Social Movements and Organizational Form

Social Movements and Organizational Form: Cooperative Alternatives to Corporations in the
American Insurance, Dairy, and Grain Industries

Author(s): Marc Schneiberg, Marissa King and Thomas Smith
Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 73, No. 4 (Aug., 2008), pp. 635-667
Published by: American Sociological Association
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Social Movements and Organizational
Form: Cooperative Alternatives to
Corporations in the American Insurance,
Dairy, and Grain Industries
Marc Schneiberg Marissa King
Reed CollegeColumbia University
Thomas Smith
Reed College
How do social movements promote diversity and alternative We

organizational forms?
address this question how was
by analyzing cooperative enterprise affected by the
Grange?a leading anticorporate movement in the United States the late

during
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. State-level across three industries
analyses
findings. First, theGrange had positive effectson cooperatives and mutuals

yield three
during the nineteenth-century populist struggles over corporate Second,
capitalism.
these effects were stronger where corporations counter-mobilized to block
challengers'
political efforts. Grangers pursued economic organization as an alternative topolitics
and in response toblockedpolitical access. Third, theGrange continued tofoster

cooperatives even as populist revolts waned. It did so, however, by buffering cooperatives
fromproblems ofgroup heterogeneityand population change, rendering them less
dependent on supportive communitiesand specific economic conditions. Thesefindings
advance research at the movement
movements/organizations interface by documenting
effectsand by isolatingdifferentcausal pathways throughwhich mobilization, counter

mobilization, and political opportunity shape economic organization. The results also
provide economic with new evidence on how social structure moderates

sociology
economic and revise institutional
forces, help analyses of American capitalism by
how as rather than aberrant, elements
showing cooperatives emerged significant, of the
U.S. economy.
and towhat extent, do social move 1997; Davis and Thompson 1994; Davis et al.
How, ments promote institutionaldiversity and 2005; Fligstein 2001; Haveman, Rao, and
alternative organizational forms? Scholars have Paruchuri 2007; Lounