatomicmeasureofthe
molecules,thedoctrineofpilupkainconnectionwiththetransformationofcoloursbyheatoccurinhis
narrationforthefirsttimeasthe_Vais'e@sikastras_aresilentonthesepoints.Itisdifficulttoascertainhis
datedefinitely;heistheearliestwriteronVais'e@sikaavailabletousafterKa@ndaanditisnotimprobable
thathelivedinthe5thor6thcenturyA.D.]

307

been definitely settled, but there is reason to believe that he lived some time in the beginning of the fourth century
A.D. Jacobi places him in 300 A.D. Udyotakara (about 635 A.D.) wrote a _Vrttika_ on Vtsyyana's bh@sya to
establish the Nyya views and to refute the criticisms of the Buddhist logician Di@nnga (about
CHAPTER VIII 209
500A.D.)inhis_Pram@nasamuccaya_.Vcaspatimis'ra(840A.D.)wroteasubcommentaryonthe
_Nyyavrttika_ofUdyotakaracalled_Nyyavrttikattparya@tk_inordertomakecleartherightmeanings
ofUdyotakara's_Vrttika_whichwassinkinginthemudasitwerethroughnumerousotherbadwritings
(_dustarakunibandhapa@nkamagnnm_).Udayana(984A.D.)wroteasubcommentaryonthe
_Ttparya@tk_called_Ttparya@tkparis'uddhi_.Varddhamna(1225A.D.)wroteasubcommentaryon
thatcalledthe_Nyyanibandhapraks'a_.Padmanbhawroteasubcommentaryonthatcalled
_Varddhamnendu_andS'a@nkaraMis'ra(1425A.D.)wroteasubcommentaryonthatcalledthe
_Nyyattparyama@n@dana_.IntheseventeenthcenturyVis'vanthawroteanindependentshortcommentary
knownas_Vis'vanthav@rtti_,onthe_Nyyastra_,andRdhmohanawroteaseparatecommentaryonthe
_Nyyastras_knownas_Nyyastravivara@na_.Inadditiontotheseworksonthe_Nyyastras_manyother
independentworksofgreatphilosophicalvaluehavebeenwrittenontheNyyasystem.Themostimportantof
theseinmedievaltimesisthe_Nyyamajari_ofJayanta(880A.D.),whoflourishedshortlyafter
Vcaspatimis'ra.Jayantachoosessomeofthe_Nyyastras_forinterpretation,buthediscussestheNyyaviews
quiteindependently,andcriticizestheviewsofothersystemsofIndianthoughtofhistime.Itisfarmore
comprehensivethanVcaspati's_Ttparya@tk_,anditsstyleismostdelightfullylucid.Anotherimportant
workisUdayana's_Kusumjali_inwhichhetriestoprovetheexistenceofs'vara(God).Thisworkoughttobe
readwithitscommentary_Praks'a_byVarddhamna(1225A.D.)anditssubcommentaryMakarandaby
Rucidatta(1275A.D.).Udayana's_tmatattvaviveka_isapolemicalworkagainsttheBuddhists,inwhichhe
triestoestablishtheNyyadoctrineofsoul.InadditiontothesewehaveanumberofusefulworksonNyyain
latertimes.Ofthesethefollowingdeservespecialmentioninconnectionwiththepresentwork.
_Bh@spariccheda_byVis'vanthawithitscommentaries_Muktval,Dinakar_and_Rmarudr,
Tarkasamgraha_with_Nyyanir@naya,Tarkabk@s_ofKes'avaMis'rawith

308

thecommentary_Nyyapradpa,Saptapadrth_ofS'ivditya,_Trkikarak@s_ofVaradarjawiththe
commentary_Ni@ska@n@taka_ofMallintha,_Nyyasra_ofMdhavaDevaofthecityofDhraand
_Nyyasiddhntamajar_ofJnakinthaBha@t@tcaryawiththe_Nyyamanjarisara_byYdavcrya,and
_Nyyasiddhntadpa_ofS'a@sadharawith_Prabh_byS'e@snantcrya.

ThenewschoolofNyyaphilosophyknownasNavyaNyyabeganwithGa@nges'aUpdhyyaofMithil,
about1200A.D.Ga@nges'awroteonlyonthefourpram@nasadmittedbytheNyya,viz.pratyak@sa,
anumna,upamna,ands'abda,andnotonanyofthetopicsofNyyametaphysics.Butitsohappenedthat
hisdiscussionsonanumna(inference)attractedunusuallygreatattentioninNavadvpa(Bengal),andlarge
numbersofcommentariesandcommentariesofcommentarieswerewrittenontheanumnaportionofhis
work_Tattvacintma@ni,andmanyindependenttreatisesonsabdaandanumnawerealsowrittenbythe
scholarsofBengal,whichbecamethenceforthforsomecenturiesthehomeofNyyastudies.The
commentariesofRaghunthaS'iroma@ni(1500A.D.),MathurBha@t@tcrya(1580A.D.),Gaddhara
Bha@t@tcrya(1650A.D.)andJagadsaBha@t@tcrya(1590A.D.),commentariesonS'iroma@ni's
commentaryon_Tattvacintmani,hadbeenverywidelyreadinBengal.ThenewschoolofNyyabecame
themostimportantstudyinNavadvpaandthereappearedaseriesofthinkerswhoproducedanextensive
literatureonthesubject[Footnoterefl].Thecontributionwasnotinthedirectionofmetaphysics,theology,
ethics,orreligion,butconsistedmainlyindevelopingasystemoflinguisticnotationstospecifyaccurately
andpreciselyanyconceptoritsrelationwithotherconcepts[Footnoteref2].Thusforexamplewhenthey
wishedtodefinepreciselythenatureoftheconcomitanceofoneconceptwithanother(e.g.smokeandfire),
theywouldsospecifytherelationthattheexactnatureoftheconcomitanceshouldbeclearlyexpressed,and
thatthereshouldbenoconfusionorambiguity.Closesubtleanalyticthinkingandthedevelopmentofa
systemofhighlytechnical

___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: From the latter half of the twelfth century to the third quarter of the sixteenth century the new
CHAPTER VIII 210
schoolofNyyawasstartedinMithil(Behar);butfromthefifteenthtotheseventeenthcenturyBengal
becamepreeminentlythehomeofNyyastudies.SeeMrCakravartt'spaper,_J.A.S.B._1915.Iam
indebtedtoitforsomeofthedatesmentionedinthissection.]

[Footnote2:_s'varnumna_ofRaghunathaaswellashis_Padrthatattvanirpa@na_are,however,notable
exceptions.]

309

expressionsmarkthedevelopmentofthisliterature.Thetechnicalexpressionsinventedbythisschoolwere
thusgenerallyacceptedevenbyothersystemsofthought,wherevertheneedofaccurateandsubtlethinking
wasfelt.ButfromthetimethatSanskritceasedtobethevehicleofphilosophicalthinkinginIndiathe
importanceofthisliteraturehasgraduallylostground,anditcanhardlybehopedthatitwilleverregainits
oldpositionbyattractingenthusiasticstudentsinlargenumbers.

IcannotclosethischapterwithoutmentioningthefactthatsofarasthelogicalportionoftheNyyasystemis
concerned,thoughAk@sapdawasthefirsttowriteacomprehensiveaccountofit,theJainsandBuddhistsin
medievaltimeshadindependentlyworkedatthissubjectandhadcriticizedtheNyyaaccountoflogicandmade
valuablecontributions.InJainalogic_Das'avaiklikaniryukti_ofBhadrabhu(357B.C.),Umsvti's
_Tattvrthdhigamastra_,_Nyyvatra_ofSiddhasenaDivkara(533A.D.)M@nikyaNandi's(800A.D.)
_Park@smukhastra_,and_Pram@nanayatattvlokla@mkra_ofDevaSri(1159A.D.)and
_Prameyakamalamrta@n@da_ofPrabhcandradeservespecialnotice._Pram@nasamuccaya_and
_Nyyapraves'a_ofDi@nnga(500A.D.),_Pram@nayrttikakrik_and_Nyyabindu_ofDharmakrtti(650
A.D.)withthecommentaryofDharmottaraarethemostinterestingoftheBuddhistworksonsystematiclogic
[Footnoterefl].ThediversepointsofdifferencebetweentheHindu,JainandBuddhistlogicrequiretobedealt
withinaseparateworkonIndianlogicandcanhardlybetreatedwithinthecompassofthepresentvolume.

Itisinterestingtonoticethatbetweenthe_Vtsyyanabh@sya_andtheUdyotakara's_Vrttika_noHindu
workonlogicofimportanceseemstohavebeenwritten:itappearsthatthescienceoflogicinthisperiodwasin
thehandsoftheJainsandtheBuddhists;anditwasDi@nnga'scriticismofHinduNyyathatroused
Udyotakaratowritethe_Vrttika_.TheBuddhistandtheJainmethodoftreatinglogicseparatelyfrom
metaphysicsasanindependentstudywasnotacceptedbytheHindustillwecometoGa@nges'a,andthereis
probablyonlyoneHinduworkofimportanceonNyyaintheBuddhiststylenamely_Nyyasra_of
Bhsarvaja.OtherolderHinduworksgenerallytreatedof

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:SeeIndianLogicMedievalSchool,byDrS.C.Vidybh@sa@na,forabibliographyofJainand
BuddhistLogic.]

310

inferenceonlyalongwithmetaphysicalandotherpointsofNyyainterest[Footnoteref1].

ThemaindoctrineoftheNyyaVais'e@sikaPhilosophy[Footnoteref2].

The Nyya-Vais'e@sika having dismissed the doctrine of momentariness took a common-sense view of things, and held
that things remain permanent until suitable collocations so arrange themselves that the thing can be destroyed. Thus
the jug continues to remain a jug unless or until it is broken to pieces by the stroke of a stick. Things exist not because
they can produce an impression on us, or serve my purposes either directly or through knowledge, as the Buddhists
suppose, but because existence is one of their characteristics. If I or you
CHAPTER VIII 211
oranyotherperceiverdidnotexist,thethingswouldcontinuetoexistallthesame.Whethertheyproduceany
effectonusorontheirsurroundingenvironmentsisimmaterial.Existenceisthemostgeneralcharacteristicof
things,anditisonaccountofthisthatthingsaretestifiedbyexperiencetobeexisting.

AstheNyyaVais'e@sikasdependedsolelyonexperienceandonvalidreasons,theydismissedtheS@mkhya
cosmology,butacceptedtheatomicdoctrineofthefourelements(_bhtas_),earth(_k@siti_),water(_ap_),fire
(_tejas_),andair(_marut_).Theseatomsareeternal;thefifthsubstance(_ks'a_)isallpervasiveandeternal.It
isregardedasthecauseofpropagatingsound;thoughallpervadingandthusintouchwiththeearsofall
persons,itmanifestssoundonlyintheeardrum,asitisonlytherethatitshowsitselfasasenseorganand
manifestssuchsoundsasthemandeservestohearbyreasonofhismeritanddemerit.Thusadeafmanthough
hehastheks'aashissenseofhearing,cannothearonaccountofhisdemeritwhichimpedesthefacultyofthat
senseorgan[Footnoteref3].Inadditiontothesetheyadmittedtheexistenceoftime(_kla_)asextendingfrom
thepastthroughthepresenttothe

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:AlmostallthebooksonNyyaandVais'e@sikareferredtohavebeenconsultedinthewritingofthis
chapter.Thosewhowanttobeacquaintedwithafullerbibliographyofthenewschooloflogicshouldrefertothe
papercalled"TheHistoryofNavyaNyyainBengal,"byMr.Cakravarttin_J.A.S.B._1915.]

[Footnote2:IhavetreatedNyyaandVais'e@sikaasthesamesystem.Whatevermayhavebeentheiroriginal
differences,theyareregardedsinceabout600A.D.asbeingincompleteagreementexceptinsomeminorpoints.
Theviewsofonesystemareoftensupplementedbythoseoftheother.Theoriginalcharacterofthetwosystems
hasalreadybeentreated.]

[Footnote3:See_Nyyakandal_,pp.5964.]

311

endlessfuturitybeforeus.Hadtherebeennotimewecouldhavenoknowledgeofitandtherewouldbenothing
toaccountforourtimenotionsassociatedwithallchanges.TheS@mkhyadidnotadmittheexistenceofany
realtime;tothemtheunitofklaisregardedasthetimetakenbyanatomtotraverseitsownunitofspace.It
hasnoexistenceseparatefromtheatomsandtheirmovements.Theappearanceofklaasaseparateentityisa
creationofourbuddhi_(buddhinirm@na)asitrepresentstheorderormodeinwhichthebuddhirecordsits
perceptions.ButklainNyyaVais'e@sikaisregardedasasubstanceexistingbyitself.Inaccordancewiththe
changesofthingsitrevealsitselfaspast,present,andfuture.S@mkhyaregardeditaspast,present,andfuture,
asbeingthemodesoftheconstitutionofthethingsinitsdifferentmanifestingstagesofevolution_(adhvan)_.The
astronomersregardeditasbeingcluetothemotionoftheplanets.ThesemustallbecontrastedwiththeNyya
Vais'e@sikaconceptionofkalawhichisregardedasanallpervading,partlesssubstancewhichappearsasmany
inassociationwiththechangesrelatedtoit[Footnoterefl].

The seventh substance is relative space _(dik)_. It is that substance by virtue of which things are perceived as being on
the right, left, east, west, upwards and downwards; kla like dik is also one. But yet tradition has given us varieties of it
in the eight directions and in the upper and lower [Footnote ref 2]. The eighth substance is the soul _(tman)_ which is
all-pervading. There are separate tmans for each person; the qualities of knowledge, feelings of pleasure and pain,
desire, etc. belong to _tman_. Manas (mind) is the ninth substance. It is atomic in size and the vehicle of memory; all
affections of the soul such as knowing, feeling, and willing, are generated by the connection of manas with soul, the
senses and the objects. It is the intermediate link which connects the soul with the senses, and thereby produces the
affections of knowledge, feeling, or willing. With each single connection of soul with manas we have a separate
affection of the soul, and thus our intellectual experience is conducted in a series, one coming after another and not
simultaneously. Over and above all these we have Isvara. The definition
CHAPTER VIII 212
___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_Nyyakandal,_pp.6466,and_Nyyamajar_,pp.136139.The_Vais'e@sikastras_
regardedtimeasthecauseofthingswhichsufferchangebutdenieditofthingswhichareeternal.]

[Footnote2:See_Nyyakandal,_pp.6669,and_Nyayamajar_,p.140.]

312

ofsubstanceconsistsinthis,thatitisindependentbyitself,whereastheotherthingssuchasquality(_gu@na_),
action(_karma_),samenessorgenerality(_smnya_),specialityorspecificindividuality(_vis'e@sa_)andthe
relationofinherence(_samavya_)cannotshowthemselveswithoutthehelpofsubstance(_dravya_).Dravyais
thustheplaceofrest(_s'ray_)onwhichalltheothersdepend(_s'@rta_).Dravya,gu@na,karma,smnya,
vis'e@sa,andsamavyaarethesixoriginalentitiesofwhichallthingsintheworldaremadeup[Footnoteref1].
Whenamanthroughsomespecialmerit,bythecultivationofreasonandathoroughknowledgeofthefallacies
andpitfallsinthewayofrightthinking,comestoknowtherespectivecharacteristicsanddifferencesoftheabove
entities,heceasestohaveanypassionsandtoworkinaccordancewiththeirpromptingsandattainsaconviction
ofthenatureofself,andisliberated[Footnoteref2].TheNyyaVais'e@sikaisapluralisticsystemwhichneither
triestoreducethediversityofexperiencetoanyuniversalprinciple,nordismissespatentfactsofexperienceon
thestrengthofthedemandsofthelogicalcoherenceofmereabstractthought.Theentitiesitadmitsaretaken
directlyfromexperience.Theunderlyingprincipleisthatattherootofeachkindofperceptiontheremustbe
somethingtowhichtheperceptionisdue.Itclassifiedtheperceptsandconceptsofexperienceintoseveral
ultimatetypesorcategories(_padrtha_),andheldthatthenotionofeachtypewasduetothepresenceofthat
entity.Thesetypesaresixinnumberdravya,gu@na,etc.Ifwetakeapercept"Iseearedbook,"thebook
appearstobeanindependententityonwhichreststheconceptof"redness"and"oneness,"andwethuscallthe
bookasubstance(_dravya_);dravyaisthusdefinedasthatwhichhasthecharacteristicofadravya
(_dravyatva_).Soalsogu@naandkarma.Inthesubdivisionofdifferentkindsofdravyaalsothesameprinciple
ofclassificationisfollowed.IncontrastingitwithS@mkhyaorBuddhismweseethatforeachunitofsensation
(say

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Abhva_(negation)asdependentonbhva(position)ismentionedinthe_Vais'e@sikastras_.
LaterNyyawriterssuchasUdayanainclude_abhva_asaseparatecategory,butS'rdharaacontemporaryof
UdayanarightlyremarksthatabhvawasnotcountedbyPras'astapdaasitwasdependenton
bhva"_abhvasyaprthaganupades'a@hbhvapratantrytnatvabhvt_."_Nyyakandal_,p.6,and
_Lak@sa@nval_,p.2.]

[Footnote2:"_Tattvatojte@subhydhytmike@suvi@saye@sudo@sadars'antviraktasya
samhniv@rttautmajasyatadarthnikarmnyakurvatahtatparitygasdhannis'rutism@rtyuditni
asa@nkalpitaphalniupdadnasyatmajnamabhyasyata@hprak@r@s@tanivarttakadharmopacayesati
paripakvtmajnasytyantikas'arraviyogasyabhvt._"_Ibid._p.7.]

313

whiteness)thelatterwouldadmitacorrespondingreal,butNyyaVais'e@sikawouldcollect"allwhiteness"
underthenameof"thequalityofwhitecolour"whichtheatompossessed[Footnoterefl].Theyonlyregardedas
aseparateentitywhatrepresentedanultimatemodeofthought.Theydidnotenquirewhethersuchnotionscould
beregardedasthemodificationofsomeothernotionornot;butwhenevertheyfoundthatthereweresome
experienceswhichweresimilaranduniversal,theyclassedthemasseparateentitiesorcategories.
The six Padrthas: Dravya, Gu@na, Karma, Smnya, Vis'e@sa, Samavya.
CHAPTER VIII 213
Ofthesixclassesofentitiesorcategories(_padrtha_)wehavealreadygivensomeaccountofdravya
[Footnoteref2].Letusnowturntotheothers.Ofthequalities(_gu@na_)thefirstonecalled_rpa_
(colour)isthatwhichcanbeapprehendedbytheeyealoneandnotbyanyothersense.Thecoloursare
white,blue,yellow,red,green,brownandvariegated(_citra_).Coloursarefoundonlyink@siti,apand
tejas.Thecoloursofapandtejasarepermanent(_nitya_},butthecolourofk@sitichangeswhenheatis
applied,andthis,S'rdharaholds,isduetothefactthatheatchangestheatomicstructureofk@siti(earth)
andthustheoldconstitutionofthesubstancebeingdestroyed,itsoldcolourisalsodestroyed,andanewone
isgenerated.Rpaisthegeneralnameforthespecificindividualcolours.Thereisthegenus_rpatva_
(colourness),andtherpagu@na(quality)isthatonwhichreststhisgenus;rpaisnotitselfagenusand
canbeapprehendedbytheeye.

Thesecondisrasa(taste),thatqualityofthingswhichcanbeapprehendedonlybythetongue;thesearesweet,
sour,pungent(_ka@tu_),astringent(ka@sya)andbitter(tikta).Onlyk@sitiandaphavetaste.Thenatural
tasteofapissweetness.Rasalikerpaalsodenotesthegenusrasatva,andrasaasqualitymustbe
distinguishedfromrasaasgenus,thoughbothofthemareapprehendedbythetongue.

Thethirdisgandha(odour),thatqualitywhichcanbeapprehendedbythenosealone.Itbelongstok@siti
alone.Water

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ThereferenceistoSautrntikaBuddhism,"yoyovruddhdhysavnnsveka@h."See
Pa@n@dits'oka's_Avayavinirkarana,SixBuddhistNyyatracts_.

[Footnote2:Theword"padrtha"literallymeansdenotationsofwords.]
314

orairisapprehendedashavingodouronaccountofthepresenceofearthmaterials.

Thefourthis_spars'a_(touch),thatqualitywhichcanbeapprehendedonlybytheskin.Therearethreekindsof
touch,cold,hot,neitherhotnorcold.Spars'abelongstok@siti;ap,tejas,andvyu.Thefifth_s'abda_(sound)is
anattributeofks'a.Hadtherebeennoks'atherewouldhavebeennosound.

Thesixthissa@mkhy(number),thatentityofqualitybelongingtothingsbyvirtueofwhichwecancountthem
asone,two,three,etc.Theconceptionofnumberstwo,three,etc.isduetoarelativeoscillatorystateofthemind
(_apek@sbuddhi_);thuswhentherearetwojugsbeforemyeyes,IhavethenotionThisisonejugandthatis
anotherjug.Thisiscalledapek@sbuddhi;theninthetwojugstherearisesthequalityoftwoness(_dvitva_)and
thenanindeterminateperception(_nirvikalpadvitvagu@na_)ofdvitvainusandthenthedeterminate
perceptionsthattherearethetwojugs.Theconceptionsofothernumbersaswellasofmanyariseinasimilar
manner[Footnoteref1].

Theseventhisparimiti(measure),thatentityofqualityinthingsbyvirtueofwhichweperceivethemasgreator
smallandspeakofthemassuch.Themeasureofthepartlessatomsiscalled_parima@n@dalaparim@na_;itis
eternal,anditcannotgeneratethemeasureofanyotherthing.Itsmeasureisitsownabsolutely;whentwoatoms
generateadyad(_dvya@nuka_)itisnotthemeasureoftheatomthatgeneratesthea@nu(atomic)andthe
hrasva (small) measure of the dyad molecule (_dvya@nuka_), for then the size (_parim@na_) of it would have been
still smaller than the measure of the atom (_parima@n@dala_), whereas the measure of the dya@nuka is of a different
kind, namely the small (_hrasva_) [Footnote ref 2]. Of course two atoms generate a dyad, but then the number
(sa@mkhy) of the atom should be regarded as bringing forth a new kind of measure, namely the small (_hrasva_)
measure in the dyads. So again when three dyads (dya@nuka) compose a trya@nuka the number and not the measure
"small"
CHAPTER VIII 214
___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ThisisdistinctivelyaVais'e@sikaviewintroducedbyPras'astapda.Nyyaseemstobesilentonthis
matter.SeeS'a@nkaraMis'ra's_Upaskra_,VII.ii.8.]

[Footnote2Itshouldbenotedthattheatomicmeasureappearsintwoformsaseternalasin"param@nus"and
noneternalasinthedvya@nuka.Theparima@n@dalaparim@naisthusavarietyofa@nuparim@na.The
a@nuparim@naandthehrasvaparim@narepresentthetwodimensionsofthemeasureofdvya@nukasas
mahatanddrghaarewithreferencetotrya@nukas.See_Nyyakandal_,p.133.]

315

(_hrasva_)ofthedyadisthecauseofthemeasure"great"(_mahat_)ofthetrya@nuka.Butwhenwecome
totheregionofthesegrosstrya@nukaswefindthatthe"great"measureofthetrya@nukasisthecauseof
themeasureofothergrosserbodiescomposedbythem.Forasmanytrya@nukasconstituteagrossbody,so
muchbiggerdoesthethingbecome.Thusthecumulationofthetrya@nukasofmahatparim@namakes
thingsofstillmoremahatparim@na.Themeasureoftrya@nukasisnotonlyregardedasmahatbutalso
asdrgha(long)andthisdrghaparim@nahastobeadmittedascoexistingwithmahatparim@nabutnot
identical,forthingsnotonlyappearasgreatbutalsoaslong(_drgha_).Herewefindthattheaccumulation
oftrya@nukasmeanstheaccumulationof"great"(_mahat_)and"long"(_drgha_)parim@na,andhence
thethinggeneratedhappenstopossessameasurewhichisgreaterandlongerthantheindividualatoms
whichcomposedthem.Nowthehrasvaparim@naofthedyadsisnotregardedashavingalowerdegreeof
greatnessorlengthbutasaseparateanddistincttypeofmeasurewhichiscalledsmall(_hrasva_).As
accumulationofgrossness,greatnessorlength,generatesstillmoregreatness,grossnessandlengthinits
effect,soanaccumulationofthehrasva(small)parim_a@naoughttogeneratestillmorehrasva
parim_a@na,andweshouldexpectthatifthehrasvameasureofthedyadswasthecauseofthemeasureof
thetrya@nukas,thetrya@nukasshouldbeevensmallerthanthedya@nukas.Soalsoiftheatomicand
circular(_parima@n@dala_)sizeoftheatomsisregardedasgeneratingbytheirmeasurethemeasureof
thedya@nukas,thenthemeasureofthedya@nukasoughttobemoreatomicthantheatoms.Theatomic,
small,andgreatmeasuresshouldnotberegardedasrepresentingsuccessivelybiggermeasuresproducedby
themerecumulationofmeasures,buteachshouldberegardedasameasureabsolutelydistinct,different
fromorforeigntotheothermeasure.Itisthereforeheldthatifgrossnessinthecausegeneratesstillmore
greatnessintheeffect,thesmallnessandtheparima@n@dalameasureofthedyadsandatomsoughtto
generatestillmoresmallnessandsubtlenessintheireffect.Butsincethedyadsandthetrya@nukamolecules
areseentobeconstitutedofatomsanddyadsrespectively,andyetarenotfoundtosharethemeasureof
theircauses,itistobearguedthatthemeasuresoftheatomsanddyadsdonotgeneratethemeasureoftheir
effects,butitistheirnumberwhichisthecause

316

ofthemeasureofthelatter.Thisexplainsa@nuparim@na,hrasvaparim@na,mahatparim@na,anddrgha
parim@na.Theparim@naofks'a,kla,dikandtmanwhichareregardedasallpervasive,issaidtobe
paramamahat(absolutelylarge).Theparim@nasoftheatoms,ks'a,kla,dik,manas,andtmanare
regardedaseternal(nitya).Allotherkindsofparim@nasasbelongingtononeternalthingsareregardedas
noneternal.

Theeighthis_p@rthaktva_(mutualdifferenceorseparatenessofthings),thatentityorqualityinthingsby
virtueofwhichthingsappearasdifferent(e.g.thisisdifferentfromthat).Differenceisperceivedbyusasa
positivenotionandnotasamerenegationsuchasthisjugisnotthispot.

The ninth is _sa@myoga_ (connection), that entity of gu@na by virtue of which things appear to us as
connected.
CHAPTER VIII 215
Thetenthis_vibhga_(separation),thatentityofgu@nawhichdestroystheconnectionorcontactofthings.

Theeleventhandtwelfthgu@nas,paratvaandaparatva,giveriseinustotheperceptionsoflongtimeand
shorttime,remoteandnear.

Theothergu@nassuchas_buddhi_(knowledge),sukha(happiness),_du@hkha_(sorrow),_icch_(will),
_dve@sa_(antipathyorhatred)andyatna(effort)canoccuronlywithreferencetosoul.

Thecharacteristicofgurutva(heaviness)isthatbyvirtueofwhichthingsfalltotheground.Thegu@naof
sneha(oiliness)belongstowater.Thegu@naof_sa@mskra_isofthreekinds,(i)vega(velocity)whichkeepsa
thingmovingindifferentdirections,(2)_sthitisthpaka_(elasticity)onaccountofwhichagrossthingtriesto
getbackitsoldstateeventhoughdisturbed,(3)_bhvan_isthatqualityoftmanbywhichthingsare
constantlypractisedorbywhichthingsexperiencedarerememberedandrecognized[Footnoterefl].Dharmais
thequalitythepresenceofwhichenablesthesoultoenjoyhappinessortoattainsalvation[Footnoteref2].
Adharmais

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Pras'astapdasaysthatbhvanisaspecialcharacteristicofthesoul,contrarytointoxication,
sorrowandknowledge,bywhichthingsseen,heardandfeltarerememberedandrecognized.Through
unexpectedness(asthesightofacamelforamanofSouthIndia),repetition(asinstudies,artetc.)andintensity
ofinterest,thesa@mskrabecomesparticularlystrong.See_Nyyakandal_,p.167.Ka@ndahoweverissilent
onthesepoints.Heonlysaysthatbyaspecialkindofcontactofthemindwithsoulandalsobythesa@mskra,
memory(sm@rti)isproduced(ix.2.6).]

[Footnote2:Pras'astapdaspeaksofdharma(merit)asbeingaqualityofthesoul.ThereuponS'ridharapoints
outthatthisviewdoesnotadmitthatdharmaisapowerofkarma(_nakarmasmarthyam_).Sacrificeetc.
cannotbedharmafortheseactionsbeingmomentarytheycannotgeneratetheeffectswhichareonlytobe
reapedatafuturetime.Iftheactionisdestroyeditspower(_smarthya_)cannotlast.Sodharmaistobe
admittedasaqualitygeneratedintheselfbycertaincoursesofconductwhichproducehappinessforhimwhen
helpedbycertainotherconditionsoftime,place,etc.Faith(_s'raddh_),noninjury,doinggoodtoallbeings,
truthfulness,nonstealing,sexcontrol,sincerity,controlofanger,ablutions,takingofpurefood,devotionto
particulargods,fasting,strictadherencetoscripturalduties,andtheperformanceofdutiesassignedtoeach
casteandstageoflife,areenumeratedbyPras'astapdaasproducingdharma.Thepersonwhostrictlyadheres
tothesedutiesandtheyamasandniyamas(cf.Patajali'sYoga)andattainsYogabyameditationonthesix
padrthasattainsadharmawhichbringsliberation(_mok@sa_).S'rdharareferstotheS@mkhyaYoga
accountofthemethodofattainingsalvation(_Nyyakandal_,pp.272280).SeealsoVallabha's_Nyyalilvat_,
pp.7475.(Bombay,1915.)]

317

theoppositequality,thepresenceofwhichinthesoulleadsamantosuffer._Ad@r@s@ta_ordestinyisthat
unknownqualityofthingsandofthesoulwhichbringsaboutthecosmicorder,andarrangesitforthe
experienceofthesoulsinaccordancewiththeirmeritsordemerits.

Karmameansmovement;itisthethirdthingwhichmustbeheldtobeasirreduciblearealityasdravyaor
gu@na.Therearefivekindsofmovement,(1)upward,(2)downward,(3)contraction,(4)expansion,(5)
movementingeneral.Allkindsofkarmasrestonsubstancesjust,asthegu@nasdo,andcausethethingsto
whichtheybelongtomove.

_Smnya_ is the fourth category. It means the genus, or aspect of generality or sameness that we notice in things.
Thus in spite of the difference of colour between one cow and another, both of them are found to have
CHAPTER VIII 216
suchasamenessthatwecallthemcows.Inspiteofalldiversityinallobjectsaroundus,theyareallperceivedas
satorexisting.Thissatorexistenceisthusasameness,whichisfoundtoexistinallthethreethings,dravya,
gu@na,andkarma.Thissamenessiscalled_smnya_or_jti_,anditisregardedasaseparatethingwhich
restsondravya,gu@na,orkarma.Thishighestgenus_satt_(being)iscalled_parajti_(highestuniversal),the
otherintermediatejtisarecalledaparajti(loweruniversals),suchasthegenusofdravya,ofkarma,orof
gu@na,orstillmoreintermediatejtissuchas_gotvjti_(thegenuscow),_nlatvajti_(thegenusblue).The
intermediatejtisorgenerasometimesappeartohaveaspecialaspectasaspecies,suchas_pas'utva_(animal
jti)andgotva(thecowjti);herehowevergotvaappearsasaspecies,yetitisinrealitynothingbutajti.The
aspectasspecieshasnoseparateexistence.Itisjtiwhichfromoneaspectappearsasgenusandfromanotheras
species.

318

Thisjtior_smnya_thusmustberegardedashavingaseparateindependentrealitythoughitisexistentin
dravya,gu@naandkarma.TheBuddhistsdeniedtheexistenceofanyindependentrealityofsmnya,butsaid
thatthesamenessascowwasreallybutthenegationofallnoncows(_apoha_).Theperceptionofcowrealizes
thenegationofallnoncowsandthisisrepresentedinconsciousnessasthesamenessascow.Hewhoshould
regardthissamenesstobeaseparateandindependentrealityperceivedinexperiencemightalsodiscovertwo
hornsonhisownhead[Footnoteref1].TheNyyaVais'e@sikasaidthatnegationofnoncowsisanegative
perception,whereasthesamenessperceivedascowisapositiveperception,whichcannotbeexplainedbythe
aforesaidnegationtheoryoftheBuddhists.Smnyahasthustobeadmittedtohaveaseparatereality.All
perceptionassamenessofathingisduetothepresenceofthisthinginthatobject[Footnoterefl].Thisjtiis
eternalornondestructible,forevenwiththedestructionofindividualscomprehendedwithinthejti,thelatter
isnotdestroyed[Footnoteref2].

Through_vis'e@sa_thingsareperceivedasdiverse.Nosinglesensationthatwereceivefromtheexternal
worldprobablyagreeswithanyothersensation,andthisdifferencemustbeduetotheexistenceofsome
specificdifferencesamongsttheatomsthemselves.The,specificdifferenceexistingintheatoms,emancipated
soulsandmindsmustberegardedaseternallyexisting,andit

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:TheBuddhistPandits'okasaysthatthereisnosinglethingrunningthroughdifferentindividuals
(e.g.cooks)byvirtueofwhichthesmnyacouldbeestablished,forifitdidexistthenwecouldhaveknownit
simplybyseeinganycookwithoutanyreferencetohisactionofcookingbyvirtueofwhichthenotionof
generalityisformed.Ifthereisasimilaritybetweentheactionofcooksthatcannotestablishjtiinthecooks,for
thesimilarityappliestootherthings,viz.theactionofthecooks.Ifthespecificindividualitiesofacowshould
requireonecommonfactortoholdthemtogether,thentheseshouldrequireanotherandthatanother,andwe
havearegressusadinfinitum.Whateverbeingperceptibleisnotperceivedisnonexistent
(_yadyadupalabdhilaksanapraptamsannopalabhyatetattadasat_).Smnyaissuch,thereforesmnyaisnon
existent.Nosmnyacanbeadmittedtoexistasanentity.Butitisonlyasaresultoftheimpressionsofpast
experiencesofexistenceandnonexistencethatthisnotionisformedandtransferrederroneouslytoexternal
objects.Apartfromthisnosmnyacanbepointedoutasbeingexternallyperceptible
_Smnyadsanadikprasarit_in_SixBuddhistNyyaTracts_.TheVedantaalsodoesnotthinkthateither
byperceptionorbyinferencewecanknowjtiasaseparatesubstance.Soitdiscardsjti.See
_Vedntaparibhs_,Sikhamaniand_Mamprabh_,pp.6971.SeealsoSriharsa's_Khan@danakhandakhadya,
pp10791086.]

[Footnote2:Similarity(sdrs'ya_)isnotregardedasaseparatecategory,foritisdefinedasidentityin
difference(_tadbhinnatvesatitadgatabhyodharmavattvam_).]
319
CHAPTER VIII 217
isonaccountofitspresencethatatomsappearasdifferenttotheyoginswhocanperceivethem.

_Samavya_,theinseparablerelationofinherence,isarelationbyvirtueofwhichtwodifferentthingssuchas
substanceandattribute,substanceandkarma,substanceandsmnya,karana(cause)andkrya(effect),atoms
andvis'e@sa,appearsounifiedthattheyrepresentonewhole,oroneidenticalinseparablereality.Thispeculiar
relationofinseparableinherenceisthecausewhysubstance,action,andattribute,causeandeffect,andjtiin
substanceandattributeappearasindissolublyconnectedasiftheyareoneandthesamethingSamyogaor
contactmaytakeplacebetweentwothingsofthesamenaturewhichexistasdisconnectedandmaylateronbe
connected(_yutasiddha_),suchaswhenIputmypenonthetable.Thepenandthetablearebothsubstancesand
weredisconnected,thesamyngarelationisthegu@nabyvirtueofwhichtheyappeartobeconnectedforawhile.
Samavyahowevermakesabsolutelydifficientthingssuchasdravyaandgu@naandkarmaorkaranaandkarya
(clayandjug)appearasoneinseparablewhole(_ayutasiddha_).Thisrelationisthusaseparateandindependent
category.Thisisnotregardedasmanylikesa@myogas(contact)butasoneandeternalbecauseithasnocause.
Thisorthatobject(eg.jug)maybedestroyedbutthesamavyarelationwhichwasneverbroughtintobeingby
anybodyalwaysremains[Footnoteref1].

Thesesixthingsarecalledthesixpadrthasorindependentrealitiesexperiencedinperceptionandexpressedin
language.

TheTheoryofCausation.

TheNyyaVais'e@sikainmostofitsspeculationstookthatviewofthingswhichfindsexpressioninour
language,andwhichwetacitlyassumeastrueinallourordinaryexperience.Thus

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:TheVedntadoesnotadmittheexistenceoftherelationofsamavyaassubsistingbetweentwo
differententities(e.g.substanceandqualities).ThusS'a@nkarasays(_Brahmastrabh@syaII.ii.13_)thatifa
samavyarelationistobeadmittedtoconnecttwodifferentthings,thenanothersamavyawouldbenecessaryto
connectitwitheitherofthetwoentitiesthatitintendedtoconnect,andthatanother,andsotherewillbeavicious
infinite(_anavasth_).Nyya,however,wouldnotregarditasviciousatall.Itiswelltorememberthatthe
Indiansystemsacknowledgetwokindsof_anavasth__prm@nik_(validinfinite,asincaseofthequestionof
theseedandthetree,oroftheavidyandthepassions),andanother_aprm@nikanavasth_(viciousinfinite)
aswhentheadmissionofanythinginvokesaninfinitechainbeforeitcanbecompleted.]

320

theyadmitteddravya,gu@na,karmaandsmnya,Vis'e@satheyhadtoadmitastheultimatepeculiaritiesof
atoms,fortheydidnotadmitthatthingswerecontinuallychangingtheirqualities,andthateverythingcouldbe
producedoutofeverythingbyachangeofthecollocationorarrangementoftheconstitutingatoms.Inthe
productionoftheeffecttootheydidnotadmitthattheeffectwaspotentiallypreexistentinthecause.Theyheld
thatthematerialcause(e.g.clay)hadsomepowerwithinit,andtheaccessoryandotherinstrumentalcauses
(suchasthestick,thewheeletc.)hadotherpowers;thecollocationofthesetwodestroyedthecause,and
producedtheeffectwhichwasnotexistentbeforebutwasnewlyproduced.Thisiswhatiscalledthedoctrineof
_asatkryavda_.ThisisjusttheoppositeoftheS@mkhyaaxiom,thatwhatisexistentcannotbedestroyed
_nbhvovidyatesata@h_)andthatthenonexistentcouldneverbeproduced(_nsatovidyatebhvah_).The
objectiontothisviewisthatifwhatisnonexistentisproduced,thenevensuchimpossiblethingsasthehare's
horncouldalsobeproduced.TheNyyaVais'e@sikaansweristhattheviewisnotthatanythingthatisnon
existentcanbeproduced,butthatwhichisproducedwasnonexistent[Footnoteref1].
It is held by Mm@ms that an unseen power resides in the cause which produces the effect. To this Nyya
CHAPTER VIII 218
objectsthatthisisneitheramatterofobservationnoroflegitimatehypothesis,forthereisnoreasontosuppose
thatthereisanytranscendentaloperationincausalmovementasthiscanbesatisfactorilyexplainedbymolecular
movement(_parispanda_).Thereisnothingexcepttheinvariabletimerelation(antecedenceandsequence)
betweenthecauseandtheeffect,butthemereinvariablenessofanantecedentdoesnotsufficetomakeitthe
causeofwhatsucceeds;itmustbeanunconditionalantecedentaswell(_anyathsiddhis'nyasya
niyatprvavarttit_).Unconditionalityandinvariabilityareindispensablefor_kryakra@nabhva_orcause
andeffectrelation.Forexample,thenonessentialoradventitiousaccompanimentsofaninvariableantecedent
mayalsobeinvariableantecedents;buttheyarenotunconditional,onlycollateralorindirect.Inotherwords
theirantecedenceisconditionaluponsomethingelse(_nasvtantrye@na_).Thepotter'sstickisanunconditional
invariableantecedentofthejar;butthecolour

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Nyyamujari_,p.494.]

321

ofastickoritstextureorsize,oranyotheraccompanimentoraccidentwhichdoesnotcontributetothework
done,isnotanunconditionalantecedent,andmustnotthereforeberegardedasacause.Similarlythecoeffects
oftheinvariableantecedentsorwhatentersintotheproductionoftheircoeffectsmaythemselvesbeinvariable
antecedents;buttheyarenotunconditional,beingthemselvesconditionedbythoseoftheantecedentsofwhich
theyareeffects.Forexample,thesoundproducedbythestickorbythepotter'swheelinvariablyprecedesthejar
butitisacoeffect;andks'a(ether)asthesubstrateandvyu(air)asthevehicleofthesoundenterintothe
productionofthiscoeffect,butthesearenounconditionalantecedents,andmustthereforeberejectedinan
enumerationofconditionsorcausesofthejar.Theconditionsoftheconditionsshouldalsoberejected;the
invariableantecedentofthepotter(whoisaninvariableantecedentofthejar),thepotter'sfather,doesnotstand
inacausalrelationtothepotter'shandiwork.Infacttheantecedencemustnotonlybeunconditionallyinvariable,
butmustalsobeimmediate.Finallyallseeminglyinvariableantecedentswhichmaybedispensedwithorleftout
arenotunconditionalandcannotthereforeberegardedascausalconditions.ThusDr.Sealindescribingitrightly
remarks,"Intheend,thediscriminationofwhatisnecessarytocompletethesumofcausesfromwhatis
dependent,collateral,secondary,superfluous,orinert(i.e.oftherelevantfromtheirrelevantfactors),must
dependonthetestofexpenditureofenergy.ThistesttheNyyawouldacceptonlyinthesenseofanoperation
analysableintomolarormolecularmotion(_parispandaevabhautikovypra@hkarotyartha@hatndriyastu
vyparonsti._Jayanta'sMajarihnikaI),butwouldemphaticallyreject,ifitisadvancedinsupportofthe
notionofamysteriouscausalpowerorefficiency(_s'akti_)[Footnoteref1]."WithNyyaallenergyisnecessarily
kinetic.ThisisapeculiarityofNyyaitsinsistingthattheeffectisonlythesumorresultantoftheoperationsof
thedifferentcausalconditionsthattheseoperationsareofthenatureofmotionorkinetic,inotherwordsit
firmlyholdstotheviewthatcausationisacaseofexpenditureofenergy,i.e.aredistributionofmotion,butatthe
sametimeabsolutelyrepudiatestheS@mkhyaconceptionofpowerorproductive

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:DrP.C.Ray'sHinduChemistry,1909,pp.249250.]
322

efficiency as metaphysical or transcendental (_atndriya_) and finds nothing in the cause other than unconditional
invariable complements of operative conditions (_kra@na-smagr_), and nothing in the effect other than the
consequent phenomenon which results from the joint operations of the antecedent conditions [Footnote ref 1]. Certain
general conditions such as relative space (_dik_), time (_kla_), the will of s'vara, destiny (_ad@r@s@ta_) are regarded
as the common cause of all effects (_kryatva-prayojaka_). Those are
CHAPTER VIII 219
called_sdhra@nakra@na_(commoncause)asdistinguishedfromthespecificcauseswhichdeterminethe
specificeffectswhicharecalled_sdhra@nakra@na_.ItmaynotbeoutofplaceheretonoticethatNyya
whilerepudiatingtranscendentalpower(_s'akti_)inthemechanismofnatureandnaturalcausation,doesnot
denytheexistenceofmetaphysicalconditionslikemerit(_dharma_),whichconstitutesasystemofmoralends
thatfulfilthemselvesthroughthemechanicalsystemsandorderofnature.

Thecausalrelationthenliketherelationofgenustospecies,isanaturalrelationofconcomitance,whichcanbe
ascertainedonlybytheuniformanduninterruptedexperienceofagreementinpresenceandagreementin
absence,andnotbyadeductionfromacertainaprioriprinciplelikethatofcausalityoridentityofessence
[Footnoteref2].

Thematerialcausesuchastheclayistechnicallycalledthe_samavyikra@na_ofthejug._Samavya_means
aswehaveseenanintimate,inseparablerelationofinherence.Akra@naiscalled_samavyi_whenits
materialsarefoundinseparablyconnectedwiththematerialsoftheeffect.Asamavyikra@naisthatwhich
producesitscharacteristicsintheeffectthroughthemediumofthesamavyiormaterialcause,e.g.theclayisnot
thecauseofthecolourofthejugbutthecolouroftheclayisthecauseofthecolourofthejug.Thecolourofthe
claywhichexistsintheclayininseparablerelationisthecauseofthecolourofthejug.Thiscolouroftheclayis
thuscalledtheasamavyicauseofthejug.Anyquality(_gu@na_)ormovementwhichexistinginthesamavya
causeinthesamavyarelationdeterminesthecharacteristicsoftheeffectiscalledtheasamavyikra@na.The
instrumental

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:DrP.C.Ray'sHinduChemistry,1909,pp.249250.]

[Footnote2:SeeforthisportionDrB.N.Seal'sPositiveSciencesoftheAncientHindus,pp.263266.
_Sarvadars'anasa@mgraha_onBuddhism._NyyamajarBh@spariccheda_,with_Muktval_and
_Dinakar_,and_Tarkas@mgraha_.ThedoctrineofAnyathsiddhiwassystematicallydevelopedfromthe
timeofGa@nges'a.]

323

nimittaandaccessory(_sahakri_)causesarethosewhichhelpthematerialcausetoproducetheeffect.Thusthe
potter,thewheelandthestickmayberegardedasthenimittaandthesahakricausesoftheeffect.

WeknowthattheNyyaVais'e@sikaregardstheeffectasnonexistent,beforetheoperationofthecausein
producingit,butitholdsthatthegu@nasinthecausearethecausesofthegu@nasintheeffect,e.g.theblack
colouroftheclayisthecauseoftheblackcolouroftheeffect,exceptincaseswhereheatcomesasan
extraneouscausetogenerateotherqualities;thuswhenaclayjugisburnt,onaccountoftheheatwegetred
colour,thoughthecolouroftheoriginalclayandthejugwasblack.Anotherimportantexceptionistobefound
inthecaseoftheproductionoftheparim@nasofdvya@nukasandtrasare@nuswhicharenotproducedby
theparim@nasofana@nuoradya@nuka,butbytheirnumberaswehavealreadyseen.

Dissolution(Pralaya)andCreation(S@r@s@ti).

The doctrine of pralaya is accepted by all the Hindu systems except the Mm@ms [Footnote ref 1]. According to the
Nyya-Vais'e@sika view s'vara wishing to give some respite or rest to all living beings desires to bring about
dissolution (_sa@mhreccho bhavati_). Simultaneously with it the ad@r@s@ta force residing in all the souls and
forming bodies, senses, and the gross elements, ceases to act (_s'akti-pratibandha_). As a result of this no further
bodies, senses, or other products come into being. Then for the bringing about of the dissolution of all produced
things (by the desire of s'vara) the separation of the atoms commences and thus all combinations as bodies or
senses are disintegrated; so all earth is reduced to
CHAPTER VIII 220
thedisintegratedatomicstate,thenallap,thenalltejasandthenallvyu.Thesedisintegratedatomsandthe
soulsassociatedwithdharma,adharmaandpastimpressions(_sa@mskra_)remainsuspendedintheirown
inanimatecondition.Forweknowthatsoulsintheirnaturalconditionarelifelessandknowledgeless,non
intelligententities.Itisonlywhentheseareconnectedwithbodiesthattheypossessknowledgethroughthe
activityofmanas.Inthestateofpralayaowingtothead@r@s@taofsoulsthe

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Thedoctrineofpralayaands@r@s@tiisfoundonlyinlaterNyyaVais'e@sikaworks,butthe
strasofboththesystemsseemtobesilentonthematter.]

324

atomsdonotconglomerate.Itisnotanactofcrueltyonthepartofs'varathathebringsaboutdissolution,for
hedoesittogivesomeresttothesufferingsofthelivingbeings.

Atthetimeofcreation,s'varawishestocreateandthisdesireofs'varaworksinallthesoulsas
ad@r@s@ta.Thisoneeternaldesireofs'varaundercertainconditionsoftime(e.g.ofpralaya)asaccessory
causes(_sahakri_)helpsthedisintegrationofatomsandatothertimes(e.g.thatofcreation)the
constructiveprocessofintegrationandunificationofatomsfortheworldcreation.Whenitactsinaspecific
capacityinthediversesoulsitiscalledad@r@s@ta.Atthetimeofdissolutionthecreativefunctionofthis
ad@r@s@taissuspendedandatthetimeofcreationitfindsfullplay.Atthetimeofcreationactionfirst
beginsinthevyuatomsbythekineticfunctionofthisad@r@s@ta,bythecontactofthesoulswiththe
atoms.Bysuchactiontheairatomscomeincontactwithoneanotherandthedvya@nukasareformedand
theninasimilarwaythetrya@nukasareformed,andthusvyuoriginates.Aftervyu,theapisformedby
theconglomerationofwateratoms,andthenthetejasatomsconglomerateandthentheearthatoms.When
thefourelementsarethusconglomeratedinthegrossform,thegodBrahmandalltheworldsarecreated
bys'varaandBrahmisdirectedbys'varatodotherestofthework.Brahmthusarrangesforthe
enjoymentandsufferingofthefruitsofdiversekindsofkarma,goodorbad.s'varabringsaboutthis
creationnotforanyselfishpurposebutforthegoodofallbeings.Evenheresorrowshavetheirplacethat
theymayleadmentoturnfromworldlyattachmentandtryfortheattainmentofthehighestgood,mukti.
Moreovers'varaarrangesfortheenjoymentofpleasuresandthesufferingofpainsaccordingtothemerits
anddemeritsofmen,justasinourordinaryexperiencewefindthatamasterawardsprizesorpunishments
accordingtogoodorbaddeeds[Footnoteref1].ManyNyyabooksdonotspeakoftheappointmentofa
Brahmasdeputyforsupervisionoftheduedisposalofthefruitsofkarmaaccordingtomeritordemerit.It
isalsoheldthatpralayaandcreationwerebroughtaboutinaccordancewiththekarmaofmen,orthatit
maybeduetoamereplay(_ll_)ofs'vara.s'varaisone,forifthereweremanys'varastheymight
quarrel.Thewillofs'varanotonlybringsaboutdissolutionandcreation,

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_Nyyakandal_,pp.4854.]

325

butalsoactsalwaysamongusinageneralway,forwithoutitourkarmascouldnotripen,andtheconsequent
disposalofpleasuresandsorrowstousandacorrespondingchangeintheexteriorworldintheformoforderor
harmonycouldnothappen.Theexteriorworldisinperfectharmonywithmen'sactions.Theirmeritsand
demeritsandallitschangesandmodificationstakeplaceinaccordancewithmeritsanddemerits.Thisdesire
(_icch_)ofs'varamaythusbecomparedwiththe_icch_ofs'varaaswefinditintheYogasystem.
Proof of the Existence of s'vara.
CHAPTER VIII 221
S@mkhyaassertsthattheteleologyoftheprak@rtiissufficienttoexplainallorderandarrangementofthe
cosmos.TheMm@msakas,theCrvkas,theBuddhistsandtheJainsalldenytheexistenceofs'vara(God).
Nyyabelievesthats'varahasfashionedthisuniversebyhiswilloutoftheeverexistingatoms.Foreveryeffect
(e.g.ajug)musthaveitscause.Ifthisbeso,thenthisworldwithallitsorderandarrangementmustalsobedue
totheagencyofsomecause,andthiscauseiss'vara.ThisworldisnotmomentaryastheBuddhistssuppose,but
ispermanentasatoms,isalsoaneffectsofarasitisacollocationofatomsandismadeupofpartslikeallother
individualobjects(e.g.jug,etc.),whichwecalleffects.Theworldbeinganeffectlikeanyothereffectmusthavea
causelikeanyothereffect.Theobjectionmadeagainstthisviewisthatsucheffectsasweordinarilyperceivemay
besaidtohaveagentsastheircausesbutthismanifestworldwithmountains,rivers,oceansetc.issoutterly
differentinformfromordinaryeffectsthatwenoticeeveryday,thatthelawthateveryeffectmusthaveacause
cannotbesaidtoholdgoodinthepresentcase.TheanswerthatNyyagivesisthattheconcomitancebetween
twothingsmustbetakeninitsgeneralaspectneglectingthespecificpeculiaritiesofeachcaseofobserved
concomitance.ThusIhadseenmanycasesoftheconcomitanceofsmokewithfire,andhadthenceformedthe
notionthat"whereverthereissmokethereisfire";butifIhadonlyobservedsmallpuffsofsmokeandsmall
fires,couldIsaythatonlysmallquantitiesofsmokecouldleadustotheinferenceoffire,andcouldIholdthat
thereforelargevolumesofsmokefromtheburningofaforestshouldnotbesufficientreasonforustoinferthe
existenceoffireintheforest?

326

Thusourconclusionshouldnotbethatonlysmallereffectsareprecededbytheircauses,butthatalleffectsare
invariablyandunconditionallyprecededbycauses.Thisworldthereforebeinganeffectmustbeprecededbya
cause,andthiscauseiss'vara.Thiscausewecannotsee,becauses'varahasnovisiblebody,notbecausehedoes
notexist.Itissometimessaidthatweseeeverydaythatshootscomeoutofseedsandtheyarenotproducedby
anyagent.TosuchanobjectiontheNyyaansweristhateventheyarecreatedbyGod,fortheyarealsoeffects.
Thatwedonotseeanyonetofashionthemisnotbecausethereisnomakerofthem,butbecausethecreator
cannotbeseen.Iftheobjectorcoulddistinctlyprovethattherewasnoinvisiblemakershapingtheseshoots,then
onlycouldhepointtoitasacaseofcontradiction.Butsolongasthisisnotdoneitisstillonlyadoubtfulcaseof
enquiryanditisthereforelegitimateforustoinferthatsincealleffectshaveacause,theshootsaswellasthe
manifestworldbeingeffectsmusthaveacause.Thiscauseiss'vara.Hehasinfiniteknowledgeandisall
merciful.AtthebeginningofcreationHecreatedtheVedas.Heislikeourfatherwhoisalwaysengagedindoing
usgood[Footnoteref1].

ThtNyyaVais'e@sikaPhysics.

Thefourkindsofatomsareearth,water,fire,andairatoms.Thesehavemass,number,weight,fluidity(or
hardness),viscosity(oritsopposite),velocity,characteristicpotentialcolour,taste,smell,ortouch,notproduced
bythechemicaloperationofheat.ks'a(space)isabsolutelyinertandstructurelessbeingonlyasthe
substratumofsound,whichissupposedtotravelwavelikeinthemanifestingmediumofair.Atomic
combinationisonlypossiblewiththefourelements.Atomscannotexistinanuncombinedconditioninthe
creationstage;atmosphericairhoweverconsistsofatomsinanuncombinedstate.

Twoatomscombinetoformabinarymolecule(_dvya@nuka_).Two,three,four,orfivedvya@nukasform
themselvesintogrossermoleculesoftrya@nuka,catura@nuka,etc.[Footnoteref2].Thoughthiswasthe
generallycurrentview,therewasalsoanotherviewashasbeenpointedoutbyDrB.N.SealinhisPositive
SciencesoftheAncientHindus,thatthe"atomshavealsoaninherenttendencytounite,"andthat

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See Jayanta's _Nyyamajar,_ pp. 190-204, and Udayana's _Kusumjali_ with _Praks'a_ and
_s'varnumna_ of Raghuntha.]
CHAPTER VIII 222
[Footnote2:_Kadcittribhirrabhyateititrya@nukamityucyate,kadcitcaturbhirrabhyatekadcit
pacabhiritiyathe@s@ta@mkalpan.Nyyakandal_,p.32.]

327

theydosointwos,threes,orfours,"eitherbytheatomsfallingintogroupsofthrees,fours,etc.,directly,orbythe
successiveadditionofoneatomtoeachprecedingaggregate[Footnoterefl]."Ofcoursetheatomsareregardedas
possessedofanincessantvibratorymotion.Itmusthoweverbenotedinthisconnectionthatbehindthisphysical
explanationoftheunionofatomsthereisthead@r@s@ta,thewillofs'vara,whichgivesthedirectionofallsuch
unionsinharmonywiththeprincipleofa"moralgovernmentoftheuniverse,"sothatonlysuchthingsare
producedascanbearrangedfortheduedisposaloftheeffectsofkarma."Anelementarysubstancethus
producedbyprimaryatomiccombinationmayhoweversufferqualitativechangesundertheinfluenceofheat
(_pkajotpatti_)"Theimpactofheatcorpusclesdecomposesadvya@nukaintotheatomsandtransformsthe
charactersoftheatomsdeterminingthemallinthesameway.Theheatparticlescontinuingtoimpingereunite
theatomssotransformedtoformbinaryorothermoleculesindifferentordersorarrangements,whichaccount
forthespecificcharactersorqualitiesfinallyproduced.TheVais'e@sikaholdsthatthereisfirstadisintegration
intosimpleatoms,thenchangeofatomicqualities,andthenthefinalrecombination,undertheinfluenceofheat.
Thisdoctrineiscalledthedoctrineof_plupka_(heatingofatoms).Nyyaontheotherhandthinksthatno
disintegrationintoatomsisnecessaryforchangeofqualities,butitisthemoleculeswhichassumenewcharacters
undertheinfluenceofheat.HeatthusaccordingtoNyyadirectlyaffectsthecharactersofthemoleculesand
changestheirqualitieswithouteffectingachangeintheatoms.Nyyaholdsthattheheatcorpusclespenetrate
intotheporousbodyoftheobjectandtherebyproducethechangeofcolour.Theobjectasawholeisnot
disintegratedintoatomsandthenreconstitutedagain,forsuchaprocedureisneverexperiencedbyobservation.
Thisiscalledthedoctrineof_pi@tharapka_(heatingofmolecules).Thisisoneofthefewpointsofdifference
betweenthelaterNyyaandVais'e@sikasystems[Footnoteref2].

Chemicalcompoundsofatomsmaytakeplacebetweenthe
____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Utpala'scommentaryon_Brhatsamh@it_I.7.]

[Footnote2:SeeDrB.N.SealinP.C.Ray'sHinduChemistry,pp.190191,_Nyyamajar_,p438,and
Udyotakara's_Vrttika_.ThereisverylittleindicationintheNyyaand_Vais'e@sikastras_thattheyhadany
ofthosedifferencesindicatedhere.Thoughthereareslightindicationsofthesemattersinthe_Vais'e@sika
stras_(VII.1),the_Nyyastras_arealmostsilentuponthematter.Asystematicdevelopmentofthetheoryof
creationandatomiccombinationsappeartohavetakenplaceafterVtsyyana.]

328

atomsofthesamebhtaorofmanybhtas.AccordingtotheNyyaviewtherearenodifferencesintheatomsof
thesamebhta,andalldifferencesofqualityandcharacteristicsofthecompoundofthesamebhtaaredueonly
todiversecollocationsofthoseatoms.ThusUdyotakarasays(III.i.4)thatthereisnodifferencebetweenthe
atomofabarleyseedandpaddyseed,sincetheseareallbutatomsofearth.Underthecontinuedimpactofheat
particlestheatomstakenewcharacters.Itisheatandheatalonethatcancausethetransformationsofcolours,
tastesetc.intheoriginalbhtaatoms.Thechangeofthesephysicalcharactersdependsonthecoloursetc.ofthe
constituentsubstancesincontact,ontheintensityordegreeofheatandalsoonthespeciesoftejascorpusclesthat
impingeontheatoms.Heatbreaksbodiesincontactintoatoms,transformstheirqualities,andformsseparate
bodieswiththem.
Pras'astapda (the commentator of Vais'e@sika) holds that in the higher compounds of the same bhta the
CHAPTER VIII 223
transformationtakesplace(underinternalheat)intheconstituentatomsofthecompoundmolecules,atoms
speciallydeterminedasthecompoundandnotintheoriginalatomsofthebhtaenteringintothecompositionof
thecompound.Thuswhenmilkisturnedintocurd,thetransformationascurdtakesplaceintheatoms
determinedasmilkinthemilkmolecule,anditisnotnecessarythatthemilkmoleculeshouldbedisintegrated
intotheatomsoftheoriginalbhtaofwhichthemilkisamodification.Thechangeascurdthustakesplaceinthe
milkatom,andthemilkmoleculehasnottobedisintegratedintok@sitiorapatoms.Soagaininthefertilized
ovum,thegermandtheovumsubstances,whichintheVais'e@sikaviewarebothisomericmodesofearth(with
accompanimentsofotherbhtas)arebrokenupintohomogeneousearthatoms,anditisthesethatchemically
combineundertheanimalheatandbiomotorforcevyutoformthegerm(_kalala_).Butwhenthegermplasm
develops,derivingitsnutritionfromthebloodofthemother,theanimalheatbreaksupthemoleculesofthegerm
plasmintoitsconstituentatoms,i.e.atomsspecificallydeterminedwhichbytheirgroupingformedthegerm
plasm.Thesegermplasmatomschemicallycombinewiththeatomsofthefoodconstituentsandthusproduce
cellsandtissues[Footnoteref1].Thisatomiccontactiscalled_rambhakasa@myoga_.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:SeeDrB.N.Seal's_PositiveSciences,_pp.104108,and_Nyyakandal_,pp.3334,
"_S'arrrambheparamnavaevakra@namnas'ukras'onitasannipta@hkriyvibhgdinyyena
tayorvins'esatiutpannapkajai@hparam@nubhirrambht,nacas'ukras'onitaparam@nn@m
kas'cidvis'e@sa@hprthivatvvis'e@st....Pitu@hs'ukra@mmtuhs'onita@mtayossanniptnantara@m
ja@tharnalasambandhts'ukras'onitrambhake@suparam@nu@suprvarpdivins'e
sam@nagu@nntarotpattaudvya@nukdikrame@nakalalas'arirotpatti@h
tatrntahkara@napraves'o...tatramturhrarasomtraysa@mkrmate,ad@r@s@tavas'ttatra
punarja@tharnalasambandhtkalalrambhakaparam@nu@sukriyvibhgadinyyenakalalas'arre
na@s@tesamutpannapkajai@hkalalrambhakaparam@nubhirad@r@s@tavas'd
upajtakriyairhraparam@nitbhi@hsahasambhyas'arrntaramrakkyate."_.]

329

Inthecaseofpolybhautikorbibhautikcompoundsthereisanotherkindofcontactcalled_upa@s@tambha_.
Thusinthecaseofsuchcompoundsasoils,fats,andfruitjuices,theearthatomscannotcombinewithone
anotherunlesstheyaresurroundedbythewateratomswhichcongregateroundtheformer,andbytheinfra
atomicforcesthussetuptheearthatomstakepeculiarqualitiesundertheimpactofheatcorpuscles.Other
compoundsarealsopossiblewheretheap,tejas,orthevyuatomsformtheinnerradicleandearthatoms
dynamicallysurroundthem(e.g.gold,whichisthetejasatomwiththeearthatomsasthesurrounding
upa@s@tambhaka).Solutions(ofearthsubstancesinap)areregardedasphysicalmixtures.

Udayanapointsoutthatthesolarheatisthesourceofallthestoresofheatrequiredforchemicalchange.But
therearedifferencesinthemodesoftheactionofheat;andthekindofcontactwithheatcorpuscles,orthekind
ofheatwithchemicalactionwhichtransformscolours,issupposedtodifferfromwhattransformsflavouror
taste.

Heatandlightraysaresupposedtoconsistofindefinitelysmallparticleswhichdartforthorradiateinall
directionsrectilineallywithinconceivablevelocity.Heatmaypenetratethroughtheinteratomicspaceasinthe
caseoftheconductionofheat,aswhenwaterboilsinapotputonthefire;incasesoftransparencylightrays
penetratethroughtheinteratomicspaceswithparispanda of the nature of deflection or refraction (_tiryag-
gamana_). In other cases heat rays may impinge on the atoms and rebound back--which explains reflection. Lastly heat
may strike the atoms in a peculiar way, so as to break up their grouping, transform the physico-chemical characters of
the atoms, and again recombine them, all by means of continual impact with inconceivable velocity, an operation which
explains all cases of chemical combination [Footnote ref l]. Govardhana a later Nyya writer says that pka means the
combination of different kinds of heat. The heat
CHAPTER VIII 224
that

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:SeeDrSeal'sPositiveSciencesoftheHindus.]

330

changesthecolourofafruitisdifferentfromthatwhichgeneratesorchangesthetaste.Evenwhenthecolour
andtasteremainthesameaparticularkindofheatmaychangethesmell.Whengrasseatenbycowsisbrokenup
intoatomsspecialkindsofheatlightrayschangeitsoldtaste,colour,touchandsmellintosuchformsasthose
thatbelongtomilk[Footnoteref1].

IntheNyyaVais`e@sikasystemallactionofmatteronmatteristhusresolvedintomotion.Conscious
activity(_prayatna_)isdistinguishedfromallformsofmotionasagainsttheS@mkhyadoctrinewhich
consideredeverythingotherthanpuru@sa(intelligence)toariseinthecourseofcosmicevolutionand
thereforetobesubjecttovibratorymotion.

TheOriginofKnowledge(Pram@na).

ThemannerinwhichknowledgeoriginatesisoneofthemostfavouritetopicsofdiscussioninIndianphilosophy.
WehavealreadyseenthatS@mkhyaYogaexplaineditbysupposingthatthebuddhi(placeofconsciousness)
assumedtheformoftheobjectofperception,andthatthebuddhisotransformedwasthenintelligizedbythe
reflectionofthepureintelligenceorpuru@sa.TheJainsregardedtheoriginofanyknowledgeasbeingduetoa
withdrawalofaveilofkarmawhichwascoveringtheallintelligenceoftheself.

NyyaVais`e@sikaregardedalleffectsasbeingduetotheassemblageofcertaincollocationswhich
unconditionally,invariably,andimmediatelyprecededtheseeffects.Thatcollocation(_smagr_)which
producedknowledgeinvolvedcertainnonintelligentaswellasintelligentelementsandthroughtheir
conjointactionuncontradictedanddeterminateknowledgewasproduced,andthiscollocationisthuscalled
pram@naorthedeterminingcauseoftheoriginofknowledge[Footnoteref2].Noneoftheseparate
elementscomposing

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Govardhana's_Nyyabodhin_on_Tarkasa@mgraha_,pp.9,10.]

[Footnote2:"_Avyabhicrinmasandigdhrthopalabdhi@mvidadhatbodhbodhasvabhvsmagr
pram@nam._"_Nyyamajar_,p.12.Udyotakarahoweverdefined"pram@na"asupalabdhihetu(causeof
knowledge).ThisviewdoesnotgoagainstJayanta'sviewwhichIhavefollowed,butitemphasizesthesideof
vypraormovementofthesenses,etc.byvirtueofwhichtheobjectscomeincontactwiththemandknowledge
isproduced.ThusVcaspatisays:"_siddhamindriydi,asiddhacatatsannikar@sdivyprayannutpdayan
kara@naevacaritrtha@hkar@na@mtvindriyditatsannikar@sdivnnyatracaritarthamiti
sk@sdupalabdhvevaphalevypryate._"_Ttparya@tk_,p.15.Thusitistheactionofthesensesas
pram@nawhichisthedirectcauseoftheproductionofknowledge,butasthisproductioncouldnothavetaken
placewithoutthesubjectandtheobject,theyalsoaretoberegardedascausesinsomesense.
_"Pramt@rprameyayo@h.pramnecaritarthatvamacaritarthatvampramanasyatasmattadevaphalahetu@h.
Pramt@rprameyetuphaloddes'enaprav@rtteititaddhetkathacit."Ibid._p.16.]

331
the causal collocation can be called the primary cause; it is only their joint collocation that can be said to
CHAPTER VIII 225
determinetheeffect,forsometimestheabsenceofasingleelementcomposingthecausalcollocationis
sufficienttostoptheproductionoftheeffect.Ofcoursethecollocationorcombinationisnotanentity
separatedfromthecollocatedorcombinedthings.Butinanycaseitistheprecedingcollocationsthat
combinetoproducetheeffectjointly.Theseinvolvenotonlyintellectualelements(e.g.indeterminate
cognitionasqualification(vis'e@sa@na)indeterminateperceptions,theknowledgeofli@ngaininference,
theseeingofsimilarthingsinupamna,thehearingofsoundins'abda)butalsotheassemblageofsuch
physicalthings(e.g.proximityoftheobjectofperception,capacityofthesense,light,etc.),whichareall
indispensablefortheoriginofknowledge.Thecognitiveandphysicalelementsallcooperateinthesame
plane,combinetogetherandproducefurtherdeterminateknowledge.Itisthiscapacityofthecollocations
thatiscalledpram@na.

NyyaarguesthatintheS@mkhyaviewknowledgeoriginatesbythetranscendentinfluenceofpuru@saona
particularstateofbuddhi;thisisquiteunintelligible,forknowledgedoesnotbelongtobuddhiasitisnon
intelligent,thoughitcontainswithinitthecontentandtheformoftheconceptorthepercept(knowledge).The
puru@satowhomtheknowledgebelongs,however,neitherknows,norfeels,neitherconceivesnorperceives,as
italwaysremainsinitsowntranscendentalpurity.Ifthetranscendentalcontactofthepuru@sawithbuddhiis
butameresemblanceorappearanceorillusion,thentheS@mkhyahastoadmitthatthereisnorealknowledge
accordingtothem.Allknowledgeisfalse.Andsinceallknowledgeisfalse,theS@mkhyistshavepreciouslittle
wherewithtoexplaintheoriginofrightknowledge.

ThereareagainsomeBuddhistswhoadvocatethedoctrinethatsimultaneouslywiththegenerationofan
objectthereistheknowledgecorrespondingtoit,andthatcorrespondingtotheriseofanyknowledgethere
istheriseoftheobjectofit.Neitheristheknowledgegeneratedbytheobjectnortheobjectbythe
knowledge;butthereisasortofsimultaneousparallelism.Itisevidentthatthisviewdoesnotexplainwhy
knowledgeshould

332

expressormanifestitsobject.Ifknowledgeandtheobjectarebothbutcorrespondingpointsinaparallelseries,
whencecomesthiscorrespondence?Whyshouldknowledgeilluminatetheobject.ThedoctrineoftheVijna
vdins,thatitisknowledgealonethatshowsitselfbothasknowledgeandasitsobject,isalsoirrational,forhow
canknowledgedivideitselfassubjectandobjectinsuchamannerthatknowledgeasobjectshouldrequirethe
knowledgeassubjecttoilluminateit?Ifthisbethecasewemightagainexpectthatknowledgeasknowledge
shouldalsorequireanotherknowledgetomanifestitandthisanother,andsoonadinfinitum.Againif
pram@nabedefinedas_prpa@na_(capacityofbeingrealized)thenalsoitwouldnothold,forallthings
beingmomentaryaccordingtotheBuddhists,thethingknowncannotberealized,sotherewouldbenothing
whichcouldbecalledpram@na.Theseviewsmoreoverdonotexplaintheoriginofknowledge.Knowledgeis
thustoberegardedasaneffectlikeanyothereffect,anditsoriginorproductionoccursinthesamewayasany
othereffect,namelybythejointcollocationofcausesintellectualandphysical[Footnoteref1].Thereisno
transcendentelementinvolvedintheproductionofknowledge,butitisaproductiononthesameplaneasthatin
whichmanyphysicalphenomenaareproduced[Footnoteref2].

ThefourPram@nasofNyya.

WeknowthattheCarvkasadmittedperception(_pratyak@sa_)aloneasthevalidsourceofknowledge.The
BuddhistsandtheVais'e@sikaadmittedtwosources,pratyak@saandinference(_anumna_);S@mkhya
added_s'abda_(testimony)asthethirdsource;

____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: See _Nyyamajar_, pp. 12-26.]
CHAPTER VIII 226
[Footnote2:DiscussingthequestionofthevalidityofknowledgeGages'a,alaternaiyyikaofgreatfame,says
thatitisderivedasaresultofourinferencefromthecorrespondenceoftheperceptionofathingwiththeactivity
whichpromptedustorealizeit.Thatwhichleadsustosuccessfulactivityisvalidandtheoppositeinvalid.When
IamsurethatifIworkinaccordancewiththeperceptionofanobjectIshallbesuccessful,Icallitvalid
knowledge._Tattvacintma@ni_,K.Tarkavgs'a'sedition,_Prm@nyavda_.

"The_Vais'e@sikastras_tacitlyadmittheVedasasapram@na.TheviewthatVais'e@sikaonlyadmitted
twopram@nas,perceptionandinference,istraditionallyaccepted,_"pratyak@sameka@mcrvk@h
ka@ndasugataupuna@hanumnacataccpi,_etc."Pras'astapdadividesallcognition(_buddhi_)as_vidy_
(rightknowledge)and_avidy_(ignorance).Under_avidy_hecounts_sa@ms'aya_(doubtoruncertainty),
viparyaya(illusionorerror),_anadhyavasya_(wantofdefiniteknowledge,thuswhenamanwhohadneverseen
amango,seesitforthefirsttime,hewonderswhatitmaybe)andsvapna(dream).Rightknowledge(_vidy_)is
offourkinds,perception,inference,memoryandthesupernaturalknowledgeofthesages(_r@sa_).
Interpretingthe_Vais'e@sikastras_I.i.3,VI.i.1,andVI.i.3,tomeanthatthevalidityoftheVedasdepends
uponthetrustworthycharacteroftheirauthor,hedoesnotconsiderscripturesasvalidinthemselves.Their
validityisonlyderivedbyinferencefromthetrustworthycharacteroftheirauthor._Arthpatti_(implication)
andanupalabdhi(nonperception)arealsoclassedasinferenceand_upamna_(analogy)andaitihya(tradition)
areregardedasbeingthesameasfaithintrustworthypersonsandhencecasesofinference.]

333

Nyyaaddsafourth,_upamna_(analogy).Theprincipleonwhichthefourfolddivisionofpram@nas
dependsisthatthecausalcollocationwhichgeneratestheknowledgeaswellasthenatureorcharacteristickind
ofknowledgeineachofthefourcasesisdifferent.Thesamethingwhichappearstousastheobjectofour
perception,maybecometheobjectofinferenceors'abda(testimony),butthemannerormodeofmanifestation
ofknowledgebeingdifferentineachcase,andthemannerorconditionsproducingknowledgebeingdifferentin
eachcase,itistobeadmittedthatinferenceands'abdaaredifferentpram@nas,thoughtheypointtothesame
objectindicatedbytheperception.Nyyathusobjectstotheincorporationofs'abda(testimony)orupamna
withininference,onthegroundthatsincethemodeofproductionofknowledgeisdifferent,thesearetobeheld
asdifferentpram@nas[Footnoteref1].

Perception(Pratyak@sa).

Thenaiyyikasadmittedonlythefivecognitivesenseswhichtheybelievedtobecomposedofoneorotherofthe
fiveelements.Thesesensescouldeachcomeincontactwiththespecialcharacteristicofthatelementofwhich
theywerecomposed.Thustheearcouldperceivesound,becausesoundwastheattributeofks'a,ofwhichthe
auditorysense,theear,wasmadeup.Theeyecouldsendforthraystoreceivethecolour,etc.,ofthings.Thusthe
cognitivesensescanonlymanifesttheirspecificobjectsbygoingovertothemandtherebycomingincontactwith
them.Thecognitivesenses(_vk,pni,pda,pyu_,and_upastha_)recognizedinS@mkhyaasseparatesenses
arenotrecognizedhereassuchforthefunctionsofthesesocalledsensesaredischargedbythegeneralmotor
functionsofthebody.

Perceptionisdefinedasthatrightknowledgegeneratedbythecontactofthesenseswiththeobject,devoidof
doubtanderrornotassociatedwithanyothersimultaneoussoundcognition(such

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:

_Smagrbhedi phalabhedcca pram@nabheda@h Anye eva hi smagrphale pratyak@sali@ngayo@h Anye eva

ca smagrphale s'abdopamnayo@h. Nyyamajari_, p. 33.]
CHAPTER VIII 227
334

asthenameoftheobjectasheardfromapersonutteringit,justatthetimewhentheobjectisseen)orname
association,anddeterminate[Footnoteref1].Ifwhenweseeacow,amansayshereisacow,theknowledgeof
thesoundasassociatedwiththeperceptcannotbecountedasperceptionbutassoundknowledge(_s'abda
pram@na_).Thatrightknowledgewhichisgenerateddirectlybythecontactofthesenseswiththeobjectissaid
tobetheproductoftheperceptualprocess.Perceptionmaybedividedasindeterminate(_nirvikalpa_)and
(_savikalpa_)determinate.Indeterminateperceptionisthatinwhichthethingistakenattheveryfirstmomentof
perceptioninwhichitappearswithoutanyassociationwithname.Determinateperceptiontakesplaceafterthe
indeterminatestageisjustpassed;itrevealsthingsasbeingendowedwithallcharacteristicsandqualitiesand
namesjustaswefindinallourconcreteexperience.Indeterminateperceptionrevealsthethingswiththeir
characteristicsanduniversals,butatthisstagetherebeingnoassociationofnameitismoreorlessindistinct.
Whenoncethenamesareconnectedwiththeperceptitformsthedeterminateperceptionofathingcalled
savikalpapratyak@sa.Ifatthetimeofhavingtheperceptionofathingofwhichthenameisnotknowntome
anybodyuttersitsnamethenthehearingofthatshouldberegardedasaseparateauditorynameperception.
Onlythatproductissaidtoconstitutenirvikalpaperceptionwhichresultsfromtheperceivingprocessofthe
contactofthesenseswiththeobject.Ofthisnirvikalpa(indeterminate)perceptionitisheldbythelater
naiyyikasthatwearenotconsciousofitdirectly,butyetithastobeadmittedasanecessaryfirststagewithout
whichthedeterminateconsciousnesscouldnotarise.Theindeterminateperceptionisregardedasthefirststage
intheprocessofperception.Atthesecondstageitjoinstheotherconditionsofperceptioninproducingthe
determinateperception.Thecontactofthesensewiththeobjectisregardedasbeingofsixkinds:(1)contactwith
thedravya(thing)calledsa@myoga,(2)contactwiththegu@nas(qualities)throughthething(_sa@myukta
samavya_)inwhichtheyinhereinsamavya(inseparable)relation,(3)contactwiththegu@nas(suchascolour
etc.)inthegenericcharacterasuniversalsofthosequalities,e.g.colourness(rpatva),whichinhereinthe
gu@nasinthesamavyarelation.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Gages'a,alaternaiyyikaofgreatreputation,describesperceptionasimmediateawareness
(_pratyak@sasyask@stkritvamlak@sa@nam_).]

335

Thisspeciesofcontactiscalledsa@myuktasamavetasamavya,fortheeyeisincontactwiththething,in
thethingthecolourisinsamavyarelation,andinthespecificcolourthereisthecolouruniversalorthe
genericcharacterofcolourinsamavyarelation.(4)Thereisanotherkindofcontactcalledsamavyaby
whichsoundsaresaidtobeperceivedbytheear.Theauditorysenseisks'aandthesoundexistsinks'a
inthesamavyarelation,andthustheauditorysensecanperceivesoundinapeculiarkindofcontactcalled
samavetasamavya.(5)Thegenericcharacterofsoundastheuniversalofsound(s'abdatva)isperceived
bythekindofcontactknownassamavetasamavya.(6)Thereisanotherkindofcontactbywhichnegation
(_abhva_)isperceived,namelysa@myuktavis'e@sa@na(asqualifyingcontact).Thisissocalledbecause
theeyeperceivesonlytheemptyspacewhichisqualifiedbytheabsenceofanobjectandthroughitthe
negation.ThusIseethatthereisnojughereontheground.Myeyeinthiscaseisintouchwiththeground
andtheabsenceofthejugisonlyakindofqualityofthegroundwhichisperceivedalongwiththe
perceptionoftheemptyground.ItwillthusbeseenthatNyyaadmitsnotonlythesubstancesandqualities
butallkindsofrelationsasrealandexistingandasbeingdirectlyapprehendedbyperception(sofaras
theyaredirectlypresented).

The most important thing about the Nyya-Vais'e@sika theory of perception is this that the whole process beginning
from the contact of the sense with the object to the distinct and clear perception of the thing, sometimes involving the
appreciation of its usefulness or harmfulness, is regarded as the process of perception and its result perception. The
self, the mind, the senses and the objects are the main factors by the particular
CHAPTER VIII 228
kindsofcontactbetweenwhichperceptualknowledgeisproduced.Allknowledgeisindeed_arthapraks'a,_
revelationofobjects,anditiscalledperceptionwhenthesensefactorsaretheinstrumentsofitsproductionand
theknowledgeproducedisoftheobjectswithwhichthesensesareincontact.Thecontactofthesenseswiththe
objectsisnotinanysensemetaphoricalbutactual.Notonlyinthecaseoftouchandtastearethesensesin
contactwiththeobjects,butinthecasesofsight,hearingandsmellaswell.ThesensesaccordingtoNyya
Vais`e@sikaarematerialandwehaveseenthatthesystemdoesnotadmitofanyotherkindoftranscendental
(_atndriya_)power(_s'akti_)thanthatofactualvibratory

336

movementwhichiswithinthepurviewofsensecognition[Footnoteref1].Theproductionofknowledgeisthus
notranscendentaloccurrence,butisonewhichissimilartotheeffectsproducedbytheconglomerationand
movementsofphysicalcauses.WhenIperceiveanorange,myvisualorthetactualsenseisintouchnotonlywith
itsspecificcolour,orhardness,butalsowiththeuniversalsassociatedwiththeminarelationofinherenceand
alsowiththeobjectitselfofwhichthecolouretc.arepredicated.Theresultofthissensecontactatthefirststage
iscalled_locanajna_(sensecognition)andasaresultofthatthereisrousedthememoryofitsprevioustaste
andasenseofpleasurablecharacter(_sukhasdhanatvasm@rti_)andasaresultofthatIperceivetheorange
beforemetohaveacertainpleasuregivingcharacter[Footnoteref2].Itisurgedthatthisappreciationofthe
orangeasapleasurableobjectshouldalsoberegardedasadirectresultofperceptionthroughtheactionofthe
memoryoperatingasaconcomitantcause(sahakri).Iperceivetheorangewiththeeyeandunderstandthe
pleasureitwillgive,bythemind,andthereuponunderstandbythemindthatitisapleasurableobject.Sothough
thisperceptionresultsimmediatelybytheoperationofthemind,yetsinceitcouldonlyhappeninassociation
withsensecontact,itmustbeconsideredasasubsidiaryeffectofsensecontactandhenceregardedasvisual
perception.Whatevermaybethesuccessiveintermediaryprocesses,iftheknowledgeisaresultofsensecontact
andifitappertainstotheobjectwithwhichthesenseisincontact,weshouldregarditasaresultofthe
perceptualprocess.Sensecontactwiththeobjectisthustheprimaryandindispensableconditionofall
perceptionsandnotonlycanthesensesbeincontactwiththeobjects,theirqualities,andtheuniversals
associatedwiththembutalsowithnegation.Aperceptioniserroneouswhenitpresentsanobjectinacharacter
whichitdoesnotpossess(_atasmi@mstaditi_)andrightknowledge(_pram_)isthatwhichpresentsanobject
withacharacterwhichitreallyhas

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:
_Nakhalvatndriys'aktirasmbhirupagamyateyaysahanakryyasya
sambandhajnasambhava@h.

Nyyamajar_,p.69.]
[Footnote2:

_Sukhdimanasbuddhvkapitthdicacak@su@stasyakaranattatramanasaivvagamyate...
...Sambandhagraha@nakleyattatkapitthdivi@sayamak@sajamjnamtadupdeydijnaphalamiti
bh@syak@rtas'cetasisthitamsukhasdhanatvajnamupdeyajnam.

_Nyyamajar_,pp.6970;seealsopp.6671.]
337

(_tadvati tatprakraknubhava_) [Footnote ref 1]. In all cases of perceptual illusion the sense is in real contact with the
right object, but it is only on account of the presence of certain other conditions that it is associated with wrong
characteristics or misapprehended as a different object. Thus when the sun's rays are perceived in
CHAPTER VIII 229
adesertandmisapprehendedasastream,atthefirstindeterminatestagethevisualsenseisinrealcontactwith
theraysandthusfarthereisnoillusionsofarasthecontactwitharealobjectisconcerned,butatthesecond
determinatestageitisowingtothesimilarityofcertainofitscharacteristicswiththoseofastreamthatitis
misapprehendedasastream[Footnoteref2].Jayantaobservesthatonaccountofthepresenceofthedefectofthe
organsortherousingofthememoryofsimilarobjects,theobjectwithwhichthesenseisincontacthidesitsown
characteristicsandappearswiththecharacteristicsofotherobjectsandthisiswhatismeantbyillusion[Footnote
ref3].Inthecaseofmentaldelusionshoweverthereisnosensecontactwithanyobjectandtherousingof
irrelevantmemoriesissufficienttoproduceillusorynotions[Footnoteref4].Thisdoctrineofillusionisknownas
_vipartakhyti_or_anyathkhyti._Whatexistedinthemindappearedastheobjectbeforeus(_h@rdaye
parisphurato'rthasyabahiravabhsanam_)[Footnoteref5].LaterVais'e@sikaasinterpretedbyPras'astapda
andS'rdharaisinfullagreementwithNyyainthisdoctrineofillusion(bhramaorasVais'e@sikacallsit
_viparyaya_)thattheobjectofillusionisalwaystherightthingwithwhichthesenseisincontactandthatthe
illusionconsistsintheimpositionofwrongcharacteristics[Footnoteref6].

IhavepointedoutabovethatNyyadividedperceptionintotwoclassesasnirvikalpa(indeterminate)and
savikalpa(determinate)accordingasitisanearlieroralaterstage.Vcaspatisays,thatatthefirststage
perceptionrevealsanobjectasaparticular;theperceptionofanorangeatthisavikalpikaornirvikalpika
stagegivesusindeedallitscolour,form,andalsotheuniversaloforangenessassociatedwithit,butitdoes
notreveal

___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:SeeUdyotakara's_Nyyavrttika_,p.37,andGa@nges'a's_Tattvacintma@ni,_p.401,
BibliothecaIndica.]

[Footnote2:"_Indriye@nlocyamarcnuccvacamuccalatonirvikalpenag@rhtv
pas'cttatropaghtado@stviparyyeti,savikalpako'syapratyayobhrntojyatetasmdvijnasyauvabhicro
nrthasya,_Vcaspati's_Ttparyatk_,"p.87.]

[Footnote3:_Nyyamajar,_p.88.]
[Footnote4:_Ibid._pp.89and184.]

[Footnote5:_Ibid._p.184.]

[Footnote6:_Nyyakandal,_pp.177181,"_S'uktisa@myuktenendriye@nado@sasahakrin
rajatasa@mskrasacivenasd@rs'yamanurundhats'uktikvi@sayorajatdhyavasya@hk@rta@h._"]

338

it in a subject-predicate relation as when I say "this is an orange." The avikalpika stage thus reveals the universal
associated with the particular, but as there is no association of name at this stage, the universal and the particular are
taken in one sweep and not as terms of relation as subject and predicate or substance and attribute
(_jtydisvarpvaghi na tu jtydn@m mitho vis'e@sa@navis'e@syabhvvaghti yvat_) [Footnote ref 1]. He
thinks that such a stage, when the object is only seen but not associated with name or a subject-predicate relation,
can be distinguished in perception not only in the case of infants or dumb persons that do not know the names of
things, but also in the case of all ordinary persons, for the association of the names and relations could be
distinguished as occurring at a succeeding stage [Footnote ref 2]. S'rdhara, in explaining the Vais'e@sika view, seems
to be largely in agreement with the above view of Vcaspati. Thus S'rdhara says that in the nirvikalpa stage not only
the universals were perceived but the differences as well. But as at this stage there is no memory of other things,
there is no manifest differentiation and unification such as can only result by comparison. But the differences and the
universals as they are in the thing are
CHAPTER VIII 230
perceived,onlytheyarenotconsciouslyorderedas"differentfromthis"or"similartothis,"whichcanonlytake
placeatthesavikalpastage[Footnoteref3].Vcaspatididnotbringinthequestionofcomparisonwithothers,
buthadonlyspokenofthedeterminatenotionofthethingindefinitesubjectpredicaterelationinassociation
withnames.ThelaterNyyawritershowever,followingGa@nges'a,holdanaltogetherdifferentopiniononthe
subject.Withthemnirvikalpaknowledgemeanstheknowledgeofmerepredicationwithoutanyassociationwith
thesubjectorthethingtowhichthepredicaterefers.Butsuchaknowledgeisnevertestifiedbyexperience.The
nirvikalpastageisthusalogicalstageinthedevelopmentofperceptualcognitionandnotapsychologicalstage.
Theywould

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Ttparya@tik_,p.81,also_ibid._p.91,"_prathamamlocito'rtha@h
smnyavis'e@savn._"]

[Footnote2:_Ibid._p.84,"_tasmdvyutpannasypinmadheyasmara@nyaprvame@sitavyovinaiva
nmadheyamarthapratyaya@h._"]

[Footnote3:_Nyyakandal,_p.189ff.,"_ata@hsavikalpakamicchatnirvikalpakamapye@sitavyam,tacca
nasmnyamtramg@rh@ntibhedasypipratibhsantnpisvalak@sa@namtramsmnykrasypi
sa@mvedantvyaktyantaradars'anepratisandhncca,kintusmnya@mvis'e@sacobhayamapi
g@rh@ntiyadiparamida@msmnyamayamvis'e@sa@hityeva@mvivicyanapratyeti
vastvantarnusandhnaviraht,pi@ndntarnuv@rttigraha@nddhismnya@mvivicyate,
vyv@rttigraha@ndvis'e@soyamitiviveka@h._"]

339

notliketodispensewithitfortheythinkthatitisimpossibletohavetheknowledgeofathingasqualifiedby
apredicateoraquality,withoutpreviouslyknowingthequalityorthepredicate
(_vis'i@s@tavais'i@styajnampratihivis'e@sa@natvacchedakaprakra@mjna@mkra@na@m_)
[Footnoteref1].So,beforeanydeterminateknowledgesuchas"Iseeacow,""thisisacow"or"acow"can
ariseitmustbeprecededbyanindeterminatestagepresentingonlytheindeterminate,unrelated,
predicativequalityasnirvikalpa,unconnectedwithuniversalityoranyotherrelations
(_jtydiyojanrahita@mvais'i@s@tynavaghini@sprakrakamnirvikalpaka@m_)[Footnoteref2].But
thisstageisneverpsychologicallyexperienced(_atndriya_)anditisonlyalogicalnecessityarisingoutof
theirsyntheticconceptionofapropositionasbeingtherelationingofapredicatewithasubject.Thus
Vis'vanthasaysinhisSiddhntamuktval,"thecognitionwhichdoesnotinvolverelationingcannotbe
perceptualfortheperceptionisoftheform'Iknowthejug';heretheknowledgeisrelatedtotheself,the
knower,thejugagainisrelatedtoknowledgeandthedefinitecontentofjugnessisrelatedtothejug.Itis
thiscontentwhichformsthepredicativequality(_vis'e@sa@natvacchedaka_)ofthepredicate'jug'which
isrelatedtoknowledge.Wecannotthereforehavetheknowledgeofthejugwithouthavingtheknowledgeof
thepredicativequality,thecontent[Footnoteref3]."Butinorderthattheknowledgeofthejugcouldbe
renderedpossible,theremustbeastageatwhichtheuniversalorthepurepredicationshouldbeknownand
thisisthenirvikalpastage,theadmissionofwhichthoughnottestifiedbyexperienceisafteralllogically
indispensablynecessary.Intheproposition"Itisacow,"thecowisanuniversal,andthismustbeintuited
directlybeforeitcouldberelatedtotheparticularwithwhichitisassociated.

ButboththeoldandthenewschoolsofNyyaandVais'e@sikaadmittedthevalidityofthesavikalpaperception
whichtheBuddhistsdenied.Thingsarenotofthenatureofmomentaryparticulars,buttheyareendowedwith
classcharactersoruniversalsandthusourknowledgeofuniversalsasrevealedbytheperceptionofobjectsisnot
erroneousandisdirectlyproducedbyobjects.TheBuddhistsholdthattheerrorofsavikalpaperceptionconsists
intheattributionofjti(universal),gu@na(quality),
____________________________________________________________________
CHAPTER VIII 231
[Footnote1:_Tattvacintma@ni_p.812.]

[Footnote2:Ibid.p.809.]

[Footnote3:_Siddhntamuktval_on_Bh@sparicchedakrik_,58.]

340

kriy(action),nma(name),anddravya(substance)tothings[Footnoteref1].Theuniversalandthatof
whichtheuniversalispredicatedarenotdifferentbutarethesameidenticalentity.Thusthepredicationof
anuniversalinthesavikalpaperceptioninvolvesthefalsecreationofadifferencewheretherewasnone.So
alsothequalityisnotdifferentfromthesubstanceandtospeakofathingasqualifiedisthusanerror
similartotheformer.Thesameremarkappliestoaction,formotionisnotsomethingdifferentfromthat
whichmoves.Butnameiscompletelydifferentfromthethingandyetthenameandthethingareidentified,
andagainthepercept"manwithastick"isregardedasifitwasasinglethingorsubstance,though"man"
and"stick"arealtogetherdifferentandthereisnounitybetweenthem.Nowasregardsthefirstthree
objectionsitisaquestionofthedifferenceoftheNyyaontologicalpositionwiththatoftheBuddhists,for
weknowthatNyyaandVais'e@sikabelievejti,gu@naandkriytobedifferentfromsubstanceand
thereforethepredicatingofthemofsubstanceasdifferentcategoriesrelatedtoitatthedeterminatestageof
perceptioncannotberegardedaserroneous.AstothefourthobjectionVcaspatirepliesthatthememoryof
thenameofthethingrousedbyitssightcannotmaketheperceptionerroneous.Thefactthatmemory
operatescannotinanywayvitiateperception.Thefactthatnameisnotassociateduntilthesecondstage
throughthejointactionofmemoryiseasilyexplained,fortheoperationofmemorywasnecessaryinorder
tobringabouttheassociation.Butsolongasitisborneinmindthatthenameisnotidenticalwiththething
butisonlyassociatedwithitasbeingthesameaswaspreviouslyacquired,therecannotbeanyobjectionto
theassociationofthename.ButtheBuddhistsfurtherobjectthatthereisnoreasonwhyoneshouldidentify
athingseenatthepresentmomentasbeingthatwhichwasseenbefore,forthisidentityisnevertheobject
ofvisualperception.TothisVcaspatisaysthatthroughthehelpofmemoryorpastimpressions
(_sa@mskra_)thiscanbeconsideredasbeingdirectlytheobjectofperception,forwhatevermaybethe
concomitantcauseswhenthemaincauseofsensecontactis

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Nyyamajar_,pp.93100,"_Pacacaitekalpanbhavantijtikalpan,gu@nakalpan,
kriykalpan,nmakalpandravyakalpanceti,ts'cakvacidabhede'pibhedakalpantkvacicca
bhede'pyabhedakalpantkalpanucyante._"SeeDharmakrtti'stheoryofPerception,pp.1514.Seealsopp.
409410ofthisbook.]

341

present, this perception of identity should be regarded as an effect of it. But the Buddhists still emphasize the point
that an object of past experience refers to a past time and place and is not experienced now and cannot therefore be
identified with an object which is experienced at the present moment. It has to be admitted that Vcaspati's answer is
not very satisfactory for it leads ultimately to the testimony of direct perception which was challenged by the Buddhists
[Footnote ref 1]. It is easy to see that early Nyya-Vais'e@sika could not dismiss the savikalpa perception as invalid for it
was the same as the nirvikalpa and differed from it only in this, that a name was associated with the thing of
perception at this stage. As it admits a gradual development of perception as the progressive effects of causal
operations continued through the contacts of the mind with the self and the object under the influence of various
intellectual (e.g. memory) and physical (e.g. light rays) concomitant causes, it does not, like Vednta, require that right
perception should only give knowledge which was not previously acquired. The variation as well as production of
knowledge in the soul depends upon the variety of causal collocations.
CHAPTER VIII 232
MindaccordingtoNyyaisregardedasaseparatesenseandcancomeincontactwithpleasure,pain,desire,
antipathyandwill.ThelaterNyyawritersspeakofthreeotherkindsofcontactofatranscendentalnaturecalled
_smnyalak@sa@na,jnalak@sa@na_andyogaja(miraculous).Thecontactsmnyalak@sa@naisthatby
virtueofwhichbycomingincontactwithaparticularwearetranscendentally(_alaukika_)incontactwithallthe
particulars(inageneralway)ofwhichthecorrespondinguniversalmaybepredicated.ThuswhenIseesmoke
andthroughitmysenseisincontactwiththeuniversalassociatedwithsmokemyvisualsenseisintranscendental
contactwithallsmokeingeneral.Jnalak@sa@nacontactisthatbyvirtueofwhichwecanassociatethe
perceptionsofothersenseswhenperceivingbyanyonesense.Thuswhenwearelookingatapieceofsandalwood
ourvisualsenseisintouchwithitscolouronly,butstillweperceiveittobefragrantwithoutanydirectcontactof
theobjectwiththeorganofsmell.Thesortoftranscendentalcontact(_alaukikasannikar@sa_)byvirtueof
whichthisisrendered

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Ttparya@tk_,pp.8895.]

342

possibleiscalledjnalak@sa@na.Buttheknowledgeacquiredbythesetwocontactsisnotcountedas
perception[Footnoterefl].

Pleasuresandpains(sukhaand_du@hkha_)areheldbyNyyatobedifferentfromknowledge(jna).For
knowledgeinterprets,conceivesorilluminesthings,butsukhaetc.areneverfoundtoappearasbehavinginthat
character.Ontheotherhandwefeelthatwegraspthemafterhavingsomeknowledge.Theycannotbeself
revealing,forevenknowledgeisnotso;ifitwereso,thenthatexperiencewhichgeneratessukhainoneshould
havegeneratedthesamekindoffeelinginothers,orinotherwordsitshouldhavemanifesteditsnatureassukha
toall;andthisdoesnothappen,forthesamethingwhichgeneratessukhainonemightnotdosoinothers.
Moreoverevenadmittingforargument'ssakethatitisknowledgeitselfthatappearsaspleasureandpain,itis
evidentthattheremustbesomedifferencesbetweenthepleasurableandpainfulexperiencesthatmakethemso
different,andthisdifferenceisduetothefactthatknowledgeinonecasewasassociatedwithsukhaandin
anothercasewithdu@hkha,Thisshowsthatsukhaanddu@hkhaarenotthemselvesknowledge.Suchisthe
courseofthingsthatsukhaanddu@hkhaaregeneratedbythecollocationofcertainconditions,andare
manifestedthroughorinassociationwithotherobjectseitherindirectperceptionorinmemory.Theyarethus
thequalitieswhicharegeneratedintheselfasaresultofcausaloperation.Itshouldhoweverberemembered
thatmeritanddemeritactasconcomitantcausesintheirproduction.

Theyoginsarebelievedtohavethepratyak@saofthemostdistantthingsbeyondoursenses;theycanacquire
thispowerbygraduallyincreasingtheirpowersofconcentrationandperceivethesubtlestandmostdistant
objectsdirectlybytheirmind.Evenweourselvesmayatsometimehavethenotionsoffutureeventswhichcome
tobetrue,e.g.sometimesImayhavetheintuitionthat"Tomorrowmybrotherwillcome,"

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Siddhntamuktval_on_Krik_63and64.WemustrememberthatGa@nges'adiscardedthe
definitionofperceptionasgiveninthe_Nyyastra_whichwehavediscussedabove,andheldthatperception
shouldbedefinedasthatcognitionwhichhasthespecialclasscharacterofdirectapprehension.Hethinksthat
theolddefinitionofperceptionasthecognitiongeneratedbysensecontactinvolvesaviciouscircle
(_Tattvacintma@ni_,pp.538546).Sensecontactisstillregardedbyhimasthecauseofperception,butitshould
notbeincludedinthedefinition.HeagreestothesixkindsofcontactdescribedfirstbyUdyotakaraasmentioned
above.]
343
CHAPTER VIII 233
andthismayhappentobetrue.Thisiscalledpratibhnajna,whichisalsotoberegardedasapratyak@sa
directlybythemind.Thisisofcoursedifferentfromtheotherformofperceptioncalledmnasapratyak@sa,by
whichmemoriesofpastperceptionsbyothersensesareassociatedwithaperceptvisualizedatthepresent
moment;thusweseearoseandperceivethatitisfragrant;thefragranceisnotperceivedbytheeye,butthe
manasperceivesitdirectlyandassociatesthevisualperceptwithit.AccordingtoVedntathisacquired
perceptionisonlyacaseofinference.Theprtibhapratyak@sahoweveristhatwhichiswithreferencetothe
happeningofafutureevent.Whenacognitionisproduced,itisproducedonlyasanobjectivecognition,e.g.This
isapot,butafterthisitisagainrelatedtotheselfbythemindas"Iknowthispot."Thisiseffectedbythemind
againcomingincontactforreperceptionofthecognitionwhichhadalreadybeengeneratedinthesoul.This
secondreperceptioniscalledanuvyavasya,andallpracticalworkcanproceedasaresultofthisanuvyavasya
[Footnoteref.l].

Inference.

Inference(_anumna_)isthesecondmeansofproof(prm@na)andthemostvaluablecontributionthatNyya
hasmadehasbeenonthissubject.Itconsistsinmakinganassertionaboutathingonthestrengthofthemarkor
ligawhichisassociatedwithit,aswhenfindingsmokerisingfromahillwerememberthatsincesmokecannot
bewithoutfire,theremustalsobefireinyonderhill.Inanexamplelikethissmokeistechnicallycalledliga,or
hetu.Thataboutwhichtheassertionhasbeenmade(thehillinthisexample)iscalledpak@sa,andtheterm
"fire"iscalledsdhya.Tomakeacorrectinferenceitisnecessarythatthehetuorligamustbepresentinthe
pak@sa,

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ThislaterNyyadoctrinethatthecognitionofselfinassociationwithcognitionisproducedatalater
momentmustbecontrastedwiththe_triputpratyak@sa_doctrineofPrabhkara,whichholdsthattheobject,
knowerandknowledgeareallgivensimultaneouslyinknowledge.Vyavasya(determinatecognition),according
toGa@nges'a,givesusonlythecognitionoftheobject,butthecognitionthatIamawareofthisobjector
cognitionisadifferentfunctioningsucceedingtheformeroneandiscalledanu(after)vyavasya(cognition),
"_idamaha@mjnmtivyavasyenabhsatetaddhakendriyasannikar@sbhvt
kintvida@mvi@sayakajnatvavis'i@s@tasyajnasyavais'i@styamtmanibhsate;nacasvapraks'e
vyavasyatd@rs'a@msvasyavais'i@s@tya@mbhsitumarhati,prva@mvis'e@sa@nasyatasyjnt,
tasmdidamaha@mjnmitinavyavasya@hkintuanuvyavasyah."_Tattvacintma@ni_,p.795.]

344

and in all other known objects similar to the pak@sa in having the sdhya in it (sapak@sa-satt), i.e., which are known
to possess the sdhya (possessing fire in the present example). The liga must not be present in any such object as does
not possess the sdhya (_vipak@sa-vyv@rtti_ absent from vipak@sa or that which does not possess the sdhya). The
inferred assertion should not be such that it is invalidated by direct perception {_pratyak@sa_) or the testimony of the
s'stra (_abdhita-vi@sayatva_). The liga should not be such that by it an inference in the opposite way could also be
possible (_asat-pratipak@sa_). The violation of any one of these conditions would spoil the certitude of the hetu as
determining the inference, and thus would only make the hetu fallacious, or what is technically called hetvbhsa or
seeming hetu by which no correct inference could be made. Thus the inference that sound is eternal because it is visible
is fallacious, for visibility is a quality which sound (here the pak@sa) does not possess [Footnote ref l]. This hetvbhsa
is technically called _asiddha-hetu_. Again, hetvbhsa of the second type, technically called _viruddha-hetu_, may be
exemplified in the case that sound is eternal, since it is created; the hetu "being created" is present in the opposite of
sdhya {_vipak@sa_), namely non-eternality, for we know that non-eternality is a quality which belongs to all created
things. A fallacy of the third type, technically called _anaikntika-hetu_, is found in the case that sound is eternal, since
it is an object of knowledge. Now "being an object of knowledge" (_prameyatva_) is here the hetu, but it is present in
things eternal (i.e. things possessing sdhya), as well as in
CHAPTER VIII 234
thingsthatarenoteternal(i.e.whichdonotpossessthesdhya),andthereforetheconcomitanceofthehetu
withthesdhyaisnotabsolute(_anaikntika_).Afallacyofthefourthtype,technicallycalled
_kltyaypadi@s@ta_,maybefoundintheexamplefireisnothot,sinceitiscreatedlikeajug,etc.Here
pratyak@sashowsthatfireishot,andhencethehetuisfallacious.Thefifthfallacy,called
_prakara@nasama_,istobefoundincaseswhereoppositehetusareavailableatthesametimeforopposite
conclusions,e.g.soundlikeajugisnoneternal,

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ItshouldbeborneinmindthatNyyadidnotbelieveinthedoctrineoftheeternalityofsound,
whichtheMm@msdid.EternalityofsoundmeantwithMm@msthetheorythatsoundsexistedas
eternalindestructibleentities,andtheywereonlymanifestedinourearsundercertainconditions,e.g.the
strokeofadrumoraparticularkindofmovementofthevocalmuscles.]

345

sincenoeternalqualitiesarefoundinit,andsoundlikeks'aiseternal,sincenononeternalqualitiesare
foundinit.

TheBuddhistsheldinanswertotheobjectionsraisedagainstinferencebytheCrvkas,thatinferential
argumentsarevalid,becausetheyareargumentsontheprincipleoftheuniformityofnatureintworelations,viz.
_tdtmya_(essentialidentity)andtadutpatti(successioninarelationofcauseandeffect).Tdtmyaisarelation
ofgenusandspeciesandnotofcausation;thusweknowthatallpinesaretrees,andinferthatthisisatreesince
itisapine;treeandpinearerelatedtoeachotherasgenusandspecies,andthecoinherenceofthegeneric
qualitiesofatreewiththespecificcharactersofapinetreemaybeviewedasarelationofessentialidentity
(_tdtmya_).Therelationoftadutpattiisthatofuniformityofsuccessionofcauseandeffect,e.g.ofsmoketo
fire.

Nyyaholdsthatinferenceismadebecauseoftheinvariableassociation(_niyama_)oftheli@ngaorhetu(the
concomitanceofwhichwiththesdhyahasbeensafeguardedbythefiveconditionsnotedabove)withthesdhya,
andnotbecauseofsuchspecificrelationsastdtmyaortadutpatti.Ifitisheldthattheinferencethatitisatree
becauseitisapineisduetotheessentialidentityoftreeandpine,thentheoppositeargumentthatitisapine
becauseitisatreeoughttobevalidaswell;forifitwereacaseofidentityitoughttobethesamebothways.Ifin
answertothisitissaidthatthecharacteristicsofapineareassociatedwiththoseofatreeandnotthoseofatree
withthoseofapine,thencertainlytheargumentisnotduetoessentialidentity,buttotheinvariableassociation
oftheli@nga(mark)withtheli@ngin(thepossessorofli@nga),otherwisecalledniyama.Theargumentfrom
tadutpatti(associationascauseandeffect)isalsoreallyduetoinvariableassociation,foritexplainsthecaseofthe
inferenceofthetypeofcauseandeffectaswellasofothertypesofinference,wheretheassociationascauseand
effectisnotavailable(e.g.fromsunsettheriseofstarsisinferred).Thusitisthattheinvariableconcomitanceof
theli@ngawiththeli@ngin,assafeguardedbytheconditionsnotedabove,iswhatleadsustomakeavalid
inference[Footnoterefl].

Weperceivedinmanycasesthatali@nga(e.g.smoke)wasassociatedwithali@ngin(fire),andhadthence
formedthenotion

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[Footnote1:See_Nyyamajari_onanumna.]

346
that wherever there was smoke there was fire. Now when we perceived that there was smoke in yonder hill,
CHAPTER VIII 235
werememberedtheconcomitance(_vypti_)ofsmokeandfirewhichwehadobservedbefore,andthensince
therewassmokeinthehill,whichwasknowntoustobeinseparablyconnectedwithfire,weconcludedthatthere
wasfireinthehill.Thediscoveryoftheli@nga(smoke)inthehillasassociatedwiththememoryofits
concomitancewithfire(_t@rtyali@ngaparmars'a)isthusthecause(_anumitikara@na_or_anumna_)of
theinference(_anumiti_).Theconcomitanceofsmokewithfireistechnicallycalled_vypti._Whenthisrefersto
theconcomitanceofcasescontainingsmokewiththosehavingfire,itiscalled_bahirvypti_;andwhenitrefers
totheconvictionoftheconcomitanceofsmokewithfire,withoutanyrelationtothecircumstancesunderwhich
theconcomitancewasobserved,itiscalled_antarvypti._TheBuddhistssincetheydidnotadmitthenotionsof
generality,etc.preferredantarvyptiviewofconcomitancetobahirvyptiasameansofinference[Footnoteref
1].

Nowthequestionarisesthatsincethevalidityofaninferencewilldependmainlyonthevalidityofthe
concomitanceofsign(_hetu_)withthesignate(_sdhya_),howarewetoassureourselvesineachcasethatthe
processofascertainingtheconcomitance(_vyptigraha_)hadbeencorrect,andtheobservationofconcomitance
hadbeenvalid.TheMm@msschoolheld,asweshallseeinthenextchapter,thatifwehadnoknowledgeof
anysuchcaseinwhichtherewassmokebutnofire,andifinallthecasesIknewIhadperceivedthatwherever
therewassmoketherewasfire,Icouldenunciatetheconcomitanceofsmokewithfire.ButNyyaholdsthatitis
notenoughthatinallcaseswherethereissmokethereshouldbefire,butitisnecessarythatinallthosecases
wherethereisnofirethereshouldnotbeanysmoke,i.e.notonlyeverycaseoftheexistenceofsmokeshouldbea
caseoftheexistenceoffire,buteverycaseofabsenceoffireshouldbeacaseofabsenceofsmoke.Theformeris
technicallycalled_anvayavypti_andthelatter_vyatirekavypti._Buteventhisisnotenough.Thustheremay
havebeenanasssitting,inahundredcaseswhereIhadseensmoke,andtheremighthavebeenahundredcases
wheretherewasneitherassnorsmoke,butitcannotbeassertedfromitthatthereisanyrelationof
concomitance,

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[Footnote1:See_Antarvyptisamarthana,_byRatnkaras'ntiinthe_SixBuddhistNyyaTracts,Bibliotheca
Indica_,1910.]

347

or of cause and effect between the ass and the smoke. It may be that one might never have observed smoke without an
antecedent ass, or an ass without the smoke following it, but even that is not enough. If it were such that we had so
experienced in a very large number of cases that the introduction of the ass produced the smoke, and that even when
all the antecedents remained the same, the disappearance of the ass was immediately followed by the disappearance of
smoke (_yasmin sati bhavanam yato vin na bhavanam iti bhuyodars'ana@m, Nyyamajar,_ p. 122), then only could
we say that there was any relation of concomitance (_vypti_} between the ass and the smoke [Footnote ref 1]. But of
course it might be that what we concluded to be the hetu by the above observations of anvaya-vyatireka might not be a
real hetu, and there might be some other condition (_updhi_) associated with the hetu which was the real hetu. Thus
we know that fire in green wood (_rdrendhana_) produced smoke, but one might doubt that it was not the fire in the
green wood that produced smoke, but there was some hidden demon who did it. But there would be no end of such
doubts, and if we indulged in them, all our work endeavour and practical activities would have to be dispensed with
(_vyghta_). Thus such doubts as lead us to the suspension of all work should not disturb or unsettle the notion of
vypti or concomitance at which we had arrived by careful observation and consideration [Footnote ref 2]. The
Buddhists and the naiyyikas generally agreed as to the method of forming the notion of concomitance or vypti
(_vyptigraha_), but the former tried to assert that the validity of such a concomitance always depended on a relation
of cause and effect or of identity of essence, whereas Nyya held that neither the relations of cause and effect, nor that
of essential identity of genus and species, exhausted the field of inference, and there was quite a number of other types
of inference which could not be brought under either of them (e.g. the rise of the moon and the tide of the ocean). A
natural fixed order that certain things
CHAPTER VIII 236
happeningotherthingswouldhappencouldcertainlyexist,evenwithoutthesuppositionofanidentityof
essence.

Butsometimesithappensthatdifferentkindsofcausesoftenhavethesamekindofeffect,andinsuchcasesitis
difficultto

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[Footnote1:See_Ttparya@tk_onanumnaandvyptigraha.]

[Footnote2:_Ttparya@tk_onvyptigraha,and_Tattvacintma@ni_ofGa@nges'aon
vyptigraha.]

348

infertheparticularcausefromtheeffect.Nyyaholdshoweverthatthoughdifferentcausesareoftenfoundto
producethesameeffect,yettheremustbesomedifferencebetweenoneeffectandanother.Ifeacheffectistaken
byitselfwithitsotherattendantcircumstancesandpeculiarities,itwillbefoundthatitmaythenbepossibleto
distinguishitfromsimilarothereffects.Thusafloodinthestreetmaybedueeithertoaheavydownpourofrain
immediatelybefore,ortotheriseinthewateroftherivercloseby,butifobservedcarefullythefloodingofthe
streetduetorainwillbefoundtohavesuchspecialtraitsthatitcouldbedistinguishedfromasimilarflooding
duetotheriseofwaterintheriver.Thusfromthefloodingofthestreetofaspecialtype,asdemonstratedbyits
otherattendantcircumstances,thespecialmannerinwhichthewaterflowsbysmallrivuletsorinsheets,will
enableustoinferthatthefloodwasduetorainsandnottotheriseofwaterintheriver.ThusweseethatNyya
reliedonempiricalinductionbasedonuniformanduninterruptedagreementinnature,whereastheBuddhists
assumedaprioriprinciplesofcausalityoridentityofessence.Itmaynotbeoutofplaceheretomentionthatin
laterNyyaworksgreatemphasisislaidonthenecessityofgettingourselvesassuredthattherewasnosuch
updhi(condition)associatedwiththehetuonaccountofwhichtheconcomitancehappened,butthatthehetuwas
unconditionallyassociatedwiththesdhyainarelationofinseparableconcomitance.Thusallfiredoesnot
producesmoke;firemustbeassociatedwithgreenwoodinordertoproducesmoke.Greenwoodisthusthe
necessarycondition(_updhi_)withoutwhich,nosmokecouldbeproduced.Itisonaccountofthisconditionthat
fireisassociatedwithsmoke;andsowecannotsaythatthereissmokebecausethereisfire.Butinthe
concomitanceofsmokewithfirethereisnocondition,andsoineverycaseofsmokethereisfire.Inordertobe
assuredofthevalidityofvypti,itisnecessarythatwemustbeassuredthatthereshouldbenothingassociated
withthehetuwhichconditionedtheconcomitance,andthismustbesettledbywideexperience
(_bhyodars'ana_).

Pras'astapdaindefininginferenceasthe"knowledgeofthat(e.g.fire)associatedwiththereason(e.g.smoke)
bythesightofthereason"describedavalidreason(_li@nga_)asthatwhichisconnectedwiththeobjectof
inference(_anumeya_)andwhichexistswherevertheobjectofinferenceexistsandisabsentinallcases

349

where it does not exist. This is indeed the same as the Nyya qualifications of _pak@sasattva, sapak@sasattva and
_vipak@ssattva_ of a valid reason (hetu). Pras'astapda further quotes a verse to say that this is the same as what
Ks'yapa (believed to be the family name of Ka@nda) said. Ka@nda says that we can infer a cause from the effect,
the effect from the cause, or we can infer one thing by another when they are mutually connected, or in opposition or
in a relation of inherence (IX. ii. 1 and III. i. 9). We can infer by a reason because it is duly associated
(_prasiddhiprvakatva_) with the object of inference. What this association was according to Ka@nda can also be
understood for he tells us (III. i. 15) that where there is no proper association, the reason (hetu) is either non-existent in
the object to be inferred or it has no concomitance with it (_aprasiddha_) or it has a doubtful existence _sandigdha_).
Thus if I say this ass is a horse because it has
CHAPTER VIII 237
hornsitisfallacious,forneitherthehorsenortheasshashorns.AgainifIsayitisacowbecauseithashorns,it
isfallacious,forthereisnoconcomitancebetweenhornsandacow,andthoughacowmayhaveahorn,allthat
havehornsarenotcows.Thefirstfallacyisacombinationofpak@ssattvaandsapak@ssattva,fornotonlythe
presentpak@sa(theass)hadnohorns,butnohorseshadanyhorns,andthesecondisacaseofvipak@sasattva,
forthosewhicharenotcows(e.g.buffaloes)havealsohorns.Thus,itseemsthatwhenPras'astapdasaysthathe
isgivingustheviewofKa@ndaheisfaithfultoit.Pras'astapdasaysthatwhereverthereissmokethereisfire,
ifthereisnofirethereisnosmoke.Whenoneknowsthisconcomitanceandunerringlyperceivesthesmoke,he
rememberstheconcomitanceandfeelscertainthatthereisfire.ButwithregardtoKa@nda'senumerationof
typesofinferencesuchas"acauseisinferredfromitseffect,oraneffectfromthecause,"etc.,Pras'astapda
holdsthatthesearenottheonlytypesofinference,butareonlysomeexamplesforshowingthegeneralnatureof
inference.Inferencemerelyshowsaconnectionsuchthatfromthisthatcanbeinferred.Hethendividesinference
intotwoclasses,d@r@s@ta(fromtheexperiencedcharacteristicsofonememberofaclasstoanothermemberof
thesameclass),andsmnyatod@r@s@ta.D@r@s@ta(perceivedresemblance)isthatwherethepreviously
knowncaseandtheinferredcaseisexactlyofthesameclass.Thusasanexampleofitwecanpointoutthatby
perceivingthatonlyacowhasahangingmassoffleshonitsneck(_ssn_),IcanwheneverIseethesame
hanging

350

massoffleshattheneckofananimalinferthatitisacow.Butwhenonthestrengthofacommonqualitythe
inferenceisextendedtoadifferentclassofobjects,itiscalledsmnyatod@r@s@ta.Thusonperceivingthatthe
workofthepeasantsisrewardedwithagoodharvestImayinferthattheworkofthepriests,namelythe
performanceofsacrifices,willalsoberewardedwiththeobjectsforwhichtheyareperformed(i.e.theattainment
ofheaven).Whentheconclusion,towhichonehasarrived(_svanis'citrtha_)isexpressedinfivepremissesfor
convincingotherswhoareeitherindoubt,orinerrororaresimplyignorant,thentheinferenceiscalled
parrthnumna.Weknowthatthedistinctionofsvrthnumna(inferenceforoneself)andparrthnumna
(inferenceforothers)wasmadebytheJainsandBuddhists.Pras'astapdadoesnotmakeasharpdistinctionof
twoclassesofinference,butheseemstomeanthatwhatoneinfers,itcanbeconveyedtoothersbymeansoffive
premissesinwhichcaseitiscalledparrthnumna.Butthisneednotbeconsideredasanentirelynew
innovationofPras'astapda,forinIX.2,Ka@ndahimselfdefinitelyalludestothisdistinction(_asyeda@m
kryyakra@nasambandhas'cvayavdbhavati_).ThefivepremisseswhicharecalledinNyya_pratij,hetu
d@r@s@tnta,upanaya,_andnigamanaarecalledinVais'e@sika_pratij,apades'a,nidars'ana,
anusandhna_,and_pratymnya_.Ka@ndahoweverdoesnotmentionthenameofanyofthesepremisses
exceptingthesecond"apades'a."PratijisofcoursethesameaswehaveinNyya,andthetermnidars'anais
verysimilartoNyyad@r@s@tnta,butthelasttwoareentirelydifferent.Nidars'anamaybeoftwokinds,(1)
agreementinpresence(e.g.thatwhichhasmotionisasubstanceasisseeninthecaseofanarrow),(2)agreement
inabsence(e.g.whatisnotasubstancehasnomotionasisseeninthecaseoftheuniversalbeing[Footnoterefl]).
Healsopointsoutcasesofthefallacyoftheexample

___________________________________________________________________

{Footnote1:DrVidybh@sa@nasaysthat"AnexamplebeforethetimeofDigngaservedasamere
familiarcasewhichwascitedtohelptheunderstandingofthelistener,e.g.Thehillisfiery;becauseithas
smoke;likeakitchen(example).Asa@ngamadetheexamplemoreserviceabletoreasoning,butDignga
converteditintoauniversalproposition,thatisapropositionexpressiveoftheuniversalorinseparable
connectionbetweenthemiddletermandthemajorterm,e.g.Thehillisfiery;becauseithassmoke;allthat
hassmokeisfieryasakitchen"(IndianLogic,pp.95,96).ItisofcoursetruethatVtsyyanahadanimperfect
exampleas"likeakitchen"(_s'abda@hutpatvidharmakatvdanuya@hsthlydivat_,I.i.36),but
Pras'astapdahasitintheproperform.WhetherPras'astapdaborroweditfromDig@nngaorDig@nnga
fromPras'astapdacannotbeeasilysettled.]
351
CHAPTER VIII 238
(_nidars'anbhsa_).Pras'astapda'scontributionthusseemstoconsistoftheenumerationofthefivepremisses
andthefallacyofthenidars'ana,butthenamesofthelasttwopremissesaresodifferentfromwhatarecurrent
inothersystemsthatitisreasonabletosupposethathecollectedthemfromsomeothertraditionalVais'e@sika
workwhichisnowlosttous.Ithoweverdefinitelyindicatesthatthestudyoftheproblemofinferencewasbeing
pursuedinVais'e@sikacirclesindependentlyofNyya.Thereisnoreasonhowevertosupposethat
Pras'astapdaborrowedanythingfromDi@nngaasProfessorStcherbatskyorKeithsupposes,for,asIhave
shownabove,mostofPras'astapda'sapparentinnovationsarealldefinitelyalludedtobyKa@ndahimself,and
ProfessorKeithhasnotdiscussedthisalternative.Onthequestionofthefallaciesofnidars'ana,unlessitis
definitelyprovedthatDi@nngaprecededPras'astapda,thereisnoreasonwhatevertosupposethatthelatter
borroweditfromtheformer[Footnoteref1].

Thenatureandascertainmentofconcomitanceisthemostimportantpartofinference.Vtsyyanasaysthatan
inferencecanbemadebythesightoftheli@nga(reasonormiddle)throughthememoryoftheconnection
betweenthemiddleandthemajorpreviouslyperceived.Udyotakararaisesthequestionwhetheritisthepresent
perceptionofthemiddleorthememoryoftheconnectionofthemiddlewiththemajorthatshouldberegarded
asleadingtoinference.Hisansweristhatboththeseleadtoinference,butthatwhichimmediatelyleadsto
inferenceis_li@ngaparmars'a_,i.e.thepresentperceptionofthemiddleintheminorassociatedwiththe
memoryofitsconnectionwiththemajor,forinferencedoesnotimmediatelyfollowthememoryofthe
connection,butthepresentperceptionofthemiddleassociatedwiththememoryoftheconnection
(_sm@rtyanug@rhtoli@ngaparmars'o_).Butheissilentwithregardtothenatureofconcomitance.
Udyotakara'scriticismsofDi@nngaasshownbyVcaspatihavenoreferencetothispointThedoctrineof
_tdtmya_andtadutpattiwasthereforeinallprobabilityanewcontributiontoBuddhistlogicbyDharmakrtti.
Dharmakrtti'scontentionwasthattherootprincipleoftheconnectionbetweenthemiddleandthemajorwas
thattheformerwaseitheridenticalinessencewiththelatteroritseffectandthatunlessthiswasgraspedamere
collectionofpositiveornegativeinstanceswillnotgiveus

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[Footnote1:Pras'astapda'sbh@syawith_Nyyakandal_,pp.200255.]

352

the desired connection [Footnote ref 1]. Vcaspati in his refutation of this view says that the cause-effect relation cannot
be determined as a separate relation. If causality means invariable immediate antecedence such that there being fire
there is smoke and there being no fire there is no smoke, then it cannot be ascertained with perfect satisfaction, for
there is no proof that in each case the smoke was caused by fire and not by an invisible demon. Unless it can be
ascertained that there was no invisible element associated, it cannot be said that the smoke was immediately preceded
by fire and fire alone. Again accepting for the sake of argument that causality can be determined, then also cause is
known to precede the effect and therefore the perception of smoke can only lead us to infer the presence of fire at a
preceding time and not contemporaneously with it. Moreover there are many cases where inference is possible, but
there is no relation of cause and effect or of identity of essence (e.g. the sunrise of this morning by the sunrise of
yesterday morning). In the case of identity of essence (_tdtmya_ as in the case of the pine and the tree) also there
cannot be any inference, for one thing has to be inferred by another, but if they are identical there cannot be any
inference. The nature of concomitance therefore cannot be described in either of these ways. Some things (e.g. smoke)
are naturally connected with some other things (e.g. fire) and when such is the case, though we may not know any
further about the nature of this connection, we may infer the latter from the former and not vice versa, for fire is
connected with smoke only under certain conditions (e.g. green wood). It may be argued that there may always be
certain unknown conditions which may vitiate the validity of inference. To this Vcaspati's answer is that if even after
observing a large number of cases and careful search such conditions (_updhi_) cannot be discovered, we have to take
it for granted that they do not exist and that there is a natural connection between the middle and the major. The later
Buddhists introduced the method of _Pacakra@n_ in order to
CHAPTER VIII 239
determineeffectivelythecausalrelation.Thesefiveconditionsdeterminingthecausalrelationare(1)neitherthe
causenortheeffectisperceived,(2)thecauseisperceived,(3)inimmediatesuccessiontheeffectisperceived,(4)
thecausedisappears,(5)in

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[Footnote1:_Kryyakra@nubhvdvsvabhvdvaniymaktavinbhvaniyamo'dars'annnanadars'ant.
Ttparya@tk_,p.105.]

353

immediatesuccessiontheeffectdisappears.Butthismethodcannotguaranteetheinfallibilityofthe
determinationofcauseandeffectrelation;andifbytheassumptionofacauseeffectrelationnohigherdegreeof
certaintyisavailable,itisbettertoacceptanaturalrelationwithoutlimitingittoacauseeffectrelation[Footnote
ref1].

InearlyNyyabooksthreekindsofinferencearedescribed,namelyprvavat,s'e@savat,andsmnyato
d@r@s@ta.Prvavatistheinferenceofeffectsfromcauses,e.g.thatofimpendingrainfromheavydarkclouds;
s'e@savatistheinferenceofcausesfromeffects,e.g.thatofrainfromtheriseofwaterintheriver;smnyato
d@r@s@tareferstotheinferenceinallcasesotherthanthoseofcauseandeffect,e.g.theinferenceofthesour
tasteofthetamarindfromitsformandcolour._Nyyamajar_mentionsanotherformofanumna,namely
paris'e@samna(_reductioadabsurdum_),whichconsistsinassertinganything(e.g.consciousness)ofanyother
thing(e.g.tman),becauseitwasalreadydefinitelyfoundoutthatconsciousnesswasnotproducedinanyother
partofman.Sinceconsciousnesscouldnotbelongtoanythingelse,itmustbelongtosoulofnecessity.Inspiteof
thesevariantformstheyareallhoweverofonekind,namelythatoftheinferenceoftheprobandum(_sdhya_)
byvirtueoftheunconditionalandinvariableconcomitanceofthehetu,calledthevyptiniyama.Inthenew
schoolofNyya(NavyaNyya)aformaldistinctionofthreekindsofinferenceoccupiesanimportantplace,
namelyanvayavyatireki,kevalnvayi,andkevalavyatireki.Anvayavyatirekiisthatinferencewherethevypti
hasbeenobservedbyacombinationofalargenumberofinstancesofagreementinpresenceandagreementin
absence,asinthecaseoftheconcomitanceofsmokeandfire(whereverthereissmokethereisfire(_anvaya_),
andwherethereisnofire,thereisnosmoke(_vyatireka_)).Aninferencecouldbeforone'sownself
(_svrthnumna_)orforthesakeofconvincingothers(_parrthnumna_).Inthelattercase,whenitwas
necessarythataninferenceshouldbeputexplicitlyinanunambiguousmanner,livepropositions(_avayavas_)
wereregardedasnecessary,namelypratija(e.g.thehillisfiery),hetu(sinceithassmoke),udhara@na(where
thereissmokethereisfire,asinthekitchen),upanaya(thishillhassmoke),niga@mana(thereforeithasgot

____________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:Vtsyya@na'sbhsya,Udyotakara's_Vrttika_and_Ttparyya@tk,_I.i.5.]

354

fire). Kevalnvayi is that type of inference, the vypti of which could not be based on any negative instance, as in the
case "this object has a name, since it is an object of knowledge (_ida@m, vcyam prameyatvt_)." Now no such case is
known which is not an object of knowledge; we cannot therefore know of any case where there was no object of
knowledge (_prameyatva_) and no name (_vcyatva_); the vypti here has therefore to be based necessarily on cases of
agreement--wherever there is prameyatva or an object of knowledge, there is vcyatva or name. The third form of
kevalavyatireki is that where positive instances in agreement cannot be found, such as in the case of the inference that
earth differs from other elements in possessing the specific quality of smell, since all that does not differ from other
elements is not earth, such as water; here it is evident that there cannot be any positive instance of agreement and the
concomitance has to be taken from negative
CHAPTER VIII 240
instances.Thereisonlyoneinstance,whichisexactlythepropositionofourinferenceearthdiffersfrom
otherelements,sinceithasthespecialqualitiesofearth.Thisinferencecouldbeofuseonlyinthosecases
wherewehadtoinferanythingbyreasonofsuchspecialtraitsofitaswaspossessedbyitanditalone.

UpamnaandS'abda.

Thethirdpram@na,whichisadmittedbyNyyaandnotbyVais'e@sika,is_upamna_,andconsistsin
associatingathingunknownbeforewithitsnamebyvirtueofitssimilaritywithsomeotherknownthing.Thusa
manofthecitywhohasneverseenawildox(_gavaya_)goestotheforest,asksaforester"whatisgavaya?"and
theforesterreplies"oh,youdonotknowit,itisjustlikeacow";afterhearingthisfromtheforesterhetravels
on,andonseeingagavayaandfindingittobesimilartoacowheformstheopinionthatthisisagavaya.This
knowinganhithertounknownthingbyvirtueofitssimilaritytoaknownthingiscalled_upamna_.Ifsome
foresterhadpointedoutagavayatoamanofthecityandhadtoldhimthatitwascalledagavaya,thenalsothe
manwouldhaveknowntheanimalbythenamegavaya,butthenthiswouldhavebeenduetotestimony(_s'abda
prama@na).Theknowledgeissaidtobegeneratedbytheupamnaprocesswhentheassociationoftheunknown
animalwithitsnameismadebytheobserver

355

onthestrengthoftheexperienceofthesimilarityoftheunknownanimaltoaknownone.Thenaiyyikasare
thoroughrealists,andassuchtheydonotregardtheobservationofsimilarityasbeingduetoanysubjective
processofthemind.Similarityisindeedperceivedbythevisualsensebutyettheassociationofthenamein
accordancewiththeperceptionofsimilarityandtheinstructionreceivedisaseparateactandiscalled
_upamna_[Footnoteref1].

S'abdapram@naortestimonyistherightknowledgewhichwederivefromtheutterancesofinfallibleand
absolutelytruthfulpersons.AllknowledgederivedfromtheVedasisvalid,fortheVedaswereutteredbys'vara
himself.TheVedasgiveusrightknowledgenotofitself,butbecausetheycameoutastheutterancesofthe
infallibles'vara.TheVais'e@sikasdidnotadmits'abdaasaseparatepram@na,buttheysoughttoestablish
thevalidityoftestimony(_s'abda_)onthestrengthofinference(_anumiti_)onthegroundofitsbeingthe
utteranceofaninfallibleperson.ButasIhavesaidbefore,thisexplanationishardlycorroboratedbythe
Vais'e@sikastras,whichtacitlyadmitthevalidityofthescripturesonitsownauthority.Butanyhowthiswas
howVais'e@sikawasinterpretedinlatertimes.

NegationinNyyaVais'e@sika.

Theproblemofnegationornonexistence(_abhva_)isofgreatinterestinIndianphilosophy.Inthissectionwe
candescribeitsnatureonlyfromthepointofviewofperceptibility.Kumrila[Footnoteref2]

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See _Nyyamajar_ on upamna. The oldest Nyya view was that the instruction given by the forester by
virtue of which the association of the name "wild ox" to the strange animal was possible was itself "upamna." When
Pras'astapda held that upamna should be treated as a case of testimony (_ptavacana_), he had probably this
interpretation in view. But Udyotakara and Vcaspati hold that it was not by the instruction alone of the forester that
the association of the name "wild ox" was made, but there was the perception of similarity, and the memory of the
instruction of the forester too. So it is the perception of similarity with the other two factors as accessories that lead us
to this association called upamna. What Vtsyya@na meant is not very clear, but Di@nnga supposes that according
to him the result of upamna was the knowledge of similarity or the knowledge of a thing having similarity. Vcaspati
of course holds that he has correctly interpreted Vtsyya@na's intention. It is however definite that upamna means
the associating of a name to a new object (_samkhysambandhapratipattirupamnrtha@h_, Vtsyya@na).
CHAPTER VIII 241
Jayantapointsoutthatitisthepreceptionofsimilaritywhichdirectlyleadstotheassociationofthenameand
hencetheinstructionoftheforestercannotberegardedasthedirectcauseandconsequentlyitcannotbeclassed
undertestimony(_s'abda_).SeePras'astapdaand_Nyyakandal,_pp.22022,Vtsyya@na,Udyotakara,
VcaspatiandJayantaon_Upamna_.]

[Footnote2:SeeKumrila'streatmentofabhvainthe_S'lokavrttika_,pp.473492.]

356

andhisfollowers,whosephilosophyweshalldealwithinthenextchapter,holdthatnegation(_abhva_)appears
asanintuition(_mnam_)withreferencetotheobjectnegatedwheretherearenomeansofordinarycognition
(_pram@na_)leadingtoprovetheexistence(_satparicchedakam_)ofthatthing.Theyheldthatthenotion"itis
notexistent"cannotbeduetoperception,forthereisnocontactherewithsenseandobject.Itistrueindeedthat
whenweturnoureyes(e.g.inthecaseoftheperceptionofthenonexistenceofajug)totheground,weseeboth
thegroundandthenonexistenceofajug,andwhenweshutthemwecanseeneitherthejugnortheground,and
thereforeitcouldbeurgedthatifwecalledthegroundvisuallyperceptible,wecouldsaythesamewithregardto
thenonexistenceofthejug.Buteventhensinceinthecaseoftheperceptionofthejugthereissensecontact,
whichisabsentintheothercase,wecouldneversaythatbotharegraspedbyperception.Weseethegroundand
rememberthejug(whichisabsent)andthusinthemindrisesthenotionofnonexistencewhichhasnoreference
atalltovisualperception.Amanmaybesittinginaplacewheretherewerenotigers,buthemightnotthenbe
awareoftheirnonexistenceatthetime,sincehedidnotthinkofthem,butwhenlateronheisaskedinthe
eveningiftherewereanytigersattheplacewherehewassittinginthemorning,hethenthinksandbecomes
awareofthenonexistenceoftigersthereinthemorning,evenwithoutperceivingtheplaceandwithoutany
operationofthememoryofthenonexistenceoftigers.Thereisnoquestionoftherebeinganyinferenceinthe
riseofournotionofnonexistence,foritisnotprecededbyanynotionofconcomitanceofanykind,andneither
thegroundnorthenonperceptionofthejugcouldberegardedasareason(_li@nga_),forthenonperceptionof
thejugisrelatedtothejugandnottothenegationofthejug,andnoconcomitanceisknownbetweenthenon
perceptionofthejuganditsnonexistence,andwhenthequestionoftheconcomitanceofnonperceptionwith
nonexistenceisbroughtin,thesamedifficultyaboutthenotionofnonexistence(_abhva_)whichwassoughtto
beexplainedwillrecuragain.Negationisthereforetobeadmittedascognizedbyaseparateandindependent
processofknowledge.Nyyahoweversaysthattheperceptionofnonexistence(e.g.thereisnojughere)isa
unitaryperceptionofonewhole,justasanyperceptionofpositiveexistence(e.g.

357

there is a jug on the ground) is. Both the knowledge of the ground as well as the knowledge of the non-existence of the
jug arise there by the same kind of action of the visual organ, and there is therefore no reason why the knowledge of
the ground should be said to be due to perception, whereas the knowledge of the negation of the jug on the ground
should be said to be due to a separate process of knowledge. The non-existence of the jug is taken in the same act as
the ground is perceived. The principle that in order to perceive a thing one should have sense-contact with it, applies
only to positive existents and not to negation or non-existence. Negation or non-existence can be cognized even without
any sense-contact. Non-existence is not a positive substance, and hence there cannot be any question here of sense-
contact. It may be urged that if no sense-contact is required in apprehending negation, one could as well apprehend
negation or non-existence of other places which are far away from him. To this the reply is that to apprehend negation it
is necessary that the place where it exists must be perceived. We know a thing and its quality to be different, and yet
the quality can only be taken in association with the thing and it is so in this case as well. We can apprehend non-
existence only through the apprehension of its locus. In the case when non-existence is said to be apprehended later on
it is really no later apprehension of non-existence but a memory of non-existence (e.g. of jug) perceived before along
with the perception of the locus of non-existence (e.g. ground). Negation or non-existence (_abhva_) can thus,
according to Nyya, generate its cognition just as any positive existence
CHAPTER VIII 242
cando.Negationisnotmerenegativityormerevacuousabsence,butiswhatgeneratesthecognition"isnot,"as
position(_bhva_)iswhatgeneratesthecognition"itis."

TheBuddhistsdenytheexistenceofnegation.Theyholdthatwhenanegationisapprehended,itisapprehended
withspecifictimeandspaceconditions(e.g.thisisnotherenow);butinspiteofsuchanapprehension,wecould
neverthinkthatnegationcouldthusbeassociatedwiththeminanyrelation.Thereisalsonorelationbetween
thenegationanditspratiyogi(thingnegatede.g.juginthenegationofjug),forwhenthereisthepratiyogithere
isnonegation,andwhenthereisthenegationthereisnopratiyogi.Thereisnoteventherelationofopposition
(_virodha_),forwecouldhaveadmittedit,if

358

thenegationofthejugexistedbeforeandopposedthejug,forhowcanthenegationofthejugopposethejug,
withouteffectinganythingatall?Again,itmaybeaskedwhethernegationistoberegardedasapositivebeingor
becomingorofthenatureofnotbecomingornonbeing.Inthefirstalternativeitwillbelikeanyotherpositive
existents,andinthesecondcaseitwillbepermanentandeternal,anditcannotberelatedtothisorthat
particularnegation.Therearehowevermanykindsofnonperception,e.g.(1)svabhvnupalabdhi(naturalnon
perceptionthereisnojugbecausenoneisperceived);(2)kra@nnupalabdhi(nonperceptionofcausethereis
nosmokehere,sincethereisnofire);(3)vypaknupalabdhi(nonperceptionofthespeciesthereisnopinehere,
sincethereisnotree);(4)krynupalabdhi(nonperceptionofeffectstherearenotthecausesofsmokehere,
sincethereisnosmoke);(5)svabhvaviruddhopalabdhi(perceptionofcontradictorynaturesthereisnocold
touchherebecauseoffire);(6)viruddhakryopalabdhi(perceptionofcontradictoryeffectsthereisnocoldtouch
herebecauseofsmoke);(7)virudhavyptopalabdhi(oppositeconcomitancepastisnotofnecessitydestructible,
sinceitdependsonothercauses);(8)kryyaviruddhopalabdhi(oppositionofeffectsthereisnotherethecauses
whichcangivecoldsincethereisfire);(9)vyapakaviruddhopalabdhi(oppositeconcomitantsthereisnotouchof
snowhere,becauseoffire);(10)kra@naviruddhopalabdhi(oppositecausesthereisnoshiveringthroughcold
here,sinceheisnearthefire);(11)kra@naviruddhakryyopalabdhi(effectsofoppositecausesthisplaceisnot
occupiedbymenofshiveringsensationsforitisfullofsmoke[Footnoteref1]).

Thereisnodoubtthatintheabovewayswespeakofnegation,butthatdoesnotprovethatthereisanyreason
forthecognitionofnegation(_heturnbhvasamvida@h_).Allthatwecansayisthisthattherearecertain
situationswhichjustifytheuse(_yogyat_)ofnegativeappellations.Butthissituationoryogyatispositivein
character.Whatweallspeakofinordinaryusageasnonperceptionisofthenatureofperceptionofsomesort.
Perceptionofnegationthusdoesnotprovetheexistenceofnegation,butonlyshowsthattherearecertain
positiveperceptionswhichareonlyinterpretedinthatway.Itisthepositiveperceptionofthegroundwherethe
visiblejugisabsentthat

_________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:See_Nyyabindu_,p.11,and_Nyyamajar_,pp.537.]

359

leadsustospeakofhavingperceivedthenegationofthejug(_anupalambha@habhva@mvyavahrayati_)
[Footnoteref1].

The Nyya reply against this is that the perception of positive existents is as much a fact as the perception of negation,
and we have no right to say that the former alone is valid. It is said that the non-perception of jug on the ground is but
the perception of the ground without the jug. But is this being without the jug identical with the ground or different? If
identical then it is the same as the ground, and we shall expect to have it even when the jug is there. If different then
the quarrel is only over the name, for whatever you may call it, it is admitted
CHAPTER VIII 243
tobeadistinctcategory.Ifsomedifferenceisnotedbetweenthegroundwiththejug,andthegroundwithoutit,
thencallit"ground,withoutthejugness"or"thenegationofjug,"itdoesnotmattermuch,foradistinct
categoryhasanyhowbeenadmitted.Negationisapprehendedbyperceptionasmuchasanypositiveexistentis;
thenatureoftheobjectsofperceptiononlyaredifferent;justasevenintheperceptionofpositivesenseobjects
therearesuchdiversitiesascolour,taste,etc.Therelationofnegationwithspaceandtimewithwhichitappears
associatedistherelationthatsubsistsbetweenthequalifiedandthequality(_vis'e@syavis'e@sa@na_).The
relationbetweenthenegationanditspratiyogiisoneofopposition,inthesensethatwheretheoneistheotheris
not.The_Vais'e@sikastra_(IX.i.6)seemstotakeabhvainasimilarwayasKumrilatheMima@msist
does,thoughthecommentatorshavetriedtoexplainitaway[Footnoteref2].InVais'e@sikathefourkindsof
negationareenumeratedas(1)_prgabhva_(thenegationprecedingtheproductionofanobjecte.g.ofthejug
beforeitismadebythepotter);(2)_dhva@msbhva_(thenegationfollowingthedestructionofanobjectasof
thejugafteritisdestroyedbythestrokeofastick);(3)_anyonybhva_(mutualnegatione.g.inthecowthere
isthenegationofthehorseand

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_Nyyabindu@tk_,pp.34ff.,andalso_Nyyamajar_,pp.4863.]

[Footnote2Pras'astapdasaysthatastheproductionofaneffectisthesignoftheexistenceofthecause,sothe
nonproductionofitisthesignofitsnonexistence,S'rdbaraincommentinguponitsaysthatthenon
preceptionofasensibleobjectisthesign(_li@nga_)ofitsnonexistence.Butevidentlyheisnotsatisfiedwith
theviewforhesaysthatnonexistenceisalsodirectlyperceivedbythesenses(_bhvavad
abhvo'pndriyagraha@nayogyah_)andthatthereisanactualsensecontactwithnonexistencewhichisthe
collocatingcauseofthepreceptionofnonexistence(_abhvendriyasannikar@so'pi
abhvagraha@nasmagr_),Nyyakandal_,pp.22530.]

360

inthehorsethatofthecow);(4)_atyantbhva_(anegationwhichalwaysexistse.g.evenwhenthereisajug
here,itsnegationinotherplacesisnotdestroyed)[Footnoteref1].

ThenecessityoftheAcquirementofdebatingdevicesfortheseekerofSalvation.

ItisprobablethattheNyyaphilosophyaroseinanatmosphereofcontinueddisputesanddebates;asa
consequenceofthiswefindheremanytermsrelatedtodebateswhichwedonotnoticeinanyothersystemof
Indianphilosophy.Thesearetarka,_nir@naya_,_vda_,jalpa,_vita@n@d_,_hetvbhsa_,chala,_jti_and
_nigrahasthna_.

Tarkameansdeliberationonanunknownthingtodiscernitsrealnature;itthusconsistsofseekingreasonsin
favourofsomesuppositiontotheexclusionofothersuppositions;itisnotinference,butmerelyanoscillationof
themindtocometoarightconclusion.Whenthereisdoubt(_sa@ms'aya_)aboutthespecificnatureofanything
wehavetotaketotarka.Nir@nayameanstheconclusiontowhichwearriveasaresultoftarka.Whentwo
oppositepartiesdisputeovertheirrespectivetheses,suchasthedoctrinesthatthereisorisnotantman,in
whicheachofthemtriestoprovehisownthesiswithreasons,eachofthethesesiscalleda_vda_.Jalpameansa
disputeinwhichthedisputantsgivewranglingrejoindersinordertodefeattheirrespectiveopponents.Ajalpais
calleda_vita@n@d_whenitisonlyadestructivecriticismwhichseekstorefutetheopponent'sdoctrine
withoutseekingtoestablishorformulateanynewdoctrine.Hetvbhsasarethosewhichappearashetusbutare
reallynotso._Nyya_strasenumeratefivefallacies(_hetvbhsas_)ofthemiddle(hetu):_savyabhicra_
(erratic),viruddha (contradictory), _prakara@nasama_ (tautology), _sddhyasama_ (unproved reason) and _kltta
_(inopportune). Savyabhicra is that where the same reason may prove opposite conclusions (e.g. sound is eternal
because it is intangible like the atoms which are eternal, and sound is non-eternal because it is intangible like cognitions
which are non-eternal); viruddha is that where the reason
CHAPTER VIII 244
opposesthepremisstobeproved(e.g.ajugiseternal,becauseitisproduced);prakara@nasamaisthat

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Thedoctrineofnegation,itsfunctionandvaluewithreferencetodiverselogicalproblems,have
manydiverseaspects,anditisimpossibletodothemjusticeinasmallsectionlikethis.]

361

wherethereasonrepeatsthethesistobeprovedinanotherform(e.g.soundisnoneternalbecauseithasnotthe
qualityofeternality);sdhyasamaisthatwherethereasonitselfrequirestobeproved(e.g.shadowisasubstance
becauseithasmotion,butitremainstobeprovedwhethershadowshavemotionornot);klttaisafalse
analogywherethereasonfailsbecauseitdoesnottallywiththeexampleinpointoftime.Thusonemayarguethat
soundiseternalbecauseitistheresultofcontact(stickandthedrum)likecolourwhichisalsoaresultofcontact
oflightandtheobjectandiseternal.Herethefallacyliesinthis,thatcolourissimultaneouswiththecontactof
lightwhichshowswhatwasalreadythereandonlymanifestedbythelight,whereasinthecaseofsounditis
producedimmediatelyafterthecontactofthestickanddrumandishenceaproductandhencenoneternal.The
laterNyyaworksdividesavyabhicraintothreeclasses,(1)sdhra@naorcommon(e.g.themountainisfiery
becauseitisanobjectofknowledge,butevenalakewhichisopposedtofireisalsoanobjectofknowledge),(2)
asdhra@naortoorestricted(e.g.soundiseternalbecauseithasthenatureofsound;thiscannotbeareasonfor
thenatureofsoundexistsonlyinthesoundandnowhereelse),and(3)anupasa@mhrinorunsubsuming(e.g.
everythingisnoneternal,becausetheyareallobjectsofknowledge;herethefallacyliesinthis,thatnoinstance
canbefoundwhichisnotanobjectofknowledgeandanoppositeconclusionmayalsobedrawn).Thefallacy
_satpratipak@sa_isthatinwhichthereisacontraryreasonwhichmayprovetheoppositeconclusion(e.g.sound
iseternalbecauseitisaudible,soundisnoneternalbecauseitisaneffect).Thefallacyasiddha(unreal)isofthree
kinds(i)_s'raysiddha_(thelotusoftheskyisfragrantbecauseitislikeotherlotuses;nowtherecannotbeany
lotusinthesky),(2)_svarpsiddha_(soundisaqualitybecauseitisvisible;butsoundhasnovisibility),(3)
_vypyatvsiddha_isthatwheretheconcomitancebetweenthemiddleandtheconsequenceisnotinvariableand
inevitable;thereissmokeinthehillbecausethereisfire;buttheremaybefirewithoutthesmokeasinaredhot
ironball,itisonlygreenwoodfirethatisinvariablyassociatedwithsmoke.Thefallacy_bdhita_isthatwhich
pretendstoproveathesiswhichisagainstdirectexperience,e.g.fireisnothotbecauseitisasubstance.Wehave
alreadyenumeratedthefallaciescountedbyVais'e@sika.ContrarytoNyyapractice

362

Pras'astapda counts the fallacies of the example. Di@nnga also counted fallacies of example (e.g. sound is eternal,
because it is incorporeal, that which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms; but atoms are not incorporeal) and
Dharmakrtti counted also the fallacies of the pak@sa (minor); but Nyya rightly considers that the fallacies of the
middle if avoided will completely safeguard inference and that these are mere repetitions. Chala means the intentional
misinterpretation of the opponent's arguments for the purpose of defeating him. Jti consists in the drawing of
contradictory conclusions, the raising of false issues or the like with the deliberate intention of defeating an opponent.
Nigrahasthna means the exposure of the opponent's argument as involving self-contradiction, inconsistency or the
like, by which his defeat is conclusively proved before the people to the glory of the victorious opponent. As to the
utility of the description of so many debating tricks by which an opponent might be defeated in a metaphysical work,
the aim of which ought to be to direct the ways that lead to emancipation, it is said by Jayanta in his _Nyyamajar_
that these had to be resorted to as a protective measure against arrogant disputants who often tried to humiliate a
teacher before his pupils. If the teacher could not silence the opponent, the faith of the pupils in him would be shaken
and great disorder would follow, and it was therefore deemed necessary that he who was plodding onward for the
attainment of mok@sa should acquire these devices for the protection of his own faith and that of his pupils. A
knowledge of these has therefore been enjoined in the Nyya stra as being necessary for the attainment of
CHAPTER VIII 245
salvation[Footnoterefl].

ThedoctrineofSoul.

DhrttaCrvkasdeniedtheexistenceofsoulandregardedconsciousnessandlifeasproductsofbodily
changes;therewereotherCrvkascalledSus'ik@sitaCrvkaswhoadmittedtheexistenceofsoulbutthought
thatitwasdestroyedatdeath.TheBuddhistsalsodeniedtheexistenceofanypermanentself.Thenaiyyikas
ascertainedallthecategoriesofmetaphysicsmainlybysuchinferenceaswascorroboratedbyexperience.They
arguedthatsinceconsciousness,pleasures,pains,willing,etc.couldnotbelongtoourbodyorthesenses,there
mustbe

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_Nyyamajar_,pp.586659,and_Trkikarak@s_ofVaradarjaand_Niska@n@taka_of
Mallintha,pp.185ff.]

363

someentitytowhichtheybelonged;theexistenceoftheselfisnotprovedaccordingtoNyyamerelybythe
notionofourselfconsciousness,asinthecaseofMm@ms,forNyyaholdsthatwecannotdependuponsuch
aperception,foritmaybeerroneous.ItoftenhappensthatIsaythatIamwhiteorIamblack,butitisevident
thatsuchaperceptioncannotbereliedupon,fortheselfcannothaveanycolour.Sowecannotsafelydependon
ourselfconsciousnessasupontheinferencethattheselfhastobeadmittedasthatentitytowhichconsciousness,
emotion,etc.adherewhentheyareproducedasaresultofcollocations.Neverhastheproductionoftmanbeen
experienced,norhasitbeenfoundtosufferanydestructionlikethebody,sothesoulmustbeeternal.Itisnot
locatedinanypartofthebody,butisallpervading,i.e.existsatthesametimeinallplaces(_vibhu_),anddoes
nottravelwiththebodybutexistseverywhereatthesametime.Butthoughtmanisthusdisconnectedfromthe
body,yetitsactionsareseeninthebodybecauseitiswiththehelpofthecollocationofbodilylimbs,etc.that
actionintheselfcanbemanifestedorproduced.Itisunconsciousinitselfandacquiresconsciousnessasaresult
ofsuitablecollocations[Footnoterefl].

Evenatbirthchildrenshowsignsofpleasurebytheirdifferentfacialfeatures,andthiscouldnotbedueto
anythingelsethanthememoryofthepastexperiencesinpastlivesofpleasuresandpains.Moreoverthe
inequalitiesinthedistributionofpleasuresandpainsandofsuccessesandfailuresprovethatthesemustbedueto
thedifferentkindsofgoodandbadactionthatmenperformedintheirpastlives.Sincetheinequalityoftheworld
musthavesomereasonsbehindit,itisbettertoadmitkarmaasthedeterminingfactorthantoleaveitto
irresponsiblechance.

s'varaandSalvation.

Nyyaseekstoestablishtheexistenceofs'varaonthebasisofinference.WeknowthattheJains,the
S@mkhyaandtheBuddhistsdidnotbelieveintheexistenceofs'varaandofferedmanyantitheistic
arguments.NyyawantedtorefutetheseandprovetheexistenceofIs'varabyaninferenceofthe
smnyatod@r@s@tatype.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:_Jnasamavyanibandhanamevtmanas'cetayit@rtvam_,&c.See_Nyyamajar_,pp.432
ff.]

364
The Jains and other atheists held that though things in the world have production and decay, the world as a
CHAPTER VIII 246
wholewasneverproduced,anditwasneverthereforeaneffect.IncontrasttothisviewtheNyyaholdsthatthe
worldasawholeisalsoaneffectlikeanyothereffect.Manygeologicalchangesandlandslipsoccur,andfrom
thesedestructiveoperationsproceedinginnatureitmaybeassumedthatthisworldisnoteternalbutaresultof
production.Butevenifthisisnotadmittedbytheatheiststheycaninnowaydenythearrangementandorderof
theuniverse.Buttheywouldarguethattherewascertainlyadifferencebetweentheorderandarrangementof
humanproductions(e.g.ajug)andtheorderandarrangementoftheuniverse;andthereforefromtheorderand
arrangement(_sannives'avis'i@s@tat_)oftheuniverseitcouldnotbearguedthattheuniversewasproducedby
acreator;for,itisfromthesortoforderandarrangementthatisfoundinhumanproductionsthatacreatoror
producercouldbeinferred.Tothis,Nyyaanswersthattheconcomitanceistobetakenbetweenthe"orderand
arrangement"inageneralsenseand"theexistenceofacreator"andnotwithspecificcasesof"orderand
arrangement,"foreachspecificcasemayhavesomesuchpeculiarityinwhichitdiffersfromsimilarother
specificcases;thusthefireinthekitchenisnotthesamekindoffireaswefindinaforestfire,butyetweareto
disregardthespecificindividualpeculiaritiesoffireineachcaseandconsidertheconcomitanceoffireingeneral
withsmokeingeneral.Sohere,wehavetoconsidertheconcomitanceof"orderandarrangement"ingeneral
with"theexistenceofacreator,"andthusthoughtheorderandarrangementoftheworldmaybedifferentfrom
theorderandarrangementofthingsproducedbyman,yetaninferencefromitfortheexistenceofacreator
wouldnotbeinadmissible.Theobjectionthatevennowweseemanyeffects(e.g.trees)whicharedailyshooting
forthfromthegroundwithoutanycreatorbeingfoundtoproducethem,doesnothold,foritcanneverbeproved
thattheplantsarenotactuallycreatedbyacreator.Theinferencethereforestandsthattheworldhasacreator,
sinceitisaneffectandhasorderandarrangementinitsconstruction.Everythingthatisaneffectandhasan
orderandarrangementhasacreator,likethejug.Theworldisaneffectandhasorderandarrangementandhas
thereforeacreator.Justasthepotterknowsallthepurposesofthejugthathemakes,

365

sos'varaknowsallthepurposesofthiswideuniverseandisthusomniscient.Heknowsallthingsalwaysand
thereforedoesnotrequirememory;allthingsareperceivedbyhimdirectlywithoutanyinterventionofany
internalsensesuchasmanas,etc.Heisalwayshappy.Hiswilliseternal,andinaccordancewiththekarmaof
menthesamewillproducesdissolution,creates,orprotectstheworld,intheorderbywhicheachmanreapsthe
resultsofhisowndeeds.Asourselfwhichisinitselfbodilesscanbyitswillproducechangesinourbodyand
throughitintheexternalworld,sos'varaalsocanbyhiswillcreatetheuniversethoughhehasnobody.Some,
however,saythatifanyassociationofbodywiths'varaisindispensableforourconceptionofhim,theatoms
mayaswellberegardedashisbody,sothatjustasbythewillofourselfchangesandmovementofourbodytake
place,soalsobyhiswillchangesandmovementsareproducedintheatoms[Footnoterefl].

ThenaiyyikasincommonwithmostothersystemsofIndianphilosophybelievedthattheworldwasfullof
sorrowandthatthesmallbitsofpleasureonlyservedtointensifytheforceofsorrow.Toawiseperson
thereforeeverythingissorrow(_sarva@mdu@hkha@mvivekina@h_);thewisethereforeisneverattachedto
thesocalledpleasuresoflifewhichonlyleadustofurthersorrows.

Thebondageoftheworldisduetofalseknowledge(_mithyjna_)whichconsistsinthinkingasmyownself
thatwhichisnotmyself,namelybody,senses,manas,feelingsandknowledge;whenoncethetrueknowledgeof
thesixpadrthasandasNyyasays,oftheproofs(_pram@na_),theobjectsofknowledge(_prameya_),andof
theotherlogicalcategoriesofinferenceisattained,falseknowledgeisdestroyed.Falseknowledgecanbe
removedbyconstantthinkingofitsopposite(_pratipak@sabhvan_),namelythetrueestimatesofthings.Thus
whenanypleasureattractsus,wearetothinkthatthisisinrealitybutpain,andthustherightknowledgeabout
itwilldawnanditwillneverattractusagain.Thusitisthatwiththedestructionoffalseknowledgeour
attachmentorantipathytothingsandignoranceaboutthem(collectivelycalleddo@sa,cf.thekles'aofPatajali)
arealsodestroyed.
With the destruction of attachment actions (_prav@rtti_) for the
CHAPTER IX 247
____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote:1:See_Nyyamajar_,pp.190204,_s'varnumna_ofRaghunthaS'iro@ma@niand
Udayana's_Kusumjal_.]

366

fulfilmentofdesiresceaseandwithitrebirthceasesandwithitsorrowceases.Withoutfalseknowledgeand
attachment,actionscannotproducethebondageofkarmathatleadstotheproductionofbodyandits
experiences.Withthecessationofsorrowthereisemancipationinwhichtheselfisdivestedofallitsqualities
(consciousness,feeling,willing,etc.)andremainsinitsowninertstate.ThestateofmuktiaccordingtoNyya
Vais'e@sikaisneitherastateofpureknowledgenorofblissbutastateofperfectqualitilessness,inwhichtheself
remainsinitselfinitsownpurity.Itisthenegativestateofabsolutepainlessnessinmuktithatissometimes
spokenofasbeingastateofabsolutehappiness(_nanda_),thoughreallyspeakingthestateofmukticannever
beastateofhappiness.Itisapassivestateofselfinitsoriginalandnaturalpurityunassociatedwithpleasure,
pain,knowledge,willing,etc.[Footnoteref1].

___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:_Nyyamajar_,pp.499533.]

CHAPTER IX
MM@MSPHILOSOPHY[Footnoteref1]

AComparativeReview.

TheNyyaVais'e@sikaphilosophylookedatexperiencefromapurelycommonsensepointofviewanddidnot
workwithanysuchmonistictendencythattheultimateconceptionsofourcommonsenseexperienceshouldbe
consideredascomingoutofanoriginaluniversal(e.g.prak@rtioftheSm@khya).Space,time,thefour
elements,soul,etc.conveytheimpressionthattheyaresubstantiveentitiesorsubstances.Whatisperceivedof
thematerialthingsasqualitiessuchascolour,taste,etc.isregardedassomanyentitieswhichhavedistinctand
separateexistencebutwhichmanifestthemselvesinconnectionwiththesubstances.Soalsokarmaoractionis
supposedtobeaseparateentity,andeventheclassnotionsareperceivedasseparateentitiesinheringin
substances.Knowledge(_jna_)whichilluminatesallthingsisregardedonlyasaqualitybelongingtosoul,just
asthereareotherqualitiesofmaterialobjects.Causationisviewedmerelyasthecollocationofconditions.The
genesisofknowledgeisalsoviewedassimilarinnaturetotheproductionofanyotherphysicalevent.Thusjustas
bythecollocationofcertainphysicalcircumstancesajuganditsqualitiesareproduced,sobythecombination
andrespectivecontactsofthesoul,mind,sense,andtheobjectsofsense,knowledge(_jna_)isproduced.Soul
withNyyaisaninertunconsciousentityinwhichknowledge,etc.inhere.Therelationbetweenasubstanceand
itsquality,action,classnotion,etc.hasalsotobeadmittedasaseparateentity,aswithoutitthedifferententities
beingwithoutanyprincipleofrelationwouldnaturallyfailtogiveusaphilosophicconstruction.

S@mkhyahadconceivedofaprinciplewhichconsistedofaninfinitenumberofrealsofthreedifferenttypes,
whichbytheircombinationwereconceivedtobeabletoproduceallsubstances,qualities,actions,etc.No
differencewasacknowledgedtoexistbetweensubstances,qualitiesandactions,anditwasconceived

___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1: On the meanirg of the word Mm@ms see
Chapter IV. 248

Chapter IV.
]

368

thatthesewerebutsomanyaspectsofacombinationofthethreetypesofrealsindifferentproportions.The
realscontainedwithinthemtherudimentsofalldevelopmentsofmatter,knowledge,willing,feelings,etc.As
combinationsofrealschangedincessantlyandnewphenomenaofmatterandmindweremanifested,collocations
didnotbringaboutanynewthingbutbroughtaboutaphenomenonwhichwasalreadythereinitscausesin
anotherform.Whatwecallknowledgeorthoughtordinarily,iswiththemmerelyaformofsubtleilluminating
matterstuff.S@mkhyaholdshoweverthatthereisatranscendententityaspureconsciousnessandthatby
somekindoftranscendentreflectionorcontactthispureconsciousnesstransformsthebaretranslucentthought
matterintoconsciousthoughtorexperienceofaperson.

Butthishypothesisofapureself,asessentiallydistinctandseparatefromknowledgeasordinarilyunderstood,
canhardlybedemonstratedinourcommonsenseexperience;andthishasbeenpointedoutbytheNyyaschool
inaverystrongandemphaticmanner.EvenS@mkhyadidnottrytoprovethattheexistenceofitstranscendent
puru@sacouldbedemonstratedinexperience,andithadtoattempttosupportitshypothesisoftheexistenceofa
transcendentselfonthegroundoftheneedofapermanententityasafixedobject,towhichthepassingstatesof
knowledgecouldcling,andongroundsofmoralstruggletowardsvirtueandemancipation.S@mkhyahadfirst
supposedknowledgetobemerelyacombinationofchangingreals,andthenhadasamatterofnecessitytoadmit
afixedprincipleaspuru@sa(puretranscendentconsciousness).Theselfisthushereinsomesenseanobjectof
inferencetofillupthegapleftbytheinadequateanalysisofconsciousness(_buddhi_)asbeingnonintelligentand
incessantlychanging.

Nyyafarednobetter,foritalsohadtodemonstrateselfonthegroundthatsinceknowledgeexisteditwasa
quality,andthereforemustinhereinsomesubstance.Thishypothesisisagainbaseduponanotheruncritical
assumptionthatsubstancesandattributeswereentirelyseparate,andthatitwasthenatureofthelatterto
inhereintheformer,andalsothatknowledgewasaqualityrequiring(similarlywithotherattributes)a
substanceinwhichtoinhere.Noneofthemcouldtaketheirstandupontheselfconsciousnatureofour
ordinarythoughtanddrawtheirconclusionsonthestrengthofthedirectevidenceofthisselfconscious

369

thought. Of course it is true that S@mkhya had approached nearer to this view than Nyya, but it had separated the
content of knowledge and its essence so irrevocably that it threatened to break the integrity of thought in a manner
quite unwarranted by common sense experience, which does not seem to reveal this dual element in thought. Anyhow
the unification of the content of thought and its essence had to be made, and this could not be done except by what
may be regarded as a makeshift--a transcendent illusion running on from beginningless time. These difficulties
occurred because S@mkhya soared to a region which was not directly illuminated by the light of common sense
experience. The Nyya position is of course much worse as a metaphysical solution, for it did not indeed try to solve
anything, but only gave us a schedule of inferential results which could not be tested by experience, and which were
based ultimately on a one-sided and uncritical assumption. It is an uncritical common sense experience that
substances are different from qualities and actions, and that the latter inhere in the former. To base the whole of
metaphysics on such a tender and fragile experience is, to say the least, building on a weak foundation. It was
necessary that the importance of the self-revealing thought must be brought to the forefront, its evidence should be
collected and trusted, and an account of experience should be given according to its verdict. No construction of
metaphysics can ever satisfy us which ignores the direct immediate convictions of self-conscious thought. It is a relief
to find that a movement of philosophy in this direction is ushered in by the Mm@ms system. The _Mm@ms
stras_ were written by Jaimini and the commentary (_bh@sya_) on it was written by S'abara. But the systematic
Chapter IV. 249
elaborationofitwasmadebyKumrila,whoprecededthegreatS'a@nkarcrya,andadiscipleofKumrila,
Prabhkara.

TheMm@msLiterature.

ItisdifficulttosayhowthesacrificialsystemofworshipgrewinIndiaintheBrhma@nas.Thissystemonceset
upgraduallybegantodevelopintoanetworkofelaboraterituals,thedetailsofwhichwereprobablytakennote
ofbythepriests.AssomegenerationspassedandthesacrificesspreadoverlargertractsofIndiaandgrewup
intomoreandmoreelaboratedetails,theoldrulesandregulationsbegantobecollectedprobablyastradition

370

hadit,andthisitseemsgaverisetothesm@rtiliterature.Discussionsanddoubtsbecamemorecommonabout
themanyintricaciesofthesacrificialrituals,andregularrationalenquiriesintothemwerebegunindifferent
circlesbydifferentscholarsandpriests.TheserepresentthebeginningsofMm@ms(lit.attemptsatrational
enquiry),anditisprobablethatthereweredifferentschoolsofthisthought.ThatJaimini's_Mm@msstras_
(whicharewithusthefoundationsofMm@ms)areonlyacomprehensiveandsystematiccompilationofone
schoolisevidentfromthereferenceshegivestotheviewsindifferentmattersofotherprecedingwriterswho
dealtwiththesubject.Theseworksarenotavailablenow,andwecannotsayhowmuchofwhatJaiminihas
writtenishisoriginalworkandhowmuchofitborrowed.Butitmaybesaidwithsomedegreeofconfidencethat
itwasdeemedsomasterlyaworkatleastofoneschoolthatithassurvivedallotherattemptsthatweremade
beforehim.Jaimini's_Mm@msstras_wereprobablywrittenabout200B.C.andarenowthegroundwork
oftheMm@mssystem.CommentarieswerewrittenonitbyvariouspersonssuchasBhart@rmitra(alluded
toin_Nyyaratnkara_verse10of_S'lokavrttika_),Bhavadsa{_Pratijastra_63},HariandUpavar@sa
(mentionedin_S'stradpik_).ItisprobablethatatleastsomeoftheseprecededS'abara,thewriterofthe
famouscommentaryknownasthe_S'abarabh@sya_.Itisdifficulttosayanythingaboutthetimeinwhichhe
flourished.DrGa@ngnthaJhwouldhavehimabout57B.C.ontheevidenceofacurrentversewhichspeaks
ofKingVikramdityaasbeingthesonofS'abarasvminbyaK@sattriyawife.Thisbh@syaofS'abaraisthe
basisofthelaterMm@msworks.ItwascommenteduponbyanunknownpersonalludedtoasVrttikakra
byPrabhkaraandmerelyreferredtoas"yathhu@h"(astheysay)byKumrila.DrGa@nganthaJhsays
thatPrabhkara'scommentary_B@rhat_onthe_S'abarabh@sya_wasbasedupontheworkofthis
Vrttikakra.This_B@rhat_ofPrabhkarahadanothercommentaryonit_@Rjuviml_byS'alikantha
Mis'ra,whoalsowroteacompendiumonthePrabhkarainterpretationofMm@mscalled
_Prakara@napacik_.TraditionsaysthatPrabhkara(oftenreferredtoasNibandhakra),whoseviewsare
oftenalludedtoas"gurumata,"wasapupilofKumrila.KumrilaBha@t@ta,whoistraditionallybelievedto
betheseniorcontemporaryofS'a@nkara(788A.D.),wrotehiscelebratedindependent

371

exposition of S'abara's bh@sya in three parts known as _S'lokavrttika_ (dealing only with the philosophical portion of
S'abara's work as contained in the first chapter of the first book known as Tarkapda), _Tantravrttika_ (dealing with the
remaining three chapters of the first book, the second and the third book) and _@Tup@tk_ (containing brief notes on
the remaining nine books) [Footnote ref 1]. Kumrila is referred to by his later followers as Bha@t@ta, Bha@t@tapda,
and Vrttikakra. The next great Mm@ms scholar and follower of Kumrila was Ma@n@dana Mis'ra, the author of
_Vidhiviveka, Mm@msnukrama@n_ and the commentator of _Tantravrttika,_ who became later on converted by
S'a@nkara to Vedantism. Prthasrathi Mis'ra (about ninth century A.D.) wrote his _S'stradpik, Tantraratna,_ and
_Nyyaratnaml_ following the footprints of Kumrila. Amongst the numerous other followers of Kumrila, the names
of Sucarita Mis'ra the author of _Ks'ik_ and Somes'vara the author of _Nyyasudh_ deserve special notice.
Rmak@r@s@na Bha@t@ta wrote an excellent commentary on the _Tarkapda_ of _S'stradpik_ called
Chapter IV. 250
the_Yuktisnehapra@nsiddhntacandrik_andSomanthawrotehis_Maykhamlik_ontheremaining
chaptersof_S'stradpik_.OtherimportantcurrentMm@msworkswhichdeservenoticearesuchas
_Nyyamlvistara_ofMdhava,_Subodhin,Mm@msblapraks'a_ofS'a@nkaraBha@t@ta,
_Nyyaka@nik_ofVcaspatiMis'ra,_Mm@msparibh@sa_byK@r@s@nayajvan,
_Mm@msnyyapraks'a_byAnantadeva,GgBha@t@ta's_Bha@t@tacintma@ni,_etc.Mostofthe
booksmentionedherehavebeenconsultedinthewritingofthischapter.TheimportanceoftheMm@ms
literatureforaHinduisindeedgreat.FornotonlyareallVedicdutiestobeperformedaccordingtoitsmaxims,
buteventhesm@rtiliteratureswhichregulatethedailyduties,ceremonialsandritualsofHindusevenatthe
presentdayareallguidedandexplainedbythem.Thelegalsideofthesm@rtisconsistingofinheritance,
proprietoryrights,adoption,etc.whichguideHinducivillifeevenundertheBritishadministrationisexplained
accordingtotheMm@msmaxims.ItsrelationstotheVedntaphilosophywillbebrieflyindicatedinthenext
chapter.ItsrelationswithNyyaVais'e@sikahavealsobeenpointedoutinvariousplacesofthischapter.The
viewsofthetwoschoolsofMm@msaspropoundedbyPrabhkaraandKumrilaonalltheimportanttopics
have

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:MahmahopadhyyaHaraprasdaS'strsays,inhisintroductionto_SixBuddhistNyya
Tracts_,that"KumrilaprecededSa@nkarabytwogenerations."]

372

alsobeenpointedout.Prabhkara'sviewshowevercouldnotwinmanyfollowersinlatertimes,butwhilelivingit
issaidthathewasregardedbyKumrilaasaverystrongrival[Footnoteref1].Hardlyanynewcontributionhas
beenmadetotheMm@msphilosophyafterKumrilaandPrabhkara.The_Mm@msstras_dealmostly
withtheprinciplesoftheinterpretationoftheVedictextsinconnectionwithsacrifices,andverylittleof
philosophycanbegleanedoutofthem.S'abara'scontributionsarealsoslightandvague.Vrttikakra'sviews
alsocanonlybegatheredfromthereferencestothembyKumrilaandPrabhkara.Whatweknowof
Mm@msphilosophyconsistsoftheirviewsandtheirsalone.Itdidnotdevelopanyfurtherafterthem.Works
writtenonthesubjectinlatertimeswerebutofapurelyexpositorynature.Idonotknowofanyworkon
Mm@mswritteninEnglishexcepttheexcellentonebyDrGa@ngnthaJhonthePrabhkaraMm@ms
towhichIhavefrequentlyreferred.

TheParata@hprm@nyadoctrineofNyyaandtheSvata@hprm@nyadoctrineofMm@ms.

Thedoctrineoftheselfvalidityofknowledge(_svata@hprm@nya_)formsthecornerstoneonwhichthewhole
structureoftheMm@msphilosophyisbased.Validitymeansthecertitudeoftruth.TheMm@ms
philosophyassertsthatallknowledgeexceptingtheactionofremembering(_sm@rti_)ormemoryisvalidin
itself,forititselfcertifiesitsowntruth,andneitherdependsonanyotherextraneousconditionnoronanyother
knowledgeforitsvalidity.ButNyyaholdsthatthisselfvalidityofknowledgeisaquestionwhichrequiresan
explanation.Itistruethatundercertainconditionsapieceofknowledgeisproducedinus,butwhatismeantby
sayingthatthisknowledgeisaproofofitsowntruth?Whenweperceiveanythingasblue,itisthedirectresultof
visualcontact,andthisvisualcontactcannotcertifythattheknowledgegeneratedistrue,asthevisualcontactis
notinanytouchwiththeknowledge

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: There is a story that Kumrila, not being able to convert Prabhkara, his own pupil, to his views,
attempted a trick and pretended that he was dead. His disciples then asked Prabhkara whether his burial rites should
be performed according to Kumrila's views or Prabhkara's. Prabhkara said that his own views were erroneous, but
these were held by him only to rouse up Kumrila's pointed attacks, whereas Kumrila's views were the right ones.
Kumrila then rose up and said that Prabhkara was defeated, but the latter said he was
Chapter IV. 251
notdefeatedsolongashewasalive.Butthishasofcoursenohistoricvalue.]

373

ithasconditioned.Moreover,knowledgeisamentalaffairandhowcanitcertifytheobjectivetruthofits
representation?Inotherwords,howcanmyperception"abluething"guaranteethatwhatissubjectively
perceivedasblueisreallysoobjectivelyaswell?Aftermyperceptionofanythingasbluewedonothaveanysuch
perceptionthatwhatIhaveperceivedasblueisreallyso.Sothissocalledselfvalidityofknowledgecannotbe
testifiedorjustifiedbyanyperception.Wecanonlybecertainthatknowledgehasbeenproducedbythe
perceptualact,butthereisnothinginthisknowledgeoritsrevelationofitsobjectfromwhichwecaninferthat
theperceptionisalsoobjectivelyvalidortrue.Iftheproductionofanyknowledgeshouldcertifyitsvaliditythen
therewouldbenoinvalidity,noillusoryknowledge,andfollowingourperceptionofevenamirageweshould
nevercometogrief.Butwearedisappointedofteninourperceptions,andthisprovesthatwhenwepractically
followthedirectionsofourperceptionweareundecidedastoitsvalidity,whichcanonlybeascertainedbythe
correspondenceoftheperceptionwithwhatwefindlateroninpracticalexperience.Again,everypieceof
knowledgeistheresultofcertaincausalcollocations,andassuchdependsuponthemforitsproduction,and
hencecannotbesaidtorisewithoutdependingonanythingelse.Itismeaninglesstospeakofthevalidityof
knowledge,forvalidityalwaysreferstoobjectiverealizationofourdesiresandattemptsproceedinginaccordance
withourknowledge.Peopleonlydeclaretheirknowledgeinvalidwhenproceedingpracticallyinaccordancewith
ittheyaredisappointed.Theperceptionofamirageiscalledinvalidwhenproceedinginaccordancewithour
perceptionwedonotfindanythingthatcanservethepurposesofwater(e.g.drinking,bathing).Thevalidityor
truthofknowledgeisthustheattainmentbypracticalexperienceoftheobjectandthefulfilmentofallour
purposesfromit(_arthakriyjna_or_phalajna_)justasperceptionorknowledgerepresentedthemtothe
perceiver.Thereisthusnoselfvalidityofknowledge(_svata@hprm@nya_),butvalidityisascertainedby
_sa@mvda_oragreementwiththeobjectivefactsofexperience[Footnoterefl].

ItiseasytoseethatthisNyyaobjectionisbasedonthesuppositionthatknowledgeisgeneratedbycertain
objectivecollocationsofconditions,andthatknowledgesoproducedcan

___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:See_Nyyamajar_,pp.160173.]

374

only be tested by its agreement with objective facts. But this theory of knowledge is merely an hypothesis; for it can
never be experienced that knowledge is the product of any collocations; we have a perception and immediately we
become aware of certain objective things; knowledge reveals to us the facts of the objective world and this is
experienced by us always. But that the objective world generates knowledge in us is only an hypothesis which can
hardly be demonstrated by experience. It is the supreme prerogative of knowledge that it reveals all other things. It is
not a phenomenon like any other phenomenon of the world. When we say that knowledge has been produced in us by
the external collocations, we just take a perverse point of view which is unwarranted by experience; knowledge only
photographs the objective phenomena for us; but there is nothing to show that knowledge has been generated by
these phenomena. This is only a theory which applies the ordinary conceptions of causation to knowledge and this is
evidently unwarrantable. Knowledge is not like any other phenomena for it stands above them and interprets or
illumines them all. There can be no validity in things, for truth applies to knowledge and knowledge alone. What we call
agreement with facts by practical experience is but the agreement of previous knowledge with later knowledge; for
objective facts never come to us directly, they are always taken on the evidence of knowledge, and they have no other
certainty than what is bestowed on them by knowledge. There arise indeed different kinds of knowledge revealing
different things, but these latter do not on that account generate the former, for this is never experienced; we are never
Chapter IV. 252
awareofanyobjectivefactbeforeitisrevealedbyknowledge.Whyknowledgemakesdifferentkindsof
revelationsisindeedmorethanwecansay,forexperienceonlyshowsthatknowledgerevealsobjectivefactsand
notwhyitdoesso.Theriseofknowledgeisneverperceivedbyustobedependentonanyobjectivefact,forall
objectivefactsaredependentonitforitsrevelationorillumination.Thisiswhatissaidtobetheselfvalidity
(_svata@hprm@ya_)ofknowledgeinitsproduction(_utpatti_).Assoonasknowledgeisproduced,objects
arerevealedtous;thereisnointermediatelinkbetweentheriseofknowledgeandtherevelationofobjectson
whichknowledgedependsforproducingitsactionofrevealingorilluminatingthem.Thusknowledgeisnotonly
independent

375

ofanythingelseinitsownrisebutinitsownactionaswell(_svakryakara@nesvata@hprm@nya@m
jnasya_).Wheneverthereisanyknowledgeitcarrieswithittheimpressionthatitiscertainandvalid,andwe
arenaturallythuspromptedtowork(_prav@rtti_}accordingtoitsdirection.Thereisnoindecisioninourmind
atthetimeoftheriseofknowledgeastothecorrectnessofknowledge;butjustasknowledgerises,itcarrieswith
itthecertaintyofitsrevelation,presence,oraction.Butincasesofillusoryperceptionotherperceptionsor
cognitionsdawnwhichcarrywiththemthenotionthatouroriginalknowledgewasnotvalid.Thusthoughthe
invalidityofanyknowledgemayappeartousbylaterexperience,andinaccordancewithwhichwerejectour
formerknowledge,yetwhentheknowledgefirstrevealeditselftousitcarriedwithittheconvictionofcertainty
whichgoadedusontoworkaccordingtoitsindication.Wheneveramanworksaccordingtohisknowledge,he
doessowiththeconvictionthathisknowledgeisvalid,andnotinapassiveoruncertaintemperofmind.Thisis
whatMm@msameanswhenitsaysthatthevalidityofknowledgeappearsimmediatelywithitsrise,thoughits
invaliditymaybederivedfromlaterexperienceorsomeotherdata(_jnasyapr@m@nyamsvata@h
aprm@nya@mparata@h_).Knowledgeattainedisprovedinvalidwhenlateronacontradictoryexperience
(_bdhakajna_)comesinorwhenourorgansetc.areknowntobefaultyanddefective
(_kara@nado@sajna).Itisfromthesethatknowledgeappearingasvalidisinvalidated;whenwetakeall
necessarycaretolookfortheseandyetfindthemnot,wemustthinkthattheydonotexist.Thusthevalidityof
knowledgecertifiedatthemomentofitsproductionneednotbedoubtedunnecessarilywhenevenafterenquiry
wedonotfindanydefectinsenseoranycontradictioninlaterexperience.Allknowledgeexceptmemoryisthus
regardedasvalidindependentlybyitselfasageneralrule,unlessitisinvalidatedlateron.Memoryisexcluded
becausethephenomenonofmemorydependsuponapreviousexperience,anditsexistinglatentimpressions,and
cannotthusberegardedasarisingindependentlybyitself.

Theplaceofsenseorgansinperception.

Wehavejustsaidthatknowledgearisesbyitselfandthatitcouldnothavebeengeneratedbysensecontact.If
thisbeso,thediversityofperceptionsishoweverleftunexplained.Butin

376

face of the Nyya philosophy explaining all perceptions on the ground of diverse sense-contact the Mm@ms
probably could not afford to remain silent on such an important point. It therefore accepted the Nyya view of sense-
contact as a condition of knowledge with slight modifications, and yet held their doctrine of svata@h-prm@nya. It
does not appear to have been conscious of a conflict between these two different principles of the production of
knowledge. Evidently the point of view from which it looked at it was that the fact that there were the senses and
contacts of them with the objects, or such special capacities in them by virtue of which the things could be perceived,
was with us a matter of inference. Their actions in producing the knowledge are never experienced at the time of the
rise of knowledge, but when the knowledge arises we argue that such and such senses must have acted. The only case
where knowledge is found to be dependent on anything else seems to be the case where one knowledge is found to
depend on a previous experience or knowledge as in the case of memory. In other cases the dependence of the rise of
knowledge on anything else cannot be felt, for the physical collocations conditioning knowledge are not felt to be
operating before the rise
Chapter IV. 253
ofknowledge,andtheseareonlyinferredlateroninaccordancewiththenatureandcharacteristicofknowledge.
Wealwayshaveourfirststartinknowledgewhichisdirectlyexperiencedfromwhichwemayproceedlateronto
theoperationandnatureofobjectivefactsinrelationtoit.Thusitisthatthoughcontactofthesenseswiththe
objectsmaylateronbeimaginedtobetheconditioningfactor,yettheriseofknowledgeaswellasournotionof
itsvaliditystrikesusasoriginal,underived,immediate,andfirsthand.

Prabhkaragivesusasketchastohowtheexistenceofthesensesmaybeinferred.Thusourcognitionsof
objectsarephenomenawhicharenotallthesame,anddonothappenalwaysinthesamemanner,forthese
varydifferentlyatdifferentmoments;thecognitionsofcoursetakeplaceinthesoulwhichmaythusbe
regardedasthematerialcause(_samavyikra@na_);buttheremustbesomesuchmovementsorother
specificassociations(_asamavyikra@na_)whichrendertheproductionofthisorthatspecificcognition
possible.Theimmaterialcausessubsisteitherinthecauseofthematerialcause(e.g.inthecaseofthe
colouringofawhitepieceofcloth,thecolouroftheyarnswhich

377

isthecauseofthecolourintheclothsubsistsintheyarnswhichformthematerialcauseofthecloth)orinthe
materialcauseitself(e.g.inthecaseofanewformofsmellbeingproducedinasubstancebyfirecontact,this
contact,whichistheimmaterialcauseofthesmell,subsistsinthatsubstanceitselfwhichisputinthefireandin
whichthesmellisproduced).Thesouliseternalandhasnoothercause,andithastobeassumedthatthe
immaterialcauserequiredfortheriseofacognitionmustinhereinthesoul,andhencemustbeaquality.Then
againacceptingtheNyyaconclusionsweknowthattheriseofqualitiesinaneternalthingcanonlytakeplaceby
contactwithsomeothersubstances.Nowcognitionbeingaqualitywhichthesoulacquireswouldnaturally
requirethecontactofsuchsubstances.Sincethereisnothingtoshowthatsuchsubstancesinhereinother
substancestheyarealsotobetakenaseternal.Therearethreeeternalsubstances,time,space,andatoms.But
timeandspacebeingallpervasivethesoulisalwaysincontactwiththem.Contactwiththesethereforecannot
explaintheoccasionalriseofdifferentcognitions.Thiscontactmustthenbeofsomekindofatomwhichresidesin
thebodyensouledbythecognizingsoul.Thisatommaybecalledmanas(mind).Thismanasalonebyitselfbrings
aboutcognitions,pleasure,pain,desire,aversion,effort,etc.Themanashoweverbyitselfisfoundtobedevoidof
anysuchqualitiesascolour,smell,etc.,andassuchcannotleadthesoultoexperienceorcognizethesequalities;
henceitstandsinneedofsuchotherorgansasmaybecharacterizedbythesequalities;forthecognitionofcolour,
themindwillneedtheaidofanorganofwhichcolouristhecharacteristicquality;forthecognitionofsmell,an
organhavingtheodorouscharacteristicandsoonwithtouch,taste,vision.Nowweknowthattheorganwhich
hascolourforitsdistinctivefeaturemustbeonecomposedoftejasorlight,ascolourisafeatureoflight,andthis
provestheexistenceoftheorgan,theeyeforthecognitionofcolour;inasimilarmannertheexistenceofthe
earthlyorgan(organofsmell),theaqueousorgan(organoftaste),theks'icorgan(organofsound)andtheairy
organ(organoftouch)maybedemonstrated.Butwithoutmanasnoneoftheseorgansisfoundtobeeffective.
Fournecessarycontactshavetobeadmitted,(1)ofthesenseorganswiththeobject,(2)ofthesenseorganswith
thequalitiesoftheobject,
(3)ofthemanas
378

withthesenseorgans,and(4)ofthemanaswiththesoul.Theobjectsofperceptionareofthreekinds,(1)
substances,(2)qualities,(3)jtiorclass.Thematerialsubstancesaretangibleobjectsofearth,fire,water,airin
largedimensions(forintheirfineatomicstatestheycannotbeperceived).Thequalitiesarecolour,taste,smell,
touch,number,dimension,separateness,conjunction,disjunction,priority,posteriority,pleasure,pain,desire,
aversion,andeffort[Footnoterefl].

It may not be out of place here to mention in conclusion that Kumrila Bha@t@ta was rather undecided as to the
nature of the senses or of their contact with the objects. Thus he says that the senses may be conceived either as
certain functions or activities, or as entities having the capacity of revealing things without coming
Chapter IV. 254
intoactualcontactwiththem,orthattheymightbeentitieswhichactuallycomeincontactwiththeirobjects
[Footnoteref2],andheprefersthislastviewasbeingmoresatisfactory.

Indeterminateanddeterminateperception.

Therearetwokindsofperceptionintwostages,thefirststageiscallednirvikalpa(indeterminate)andthe
secondsavikalpa(determinate).Thenirvikalpaperceptionofathingisitsperceptionatthefirstmomentofthe
associationofthesensesandtheirobjects.ThusKumrilasaysthatthecognitionthatappearsfirstisamere
_locana_orsimpleperception,callednondeterminatepertainingtotheobjectitselfpureandsimple,and
resemblingthecognitionsthatthenewborninfanthasofthingsaroundhimself.Inthiscognitionneitherthe
genusnorthedifferentiaispresentedtoconsciousness;allthatispresentthereistheindividualwhereinthese
twosubsist.ThisviewofindeterminateperceptionmayseeminsomesensetoresembletheBuddhistviewwhich
definesitasbeingmerelythespecificindividuality(_svalak@sa@na_}andregardsitasbeingtheonlyvalid
elementinperception,whereasalltherestareconceivedasbeingimaginary

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_Prakara@napacik_,pp.53etc.,andDrGa@ngnthaJh's_Prabhkaramim@ms_,pp.
35etc.]

[Footnote2:_S'lokavrttika_,see_Pratyak@sastra_,40etc.,and_Nyyaratnkara_onit.Itmaybenotedin
thisconnectionthatS@mkhyaYogadidnotthinklikeNyyathatthesensesactuallywentouttomeetthe
objects(_prpyakritva_)butheldthattherewasaspecialkindoffunctioning(_v@rtti_)byvirtueofwhichthe
sensescouldgraspevensuchdistantobjectsasthesunandthestars.Itisthefunctioningofthesensethat
reachedtheobjects.Thenatureofthev@rttiisnotfurtherclearlyexplainedandPrthasrathiobjectstoitas
beingalmostadifferentcategory(_tattvntara_).]

379

impositions.ButbothKumrilaandPrabhkarathinkthatboththegenusandthedifferentiaareperceived
intheindeterminatestage,butthesedonotmanifestthemselvestousonlybecausewedonotrememberthe
otherthingsinrelationtowhich,orincontrasttowhich,thepercepthastoshowitscharacterasgenusor
differentia;athingcanbecognizedasan"individual"onlyincomparisonwithotherthingsfromwhichit
differsincertainwelldefinedcharacters;anditcanbeapprehendedasbelongingtoaclassonlywhenitis
foundtopossesscertaincharacteristicfeaturesincommonwithsomeotherthings;soweseethatasother
thingsarenotpresentedtoconsciousnessthroughmemory,theperceptattheindeterminatestagecannotbe
fullyapprehendedasanindividualbelongingtoaclass,thoughthedataconstitutingthecharacteristicofthe
thingasagenusanditsdifferentiaareperceivedattheindeterminatestage[Footnoteref1].Solongasother
thingsarenotrememberedthesedatacannotmanifestthemselvesproperly,andhencetheperceptionofthe
thingremainsindeterminateatthefirststageofperception.Atthesecondstagetheselfbyitspast
impressionsbringsthepresentperceptioninrelationtopastonesandrealizesitscharacterasinvolving
universalandparticular.Itisthusapparentthatthedifferencebetweentheindeterminateandthe
determinateperceptionisthis,thatinthelattercasememoryofotherthingscreepsin,butthisassociationof
memoryinthedeterminateperceptionreferstothoseotherobjectsofmemoryandnottothepercept.Itis
alsoheldthatthoughthedeterminateperceptionisbasedupontheindeterminateone,yetsincetheformer
alsoapprehendscertainsuchfactorsasdidnotenterintotheindeterminateperception,itistoberegarded
asavalidcognition.KumrilaalsoagreeswithPrabhkarainholdingboththeindeterminateandthe
determinateperceptionvalid[Footnoteref2].

SomeOntologicalProblemsconnectedwiththeDoctrineofPerception.
The perception of the class (_jti_) of a percept in relation to other things may thus be regarded in the main as
Chapter IV. 255
adifferencebetweendeterminateandindeterminateperceptions.Theproblemsofjtiandavayavvayav(part
andwholenotion)were

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ComparethiswiththeVais'e@sikaviewasinterpretedbyS'rdhara.]

[Footnote2:See_Prakara@napacik_and_S'stradpik_.]

380

thesubjectsofhotdisputeinIndianphilosophy.Beforeenteringintodiscussionaboutjti,Prabhkarafirst
introducedtheproblemofavayava(part)and_avayav_(whole).Hearguesasanexponentofsvata@h
prm@nyavdathattheproofofthetrueexistenceofanythingmustultimatelyrestonourownconsciousness,
andwhatisdistinctlyrecognizedinconsciousnessmustbeadmittedtohaveitsexistenceestablished.Following
thiscanonPrabhkarasaysthatgrossobjectsasawholeexist,sincetheyaresoperceived.Thesubtleatomsare
thematerialcauseandtheirconnection(_sa@myoga_)istheimmaterialcause(_asamavyikra@na_),andit
isthelatterwhichrendersthewholealtogetherdifferentfromthepartsofwhichitiscomposed;anditisnot
necessarythatallthepartsshouldbeperceivedbeforethewholeisperceived.Kumrilaholdsthatitisdueto
thepointofviewfromwhichwelookatathingthatwecallitaseparatewholeoronlyaconglomerationof
parts.Inrealitytheyareidentical,butwhenwelaystressonthenotionofparts,thethingappearstobea
conglomerationofthem,andwhenwelookatitfromthepointofviewoftheunityappearingasawhole,the
thingappearstobeawholeofwhichthereareparts(see_S'lokavrttika,Vanavda_)[Footnoteref1].

Jti,thoughincorporatingtheideaofhavingmanyunitswithinone,isdifferentfromtheconceptionofwholein
this,thatitresidesinitsentiretyineachindividualconstitutingthatjti(_vys'ajyav@rtti_),

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:AccordingtoS@mkhyaYogaathingisregardedastheunityoftheuniversalandtheparticular
(_smnyavis'esasamudyodravyam,Vysabhsya_,III.44),forthereisnootherseparateentitywhichis
differentfromthembothinwhichtheywouldinhereasNyayaholds.Conglomerationscanbeoftwokinds,
namelythoseinwhichthepartsexistatadistancefromoneanother(e.g.aforest),andthoseinwhichtheyexist
closetogether(_mrantarhitadavayavh_),anditisthislattercombination(_ayutasiddhvayava_)whichis
calledadravya,butherealsothereisnoseparatewholedistinctfromtheparts;itisthepartsconnectedina
particularwayandhavingnoperceptiblespacebetweenthemthatiscalledathingorawhole.TheBuddhistsas
Pandits'okahasshowndidnotbelieveinanywhole(_avayavi_),itistheatomswhichinconnectionwithone
anotherappearedasawholeoccupyingspace(_paramnavaevahipararpades'aparihrenotpannh
parasparasahitavabhsamndesavitnavantobhavanti_).Thewholeisthusamereappearanceandnota
reality(see_Avayavinirkarana,SixBuddhistNyyaTracts_).Nyayahoweverheldthattheatomswerepartless
_(niravayava}_andhenceitwouldbewrongtosaythatwhenweseeanobjectweseetheatoms.Theexistenceof
awholeasdifferentfromthepartswhichbelongtoitisdirectlyexperiencedandthereisnovalidreasonagainst
it:

"_adustakaranodbhtamanvirbhtabdhakamasandigdacavijnamkathammithyetikathyate._"
_Nyyamajar_,pp.550ff.]

381
but the establishment of the existence of wholes refutes the argument that jti should be denied, because it
Chapter IV. 256
involvestheconceptionofawhole(class)consistingofmanyparts(individuals).Theclasscharacterorjtiexists
becauseitisdistinctlyperceivedbyusintheindividualsincludedinanyparticularclass.Itiseternalinthesense
thatitcontinuestoexistinotherindividuals,evenwhenoneoftheindividualsceasestoexist.Whenanew
individualofthatclass(eg.cowclass)comesintobeing,anewrelationofinherenceisgeneratedbywhichthe
individualisbroughtintorelationwiththeclasscharacterexistinginotherindividuals,forinherence
(_samavya_)accordingtoPrabhkaraisnotaneternalentitybutanentitywhichisbothproducedandnot
producedaccordingasthethinginwhichitexistsisnoneternaloreternal,anditisnotregardedasoneasNyya
holds,butasmany,accordingasthereistheinfinitenumberofthingsinwhichitexists.Whenanyindividualis
destroyed,theclasscharacterdoesnotgoelsewhere,norsubsistinthatindividual,norisitselfdestroyed,butitis
onlytheinherenceofclasscharacterwiththatindividualthatceasestoexist.Withthedestructionofan
individualoritsproductionitisanewrelationofinherencethatisdestroyedorproduced.Buttheclasscharacter
orjtihasnoseparateexistenceapartfromtheindividualsasNyyasupposes.Apprehensionofjtiisessentially
theapprehensionoftheclasscharacterofathinginrelationtoothersimilarthingsofthatclassbytheperception
ofthecommoncharacteristics.ButPrabhkarawouldnotadmittheexistenceofahighestgenussatt(being)as
acknowledgedbyNyya.Hearguesthattheexistenceofclasscharacterisapprehendedbecausewefindthatthe
individualsofaclasspossesssomecommoncharacteristicpossessedbyalltheheterogeneousanddisparatethings
oftheworldascangiverisetotheconceptionofaseparatejtiassatt,asdemandedbythenaiyyikas.Thatall
thingsaresaidtobesat(existing)ismoreorlessawordoranamewithoutthecorrespondingapprehensionofa
commonquality.Ourexperiencealwaysgivesusconcreteexistingindividuals,butwecanneverexperiencesuch
ahighestgenusaspureexistenceorbeing,asithasnoconcreteformwhichmaybeperceived.Whenwespeakof
athingassat,wedonotmeanthatitispossessedofanysuchclasscharactersassatt(being);whatwemeanis
simplythattheindividualhasitsspecificexistenceorsvarpasatt.

382

ThustheNyyaviewofperceptionastakingonlythethinginitspurebeingapartfromqualities,etc,(_sanmtra
vi@sayampratyak@sa@m_)ismadeuntenablebyPrabhkara,asaccordingtohimthethingisperceiveddirect
withallitsqualities.AccordingtoKumrilahoweverjtiisnotsomethingdifferentfromtheindividuals
comprehendedbyitanditisdirectlyperceived.Kumrila'sviewofjtiisthussimilartothatheldbyS@mkhya,
namelythatwhenwelookatanindividualfromonepointofview(jtiasidenticalwiththeindividual),itisthe
individualthatlaysitsstressuponourconsciousnessandthenotionofjtibecomeslatent,butwhenwelookatit
fromanotherpointofview(theindividualasidenticalwithjti)itisthejtiwhichpresentsitselftoconsciousness,
andtheaspectasindividualbecomeslatent.Theapprehensionasjtiorasindividualisthusonlyamatterof
differentpointsofvieworanglesofvisionfromwhichwelookatathing.Quiteinharmonywiththeconceptionof
jti,Kumrilaholdsthattherelationofinherenceisnotanythingwhichisdistinctfromthethingsthemselvesin
whichitissupposedtoexist,butonlyaparticularaspectorphaseofthethingsthemselves(_S'lokavrttika,
Pratyak@sastra_,149,150,_abhedtsamavyo'stusvarpamdharmadharmi@no@h_),Kumrilaagreeswith
Prabhkarathatjtiisperceivedbythesenses(_tatraikabuddhinirgrhyjtirindriyagocar_).

ItisnotoutofplacetomentionthatontheevidenceofPrabhkarawefindthatthecategoryofvis'e@sa
admittedbytheKa@ndaschoolisnotacceptedasaseparatecategorybytheMm@msonthegroundthat
thedifferentiationofeternalthingsfromoneanother,forwhichthecategoryofvis'e@saisadmitted,mayvery
wellbeeffectedonthebasisoftheordinaryqualitiesofthesethings.Thequalityofp@rthaktvaorspecific
differencesinatoms,asinferredbythedifferenceofthingstheyconstitute,canverywellservethepurposesof
vis'e@sa.

Thenatureofknowledge.

All knowledge involves the knower, the known object, and the knowledge at the same identical moment. All
knowledge whether perceptual, inferential or of any other kind must necessarily reveal the self or the knower
Chapter IV. 257
directly.Thusasinallknowledgetheselfisdirectlyandimmediatelyperceived,allknowledgemaybe
regardedasperceptionfromthepointofviewofself.Thedivision

383

ofthepram@nasaspratyak@sa(perception),anumna(inference),etc.isfromthepointofviewoftheobjects
ofknowledgewithreferencetothevaryingmodesinwhichtheyarebroughtwithinthepurviewofknowledge.
Theselfitselfhoweverhasnoilluminingorrevealingpowers,forthenevenindeepsleepwecouldhave
knowledge,fortheselfispresenteventhen,asisprovedbytheremembranceofdreams.Itisknowledge
(_sa@mvid_)thatrevealsbyitsveryappearanceboththeself,theknower,andtheobjects.Itisgenerallyargued
againsttheselfilluminativecharacterofknowledgethatallcognitionsareoftheformsoftheobjectstheyaresaid
toreveal;andiftheyhavethesameformwemayrathersaythattheyhavethesameidenticalrealitytoo.The
Mm@msanswertotheseobjectionsisthis,thatifthecognitionandthecognizedwerenotdifferentfromone
another,theycouldnothavebeenfeltassuch,andwecouldnothavefeltthatitisbycognitionthatweapprehend
thecognizedobjects.Thecognition(_sa@mvedana_)ofapersonsimplymeansthatsuchaspecialkindofquality
(_dharma_)hasbeenmanifestedintheselfbyvirtueofwhichhisactiveoperationwithreferencetoacertain
objectisfavouredordetermined,andtheobjectofcognitionisthatwithreferencetowhichtheactiveoperationof
theselfhasbeeninduced.Cognitionsarenotindeedabsolutelyformless,fortheyhavethecognitionalcharacter
bywhichthingsareilluminedandmanifested.Cognitionhasnoothercharacterthanthis,thatitilluminesand
revealsobjects.Thethingsonlyarebelievedtohaveformsandonlysuchformsasknowledgerevealtousabout
them.Eventhedreamcognitioniswithreferencetoobjectsthatwereperceivedpreviously,andofwhichthe
impressionswereleftinthemindandwerearousedbytheunseenagency(_ad@r@s@ta_).Dreamcognitionis
thusonlyakindofremembranceofthatwhichwaspreviouslyexperienced.Onlysuchoftheimpressionsof
cognizedobjectsarerousedindreamsascanbegetjustthatamountofpleasurableorpainfulexperience,in
accordancewiththeoperationofad@r@s@ta,asthepersondeservestohaveinaccordancewithhisprevious
meritordemerit.

ThePrabhkaraMm@ms,inrefutingtheargumentsofthosewhoholdthatourcognitionsofobjectsare
themselvescognizedbysomeothercognition,saysthatthisisnotpossible,sincewedonotexperienceanysuch
doublecognitionandalsobecauseitwouldleadustoa_regressusadinfinitum,_forifasecondcognition

384

isnecessarytointerpretthefirst,thenthatwouldrequireathirdandsoon.Ifacognitioncouldbetheobjectof
anothercognition,thenitcouldnotbeselfvalid.Thecognitionisnotofcourseunknowntous,butthatisof
coursebecauseitisselfcognized,andrevealsitselftousthemomentitrevealsitsobjects.Fromtheillumination
ofobjectsalsowecaninferthepresenceofthisselfcognizingknowledge.Butitisonlyitspresencethatis
inferredandnotthecognitionitself,forinferencecanonlyindicatethepresenceofanobjectandnotintheform
inwhichitcanbeapprehendedbyperception(_pratyak@sa_).Prabhkaradrawsasubtledistinctionbetween
perceptuality(_sa@mvedyatva_)andbeingobjectofknowledge(_prameyatva_).Athingcanonlybe
apprehended(_sa@mvedyate_)byperception,whereasinferencecanonlyindicatethepresenceofanobject
withoutapprehendingtheobjectitself.Ourcognitioncannotbeapprehendedbyanyothercognition.Inference
canonlyindicatethepresenceorexistenceofknowledgebutcannotapprehendthecognitionitself[Footnoteref
1].

Kumrila also agrees with Prabhkara in holding that perception is never the object of another perception and that it
ends in the direct apprehensibility of the object of perception. But he says that every perception involves a relationship
between the perceiver and the perceived, wherein the perceiver behaves as the agent whose activity in grasping the
object is known as cognition. This is indeed different from the Prabhkara view, that in one manifestation of knowledge
the knower, the known, and the knowledge, are simultaneously illuminated (the doctrine of _tripu@tpratyak@sa_)
[Footnote ref 2].
Chapter IV. 258
ThePsychologyofIllusion.

Thequestionhoweverarisesthatifallapprehensionsarevalid,howarewetoaccountforillusoryperceptions
whichcannotberegardedasvalid?Theproblemofillusoryperceptionanditspsychologyisaveryfavouritetopic
ofdiscussioninIndianphilosophy.OmittingthetheoryofillusionoftheJainscalled_satkhyti_whichwehave
describedbefore,andoftheVedntists,whichweshalldescribeinthenextchapter,therearethreedifferent
theoriesofillusion,viz.(1)_tmakhyti_,(2)_vipartakhyt_or_anyathkhyti_,and(3)_akhyti_ofthe
Mm@msschool.The

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_Prabhkaramm@ms,_byDrGa@nganthaJh.]

[Footnote2:_loc.cit._pp.2628.]

385

vipartkhytioranyathkhytitheoryofillusionisacceptedbytheNyya,Vais'e@sikaandtheYoga,the
khytitheorybyMm@msandS@mkhyaandthetmakhytibytheBuddhists.

ThecommonestexampleofillusioninIndianphilosophyistheillusoryappearanceofapieceofbrokenconch
shellasapieceofsilver.Thatsuchanillusionoccursisafactwhichisexperiencedbyallandagreedtobyall.The
differencesofviewarewithregardtoitscauseoritspsychology.TheidealisticBuddhistswhodenytheexistence
oftheexternalworldandthinkthatthereareonlytheformsofknowledge,generatedbytheaccumulatedkarma
ofpastlives,holdthatjustasinthecaseofacorrectperception,soalsointhecaseofillusoryperceptionitisthe
flowofknowledgewhichmustbeheldresponsible.Theflowofknowledgeonaccountofthepeculiaritiesofits
owncollocatingconditionsgeneratessometimeswhatwecallrightperceptionandsometimeswrongperceptionor
illusion.Onthisviewnothingdependsuponthesocalledexternaldata.Fortheydonotexist,andeveniftheydid
exist,whyshouldthesamedatasometimesbringabouttherightperceptionandsometimestheillusion?Theflow
ofknowledgecreatesboththeperceptandtheperceiverandunitesthem.Thisistruebothinthecaseofcorrect
perceptionandillusoryperception.Nyyaobjectstotheaboveview,andsaysthat,ifknowledgeirrespectiveof
anyexternalconditionimposesuponitselftheknowerandtheillusorypercept,thentheperceptionoughttobeof
theform"Iamsilver"andnot"thisissilver."Moreoverthistheorystandsrefuted,asitisbaseduponafalse
hypothesisthatitistheinnerknowledgewhichappearsascomingfromoutsideandthattheexternalassuchdoes
notexist.

Thevipartakhytiortheanyathkhytitheorysupposesthattheillusiontakesplacebecauseonaccountof
malobservationwedonotnotethepeculiartraitsoftheconchshellasdistinguishedfromthesilver,andatthe
sametimebytheglowetc.oftheconchshellunconsciouslythesilverwhichIhadseenelsewhereisremembered
andtheobjectbeforemeistakenassilver.Inillusiontheobjectbeforeuswithwhichoureyeisassociatedisnot
conchshell,forthetraitspeculiartoitnotbeinggrasped,itismerelyanobject.Thesilverisnotutterlynon
existent,foritexistselsewhereanditisthememoryofitasexperiencedbeforethatcreatesconfusionandleadsus
tothinkoftheconchshellassilver.Thisschoolagreeswiththeakhytischoolthatthefact

386

thatIremembersilverisnottakennoteofatthetimeofillusion.Butitholdsthatthemerenondistinctionisnot
enoughtoaccountforthephenomenonofillusion,forthereisadefinitepositiveaspectassociatedwithit,viz.the
falseidentificationofsilver(seenelsewhere)withtheconchshellbeforeus.
The khyti theory of Mm@ms holds that since the special peculiarities of the conch-shell are not noticed,
Chapter IV. 259
itiserroneoustosaythatweidentifyorcognizepositivelytheconchshellasthesilver(perceivedelsewhere),
fortheconchshellisnotcognizedatall.Whathappenshereissimplythis,thatonlythefeaturescommonto
conchshellandsilverbeingnoticed,theperceiverfailstoapprehendthedifferencebetweenthesetwo
things,andthisgivesrisetothecognitionofsilver.Owingtoacertainweaknessofthemindthe
remembranceofsilverrousedbythecommonfeaturesoftheconchshellandsilverisnotapprehended,and
thefactthatitisonlyamemoryofsilverseeninsomepasttimethathasappearedbeforehimisnot
perceived;anditisasaresultofthisnonapprehensionofthedifferencebetweenthesilverrememberedand
thepresentconchshellthattheillusiontakesplace.Thus,thoughtheillusoryperceptionpartakesofadual
characterofremembranceandapprehension,andassuchisdifferentfromtheordinaryvalidperception
(whichiswhollyamatterofdirectapprehension)ofrealsilverbeforeus,yetasthedifferencebetweenthe
remembranceofsilverandthesightofthepresentobjectisnotapprehended,theillusoryperception
appearsatthemomentofitsproductiontobeasvalidasarealvalidperception.Bothgiverisetothesame
kindofactivityonthepartoftheagent,forinillusoryperceptiontheperceiverwouldbeaseagertostoop
andpickupthethingasinthecaseofarealperception.Kumrilaagreeswiththisviewasexpoundedby
Prabhkara,andfurthersaysthattheillusoryjudgmentisasvalidtothecognizoratthetimethathehas
thecognitionasanyrealjudgmentcouldbe.Ifsubsequentexperiencerejectsit,thatdoesnotmatter,foritis
admittedinMm@msthatwhenlaterexperiencefindsoutthedefectsofanyperceptionitcaninvalidate
theoriginalperceptionwhichwasselfvalidatthetimeofitsproduction[FootnoteRef.1].Itiseasytosee
thattheMm@mshadtoadoptthisviewofillusiontomaintainthedoctrinethatallcognitionatthe
momentofitsproductionisvalid.Thekhytitheory

___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:See_Prakara@napacik,S'stradpik_,and_S'lokavrttika_,stra2.]

387

triestoestablishtheviewthattheillusionisnotduetoanypositivewrongknowledge,buttoamerenegative
factorofnonapprehensionduetocertainweaknessofmind.Soitisthatthoughillusionistheresult,yetthe
cognitionsofarasitiscognition,ismadeupoftwoelements,thepresentperceptionandmemory,bothofwhich
aretruesofarastheyareindividuallypresenttous,andthecognitionitselfhasallthecharacteristicsofanyother
validknowledge,forthemarkofthevalidityofacognitionisitspowertopromptustoaction.Indoubtful
cognitionsalso,asinthecase"Isthisapostoraman?"whatisactuallyperceivedissometallobjectandthusfar
itisvalidtoo.Butwhenthisperceptiongivesrisetotwodifferentkindsofremembrance(ofthepillarandthe
man),doubtcomesin.Sotheelementofapprehensioninvolvedindoubtfulcognitionsshouldberegardedasself
validasanyothercognition.

Inference.

S'abara says that when a certain fixed or permanent relation has been known to exist between two things, we can have
the idea of one thing when the other one is perceived, and this kind of knowledge is called inference. Kumrila on the
basis of this tries to show that inference is only possible when we notice that in a large number of cases two things (e.g.
smoke and fire) subsist together in a third thing (e.g. kitchen, etc.) in some independent relation, i.e. when their
coexistence does not depend upon any other eliminable condition or factor. It is also necessary that the two things
(smoke and fire) coexisting in a third thing should be so experienced that all cases of the existence of one thing should
also be cases involving the existence of the other, but the cases of the existence of one thing (e.g. fire), though
including all the cases of the existence of the other (smoke), may have yet a more extensive sphere where the latter
(smoke) may not exist. When once a permanent relation, whether it be a case of coexistence (as in the case of the
contiguity of the constellation of K@rttik with Rohi@n, where, by the rise of the former the early rise of the latter
may be inferred), or a case of identity (as in the relation between a genus and its species), or a case of cause and effect
or otherwise between two things and a third thing which had been apprehended in a large number of cases, is
perceived,
Chapter IV. 260
theyfusetogetherinthemindasforming

388

onewhole,andasaresultofthatwhentheexistenceoftheone(e.g.smoke)inathing(hill)isnoticed,wecaninfer
theexistenceofthething(hill)withitscounterpart(fire).Inallsuchcasesthething(e.g.fire)whichhasasphere
extendingbeyondthatinwhichtheother(e.g.smoke)canexistiscalledgamyaor_vypaka_andtheother(e.g.
smoke)_vypya_orgamakaanditisonlybythepresenceofgamakainathing(e.g.hill,thepak@sa)thatthe
othercounterpartthegamya(fire)maybeinferred.Thegeneralproposition,universalcoexistenceofthegamaka
withthegamya(e.g.whereverthereissmokethereisfire)cannotbethecauseofinference,foritisitselfacaseof
inference.Inferenceinvolvesthememoryofapermanentrelationsubsistingbetweentwothings(e.g.smokeand
fire)inathirdthing(eg.kitchen);butthethirdthingisrememberedonlyinageneralwaythatthecoexisting
thingsmusthaveaplacewheretheyarefoundassociated.Itisbyvirtueofsuchamemorythatthedirect
perceptionofabasis(e.g.hill)withthegamakathing(e.g.smoke)initwouldnaturallybringtomymindthatthe
samebasis(hill)mustcontainthegamya(i.e.fire)also.Everycaseofinferencethusproceedsdirectlyfroma
perceptionandnotfromanyuniversalgeneralproposition.Kumrilaholdsthattheinferencegivesustheminor
asassociatedwiththemajorandnotofthemajoralone,i.e.ofthefierymountainandnotoffire.Thusinference
givesusanewknowledge,forthoughitwasknowninageneralwaythatthepossessorofsmokeisthepossessorof
fire,yetthecaseofthemountainwasnotanticipatedandtheinferenceofthefierymountainisthusadistinctly
newknowledge(_des'akldhikydyuktamag@rhtagrhitvamanumnasya,Nyyaratnkara_,p.363)[Footnote
ref1].Itshouldalsobenotedthatinformingthenotionofthepermanentrelationbetweentwothings,athird
thinginwhichthesetwosubsistisalwaysrememberedandfortheconceptionofthispermanentrelationitis
enoughthatinthelargenumberofcaseswheretheconcomitancewasnotedtherewasnoknowledgeofanycase
wheretheconcomitancefailed,anditisnotindispensablethatthenegativeinstancesinwhichtheabsenceofthe
gamyaorvypakawasmarkedbyan

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ItisimportanttonotethatitisnotunlikelythatKumrilawasindebtedtoDi@nngaforthis;for
Di@nnga'smaincontentionisthat"itisnotfire,northeconnectionbetweenitandthehill,butitisthefieryhill
thatisinferred"forotherwiseinferencewouldgiveusnonewknowledgeseeVidybh@sa@na'sIndianLogic,
p.87and_Ttparya@tik_,p.120.]

389

absenceofthegamakaorvypya,shouldalsobenoted,foraknowledgeofsuchanegativerelationisnot
indispensablefortheformingofthenotionofthepermanentrelation[Footnoteref1].Theexperienceofalarge
numberofparticularcasesinwhichanytwothingswerefoundtocoexisttogetherinanotherthinginsome
relationassociatedwiththenonperceptionofanycaseoffailurecreatesanexpectancyinusofinferringthe
presenceofthegamyainthatthinginwhichthegamakaisperceivedtoexistinexactlythesamerelation
[Footnoteref2].Inthosecaseswherethecircleoftheexistenceofthegamyacoincideswiththecircleofthe
existenceofthegamaka,eachofthembecomesagamakafortheother.Itisclearthatthisformofinferencenot
onlyincludesallcasesofcauseandeffect,ofgenusandspeciesbutalsoallcasesofcoexistenceaswell.

The question arises that if no inference is possible without a memory of the permanent relation, is not the self-validity
of inference destroyed on that account, for memory is not regarded as self-valid. To this Kumrila's answer is that
memory is not invalid, but it has not the status of pramna, as it does not bring to us a new knowledge. But inference
involves the acquirement of a new knowledge in this, that though the coexistence of two things in another was known
in a number of cases, yet in the present case a new case of the existence of the gamya in a thing is known from the
perception of the existence of the gamaka and this knowledge is gained by a means which is not perception, for it is
only the gamaka that is seen and not the
Chapter IV. 261
gamya.Ifthegamyaisalsoseenitisnoinferenceatall.

Asregardsthenumberofpropositionsnecessaryfortheexplicitstatementoftheprocessofinferencefor
convincingothers(_prrthnumna_)bothKumrilaandPrabhkaraholdthatthreepremissesarequite
sufficientforinference.Thusthefirstthreepremissespratij,hetuandd@rstntamayquiteservethe
purposeofananumna.

TherearetwokindsofanumnaaccordingtoKumrilaviz.pratyak@satod@rstasambandhaand
smnyatod@r@s@tasambandha.Theformeristhatkindofinferencewherethepermanent

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:KumrilastronglyopposesaBuddhistviewthatconcomitance(_vypti_)isascertainedonlybythe
negativeinstancesandnotbythepositiveones.]

[Footnote2:"_tasmdanavagate'pisarvatrnvayesarvatas'cavyatirekebahus'ahshityvagamamtrdeva
vyabhicrdars'anasanthdanumnotpattira@ngkartavya@h._"_Nyyaratnkara_,p.288.]

390

relationbetweentwoconcretethings,asinthecaseofsmokeandfire,hasbeennoticed.Thelatteristhatkindof
inferencewherethepermanentrelationisobservednotbetweentwoconcretethingsbutbetweentwogeneral
notions,asinthecaseofmovementandchangeofplace,e.g.theperceivedcaseswherethereischangeofplace
thereisalsomotioninvolvedwithit;sofromthechangeofplaceofthesunitsmotionisinferredanditisheld
thatthisgeneralnotionisdirectlyperceivedlikealluniversals[Footnoteref1].

Prabhkararecognizestheneedofformingthenotionofthepermanentrelation,buthedoesnotlayanystresson
thefactthatthispermanentrelationbetweentwothings(fireandsmoke)istakeninconnectionwithathirdthing
inwhichtheybothsubsist.Hesaysthatthenotionofthepermanentrelationbetweentwothingsisthemainpoint,
whereasinallotherassociationsoftimeandplacethethingsinwhichthesetwosubsisttogetheraretakenonlyas
adjunctstoqualifythetwothings(e.g.fireandsmoke).Itisalsonecessarytorecognizethefactthatthoughthe
concomitanceofsmokeinfireisonlyconditional,theconcomitanceofthefireinsmokeisunconditionaland
absolute[Footnoteref2].Whensuchaconvictionisfirmlyrootedinthemindthattheconceptofthepresenceof
smokeinvolvestheconceptofthepresenceoffire,theinferenceoffireismadeassoonasanysmokeisseen.
Prabhkaracountsseparatelythefallaciesoftheminor(_pak@sbhsa_),oftheenunciation(_pratijbhsa_)
andoftheexample(_d@r@s@tntbhsa_)alongwiththefallaciesofthemiddleandthisseemstoindicatethat
theMm@mslogicwasnotaltogetherfreefromBuddhistinfluence.Thecognitionofsmokeincludeswithin
itselfthecognitionoffirealso,andthustherewouldbenothingleftunknowntobecognizedbytheinferential
cognition.ButthisobjectionhaslittleforcewithPrabhkara,forhedoesnotadmitthatapram@nashould
necessarilybringusanynewknowledge,forpram@naissimplydefinedas"apprehension."Sothoughthe
inferentialcognitionalwayspertainstothingsalreadyknownitisyetregardedbyhimasapram@na,sinceitis
inanycasenodoubtanapprehension.

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_S'lokavrttika,Nyyaratnkara,S'stradpik,Yuktisnehapra@n,Siddhntacandrik_on
anumna.]

[Footnote 2: On the subject of the means of assuring oneself that there is no condition (_updhi_) which may vitiate
the inference, Prabhkara has nothing new to tell us. He says that where even after careful enquiry in a large number
of cases the condition cannot be discovered we must say that it does not exist (_prayatnennvi@syam@ne
aupdhikatvnavagamt_, see _Prakara@napacik_, p. 71).]
Chapter IV. 262
391

Upamna,Arthpatti.

Analogy(_upamna_)isacceptedbyMm@msinasensewhichisdifferentfromthatinwhichNyya
tookit.Themanwhohasseenacow(_go_)goestotheforestandseesawildox(_gavaya_),andapprehends
thesimilarityofthegavayawiththe_go,_andthencognizesthesimilarityofthego(whichisnotwithinthe
limitsofhisperceptionthen)withthe_gavaya._Thecognitionofthissimilarityofthegavayainthe_go,_as
itfollowsdirectlyfromtheperceptionofthesimilarityofthegointhe_gavaya,_iscalledupamna
(analogy).Itisregardedasaseparatepram@na,becausebyitwecanapprehendthesimilarityexistingin
athingwhichisnotperceivedatthemoment.Itisnotmereremembrance,foratthetimethegowasseen
thegavayawasnotseen,andhencethesimilarityalsowasnotseen,andwhatwasnotseencouldnotbe
remembered.ThedifferenceofPrabhkaraandKumrilaonthispointisthatwhilethelatterregards
similarityasonlyaqualityconsistinginthefactofmorethanoneobjecthavingthesamesetofqualities,the
formerregardsitasadistinctcategory.

_Arthpatti_(implication)isanewpram@nawhichisadmittedbytheMm@ms.Thuswhenweknowthata
personDevadattaisaliveandperceivethatheisnotinthehouse,wecannotreconcilethesetwofacts,viz.his
remainingaliveandhisnotbeinginthehousewithoutpresuminghisexistencesomewhereoutsidethehouse,and
thismethodofcognizingtheexistenceofDevadattaoutsidethehouseiscalled_arthpatti_(presumptionor
implication).

TheexactpsychologicalanalysisofthemindinthisarthpatticognitionisamatteronwhichPrabhkaraand
Kumriladisagree.PrabhkaraholdsthatwhenamanknowsthatDevadattahabituallyresidesinhishousebut
yetdoesnotfindhimthere,hisknowledgethatDevadattaisliving(thoughacquiredpreviouslybysomeother
meansofproof)ismadedoubtful,andthecauseofthisdoubtisthathedoesnotfindDevadattaathishouse.The
absenceofDevadattafromthehouseisnotthecauseofimplication,butitthrowsintodoubttheveryexistence
ofDevadatta,andthusforcesustoimaginethatDevadattamustremainsomewhereoutside.Thatcanonlybe
foundbyimplication,withoutthehypothesisofwhichthedoubtcannotberemoved.Themereabsenceof
Devadattafromthehouseisnotenoughfor

392

makingthepresumptionthatheisoutsidethehouse,forhemightalsobedead.ButIknowthatDevadattawas
livingandalsothathewasnotathome;thisperceptionofhisabsencefromhomecreatesadoubtasregardsmy
firstknowledgethatheisliving,anditisfortheremovalofthisdoubtthattherecreepsinthepresumptionthat
hemustbelivingsomewhereelse.TheperceptionoftheabsenceofDevadattathroughtheintermediatelinkofa
doubtpassesintothenotionofapresumptionthathemustthenremainsomewhereelse.Ininferencethereisno
elementofdoubt,foritisonlywhenthesmokeisperceivedtoexistbeyondtheleastelementofdoubtthatthe
inferenceofthefireispossible,butinpresumptiontheperceivednonexistenceinthehouseleadstothe
presumptionofanexternalexistenceonlywhenithasthrownthefactoftheman'sbeingaliveintodoubtand
uncertainty[Footnoteref1].

Kumrila however objects to this explanation of Prabhkara, and says that if the fact that Devadatta is living is made
doubtful by the absence of Devadatta at his house, then the doubt may as well be removed by the supposition that
Devadatta is dead, for it does not follow that the doubt with regard to the life of Devadatta should necessarily be
resolved by the supposition of his being outside the house. Doubt can only be removed when the cause or the root of
doubt is removed, and it does not follow that because Devadatta is not in the house therefore he is living. If it was
already known that Devadatta was living and his absence from the house creates the doubt, how then can the very fact
which created the doubt remove the doubt? The cause of doubt cannot be the cause of its removal too. The real
procedure of the presumption is quite the other way. The doubt about the life of Devadatta being removed by previous
knowledge or by some other means, we may
Chapter IV. 263
presumethathemustbeoutsidethehousewhenheisfoundabsentfromthehouse.Sotherecannotbeany
doubtaboutthelifeofDevadatta.Itisthecertaintyofhislifeassociatedwiththeperceptionofhisabsencefrom
thehousethatleadsustothepresumptionofhisexternalexistence.Thereisanoppositionbetweenthelifeof
Devadattaandhisabsencefromthehouse,andthemindcannotcometorestwithoutthepresumptionofhis
externalexistence.Themindoscillatesbetweentwocontradictorypolesbothofwhichitacceptsbut

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_Prakara@napacik_,pp.113115.]

393

cannotreconcile,andasaresultofthatfindsanoutletandareconciliationinthepresumptionthatthe
existenceofDevadattamustbefoundoutsidethehouse.

Wellthen,ifthatbeso,inferencemayaswellbeinterpretedaspresumption.Forifwesaythatweknowthat
whereverthereissmokethereisfire,andthenperceivethatthereissmokeinthehill,butnofire,thenthe
existenceofthesmokebecomesirreconcilable,ortheuniversalpropositionoftheconcomitanceofsmokewithfire
becomesfalse,andhencethepresumptionthatthereisfireinthehill.Thiswouldhavebeenallrightifthe
universalconcomitanceofsmokewithfirecouldbeknownotherwisethanbyinference.Butthisisnotso,forthe
concomitancewasseenonlyinindividualcases,andfromthatcametheinferencethatwhereverthereissmoke
thereisfire.Itcannotbesaidthattheconcomitanceperceivedinindividualcasessufferedanycontradiction
withoutthepresumptionoftheuniversalproposition(whereverthereissmokethereisfire);thusarthpattiisof
noavailhereandinferencehastobeaccepted.Nowwhenitisprovedthattherearecaseswherethepurposeof
inferencecannotbeservedbyarthpatti,thevalidityofinferenceasameansofproofbecomesestablished.That
beingdoneweadmitthattheknowledgeofthefireinthehillmaycometouseitherbyinferenceorbyarthpatti.

Soinferencealsocannotservethepurposeofarthpatti,forininferencealsoitisthehetu(reason)whichis
knownfirst,andlateronfromthatthesdhya(whatistobeproved);bothofthemhowevercannotbe
apprehendedatthesamemoment,anditisexactlythisthatdistinguishesarthpattifromanumna.For
arthpattitakesplacewhere,withoutthepresumptionofDevadatta'sexternalexistence,theabsencefromthe
houseofDevadattawhoislivingcannotbecomprehended.IfDevadattaislivinghemustexistinsideoroutside
thehouse.Themindcannotswallowacontradiction,andhencewithoutpresumingtheexternalexistenceof
Devadattaeventheperceivednonexistencecannotbecomprehended.Itisthusthatthecontradictionisresolved
bypresuminghisexistenceoutsidethehouse.Arthpattiisthustheresultofarthnupapattiorthecontradiction
ofthepresentperceptionwithapreviouslyacquiredcertainknowledge.

Itisbythisarthpattipram@nathatwehavetoadmitthatthereisaspecialpotencyinseedsbywhichthey
producethe

394

shoots,andthataspecialpotencyisbelievedtoexistinsacrificesbywhichthesecanleadthesacrificerto
Heavenorsomesuchbeneficentstateofexistence.

S'abdapram@na.

S'abda or word is regarded as a separate means of proof by most of the recognized Indian systems of thought
excepting the Jaina, Buddhist, Crvka and Vais`e@sika. A discussion on this topic however has but little philosophical
value and I have therefore omitted to give any attention to it in connection with the Nyya, and the S@mkhya-Yoga
systems. The validity and authority of the Vedas were acknowledged by all Hindu
Chapter IV. 264
writersandtheyhadwordybattlesoveritwiththeBuddhistswhodeniedit.Somesoughttoestablishthis
authorityonthesuppositionthattheywerethewordofGod,whileothers,particularlytheMm@msistsstrove
toprovethattheywerenotwrittenbyanyone,andhadnobeginningintimenorendandwereeternal.Their
authoritywasnotderivedfromtheauthorityofanytrustworthypersonorGod.Theirwordsarevalidin
themselves.Evidentlyadiscussiononthesemattershasbutlittlevaluewithus,thoughitwasaveryfavourite
themeofdebateintheolddaysofIndia.ItwasinfactthemostimportantsubjectforMm@ms,forthe
_Mm@msstras_werewrittenforthepurposeoflayingdowncanonsforarightinterpretationoftheVedas.
Theslightextenttowhichithasdealtwithitsownepistemologicaldoctrineshasbeenduesolelytotheirlaying
thefoundationofitsstructureofinterpretativemaxims,andnottowritingphilosophyforitsownsake.Itdoes
notdwellsomuchuponsalvationasothersystemsdo,butseekstoserveasarationalcompendiumofmaxims
withthehelpofwhichtheVedasmayberightlyunderstoodandthesacrificesrightlyperformed.Butabrief
examinationofthedoctrineofword(_s'abda_)asameansofproofcannotbedispensedwithinconnectionwith
Mm@msasitisitsverysoul.

S'abda(word)asapram@nameanstheknowledgethatwegetaboutthings(notwithinthepurviewofour
perception)fromrelevantsentencesbyunderstandingthemeaningofthewordsofwhichtheyaremadeup.
Thesesentencesmaybeoftwokinds,viz.thoseutteredbymenandthosewhichbelongtotheVedas.Thefirst
becomesavalidmeansofknowledgewhenitisnot

395

utteredbyuntrustworthypersonsandthesecondisvalidinitself.Themeaningsofwordsareofcourseknownto
usbefore,andcannotthereforebecountedasameansofproof;butthemeaningsofsentencesinvolvinga
knowledgeoftherelationsofwordscannotbeknownbyanyotheracknowledgedmeansofproof,anditisforthis
thatwehavetoaccepts`abdaasaseparatemeansofproof.Evenifitisadmittedthatthevalidityofanysentence
maybeinferredonthegroundofitsbeingutteredbyatrustworthyperson,yetthatwouldnotexplainhowwe
understandthemeaningsofsentences,forwheneventhenameorpersonofawriterorspeakerisnotknown,we
havenodifficultyinunderstandingthemeaningofanysentence.

Prabhkarathinksthatallsoundsareintheformofletters,orareunderstandableascombinationsofletters.The
constituentlettersofawordhowevercannotyieldanymeaning,andarethustoberegardedaselementsof
auditoryperceptionwhichserveasameansforunderstandingthemeaningofaword.Thereasonofour
apprehensionofthemeaningofanywordistobefoundinaseparatepotencyexistinginthelettersbywhichthe
denotationofthewordmaybecomprehended.Theperceptionofeachlettersoundvanishesthemomentitis
uttered,butleavesbehindanimpressionwhichcombineswiththeimpressionsofthesuccessivelydying
perceptionsofletters,andthisbringsaboutthewholewordwhichcontainsthepotencyofbringingaboutthe
comprehensionofacertainmeaning.Ifevenonhearingawordthemeaningcannotbecomprehended,ithasto
beadmittedthatthehearerlackscertainauxiliariesnecessaryforthepurpose.Asthepotencyoftheword
originatesfromtheseparatepotenciesoftheletters,ithastobeadmittedthatthelatteristhedirectcauseof
verbalcognition.BothPrabhkaraandKumrilaagreeonthispoint.

Anotherpeculiardoctrineexpoundedhereisthatallwordshavenaturaldenotativepowersbywhichthey
themselvesoutoftheirownnaturerefertocertainobjectsirrespectiveoftheircomprehensionornon
comprehensionbythehearer.Thehearerwillnotunderstandthemeaningunlessitisknowntohimthatthe
wordinquestionisexpressiveofsuchandsuchameaning,butthewordwasallalongcompetenttodenotethat
meaninganditisthehearer'sknowledgeofthatfactthathelpshimto

396

understand the meaning of a word. Mmms does not think that the association of a particular meaning with a word is
due to conventions among people who introduce and give meanings to the words [Footnote ref 1]. Words are thus
acknowledged to be denotative of themselves. It is only about proper names that convention is
Chapter IV. 265
admittedtobethecauseofdenotation.Itiseasytoseethebearingofthisdoctrineontheselfvalidityofthe
Vediccommandments,bytheperformanceofwhichsuchresultswouldariseascouldnothavebeen
predictedbyanyotherperson.Againallwordsarebelievedtobeeternallyexistent;butthoughtheyare
everpresentsomemanifestiveagencyisrequiredbywhichtheyaremanifestedtous.Thismanifestive
agencyconsistsoftheeffortputforthbythemanwhopronouncestheword.Nyyathinksthatthiseffortof
pronouncingisthecausethatproducesthewordwhileMmm@sthinksthatitonlymanifeststothe
hearertheeverexistingword.

TheprocessbywhichaccordingtoPrabhkarathemeaningsofwordsareacquiredmaybeexemplifiedthus:a
seniorcommandsajuniortobringacowandtobindahorse,andthechildonnoticingtheactionofthejuniorin
obediencetothesenior'scommandscomestounderstandthemeaningof"cow"and"horse."Thusaccordingto
himthemeaningsofwordscanonlybeknownfromwordsoccurringininjunctivesentences;hededucesfrom
thistheconclusionthatwordsmustdenotethingsonlyasrelatedtotheotherfactorsoftheinjunction
(_anvitbhidhnavda_),andnowordcanbecomprehendedashavinganydenotationwhentakenapartfrom
suchasentence.Thisdoctrineholdsthateachwordyieldsitsmeaningonlyasbeinggenerallyrelatedtoother
factorsoronlyasapartofaninjunctivesentence,thustheword_gm_accusativecaseofgo(cow)meansthatit
isintendedthatsomethingistobedonewiththecoworthebovinegenus,anditappearsonlyasconnectedwitha
specifickindofaction,viz.bringinginthesentence_gmnaya_bringthecow.Kumrilahoweverthinksthat
wordsindependentlyexpressseparatemeaningswhicharesubsequentlycombinedintoasentenceexpressingone
connectedidea(_abhihitnvayavda_).Thusin_gmnaya_,accordingtoKumrila,_gm_meansthebovine
classintheaccusativecharacterand_naya_independentlymeans

___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:AccordingtoNyyaGodcreatedallwordsandassociatedthemwiththeirmeanings.]

397

bring;thesetwoarethencombinedintothemeaning"bringthecow."Butontheformertheorytheword_gm_
meansthatitisconnectedwithsomekindofaction,andtheparticularsentenceonlyshowswhatthespecialkind
ofactionis,asintheabovesentenceitappearsasassociatedwithbringing,butitcannothaveanymeaning
separatelybyitself.ThistheoryofKumrilawhichisalsotheNyyatheoryiscalledabhihitnvayavda[Footnote
ref1].

LastlyaccordingtoPrabhkaraitisonlytheVedathatcanbecalleds'abdapram@na,andonlythosesentences
ofitwhichcontaininjunctions(suchas,performthissacrificeinthiswaywiththesethings).Inallothercasesthe
validityofwordsisonlyinferredonthegroundofthetrustworthycharacterofthespeaker.ButKumrila
considersthewordsofalltrustworthypersonsass'abdapram@na.

ThePram@naofNonperception(anupalabdhi).

Inadditiontotheabovepram@nasKumrilaadmitsafifthkindofpram@na,viz.anupalabdhi for the

perception of the non-existence of a thing. Kumrila argues that the non-existence of a thing (e.g. there is no jug in
this room) cannot be perceived by the senses, for there is nothing with which the senses could come into contact in
order to perceive the non-existence. Some people prefer to explain this non-perception as a case of anumna. They
say that wherever there is the existence of a visible object there is the vision of it by a perceiver. When there is no
vision of a visible object, there is no existence of it also. But it is easy to see that such an inference presupposes the
perception of want of vision and want of existence, but how these non-perceptions are to be accounted for is exactly
the point to be solved. How can the perception of want of vision or want of existence be grasped? It is for this that we
have to admit a separate mode of pram@na namely anupalabdhi.
Chapter IV. 266
Allthingsexistinplaceseitherinapositive(_sadrpa_)orinanegativerelation(_asadrpa_),anditisonlyin
theformercase

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_Prabhkaramm@ms_byDrGa@ngnthaJhandS.N.Dasgupta'sStudyofPatanjali,
appendix.ItmaybenotedinthisconnectionthatMm@msdidnotfavourtheSpho@tadoctrineofsound
whichconsistsinthebeliefthatapartfromthemomentarysoundsofletterscomposingaword,therewasa
completewordformwhichwasmanifested(spho@ta)butnotcreatedbythepassingsoundsofthesyllables.
Theworkofthesyllablesoundsisonlytoprojectthiswordmanifestation.SeeVcaspati's_Tattvabindu,
S'lokavrttika_and_Prakara@napacik_.ForthedoctrineofanvitbhidhnaseeShkantha's
_Vkyrthamt@rkv@rtt_.]

398

thattheycomewithinthepurviewofthesenses,whileinthelattercasetheperceptionofthenegativeexistence
canonlybehadbyaseparatemodeofthemovementofthemindwhichwedesignateasaseparatepram@naas
anupalabdhi.Prabhkaraholdsthatnonperceptionofavisibleobjectinaplaceisonlytheperceptionofthe
emptyplace,andthatthereforethereisnoneedofadmittingaseparatepram@naasanupalabdhi.Forwhatis
meantbyemptyspace?Ifitisnecessarythatfortheperceptionofthenonexistenceofjugthereshouldbe
absolutelyemptyspacebeforeus,theniftheplacebeoccupiedbyastoneweoughtnottoperceivethenon
existenceofthejug,inasmuchastheplaceisnotabsolutelyempty.Ifemptyspaceisdefinedasthatwhichisnot
associatedwiththejug,thenthecategoryofnegationispracticallyadmittedasaseparateentity.Iftheperception
ofemptyspaceisdefinedastheperceptionofspaceatthemomentwhichweassociatedwithawantofknowledge
aboutthejug,thenalsowantofknowledgeasaseparateentityhastobeaccepted,whichamountstothesame
thingastheadmissionofthewantornegationofthejug.Whateverattemptmaybemadetoexplainthenotionof
negationbyanypositiveconception,itwillatbestbeanattempttoshiftnegationfromtheobjectivefieldto
knowledge,orinotherwordstosubstitutefortheplaceoftheexternalabsenceofathinganassociatedwantof
knowledgeaboutthething(inspiteofitsbeingavisibleobject)andthisnaturallyendsinfailure,fornegationasa
separatecategoryhastobeadmittedeitherinthefieldofknowledgeorintheexternalworld.Negationorabhva
asaseparatecategoryhasanyhowtobeadmitted.Itissaidthatatthefirstmomentonlythegroundisseen
withoutanyknowledgeofthejugoritsnegation,andthenatthenextmomentcomesthecomprehensionofthe
nonexistenceofthejug.Butthisalsomeansthatthemomentoftheperceptionofthegroundisassociatedwith
thewantofknowledgeofthejugoritsnegation.Butthiscomestothesamethingastheadmissionofnegationas
aseparatecategory,forwhatothermeaningcantherebeintheperceptionof"onlytheground"ifitisnotmeant
thatit(theperceptionoftheground)isassociatedwithorqualifiedbythewantofknowledgeofthejug?Forthe
perceptionofthegroundcannotgeneratethenotionofthenonexistenceofthejug,sinceevenwherethereisa
jugthegroundisperceived.Thequalifyingphrasethat"onlythegroundisperceived"becomes

399

meaningless,ifthingswhosepresenceisexcludedarenotspecifiedasnegativeconditionsqualifyingthe
perceptionoftheground.Andthiswouldrequirethatwehadalreadythenotionofnegationinus,which
appearedtousofitselfinaspecialmannerunaccountablebyothermeansofproof.Itshouldalsobenotedthat
nonperceptionofasensibleobjectgeneratesthenotionofnegationimmediatelyandnotthroughothernegations,
andthisistruenotonlyofthingsofthepresentmomentbutalsoofthememoryofpastperceptionsofnon
existence,aswhenwerememberthattherewasnojughere.Anupalabdhiisthusaseparatepram@nabywhich
theabsenceorwantofasensibleobjectthenegationofathingcanbecomprehended.
Self, Salvation, God.
Chapter IV. 267
Mm@mshastoaccepttheexistenceofsoul,forwithoutitwhowouldperformtheVediccommandments,
andwhatwouldbethemeaningofthoseVedictextswhichspeakofmenasperformingsacrificesandgoing
toHeaventhereby?Thesoulisthusregardedassomethingentirelydistinctfromthebody,thesenseorgans,
andbuddhi;itiseternal,omnipresent,andmany,oneineachbody.Prabhkarathinksthatitismanifested
tousinallcognitions.Indeedhemakesthisalsoaprooffortheexistenceofselfasaseparateentityfromthe
body,forhaditnotbeenso,whyshouldwehavethenotionofselfpersistenceinallourcognitionsevenin
thosewherethereisnoperceptionofthebody?KumrilahoweverdiffersfromPrabhkaraaboutthis
analysisoftheconsciousnessofselfinourcognitions,andsaysthateventhoughwemaynothaveanynotion
ofthepartsofourbodyortheirspecificcombination,yetthenotionofourselvesasembodiedbeingsalways
appearsinallourcognitions.Moreoverinourcognitionsofexternalobjectswearenotalwaysconsciousof
theselfastheknower;soitisnotcorrecttosaythatselfisdifferentfromthebodyonthegroundthatthe
consciousnessofselfispresentinallourcognitions,andthatthebodyisnotcognizedinmanyofour
cognitions.Butthetruereasonforadmittingthattheselfisdifferentfromthebodyisthis,thatmovementor
willing,knowledge,pleasure,pain,etc.,cannotbeattributedtothebody,forthoughthebodyexistsatdeath
thesecannotthenbefound.Soithastobeadmittedthattheymustbelongtosomeotherentityowingtothe
associationwithwhichthebodyappears

400

tobeendowedwithmovementetc.Moreoverknowledge,feeling,etc.thoughapparenttotheperceiver,are
notyetperceivedbyothersasotherqualitiesofthebody,ascolouretc.,areperceivedbyothermen.Itisa
generallawofcausationthatthequalitiesoftheconstituentelements(inthecause)impartthemselvesto
theeffect,buttheearthatomsofwhichthebodyismadeupdonotcontainthequalitiesofknowledgeetc.,
andthisalsocorroboratestheinferenceofaseparateentityasthevehicleofknowledgeetc.Theobjection
issometimesraisedthatifthesoulisomnipresenthowcanitbecalledanagentoramover?But
Mm@msdoesnotadmitthatmovementmeansatomicmotion,fortheprincipleofmovementisthe
energywhichmovestheatoms,andthisispossessedbytheomnipresentsoul.Itisbytheenergyimparted
byittothebodythatthelattermoves.Soitisthatthoughthesouldoesnotmoveitiscalledanagenton
accountofthefactthatitcausesthemovementofthebody.Theselfmustalsobeunderstoodasbeing
differentfromthesenses,forevenwhenonelosessomeofthesenseshecontinuestoperceivehisselfallthe
sameaspersistingallthrough.

Thequestionnowarises,howisselfcognized?Prabhkaraholdsthattheselfascognizorisnevercognizedapart
fromthecognizedobject,noristheobjectevercognizedwithoutthecognizorenteringintothecognitionasa
necessaryfactor.Boththeselfandtheobjectshineforthintheselfluminousknowledgeinwhatwehavealready
describedastripu@tipratyk@sa(perceptionasthreetogether).Itisnotthesoulwhichisselfilluminedbut
knowledge;soitisknowledgewhichilluminesboththeselfandtheobjectinoneoperation.Butjustasinthecase
ofamanwhowalks,theactionofwalkingrestsuponthewalker,yetheisregardedastheagentoftheworkand
notastheobject,sointhecaseoftheoperationofknowledge,thoughitaffectstheself,yetitappearsastheagent
andnotastheobject.Cognitionisnotsoul,butthesoulismanifestedincognitionasitssubstratum,andappears
initasthecognitiveelement"I"whichisinseparablefromallcognitions.Indeepsleepthereforewhennoobject
iscognizedtheselfalsoisnotcognized.

Kumrilahoweverthinksthatthesoulwhichisdistinctfromthebodyisperceivedbyamentalperception
(_mnasapratyak@sa_asthesubstratumofthenotionof"I,"orinotherwordstheselfperceivesitselfby
mentalperception,andtheperceptionofits

401

own nature shines forth in consciousness as the "I." The objection that the self cannot itself be both subject and object
to its own operation does not hold, for it applies equally to Prabhkara's theory in which knowledge reveals the self as
its object and yet considers it as the subject of the operation. The analogy of linguistic usage
Chapter IV. 268
thatthoughthewalkingaffectsthewalkeryetheistheagent,cannotberegardedasanescapefromthis
charge,fortheusageoflanguageisnotphilosophicalanalysis.Thoughatthetimeofthecognitionofobjects
theselfiscognized,yetitdoesnotappearastheknoweroftheknowledgeofobjects,butrevealsitselfasan
objectofaseparatementalperceptionwhichisdistinctfromtheknowledgeofobjects.Theselfisnodoubt
knownasthesubstratumof"I,"buttheknowledgeofthisselfdoesnotrevealitselfnecessarilywiththe
cognitionofobjects,nordoestheselfshowitselfastheknowerofallknowledgeofobjects,buttheselfis
apprehendedbyaseparatementalintuitionwhichwerepresentasthe"I."Theselfdoesnotrevealitselfas
theknowerbutasanobjectofaseparateintuitiveprocessofthemind.Thisisindeeddifferentfrom
Prabhkara'sanalysis,whoregardedthecognitionofselfasinseparablefromtheobjectcognition,both
beingtheresultoftheilluminationofknowledge.KumrilaagreeswithPrabhkarahoweverinholding
thatsoulisnotselfilluminating(_svayampraks'a_),forthenevenindeepsleepthesoulshouldhave
manifesteditself;butthereisnosuchmanifestationthen,andthestateofdeepsleepappearsasan
unconsciousstate.Thereisalsonoblissindeepsleep,forhaditbeensopeoplewouldnothaveregretted
thattheyhadmissedsensualenjoymentsbyuntimelysleep.Theexpressionthat"Isleptinbliss"signifies
onlythatnomiserywasfelt.Moreovertheoppositerepresentationofthedeepsleepstateisalsofoundwhen
amanonrisingfromsleepsays"Isleptsolongwithoutknowinganythingnotevenmyownself."Theselfis
notatomic,sincewecansimultaneouslyfeelasensationintheheadaswellasintheleg.TheJainatheory
thatitisofthesizeofthebodywhichcontractsandexpandsaccordingtothebodyitoccupiesis
unacceptable.Itisbetterthereforethatthesoulshouldberegardedasallpervadingasdescribedinthe
Vedas.Thisselfmustalsobedifferentindifferentpersonsforotherwisetheirindividualexperiencesof
objectsandofpleasureandpaincannotbeexplained[Footnoteref1].
___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_S'lokavrttika_,tmavda_S'stradpik_,tmavdaandmok@savda.]

402

Kumrilaconsideredtheselftobemerelythepotencyofknowledge(jnas'akti)[Footnoteref1].Cognitionsof
thingsweregeneratedbytheactivityofthemanasandtheothersenses.Thisselfitselfcanonlybecognizedby
mentalperception,Oratthetimeofsalvationtherebeingnoneofthesensesnorthemanastheselfremainsin
pureexistenceasthepotencyofknowledgewithoutanyactualexpressionormanifestation.Sothestateof
salvationisthestateinwhichtheselfremainsdevoidofanyofitscharacteristicqualitiessuchaspleasure,pain,
knowledge,willing,etc.,fortheselfitselfisnotknowledgenorisitblissornandaasVedntasupposes;butthese
aregeneratedinitbyitsenergyandtheoperationofthesenses.Theselfbeingdivestedofallitssensesatthat
time,remainsasamerepotencyoftheenergyofknowledge,amereexistence.Thisviewofsalvationisaccepted
inthemainbyPrabhkaraalso.

Salvationisbroughtaboutwhenamanenjoysandsuffersthefruitsofhisgoodandbadactionsandthereby
exhauststhemandstopsthefurthergenerationofneweffectsbyrefrainingfromtheperformanceofkmya
karmas(sacrificesetc.performedfortheattainmentofcertainbeneficentresults)andguaranteeshimselfagainst
theevileffectsofsinbyassiduouslyperformingthenityakarmas(suchasthesandhyprayersetc.,bythe
performanceofwhichthereisnobenefitbutthenonperformanceofwhichproducessins).Thisstateis
characterizedbythedissolutionofthebodyandthenonproductionofanyfurtherbodyorrebirth.

Mm@msdoesnotadmittheexistenceofanyGodasthecreatoranddestroyeroftheuniverse.Thoughthe
universeismadeupofparts,yetthereisnoreasontosupposethattheuniversehadeveranybeginningintime,or
thatanyGodcreatedit.Everydayanimalsandmenarecomingintobeingbytheactionoftheparentswithout
theoperationofanyGod.NeitherisitnecessaryasNyyasupposesthatdharmaandadharmashouldhavea
supervisor,forthesebelongtotheperformerand
_____________________________________________________________________
Chapter IV. 269
[Footnote1:ItmaybementionedinthisconnectionthatunlikeNyyaMm@msdidnotconsiderallactivityas
beingonlyofthenatureofmolecularvibration(_parispanda_).Itadmittedtheexistenceofenergy(_s'akti_)asa
separatecategorywhichmanifesteditselfinactualmovements.Theselfbeingconsideredasas'akticanmovethe
bodyandyetremainunmoveditself.Manifestationofactiononlymeanstherelationingoftheenergywitha
thing.Nyyastronglyopposesthisdoctrineofanonsensible(atndriya)energyandseekstoexplainallactionby
actualmolecularmotion.]

403

noonecanhaveanyknowledgeofthem.Moreovertherecannotbeanycontact(_sa@myoga_)orinherence
(_samavya_)ofdharmaandadharmawithGodthathemightsupervisethem;hecannothaveanytoolsorbody
wherewithtofashiontheworldlikethecarpenter.Moreoverhecouldhavenomotivetocreatetheworldeitheras
amercifulorasacruelact.Forwheninthebeginningtherewerenobeingstowardswhomshouldhebeactuated
withafeelingofmercy?Moreoverhewouldhimselfrequireacreatortocreatehim.SothereisnoGod,no
creator,nocreation,nodissolutionorpralaya.Theworldhaseverbeenrunningthesame,withoutanynew
creationordissolution,s@r@s@tiorpralaya.

Mm@msasphilosophyandMm@msasritualism.

FromwhatwehavesaidbeforeitwillbeeasytoseethatMm@msagreesinthemainwithVais'e@sika
abouttheexistenceofthecategoriesofthingssuchasthefiveelements,thequalities,rpa,rasa,etc.
Kumrila'sdifferencesonthepointsofjti,samavya,etc.andPrabhkara'speculiaritieshavealsobeen
mentionedbefore.OnsomeofthesepointsitappearsthatKumrilawasinfluencedbyS@mkhyathought
ratherthanbyNyya.S@mkhyaandVais'e@sikaaretheonlyHindusystemswhichhavetriedto
constructaphysicsasapartoftheirmetaphysics;othersystemshavegenerallyfollowedthemorhave
differedfromthemonlyonminormatters.ThephysicsofPrabhkaraandKumrilahavethusbutlittle
importance,astheyagreeingeneralwiththeVais'e@sikaview.Infacttheywerejustifiedinnotlayingany
specialstressonthispart,becausefortheperformanceofsacrificesthecommonsenseviewofNyya
Vais'e@sikaabouttheworldwasmostsuitable.

ThemaindifferenceofMm@mswithNyyaconsistsofthetheoryofknowledge.Theformerwasrequiredto
provethattheVedawasselfvalidandthatitdidnotderiveitsvalidityfromGod,andalsothatitwasnot
necessarytotestitsvaliditybyanyothermeans.Todothisitbeganbytryingtoestablishtheselfvalidityofall
knowledge.ThiswouldsecurefortheVedatheadvantagethatassoonasitsordersorinjunctionswere
communicatedtoustheywouldappeartousasvalidknowledge,andtherebeingnothingtocontradictthemlater
ontherewouldbenothingintheworldwhichcouldrendertheVedicinjunctions

404

invalid.Theotherpram@nassuchasperception,inference,etc.weredescribed,firstlytoindicatethatthey
couldnotshowtoushowdharmacouldbeacquired,fordharmawasnotanexistingthingwhichcouldbe
perceivedbytheotherpram@nas,butathingwhichcouldonlybeproducedbyactingaccordingtothe
injunctionsoftheVedas.Fortheknowledgeofdharmaandadharmathereforethes'abdapram@naoftheVeda
wasouronlysource.Secondlyitwasnecessarythatweshouldhaveaknowledgeofthedifferentmeansof
cognition,aswithoutthemitwouldbedifficulttodiscussandverifythemeaningsofdebatableVedicsentences.
ThedoctrineofcreationanddissolutionwhichisrecognizedbyallotherHindusystemscouldnotbe
acknowledgedbytheMm@msasitwouldhaveendangeredtheeternalityoftheVedas.EvenGodhadtobe
dispensedwithonthataccount.

TheVedaisdefinedasthecollectionofMantrasandBrhma@nas(alsocalledthevidhis or injunctive
sentences). There are three classes of injunctions (1) aprva-vidhi, (2) niyama-vidhi, and (3) parisa@nkhy-vidhi.
Aprva-vidhi is an order which enjoins something not otherwise known, e.g. the grains
CHAPTER X 270
shouldbewashed(wecouldnotknowthatthispartofthedutywasnecessaryforthesacrificeexceptbythe
aboveinjunction).Niyamavidhiisthatwherewhenathingcouldhavebeendoneinanumberofways,anorder
ismadebytheVedawhichrestrictsustofollowingsomedefinitealternative(e.g.thoughthechafffromthecorn
couldbeseparatedevenbythenails,theorderthat"cornshouldbethreshed"restrictsustothealternativeof
threshingastheonlycourseacceptableforthesacrifice).Intheniyamavidhithatwhichisorderedisalready
knownaspossiblebutonlyasanalternative,andthevidhiinsistsupononeofthesemethodsastheonlyone.In
aprvavidhithethingtobedonewouldhaveremainedundoneandunknownhaditnotbeenforthevidhi.In
parisa@nkhyvidhiallthatisenjoinedisalreadyknownbutnotnecessarilyaspossiblealternatives.Acertain
mantra"Itakeuptherein"(_immag@rbhn@mras'an@m_)whichcouldbeusedinanumberofcases
shouldnothoweverbeusedatthetimeofholdingthereinsofanass.

TherearethreemainprinciplesofinterpretingtheVedicsentences.(1)Whensomesentencesaresuchthat
connectivelytheyyieldameaningbutnotindividually,thentheyshouldbe

405

takentogetherconnectivelyasawhole.(2)Iftheseparatesentencescanhoweveryieldmeaningsseparatelyby
themselvestheyshouldnotbeconnectedtogether.(3)Inthecaseofcertainsentenceswhichareincomplete
suitablewordsfromthecontextofimmediatelyprecedingsentencesaretobesupplied.

Thevidhisproperlyinterpretedarethemainsourceofdharma.Themantraswhicharegenerallyhymnsinpraise
ofsomedeitiesorpowersaretobetakenasbeingforthespecificationofthedeitytowhomthelibationistobe
offered.ItshouldberememberedthatasdharmacanonlybeacquiredbyfollowingtheinjunctionsoftheVedas
theyshouldallbeinterpretedasgivingusinjunctions.AnythingthereforefoundintheVedaswhichcannotbe
connectedwiththeinjunctiveordersasformingpartofthemistoberegardedasuntrustworthyoratbest
inexpressive.ThusitisthatthosesentencesintheVedaswhichdescribeexistingthingsmerelyorpraisesome
deedofinjunction(calledthe_arthavdas_)shouldbeinterpretedasformingpartofavidhivkya(injunction)
orberejectedaltogether.Eventhoseexpressionswhichgivereasonsfortheperformanceofcertainactionsareto
betreatedasmerearthavdasandinterpretedaspraisinginjunctions.ForVedashavevalueonlyasmandatesby
theperformanceofwhichdharmamaybeacquired.

WhenasacrificeisperformedaccordingtotheinjunctionsoftheVedas,acapacitywhichdidnotexistbefore
andwhoseexistenceisprovedbytheauthorityofthescripturesisgeneratedeitherintheactionorintheagent.
Thiscapacityorpositiveforcecalled_aprva_producesintimethebeneficentresultsofthesacrifice(e.g.leads
theperformertoHeaven).Thisaprvaislikeapotencyorfacultyintheagentwhichabidesinhimuntilthe
desiredresultsfollow[Footnoteref1].

Itisneedlesstodilateuponthese,forthevoluminousworksofS'abaraandKumrilamakeanelaborateresearch
intothenatureofsacrifices,rituals,andotherrelevantmattersingreatdetail,whichanyhowcanhavebutlittle
interestforastudentofphilosophy.

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:SeeDrGa@ngnthaJh's_Prabhkaramm@ms_andMdhava's
_Nyyamlvistara_.]

406

CHAPTER X
THE S'A@NKARA SCHOOL OF VEDNTA
CHAPTER X 271
ComprehensionofthephilosophicalIssuesmoreessentialthantheDialecticofcontroversy.

_Pram@na_inSanskritsignifiesthemeansandthemovementbywhichknowledgeisacquired,_pramt_
meansthesubjectortheknowerwhocognizes,_pram_theresultofpram@narightknowledge,prameyathe
objectofknowledge,and_prm@nya_thevalidityofknowledgeacquired.Thevalidityofknowledgeis
sometimesusedinthesenseofthefaithfulnessofknowledgetoitsobject,andsometimesinthesenseofaninner
notionofvalidityinthemindofthesubjecttheknower(thathisperceptionsaretrue),whichmoveshimtowork
inaccordancewithhisperceptionstoadapthimselftohisenvironmentfortheattainmentofpleasurableandthe
avoidanceofpainfulthings.Thequestionwhereinconsiststheprm@nyaofknowledgehasnotonlyan
epistemologicalandpsychologicalbearingbutametaphysicalonealso.Itcontainsononesideatheoryof
knowledgebasedonananalysisofpsychologicalexperience,andontheotherindicatesametaphysicalsituation
consistentwiththetheoryofknowledge.Allthedifferentschoolstriedtojustifyatheoryofknowledgebyan
appealtotheanalysisandinterpretationofexperiencewhichtheotherssometimesignoredorsometimes
regardedasunimportant.Thethinkersofdifferentschoolswereaccustomedoftentomeettogetheranddefeat
oneanotherinactualdebates,andtheresultofthesedebateswasfrequentlyveryimportantindeterminingthe
prestigeofanyschoolofthought.IfaBuddhistforexamplecoulddefeatagreatNyyaorMm@msthinkerin
agreatpublicdebateattendedbymanylearnedscholarsfromdifferentpartsofthecountry,hisfameatonce
spreadalloverthecountryandhecouldprobablysecurealargenumberoffollowersonthespot.Extensivetours
ofdisputationwereoftenundertakenbygreatmastersalloverthecountryforthepurposeofdefeatingthe
teachersoftheoppositeschoolsandofsecuringadherentstotheirown.Thesedebateswerethereforenot
generallyconductedmerelyinapassionlessphilosophical

407

moodwiththeobjectofarrivingatthetruthbutinordertoinflictadefeatonopponentsandtoestablishthe
ascendencyofsomeparticularschoolofthought.Itwasoftenasenseofpersonalvictoryandofthevictoryofthe
schoolofthoughttowhichthedebateradheredthatledhimtopursuethedebate.AdvancedSanskrit
philosophicalworksgiveusapictureoftheattitudeofmindofthesedebatersandwefindthatmostofthese
debatesattempttocriticizethedifferentschoolsofthinkersbyexposingtheirinconsistenciesandself
contradictionsbyclosedialecticalreasoning,anticipatingtheanswersoftheopponent,askinghimtodefinehis
statements,andultimatelyprovingthathistheorywasinconsistent,ledtocontradictions,andwasopposedtothe
testimonyofexperience.InreadinganadvancedworkonIndianphilosophyintheoriginal,astudenthastopass
throughaninterminableseriesofdialecticarguments,andnegativecriticisms(tothwartopponents)sometimes
called_vita@n@d_,beforehecancometotherootofthequarrel,therealphilosophicaldivergence.Allthe
resourcesoftheartsofcontroversyfindfullplayforsilencingtheopponentbeforethefinalphilosophicalanswer
isgiven.Buttoamodernstudentofphilosophy,whobelongstonopartyandisconsequentlyindifferenttothe
respectivevictoryofeitherside,themostimportantthingisthecomprehensionofthedifferentaspectsfrom
whichtheproblemofthetheoryofknowledgeanditsassociatedmetaphysicaltheorywaslookedatbythe
philosophers,andalsoaclearunderstandingofthedeficiencyofeachview,thevalueofthemutualcriticisms,the
speculationsontheexperienceofeachschool,theiranalysis,andtheirnetcontributiontophilosophy.With
Vedntawecometoanendofthepresentvolume,anditmaynotbeoutofplaceheretomakeabriefsurveyof
themainconflictingtheoriesfromthepointofviewofthetheoryofknowledge,inordertoindicatethepositionof
theVedntaoftheS'a@nkaraschoolinthefieldofIndianphilosophysofaraswehavetraversedit.Ishall
thereforenowtrytolaybeforemyreadersthesolutionofthetheoryofknowledge(_pram@navda_)reached
bysomeofthemainschoolsofthought.TheirrelationstothesolutionofferedbytheS'a@nkaraVedntawillalso
bedealtwith,asweshallattempttosketchtheviewsoftheVedantalateroninthischapter.

408
The philosophical situation. A Review.
CHAPTER X 272
BeforedealingwiththeVedntasystemitseemsadvisabletoreviewthegeneralattitudeoftheschoolsalready
discussedtothemainphilosophicalandepistemologicalquestionswhichdeterminethepositionoftheVedntaas
taughtbyS'a@nkaraandhisschool.

TheSautrntikaBuddhistsaysthatinallhisaffairsmanisconcernedwiththefulfilmentofhisendsanddesires
(_puru@sdrtka_).Thishowevercannotbedonewithoutrightknowledge(_samyagjna_)whichrightly
representsthingstomen.Knowledgeissaidtoberightwhenwecangetthingsjustasweperceivedthem.Sofar
asmererepresentationorilluminationofobjectsisconcerned,itisapatentfactthatweallhaveknowledge,and
thereforethisdoesnotdeservecriticismorexamination.Ourenquiryaboutknowledgeisthusrestrictedtoits
aspectoflaterverificationorcontradictioninexperience,forweareallconcernedtoknowhowfarour
perceptionsofthingswhichinvariablyprecedeallouractionscanbetrustedasrightlyindicatingwhatwewantto
getinourpracticalexperience(_arthaprdpakatva_).Theperceptionisright(_abhrnta_nonillusory)when
followingitsrepresentationwecangetintheexternalworldsuchthingsaswererepresentedbyit
(_sa@mvdakatva_).Thatperceptionalonecanberightwhichisgeneratedbytheobjectandnotmerelysupplied
byourimagination.WhenIsay"thisisthecowIhadseen,"whatIseeistheobjectwiththebrowncolour,horns,
feet,etc.,butthefactthatthisiscalledcow,orthatthisisexistingfromapasttime,isnotperceivedbythevisual
sense,asthisisnotgeneratedbythevisualobject.Forallthingsaremomentary,andthatwhichIseenownever
existedbeforesoastobeinvestedwiththisorthatpermanentname.Thisassociationofnameandpermanenceto
objectsperceivediscalled_kaipan_or_abhilpa_.Ourperceptioniscorrectonlysofarasitiswithoutthe
abhilpaassociation(_kalpanpo@dha_),forthoughthisistakenasapartofourperceptualexperienceitisnot
derivedfromtheobject,andhenceitsassociationwiththeobjectisanevidenterror.Theobjectasunassociated
withnamethenirvikalpaisthuswhatisperceived.Asaresultofthepratyak@sathemanovijnaorthought
andmentalperceptionofpleasureandpainisalsodetermined.Atonemomentperceptionrevealstheobjectasan

409

objectofknowledge(_grhya_),andbythefactoftheriseofsuchapercept,atanothermomentitappearsasa
thingrealizableorattainableintheexternalworld.Thespecialfeaturesoftheobjectundefinableinthemselves
asbeingwhattheyareinthemselves(_svalak@sa@na_)arewhatisactuallyperceived(_pratyak@savi@saya_)
[Footnoteref1].The_pram@naphala_(resultofperception)isthe

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Thereisadifferenceofopinionaboutthemeaningoftheword"svalak@sa@na"ofDharmakrtti
betweenrayesteemedfriendProfessorStcherbatskyofPetrogradandmyself.HemaintainsthatDharmakrtti
heldthatthecontentofthepresentativeelementatthemomentofperceptionwasalmosttotallyempty.Thushe
writestome,"Accordingtoyourinterpretationsvalak@sa@namean,theobject(orideawithVijnavdin)
fromwhicheverythingpastandeverythingfuturehasbeeneliminated,thisIdonotdenyatall.ButImaintainthat
ifeverythingpastandfuturehasbeentakenaway,whatremains?Thepresentandthepresentisa_k@sa@na_
i.e.nothing....Thereverseofk@sa@naisak@sa@nasamtnaorsimplysa@mtnaandineverysa@mtna
thereisasynthesisekbhvaofmomentspastandfuture,producedbytheintellect(buddhi=nis'caya=kalpana
=adhyavasya)...Thereisintheperceptionofajugsomething(ak@sa@naofsenseknowledge)whichwemust
distinguishfromtheideaofajug(whichisalwaysasa@mtna,alwaysvikalpita),andifyoutaketheideaaway
inastrictunconditionalsense,noknowledgeremains:k@sanasyajnenaprpayitumas'akyatvt.Thisis
absolutelytheKantianteachingaboutSynthesisofApprehension.Accordinglypratyak@saisatranscendental
sourceofknowledge,becausepracticallyspeakingitgivesnoknowledgeatall.This_pram@na_isasatkalpa.
Kant says that without the elements of intuition (= sense-knowledge = pratyak@sa = kalpanpo@dha) our cognitions
would be empty and without the elements of intellect (kalpan = buddhi = synthesis = ekbhva) they would be blind.
Empirically both are always combined. This is exactly the theory of Dharmakrtti. He is a Vijnavd as I understand,
because he maintains the cognizability of ideas (vijna) alone, but the reality is an incognizable foundation of our
CHAPTER X 273
knowledge;headmits,itisbhya,itisartha,itisarthakriyk@sa@na=svalak@sa@na;thatisthereasonfor
whichhesometimesiscalledSautrntikaandthisschoolissometimescalledSautrantavijnavda,asopposed
totheVijnavdaofAs'vagho@saandrysanga,whichhadnoelaboratetheoryofcognition.Ifthejugasit
existsinourrepresentationwerethesvalak@sa@naandparamrthasat,whatwouldremainofVijnavda?
Butthereistheperceptionofthejugasopposedtothepureideaofajug(s'uddhkalpan),anelementofreality,
thesensationalk@sa@na,whichiscommunicatedtousbysenseknowledge.Kant's'thinginitself'isalsoa
k@sa@naandalsoanelementofsenseknowledgeofpuresenseasopposedtopurereason,Dharmakrttihasalso
_s'uddhkalpan_and_s'uddhampratyak@sam_....Andveryinterestingistheoppositionbetweenpratyak@sa
andanumna,thefirstmovesfromk@sa@natosa@mtnaandthesecondfromsa@mtnatok@sa@na,thatis
thereasonthatalthoughbhrntatheanumnaisneverthelesspram@nabecausethroughitweindirectlyalso
reachk@sa@na,thearthakriyk@sa@na.Itisbhrntadirectlyandpram@naindirectly;pratyak@sais
pram@nadirectlyandbhrnta(asatkalpa)indirectly...."SofarasthepassagestowhichProfessorStcherbatsky
refersareconcerned,Iaminfullagreementwithhim.ButIthinkthathepushestheinterpretationtoofaron
Kantianlines.WhenIperceive"thisisblue,"theperceptionconsistsoftwoparts,theactualpresentativeelement
ofsenseknowledge(_svalak@sa@na_)andtheaffirmation(_nis'caya_).Sofarweareincompleteagreement.
ButProfessorStcherbatskysaysthatthissenseknowledgeisak@sa@na(moment)andisnothing.Ialsohold
thatitisak@sa@na,butitisnothingonlyinthesensethatitisnotthesameasthenotioninvolvingaffirmation
suchas"thisisblue."Theaffirmativeprocessoccurringatthesucceedingmomentsisdeterminedbythe
presentativeelementofthefirstmoment(_pratyak@sabalotpanna_N.T.,p.20)butthispresentativeelement
divestedfromtheproductoftheaffirmativeprocessofthesucceedingmomentsisnotcharacterless,thoughwe
cannotexpressitscharacter;assoonaswetrytoexpressit,namesandotherideasconsistingofaffirmationare
associatedandthesedidnotformapartofthepresentativeelement.Itsowncharacterissaidtobeitsown
specificnature(_svalak@sa@na_).Butwhatisthisspecificnature?Dharmakrtti'sansweronthispointisthatby
specificnaturehemeansthosespecificcharacteristicsoftheobjectwhichappearclearwhentheobjectisnear
andhazywhenitisatadistance(_yasyrthasyasannidhnsannidhnbkymjnapratibhsabhedastat
svalak@sa@nam_N.,p.1andN.T.,p.16).Senseknowledgethusgivesusthespecificcharacteristicsofthe
object,andthishasthesameformastheobjectitself;itistheappearanceofthe"blue"initsspecificcharacterin
themindandwhenthisisassociatedbytheaffirmativeorideationalprocess,theresultistheconceptoridea
"thisisblue"(_nlasarpa@mpratyak@samanubhyamna@mnlabodharpamavasthpyate...
nlasrpyamasyapram@namnlavikalpanarpa@mtvasyapram@naphalam_,N.T.p.22).Atthefirst
momentthereistheappearanceoftheblue(_nlanirbhsa@mhivijnam_,N.T.19)andthisisdirect
acquaintance(_yatkicitarthasyask@stkrijnamtatpratyak@samucyate_,N.T.7)andthisisreal
(_paramrthasat_)andvalid.Thisbluesensationisdifferentfromtheidea"thisisblue"(_nlabodha_,N.T.22)
whichistheresultoftheformer(_pram@naphala_)throughtheassociationoftheaffirmativeprocess
(_adhyavasya_)andisregardedasinvalidforitcontainselementsotherthanwhatwerepresentedtothesense
andisavikalpapratyaya.Inmyopinion_svalak@sa@na_thereforemeanspuresensationofthemoment
presentingthespecificfeaturesoftheobjectandwithDharmakrttithisistheonlythingwhichisvalidin
perceptionandvikalpapratyayaorpramnaphalaistheideaorconceptwhichfollowsit.Butthoughthelatter
isaproductoftheformer,yet,beingtheconstructionofsucceedingmoments,itcannotgiveusthepurestageof
thefirstmomentofsensationpresentation(_k@sa@nasyaprpayitumas'akyatvt_,N.T.16).N.T.=
_Nyyabindu@tk_,N=_Nyyabindu(Peterson'sedition).]

410

ideational concept and power that such knowledge has of showing the means which being followed the thing can be
got (_yena k@rtena artha@h prpito bhavati_). Pram@na then is the similarity of the knowledge with the object by
which it is generated, by which we assure ourselves that this is our knowledge of the object as it is perceived, and are
thus led to attain it by practical experience. Yet this later stage is pram@naphala and not pram@na which consists
merely in the vision of the thing (devoid of other associations), and which determines the attitude of the perceiver
towards the perceived object. The pram@na therefore only refers to the newly-acquired knowledge
(_anadhigatdhigant@r_) as this is of use to the perceiver in determining his
CHAPTER X 274
relationswiththeobjectiveworld.Thisaccountofperceptionleavesouttherealepistemologicalquestionasto
howtheknowledgeisgeneratedbytheexternalworld,orwhatitisinitself.Itonlylookstothecorrectnessor
faithfulnessoftheperceptiontotheobjectanditsvalueforusinthepracticalrealizationofourends.The
questionoftherelationoftheexternalworldwithknowledgeasdeterminingthelatterisregardedas
unimportant.

411

TheYogcrasoridealisticBuddhiststaketheircuefromtheabovementionedSautrntikaBuddhists,andsay
thatsincewecancomeintotouchwithknowledgeandknowledgealone,whatistheuseofadmittinganexternal
worldofobjectsasthedataofsensationdeterminingourknowledge?Yousaythatsensationsarecopiesofthe
externalworld,butwhyshouldyousaythattheycopy,andnotthattheyaloneexist?Wenevercomeintotouch
withobjectsinthemselves;thesecanonlybegraspedbyussimultaneouslywithknowledgeofthem,theymust
thereforebethesameasknowledge(_sahopalambhaniyamtabhedonlataddhiyo@h_);foritisinandthrough
knowledgethatexternalobjectscanappeartous,andwithoutknowledgewearenotintouchwiththesocalled
externalobjects.Soitisknowledgewhichisselfapparentinitself,thatprojectsitselfinsuchamannerasto
appearasreferringtootherexternalobjects.Weallacknowledgethatindreamstherearenoexternalobjects,
buteventherewehaveknowledge.Thequestionwhytheniftherearenoexternalobjects,thereshouldbeso
muchdiversityintheformsofknowledge,isnotbettersolvedbytheassumptionofanexternalworld;forinsuch
anassumption,theexternalobjectshavetobeadmittedaspossessingtheinfinitelydiversepowersofdiversely
affectinganddeterminingourknowledge;thatbeingso,itmayratherbesaidthatinthebeginninglessseriesof
flowingknowledge,precedingknowledgemomentsbyvirtueoftheirinherentspecificqualitiesdeterminethe
succeedingknowledgemoments.Thusknowledgealoneexists;theprojectionofanexternalwordisanillusionof
knowledgebroughtaboutbybeginninglesspotenciesofdesire(_vsan_)associatedwithit.Thepreceding
knowledgedeterminesthesucceedingoneandthatanotherandsoon.Knowledge,pleasure,pain,etc.arenot
qualitiesrequiringapermanententityassoulinwhichtheymayinhere,butarethevariousformsinwhich
knowledgeappears.Eventhecognition,"Iperceiveabluething,"isbutaformofknowledge,andthisisoften
erroneouslyinterpretedasreferringtoapermanentknower.Thoughthecognitionsareallpassingand
momentary,yetsolongastheseriescontinuestobethesame,asinthecaseofoneperson,sayDevadatta,the
phenomenaofmemory,recognition,etc.canhappeninthesucceedingmoments,fortheseareevidentlyillusory
cognitions,sofarastheyrefertothepermanenceoftheobjects

412

believedtohavebeenperceivedbefore,forthingsorknowledgemoments,whatevertheymaybe,are
destroyedthenextmomentaftertheirbirth.Thereisnopermanententityasperceiverorknower,butthe
knowledgemomentsareatoncetheknowledge,theknowerandtheknown.Thisthoroughgoingidealism
brushesoffallreferencestoanobjectivefieldofexperience,interpretstheverdictofknowledgeas
involvingaknowerandtheknownasmereillusoryappearance,andconsiderstheflowofknowledgeasa
selfdeterminingseriesinsuccessiveobjectiveformsastheonlytruth.TheHinduschoolsofthought,
Nyya,S@mkhya,andtheMm@ms,acceptthedualityofsoulandmatter,andattempttoexplainthe
relationbetweenthetwo.WiththeHinduwritersitwasnotthepracticalutilityofknowledgethatwasthe
onlyimportantthing,butthenatureofknowledgeandthemannerinwhichitcameintobeingwerealso
enquiredafterandconsideredimportant.

Pram@na is defined by Nyya as the collocation of instruments by which unerring and indubitable knowledge comes
into being. The collocation of instruments which brings about definite knowledge consists partly of consciousness
(_bodha_) and partly of material factors (_bodhbodhasvabhva_). Thus in perception the proper contact of the visual
sense with the object (e.g. jug) first brings about a non-intelligent, non-apprehensible indeterminate consciousness
(nirvikalpa) as the jugness (gha@tatva) and this later on combining with the remaining other collocations of sense-
contact etc. produces the determinate consciousness: this is a jug. The existence of this indeterminate state of
consciousness as a factor in bringing
CHAPTER X 275
aboutthedeterminateconsciousness,cannotofcoursebeperceived,butitsexistencecanbeinferredfromthefact
thatiftheperceiverwerenotalreadyinpossessionofthequalifyingfactor(_vis'e@sanajna_asjugness)he
couldnothavecomprehendedthequalifiedobject(_vis'i@s@tabuddhi_}thejug(i.e.theobjectwhichpossesses
jugness).Ininference(_anum@na_)knowledgeoftheli@ngatakespart,andinupamnathesightofsimilarity
withothermaterialconglomerations.InthecaseoftheBuddhistsknowledgeitselfwasregardedaspram@na;
evenbythosewhoadmittedtheexistenceoftheobjectiveworld,rightknowledgewascalledpram@na,because
itwasofthesameformastheexternalobjectsitrepresented,anditwasbytheformoftheknowledge(e.g.blue)
thatwecouldapprehendthatthe

413

externalobjectwasalsoblue.Knowledgedoesnotdeterminetheexternalworldbutsimplyenforcesour
convictionsabouttheexternalworld.Sofarasknowledgeleadsustoformourconvictionsoftheexternalworldit
ispram@na,andsofarasitdeterminesourattitudetowardstheexternalworlditispram@naphala.The
questionhowknowledgeisgeneratedhadlittleimportancewiththem,buthowwithknowledgewecouldform
convictionsoftheexternalworldwasthemostimportantthing.Knowledgewascalledpram@na,becauseitwas
themeansbywhichwecouldformconvictions(_adhyavasya_)abouttheexternalworld.Nyyasoughtto
answerthequestionhowknowledgewasgeneratedinus,butcouldnotunderstandthatknowledgewasnota
merephenomenonlikeanyotherobjectivephenomenon,butthoughtthatthoughasagu@na(quality)itwas
externallikeothergu@nas,yetitwasassociatedwithourselfasaresultofcollocationslikeanyotherhappening
inthematerialworld.Pram@nadoesnotnecessarilybringtousnewknowledge(_anadhigatdhigant@r_)as
theBuddhistsdemanded,butwhensoevertherewerecollocationsofpram@na,knowledgewasproduced,no
matterwhethertheobjectwaspreviouslyunknownorknown.Eventheknowledgeofknownthingsmaybe
repeatediftherebesuitablecollocations.Knowledgelikeanyotherphysicaleffectisproducedwheneverthe
causeofitnamelythepram@nacollocationispresent.Categorieswhicharemerelymentalsuchasclass
(_smnya_),inherence(_samavya_),etc.,wereconsideredashavingasmuchindependentexistenceasthe
atomsofthefourelements.Thephenomenonoftheriseofknowledgeinthesoulwasthusconceivedtobeas
muchaphenomenonastheturningofthecolourofthejugbyfirefromblacktored.Theelementof
indeterminateconsciousnesswasbelievedtobecombiningwiththesensecontact,theobject,etc.toproducethe
determinateconsciousness.Therewasnoothersubtlerformofmovementthanthemolecular.Suchamovement
broughtaboutbyacertaincollocationofthingsendedinacertainresult(_phala_).Jna(knowledge)wasthus
theresultofcertainunitedcollocations(_smagr_)andtheirmovements(e.g.contactofmanaswithsoul,of
manaswiththesenses,ofthesenseswiththeobject,etc.).Thisconfusionrendersitimpossibletounderstandthe
realphilosophicaldistinctionbetweenknowledgeandanexternaleventoftheobjectiveworld.Nyyathusfailsto
explainthecause

414

oftheoriginofknowledge,anditstruerelationswiththeobjectiveworld.Pleasure,pain,willing,etc.were
regardedasqualitieswhichbelongedtothesoul,andthesoulitselfwasregardedasaqualitilessentitywhich
couldnotbeapprehendeddirectlybutwasinferredasthatinwhichthequalitiesofjna,sukha(pleasure),etc.
inhered.Qualitieshadindependentexistenceasmuchassubstances,butwhenanynewsubstanceswere
produced,thequalitiesrushedforwardandinheredinthem.ItisveryprobablethatinNyyathecultivationof
theartofinferencewasoriginallypreeminentandmetaphysicswasdeducedlaterbyanapplicationofthe
inferentialmethodwhichgavetheintrospectivemethodbutlittlescopeforitsapplication,sothatinferencecame
intoexplainevenperception(e.g.thisisajugsinceithasjugness)andthetestimonyofpersonalpsychological
experiencewastakenonlyasasupplementtocorroboratetheresultsarrivedatbyinferenceandwasnotusedto
criticizeit[Footnoteref1].

S@mkhya understood the difference between knowledge and material events. But so far as knowledge consisted in
being the copy of external things, it could not be absolutely different from the objects themselves; it was even then an
invisible translucent sort of thing, devoid of weight and grossness such as the external
CHAPTER X 276
objectspossessed.Butthefactthatitcopiesthosegrossobjectsmakesitevidentthatknowledgehadessentially
thesamesubstancesthoughinasubtlerformasthatofwhichtheobjectsweremade.Butthoughthematterof
knowledge,whichassumedtheformoftheobjectswithwhichitcameintouch,wasprobablythusasubtler
combinationofthesameelementarysubstancesofwhichmatterwasmadeup,yettherewasinitanotherelement,
viz.intelligence,whichatoncedistinguisheditasutterlydifferentfrommaterialcombinations.Thiselementof
intelligenceisindeeddifferentfromthesubstancesorcontentoftheknowledgeitself,fortheelementof
intelligenceislikeastationarylight,"theself,"whichilluminatesthecrowding,bustlingknowledgewhichis
incessantlychangingitsforminaccordancewiththeobjectswithwhichitcomesintouch.Thislightofintelligence
isthesamethatfindsitsmanifestationinconsciousnessasthe"I,"thechangelessentityamidstallthefluctuations
ofthechangefulprocessionofknowledge.Howthiselementoflightwhichisforeigntothesubstanceofknowledge

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_Nyyamajar_onpram@na.]

415

relatesitselftoknowledge,andhowknowledgeitselftakesitupintoitselfandappearsasconscious,isthemost
difficultpointoftheS@mkhyaepistemologyandmetaphysics.Thesubstanceofknowledgecopiestheexternal
world,andthiscopyshapeofknowledgeisagainintelligizedbythepureintelligence(_puru@sa_)whenit
appearsasconscious.Theformingofthebuddhishapeofknowledgeisthusthepram@na(instrumentand
processofknowledge)andthevalidityorinvalidityofanyoftheseshapesiscriticizedbythelatershapesof
knowledgeandnotbytheexternalobjects(_svata@hprm@nya_and_svata@haprm@nya_).The
pram@nahowevercanleadtoapramorrightknowledgeonlywhenitisintelligizedbythepuru@sa.The
puru@sacomesintouchwithbuddhinotbytheordinarymeansofphysicalcontactbutbywhatmaybecalled
aninexplicabletranscendentalcontact.Itisthetranscendentalinfluenceofpuru@sathatsetsinmotionthe
originalprak@rtiinS@mkhyametaphysics,anditisthesametranscendenttouch(callityogyataccordingto
VcaspatiorsamyogaaccordingtoBhik@su)ofthetranscendententityofpuru@sathattransformsthenon
intelligentstatesofbuddhiintoconsciousness.TheVijnavdinBuddhistdidnotmakeanydistinctionbetween
thepureconsciousnessanditsforms(_kra_)anddidnotthereforeagreethatthekraofknowledgewasdue
toitscopyingtheobjects.S@mkhyawashoweverarealistwhoadmittedtheexternalworldandregardedthe
formsasallduetocopying,allstampedassuchuponatranslucentsubstance(_sattva_)whichcouldassumethe
shapeoftheobjects.ButS@mkhyawasalsotranscendentalistinthis,thatitdidnotthinklikeNyyathatthe
kraofknowledgewasallthatknowledgehadtoshow;itheldthattherewasatranscendentelementwhich
shoneforthinknowledgeandmadeitconscious.WithNyyatherewasnodistinctionbetweentheshapedbuddhi
andtheintelligence,andthatbeingsoconsciousnesswasalmostlikeaphysicalevent.WithS@mkhyahowever
sofarasthecontentandtheshapemanifestedinconsciousnesswereconcerneditwasindeedaphysicalevent,
butsofarasthepureintelligizingelementofconsciousnesswasconcerneditwasawhollytranscendentaffair
beyondthescopeandprovinceofphysics.Theriseofconsciousnesswasthusatoncebothtranscendentand
physical.

TheMm@msistPrabhkaraagreedwithNyyaingeneralasregardsthewayinwhichtheobjectiveworld
andsensecontact

416

induced knowledge in us. But it regarded knowledge as a unique phenomenon which at once revealed itself, the
knower and the known. We are not concerned with physical collocations, for whatever these may be it is knowledge
which reveals things--the direct apprehension that should be called the pram@na. Pram@na in this sense is the
same as pramiti or pram, the phenomenon of apprehension. Pram@na may also indeed mean the collocations so
far as they induce the pram. For pram or right knowledge is never produced, it
CHAPTER X 277
alwaysexists,butitmanifestsitselfdifferentlyunderdifferentcircumstances.Thevalidityofknowledgemeans
theconvictionorthespecificattitudethatisgeneratedinuswithreferencetotheobjectiveworld.Thisvalidityis
manifestedwiththeriseofknowledge,anditdoesnotawaittheverdictofanylaterexperienceintheobjective
field(_sa@mvdin_).Knowledgeasnirvikalpa(indeterminate)meansthewholeknowledgeoftheobjectandnot
merelyanonsensiblehypotheticalindeterminateclassnotionasNyyaholds.Thesavikalpa(determinate)
knowledgeonlyreestablishestheknowledgethusformedbyrelatingitwithotherobjectsasrepresentedby
memory[Footnoteref1].

PrabhkararejectedtheS@mkhyaconceptionofadualelementinconsciousnessasinvolvingatranscendent
intelligence(_cit_)andamaterialpart,thebuddhi;butitregardedconsciousnessasanuniquethingwhichby
itselfinoneflashrepresentedboththeknowerandtheknown.Thevalidityofknowledgedidnotdependuponits
faithfulnessinreproducingorindicating(_pradars'akatva_)externalobjects,butupontheforcethatalldirect
apprehension(_anubhti_)hasofpromptingustoactionintheexternalworld;knowledgeisthusacompleteand
independentunitinallitsselfrevealingaspects.Butwhattheknowledgewasinitselfapartfromitsselfrevealing
characterPrabhkaradidnotenquire.

Kumriladeclaredthatjna(knowledge)wasamovementbroughtaboutbytheactivityoftheselfwhich
resultedinproducingconsciousness(_jtat_)ofobjectivethings.Jnaitselfcannotbeperceived,butcan
onlybeinferredasthemovementnecessaryforproducingthejtatorconsciousnessofthings.Movement
withKumrilawasnotamereatomicvibration,butwasanonsensuoustranscendentoperationofwhich
vibration

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:S@mkhyaconsiderednirvikalpaasthedimknowledgeofthefirstmomentofconsciousness,
which,whenitbecameclearatthenextmoment,wascalledsavikalpa.]

417

wassometimestheresult.JnawasamovementandnottheresultofcausaloperationasNyyasupposed.
Nyyawouldnotalsoadmitanymovementonthepartoftheself,butitwouldholdthatwhentheselfispossessed
ofcertainqualities,suchasdesire,etc.,itbecomesaninstrumentfortheaccomplishmentofaphysicalmovement.
KumrilaaccordsthesameselfvaliditytoknowledgethatPrabhkaragives.Laterknowledgebyexperienceis
notendowedwithanyspecialqualitywhichshoulddecideastothevalidityoftheknowledgeoftheprevious
movement.Forwhatiscalledsa@mvdiorlatertestimonyofexperienceisbutlaterknowledgeandnothingmore
[Footnoteref1].Theselfisnotrevealedintheknowledgeofexternalobjects,butwecanknowitbyamental
perceptionofselfconsciousness.Itisthemovementofthisselfinpresenceofcertaincollocatingcircumstances
leadingtocognitionofthingsthatiscalledjna[Footnoteref2].HereKumriladistinguishesknowledgeas
movementfromknowledgeasobjectiveconsciousness.Knowledgeasmovementwasbeyondsenseperceptionand
couldonlybeinferred.

The idealistic tendency of Vijnavda Buddhism, S@mkhya, and Mm@ms was manifest in its attempt at
establishing the unique character of knowledge as being that with which alone we are in touch. But Vijnavda denied
the external world, and thereby did violence to the testimony of knowledge. S@mkhya admitted the external world
but created a gulf between the content of knowledge and pure intelligence; Prabhkara ignored this difference, and was
satisfied with the introspective assertion that knowledge was such a unique thing that it revealed with itself, the knower
and the known, Kumrila however admitted a transcendent element of movement as being the cause of our objective
consciousness, but regarded this as being separate from self. But the question remained unsolved as to why, in spite of
the unique character of knowledge, knowledge could relate itself to the world of objects, how far the world of external
objects or of knowledge could be regarded as absolutely true. Hitherto judgments were only relative, either referring to
one's being prompted to the objective world, to the faithfulness of the representation of objects, the suitability
CHAPTER X 278
offulfillingourrequirements,ortoverificationbylater

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_Nyyaratnamla_,svata@hprm@nyanir@naya.]

[Footnote2:See_Nyyamajari_onPram@na,_S'lokavrttika_onPratyak@sa,andGgBha@t@ta's
_Bha@t@tcintama@ni_onPratyak@sa.]

418

uncontradictedexperience.Butnoenquirywasmadewhetheranyabsolutejudgmentsabouttheultimatetruthof
knowledgeandmattercouldbemadeatall.Thatwhichappearedwasregardedasthereal.Butthequestionwas
notasked,whethertherewasanythingwhichcouldberegardedasabsolutetruth,thebasisofallappearance,
andtheunchangeable,reality.ThisphilosophicalenquiryhadthemostwonderfulcharmfortheHindumind.

VedntaLiterature.

Itisdifficulttoascertainthetimewhenthe_Brahmastras_werewritten,butsincetheycontainarefutationof
almostalltheotherIndiansystems,evenoftheS'nyavdaBuddhism(ofcourseaccordingtoS'a@nkara's
interpretation),theycannothavebeenwrittenveryearly.Ithinkitmaynotbefarfromthetruthinsupposing
thattheywerewrittensometimeinthesecondcenturyB.C.Abouttheperiod780A.D.Gau@dapdarevivedthe
monisticteachingoftheUpani@sadsbyhiscommentaryontheM@n@dkyaUpani@sadinversecalled
_M@n@dkyakrik_.HisdiscipleGovindawastheteacherofS'a@nkara(788820A.D.).S'a@nkara's
commentaryonthe_Brahmastras_istherootfromwhichsprangforthahostofcommentariesandstudieson
Vedntismofgreatoriginality,vigour,andphilosophicinsight.Thusnandagiri,adiscipleofS'a@nkara,wrote
acommentarycalled_Nyyanir@naya_,andGovindnandawroteanothercommentarynamed_Ratna
prabh_.VcaspatiMis'ra,whoflourishedabout841A.D.,wroteanothercommentaryonitcalledthe
_Bhmati._Amalnanda(12471260A.D.)wrotehisKalpataruonit,andApyayadik@sita(1550A.D.)sonof
Ra@ngarjadhvarndraofKcwrotehisKalpataruparimalaonthe_Kalpataru._Anotherdiscipleof
S'a@nkara,Padmapda,alsocalledSanandana,wroteacommentaryonitknownas_Pacapdik_.Fromthe
mannerinwhichthebookisbegunonewouldexpectthatitwastobearunningcommentaryonthewholeof
S'a@nkara'sbhsya,butitendsabruptlyattheendofthefourthstra.Mdhava(1350),inhis
_S'a@nkaravijaya,_recitesaninterestingstoryaboutit.HesaysthatSures'varareceivedS'a@nkara's
permissiontowriteavrttikaonthebhsya.ButotherpupilsobjectedtoS'a@nkarathatsinceSures'varawas
formerlyagreatMm@msist(Ma@n@danaMisrawascalledSures'varaafterhisconversiontoVedntism)he
wasnotcompetenttowrite

419

a good _vrttika_ on the bh@sya. Sures'vara, disappointed, wrote a treatise called _Nai@skarmyasiddhi._
Padmapda wrote a @tk but this was burnt in his uncle's house. S'a@nkara, who had once seen it, recited it from
memory and Padmapda wrote it down. Praks'tman (1200) wrote a commentary on Padmapda's _Pacapdik_
known as _Pacapdikvivara@na. _Akha@n@dnanda wrote his _Tattvadpana,_ and the famous
N@rsi@mhs'rama Muni (1500) wrote his _Vivara@nabhvapraks'ik_ on it. Amalnanda and Vidyasgara also
wrote commentaries on _Pacapdik,_ named _Pacapdikdarpa@na_ and _Pacapdik@tk_ respectively, but
the _Pacapdikvivara@na_ had by far the greatest reputation. Vidyra@nya who is generally identified by some
with Mdhava (1350) wrote his famous work _Vivara@naprameyasa@mgraha_ [Footnote ref 1], elaborating the ideas
of _Pacapdikvivara@na_; Vidyra@nya wrote also another excellent work named _Jvanmuktiviveka_ on the
Vednta doctrine of emancipation. Sures'vara's (800 A.D.) excellent work _Nai@skarmyasiddhi_ is probably the
earliest
CHAPTER X 279
independenttreatiseonS'a@nkara'sphilosophyasexpressedinhisbh@sya.Ithasbeencommenteduponby
JnottamaMis'ra.Vidyra@nyaalsowroteanotherworkofgreatmeritknownas_Pacadas',_whichisa
verypopularandilluminatingtreatiseinverseonVednta.Anotherimportantworkwritteninverseonthemain
teachingsofS'a@nkara'sbh@syais_Sa@mk@sepas'arraka_,writtenbySarvajtmaMuni(900A.D.).This
hasalsobeencommenteduponbyRmatrtha.S'rhar@sa(1190A.D.)wrotehis
_Kha@n@danakha@n@dakhdya_,themostcelebratedworkontheVedntadialectic.Citsukha,whoprobably
flourishedshortlyafterS'rhar@sa,wroteacommentaryonit,andalsowroteanindependentworkonVednta
dialecticknownas_Tattvadpik_whichhasalsoacommentarycalled_Nayanaprasdin_writtenby
Pratyagrpa.S'a@nkaraMis'raandRaghunthaalsowrotecommentarieson
_Kha@n@danakha@n@dakhdya._AworkonVedntaepistemologyandtheprincipaltopicsofVedntaof
greatoriginalityandmeritknownas_Vedntaparibh@s_waswrittenbyDharmarjdhvarndra(about
155OA.D.).HissonRmak@r@sndhvarinwrotehis_S'ikhma@ni_onitandAmaradsahis
_Ma@niprabh._The_Vedntaparibh@s_withthesetwocommentariesformsanexcellentexpositionofsome
ofthefundamentalprinciplesofVednta.Anotherworkofsupremeimportance

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:SeeNarasi@mhcrya'sarticleintheIndianAntiquary,1916.]
420

(thoughprobablythelastgreatworkonVednta)istheAdvaitasiddhiofMadhusdanaSarasvatwhofollowed
Dharmarjdhvarndra.Thishasthreecommentariesknownas_Gau@dabrahmnand_,
_Vi@t@thales'opadhyy_and_Siddhivykhy_.SadnandaVysawrotealsoasummaryofitknownas
_Advaitasiddhisiddhntasra_.Sadnandawrotealsoanexcellentelementaryworknamed_Vedntasra_
whichhasalsotwocommentaries_Subodhin_and_Vidvanmanorajin_.TheAdvaitabrahmasiddhiof
SadnandaYatithoughmuchinferiortoAdvaitasiddhiisimportant,asittouchesonmanypointsofVednta
interestwhicharenotdealtwithinotherVedntaworks.The_Nyyamakaranda_ofnandabodha
Bha@t@trakcryyatreatsofthedoctrinesofillusionverywell,asalsosomeotherimportantpointsof
Vedntainterest._Vedntasiddhntamuktval_ofPraks'nandadiscussesmanyofthesubtlepointsregarding
thenatureofajnaanditsrelationstocit,thedoctrineof_d@r@stis@r@stivda_,etc.,withgreatclearness.
_Siddhntales'abyApyayadk@sitaisveryimportantasasummaryofthedivergentviewsofdifferentwriters
onmanypointsofinterest._Vedntatattvadpik_and_Siddhntatattva_arealsogoodaswellasdeepintheir
generalsummaryoftheVedntasystem._Bhedadhikkra_ofNrsi@mhs'ramaMunialsoistoberegardedas
animportantworkontheVedntadialectic.

TheaboveisonlyalistofsomeofthemostimportantVedntaworksonwhichthepresentchapterhasbeen
based.

VedntainGau@dapda.

ItisuselessIthinktoattempttobringoutthemeaningoftheVedntathoughtascontainedinthe_Brahma
stras_withoutmakinganyreferencetothecommentaryofS'a@nkaraoranyothercommentator.Thereis
reasontobelievethatthe_Brahmastras_werefirstcommenteduponbysomeVai@s@navawriterswhoheld
someformofmodifieddualism[Footnoteref1].TherehavebeenmorethanahalfdozenVai@s@nava
commentatorsofthe_Brahmastras_whonotonlydifferedfromS'a@nkara'sinterpretation,butalsodiffered
largelyamongstthemselvesinaccordancewiththedifferentdegreesofstresstheylaidonthedifferentaspectsof
theirdualisticcreeds.Everyoneofthemclaimedthathisinterpretationwastheonlyonethatwasfaithfultothe
strasandto
___________________________________________________________________
CHAPTER X 280
[Footnote1:Thispointwillbedealtwithinthe2ndvolume,whenIshalldealwiththesystemsexpoundedbythe
Vai@s@navacommentatorsofthe_Brahmastras_.]

421

theUpani@sads.ShouldIattempttogiveaninterpretationmyselfandclaimthattobetherightone,itwouldbe
onlyjustoneadditionalview.Buthoweverthatmaybe,Iammyselfinclinedtobelievethatthedualistic
interpretationsofthe_Brahmastras_wereprobablymorefaithfultothestrasthantheinterpretationsof
S'akara.

The_S'rmadbhagavadgt_,whichitselfwasaworkoftheEknti(singularistic)Vai@s@navas,mentionsthe
_Brahmastras_ashavingthesamepurportasitsown,givingcogentreasons[Footnoteref1].ProfessorJacobi
indiscussingthedateofthephilosophicalstrasoftheHindushasshownthatthereferencestoBuddhismfound
inthe_Brahmastras_arenotwithregardtotheVijnavadaofVasubandhu,butwithregardtothe
S'nyavda,butheregardsthecompositionofthe_Brahmastras_tobelaterthanNgrjuna.Iagreewiththe
lateDrS.C.Vidybh@shanainholdingthatboththeYogcrasystemandthesystemofNgrjunaevolved
fromthe_Prajpramit_[Footnoteref2].Ngrjuna'smeritconsistedinthedialecticalformofhisarguments
insupportofS'unyavda;butsofarastheessentialsofS'unyavdaareconcernedIbelievethattheTathat
philosophyofAs'vagho@saandthephilosophyofthe_Prajpramit_containednoless.Thereisnoreasonto
supposethattheworksofNgrjunawerebetterknowntotheHinduwritersthanthe_Mahynastras_.Even
insuchlatertimesasthatofVcaspatiMis'ra,wefindhimquotingapassageofthe_S'listambhastra_togive
anaccountoftheBuddhistdoctrineofprattyasamutpda[Footnoteref3].Wecouldinterpretanyreferenceto
S'nyavdaaspointingtoNgrjunaonlyifhisspecialphraseologyordialecticalmethodswerereferredtoinany
way.Ontheotherhand,thereferenceinthe_Bhagavadgt_tothe_Brahmastras_clearlypointsoutadate
priortothatofNgrjuna;thoughwemaybeslowtobelievesuchanearlydateashasbeenassignedtothe
_Bhagavadgt_byTelang,yetIsupposethatitsdatecouldsafelybeplacedsofarbackasthefirsthalfofthefirst
centuryB.C.orthelastpartofthesecondcenturyB.C.The_Brahmastras_couldthusbeplacedslightlyearlier
thanthedateofthe_Bhagavadgt_.

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:"Brahmastrapadais'caivahetumadbhirvinis'cita@h"_Bhagavadgt_.Theproofsinsupportof
theviewthatthe_Bhagavadgt_isaVai@s@navaworkwillbediscussedinthe2ndvolumeofthepresent
workinthesectionon_Bhagavadgt_anditsphilosophy.]

[Footnote2:IndianAntiquary,1915.]
[Footnote3:SeeVcaspatiMis'ra's_Bhmat_onS'a@nkara'sbhsyaon_Brahmastra_,II.ii.]
422

I do not know of any evidence that would come in conflict with this supposition. The fact that we do not know of any
Hindu writer who held such monistic views as Gau@dapda or S'a@nkara, and who interpreted the _Brahma-stras_ in
accordance with those monistic ideas, when combined with the fact that the dualists had been writing commentaries
on the _Brahma-stras_, goes to show that the _Brahma-stras_ were originally regarded as an authoritative work of
the dualists. This also explains the fact that the _Bhagavadgt_, the canonical work of the Eknti Vai@s@navas, should
refer to it. I do not know of any Hindu writer previous to Gau@dapda who attempted to give an exposition of the
monistic doctrine (apart from the Upani@sads), either by writing a commentary as did S'a@nkara, or by writing an
independent work as did Gau@dapda. I am inclined to think therefore that as the pure monism of the Upani@sads
was not worked out in a coherent manner for the formation of a monistic system, it was dealt with by people who had
sympathies with some form of dualism which was already developing in the later days of the Upani@sads, as evidenced
by the
CHAPTER X 281
dualistictendenciesofsuchUpani@sadsastheS'vets'vatara,andthelike.TheepicS'a@mkhyawasalsothe
resultofthisdualisticdevelopment.

ItseemsthatBdarya@na,thewriterofthe_Brahmastras_,wasprobablymoreatheist,thananabsolutist
likehiscommentatorS'a@nkara.Gau@dapdaseemstobethemostimportantman,aftertheUpani@sadsages,
whorevivedthemonistictendenciesoftheUpani@sadsinaboldandclearformandtriedtoformulatethemina
systematicmanner.ItseemsverysignificantthatnootherkriksontheUpani@sadswereinterpreted,except
the_Mn@dkyakrik_byGau@dapda,whodidnothimselfmakeanyreferencetoanyotherwriterofthe
monisticschool,notevenBdarya@na.S'a@nkarahimselfmakestheconfessionthattheabsolutist(_advaita_)
creedwasrecoveredfromtheVedasbyGau@dapda.Thusattheconclusionofhiscommentaryon
Gau@dapda'skrik,hesaysthat"headoresbyfallingatthefeetofthatgreatguru(teacher)theadoredofhis
adored,whoonfindingallthepeoplesinkingintheoceanmadedreadfulbythecrocodilesofrebirth,outof
kindnessforallpeople,bychurningthegreatoceanoftheVedabyhisgreatchurningrodofwisdomrecovered
whatlaydeepintheheartoftheVeda,andishardlyattainableevenbytheimmortal

423

gods[Footnoterefl]."ItseemsparticularlysignificantthatS'a@nkarashouldcreditGau@dapdaandnot
Bdarya@nawithrecoveringtheUpani@sadcreed.Gau@dapdawastheteacherofGovinda,theteacher
ofS'a@nkara;buthewasprobablylivingwhenS'a@nkarawasastudent,forS'a@nkarasaysthathewas
directlyinfluencedbyhisgreatwisdom,andalsospeaksofthelearning,selfcontrolandmodestyofthe
otherpupilsofGau@dapda[Footnoteref2].ThereissomedisputeaboutthedateofS'a@nkara,but
acceptingthedateproposedbyBha@n@darkar,Pa@thakandDeussen,wemayconsiderittobe788A.D.
[Footnoteref3],andsupposethatinordertobeabletoteachS'a@nkara,Gau@dapdamusthavebeen
livingtillatleast800A.D.

Gau@dapdathusflourishedafterallthegreatBuddhistteachersAs'vagho@sa,Ngrjuna,Asa@ngaand
Vasubandhu;andIbelievethatthereissufficientevidenceinhiskriksforthinkingthathewaspossiblyhimself
aBuddhist,andconsideredthattheteachingsoftheUpani@sadstalliedwiththoseofBuddha.Thusatthe
beginningofthefourthchapterofhiskrikshesaysthatheadoresthatgreatman(_dvipadmvaram_)whoby
knowledgeaswideastheskyrealized(_sambuddha_)thatallappearances(_dharma_)werelikethevacuoussky
(gaganopamam[Footnoteref4].Hethengoesontosaythatheadoreshimwhohasdictated(_des'ita_)thatthe
touchofuntouch(_aspars'ayoga_probablyreferringtoNirv@na)wasthegoodthatproducedhappinesstoall
beings,andthathewasneitherindisagreementwiththisdoctrinenorfoundanycontradictioninit(_avivda@h
aviruddhas'ca_).Somedisputantsholdthatcomingintobeingisofexistents,whereasothersquarrellingwith
themholdthatbeing(_jta_)isofnonexistents(_abhtasya_);thereareotherswhoquarrelwiththemandsay
thatneithertheexistentsnornonexistentsareliabletobeingandthereisonenoncomingintobeing
(_advayamajtim_).Heagreeswiththosewhoholdthatthereisnocomingintobeing[Footnoteref5].InIV.19
ofhiskrikheagainsaysthattheBuddhashaveshownthattherewasnocomingintobeinginanyway
(_sarvathBuddhairajti@hparidpita@h_).

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:S'a@nkara'sbh@syaonGau@dapda'skrik,Anands'ramaedition,p.214.]

[Footnote2:Anands'ramaeditionofS'a@nkara'sbh@syaonGau@dapda'skrik,p.21.]

[Footnote3:TelangwishestoputS'a@nkara'sdatesomewhereinthe8thcentury,andVe@nkates'varawould
havehimin805A.D.897A.D.,ashedidnotbelievethatS'a@nkaracouldhavelivedonlyfor32years.
_J.R.A.S._1916.]
[Footnote 4: Compare _Lankvatra_, p. 29, _Katha@m ca gaganopamam_.]
CHAPTER X 282
[Footnote5:Gau@dapda'skrik,IV.2,4.]

424

Again,inIV.42hesaysthatitwasforthoserealists(_vastuvdi_),whosincetheyfoundthingsandcoulddeal
withthemandwereafraidofnonbeing,thattheBuddhashadspokenoforigination(_jti_).InIV.90herefers
to_agrayna_whichweknowtobeanameof_Mahyna_.Again,inIV.98and99hesaysthatallappearances
arepureandvacuousbynature.ThesetheBuddhas,theemancipatedone(_mukta_)andtheleadersknowfirst.
ItwasnotsaidbytheBuddhathatallappearances(_dharma_)wereknowledge.Hethenclosesthekrikswith
anadorationwhichinallprobabilityalsoreferstotheBuddha[Footnoteref1].

Gau@dapda'sworkisdividedintofourchapters:(i)gama(scripture),(2)Vaitathya(unreality),(3)Advaita
(unity),(4)Altas'nti(theextinctionoftheburningcoal).Thefirstchapterismoreinthewayofexplainingthe
M@n@dkyaUpani@sadbyvirtueofwhichtheentireworkisknownas_M@n@dkyakrik_.Thesecond,
third,andfourthchaptersaretheconstructivepartsofGau@dapda'swork,notparticularlyconnectedwiththe
M@n@dkyaUpani@sad.

InthefirstchapterGau@dapdabeginswiththethreeapparentmanifestationsoftheself:(1)astheexperiencer
oftheexternalworldwhileweareawake(_vis'va_or_vais'vnaratm_),(2)astheexperiencerinthedream
state(_taijasatm_),(3)astheexperiencerindeepsleep(_su@supti_),calledthe_prja_whenthereisno
determinateknowledge,butpureconsciousnessandpurebliss(_nanda_).Hewhoknowsthesethreeasoneis
neverattachedtohisexperiences.Gau@dapdathenenumeratessometheoriesofcreation:somethinkthatthe
worldhasproceededasacreationfromthepr@na(vitalactivity),othersconsidercreationasanexpansion
(_vibhti_)ofthatcausefromwhichithasproceeded;othersimaginethatcreationislikedream(_svapna_)and
magic(_my_);others,thatcreationproceedssimplybythewilloftheLord;othersthatitproceedsfromtime;
othersthatitisfortheenjoymentoftheLord(_bhogrtham_)orforhisplayonly(_kri@drtham_),forsuchis
thenature(_svabhva_)oftheLord,thathecreates,buthecannothaveanylonging,asallhisdesiresareina
stateoffulfilment.

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Gau@dapda'skrikIV.100.InmytranslationIhavenotfollowedS'a@nkara,forhehasI
thinktriedhislevelbesttoexplainawayeventhemostobviousreferencestoBuddhaandBuddhismin
Gau@dapda'skrik.Ihave,therefore,drawnmymeaningdirectlyasGau@dapda'skriksseemedto
indicate.IhavefollowedthesameprincipleingivingtheshortexpositionofGau@dapda'sphilosophy
below.]

425

Gau@dapda does not indicate his preference one way or the other, but describes the fourth state of the self as unseen
(_ad@r@s@ta_), unrelationable (_avyavahryam_), ungraspable (_agrhyam_), indefinable (_alak@sa@na_),
unthinkable (_acintyam_), unspeakable (_avyapades'ya_), the essence as oneness with the self
(_ektmapratyayasra_), as the extinction of the appearance (_prapacopas'ama_), the quiescent (_s'ntam_), the
good (_s'ivam_), the one (_advaita_) [Footnote ref 1]. The world-appearance (_prapaca_) would have ceased if it had
existed, but all this duality is mere my (magic or illusion), the one is the ultimately real (_paramrthata@h_). In the
second chapter Gau@dapda says that what is meant by calling the world a dream is that all existence is unreal. That
which neither exists in the beginning nor in the end cannot be said to exist in the present. Being like unreal it appears as
real. The appearance has a beginning and an end and is therefore false. In dreams things are imagined internally, and in
the experience that we have when we are awake things are imagined as if existing outside, but both of them are but
illusory creations of the self. What is perceived in the mind is perceived as existing at the moment of perception only;
external objects are supposed to have two moments of existence (namely before they are perceived, and when they
Chapter on 283
begintobeperceived),butthisisallmereimagination.Thatwhichisunmanifestedinthemindandthat
whichappearsasdistinctandmanifestoutsideareallimaginaryproductionsinassociationwiththesense
faculties.Thereisfirsttheimaginationofaperceiverorsoul(_jva_)andthenalongwithittheimaginary
creationsofdiverseinnerstatesandtheexternalworld.Justasindarknesstheropeisimaginedtobea
snake,sotheselfisalsoimaginedbyitsownillusionindiverseforms.Thereisneitheranyproductionnor
anydestruction(_nanirodho,nacotpatti@h_),thereisnoonewhoisenchained,noonewhoisstriving,no
onewhowantstobereleased[Footnoteref2].Imaginationfindsitselfrealizedinthenonexistentexistents
andalsointhesense

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:CompareinNgrjuna'sfirstkriktheideaof_prapacopas'amams'ivam.
Anirodhamanutpdamanucchedamas's'vatamanekrthamannrthamangamamanirgamamya@h
prattyasamutpdamprapacopas'amams'ivamdes'aymvasambuddhastamvandevadatmvaram_.Compare
alsoNgrjuna's

Chapter on
_Nirv@napark@s,Prvopalambhopas'ama@hprapacopas'ama@hs'iva@hnakvacitkasyacitkas'cit
dharmmobuddhenades'ita@h_.SofarasIknowtheBuddhistswerethefirsttousethewords
_prapacopas'amans'ivam_.]

[Footnote2:CompareNgrjuna'sk@arik,"anirodhamanutpdam"in_Mdhyamikav@rtti,B.T.S._,p.
3.]

426

ofunity;allimaginationeitherasthemanyortheone(_advaya_)isfalse;itisonlytheoneness(_advayat_)that
isgood.Thereisnomany,norarethingsdifferentornondifferent(_nannedam...nap@rthagnp@rthak_)
[Footnoteref1].Thesageswhohavetranscendedattachment,fear,andangerandhavegonebeyondthedepths
oftheVedashaveperceiveditastheimaginationlesscessationofallappearance(nirvikalpa@h
prapacopas'ama@h_),theone[Footnoteref2].

InthethirdchapterGau@dapdasaysthattruthislikethevoid(_ks'a_)whichisfalselyconcievedastaking
partinbirthanddeath,comingandgoingandasexistinginallbodies;buthowsoeveritbeconceived,itisallthe
whilenotdifferentfromks'a.Allthingsthatappearascompoundedarebutdreams(_svapna_)andmy
(magic).Dualityisadistinctionimposedupontheone(_advaita_)bymy.Thetruthisimmortal,itcannot
thereforebyitsownnaturesufferchange.Ithasnobirth.Allbirthanddeath,allthismanifoldisbuttheresultof
animpositionofmyuponit[Footnoteref3].Onemindappearsasmanyinthedream,asalsointhewaking
stateoneappearsasmany,butwhenthemindactivityoftheTogins(sages)isstoppedarisesthisfearlessstate,
theextinctionofallsorrow,finalceasation.Thinkingeverythingtobemisery(_du@hkhamsarvam
anusm@rtya_)oneshouldstopalldesiresandenjoyments,andthinkingthatnothinghasanybirthheshouldnot
seeanyproductionatall.Heshouldawakenthemind(_citta_)intoitsfinaldissolution(_laya_)andpacifyit
whendistracted;heshouldnotmoveittowardsdiverseobjectswhenitstops.Heshouldnottasteanypleasure
(_sukham_)andbywisdomremainunattached,bystrongeffortmakingitmotionlessandstill.Whenheneither
passesintodissolutionnorintodistraction;whenthereisnosign,noappearancethatistheperfectBrahman.
Whenthereisnoobjectofknowledgetocomeintobeing,theunproducedisthencalledtheomniscent
(_sarvaja_).

Inthefourthchapter,calledtheAlats'nti,Gau@dapdafurther
____________________________________________________________________
Chapter on 284
[Footnote1:Compare_Mdhyamikakrik,_B.T.S._,p.3_anekrthamannrtham_,etc.]

[Footnote2:Compare_Lankvatrastra_,p.78,_Advaysamsraparinirv@nvatsarvadharm@htasmt
tarhimahmateS'unyatnutpddvayani@hsvabhvalak@sa@neyoga@hkara@niya@h_;also8,46,
_Yadutasvacittavi@sayavikalpad@r@s@tynavabodhantvijnnm
svacittad@r@s@tyamtrnavatre@namahmatevlaprthagjan@h
bhvbhvasvabhvaparamrthad@r@s@tidvayvdinobhavanti_.]

[Footnote3:CompareNgrjuna'skrik,_B.T.S._p.196,_ks'ams'as'as'@r@ngacabandhyy@hputra
evacaasantas'cbhivyajyantetathbhvenakalpan_,withGau@dapda'skrik,III.28,_Asatomyay
janmatatvatonaivajyatebandhyputronatattvenamyyavpijyate_.]

427

describesthisfinalstate[Footnoterefl].Allthedharmas(appearances)arewithoutdeathordecay
[Footnote:ref2].Gau@dapdathenfollowsadialecticalformofargumentwhichremindsusofNgrjuna.
Gau@dapdacontinuesthus:Thosewhoregardkra@na(cause)asthekryya(effectinapotentialform)
cannotconsiderthecauseastrulyunproduced(_aja_),foritsuffersproduction;howcanitbecalledeternal
andyetchanging?Ifitissaidthatthingscomeintobeingfromthatwhichhasnoproduction,thereisno
examplewithwhichsuchacasemaybeillustrated.Norcanweconsiderthatanythingisbornfromthat
whichhasitselfsufferedproduction.Howagaincanonecometoarightconclusionabouttheregressusad
infinitumofcauseandeffect(hetuand_phala_)?Withoutreferencetotheeffectthereisnocause,and
withoutreferencetocausethereisnoeffect.Nothingisborneitherbyitselforthroughothers;calliteither
being,nonbeing,orbeingnonbeing,nothingsuffersanybirth,neitherthecausenortheeffectisproduced
outofitsownnature(_svabhvatah_),andthusthatwhichhasnobeginninganywherecannotbesaidto
haveaproduction.Allexperience(_prajapti_)isdependentonreasons,forotherwisebothwouldvanish,
andtherewouldbenoneoftheafflictions(_sa@mkles'a_)thatwesuffer.Whenwelookatallthingsina
connectedmannertheyseemtobedependent,butwhenwelookatthemfromthepointofviewofrealityor
truththereasonsceasetobereasons.Themind(_citta_)doesnotcomeintouchwithobjectsandthereby
manifestthem,forsincethingsdonotexisttheyarenotdifferentfromtheirmanifestationsinknowledge.It
isnotinanyparticularcasethatthemindproducesthemanifestationsofobjectswhiletheydonotexistso
thatitcouldbesaidtobeanerror,forinpresent,past,andfuturethemindnevercomesintouchwith
objectswhichonlyappearbyreasonoftheirdiversemanifestations.Thereforeneitherthemindnorthe
objectsseenbyitareeverproduced.Thosewhoperceivethemtosufferproductionarereallytraversingthe
reasonofvacuity(_khe_),forallproductionisbutfalseimpositiononthevacuity.Sincetheunbornis
perceivedasbeingborn,theessencethenistheabsenceof

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:TheverynameAlta@sntiisabsolutelyBuddhistic.CompareNgrjuna'skrik,_B.T.S._,p.
206,wherehequotesaversefromthe_S'ataka_.]

[Footnote2:TheuseoftheworddharmainthesenseofappearanceorentityispeculiarlyBuddhistic.The
HindusenseisthatgivenbyJaimini,"Codanlak@sa@naharthah,dharmah."Dharmaisdeterminedbythe
injunctionsoftheVedas.]

428

production, for it being of the nature of absence of production it could never change its nature. Everything has a
beginning and an end and is therefore false. The existence of all things is like a magical or illusory elephant
(_myhast_) and exists only as far as it merely appears or is related to experience. There is thus the appearance of
production, movement and things, but the one knowledge (_vijna_) is the unborn, unmoved,
Chapter on 285
theunthingness(_avastutva_),thecessation(s'ntam).Asthemovementofburningcharcoalisperceivedas
straightorcurved,soitisthemovement(_spandita_)ofconsciousnessthatappearsastheperceivingandthe
perceived.Alltheattributes(e.g.straightorcurved)areimposeduponthecharcoalfire,thoughinrealityitdoes
notpossessthem;soalsoalltheappearancesareimposeduponconsciousness,thoughinrealitytheydonot
possessthem.Wecouldneverindicateanykindofcausalrelationbetweentheconsciousnessanditsappearance,
whicharethereforetobedemonstratedasunthinkable(_acintya_).Athing(_dravya_)isthecauseofathing
(_dravya_),andthatwhichisnotathingmaybethecauseofthatwhichisnotathing,butalltheappearancesare
neitherthingsnorthosewhicharenotthings,soneitherareappearancesproducedfromthemind(_citta_)noris
themindproducedbyappearances.Solongasonethinksofcauseandeffecthehastosufferthecycleofexistence
(_sa@msra_),butwhenthatnotionceasesthereisnosa@msra.Allthingsareregardedasbeingproducedfrom
arelativepointofviewonly(_sa@mv@rti_),thereisthereforenothingpermanent(_s's'vata_).Again,no
existentthingsareproduced,hencetherecannotbeanydestruction(_uccheda_).Appearances(_dharma_)are
producedonlyapparently,notinreality;theircomingintobeingislikemy,andthatmyagaindoesnotexist.
Allappearancesarelikeshootsofmagiccomingoutofseedsofmagicandarenotthereforeneithereternalnor
destructible.Asindreams,orinmagic,menarebornanddie,soareallappearances.Thatwhichappearsas
existingfromanimaginaryrelativepointofview(_kalpitasa@mv@rti_)isnotsoinreality(_paramrtha_),for
theexistencedependingonothers,asshowninallrelativeappearance,isafterallnotarealexistence.Thatthings
exist,donotexist,doexistandnotexist,andneitherexistnornotexist;thattheyaremovingorsteady,ornoneof
those,arebutthoughtswithwhichfoolsaredeluded.

429

ItissoobviousthatthesedoctrinesareborrowedfromtheMdhyamikadoctrines,asfoundinthe
Ngrjuna'skriksandtheVijnavdadoctrines,asfoundin_La@nkvatra_,thatitisneedlessto
attempttoproveit,Gau@dapdaassimilatedalltheBuddhistS'nyavdaandVijnavdateachings,and
thoughtthattheseheldgoodoftheultimatetruthpreachedbytheUpani@sads.Itisimmaterialwhetherhe
wasaHinduoraBuddhist,solongaswearesurethathehadthehighestrespectfortheBuddhaandforthe
teachingswhichhebelievedtobehis.Gau@dapdatookthesmallestUpani@sadstocommentupon,
probablybecausehewishedtogivehisopinionsunrestrictedbythetextuallimitationsofthebiggerones.
Hismainemphasisisonthetruththatherealizedtobeperfect.Heonlyincidentallysuggestedthatthe
greatBuddhisttruthofindefinableandunspeakablevijnaorvacuitywouldholdgoodofthehighest
tmanoftheUpani@sads,andthuslaidthefoundationofarevivaloftheUpani@sadstudiesonBuddhist
lines.HowfartheUpani@sadsguaranteedindetailthetruthofGau@dapda'sviewsitwasleftforhis
disciple,thegreatS'a@nkara,toexamineandexplain.

VedntaandSa@nkara(788820A.D.).

Vedntaphilosophyisthephilosophywhichclaimstobetheexpositionofthephilosophytaughtinthe
Upani@sadsandsummarizedinthe_Brahmastras_ofBdarya@na.TheUpani@sadsformthelastpartof
theVedaliterature,anditsphilosophyisthereforealsocalledsometimestheUttaraMm@msortheMmms
(decision)ofthelaterpartoftheVedasasdistinguishedfromtheMm@msofthepreviouspartoftheVedas
andtheBrhma@nasasincorporatedinthe_Prvamm@msstras_ofJaimini.Thoughthese_Brahma
stras_weredifferentlyinterpretedbydifferentexponents,theviewsexpressedintheearliestcommentaryon
themnowavailable,writtenbyS'a@nkarcrya,haveattainedwonderfulcelebrity,bothonaccountofthesubtle
anddeepideasitcontains,andalsoonaccountoftheassociationoftheillustriouspersonalityofS'a@nkara.So
greatistheinfluenceofthephilosophypropoundedbySa@nkaraandelaboratedbyhisillustriousfollowers,
thatwheneverwespeakoftheVedntaphilosophywemeanthephilosophythatwaspropoundedbyS'a@nkara.
Ifotherexpositionsareintendedthenamesoftheexponentshavetobementioned(e.g.Rmnujamata,
Vallabhamata,etc.),Inthis
430
Chapter on 286
chapterweshalllimitourselvestotheexpositionoftheVedntaphilosophyaselaboratedbyS'a@nkaraandhis
followers.InS'a@nkara'swork(thecommentariesonthe_Brahmastra_andthetenUpani@sads)manyideas
havebeenbrieflyincorporatedwhichasfoundinS'a@nkaradonotappeartobesufficientlyclear,butaremore
intelligibleaselaboratedbyhisfollowers.ItisthereforebettertotakeuptheVedntasystem,notaswefinditin
S'a@nkara,butaselaboratedbyhisfollowers,allofwhomopenlydeclarethattheyaretruetotheirmaster's
philosophy.

FortheotherHindusystemsofthought,thestras(_Jaiministra,Nyyastra,_etc.)aretheonlyoriginal
treatises,andnofoundationotherthantheseisavailable.InthecaseoftheVedntahowevertheoriginal
sourceistheUpani@sads,andthestrasarebutanextremelycondensedsummaryinasystematicform.
S'a@nkaradidnotclaimtobetheinventororexpounderofanoriginalsystem,butinterpretedthestras
andtheUpani@sadsinordertoshowthatthereexistedaconnectedandsystematicphilosophyinthe
Upani@sadswhichwasalsoenunciatedinthestrasofBdarya@na.TheUpani@sadswereapartofthe
VedasandwerethusregardedasinfalliblebytheHindus.IfS'a@nkaracouldonlyshowthathisexposition
ofthemwastherightone,thenhisphilosophybeingfoundeduponthehighestauthoritywouldbeaccepted
byallHindus.ThemostformidableopponentsinthewayofaccomplishinghistaskweretheMma@msists,
whoheldthattheVedasdidnotpreachanyphilosophy,forwhatevertherewasintheVedaswastobe
interpretedasissuingcommandstousforperformingthisorthataction.TheyheldthatiftheUpani@sads
spokeofBrahmananddemonstratedthenatureofitspureessence,theseweremereexaggerationsintended
toputthecommandmentofperformingsomekindofworshipofBrahmanintoamoreattractiveform.
S'a@nkaracouldnotdenythatthepurportoftheVedasasfoundintheBrhma@naswasexplicitlyofa
mandatorynatureasdeclaredbytheMm@ms,buthesoughttoprovethatsuchcouldnotbethepurport
oftheUpani@sads,whichspokeofthetruestandthehighestknowledgeoftheAbsolutebywhichthewise
couldattainsalvation.Hesaidthatinthekarmak@n@dathe(sacrificialinjunctions)Brhma@nasofthe
VedasthepurportoftheVedaswascertainlyofamandatorynature,asitwasintendedforordinary
peoplewhowereanxiousforthisorthatpleasure,

431

and were never actuated by any desire of knowing the absolute truth, but the Upani@sads, which were intended for
the wise who had controlled their senses and become disinclined to all earthly joys, demonstrated the one Absolute,
Unchangeable, Brahman as the only Truth of the universe. The two parts of the Vedas were intended for two classes of
persons. S'a@nkara thus did not begin by formulating a philosophy of his own by logical and psychological analysis,
induction, and deduction. He tried to show by textual comparison of the different Upani@sads, and by reference to the
content of passages in the Upani@sads, that they were concerned in demonstrating the nature of Brahman (as he
understood it) as their ultimate end. He had thus to show that the uncontradicted testimony of all the Upani@sads was
in favour of the view which he held. He had to explain all doubtful and apparently conflicting texts, and also to show
that none of the texts referred to the doctrines of mahat, prak@rti, etc. of the S@mkhya. He had also to interpret the
few scattered ideas about physics, cosmology, eschatology, etc. that are found in the Upani@sads consistently with the
Brahman philosophy. In order to show that the philosophy of the Upani@sads as he expounded it was a consistent
system, he had to remove all the objections that his opponents could make regarding the Brahman philosophy, to
criticize the philosophies of all other schools, to prove them to be self-contradictory, and to show that any interpretation
of the Upani@sads, other than that which he gave, was inconsistent and wrong. This he did not only in his bhsya on
the _Brahma-stras_ but also in his commentaries on the Upani@sads. Logic with him had a subordinate place, as its
main value for us was the aid which it lent to consistent interpretations of the purport of the Upani@sad texts, and to
persuading the mind to accept the uncontradicted testimony of the Upani@sads as the absolute truth. His disciples
followed him in all, and moreover showed in great detail that the Brahman philosophy was never contradicted either in
perceptual experience or in rational thought, and that all the realistic categories which Nyya and other systems had put
forth were self-contradictory and erroneous. They also supplemented his philosophy by constructing a Vednta
epistemology, and by rethinking elaborately the relation of the my, the Brahman, and the world of appearance and
other relevant topics.
Chapter on 287
Manyproblemsofgreatphilosophicalinterestwhich

432

hadbeenleftoutorslightlytouchedbyS'a@nkarawerediscussedfullybyhisfollowers.Butitshouldalwaysbe
rememberedthatphilosophicalreasoningsandcriticismsarealwaystobetakenasbutaidsforconvincingour
intellectandstrengtheningourfaithinthetruthrevealedintheUpani@sads.Thetrueworkoflogicistoadapt
themindtoacceptthem.LogicusedforupsettingtheinstructionsoftheUpani@sadsislogicgoneastray.Many
livesofS'a@nkarcryawerewritteninSanskritsuchasthe_S'a@nkaradigvijaya_,_S'a@nkaravijayavilsa_,
_S'a@nkarajaya_,etc.Itisregardedasalmostcertainthathewasbornbetween700and800A.D.inthe
MalabarcountryintheDeccan.HisfatherS'ivaguruwasaYajurvediBrhminoftheTaittiryabranch.Many
miraclesarerelatedofS'a@nkara,andheisbelievedtohavebeentheincarnationofS'iva.Heturnedasceticin
hiseighthyearandbecamethediscipleofGovinda,arenownedsagethenresidinginamountaincellonthe
banksoftheNarbuda.HethencameovertoBenaresandthencewenttoBadariks'rama.Itissaidthathewrote
hisillustriousbh@syaonthe_Brahmastra_inhistwelfthyear.Lateronhealsowrotehiscommentarieson
tenUpani@sads.HereturnedtoBenares,andfromthistimeforthhedecidedtotravelalloverIndiainorderto
defeattheadherentsofotherschoolsofthoughtinopendebate.ItissaidthathefirstwenttomeetKumrila,but
Kumrilawasthenatthepointofdeath,andheadvisedhimtomeetKumrila'sdisciple.Hedefeated
Ma@n@danaandconvertedhimintoanasceticfollowerofhisown.Hethentravelledinvariousplaces,and
defeatinghisopponentseverywhereheestablishedhisVedntaphilosophy,whichfromthattimeforthacquireda
dominantinfluenceinmouldingthereligiouslifeofIndia.

S'a@nkaracarriedontheworkofhisteacherGaudapdaandbywritingcommentariesonthetenUpani@sads
andthe_Brahmastras_triedtoprove,thattheabsolutistcreedwastheonewhichwasintendedtobepreached
intheUpani@sadsandthe_Brahmastras_[Footnote:1].Throughouthiscommentaryonthe_Brahmastras_,
thereisampleevidencethathewascontendingagainstsomeotherrivalinterpretationsofadualistictendency
whichheldthattheUpani@sadspartlyfavouredtheS@mkhyacosmology

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:ThemainworksofS'a@nkaraarehiscommentaries(bh@sya)onthetenUpani@sads(s'a,Kena,
Katha,Pras'na,Mu@ndaka,M@n@dkya,Aitareya,Taittirya,B@rhadra@nyaka,andChndogya),andon
the_Brahmastra_.]

433

of the existence of prak@rti. That these were actual textual interpretations of the _Brahma-stras_ is proved by the
fact that S'a@nkara in some places tries to show that these textual constructions were faulty [Footnote ref 1]. In one
place he says that others (referring according to Vcaspati to the Mm@ms) and some of us (referring probably to
those who interpreted the stras and the Upani@sads from the Vednta point of view) think that the soul is
permanent. It is to refute all those who were opposed to the right doctrine of perceiving everything as the unity of the
self (_tmaikatva_) that this S'rraka commentary of mine is being attempted [Footnote ref 2]. Rmnuja, in the
introductory portion of his bh@sya on the _Brahma-stra,_ says that the views of Bodhyana who wrote an elaborate
commentary on the _Brahma-stra_ were summarized by previous teachers, and that he was following this Bodhyana
bh@sya in writing his commentary. In the _Vedrthasa@mgraha_ of Rmnuja mention is made of Bodhyana, Tanka,
Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bhruci as Vedntic authorities, and Dravi@dcryya is referred to as the "bh@syakra"
commentator. In Chndogya III. x. 4, where the Upani@sad cosmology appeared to be different from the
_Vi@s@nupurana_ cosmology, S'a@nkara refers to an explanation offered on the point by one whom he calls
"cryya" (_atrokta@h parihrah cryyaih_) and nandagiri says that "cryya" there refers to Dravi@dcryya. This
Dravi@dcryya is known to us from Rmnuja's statement as being a commentator of the dualistic school, and we
have evidence here that he had written a commentary on the Chndogya Upani@sad.
Chapter I 288
Astudyoftheextantcommentariesonthe_Brahmastras_ofBdarya@nabytheadherentsofdifferent
schoolsofthoughtleavesusconvincedthatthesestraswereregardedbyallascondensationsoftheteachingsof
theUpani@sads.ThedifferencesofopinionwerewithregardtothemeaningofthesestrasandtheUpani@sad
textstowhichreferencesweremadebythemineachparticularcase.The_Brahmastra_isdividedintofour
adhyyasorbooks,andeachoftheseisdividedintofourchaptersorpdas.Eachofthesecontainsanumberof
topicsofdiscussion(_adhikara@na_)whicharecomposedofanumberofstras,whichraisethepointatissue,
thepointsthatleadtodoubtanduncertainty,andtheconsiderationsthatshouldleadonetofavour

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Seenoteonp.432.]

[Footnote2:S'a@nkara'sbh@syaonthe_Brahmastras_,I.iii.19.]

434

aparticularconclusion.AsexplainedbyS'a@nkara,mostofthesestrasexceptthefirstfourandthefirsttwo
chaptersofthesecondbookaredevotedtothetextualinterpretationsoftheUpani@sadpassages.S'a@nkara's
methodofexplainingtheabsolutistVedntacreeddoesnotconsistinprovingtheVedntatobeaconsistent
systemofmetaphysics,completeinallparts,butinsointerpretingtheUpani@sadtextsastoshowthattheyall
agreeinholdingtheBrahmantobetheselfandthatalonetobetheonlytruth.In

Chapter I
ofBookIIS'a@nkaratriestoanswersomeoftheobjectionsthatmaybemadefromtheS@mkhyapointof
viewagainsthisabsolutistcreedandtoshowthatsomeapparentdifficultiesoftheabsolutistdoctrinedidnot
presentanyrealdifficulty.In

Chapter II
ofBookIIhetriestorefutetheS@mkhya,Yoga,NyyaVais'e@sika,theBuddhist,Jaina,Bhgavataand
S'aivasystemsofthought.Thesetwochaptersandhiscommentariesonthefirstfourstrascontainthe
mainpointsofhissystem.Therestoftheworkismainlyoccupiedinshowingthattheconclusionofthe
straswasalwaysinstrictagreementwiththeUpani@saddoctrines.ReasonwithS'a@nkaranever
occupiedthepremierposition;itsvaluewasconsideredonlysecondary,onlysofarasithelpedonetothe
rightunderstandingoftherevealedscriptures,theUpani@sads.Theultimatetruthcannotbeknownby
reasonalone.Whatonedebatershowstobereasonableamoreexpertdebatershowstobefalse,andwhathe
showstoberightisagainprovedtobefalsebyanotherdebater.Sothereisnofinalcertaintytowhichwe
canarrivebylogicandargumentalone.TheultimatetruthcanthusonlybefoundintheUpani@sads;
reason,discriminationandjudgmentarealltobeusedonlywithaviewtothediscoveryoftherealpurport
oftheUpani@sads.FromhisownpositionS'a@nkarawasnotthusboundtovindicatethepositionofthe
Vedntaasathoroughlyrationalsystemofmetaphysics.Foritstruthdidnotdependonitsrationalitybut
ontheauthorityoftheUpani@sads.Butwhatwastruecouldnotcontradictexperience.Iftherefore
S'a@nkara'sinterpretationoftheUpani@sadswastrue,thenitwouldnotcontradictexperience.
S'a@nkarawasthereforeboundtoshowthathisinterpretationwasrationalanddidnotcontradict
experience.Ifhecouldshowthathisinterpretationwastheonlyinterpretationthatwasfaithfultothe
Upani@sads,andthatitsapparentcontradictionswithexperiencecouldinsomewaybeexplained,
435
Chapter II 289
heconsideredthathehadnothingmoretodo.Hewasnotwritingaphilosophyinthemodernsenseoftheterm,
butgivingusthewholetruthastaughtandrevealedintheUpani@sadsandnotsimplyasystemspunbyaclever
thinker,whichmayerroneouslyappeartobequitereasonable,Ultimatevaliditydoesnotbelongtoreasonbutto
thescriptures.

Hestartedwiththepremisethatwhatevermaybethereasonitisafactthatallexperiencestartsandmoves
inanerrorwhichidentifiestheselfwiththebody,thesenses,ortheobjectsofthesenses.Allcognitiveacts
presupposethisillusoryidentification,forwithoutitthepureselfcanneverbehaveasaphenomenal
knowerorperceiver,andwithoutsuchaperceivertherewouldbenocognitiveact.S'a@nkaradoesnottry
toprovephilosophicallytheexistenceofthepureselfasdistinctfromallotherthings,forheissatisfiedin
showingthattheUpani@sadsdescribethepureselfunattachedtoanykindofimpurityastheultimate
truth.Thiswithhimisamattertowhichnoexceptioncanbetaken,foritissorevealedintheUpani@sads.
Thispointbeinggranted,thenextpointisthatourexperienceisalwaysbaseduponanidentificationofthe
selfwiththebody,thesenses,etc.andtheimpositionofallphenomenalqualitiesofpleasure,pain,etc.upon
theself;andthiswithS'a@nkaraisabeginninglessillusion.AllthishadbeensaidbyGau@dapda.
S'a@nkaraacceptedGau@dapda'sconclusions,butdidnotdevelophisdialecticforapositiveproofofhis
thesis.Hemadeuseofthedialecticonlyfortherefutationofothersystemsofthought.Thisbeingdonehe
thoughtthathehadnothingmoretodothantoshowthathisideawasinagreementwiththeteachingsof
theUpani@sads.HeshowedthattheUpani@sadsheldthatthepureselfaspurebeing,pureintelligence
andpureblisswastheultimatetruth.Thisbeingacceptedtheworldasitappearscouldnotbereal.Itmust
beameremagicshowofillusionormy.S'a@nkaranevertriestoprovethattheworldismy,but
acceptsitasindisputable.For,iftheselfiswhatisultimatelyreal,thenecessaryconclusionisthatallelseis
mereillusionormy.HehadthustoquarrelononesidewiththeMm@msrealistsandontheother
withtheS@mkhyarealists,bothofwhomacceptedthevalidityofthescriptures,butinterpretedthemin
theirownway.TheMm@msistsheldthateverythingthatissaidintheVedasistobeinterpretedas
requiringustoperformparticularkindsofaction,

436

or to desist from doing certain other kinds. This would mean that the Upani@sads being a part of the Veda should also
be interpreted as containing injunctions for the performance of certain kinds of actions. The description of Brahman in
the Upani@sads does not therefore represent a simple statement of the nature of Brahman, but it implies that the
Brahman should be meditated upon as possessing the particular nature described there, i.e. Brahman should be
meditated upon as being an entity which possesses a nature which is identical with our self; such a procedure would
then lead to beneficial results to the man who so meditates. S'a@nkara could not agree to such a view. For his main
point was that the Upani@sads revealed the highest truth as the Brahman. No meditation or worship or action of any
kind was required; but one reached absolute wisdom and emancipation when the truth dawned on him that the
Brahman or self was the ultimate reality. The teachings of the other parts of the Vedas, the karmak@n@da (those
dealing with the injunctions relating to the performance of duties and actions), were intended for inferior types of
aspirants, whereas the teachings of the Upani@sads, the jnak@n@da (those which declare the nature of ultimate
truth and reality), were intended only for superior aspirants who had transcended the limits of sacrificial duties and
actions, and who had no desire for any earthly blessing or for any heavenly joy. Throughout his commentary on the
_Bhagavadgt_ S'a@nkara tried to demonstrate that those who should follow the injunctions of the Veda and perform
Vedic deeds, such as sacrifices, etc., belonged to a lower order. So long as they remained in that order they had no right
to follow the higher teachings of the Upani@sads. They were but karmins (performers of scriptural duties). When they
succeeded in purging their minds of all desires which led them to the performance of the Vedic injunctions, the field of
karmamrga (the path of duties), and wanted to know the truth alone, they entered the jnamrga (the way of
wisdom) and had no duties to perform. The study of Vednta was thus reserved for advanced persons who were no
longer inclined to the ordinary joys of life but wanted complete emancipation. The qualifications necessary for a man
intending to study the Vednta are (1) discerning knowledge about what is eternal and what is transitory
(_nitynityavastuviveka_), (2)
Chapter II 290
disinclinationtotheenjoymentofthepleasuresofthisworldorof

437

theafterworld(_ihmutraphalabhogavirga_),(3)attainmentofpeace,selfrestraint,renunciation,patience,
deepconcentrationandfaith(_s'amadamdisdhanasampat_)anddesireforsalvation(_mumuk@sutva_).The
personwhohadthesequalificationsshouldstudytheUpani@sads,andassoonashebecameconvincedofthe
truthabouttheidentityoftheselfandtheBrahmanheattainedemancipation.Whenonceamanrealizedthatthe
selfalonewastherealityandallelsewasmy,allinjunctionsceasedtohaveanyforcewithhim.Thus,thepath
ofduties(_karma_)andthepathofwisdom(_jna_)wereintendedfordifferentclassesofpersonsor
adhikrins.TherecouldbenojointperformanceofVedicdutiesandtheseekingofthehighesttruthastaughtin
theUpani@sads(_jnakarmasamuccaybhva@h_).Asagainstthedualistshetriedtoshowthatthe
Upani@sadsneverfavouredanykindofdualisticinterpretations.ThemaindifferencebetweentheVedntaas
expoundedbyGau@dapdaandasexplainedbyS'a@nkaraconsistsinthis,thatS'a@nkaratriedasbesthe
couldtodissociatethedistinctiveBuddhisttraitsfoundintheexpositionoftheformerandtoformulatethe
philosophyasadirectinterpretationoftheolderUpani@sadtexts.Inthisheachievedremarkablesuccess.He
wasnodoubtregardedbysomeasahiddenBuddhist(_pracchannaBauddha_),buthisinfluenceonHindu
thoughtandreligionbecamesogreatthathewasregardedinlatertimesasbeingalmostadivinepersonoran
incarnation.Hisimmediatedisciples,thedisciplesofhisdisciples,andthosewhoadheredtohisdoctrineinthe
succeedinggenerations,triedtobuildarationalbasisforhissysteminamuchstrongerwaythanS'a@nkaradid.
OurtreatmentofS'a@nkara'sphilosophyhasbeenbasedontheinterpretationsofVedntathought,asofferedby
thesefollowersofS'a@nkara.TheseinterpretationsarenowhereinconflictwithS'a@nkara'sdoctrines,butthe
questionsandproblemswhichS'a@nkaradidnotraisehavebeenraisedanddiscussedbyhisfollowers,and
withouttheseonecouldnottreatVedntaasacompleteandcoherentsystemofmetaphysics.Asthesewillbe
discussedinthelatersections,wemayclosethiswithashortdescriptionofsomeofthemainfeaturesofthe
VedntathoughtasexplainedbyS'a@nkara.

BrahmanaccordingtoS'a@nkarais"thecausefromwhich(proceeds)theoriginorsubsistenceand
dissolutionofthisworldwhichisextendedinnamesandforms,whichincludesmany

438

agentsandenjoyers,whichcontainsthefruitofworksspeciallydeterminedaccordingtospace,time,andcause,a
worldwhichisformedafteranarrangementinconceivableevenbythe(imaginationofthe)mind[Footnoteref
1]."ThereasonsthatS'a@nkaraadducesfortheexistenceofBrahmanmaybeconsideredtobethreefold:(1)
Theworldmusthavebeenproducedasthemodificationofsomething,butintheUpani@sadsallotherthings
havebeenspokenofashavingbeenoriginatedfromsomethingotherthanBrahman,soBrahmanisthecause
fromwhichtheworldhassprungintobeing,butwecouldnotthinkthatBrahmanitselforiginatedfrom
somethingelse,forthenweshouldhavearegressusadinfinitum(_anavasth_).(2)Theworldissoorderlythatit
couldnothavecomeforthfromanonintelligentsource.Theintelligentsourcethenfromwhichthisworldhas
comeintobeingisBrahman.(3)ThisBrahmanistheimmediateconsciousness(_sk@si_)whichshinesasthe
self,aswellasthroughtheobjectsofcognitionwhichtheselfknows.Itisthustheessenceofusall,theself,and
henceitremainsundeniedevenwhenonetriestodenyit,foreveninthedenialitshowsitselfforth.Itistheself
ofusallandishenceeverpresenttousinallourcognitions.

Brahman according to S'a@nkara is the identity of pure intelligence, pure being, and pure blessedness. Brahman is
the self of us all. So long as we are in our ordinary waking life, we are identifying the self with thousands of illusory
things, with all that we call "I" or mine, but when in dreamless sleep we are absolutely without any touch of these
phenomenal notions the nature of our true state as pure blessedness is partially realized. The individual self as it
appears is but an appearance only, while the real truth is the true self which is one for all, as pure intelligence, pure
blessedness, and pure being.
Chapter II 291
Allcreationisillusorymy.Butacceptingitasmy,itmaybeconceivedthatGod(s'vara)createdtheworld
asameresport;fromthetruepointofviewthereisnos'varawhocreatestheworld,butinthesenseinwhich
theworldexists,andweallexistasseparateindividuals,wecanaffirmtheexistenceofs'vara,asengagedin
creatingandmaintainingtheworld.Inrealityallcreationisillusoryandsothecreatoralsoisillusory.Brahman,
theself,isatoncethematerialcause(updnakra@na)aswellastheefficientcause(nimittakra@na)ofthe
world.

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:S'a@nkara'scommentary,I.i.2.SeealsoDeussen's_SystemoftheVednta_.]

439

Thereisnodifferencebetweenthecauseandtheeffect,andtheeffectisbutanillusoryimpositiononthecause
amereillusionofnameandform.Wemaymouldclayintoplatesandjugsandcallthembysomanydifferent
names,butitcannotbeadmittedthattheyarebythatfactanythingmorethanclay;theirtransformationsas
platesandjugsareonlyappearancesofnameandform(_nmarpa_).Thisworld,inasmuchasitisbutan
effectimposedupontheBrahman,isonlyphenomenallyexistent(_vyavahrika_)asmereobjectsofnameand
form(_nmarpa_),butthecause,theBrahman,isalonethetruereality(_pramrthika_)[Footnoteref1].

ThemainideaoftheVedntaphilosophy.

Themainideaoftheadvaita(nondualistic)Vedntaphilosophyastaughtbythe@S'a@karaschoolisthis,that
theultimateandabsolutetruthistheself,whichisone,thoughappearingasmanyindifferentindividuals.The
worldalsoasapartfromustheindividualshasnorealityandhasnoothertruthtoshowthanthisself.Allother
events,mentalorphysical,arebutpassingappearances,whiletheonlyabsoluteandunchangeabletruth
underlyingthemallistheself.Whileothersystemsinvestigatedthepramanasonlytoexaminehowfartheycould
determinetheobjectivetruthofthingsorourattitudeinpracticallifetowardsthem,Vedntasoughttoreach
beneaththesurfaceofappearances,andenquiredafterthefinalandultimatetruthunderlyingthemicrocosmand
themacrocosm,thesubjectandtheobject.Thefamousinstructionof@S'vetaketu,themostimportantVednta
text(mahvkya)says,"Thatartthou,OS'vetaketu."Thiscomprehensionofmyselfastheultimatetruthisthe
highestknowledge,forwhenthisknowledgeisonceproduced,ourcognitionofworldappearanceswill
automaticallycease.Unlessthemindischastenedandpurgedofallpassionsanddesires,thesoulcannot
comprehendthistruth;butwhenthisisoncedone,andthesoulisanxiousforsalvationbyaknowledgeofthe
highesttruth,thepreceptorinstructshim,"Thatartthou."Atoncehebecomesthetruthitself,whichisatonce
identicalwithpureblissandpureintelligence;allordinarynotionsandcognitionsofdiversityandofthe

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:AllthatisimportantinS'a@nkara'scommentaryofthe_Brahmastras_hasbeenexcellently
systematizedbyDeusseninhis_SystemoftheVedanta_;itisthereforeunnecessaryformetogiveanylong
accountofthispart.Mostofwhatfollowshasbeentakenfromthewritingsofhisfollowers.]

440

many cease; there is no duality, no notion of mine and thane; the vast illusion of this world process is extinct in him,
and he shines forth as the one, the truth, the Brahman. All Hindu systems believed that when man attained salvation,
he became divested of all world-consciousness, or of all consciousness of himself and his interests, and was thus
reduced to his own original purity untouched by all sensations, perceptions, feelings and willing, but there the idea
was this that when man had no bonds of karma and no desire and attachment
Chapter II 292
withtheworldandhadknownthenatureofhisselfasabsolutelyfreeandunattachedtotheworldandhisown
psychosis,hebecameemancipatedfromtheworldandallhisconnectionswiththeworldceased,thoughtheworld
continuedaseverthesamewithothers.Theexternalworldwasarealitywiththem;theunrealityorillusion
consistedinwantoftrueknowledgeabouttherealnatureoftheself,onaccountofwhichtheselffoolishly
identifieditselfwithworldexperiences,worldlyjoysandworldevents,andperformedgoodandbadworks
accordingly.Theforceofaccumulatedkarmasledhimtoundergotheexperiencesbroughtaboutbythem.While
reapingthefruitsofpastkarmashe,asignorantaseverofhisownself,workedagainunderthedelusionofafalse
relationshipbetweenhimselfandtheworld,andsotheworldprocessranon.Mufti(salvation)meantthe
dissociationoftheselffromthesubjectivepsychosisandtheworld.Thisconditionofthepurestateofselfwas
regardedasanunconsciousonebyNyyaVais'e@sikaandMma@ms,andasastateofpureintelligenceby
S@mkhyaandYoga.ButwithVedntathecaseisdifferent,foritheldthattheworldassuchhasnoreal
existenceatall,butisonlyanillusoryimaginationwhichlaststillthemomentwhentrueknowledgeisacquired.
Assoonaswecometoknowthattheonetruthistheself,theBrahman,allourillusoryperceptionsrepresenting
theworldasafieldofexperiencecease.Thishappensnotbecausetheconnectionsoftheselfwiththeworldcease,
butbecausetheappearanceoftheworldprocessdoesnotrepresenttheultimateandhighesttruthaboutit.All
ournotionsabouttheabidingdiversifiedworld(lastingthoughtheymaybefrombeginninglesstime)arefalsein
thesensethattheydonotrepresenttherealtruthaboutit.Wenotonlydonotknowwhatweourselvesreallyare,
butdonotalsoknowwhattheworldaboutusis.Wetakeourordinaryexperiencesoftheworldasrepresenting

441

itcorrectly,andproceedonourcareerofdailyactivity.Itisnodoubttruethattheseexperiencesshowusan
establishedorderhavingitsownlaws,butthisdoesnotrepresenttherealtruth.Theyaretrueonlyinarelative
sense,solongastheyappeartobeso;forthemomenttherealtruthaboutthemandtheselfiscomprehendedall
worldappearancesbecomeunreal,andthatonetruth,theBrahman,purebeing,bliss,intelligence,shinesforthas
theabsolutetheonlytruthinworldandman.Theworldappearanceasexperiencedbyusisthusoftenlikenedto
theillusoryperceptionofsilverinaconchshell;forthemomenttheperceptionappearstobetrueandtheman
runstopickitup,asiftheconchshellwerearealpieceofsilver;butassoonashefindsoutthetruththatthisis
onlyapieceofconchshell,heturnshisbackonitandisnolongerdeludedbytheappearanceoragainattracted
towardsit.Theillusionofsilverisinexplicableinitself,foritwastrueforallpurposessolongasitpersisted,but
whentrueknowledgewasacquired,itforthwithvanished.Thisworldappearancewillalsovanishwhenthetrue
knowledgeofrealitydawns.Whenfalseknowledgeisoncefoundtobefalseitcannotreturnagain.The
Upani@sadstellusthathewhoseesthemanyhereisdoomed.Theone,theBrahman,aloneistrue;allelseisbut
delusionofnameandform.Othersystemsbelievedthatevenafteremancipation,theworldwouldcontinueasit
is,thattherewasnothingillusoryinit,butIcouldnothaveanyknowledgeofitbecauseoftheabsenceofthe
instrumentsbytheprocessesofwhichknowledgewasgenerated.TheS@mkhyapuru@sacannotknowthe
worldwhenthebuddhistuffisdissociatedfromitandmergedintheprak@rti,theMm@msandtheNyya
soulisalsoincapableofknowingtheworldafteremancipation,asitisthendissociatedfrommanas.Butthe
Vedntapositionisquitedistincthere.Wecannotknowtheworld,forwhentherightknowledgedawns,the
perceptionofthisworldappearanceprovesitselftobefalsetothepersonwhohaswitnessedthetruth,the
Brahman.Anillusioncannotlastwhenthetruthisknown;whatistruthisknowntous,butwhatisillusionis
undemonstrable,unspeakable,andindefinite.Theillusionrunsonfrombeginninglesstime;wedonotknowhow
itisrelatedtotruth,theBrahman,butweknowthatwhenthetruthisonceknownthefalseknowledgeofthis

442

world-appearance disappears once for all. No intermediate link is necessary to effect it, no mechanical dissociation of
buddhi or manas, but just as by finding out the glittering piece to be a conch-shell the illusory perception of silver is
destroyed, so this illusory perception of world-appearance is also destroyed by a true knowledge of the reality, the
Brahman. The Upani@sads held that reality or truth was one, and there was "no
Chapter II 293
many"anywhere,andS'akaraexplaineditbyaddingthatthe"many"wasmerelyanillusion,andhence
didnotexistinrealityandwasboundtodisappearwhenthetruthwasknown.Theworldappearanceis
my(illusion).ThisiswhatS'akaraemphasizesinexpoundinghisconstructivesystemoftheUpani@sad
doctrine.Thequestionissometimesasked,howthemybecomesassociatedwithBrahman.ButVednta
thinksthisquestionillegitimate,forthisassociationdidnotbeginintimeeitherwithreferencetothecosmos
orwithreferencetoindividualpersons.Infactthereisnorealassociation,forthecreationofillusiondoes
notaffecttheunchangeabletruth.Myorillusionisnorealentity,itisonlyfalseknowledge(_avidy_)
thatmakestheappearance,whichvanisheswhentherealityisgraspedandfound.Myoravidyhasan
apparentexistenceonlysolongasitlasts,butthemomentthetruthisknownitisdissolved.Itisnotareal
entityinassociationwithwhicharealworldappearancehasbeenbroughtintopermanentexistence,forit
onlyhasexistencesolongaswearedeludedbyit(_prttikasatt_).Mythereforeisacategorywhich
bafflestheordinarylogicaldivisionofexistenceandnonexistenceandtheprincipleofexcludedmiddle.For
themycanneitherbesaidtobe"is"nor"isnot"(_tattvnyatvbhymanirvacany_).Itcannotbesaid
thatsuchalogicalcategorydoesnotexist,forallourdreamandillusorycognitionsdemonstrateittous.
Theyexistastheyareperceived,buttheydonotexistsincetheyhavenootherindependentexistencethan
thefactoftheirperception.Ifithasanycreativefunction,thatfunctionisasillusiveasitsownnature,for
thecreationonlylastssolongastheerrorlasts.Brahman,thetruth,isnotinanywaysulliedoraffectedby
associationwithmy,fortherecanbenoassociationoftherealwiththeempty,themy,theillusory.Itis
norealassociationbutamereappearance.

443
Inwhatsenseistheworldappearancefalse?

Theworldissaidtobefalseamereproductofmy.Thefalsehoodofthisworldappearancehasbeenexplained
asinvolvedinthecategoryoftheindefinitewhichisneithersat"is"norasat"isnot."Heretheoppositionofthe
"is"and"isnot"issolvedbythecategoryoftime.Theworldappearanceis"isnot,"sinceitdoesnotcontinueto
manifestitselfinalltimes,andhasitsmanifestationuptothemomentthattherightknowledgedawns.Itisnot
therefore"isnot"inthesensethata"castleintheair"orahare'shornis"isnot,"forthesearecalledtuccha,the
absolutelynonexistent.Theworldappearanceissaidtobe"is"orexisting,sinceitappearstobesoforthetime
thestateofignorancepersistsinus.Sinceitexistsforatimeitissat(is),butsinceitdoesnotexistforalltimesitis
asat(isnot).Thisistheappearance,thefalsehoodoftheworldappearance(_jagatprapaca_)thatitisneither
satnorasatinanabsolutesense.Orratheritmayalsobesaidinanotherwaythatthefalsehoodoftheworld
appearanceconsistsinthis,thatthoughitappearstobetherealityoranexpressionormanifestationofthe
reality,thebeing,sat,yetwhentherealityisoncerightlycomprehended,itwillbemanifestthattheworldnever
existed,doesnotexist,andwillneverexistagain.Thisisjustwhatwefindinanillusoryperception;whenonce
thetruthisfoundoutthatitisaconchshell,wesaythatthesilver,thoughitappearedatthetimeofillusory
perceptiontobewhatwesawbeforeusas"this"(thisissilver),yetitneverexistedbefore,doesnotnowexist,and
willneverexistagain.Inthecaseoftheillusoryperceptionofsilver,the"this"(pointingtoathingbeforeme)
appearedassilver;inthecaseoftheworldappearance,itisthebeing(_sat_),theBrahman,thatappearsasthe
world;butasinthecasewhenthe"this"beforeusisfoundtobeapieceofconchshell,thesilverisatonce
dismissedashavinghadnoexistenceinthe"this"beforeus,sowhentheBrahman,thebeing,thereality,isonce
directlyrealized,theconvictioncomesthattheworldneverexisted.Thenegationoftheworldappearance
howeverhasnoseparateexistenceotherthanthecomprehensionoftheidentityofthereal.Thefactthatthereal
isrealizedisthesameasthattheworldappearanceisnegated.Thenegationhereinvolvedrefersbothtothething
negated(theworldappearance)andthe

444

negation itself, and hence it cannot be contended that when the conviction of the negation of the world is also regarded
as false (for if the negation is not false then it remains as an entity different from Brahman and hence
Chapter II 294
theunqualifiedmonismfails),thenthisreinstatestherealityoftheworldappearance;fornegationoftheworld
appearanceisasmuchfalseastheworldappearanceitself,andhenceontherealizationofthetruththenegative
thesis,thattheworldappearancedoesnotexist,includesthenegationalsoasamanifestationofworld
appearance,andhencetheonlythingleftistherealizedidentityofthetruth,thebeing.Thepeculiarityofthis
illusionofworldappearanceisthis,thatitappearsasconsistentwithorinlaidinthebeing(_sat_)thoughitisnot
there.Thisofcourseisdissolvedwhenrightknowledgedawns.Thisindeedbringshometousthetruththatthe
worldappearanceisanappearancewhichisdifferentfromwhatweknowasreal(_sadvilak@sa@na_);forthe
realisknowntousasthatwhichisprovedbytheprama@nas,andwhichwillneveragainbefalsifiedbylater
experienceorothermeansofproof.Athingissaidtobetrueonlysolongasitisnotcontradicted;butsinceatthe
dawnofrightknowledgethisworldappearancewillbefoundtobefalseandnonexisting,itcannotberegarded
asreal[Footnoterefl].ThusBrahmanaloneistrue,andtheworldappearanceisfalse;falsehoodandtruthare
notcontraryentitiessuchthatthenegationorthefalsehoodoffalsehoodwillmeantruth.Theworldappearance
isawholeandinreferringtoitthenegationrefersalsotoitselfasapartoftheworldappearanceandhencenot
onlyisthepositiveworldappearancefalse,butthefalsehooditselfisalsofalse;whentheworldappearanceis
contradictedatthedawnofrightknowledge,thefalsehooditselfisalsocontradicted.

Brahmandiffersfromallotherthingsinthisthatitisselfluminous(_svapraks'a_)andhasnoform;itcannot
thereforebetheobjectofanyotherconsciousnessthatgraspsit.Allotherthings,ideas,emotions,etc.,incontrast
toitarecalled_d@rs'ya_(objectsofconsciousness),whileitisthe_dra@s@t_(thepureconsciousness
comprehendingallobjects).Assoonasanythingiscomprehendedasanexpressionofamentalstate(_v@rtti_),it
issaidtohaveaformanditbecomesd@rs'ya,andthisisthecharacteristicofallobjectsofconsciousnessthat
theycannotrevealthemselvesapartfrombeingmanifestedasobjectsofconsciousnessthroughamentalstate.

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_Advaitasiddhi,Mithytvanirukti_.]
445

Brahman also, so long as it is understood as a meaning of the Upani@sad text, is not in its true nature; it is only when it
shines forth as apart from the associations of any form that it is svapraks'a and dra@s@t. The knowledge of the pure
Brahman is devoid of any form or mode. The notion of _d@rs'yatva_ (objectivity) carries with it also the notion of
_ja@datva_ (materiality) or its nature as non-consciousness (_ajnatva_) and non-selfness (_antmatva_) which
consists in the want of self-luminosity of objects of consciousness. The relation of consciousness (_jna_) to its objects
cannot be regarded as real but as mere illusory impositions, for as we shall see later, it is not possible to determine the
relation between knowledge and its forms. Just as the silver-appearance of the conch-shell is not its own natural
appearance, so the forms in which consciousness shows itself are not its own natural essence. In the state of
emancipation when supreme bliss (_nanda_) shines forth, the nanda is not an object or form of the illuminating
consciousness, but it is the illumination itself. Whenever there is a form associated with consciousness, it is an
extraneous illusory imposition on the pure consciousness. These forms are different from the essence of consciousness,
not only in this that they depend on consciousness for their expression and are themselves but objects of
consciousness, but also in this that they are all finite determinations (_paricchinna_), whereas consciousness, the
abiding essence, is everywhere present without any limit whatsoever. The forms of the object such as cow, jug, etc. are
limited in themselves in what they are, but through them all the pure being runs by virtue of which we say that the cow
is, the jug is, the pot is. Apart from this pure being running through all the individual appearances, there is no other
class (_jti_) such as cowness or jugness, but it is on this pure being that different individual forms are illusorily imposed
(_gha@tdkam sadarthekalpitam, pratyekam tadanubiddhatvena pra@tyamnatvt_). So this world-appearance which
is essentially different from the Brahman, the being which forms the material cause on which it is imposed, is false
Chapter II 295
(_updnani@s@thiyanibhvapratiyogitvalak@sa@namithytvasiddhi@hasCitsukhahasit).

Thenatureoftheworldappearance,phenomena.

Theworldappearanceisnothoweversoillusoryastheperceptionofsilverintheconchshell,forthelatter
typeofworldlyillusionsiscalled_prtibhsika,_astheyarecontradictedbyother

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laterexperiences,whereastheillusionofworldappearanceisnevercontradictedinthisworldlystageandisthus
called_vyavahrika_(from_vyavahra_,practice,i.e.thatonwhichisbasedallourpracticalmovements).So
longastherightknowledgeoftheBrahmanastheonlyrealitydoesnotdawn,theworldappearancerunsonin
anorderlymanneruncontradictedbytheaccumulatedexperienceofallmen,andassuchitmustbeheldtobe
true.Itisonlybecausetherecomessuchastageinwhichtheworldappearanceceasestomanifestitselfthatwe
havetosaythatfromtheultimateandabsolutepointofviewtheworldappearanceisfalseandunreal.Asagainst
thisdoctrineoftheVedntaitissometimesaskedhow,asweseethereality(_sattva_)beforeus,wecandenythat
ithastruth.TothistheVedntaanswersthatthenotionofrealitycannotbederivedfromthesenses,norcanitbe
definedasthatwhichisthecontentofrightknowledge,forwecannothaveanyconceptionofrightknowledge
withoutaconceptionofreality,andnoconceptionofrealitywithoutaconceptionofrightknowledge.The
conceptionofrealitycomprehendswithinitthenotionsofunalterability,absoluteness,andindependence,which
cannotbehaddirectlyfromexperience,asthisgivesonlyanappearancebutcannotcertifyitstruth.Judgedfrom
thispointofviewitwillbeevidentthatthetruerealityinallourexperienceistheoneselfluminousflashof
consciousnesswhichisallthroughidenticalwithitselfinallitsmanifestationsofappearance.Ourpresent
experienceoftheworldappearancecannotinanywayguaranteethatitwillnotbecontradictedatsomelater
stage.Whatreallypersistsinallexperienceisthebeing(_sat_)andnotitsforms.Thisbeingthatisassociated
withallourexperienceisnotauniversalgenusnormerelytheindividualappearanceofthemoment,butitisthe
being,thetruthwhichformsthesubstratumofallobjectiveeventsandappearances(_ekenaivasarvnugatena
sarvatrasatpratti@h_).Thingsarenotexistentbecausetheypossessthegenusofbeing(_sat_)asNyya
supposes,buttheyaresobecausetheyarethemselvesbutappearanceimposedononeidenticalbeingasthebasis
andgroundofallexperience.Beingisthussaidtobethebasis(_adhi@s@thna_)onwhichtheillusionsappear.
Thisbeingisnotdifferentwithdifferentthingsbutoneinallappearances.Ourperceptionsoftheworld
appearancecouldhavebeentakenasaguaranteeoftheirreality,iftherealitywhichissupposedofthem

447

could be perceived by the senses, and if inference and s'ruti (scriptures) did not point the other way. Perception can of
course invalidate inference, but it can do so only when its own validity has been ascertained in an undoubted and
uncontested manner. But this is not the case with our perceptions of the world-appearance, for our present perceptions
cannot prove that these will never be contradicted in future, and inference and s'ruti are also against it. The mere fact
that I perceive the world-appearance cannot prove that what I perceive is true or real, if it is contradicted by inference.
We all perceive the sun to be small, but our perception in this case is contradicted by inference and we have hence to
admit that our perceptions are erroneous. We depend (_upajvya_) indeed for all our transactions on perception, but
such dependence cannot prove that that on which we depend is absolutely valid. Validity or reality can only be
ascertained by proper examination and enquiry (_park@s_), which may convince us that there is no error in it. True it
is that by the universal testimony of our contemporaries and by the practical fruition and realization of our endeavours
in the external world, it is proved beyond doubt that the world-appearance before us is a reality. But this sort of
examination and enquiry cannot prove to us with any degree of satisfaction that the world-appearance will never be
contradicted at any time or at any stage. The Vednta also admits that our examination and enquiry prove to us that the
world-appearance now exists as it appears; it only denies that it cannot continue to exist for all times, and a time will
come when to the emancipated person the world-appearance will cease to exist.
Chapter II 296
Theexperience,observation,andpracticalutilityoftheobjectsasperceivedbyuscannotprovetousthatthese
willneverbecontradictedatanyfuturetime.Ourperceptionoftheworldappearancecannotthereforedisprove
theVedntainferencethattheworldappearanceisfalse,anditwilldemonstrateitselftobesoatthetimewhen
therightknowledgeofBrahmanasonedawnsinus.ThetestimonyoftheUpani@sadsalsocontradictsthe
perceptionwhichgraspstheworldappearanceinitsmanifoldaspect.

Moreoverweareledtothinkthattheworldappearanceisfalse,foritisnotpossibleforustodiscoverany
truerelationbetweentheconsciousness(_d@rk_)andtheobjectsofconsciousness(_d@rs'ya_).
Consciousnessmustbeadmittedtohavesomekindof

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connectionwiththeobjectswhichitillumines,forhaditnotbeensotherecouldbeanyknowledgeatany
timeirrespectiveofitsconnectionswiththeobjects.Butitisnotpossibletoimagineanykindofconnection
betweenconsciousnessanditsobjects,foritcanneitherbecontact(_sa@myoga_)norinherence
(_samavya_);andapartfromthesetwokindsofconnectionsweknowofnoother.Wesaythatthingsare
theobjectsofourconsciousness,butwhatismeantbyitisindeeddifficulttodefine.Itcannotbethat
objectivityofconsciousnessmeansthataspecialeffectlikethejtatofMm@msisproduceduponthe
object,forsuchaneffectisnotadmissibleorperceivableinanyway;norcanobjectivityalsomeanany
practicalpurpose(ofbeingusefultous)associatedwiththeobjectasPrabhakrathinks,fortherearemany
thingswhicharetheobjectsofourconsciousnessbutnotconsideredasuseful(e.g.thesky).Objectivityalso
cannotmeanthatthethingistheobjectofthethoughtmovement(_jnakra@na_)involvedin
knowledge,forthiscanonlybewithreferencetoobjectspresenttotheperceiver,andcannotapplyto
objectsofpasttimeaboutwhichonemaybeconscious,forifthethingisnotpresenthowcanitbemadean
objectofthoughtmovement?Objectivityfurthercannotmeanthatthethingsprojecttheirownformson
theknowledgeandarehencecalledobjects,forthoughthismayapplyinthecaseofperception,itcannotbe
trueofinference,wheretheobjectofconsciousnessisfarawayanddoesnotmouldconsciousnessafterits
ownform.Thusinwhateverwaywemaytrytoconceivemanifoldthingsexistingseparatelyandbecoming
objectsofconsciousnesswefail.Wehavealsoseenthatitisdifficulttoconceiveofanykindofrelation
subsistingbetweenobjectsandconsciousness,andhenceithastobeadmittedthattheimpositionofthe
worldappearanceisafterallnothingbutillusory.

Nowthoughallthingsarebutillusoryimpositionsonconsciousnessyetfortheilluminationofspecificobjectsit
isadmittedevenbyVedntathatthiscanonlytakeplacethroughspecificsensecontactandparticularmental
states(_v@rtti_)ormodes;butifthatbesowhynotratheradmitthatthiscantakeplaceevenonthe
assumptionoftheabsoluterealityofthemanifoldexternalworldwithout?TheanswerthattheVedntagivesto
suchaquestionisthis,thatthephenomenonofilluminationhasnottoundergoanygradualprocess,foritisthe
workofone

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flash like the work of the light of a lamp in removing darkness; so it is not possible that the external reality should have
to pass through any process before consciousness could arise; what happens is simply this, that the reality (_sat_)
which subsists in all things as the same identical one reveals the object as soon as its veil is removed by association
with the v@rtti (mental mould or state). It is like a light which directly and immediately illuminates everything with
which it comes into relation. Such an illumination of objects by its underlying reality would have been continuous if
there were no veils or covers, but that is not so as the reality is hidden by the veil of ajna (nescience). This veil is
removed as soon as the light of consciousness shines through a mental mould or v@rtti, and as soon as it is removed
the thing shines forth. Even before the formation of the v@rtti the illusory impositions on the reality had still been
continuing objectively, but it could not be revealed as it was hidden by ajna which is removed by the action of the
corresponding v@rtti; and as soon as the veil is removed the thing shines forth in its true light. The action of the
senses, eye, etc.
Chapter II 297
servesbuttomodifythev@rttiofthemind,andthev@rttiofthemindonceformed,thecorrespondingajna
veilwhichwascoveringthecorrespondingspecificpartoftheworldappearanceisremoved,andtheillumination
oftheobjectwhichwasalreadypresent,beingdivestedoftheveil,showsitselfforth.Theillusorycreationswere
there,buttheycouldnotbemanifestedonaccountoftheveilofnescience.Assoonastheveilisremovedbythe
actionofthev@rttithelightofrealityshowsthecorrespondingillusorycreations.Soconsciousnessinitselfisthe
evershininglightofrealitywhichisnevergeneratedbuteverexists;errorsofperception(e.g.silverintheconch
shell)takeplacenotbecausethedo@saconsistingofthedefectoftheeye,theglazeoftheobjectandsuchother
elementsthatcontributedtotheillusion,generatedtheknowledge,butbecauseitgeneratedawrongv@rtti.Itis
becauseofthegenerationofthewrongv@rttithatthemanifestationisillusory.Intheillusion"thisissilver"as
whenwemistaketheconchshellforthesilver,itisthe_cit,_consciousnessorrealityasunderlyingtheobject
representedtousby"this"or"_idam_"thatisthebasis(_adhi@s@thna_)oftheillusionofsilver.Thecauseof
errorisournescienceornoncognition(_ajna_)ofitintheformoftheconchshell,whereastheright
knowledgeisthecognitionofitasconchshell.The

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basisisnotinthecontentofmyknowledgeasmanifestedinmymentalstate(_v@rtti_),sothattheillusionisnot
oftheformthatthe"knowledgeissilver"butof"thisissilver."Objectivephenomenaassuchhaverealityas
theirbasis,whereastheexpressionofilluminationofthemasstatesofknowledgeismadethroughthecitbeing
manifestedthroughthementalmouldorstates.Withoutthev@rttithereisnoilluminatingknowledge.
Phenomenalcreationsarethereintheworldmovingaboutasshadowyformsontheunchangeablebasisofonecit
orreality,butthisbasis,thislightofreality,canonlymanifesttheseformswhentheveilofnesciencecovering
themistemporarilyremovedbytheircomingintouchwithamentalmouldormindmodification(_v@rtti_).Itis
sometimessaidthatsinceallilluminationofknowledgemustbethroughthementalstatesthereisnootherentity
ofpureconsciousnessapartfromwhatismanifestedthroughthestates.ThisVedntadoesnotadmit,foritholds
thatitisnecessarythatbeforetheoperationofthementalstatescanbegintointerpretreality,realitymust
alreadybethereandthisrealityisnothingbutpureconsciousness.Hadtherebeennorealityapartfromthe
manifestingstatesofknowledge,thevalidityofknowledgewouldalsocease;soithastobeadmittedthatthereis
theoneeternalselfluminousrealityuntouchedbythecharacteristicsofthementalstates,whicharematerialand
sufferoriginationanddestruction.Itisthisselfluminousconsciousnessthatseemstoassumediverseformsin
connectionwithdiversekindsofassociationsorlimitations(_updhi_).Itmanifests_ajna_(nescience)and
hencedoesnotbyitselfremovetheajna,exceptwhenitisreflectedthroughanyspecifickindofv@rtti.There
isofcoursenodifference,noinnerandoutervarietiesbetweenthereality,thepureconsciousnesswhichisthe
essence,thebasisandthegroundofallphenomenalappearancesoftheobjectiveworld,andtheconsciousness
thatmanifestsitselfthroughthementalstates.Thereisonlyoneidenticalpureconsciousnessorreality,whichis
atoncethebasisofthephenomenaaswell,istheirinterpreterbyareflectionthroughthementalstatesor
v@rttis.

Thephenomenaorobjectscalledthedrs'yacanonlybedeterminedintheirvariousformsandmanifestations
butnotastotheirultimatereality;thereisnoexistenceasanentityofanyrelationsuchassa@myoga(contact)
orsamavya(inherence)

451

betweenthemandthepureconsciousnesscalledthed@rk;forthetruthisthis,thatthed@rk(perceiver)and
thed@rs'ya(perceived)haveoneidenticalreality;theformsofphenomenaarebutillusorycreationsonit.

It is sometimes objected that in the ordinary psychological illusion such as "this is silver," the knowledge of "this" as a
thing is only of a general and indefinite nature, for it is perceived as a thing but its special characteristics as a conch-
shell are not noticed, and thus the illusion is possible. But in Brahman or pure consciousness there are neither
definite nor indefinite characteristics of any kind, and hence it cannot be the ground of any illusion as the piece of
conch-shell perceived indefinitely as a mere "this" can be. The answer
Chapter II 298
ofVedntaisthatwhentheBrahmanstandsastheground(_adhi@s@thna_)oftheworldappearanceits
characteristicassatorrealonlyismanifested,whereasitsspecialcharacteraspureandinfiniteblissisnever
noticed;orratheritmaybesaidthattheillusionofworldappearanceispossiblebecausetheBrahmaninitstrue
andcorrectnatureisneverrevealedtousinourobjectiveconsciousness;whenIsay"thejugis,"the"isness,"or
"being,"doesnotshineinitspurity,butonlyasacharacteristicofthejugform,andthisistherootofthe
illusion.InallourexperiencesonlytheaspectofBrahmanasrealshinesforthinassociationwiththemanifold
objects,andthereforetheBrahmaninitstruenaturebeingunknowntheillusionismadepossible.Itisagain
objectedthatsincetheworldappearancecanserveallpracticalpurposes,itmustbeconsideredasrealandnot
illusory.ButtheVedntapointsoutthatevenbyillusoryperceptionspracticaleffectsareseentotakeplace;the
illusoryperceptionofasnakeinaropecausesallthefearthatarealsnakecoulddo;evenindreamswefeel
happyandsad,anddreamsmaybesobadastoaffectorincapacitatetheactualphysicalfunctionsandorgansof
aman.Soitisthatthepastimpressionsimbeddedinuscontinuingfrombeginninglesstimearesufficientto
accountforourillusorynotions,justastheimpressionsproducedinactualwakinglifeaccountforthedream
creations.Accordingtothegoodorbaddeedsthatamanhasdoneinpreviouslivesandaccordingtothe
impressionsorpotencies(_sa@mskra_)ofhispastliveseachmanhasaparticularkindofworldexperiencefor
himselfandtheimpressionsofonecannotaffecttheformationoftheillusoryexperienceoftheother.But

452

theexperienceoftheworldappearanceisnotwhollyasubjectivecreationforeachindividual,foreven
beforehiscognitionthephenomenaofworldappearancewererunninginsomeunknowablestateof
existence(_svenaadhyastasyasa@mskrasyaviyaddyadhysajanakatvopapatte@htatprattyabhvepi
tadadhysasyaprvamsattvtk@rtsnasypivyavahrikapadrthasyaajtasattvbhyupagamt_).Itis
againsometimesobjectedthatillusionisproducedbymalobservedsimilaritybetweentheground
(_adhi@s@thna_)andtheillusorynotionassilverin"thisissilver,"butnosuchsimilarityisfound
betweentheBrahmanandtheworldappearance.TothisVedntasaysthatsimilarityisnotan
indispensablefactorintheproductionofanillusion(e.g.whenawhiteconchisperceivedasyellowowingto
thedefectoftheeyethroughtheinfluenceofbileor_pitta_).Similarityhelpstheproductionofillusionby
rousingupthepotenciesofpastimpressionsormemories;butthisrousingofpastmemoriesmayaswellbe
doneby_ad@r@s@ta_theunseenpowerofourpastgoodorbaddeeds.Inordinaryillusionsomedefectis
necessarybuttheillusionofthisworldappearanceisbeginningless,andhenceitawaitsnootherdo@sa
(defect)thantheavidy(nescience)whichconstitutestheappearance.Hereavidyistheonlydo@saand
Brahmanistheonlyadhi@s@thnaorground.HadtherenotbeentheBrahman,theselfluminousasthe
adhi@s@thna,theillusorycreationscouldnothavebeenmanifestedatallThecauseofthedirect
perceptionofillusionisthedirectbutindefiniteperceptionoftheadhi@s@thna.Hencewherethe
adhi@s@thnaishiddenbytheveilofavidy,theassociationwithmentalstatesbecomesnecessaryfor
removingtheveilandmanifestingtherebytheselfluminousadhi@s@thna.Assoonastheadhi@s@thna,
theground,thereality,theblissfulselfluminousBrahmaniscompletelyrealizedtheillusionsdisappear.
Thedisappearanceofthephenomenameansnothingmorethantherealizationoftheselfluminous
Brahman.

TheDefinitionofAjna(nescience).

Ajnathecauseofallillusionsisdefinedasthatwhichisbeginningless,yetpositiveandremovableby
knowledge(_andibhvarupatvesatijnanivartyatvam_).Thoughitmanifestsitselfinallordinarythings
(veiledbyitbeforetheybecomeobjectsofperception)whichhaveabeginningintime,yetititselfhasno
beginning,foritisassociatedwiththepureconsciousnesswhich

453

is beginningless. Again though it has been described as positive (_bhvarpa_) it can very well constitute the essence of
negation (_abhva_) too, for the positivity (_bhvatva_) does not mean here the opposite of abhva
Chapter II 299
(negation)butnotesmerelyitsdifferencefromabhva(_abhvavilak@sa@natvamtramvivak@sitam_).
Ajnaisnotapositiveentity(_bhva_)likeanyotherpositiveentity,butitiscalledpositivesimplybecauseitis
notamerenegation(_abhva_).Itisacategorywhichisbelievedneithertobepositiveintheordinarysensenor
negative,butathirdonewhichisdifferentbothfrompositionaswellasfromnegation.Itissometimesobjected
thatajnaisamereillusoryimaginationofthemomentcausedbydefect(_do@sa_)andhenceitcannotbe
beginningless(_andi_);butVedntaholdsthatthefactthatitisanimaginationorratherimposition,doesnot
necessarilymeanthatitismerelyatemporarynotionproducedbythedefects;foritcouldhavebeensaidtobea
temporaryproductofthemomentifthegroundaswellastheillusorycreationassociatedwithitcameintobeing
forthemoment,butthisisnotthecasehere,asthecit,thegroundofillusion,iseverpresentandtheajna
thereforebeingeverassociatedwithitisalsobeginningless.Theajnaistheindefinitewhichisveiling
everything,andassuchisdifferentfromthedefiniteorthepositiveandthenegative.Thoughitisbeginningless
yetitcanberemovedbyknowledge,fortohaveabeginningornottohaveitdoesnotinanywaydetermine
whetherthethingissubjecttodissolutionornotforthedissolutionofathingdependsuponthepresenceofthe
thingwhichcancauseit;anditisafactthatwhenknowledgecomestheillusionisdestroyed;itdoesnotmatter
whetherthecausewhichproducedtheillusionwasbeginninglessornot.SomeVedntistshoweverdefineajna
asthesubstanceconstitutingillusion,andsaythatthoughitisnotapositiveentityyetitmayberegardedas
formingthesubstanceoftheillusion;itisnotnecessarythatonlyapositiveentityshouldbethematterofany
thing,forwhatisnecessaryforthenotionofamaterialcause(_updna_)isthis,thatitshouldcontinueor
persistasthesameinallchangesofeffects.Itisnottruethatonlywhatispositivecanpersistinandthroughthe
effectswhichareproducedinthetimeprocess.Illusionisunrealanditisnotunnaturalthattheajnawhich
alsoisunrealshouldbethecauseofit.

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AjnaestablishedbyPerceptionandInference.

Ajnadefinedastheindefinitewhichisneitherpositivenornegativeisalsodirectlyexperiencedbyusin
suchperceptionsas"Idonotknow,orIdonotknowmyselforanybodyelse,"or"Idonotknowwhatyou
say,"ormoreparticularly"Ihadbeensleepingsolonghappilyanddidnotknowanything."Such
perceptionspointtoanobjectwhichhasnodefinitecharacteristics,andwhichcannotproperlybesaidtobe
eitherpositiveornegative.Itmaybeobjectedthattheperception"Idonotknow"isnottheperceptionof
theindefinite,theajna,butmerelythenegationofknowledge.TothisVedntasaysthathaditbeenthe
perceptionofanegationmerely,thenthenegationmusthavebeenassociatedwiththespecificobjectto
whichitapplied.Anegationmustimplythethingnegatived;infactnegationgenerallyappearsasa
substantivewiththeobjectofnegationasaqualifyingcharacterspecifyingthenatureofthenegation.But
theperception"IdonotknoworIhadnoknowledge"doesnotinvolvethenegationofanyparticular
knowledgeofanyspecificobject,buttheknowledgeofanindefiniteobjectlessignorance.Suchanindefinite
ajnaispositiveinthesensethatitiscertainlynotnegative,butthispositiveindefiniteisnotpositiveinthe
samesenseinwhichotherdefiniteentitiesarecalledpositive,foritismerelythecharacterless,passive
indefiniteshowingitselfinourexperience.Ifnegationmeantonlyageneralnegation,andiftheperception
ofnegationmeantineachcasetheperceptionofageneralnegation,thenevenwherethereisajugonthe
ground,oneshouldperceivethenegationofthejugontheground,forthegeneralnegationinrelationto
otherthingsisthere.Thusnegationofathingcannotmeanthegeneralnotionofthenegationofallspecific
things;similarlyageneralnegationwithoutanyspecificobjecttowhichitmightapplycannotmanifestitself
toconsciousness;thenotionofageneralnegationofknowledgeisthusopposedtoanyandeveryknowledge,
sothatifthelatterispresenttheformercannotbe,buttheperception"Idonotknow"canpersist,even
thoughmanyindividualobjectsbeknowntous.Thusinsteadofsayingthattheperceptionof"Idonot
know"istheperceptionofaspecialkindofnegation,itisratherbettertosaythatitistheperceptionofa
differentcategorynamelytheindefinite,theajna.Itisourcommonexperience
455
Chapter II 300
thatafterexperiencingtheindefinite(_ajna_)ofaspecifictypewelaunchforthinourendeavourstoremoveit.
Soithastobeadmittedthattheperceptionoftheindefiniteisdifferentfromtheperceptionofmerenegation.The
characterofourperceivingconsciousness(_sk@si_)issuchthatboththerootajnaaswellasitsdiverseforms
withreferencetoparticularobjectsasrepresentedinmentalstates(_v@rttijna_),arecomprehendedbyit.Of
coursewhenthev@rttijnaaboutathingasinordinaryperceptionsofobjectscomesin,theajnawithregard
toitistemporarilyremoved,forthev@rttijnaisopposedtotheajna.Butsofarasourownperceiving
consciousness(_sk@sicaitanya_)isconceiveditcancomprehendboththeajnaandthejna(knowledge)of
things.Itisthusoftensaidthatallthingsshowthemselvestotheperceivingconsciousnesseitherasknownoras
unknown.Thustheperceivingconsciousnesscomprehendsallpositiveseitherasindefiniteajnaorasstatesof
knowledgeorasspecifickindsofajnaorignorance,butitisunabletocomprehendanegation,fornegation
(_abhva_)isnotaperception,butmerelytheabsenceofperception(_anupalabdhi_).ThuswhenIsayIdonot
knowthis,Iperceivetheindefiniteinconsciousnesswithreferencetothatthing,andthisisnottheperceptionofa
negationofthething.AnobjectionissometimesraisedfromtheNyyapointofviewthatsincewithoutthe
knowledgeofaqualification(_vis'e@sana_)thequalifiedthing(_vis'i@s@ta_)cannotbeknown,theindefinite
aboutanobjectcannotbepresentinconsciousnesswithouttheobjectbeingknownfirst.TothisVedntareplies
thatthemaximthatthequalificationmustbeknownbeforethequalifiedthingisknownisgroundless,forwecan
aswellperceivethethingfirstandthenitsqualification.Itisnotoutofplaceheretosaythatnegationisnota
separateentity,butisonlyapeculiarmodeofthemanifestationofthepositive.Eventhenaiyyikaswouldagree
thatintheexpression"thereisnonegationofajughere,"noseparatenegationcanbeaccepted,forthejugis
alreadypresentbeforeus.Astherearedistinctionsanddifferencesinpositiveentitiesbyillusoryimpositions,so
negationsarealsodistinguishedbysimilarillusoryimpositionsandappearasthenegationofjug,negationof
cloth,etc.;soalldistinctionsbetweennegationsareunnecessary,anditmaybeacceptedthatnegationlike
positionisonewhichappearsasmanyonaccountofillusorydistinctionsandimpositions.Thusthe

456

contentofnegationbeingitselfpositive,thereisnoreasontoobjectthatsuchperceptionsas"Idonotknow"
refertotheperceptionofanindefiniteajnainconsciousness.Soalsotheperception"Idonotknowwhatyou
say"isnottheperceptionofnegation,forthiswouldrequirethatthehearershouldknowfirstwhatwassaidby
thespeaker,andifthisissothenitisimpossibletosay"Idonotknowwhatyousay."

Soalsothecognition"Iwassleepinglonganddidnotknowanything"hastobeadmittedasreferringtothe
perceptionoftheindefiniteduringsleep.Itisnottrueassomesaythatduringsleepthereisnoperception,but
whatappearstotheawakenedmanas"Ididnotknowanythingsolong"isonlyaninference;for,itisnot
possibletoinferfromthepleasantandactivestateofthesensesintheawakenedstatethattheactivityhadceased
inthesleepstateandthatsincehehadnoobjectofknowledgethen,hecouldnotknowanything;forthereisno
invariableconcomitancebetweenthepleasantandactivestateofthesensesandtheabsenceofobjectsof
knowledgeintheimmediatelyprecedingstate.Duringsleepthereisamentalstateoftheformoftheindefinite,
andduringtheawakenedstateitisbytheimpression(_sa@mskra_)oftheaforesaidmentalstateofajnathat
oneremembersthatstateandsaysthat"Ididnotperceiveanythingsolong."Theindefinite(_ajna_)
perceivedinconsciousnessismorefundamentalandgeneralthanthemerenegationofknowledge
(_jnbhva_)andthetwoaresoconnectedthatthoughthelattermaynotbefelt,yetitcanbeinferredfrom
theperceptionoftheindefinite.Theindefinitethoughnotdefiniteisthusapositivecontentdifferentfrom
negationandisperceivedassuchindirectandimmediateconsciousnessbothintheawakenedstateaswellasin
thesleepingstate.

The presence of this ajna may also be inferred from the manner in which knowledge of objects is revealed in
consciousness, as this always takes place in bringing a thing into consciousness which was not known or rather known
as indefinite before we say "I did not know it before, but I know it now." My present knowledge of the thing thus
involves the removal of an indefinite which was veiling it before and positing it in consciousness, just as the first streak
of light in utter darkness manifests itself by removing the
Chapter II 301
darkness[Footnoteref1].Apartfromsuchaninferenceitsexistence

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_Pacapdikvivara@na,Tattvadpana_,andAdvaitasiddhi.]

457

isalsoindicatedbythefactthattheinfiniteblissofBrahmandoesnotshowitselfinitscompleteandlimitless
aspect.Iftherewasnoajnatoobstruct,itwouldsurelyhavemanifesteditselfinitsfullness.Againhaditnot
beenforthisajnatherewouldhavebeennoillusion.Itistheajnathatconstitutesthesubstanceofthe
illusion;forthereisnothingelsethatcanberegardedasconstitutingitssubstance;certainlyBrahmancouldnot,
asitisunchangeable.Thisajnaismanifestedbytheperceivingconsciousness(_sk@si_)andnotbythepure
consciousness.Theperceivingconsciousnessisnothingbutpureintelligencewhichreflectsitselfinthestatesof
avidy(ignorance).

LocusandObjectofAjna,Aha@mkra,andAnta@hkara@na.

Thisajnarestsonthepurecitorintelligence.ThiscitorBrahmanisofthenatureofpureillumination,butyet
itisnotopposedtotheajnaortheindefinite.Thecitbecomesopposedtotheajnaanddestroysitonlywhen
itisreflectedthroughthementalstates(_v@rtti_).Theajnathusrestsonthepurecitandnotonthecitas
associatedwithsuchillusoryimpositionsasgotoproducethenotionofego"_aham_"ortheindividualsoul.
VcaspatiMis'rahoweverholdsthattheajnadoesnotrestonthepurecitbutonthejva(individualsoul).
MdhavareconcilesthisviewofVcaspatiwiththeaboveview,andsaysthattheajnamayberegardedas
restingonthejvaorindividualsoulfromthispointofviewthattheobstructionofthepurecitiswithreference
tothejva(_Cinmtrs'ritamajnamjvapak@saptitvtjvs'ritamucyate_Vivara@naprameya,p.48).The
feeling"Idonotknow"seemshowevertoindicatethattheajnaiswithreferencetotheperceivingselfin
associationwithitsfeelingasegoor"I";butthisisnotso;suchanappearancehoweveriscausedonaccountof
thecloseassociationofajnawithanta@hkara@na(mind)bothofwhichareinessencethesame(see
Vivara@naprarneyasa@mgraha,p.48).

Theajnahoweverdoesnotonlyrestonthecit,butithasthecitasitsvisayaorobjecttoo,i.e.itsmanifestations
arewithreferencetotheselfluminouscit.Theselfluminouscitisthustheentityonwhichtheveilingactionof
theajnaisnoticed;theveilingactionismanifestednotbydestroyingtheselfluminouscharacter,norby
stoppingafuturecourseofluminouscareeronthepartofthecit,norbystoppingitsrelationswiththevi@saya,

458

but by causing such an appearance that the self-luminous cit seems so to behave that we seem to think that it is not or
it does not shine (_nsti na praks'ate iti vyavahra@h_) or rather there is no appearance of its shining or luminosity. To
say that Brahman is hidden by the ajna means nothing more than this, that it is such {_tadyogyat_) that the ajna
can so relate itself with it that it appears to be hidden as in the state of deep sleep and other states of ajna-
consciousness in experience. Ajna is thus considered to have both its locus and object in the pure cit. It is opposed to
the states of consciousness, for these at once dispel it. The action of this aj@ana is thus on the light of the reality
which it obstructs for us, so long as the obstruction is not dissolved by the states of consciousness. This obstruction of
the cit is not only with regard to its character as pure limitless consciousness but also with regard to its character as
pure and infinite bliss; so it is that though we do not experience the indefinite in our pleasurable feelings, yet its
presence as obstructing the pure cit is indicated by the fact that the full infinite bliss constituting the essence of
Brahman is obstructed; and as a result of that there is only an incomplete manifestation of the bliss in our phenomenal
experiences of pleasure. The ajna is one, but it seems to obstruct the pure cit in various aspects or modes, with
regard to which it
Chapter II 302
maybesaidthattheajnahasmanystatesasconstitutingtheindividualexperiencesoftheindefinitewith
referencetothediverseindividualobjectsofexperience.Thesestatesofajnaaretechnicallycalledtuljna
oravasthjna.Anystateofconsciousness(v@rttijna)removesamanifestationoftheajnaastuljna
andrevealsitselfastheknowledgeofanobject.

Themostimportantactionofthisajnaasobstructingthepurecit,andascreatinganillusoryphenomenonis
demonstratedinthenotionoftheegooraha@mkra.Thisnotionofaha@mkraisaunionofthetrueself,the
pureconsciousnessandotherassociations,suchasthebody,thecontinuedpastexperiences,etc.;itistheself
luminouscharacterlessBrahmanthatisfoundobstructedinthenotionoftheegoastherepositoryofathousand
limitations,characters,andassociations.Thisillusorycreationofthenotionoftheegorunsonfrombeginningless
time,eachsetofpreviousfalseimpositionsdeterminingthesucceedingsetofimpositionsandsoon.Thisblending
oftheunrealassociationsheldupinthemind(_anta@hkara@na_)withthereal,thefalsewith

459

thetrue,thatisattherootofillusion.Itistheanta@hkara@natakenastheselfluminousselfthatreflects
itselfinthecitasthenotionoftheego.Justaswhenwesaythattheironball(redhot)burns,therearetwo
entitiesoftheballandthefirefusedintoone,so,herealsowhenIsay"Iperceive",therearetwodistinct
elementsoftheself,asconsciousnessandthemindorantahkaranafusedintoone.Thepartoraspect
associatedwithsorrow,materiality,andchangefulnessrepresentstheanta@hkara@na,whereasthatwhich
appearsastheunchangeableperceivingconsciousnessistheself.Thusthenotionofegocontainstwoparts,one
realandotherunreal.

WerememberthatthisisdistinctlythatwhichPrabhkarasoughttorepudiate.Prabhkaradidnotconsiderthe
selftobeselfluminous,andheldthatsuchisthethreefoldnatureofthought(_tripu@ti_),thatitatoncereveals
theknowledge,theobjectofknowledge,andtheself.Hefurthersaid,thattheanalogyoftheredhotironballdid
nothold,fortheironballandthefireareseparatelyexperienced,buttheselfandtheanta@hkara@naarenever
separatelyexperienced,andwecanneversaythatthesetwoarereallydifferent,andonlyhaveanillusory
appearanceofaseemingunity.Perception(_anubhava_)islikealightwhichilluminatesboththeobjectandthe
self,andlikeitdoesnotrequiretheassistanceofanythingelseforthefulfilmentofitspurpose.ButtheVednta
objectstothissayingthataccordingtoPrabhakara'ssupposition,itisimpossibletodiscoveranyrelationbetween
theselfandtheknowledge.Ifknowledgecanberegardedasrevealingitself,theselfmayaswellbeheldtobe
selfluminous;theselfandtheknowledgeareindeedoneandthesame.Kumrilathinksthisthought
(_anubhava_),tobeamovement,NyyaandPrabhkaraasaqualityoftheself[Footnoteref1].Butifitwasa
movementlikeothermovements,itcouldnotaffectitselfasillumination.Ifitwereasubstanceandatomicin
size,itwouldonlymanifestasmallportionofathing,ifallpervasive,thenitwouldilluminateeverything,ifof
mediumsize,itwoulddependonitspartsforitsown

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:AccordingtoNyyathe_tman_isconsciousonlythroughassociationwithconsciousness,butitis
not consciousness(_cit_). Consciousness is associated with it only as a result of suitable collocations. Thus,
_Nyyamajar_inrefutingthedoctrineofselfluminosity{_svapraks'a_)says(p.432)

_sacetanas'cityogttadyogenavinja@da@hnrthvabhsadanyaddhicaitanya@mnma
manma@he.]

460

constitution and not on the self. If it is regarded as a quality of the self as the light is of the lamp, then also it has
necessarily to be supposed that it was produced by the self, for from what else could it be produced? Thus it is to be
admitted that the self, the tman, is the self-luminous entity. No one doubts any of his knowledge,
Chapter II 303
whetheritishewhoseesoranybodyelse.Theselfisthusthesameasvijna,thepureconsciousness,whichis
alwaysofitselfselfluminous[Footnoteref1].

Again,thoughconsciousnessiscontinuousinallstages,wakingorsleeping,yetaha@mkraisabsentduringdeep
sleep.Itistruethatonwakingfromdeepsleeponefeels"Islepthappilyanddidnotknowanything";yetwhat
happensisthis,thatduringdeepsleeptheanta@hkara@naandtheaha@mkraarealtogethersubmergedinthe
ajna,andthereareonlytheajnaandtheself;onwaking,thisaha@mkraasastateofanta@hkar@nais
againgenerated,andthenitassociatestheperceptionoftheajnainthesleepandoriginatestheperception"I
didnotknowanything."Thisaha@mkrawhichisamode(_v@rtti_)oftheanta@hkara@naisthusconstituted
byavidy,andismanifestedasjnas'akti(powerofknowledge)andkriys'akti(powerofwork).This
kriys'aktioftheaha@mkraisillusorilyimposedupontheself,andasaresultofthattheselfappearstobean
activeagentinknowingandwilling.Theaha@mkraitselfisregarded,aswehavealreadyseen,asamodeor
v@rttioftheanta@hkara@na,andassuchtheaha@mkraofapastperiodcannowbeassociated;buteventhen
thev@rttiofanta@hkara@na,aha@mkra,mayberegardedasonlytheactivesideoraspectofthe
anta@hkara@na.Thesameanta@hkara@naiscalledmanasinitscapacityasdoubtbuddhiinitscapacityas
achievingcertaintyofknowledge,andcittainitscapacityasremembering[Footnoteref2].Whenthepurecit
shinesforthinassociationwiththisanta@hkara@na,itiscalledajva.Itisclearfromtheaboveaccountthatthe
ajnaisnotamerenothing,butistheprincipleofthephenomena.Butitcannotstandalone,withoutthe
principleoftherealtosupportit(_s'raya_);itsownnatureastheajnaorindefiniteisperceiveddirectlyby
thepureconsciousness;itsmovementsasoriginatingthephenomenaremainindefiniteinthemselves,therealas
underlying

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_Nyyamakaranda_,pp.130140,Citshkhaand_Vivara@naprameyasa@mgraha_,pp.53
58.]

[Footnote2:See_Vedntaparibh@s_,p.88,Bombayedition.]

461

thesephenomenalmovementscanonlymanifestitselfthroughthesewhichhideit,whencorrespondingstates
ariseintheanta@hkara@na,andthelightoftherealshinesforththroughthesestates.Theanta@hkara@naof
whichaha@mkraisamoment,isitselfabeginninglesssystemofajnaphenomenacontainingwithinitthe
associationsandimpressionsofpastphenomenaasmerit,demerit,instincts,etc.fromabeginninglesstimewhen
thejvaorindividualsoulbeganhiscareer.

AnirvcyavdaandtheVedntaDialectic.

We have already seen that the indefinite ajna could be experienced in direct perception and according to Vednta
there are only two categories. The category of the real, the self-luminous Brahman, and the category of the indefinite.
The latter has for its ground the world-appearance, and is the principle by which the one unchangeable Brahman is
falsely manifested in all the diversity of the manifold world. But this indefinite which is different from the category of
the positive and the negative, has only a relative existence and will ultimately vanish, when the true knowledge of the
Brahman dawns. Nothing however can be known about the nature of this indefinite except its character as indefinite.
That all the phenomena of the world, the fixed order of events, the infinite variety of world-forms and names, all these
are originated by this avidy, ajna or my is indeed hardly comprehensible. If it is indefinite nescience, how can all
these well-defined forms of world-existence come out of it? It is said to exist only relatively, and to have only a
temporary existence beside the permanent infinite reality. To take such a principle and to derive from it the mind,
matter, and indeed everything else except the pure self-luminous Brahman, would hardly appeal to our reason. If this
system of world-order were only seeming appearance, with no other element of truth in it except pure being,
Chapter II 304
thenitwouldbeindefensibleinthelightofreason.Ithasbeenprovedthatwhatevernotionswehaveaboutthe
objectiveworldareallselfcontradictory,andthusgroundlessandfalse.Iftheyhaveallproceededfromthe
indefinitetheymustshowthischaracterwhenexposedtodiscerningcriticism.Allcategorieshavetobeshown
tobesohopelesslyconfusedandtobewithoutanyconceivablenotionthatthoughapparentbeforeusyetthey
crumbleintoindefinitenessassoonastheyare

462

examined,andonecannotmakesuchassertionaboutthemasthattheyareorthattheyarenot.Suchnegative
criticismsofourfundamentalnotionsabouttheworldorderwereundertakenbyS'rhar@saandhis
commentatorandfollowerCitsukha.Itisimpossiblewithinthelimitsofthischapter,togiveacompleteaccount
oftheircriticismsofourvariousnotionsofreality.Ishallgivehere,onlyoneexample.

Letustaketheexaminationofthenotionofdifference(_bheda_)from_Kha@n@danakha@n@dakhdya_.
Fourexplanationsarepossibleaboutthenotionofdifference:(1)thedifferencemaybeperceivedas
appearinginitsowncharacteristicsinourexperience(_svarpabheda_)asPrabhkarathinks;(2)the
differencebetweentwothingsisnothingbuttheabsenceofoneintheother(_anyonybhva_),assome
NaiyyikasandBh@t@tasthink;(3)differencemeansdivergenceofcharacteristics(_vaidharmya_)asthe
Vais'e@sikasspeakofit;(4)differencemaybeaseparatequalityinitselflikethep@rthaktvaqualityof
Nyya.Takingthefirstalternative,weseethatitissaidthatthejugandtheclothrepresentinthemselves,
bytheirveryformandexistence,theirmutualdifferencefromeachother.Butifbyperceivingtheclothwe
onlyperceiveitsdifferencefromthejugasthecharacteristicofthecloth,thenthejugalsomusthave
penetratedintotheformofthecloth,otherwisehowcouldweperceiveintheclothitscharacteristicsasthe
differencefromthejug?i.e.ifdifferenceisathingwhichcanbedirectlyperceivedbythesenses,thenas
differencewouldnaturallymeandifferencefromsomethingelse,itisexpectedthatsomethingelsesuchas
jug,etc.fromwhichthedifferenceisperceived,mustalsobeperceiveddirectlyintheperceptionofthe
cloth.Butiftheperceptionof"difference"betweentwothingshaspenetratedtogetherinthesameidentical
perception,thentheselfcontradictionbecomesapparent.Differenceasanentityisnotwhatweperceivein
thecloth,fordifferencemeansdifferencefromsomethingelse,andifthatthingfromwhichthedifferenceis
perceivedisnotperceived,thenhowcanthedifferenceasanentitybeperceived?Ifitissaidthatthecloth
itselfrepresentsitsdifferencefromthejug,andthatthisisindicatedbythejug,thenwemayask,whatis
thenatureofthejug?Ifthedifferencefromtheclothistheverynatureofthejug,thentheclothitselfisalso
involvedinthenatureofthejug.Ifitissaidthat

463

the jug only indicates a term from which difference is intended to be conveyed, then that also becomes impossible, for
how can we imagine that there is a term which is independent of any association of its difference from other things, and
is yet a term which establishes the notion of difference? If it is a term of difference, it cannot be independent of its
relation to other things from which it is differentiated. If its difference from the cloth is a quality of the jug, then also the
old difficulty comes in, for its difference from the cloth would involve the cloth also in itself; and if the cloth is involved
in the nature of the jug as its quality, then by the same manner the jug would also be the character of the cloth, and
hence not difference but identity results. Moreover, if a cloth is perceived as a character of the jug, the two will appear
to be hanging one over the other, but this is never so experienced by us. Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain if qualities
have any relation with things; if they have not, then absence of relation being the same everywhere, everything might
be the quality of everything. If there is a relation between these two, then that relation would require another relation
to relate itself with that relation, and that would again require another relation and that another, and so on. Again, it
may be said that when the jug, etc. are seen without reference to other things, they appear as jug, etc., but when they
are viewed with reference to cloth, etc. they appear as difference. But this cannot be so, for the perception as jug is
entirely different from the perception of difference. It should also be noted that the notion of difference is also different
from the notions of both the jug and the cloth. It is one
Chapter II 305
thingtosaythattherearejugandcloth,andquiteanotherthingtosaythatthejugisdifferentfromthecloth.
Thusajugcannotappearasdifference,thoughitmaybeviewedwithreferencetocloth.Thenotionofajugdoes
notrequirethenotionsofotherthingsforitsmanifestation.Moreover,whenIsaythejugisdifferentfromthe
cloth,Inevermeanthatdifferenceisanentitywhichisthesameasthejugorthecloth;whatImeanisthatthe
differenceoftheclothfromthejughasitslimitsinthejug,andnotmerelythatthenotionofclothhasa
referencetojug.Thisshowsthatdifferencecannotbethecharacteristicnatureofthethingperceived.

Again,inthesecondalternativewheredifferenceoftwo

463

thingsisdefinedastheabsenceofeachthingintheother,wefindthatifdifferenceinjugandclothmeansthat
thejugisnotintheclothorthatclothisnotinjug,thenalsothesamedifficultyarises;forwhenIsaythatthe
absenceornegationofjugintheclothisitsdifferencefromthejug,thenalsotheresidenceoftheabsenceofjug
intheclothwouldrequirethatthejugalsoresidesinthecloth,andthiswouldreducedifferencetoidentity.Ifitis
saidthattheabsenceofjugintheclothisnotaseparatething,butisrathertheidenticalclothitself,thenalso
theirdifferenceasmutualexclusioncannotbeexplained.Ifthismutualnegation(_anyonyabhva_)isexplained
asthemereabsenceofjugnessintheclothandofclothnessinthejug,thenalsoadifficultyarises;forthereisno
suchqualityinjugnessorclothnessthattheymaybemutuallyexcluded;andthereisnosuchqualityinthemthat
theycanbetreatedasidentical,andsowhenitissaidthatthereisnojugnessinclothwemightaswellsaythat
thereisnoclothnessincloth,forclothnessandjugnessareoneandthesame,andhenceabsenceofjugnessinthe
clothwouldamounttotheabsenceofclothnessintheclothwhichisselfcontradictory.Takingagainthethird
alternativeweseethatifdifferencemeansdivergenceofcharacteristics(_vaidharmya_),thenthequestionarises
whetherthevaidharmyaordivergenceasexistinginjughassuchadivergenceascandistinguishitfromthe
divergenceexistinginthecloth;iftheanswerisintheaffirmativethenwerequireaseriesofendlessvaidharmyas
progressingadinfinitum.Iftheanswerisinthenegativethentherebeingnodivergencebetweenthetwo
divergencestheybecomeidentical,andhencedivergenceofcharacteristicsassuchceasestoexist.Ifitissaidthat
thenaturalformsofthingsaredifferenceinthemselves,foreachofthemexcludestheother,thenapartfromthe
differencesthenaturalformsthethingsarereducedtoformlessness(_ni@hsvarpat_).Ifnaturalforms
(_svarpa_)meanspecialnaturalforms(_svarpavis'e@sa_)thenasthespecialnaturalformsorcharacteristics
onlyrepresentdifference,thenaturalformsofthethingsasapartfromthespecialoneswouldappeartobe
identical.Soalsoitmaybeprovedthatthereisnosuchqualityasp@rthaktva(separateness)whichcanexplain
differencesofthings,fortherealsothequestionswouldariseastowhetherseparatenessexistsindifferentthings
orsimilaronesorwhetherseparatenessisidenticalwiththethinginwhichitexistsornot,andsoforth.

465

The earliest beginnings of this method of subtle analysis and dialectic in Indian philosophy are found in the opening
chapters of _Kathvatthu_. In the great _Mahbha@sya_ on P@nini by Patajali also we find some traces of it. But
Ngrjuna was the man who took it up in right earnest and systematically cultivated it in all its subtle and abstruse
issues and counter-issues in order to prove that everything that appeared as a fixed order or system was non-existent,
for all were unspeakable, indescribable and self-contradictory, and thus everything being discarded there was only the
void (_s'nya_). S'a@nkara partially utilized this method in his refutations of Nyya and the Buddhist systems; but
S'rhar@sa again revived and developed it in a striking manner, and after having criticized the most important notions
and concepts of our everyday life, which are often backed by the Nyya system, sought to prove that nothing in the
world can be defined, and that we cannot ascertain whether a thing is or is not. The refutations of all possible
definitions that the Nyya could give necessarily led to the conclusion that the things sought to be defined did not exist
though they appeared to do so; the Vedntic contention was that this is exactly as it should be, for the indefinite
ajna produces only appearances which when exposed to reason show that no consistent notions of them can be
formed, or in other words the world-appearance, the phenomena of my or ajna, are indefinable or anirvacanya.
This
Chapter II 306
greatworkofS'rhar@sawasfollowedby_Tattvadpik_ofCitsukha,inwhichhegenerallyfollowed
S'rhar@saandsometimessupplementedhimwiththeadditionofcriticismsofcertainnewconcepts.The
methodofVedntathusfollowedononesidethemethodofS'nyavdainannullingalltheconceptsof
worldappearanceandontheotherVijnavdaBuddhisminprovingtheselfilluminatingcharacterof
knowledgeandultimatelyestablishedtheselfastheonlyselfluminousultimatereality.

TheTheoryofCausation.

TheVedntaphilosophylookedattheconstantlychangingphenomenaoftheworldappearanceandsoughtto
discovertherootwhenceproceededtheendlessseriesofeventsandeffects.Thetheorythateffectswere
altogethernewproductionscausedbytheinvariableunconditionalandimmediatelyprecedingantecedents,as
wellasthetheorythatitwasthecausewhichevolved

466

andbyitstransformationsproducedtheeffect,areconsideredinsufficienttoexplaintheproblemwhichthe
Vedntahadbeforeit.Certaincollocationsinvariablyandunconditionallyprecededcertaineffects,butthis
cannotexplainhowtheprevioussetofphenomenacouldberegardedasproducingthesucceedingset.Infactthe
conceptofcausationandproductionhadinitsomethingquiteundefinableandinexplicable.Ourenquiryafter
thecauseisanenquiryafteramorefundamentalandprimaryformofthetruthofathingthanwhatappearsat
thepresentmomentwhenwewishedtoknowwhatwasthecauseofthejug,whatwesoughtwasasimplerform
ofwhichtheeffectwasonlyamorecomplexformofmanifestation,whatistheground,theroot,outofwhichthe
effecthascomeforth?Ifapartfromsuchanenquirywetakethepictorialrepresentationofthecausalphenomena
inwhichsomecollocationsbeinginvariablypresentatanantecedentpointoftime,theeffectspringsforthinto
being,wefindthatwearejustwherewewerebefore,andareunabletopenetrateintothelogicoftheaffair.The
Nyyadefinitionofcauseandeffectmaybeofusetousinageneralwayinassociatingcertaingroupsofthingsof
aparticularkindwithcertainotherphenomenahappeningatasucceedingmomentasbeingrelevantpairsof
whichonebeingpresenttheotheralsohasaprobabilityofbeingpresent,butcandonothingmorethanthis.It
doesnotanswerourquestionastothenatureofcause.Antecedenceintimeisregardedinthisviewasan
indispensableconditionforthecause.Buttime,accordingtoNyya,isonecontinuousentity;successionoftime
canonlybeconceivedasantecedenceandconsequenceofphenomena,andtheseagaininvolvesuccession;thusthe
notionsofsuccessionoftimeandoftheantecedenceandconsequenceoftimebeingmutuallydependentupon
eachother(_anyonys'raya_)neitherofthesecanbeconceivedindependently.Anotherimportantconditionis
invariability.Butwhatdoesthatmean?Ifitmeansinvariableantecedence,thenevenanasswhichisinvariably
presentasanantecedenttothesmokerisingfromthewasherman'shouse,mustberegardedasthecauseofthe
smoke[Footnoteref1].Ifitmeanssuchanantecedenceascontributestothehappeningoftheeffect,itbecomes
againdifficulttounderstandanythingaboutitscontributing

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:AssesareusedincarryingsoiledlineninIndia.Assesarealwayspresentwhenwaterisboiledfor
washinginthelaundry.]

467

to the effect, for the only intelligible thing is the antecedence and nothing more. If invariability means the existence of
that at the presence of which the effect comes into being, then also it fails, for there may be the seed but no shoot, for
the mere presence of the seed will not suffice to produce the effect, the shoot. If it is said that a cause can produce an
effect only when it is associated with its accessory factors, then also the question remains the same, for we have not
understood what is meant by cause. Again when the same effect is often seen to be produced by a plurality of causes,
the cause cannot be defined as that which happening the
Chapter II 307
effecthappensandfailingtheeffectfails.Itcannotalsobesaidthatinspiteofthepluralityofcauses,each
particularcauseissoassociatedwithitsownparticularkindofeffectthatfromaspecialkindofcausewecan
withoutfailgetaspecialkindofeffect(cf.Vtsyyanaand_Nyyamajar_),foroutofthesameclaydifferent
effectscomeforthnamelythejug,theplate,etc.Againifcauseisdefinedasthecollocationoffactors,thenthe
questionarisesastowhatismeantbythiscollocation;doesitmeanthefactorsthemselvesorsomethingelseabove
them?Ontheformersuppositionthescatteredfactorsbeingalwayspresentintheuniversethereshouldalways
betheeffect;ifitmeanssomethingelseabovethespecificfactors,thenthatsomethingalwaysexisting,there
shouldalwaysbetheeffect.Norcancollocation(_smagr_)bedefinedasthelastmovementofthecauses
immediatelysucceedingwhichtheeffectcomesintobeing,fortherelationofmovementwiththecollocatingcause
isincomprehensible.Moreoverifmovementisdefinedasthatwhichproducestheeffect,theveryconceptionof
causationwhichwasrequiredtobeprovedistakenforgranted.Theideaofnecessityinvolvedinthecausal
conceptionthatacauseisthatwhichmustproduceitseffectisalsoequallyundefinable,inexplicable,andlogically
inconceivable.Thusinwhatsoeverwaywemayseektofindouttherealnatureofthecausalprinciplefromthe
interminableseriesofcauseeffectphenomenawefail.Allthecharacteristicsoftheeffectsareindescribableand
indefinableajnaofmy,andinwhateverwaywemaytrytoconceivethesephenomenainthemselvesorin
relationtooneanotherwefail,fortheyareallcarvedoutoftheindefiniteandareillogicalandillusory,andsome
daywillvanishforever.Thetruecauseisthusthepurebeing,therealitywhichisunshakableinitself,theground
upon

468

whichallappearancesbeingimposedtheyappearasreal.Thetruecauseisthustheunchangeablebeingwhich
persiststhroughallexperience,andtheeffectphenomenaarebutimpositionsuponitofajnaoravidy.Itis
thustheclay,thepermanent,thatisregardedasthecauseofallclayphenomenaasjug,plates,etc.Allthe
variousmodesinwhichtheclayappearsaremereappearances,unreal,indefinableandsoillusory.Theonetruth
istheclay.Soinallworldphenomenatheonetruthisbeing,theBrahman,andallthephenomenathatarebeing
imposedonitarebutillusoryformsandnames.Thisiswhatiscalledthe_satkryavda_ormoreproperlythe
_satkra@navda_oftheVednta,thatthecausealoneistrueandeverexisting,andphenomenainthemselves
arefalse.Thereisonlythismuchtruthinthem,thatallareimposedontherealityorbeingwhichaloneistrue.
Thisappearanceoftheonecausethebeing,astheunrealmanyofthephenomenaiswhatiscalledthe
_vivarttavda_asdistinguishedfromthe_s@mkhyayogapari@nmavda_,inwhichtheeffectisregardedas
therealdevelopmentofthecauseinitspotentialstate.Whentheeffecthasadifferentkindofbeingfromthe
causeitiscalledvivarttabutwhentheeffecthasthesamekindofbeingasthecauseitiscalled_pari@nma
(kra@nasvalak@sa@nnyathbhva@hpari@nma@htadvilak@sa@novivartta@h_or
_vastunastatsamattko'nyathbhva@hpari@nma@htadvi@samasattka@hvivartta@h)_.Vedntahasas
muchtoobjectagainsttheNyyaasagainstthepari@nmatheoryofcausationoftheS@mkhya;for
movement,development,form,potentiality,andactualityalltheseareindefinableandinconceivableinthelight
ofreason;theycannotexplaincausationbutonlyrestatethingsandphenomenaastheyappearintheworld.In
realityhoweverthoughphenomenaarenotidenticalwiththecause,theycanneverbedefinedexceptintermsof
thecause(_Tadabhedamvinaivatadvyatireke@nadurvacamkryyamvivartta@h)_.

ThisbeingtherelationofcauseandeffectorBrahmanandtheworld,thedifferentfollowersofS'a@nkara
Vedntainexplainingthecauseoftheworldappearancesometimeslaystressonthemy,ajnaoravidy,
sometimesontheBrahman,andsometimesonthemboth.ThusSarvaj@ntmamuni,thewriterof
_Sa@nk@sepas'rraka_andhisfollowersthinkthatthepureBrahmanshouldberegardedasthecausal
substance(_updna_)oftheworldappearance,whereasPraks'tmanAkhan@dnanda,and

469

Mdhava hold that Brahman in association with my, i.e. the my-reflected form of Brahman as s'vara should be
regarded as the cause of the world-appearance. The world-appearance is an evolution or pari@nma of the my as
located in s'vara, whereas s'vara (God) is the vivartta causal matter. Others however make a
Chapter II 308
distinctionbetweenmyasthecosmicalfactorofillusionandavidyasthemanifestationofthesameentityin
theindividualorjva.Theyholdthatthoughtheworldappearancemaybesaidtobeproducedbythemyyet
themindetc.associatedwiththeindividualareproducedbytheavidywiththejvaortheindividualasthe
causalmatter(_updna_).Othersholdthatsinceitistheindividualtowhomboths'varaandtheworld
appearancearemanifested,itisbetterrathertothinkthattheseareallmanifestationsofthejvainassociation
withhisavidyorajna.Othershoweverholdthatsinceintheworldappearancewefindinoneaspectpure
beingandinanothermaterialityetc.,bothBrahmanandmyaretoberegardedasthecause,Brahmanasthe
permanentcausalmatter,updnaandmyastheentityevolvinginpari@nma.VcaspatiMis'rathinksthat
Brahmanisthepermanentcauseoftheworldappearancethroughmyasassociatedwithjva.Myisthus
onlyasahakriorinstrumentasitwere,bywhichtheoneBrahmanappearsintheeyeofthejvaasthemanifold
worldofappearance.Praks'nandaholdshoweverinhis_SiddhntaMuktval_thatBrahmanitselfispureand
absolutelyunaffectedevenasillusoryappearance,andisnoteventhecausalmatteroftheworldappearance.
Everythingthatweseeinthephenomenalworld,thewholefieldofworldappearance,istheproductofmy,
whichisboththeinstrumentalandtheupdna(causalmatter)oftheworldillusion.Butwhateverthese
divergencesofviewmaybe,itisclearthattheydonotinanywayaffecttheprincipalVedntatextthattheonly
unchangeablecauseistheBrahman,whereasallelse,theeffectphenomena,haveonlyatemporaryexistenceas
indefinableillusion.Thewordmywasusedinthe@RgVedainthesenseofsupernaturalpowerandwonderful
skill,andtheideaofaninherentmysteryunderlyingitwasgraduallyemphasizedintheAtharvaVeda,andit
begantobeusedinthesenseofmagicorillusion.IntheB@rhadra@nyaka,Pras'na,andSvets'vatara
Upani@sadsthewordmeansmagic.ItisnotoutofplaceheretomentionthatintheolderUpani@sads

470

thewordmyoccursonlyonceintheB@rhadra@nyakaandonceonlyinthePras'na.InearlyPliBuddhist
writingsitoccursonlyinthesenseofdeceptionordeceitfulconduct.Buddhagho@sausesitinthesenseof
magicalpower.InNgrjunaandthe_Lankvatra_ithasacquiredthesenseofillusion.InS'a@nkarathe
wordmyisusedinthesenseofillusion,bothasaprincipleofcreationasas'akti(power)oraccessorycause,
andasthephenomenalcreationitself,astheillusionofworldappearance.

ItmayalsobementionedherethatGau@dapdatheteacherofS'a@nkara'steacherGovindaworkedouta
systemwiththehelpofthemydoctrine.TheUpani@sadsarepermeatedwiththespiritofanearnestenquiry
afterabsolutetruth.Theydonotpayanyattentiontowardsexplainingtheworldappearanceorenquiringinto
itsrelationswithabsolutetruth.Gau@dapdaassertsclearlyandprobablyforthefirsttimeamongHindu
thinkers,thattheworlddoesnotexistinreality,thatitismy,andnotreality.Whenthehighesttruthis
realizedmyisnotremoved,foritisnotathing,butthewholeworldillusionisdissolvedintoitsownairy
nothingnevertorecuragain.ItwasGau@dapdawhocomparedtheworldappearancewithdream
appearances,andheldthatobjectsseeninthewakingworldareunreal,becausetheyarecapableofbeingseen
likeobjectsseeninadream,whicharefalseandunreal.ThetmansaysGau@dapdaisatoncethecognizer
andthecognized,theworldsubsistsinthetmanthroughmy.Astmanaloneisrealandalldualityan
illusion,itnecessarilyfollowsthatallexperienceisalsoillusory.S'a@nkaraexpoundedthisdoctrineinhis
elaboratecommentariesontheUpani@sadsandtheBrahmastra,butheseemstometohavedonelittlemore
thanmakingexplicitthedoctrineofmy.Someofhisfollowershoweverexaminedandthoughtoverthe
conceptofmyandbroughtoutinboldreliefitscharacterastheindefinabletherebysubstantiallycontributing
tothedevelopmentoftheVedntaphilosophy.

VedntatheoryofPerceptionandInference[Footnoteref1].

Pram@naisthemeansthatleadstorightknowledge.Ifmemoryisintendedtobeexcludedfromthe
definitionthen
____________________________________________________________________
Chapter II 309
[Footnote1:DharmarjdhvarndraandhissonRmak@r@s@naworkedoutacompleteschemeofthetheory
ofVednticperceptionandinference.ThisisincompleteagreementwiththegeneralVedntametaphysics.The
earlyVedntistsweremoreinterestedindemonstratingtheillusorynatureoftheworldofappearance,anddid
notworkoutalogicaltheory.Itmaybeincidentallymentionedthatinthetheoryofinferenceasworkedoutby
DharmarjdhvarndrahewaslargelyindebtedtotheMmm@sschoolofthought.Inrecognizingarthapatti,
upamnas'abdaandanupalabdhialsoDharmarjdhvarndraacceptedtheMmm@sview.TheVedantins,
previoustoDharmarjdhvarndra,hadalsotacitlyfollowedtheMmm@sinthesematters.]

471

pram@naistobedefinedasthemeansthatleadstosuchrightknowledgeashasnotalreadybeenacquired.
Rightknowledge(_pram_)inVedntaistheknowledgeofanobjectwhichhasnotbeenfoundcontradicted
(_abdhitrthavi@sayajnatva_).Exceptwhenspeciallyexpressedotherwise,pramisgenerallyconsideredas
beingexcludentofmemoryandappliestopreviouslyunacquired(_anadhigata_)anduncontradictedknowledge.
Objectionsaresometimesraisedthatwhenwearelookingatathingforafewminutes,theperceptionofthe
thinginallthesuccessivemomentsafterthefirstreferstotheimageofthethingacquiredintheprevious
moments.TothisthereplyisthattheVedntaconsidersthatsolongasadifferentmentalstatedoesnotarise,
anymentalstateisnottobeconsideredasmomentarybutasremainingeverthesame.Solongaswecontinueto
perceiveonethingthereisnoreasontosupposethattherehasbeenaseriesofmentalstates.Sothereisno
questionastotheknowledgeofthesucceedingmomentsbeingreferredtotheknowledgeofthepreceding
moments,forsolongasanymentalstatehasanyonethingforitsobjectitistobeconsideredashavingremained
unchangedallthroughtheseriesofmoments.Thereisofcoursethisdifferencebetweenthesameperceptofa
previousandalatermomentfollowinginsuccession,thatfreshelementsoftimearebeingperceivedaspriorand
later,thoughthecontentofthementalstatesofarastheobjectisconcernedremainsunchanged.Thistime
elementisperceivedbythesensesthoughthecontentofthementalstatemayremainundisturbed.WhenIseethe
samebookfortwoseconds,mymentalstaterepresentingthebookisnotchangedeverysecond,andhencethere
canbenosuchsuppositionthatIamhavingseparatementalstatesinsuccessioneachofwhichisarepetitionof
thepreviousone,forsolongasthegeneralcontentofthementalstateremainsthesamethereisnoreasonfor
supposingthattherehasbeenanychangeinthementalstate.Thementalstatethusremainsthesamesolongas
thecontentisnotchanged,butthoughitremainsthesameitcannotethechangeinthetimeelementsas
extraneous

472

addition.Allouruncontradictedknowledgeoftheobjectsoftheexternalworldshouldberegardedasright
knowledgeuntiltheabsoluteisrealized.

When the anta@hkara@na (mind) comes in contact with the external objects through the senses and becomes
transformed as it were into their forms, it is said that the anta@hkara@na has been transformed into a state (_v@rtti_)
[Footnote 1]. As soon as the anta@hkara@na has assumed the shape or form of the object of its knowledge, the
ignorance (_ajna_) with reference to that object is removed, and thereupon the steady light of the pure
consciousness (_cit_) shows the object which was so long hidden by ignorance. The appearance or the perception of an
object is thus the self-shining of the cit through a v@rtti of a form resembling an object of knowledge. This therefore
pre-supposes that by the action of ajna, pure consciousness or being is in a state of diverse kinds of modifications. In
spite of the cit underlying all this diversified objective world which is but the transformation of ignorance (ajna), the
former cannot manifest itself by itself, for the creations being of ignorance they are but sustained by modifications of
ignorance. The diversified objects of the world are but transformations of the principle of ajna which is neither real
nor unreal. It is the nature of ajna that it veils its own creations. Thus on each of the objects created by the ajna by
its creating (_vik@sepa_) capacity there is a veil by its veiling (vara@na) capacity. But when any object comes in direct
touch with anta@hkara@na through the senses the anta@hkara@na becomes transformed into the form of the object,
and
Chapter II 310
thisleadstotheremovaloftheveilonthatparticularajnaformtheobject,andastheselfshiningcitis
shiningthroughtheparticularajnastate,wehavewhatiscalledtheperceptionofthething.Thoughthereisin
realitynosuchdistinctionastheinnerandtheouteryettheajnahascreatedsuchillusorydistinctionsas
individualsoulsandtheexternalworldofobjectsthedistinctionsoftime,space,

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Vedntadoesnotregardmanas(mind)asasense(indriya).Thesameanta@hkara@na,
accordingtoitsdiversefunctions,iscalledmns,buddhi,aha@mkra,andcitta.Initsfunctionsasdoubtit
iscalledmns,asoriginatingdefinitecognitionsitiscalledbuddhi.Aspresentingthenotionofanegoin
consciousnessaha@mkra,andasproducingmemorycitta.Thesefourrepresentthedifferentmodifications
orstates(v@rtti)ofthesameentity(whichinitselfisbutaspecialkindofmodificationofajnaas
anta@hkara@na).]

473

etc.andveiledtheseforms.Perceptionleadstothetemporaryandthepartialbreakingoftheveiloverspecific
ajnaformssothatthereisatemporaryunionofthecitasunderlyingthesubjectandtheobjectthroughthe
brokenveil.Perceptiononthesubjectivesideisthusdefinedastheunionorundifferentiation(_abheda_)ofthe
subjectiveconsciousnesswiththeobjectiveconsciousnesscomprehendingthesensibleobjectsthroughthespecific
mentalstates(_tattadindriyayogyavi@sayvacchinnacaitanybhinnatvamtattadkravi@sayvacchinnajnasya
tattadams'epratyak@satvam_).Thisunioninperceptionmeansthattheobjectivehasatthatmomentno
separateexistencefromthesubjectiveconsciousnessoftheperceiver.Theconsciousnessmanifestingthroughthe
anta@hkara@naiscalledjvask@si.

Inference(_anumna_),accordingtoVednta,ismadebyournotionofconcomitance(_vyptijna_)
betweentwothings,actingthroughspecificpastimpressions(_sa@mskra_).ThuswhenIseesmokeona
hill,mypreviousnotionoftheconcomitanceofsmokewithfirebecomesrousedasasubconscious
impression,andIinferthatthereisfireonthehill.Myknowledgeofthehillandthesmokeisbydirect
perception.Thenotionofconcomitancerevivedinthesubconsciousonlyestablishestheconnectionbetween
thesmokeandthefire.Thenotionofconcomitanceisgeneratedbytheperceptionoftwothingstogether,
whennocaseofthefailureofconcomitanceisknown(_vyabhicrjna_)regardingthesubject.The
notionofconcomitancebeingaltogethersubjective,theVedntistdoesnotemphasizethenecessityof
perceivingtheconcomitanceinalargenumberofcases(_bhyodars'anamsak@rddars'anamvetivis'e@so
ndara@nya@h_).Vedntaisnotanxioustoestablishanymaterialvalidityfortheinference,butonly
subjectiveandformalvalidity.Asingleperceptionofconcomitancemayincertaincasesgeneratethenotion
oftheconcomitanceofonethingwithanotherwhennocontradictoryinstanceisknown.Itisimmaterial
withtheVedntawhetherthisconcomitanceisexperiencedinonecaseorinhundredsofcases.Themethod
ofagreementinpresenceistheonlyformofconcomitance(_anvayavypti_)thattheVedntaallows.Sothe
VedntadiscardsalltheotherkindsofinferencethatNyyasupported,viz.anvayavyatireki(byjoining
agreementinpresencewithagreementinabsence),_kevalnvayi_(byuniversalagreementwherenotest
couldbeappliedofagreementinabsence)and

474

kevalavyatireki(byuniversalagreementinabsence).Vedntaadvocatesthreepremisses,viz.(1)_pratija_(the
hillisfiery);(2)hetu (because it has smoke) and (3) _d@rs@tnta_ (as in the kitchen) instead of the five propositions
that Nyya maintained [Footnote ref 1]. Since one case of concomitance is regarded by Vednta as being sufficient for
making an inference it holds that seeing the one case of appearance (silver in the conch-shell) to be false, we can infer
that all things (except Brahman) are false (_Brahmabhinnam sarvam mithy Brahmabhinnatvt yedevam tadevam
yath s'uktirpyam_). First premiss (_pratij_) all else excepting Brahman is false; second premiss (_hetu_) since all is
different from Brahman; third premiss
Chapter II 311
(_dr@s@tnta_)whateverissoissoasthesilverintheconch[Footnoteref2].

tman,Jva,s'vara,EkajvavdaandD@r@s@tis@r@s@tivda.

Wehavemanytimesspokenoftruthorrealityasselfluminous(_svayampraks'a).Butwhatdoesthismean?
Vedntadefinesitasthatwhichisnevertheobjectofaknowingactbutisyetimmediateanddirectwithus
(_avedyatvesatiaparoksavyavaharayogyatvam_).Selfluminositythusmeansthecapacityofbeingeverpresent
inallouractsofconsciousnesswithoutinanywaybeinganobjectofconsciousness.Wheneveranythingis
describedasanobjectofconsciousness,itscharacterasconstitutingitsknowabilityisaquality,whichmayor
maynotbepresentinit,ormaybepresentatonetimeandabsentatanother.Thismakesitdependentonsome
othersuchentitywhichcanproduceitormanifestit.Pureconsciousnessdiffersfromallitsobjectsinthisthatit
isneverdependentonanythingelseforitsmanifestation,butmanifestsallotherobjectssuchasthejug,thecloth,
etc.Ifconsciousnessshouldrequireanotherconsciousnesstomanifestit,thenthatmightagainrequireanother,
andthatanother,andsoonadinfinitum(_anavasth_).Ifconsciousnessdidnotmanifestitselfatthetimeofthe
objectmanifestation,thenevenonseeingorknowingathingonemightdoubtifhehadseenorknownit.Itis
thustobeadmittedthatconsciousness(_anubhti_)manifestsitselfandtherebymaintainstheappearance

_________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:Vedantawouldhaveeitherpratij,hetuandudharana,orudhara@na,upanayaandnigamana,
andnotallthefiveofNyya,viz.pratija,hetu,udhara@na,upanayaandnigamana.]

[Footnote2:Vednticnotionsofthepramnaofupamana,arthapatti,s'abdaandanupalabdhi,beingsimilarto
themmm@sview,donotrequiretobetreatedhereseparately.]

475

ofallourworldexperience.ThisgoesdirectlyagainstthejtattheoryofKumrilathatconsciousnesswasnot
immediatebutwasonlyinferablefromthemanifestingquality(_jtat_)ofobjectswhentheyareknownin
consciousness.

Now Vednta says that this self-luminous pure consciousness is the same as the self. For it is only self which is not the
object of any knowledge and is yet immediate and ever present in consciousness. No one doubts about his own self,
because it is of itself manifested along with all states of knowledge. The self itself is the revealer of all objects of
knowledge, but is never itself the object of knowledge, for what appears as the perceiving of self as object of knowledge
is but association comprehended under the term aha@mkra (ego). The real self is identical with the pure manifesting
unity of all consciousness. This real self called the tman is not the same as the jva or individual soul, which passes
through the diverse experiences of worldly life. s'vara also must be distinguished from this highest tman or Brahman.
We have already seen that many Vedntists draw a distinction between my and avidy. My is that aspect of ajna
by which only the best attributes are projected, whereas avidy is that aspect by which impure qualities are projected.
In the former aspect the functions are more of a creative, generative (_vik@sepa_) type, whereas in the latter veiling
(_vara@na_) characteristics are most prominent. The relation of the cit or pure intelligence, the highest self, with my
and avidy (also called ajna) was believed respectively to explain the phenomenal s'vara and the phenomenal jva or
individual. This relation is conceived in two ways, namely as updhi or pratibimba, and avaccheda. The conception of
pratibimba or reflection is like the reflection of the sun in the water where the image, though it has the same brilliance
as the sun, yet undergoes the effect of the impurity and movements of the water. The sun remains ever the same in its
purity untouched by the impurities from which the image sun suffers. The sun may be the same but it may be reflected
in different kinds of water and yield different kinds of images possessing different characteristics and changes which
though unreal yet phenomenally have all the appearance of reality. The other conception of the relation is that when
we speak of ks'a (space) in the jug or
Chapter II 312
ofks'aintheroom.Theks'ainrealitydoesnotsuffer

476

anymodificationinbeingwithinthejugorwithintheroom.Inrealityitisallpervasiveandisneitherlimited
(_avachinna_)withinthejugortheroom,butisyetconceivedasbeinglimitedbythejugorbytheroom.Solong
asthejugremains,theks'alimitedwithinitwillremainasseparatefromtheks'alimitedwithintheroom.

OftheVedntistswhoacceptthereflectionanalogythefollowersofN@rsi@mhs'ramathinkthatwhenthepure
citisreflectedinthemy,s'varaisphenomenallyproduced,andwhenintheavidytheindividualorjva.
Sarvajtmhoweverdoesnotdistinguishbetweenthemyandtheavidy,andthinksthatwhenthecitis
reflectedintheavidyinitstotalaspectascause,wegets'vara,andwhenreflectedintheanta@hkara@naa
productoftheavidywehavejvaorindividualsoul.

Jvaorindividualmeanstheselfinassociationwiththeegoandotherpersonalexperiences,i.e.phenomenalself,
whichfeels,suffersandisaffectedbyworldexperiences.Injvaalsothreestagesaredistinguished;thuswhen
duringdeepsleeptheanta@hkara@naissubmerged,theselfperceivesmerelytheajnaandthejvainthis
stateiscalledprjaornandamaya.Inthedreamstatetheselfisinassociationwithasubtlebodyandiscalled
taijasa.Intheawakenedstatetheselfasassociatedwithasubtleandgrossbodyiscalledvis'va.Soalsotheselfin
itspurestateiscalledBrahman,whenassociatedwithmyitiscalleds'vara,whenassociatedwiththefine
subtleelementofmatterascontrollingthem,itiscalledhira@nyagarbha;whenwiththegrosselementsasthe
rulerorcontrollerofthemitiscalledvir@tpuru@sa.

Thejvainitselfaslimitedbyitsavidyisoftenspokenofaspramarthika(real),whenmanifestedthrough
thesenseandtheegointhewakingstatesasvyavahrika(phenomenal),andwheninthedreamstatesas
dreamself,prtibh@sika(illusory).

Praks'tmandhisfollowersthinkthatsinceajnaisonetherecannotbetwoseparatereflectionssuchas
jvaands'vara;butitisbettertoadmitthatjvaistheimageofs'varaintheajna.ThetotalityofBrahma
citinassociationwithmyiss'vara,andthiswhenagainreflectedthroughtheajnagivesusthejva.The
manifestationofthejvaisintheanta@hkara@naasstatesofknowledge.Thejvathusinrealityiss'varaand
apartfromjvaands'varathereisnootherseparateexistenceof

477

Brahmacaitanya.Jvabeingtheimageofs'varaisthusdependentonhim,butwhenthelimitationsofjva
areremovedbyrightknowledge,thejvaisthesameBrahmanitalwayswas.

Those who prefer to conceive the relation as being of the avaccheda type hold that reflection (pratibimba) is only
possible of things which have colour, and therefore jva is cit limited (avacchinna) by the anta@hkara@na (mind). s'vara
is that which is beyond it; the diversity of anta@hkara@nas accounts for the diversity of the jvas. It is easy however to
see that these discussions are not of much fruit from the point of view of philosophy in determining or comprehending
the relation of s'vara and jva. In the Vednta system s'vara has but little importance, for he is but a phenomenal being;
he may be better, purer, and much more powerful than we, but yet he is as much phenomenal as any of us. The highest
truth is the self, the reality, the Brahman, and both jva and s'vara are but illusory impositions on it. Some Vedntists
hold that there is but one jva and one body, and that all the world as well as all the jvas in it are merely his imaginings.
These dream jvas and the dream world will continue so long as that super-jva continues to undergo his experiences;
the world-appearance and all of us imaginary individuals, run our course and salvation is as much imaginary salvation as
our world-experience is an imaginary experience of the imaginary jvas. The cosmic jva is alone the awakened jva and
all the rest are but his imaginings. This is known as the doctrine of ekajva (one-soul).
Chapter II 313
TheoppositeofthisdoctrineisthetheoryheldbysomeVedntiststhattherearemanyindividualsandthe
worldappearancehasnopermanentillusionforallpeople,buteachpersoncreatesforhimselfhisownillusion,
andthereisnoobjectivedatumwhichformsthecommongroundfortheillusoryperceptionofallpeople;justas
whentenpersonsseeinthedarknessaropeandhavingtheillusionofasnakethere,runaway,andagreeintheir
individualperceptionsthattheyhaveallseenthesamesnake,thougheachreallyhadhisownillusionandthere
wasnosnakeatall.Accordingtothisviewtheillusoryperceptionofeachhappensforhimsubjectivelyandhas
nocorrespondingobjectivephenomenaasitsground.ThismustbedistinguishedfromthenormalVedntaview
whichholdsthatobjectivelyphenomenaarealsohappening,butthatthese

478

areillusoryonlyinthesensethattheywillnotlastpermanentlyandhavethusonlyatemporaryandrelative
existenceincomparisonwiththetruthorrealitywhichiseverthesameconstantandunchangeableentityin
allourperceptionsandinallworldappearance.Accordingtotheotherviewphenomenaarenotobjectively
existentbutareonlysubjectivelyimagined;sothatthejugIseehadnoexistencebeforeIhappenedtohave
theperceptionthattherewasthejug;assoonasthejugillusionoccurredtomeIsaidthattherewasthejug,
butitdidnotexistbefore.AssoonasIhadtheperceptiontherewastheillusion,andtherewasnoother
realityapartfromtheillusion.Itisthereforecalledthetheoryofd@r@s@tis@r@s@tivda,i.e.thetheory
thatthesubjectiveperceptionisthecreatingoftheobjectsandthattherearenootherobjectivephenomena
apartfromsubjectiveperceptions.InthenormalVedntaviewhowevertheobjectsoftheworldareexistent
asphenomenabythesensecontactwithwhichthesubjectiveperceptionsarecreated.Theobjective
phenomenainthemselvesareofcoursebutmodificationsofajna,butstillthesephenomenaoftheajna
arethereasthecommongroundfortheexperienceofall.Thisthereforehasanobjectiveepistemology
whereasthed@r@s@tis@r@s@tivdahasnoproperepistemology,fortheexperiencesofeachpersonare
determinedbyhisownsubjectiveavidyandpreviousimpressionsasmodificationsoftheavidy.The
d@r@s@tis@r@s@tivdatheoryapproachesnearesttotheVijnavdaBuddhism,onlywiththis
differencethatwhileBuddhismdoesnotadmitofanypermanentbeingVedntaadmitstheBrahman,the
permanentunchangeablerealityastheonlytruth,whereastheillusoryandmomentaryperceptionsarebut
impositionsonit.

Thementalandphysicalphenomenaarealikeinthis,thatbotharemodificationsofajna.Itisindeeddifficult
tocomprehendthenatureofajna,thoughitspresenceinconsciousnesscanbeperceived,andthoughby
dialecticcriticismallourmostwellfoundednotionsseemtovanishawayandbecomeselfcontradictoryand
indefinable.Vedntaexplainsthereasonofthisdifficultyasduetothefactthatalltheseindefinableformsand
namescanonlybeexperiencedasmodesofthereal,theselfluminous.Ourinnateerrorwhichwecontinuefrom
beginninglesstimeconsistsinthis,thattherealinitsfullcompletelightiseverhiddenfromus,andtheglimpse

479

that we get of it is always through manifestations of forms and names; these phenomenal forms and names are
undefinable, incomprehensible, and unknowable in themselves, but under certain conditions they are manifested by
the self-luminous real, and at the time they are so manifested they seem to have a positive being which is undeniable.
This positive being is only the highest being, the real which appears as the being of those forms and names. A lump of
clay may be moulded into a plate or a cup, but the plate-form or the cup-form has no existence or being apart from the
being of the clay; it is the being of the clay that is imposed on the diverse forms which also then seem to have being in
themselves. Our illusion thus consists in mutually misattributing the characteristics of the unreal forms--the modes of
ajna and the real being. As this illusion is the mode of all our experience and its very essence, it is indeed difficult for
us to conceive of the Brahman as apart from the modes of ajna. Moreover such is the nature of ajnas that they are
knowable only by a false identification of them with the self-luminous Brahman or tman. Being as such is the highest
truth, the Brahman. The ajna states are not non-being in the sense of nothing of pure negation (_abhva_), but in the
Chapter II 314
sensethattheyarenotbeing.Beingthatistheselfluminousilluminatesnonbeing,theajna,andthis
illuminationmeansnothingmorethanafalseidentificationofbeingwithnonbeing.Theformsofajnaifthey
aretobeknownmustbeassociatedwithpureconsciousness,andthisassociationmeansanillusion,
superimposition,andmutualmisattribution.Butapartfrompureconsciousnessthesecannotbemanifestedor
known,foritispureconsciousnessalonethatisselfluminous.Thuswhenwetrytoknowtheajnastatesin
themselvesasapartfromthetmanwefailinadilemma,forknowledgemeansillusorysuperimpositionor
illusion,andwhenitisnotknowledgetheyevidentlycannotbeknown.Thusapartfromitsbeingafactorinour
illusoryexperiencenootherkindofitsexistenceisknowntous.Ifajnahadbeenanonentityaltogetherit
couldnevercomeatall,ifitwereapositiveentitythenitwouldneverceasetobe;theajnathusisamysterious
categorymidwaybetweenbeingandnonbeingandundefinableineveryway;anditisonaccountofthisthatitis
called_tattvnyatvbhymanirvcya_orundefinableandundeterminableeitherasrealorunreal.Itisrealinthe
sensethatitis

480

anecessarypostulateofourphenomenalexperienceandunrealinitsownnature,forapartfromitsconnection
withconsciousnessitisincomprehensibleandundefinable.Itsformsevenwhiletheyaremanifestedin
consciousnessareselfcontradictoryandincomprehensibleastotheirrealnatureormutualrelation,and
comprehensibleonlysofarastheyaremanifestedinconsciousness,butapartfromthesenorationalconceptionof
themcanbeformed.Thusitisimpossibletosayanythingabouttheajna(fornoknowledgeofitispossible)
savesofarasmanifestedinconsciousnessanddependingonthistheD@r@s@tis@r@s@tivdinsassertedthat
ourexperiencewasinexplicablyproducedundertheinfluenceofavidyandthatbeyondthatnoobjective
commongroundcouldbeadmitted.ButthoughthishasthegeneralassentofVedntaandisirrefutableinitself,
stillforthesakeofexplainingourcommonsenseview(_pratikarmavyavasath_)wemaythinkthatwehavean
objectiveworldbeforeusasthecommonfieldofexperience.Wecanalsoimagineaschemeofthingsand
operationsbywhichthephenomenonofourexperiencemaybeinterpretedinthelightoftheVednta
metaphysics.

Thesubjectcanbeconceivedinthreeforms:firstlyasthetman,theonehighestreality,secondlyasjvaorthe
tmanaslimitedbyitspsychosis,whenthepsychosisisnotdifferentiatedfromthetman,buttmanisregarded
asidenticalwiththepsychosisthusappearingasalivingandknowingbeing,as_jvask@si_orperceiving
consciousness,ortheaspectinwhichthejvacomprehends,knows,orexperiences;thirdlytheanta@hkara@na
psychosisormindwhichisaninnercentreorbundleofavidymanifestations,justastheouterworldobjectsare
exteriorcentresofavidyphenomenaorobjectiveentities.Theanta@hkara@naisnotonlytheavidycapableof
supplyingallformstoourpresentexperiences,butitalsocontainsallthetendenciesandmodesofpast
impressionsofexperienceinthislifeorinpastlives.Theanta@hkara@naisalwaysturningthevariousavidy
modesofitintothejvask@si(jvainitsaspectasilluminatingmentalstates),andthesearealsoimmediately
manifested,madeknown,andtransformedintoexperience.Theseavidystatesoftheanta@hkara@naarecalled
itsv@rttisorstates.Thespecificpeculiarityofthev@rttiajnasisthisthatonlyintheseformscantheybe
superimposeduponpureconsciousness,andthusbeinterpretedasstatesofconsciousnessandhavetheir
indefinitenessorcoverremoved.The

481

forms of ajna remain as indefinite and hidden or veiled only so long as they do not come into relation to these
v@rttis of anta@hkara@na, for the ajna can be destroyed by the cit only in the form of a v@rtti, while in all other
forms the ajna veils the cit from manifestation. The removal of ajna-v@rttis of the anta@hkara@na or the
manifestation of v@rtti-jna is nothing but this, that the anta@hkara@na states of avidy are the only states of
ajna which can be superimposed upon the self-luminous tman (_adhysa_, false attribution). The objective world
consists of the avidy phenomena with the self as its background. Its objectivity consists in this that avidy in this form
cannot be superimposed on the self-luminous cit but exists only as veiling the cit. These avidy phenomena may be
regarded as many and diverse, but in all these forms
Chapter II 315
theyserveonlytoveilthecitandarebeyondconsciousness.Itisonlywhentheycomeincontactwiththeavidy
phenomenaasanta@hkara@nastatesthattheycoalescewiththeavidystatesandrenderthemselvesobjectsof
consciousnessorhavetheirveilofvara@naremoved.Itisthusassumedthatinordinaryperceptionsofobjects
suchasjug,etc.theanta@hkara@nagoesoutoftheman'sbody(_s'arramadhyt_)andcomingintouchwith
thejugbecomestransformedintothesameform,andassoonasthistransformationtakesplacethecitwhichis
alwayssteadilyshiningilluminatesthejugformorthejug.Thejugphenomenaintheobjectiveworldcouldnot
bemanifested(thoughtheseweretakingplaceonthebackgroundofthesameselfluminousBrahmanortman
asformsofthehighesttruthofmysubjectiveconsciousness)becausetheajnaphenomenaintheseformsserve
toveiltheirilluminator,theselfluminous.Itwasonlybycomingintocontactwiththesephenomenathatthe
anta@hkara@nacouldbetransformedintocorrespondingstatesandthattheilluminationdawnedwhichatonce
revealedtheanta@hkara@nastatesandtheobjectswithwhichthesestatesorv@rttishadcoalesced.The
consciousnessmanifestedthroughthev@rttisalonehasthepowerofremovingtheajnaveilingthecit.Of
coursetherearenoactualdistinctionsofinnerorouter,orthecitwithinmeandthecitwithoutme.Theseare
onlyofappearanceandduetoavidy.Anditisonlyfromthepointofviewofappearancethatwesupposethat
knowledgeofobjectscanonlydawnwhentheinnercitandtheoutercitunitetogetherthroughthe
anta@hkara@nav@rtti,whichmakestheexternalobjects

482

translucentasitwerebyitsowntranslucence,removestheajnawhichwasveilingtheexternalselfluminous
citandrevealstheobjectphenomenabytheveryunionofthecitasreflectedthroughitandthecitasunderlying
theobjectphenomena.Thepratyak@sapramorrightknowledgebyperceptionisthecit,thepure
consciousness,reflectedthroughthev@rttiandidenticalwiththecitasthebackgroundoftheobjectphenomena
revealedbyit.Fromtherelativepointofviewwemaythusdistinguishthreeconsciousnesses:(1)consciousness
asthebackgroundofobjectivephenomena,(2)consciousnessasthebackgroundofthejvaorpramt,the
individual,(3)consciousnessreflectedinthev@rttioftheanta@hkara@na;whenthesethreeuniteperceptionis
effected.

PramorrightknowledgemeansinVedntatheacquirementofsuchnewknowledgeashasnotbeen
contradictedbyexperience(_abdhita_).Thereisthusnoabsolutedefinitionoftruth.Aknowledgeacquiredcan
besaidtobetrueonlysolongasitisnotcontradicted.Thustheworldappearancethoughitisverytruenow,
mayberenderedfalse,whenthisiscontradictedbyrightknowledgeofBrahmanastheonereality.Thusthe
knowledgeoftheworldappearanceistruenow,butnottrueabsolutely.Theonlyabsolutetruthisthepure
consciousnesswhichisnevercontradictedinanyexperienceatanytime.Thetruthofourworldknowledgeis
thustobetestedbyfindingoutwhetheritwillbecontradictedatanystageofworldexperienceornot.That
whichisnotcontradictedbylaterexperienceistoberegardedastrue,forallworldknowledgeasawholewillbe
contradictedwhenBrahmaknowledgeisrealized.

Theinnerexperiencesofpleasureandpainalsoaregeneratedbyafalseidentificationofanta@hkara@na
transformationsaspleasureorpainwiththeself,byvirtueofwhicharegeneratedtheperceptions,"Iamhappy,"
or"Iamsorry."Incontinuousperceptionofanythingforacertaintimeasanobjectoraspleasure,etc.the
mentalstateorv@rttiissaidtolastinthesamewayallthewhilesolongasanyothernewformisnottakenupby
theanta@hkara@nafortheacquirementofanynewknowledge.InsuchcasewhenIinferthatthereisfireonthe
hillthatIsee,thehillisanobjectofperception,fortheanta@hkara@nav@rttiisonewithit,butthatthereis
fireinitisamatterofinference,fortheanta@hkara@nav@rtticannotbeintouchwiththefire;sointhesame
experiencetheremaybetwomodesof

483

mental modification, as perception in seeing the hill, and as inference in inferring the fire in the hill. In cases of
acquired perception, as when on seeing sandal wood I think that it is odoriferous sandal wood, it is pure perception
so far as the sandal wood is concerned, it is inference or memory so far as I assert it to be
Chapter II 316
odoriferous.Vedntadoesnotadmittheexistenceoftherelationcalled_samavya_(inherence)or_jti_(class
notion);andsodoesnotdistinguishperceptionasaclassasdistinctfromtheotherclasscalledinference,and
holdsthatbothperceptionandinferencearebutdifferentmodesofthetransformationsoftheanta@hkara@na
reflectingthecitinthecorrespondingv@rttis.Theperceptionisthusnothingbutthecitmanifestationinthe
anta@hkara@nav@rttitransformedintotheformofanobjectwithwhichitisincontact.Perceptioninits
objectiveaspectistheidentityofthecitunderlyingtheobjectwiththesubject,andperceptioninthesubjective
aspectisregardedastheidentityofthesubjectivecitwiththeobjectivecit.Thisidentityofcoursemeansthat
throughthev@rttithesamerealitysubsistingintheobjectandthesubjectisrealized,whereasininferencethe
thingtobeinferred,beingawayfromcontactwithanta@hkara@na,hasapparentlyadifferentrealityfromthat
manifestedinthestatesofconsciousness.Thusperceptionisregardedasthementalstaterepresentingthesame
identicalrealityintheobjectandthesubjectbyanta@hkara@nacontact,anditisheldthattheknowledge
producedbywords(e.g.thisisthesameDevadatta)referringidenticallytothesamethingwhichisseen(e.g.
whenIseeDevadattabeforemeanothermansaysthisisDevadatta,andtheknowledgeproducedby"thisis
Devadatta"thoughaverbal(_s'bda_)knowledgeistoberegardedasperception,fortheanta@hkara@na
v@rttiisthesame)istoberegardedasperceptionorpratyak@sa.Thecontentofthesewords(thisisDevadatta)
beingthesameastheperception,andtherebeingnonewrelationingknowledgeasrepresentedintheproposition
"thisisDevadatta"involvingtheunityoftwoterms"this"and"Devadatta"withacopula,butonlythe
indicationofonewholeasDevadattaundervisualperceptionalreadyexperienced,theknowledgeproceeding
from"thisisDevadatta"isregardedasanexampleofnirvikalpaknowledge.Soontheoccasionoftheriseof
Brahmaconsciousnesswhenthepreceptorinstructs"thouartBrahman"theknowledgeproceedingfromthe
sentenceisnotsavikalpa,for

484

thoughgrammaticallytherearetwoideasandacopula,yetfromthepointofviewofintrinsicsignificance
(_ttparya_)oneidenticalrealityonlyisindicated.Vedntadoesnotdistinguishnirvikalpaandsavikalpain
visualperception,butonlyins'bdaperceptionasincasesreferredtoabove.Inallsuchcasestheconditionfor
nirvikalpaisthatthenotionconveyedbythesentenceshouldbeonewholeoroneidenticalreality,whereasin
savikalpaperceptionwehaveacombinationofdifferentideasasinthesentence,"theking'smaniscoming"
(_rjapuru@sagacchat_).Herenoidenticalrealityissignified,butwhatissignifiedisthecombinationoftwo
orthreedifferentconcepts[Footnoteref1].

ItisnotoutofplacetomentioninthisconnectionthatVedntaadmitsallthesixpram@nasofKumrila
andconsiderslikeMm@msthatallknowledgeisselfvalid(_svat@ahpram@na_).Butpramhasnot
thesamemeaninginVedntaasinMm@ms.Thereaswerememberprammeanttheknowledgewhich
goadedonetopracticalactionandassuchallknowledgewaspram,untilpracticalexperienceshowedthe
courseofactioninaccordancewithwhichitwasfoundtobecontradicted.InVedntahoweverthereisno
referencetoaction,butprammeansonlyuncontradictedcognition.Tothedefinitionofselfvalidityas
givenbyMm@msVedntaaddsanotherobjectivequalification,thatsuchknowledgecanhavesvata@h
prm@nyaasisnotvitiatedbythepresenceofanydo@sa(causeoferror,suchasdefectofsensesorthe
like).VedntaofcoursedoesnotthinklikeNyyathatpositiveconditions(e.g.correspondence,etc.)are
necessaryforthevalidityofknowledge,nordoesitdivestknowledgeofallqualificationslikethe
Mm@msists,forwhomallknowledgeisselfvalidassuch.Itadoptsamiddlecourseandholdsthat
absenceofdo@saisanecessaryconditionfortheselfvalidityofknowledge.Itisclearthatthisisa
compromise,forwheneveranexternalconditionhastobeadmitted,theknowledgecannotberegardedas
selfvalid,butVedntasaysthatasitrequiresonlyanegativeconditionfortheabsenceofdo@sa,the
objectiondoesnotapplytoit,anditholdsthatifitdependedonthepresenceofanypositiveconditionfor
provingthevalidityofknowledgeliketheNyya,thenonlyitstheoryofselfvaliditywouldhavebeen
damaged.Butsinceitwantsonlyanegativecondition,noblamecanbe
____________________________________________________________________
Chapter II 317
[Footnote1:See_Vedntaparibh@s_and_S'ikhma@ni._]

485

attributedtoitstheoryofselfvalidity.Vedntawasboundtofollowthisslipperymiddlecourse,foritcouldnot
saythatthepurecitreflectedinconsciousnesscouldrequireanythingelseforestablishingitsvalidity,norcouldit
saythatallphenomenalformsofknowledgewerealsoallvalid,forthentheworldappearancewouldcometobe
valid;soitheldthatknowledgecouldberegardedasvalidonlywhentherewasnodo@sapresent;thusfromthe
absolutepointofviewallworldknowledgewasfalseandhadnovalidity,becausetherewastheavidydo@sa,
andintheordinaryspherealsothatknowledgewasvalidinwhichtherewasnodo@sa.Validity(prm@nya)
withMm@msmeantthecapacitythatknowledgehastogoadustopracticalactioninaccordancewithit,but
withVedntaitmeantcorrectnesstofactsandwantofcontradiction.Theabsenceofdo@sabeingguaranteed
thereisnothingwhichcanvitiatethecorrectnessofknowledge[Footnoteref1].

VedntaTheoryofIllusion.

WehavealreadyseenthattheMm@msistshadassertedthatallknowledgewastruesimplybecauseitwas
knowledge(_yathrth@hsarvevivdaspadbht@hpratyay@hpratyayatvt_).Evenillusionswere
explainedbythemasbeingnonperceptionofthedistinctionbetweenthethingperceived(e.g.theconchshell),
andthethingremembered(e.g.silver).ButVedntaobjectstothis,andaskshowtherecanbenondistinction
betweenathingwhichisclearlyperceivedandathingwhichisremembered?Ifitissaidthatitismerelyanon
perceptionofthenonassociation(i.e.nonperceptionofthefactthatthisisnotconnectedwithsilver),thenalso
itcannotbe,forthenitisoneithersidemerenegation,andnegationwithMm@msisnothingbutthebare
presenceofthelocusofnegation(e.g.negationofjugonthegroundisnothingbutthebarepresenceofthe
ground),orinotherwordsnonperceptionofthenonassociationof"silver"and"this"meansbarelyand
merelythe"silver"and"this."Evenadmittingforargument'ssakethatthedistinctionbetweentwothingsor
twoideasisnotperceived,yetmerelyfromsuchanegativeaspectnoonecouldbetemptedtomoveforwardto
action(suchasstoopingdowntopickupapieceofillusorysilver).Itispositive

______________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:See_Vedntaparibh@s,S'ikhma@ni,Ma@niprabh_andCitsukhaon
svata@hprma@nya.]

486

conviction or perception that can lead a man to actual practical movement. If again it is said that it is the general and
imperfect perception of a thing (which has not been properly differentiated and comprehended) before me, which by
the memory of silver appears to be like true silver before me and this generates the movement for picking it up, then
this also is objectionable. For the appearance of the similarity with real silver cannot lead us to behave with the thing
before me as if it were real silver. Thus I may perceive that gavaya (wild ox) is similar to cow, but despite this similarity I
am not tempted to behave with the gavaya as if it were a cow. Thus in whatever way the Mma@ms position may be
defined it fails [Footnote ref l]. Vednta thinks that the illusion is not merely subjective, but that there is actually a
phenomenon of illusion as there are phenomena of actual external objects; the difference in the two cases consists in
this, that the illusion is generated by the do@sa or defect of the senses etc., whereas the phenomena of external
objects are not due to such specific do@sas. The process of illusory perception in Vedanta may be described thus. First
by the contact of the senses vitiated by do@sas a mental state as "thisness" with reference to the thing before me is
generated; then in the thing as "this" and in the mental state of the form of that "this" the cit is reflected. Then the
avidy (nescience) associated with the cit is disturbed by the presence of the do@sa, and this disturbance along with
the impression of silver remembered through similarity is transformed into the appearance of silver. There is thus an
objective illusory silver appearance, as well as a similar transformation of the mental state generated by its contact with
the illusory silver. These two transformations, the silver state of the mind
Chapter II 318
andexternalphenomenalillusorysilverstate,aremanifestedbytheperceivingconsciousness
(_sk@sicaitanya_).Therearethusheretwophenomenaltransformations,oneintheavidystatesforming
theillusoryobjectivesilverphenomenon,andanotherintheanta@hkara@nav@rttiormindstate.Butin
spiteoftherebeingtwodistinctandseparatephenomena,theirobjectbeingthesameasthe"this"in
perception,wehaveoneknowledgeofillusion.Thespecialfeatureofthistheoryofillusionisthatan
indefinable(_anirvacanyakhyti_)illusorysilveriscreatedineverycasewhereanillusoryperceptionof
silveroccurs.TherearethreeordersofrealityinVednta,namelythe

____________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_Vivara@naprameyasa@mgraha_and_Nyyamakaranda_onakhytirefutation.]

487

_pramrthika_orabsolute,_vyavahrika_orpracticalordinaryexperience,and_prtibhsika,_illusory.The
firstonerepresentstheabsolutetruth;theothertwoarefalseimpressionsduetodo@sa.Thedifferencebetween
vyavahrikaandprtibhsikaisthatthedo@saofthevyavahrikaperceptionisneitherdiscoverednorremoved
untilsalvation,whereasthedo@saoftheprtibhsikarealitywhichoccursinmanyextraneousforms(suchas
defectofthesenses,sleep,etc.)isperceivedintheworldofourordinaryexperience,andthustheprtibhsika
experiencelastsforamuchshorterperiodthanthevyavahrika.Butjustasthevyavahrikaworldisregardedas
phenomenalmodificationsoftheajna,asapartfromoursubjectiveexperienceandevenbeforeit,sothe
illusion(e.g.ofsilverintheconchshell)isalsoregardedasamodificationofavidy,anundefinablecreationof
theobjectofillusion,bytheagencyofthedo@sa.Thusinthecaseoftheillusionofsilverintheconchshell,
indefinablesilveriscreatedbythedo@sainassociationwiththesenses,whichiscalledthecreationofan
indefinable(_anirvacanya_)silverofillusion.Herethecitunderlyingtheconchshellremainsthesamebutthe
avidyofanta@hkara@nasuffersmodifications(_pari@nma_)onaccountofdo@sa,andthusgivesrisetothe
illusorycreation.Theillusorysilveristhusvivartta(appearance)fromthepointofviewofthecitandpari@nma
fromthepointofviewofavidy,forthedifferencebetweenvivarttaandpari@nmais,thatintheformerthe
transformationshaveadifferentrealityfromthecause(citisdifferentfromtheappearanceimposedonit),while
inthelattercasethetransformationshavethesamerealityasthetransformingentity(appearanceofsilverhas
thesamestuffastheavidywhosetransformationsitis).Butnowadifficultyarisesthatiftheillusoryperception
ofsilverisduetoacoalescingofthecitunderlyingtheanta@hkara@nav@rttiasmodifiedbydo@saandthe
objectcitasunderlyingthe"this"beforeme(intheillusionof"thisissilver"),thenIoughttohavethe
experiencethat"Iamsilver"like"Iamhappy"andnotthat"thisissilver";theansweris,thatasthecoalescing
takesplaceinconnectionwithmypreviousnotionas"this,"theformoftheknowledgealsois"thisissilver,"
whereasinthenotion"Iamhappy,"thenotionofhappinesstakesplaceinconnectionwithapreviousv@rttiof
"I."Thusthoughthecoalescingofthetwo"cits"isthesameinbothcases,yetinonecasethe

488

knowledge takes the form of "I am," and in another as "this is" according as the previous impression is "I" or "this." In
dreams also the dream perceptions are the same as the illusory perception of silver in the conch-shell. There the
illusory creations are generated through the defects of sleep, and these creations are imposed upon the cit. The dream
experiences cannot be regarded merely as memory-products, for the perception in dream is in the form that "I see that
I ride in the air on chariots, etc." and not that "I remember the chariots." In the dream state all the senses are inactive,
and therefore there is no separate objective cit there, but the whole dream experience with all characteristics of space,
time, objects, etc. is imposed upon the cit. The objection that since the imposition is on the pure cit the imposition
ought to last even in waking stages, and that the dream experiences ought to continue even in waking life, does not
hold; for in the waking stages the anta@hkara@na is being constantly transformed into different states on the expiry of
the defects of sleep, etc., which were causing the dream cognitions. This is called _niv@rtti_ (negation) as
distinguished
Chapter II 319
from_bdha_(cessation).Theillusorycreationofdreamexperiencesmaystillbethereonthepurecit,butthese
cannotbeexperiencedanylonger,fortherebeingnodo@saofsleeptheanta@hkara@naisactiveandsuffering
modificationsinaccordancewiththeobjectspresentedbeforeus.Thisiswhatiscalledniv@rtti,forthoughthe
illusionisthereIcannotexperienceit,whereasbdhaorcessationoccurswhentheillusorycreationceases,as
whenonfindingouttherealnatureoftheconchshelltheillusionofsilverceases,andwefeelthatthisisnot
silver,thiswasnotandwillnotbesilver.Whentheconchshellisperceivedassilver,thesilverisfeltasareality,
butthisfeelingofrealitywasnotanillusorycreation,thoughthesilverwasanobjectiveillusorycreation;forthe
realityinthes'ukti(conchshell)istransferredandfeltasbelongingtotheillusionofsilverimposeduponit.Here
weseethattheillusionofsilverhastwodifferentkindsofillusioncomprehendedinit.Oneisthecreationofan
indefinablesilver(_anirvacanyarajatotpatti_)andtheotheristheattributionoftherealitybelongingtothe
conchshelltotheillusorysilverimposeduponit,bywhichwefeelatthetimeoftheillusionthatitisareality.
Thisisnodoubtthe_anyathkhyti_formofillusionasadvocatedbyNyya.Vedntaadmitsthatwhentwo
things(e.g.redflowerandcrystal)arebothpresent

489

beforemysenses,andIattributethequalityofonetotheotherbyillusion(e.g.theillusionthatthecrystalis
red),thentheillusionisoftheformofanyathkhyti;butifoneofthethingsisnotpresentbeforemysensesand
theotheris,thentheillusionisnotoftheanyathkhytitype,butoftheanirvacanyakhytitype.Vedntacould
notavoidtheformertypeofillusion,foritbelievedthatallappearanceofrealityintheworldappearancewas
reallyderivedfromtherealityofBrahman,whichwasselfluminousinallourexperiences.Theworld
appearanceisanillusorycreation,butthesenseofrealitythatitcarrieswithitisamisattribution
(_anyathkhyti_)ofthecharacteristicoftheBrahmantoit,forBrahmanaloneisthetrueandthereal,which
manifestsitselfastherealityofallourillusoryworldexperience,justasitistherealityofs'uktithatgivestothe
appearanceofsilveritsreality.

VedntaEthicsandVedntaEmancipation.

VedntasaysthatwhenadulyqualifiedmantakestothestudyofVedntaandisinstructedbythe
preceptor"Thouartthat(Brahman),"heattainstheemancipatingknowledge,andtheworldappearance
becomesforhimfalseandillusory.ThequalificationsnecessaryforthestudyofVedntaare(1)thattheperson
havingstudiedalltheVedaswiththeproperaccessories,suchasgrammar,lexiconetc.isinfullpossessionofthe
knowledgeoftheVedas,(2)thateitherinthislifeorinanother,hemusthaveperformedonlytheobligatory
Vedicduties(suchasdailyprayer,etc.called_nityakarma_)andoccasionallyobligatoryduty(suchasthebirth
ceremonyatthebirthofason,called_naimittikakarma_)andmusthaveavoidedallactionsforthefulfilment
ofselfishdesires(_kmyakarmas_,suchastheperformanceofsacrificesforgoingtoHeaven)andallprohibited
actions(e.g.murder,etc._ni@siddhakarma_)insuchawaythathismindispurgedofallgoodandbadactions
(nokarmaisgeneratedbythenityaand_naimittikakarma_,andashehasnotperformedthe_kmya_and
prohibitedkarmas,hehasacquirednonewkarma).Whenhehasthusproperlypurifiedhismindandisin
possessionofthefourvirtuesormeansoffittingthemindforVedntainstruction(called_sdhana_)hecan
regardhimselfasproperlyqualifiedfortheVedntainstruction.Thesevirtuesare(1)knowledgeofwhatis
eternal

490

andwhatistransient,(2)disinclinationtoenjoymentsofthislifeandoftheheavenlylifeafterdeath,(3)
extremedistasteforallenjoyments,andanxietyforattainingthemeansofrightknowledge,(4)controloverthe
sensesbywhichthesearerestrainedfromeverythingbutthatwhichaidstheattainmentofrightknowledge
(_dama_),(a)havingrestrainedthem,theattainmentofsuchpowerthatthesesensesmaynotagainbetempted
towardsworldlyenjoyments(_uparati_),(b)powerofbearingextremesofheat,cold,etc.,
(c) employment of mind towards the attainment of right knowledge, (d) faith in the instructor and
Upani@sads; (5) strong desire to attain salvation. A man possessing the above qualities should try to
Chapter II 320
understandcorrectlythetruepurportoftheUpani@sads(called_s'rava@na_),andbyargumentsinfavourof
thepurportoftheUpani@sadstostrengthenhisconvictionasstatedintheUpani@sads(called_manana_)and
thenby_nididhysana_(meditation)whichincludesalltheYogaprocessesofconcentration,trytorealizethe
truthasone.VedntathereforeinethicscoversthegroundofYoga;butwhileforYogaemancipationproceeds
fromunderstandingthedifferencebetweenpuru@saandprak@rti,withVedntasalvationcomesbythedawnof
rightknowledgethatBrahmanaloneisthetruereality,hisownself[Footnoteref1].Mm@msassertsthatthe
VedasdonotdeclaretheknowledgeofoneBrahmantobethesupremegoal,butholdsthatallpersonsshouldact
inaccordancewiththeVedicinjunctionsfortheattainmentofgoodandtheremovalofevil.ButVedntaholds
thatthoughthepurportoftheearlierVedasisasMm@mshasit,yetthisismeantonlyforordinarypeople,
whereasfortheelectthegoalisclearlyastheUpani@sadsindicateit,namelytheattainmentofthehighest
knowledge.TheperformanceofVedicdutiesisintendedonlyforordinarymen,butyetitwasbelievedbymany
(e.g.VcaspatiMis'raandhisfollowers)thatdueperformanceofVedicdutieshelpedamantoacquireagreat
keennessfortheattainmentofrightknowledge;othersbelieved(e.g.Praks'tmandhisfollowers)thatitserved
tobringaboutsuitableopportunitiesbysecuringgoodpreceptors,etc.andtoremovemanyobstaclesfromthe
waysothatitbecameeasierforapersontoattainthedesiredrightknowledge.Intheacquirementofordinary
knowledgetheajnasremoved

___________________________________________________________________
[Footnote1:See_Vedntasra_and_Advaitabrahmasiddhi.]

491

areonlysmallerstatesofajna,whereaswhentheBrahmaknowledgedawnstheajnaasawholeisremoved.
Brahmaknowledgeatthestageofitsfirstriseisitselfalsoastateofknowledge,butsuchisitsspecialstrength
thatwhenthisknowledgeoncedawns,eventhestateofknowledgewhichatfirstreflectsit(andwhichbeinga
stateisitselfajnamodification)isdestroyedbyit.Thestateitselfbeingdestroyed,onlythepureinfiniteand
unlimitedBrahmanshinesforthinitsowntruelight.Thusitissaidthatjustasfireridingonapieceofwood
wouldburnthewholecityandafterthatwouldburntheverysamewood,sointhelaststateofmindtheBrahma
knowledgewoulddestroyalltheillusoryworldappearanceandatlastdestroyeventhatfinalstate[Footnoteref
l].

ThemuktistageisoneinwhichthepurelightofBrahmanastheidentityofpureintelligence,beingand
completeblissshinesforthinitsuniqueglory,andalltherestvanishesasillusorynothing.Asallbeingofthe
worldappearanceisbutlimitedmanifestationsofthatonebeing,soallpleasuresalsoarebutlimited
manifestationsofthatsupremebliss,atasteofwhichweallcangetindeepdreamlesssleep.Thebeingof
Brahmanhoweverisnotanabstractionfromallexistentbeingsasthe_satt_(beingasclassnotion)ofthe
naiyyika,buttheconcrete,thereal,whichinitsaspectaspureconsciousnessandpureblissisalways
identicalwithitself.Being(_sat_)ispureblissandpureconsciousness.Whatbecomesoftheavidyduring
mukti(emancipation)isasdifficultforonetoanswerasthequestion,howtheavidycameforthandstayed
duringtheworldappearance.Itisbesttorememberthatthecategoryoftheindefiniteavidyisindefiniteas
regardsitsorigin,manifestationanddestruction.Vedntahoweverbelievesthatevenwhenthetrue
knowledgehasoncebeenattained,thebodymaylastforawhile,iftheindividual'spreviouslyripened
karmasdemandit.Thustheemancipatedpersonmaywalkaboutandbehavelikeanordinarysage,butyet
heisemancipatedandcannolongeracquireanynewkarma.Assoonasthefruitsduetohisripekarmas
areenjoyedandexhausted,thesageloseshisbodyandtherewillneverbeanyotherbirthforhim,forthe
dawnofperfectknowledgehasburntupforhimallbuddingkarmasofbeginninglesspreviouslives,andhe
isnolongersubjecttoany

__________________________________________________________________
[Footnote 1:_Siddhntales'a_.]
Chapter II 321
492

oftheillusionssubjectiveorobjectivewhichcouldmakeanyknowledge,action,orfeelingpossibleforhim.
Suchamaniscalled_jvanmukta_,i.e.emancipatedwhileliving.Forhimallworldappearancehasceased.He
istheonelightburningaloneinhimselfwhereeverythingelsehasvanishedforeverfromthestage[Footnote
ref1].

VedntaandotherIndianSystems.

VedntaisdistinctlyantagonistictoNyya,andmostofitspowerfuldialecticcriticismisgenerallydirected
againstit.S'a@nkarahimselfhadbegunitbyshowingcontradictionsandinconsistenciesinmanyoftheNyya
conceptions,suchasthetheoryofcausation,conceptionoftheatom,therelationofsamavya,theconceptionof
jti,etc[Footnoteref2].Hisfollowerscarriedittostillgreaterlengthsasisfullydemonstratedbythelaboursof
S'rhar@sa,Citsukha,Madhusdana,etc.ItwasopposedtoMm@mssofarasthisadmittedtheNyya
Vais'e@sikacategories,butagreedwithitgenerallyasregardsthepram@nasofanumna,upamiti,arthpatti,
s'abda,andanupalabdhi.ItalsofoundagreatsupporterinMm@mswithitsdoctrineoftheselfvalidityand
selfmanifestingpowerofknowledge.ButitdifferedfromMm@msinthefieldofpracticaldutiesandentered
intomanyelaboratediscussionstoprovethatthedutiesoftheVedasreferredonlytoordinarymen,whereas
menofhigherorderhadnoVedicdutiestoperformbutweretoriseabovethemandattainthehighest
knowledge,andthatamanshouldperformtheVedicdutiesonlysolongashewasnotfitforVedntainstruction
andstudies.

WithS@mkhyaandYogatherelationofVedntaseemstobeveryclose.WehavealreadyseenthatVednta
hadacceptedallthespecialmeansofselfpurification,meditation,etc.,thatwereadvocatedbyYoga.Themain
differencebetweenVedntaandS@mkhyawasthisthatS@mkhyabelieved,thatthestuffofwhichtheworld
consistedwasarealitysidebysidewiththepuru@sas.InlatertimesVedntahadcompromisedsofarwith
S@mkhyathatitalsosometimesdescribedmyasbeingmadeupofsattva,rajas,andtamas.Vedntaalsoheld
thataccordingtothesethreecharacteristicswereformeddiversemodifications

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote1:See_Pacadas'_.]
[Footnote2:SeeS'a@nkara'srefutationofNyya,_S'a@nkarabh@sya_,II.ii.]

493

of the my. Thus s'vara is believed to possess a mind of pure sattva alone. But sattva, rajas and tamas were accepted
in Vednta in the sense of tendencies and not as reals as S@mkhya held it. Moreover, in spite of all modifications that
my was believed to pass through as the stuff of the world-appearance, it was indefinable and indefinite, and in its
nature different from what we understand as positive or negative. It was an unsubstantial nothing, a magic entity which
had its being only so long as it appeared. Prak@rti also was indefinable or rather undemonstrable as regards its own
essential nature apart from its manifestation, but even then it was believed to be a combination of positive reals. It was
undefinable because so long as the reals composing it did not combine, no demonstrable qualities belonged to it with
which it could be defined. My however was undemonstrable, indefinite, and indefinable in all forms; it was a
separate category of the indefinite. S@mkhya believed in the personal individuality of souls, while for Vednta there
was only one soul or self, which appeared as many by virtue of the my transformations. There was an adhysa or
illusion in S@mkhya as well as in Vednta; but in the former the illusion was due to a mere non-distinction between
prak@rti and puru@sa or mere misattribution of characters or identities, but in Vednta there was not only
misattribution, but a false and altogether indefinable creation. Causation with S@mkhya meant real transformation,
but with Vednta all transformation was mere appearance. Though there were so many
Chapter II 322
differences,itishowevereasytoseethatprobablyatthetimeoftheoriginofthetwosystemsduringthe
Upani@sadperiodeachwasbuiltupfromverysimilarideaswhichdifferedonlyintendenciesthatgradually
manifestedthemselvesintothepresentdivergencesofthetwosystems.ThoughS'a@nkaralabouredhardto
provethattheS@mkhyaviewcouldnotbefoundintheUpani@sads,wecanhardlybeconvincedbyhis
interpretationsandarguments.Themoreheargues,themoreweareledtosuspectthattheS@mkhyathought
haditsoriginintheUpani@sads.S'a@nkaraandhisfollowersborrowedmuchoftheirdialecticformof
criticismfromtheBuddhists.HisBrahmanwasverymuchlikethes'nyaofNgrjuna.Itisdifficultindeedto
distinguishbetweenpurebeingandpurenonbeingasacategory.ThedebtsofS`a@nkaratotheselfluminosity
oftheVijnavdaBuddhism

494

canhardlybeoverestimated.ThereseemstobemuchtruthintheaccusationsagainstS'a@nkarabyVijna
Bhik@suandothersthathewasahiddenBuddhisthimself.IamledtothinkthatS'a@nkara'sphilosophyis
largelyacompoundofVijnavdaandS'nyavdaBuddhismwiththeUpani@sadnotionofthepermanenceof
selfsuperadded.

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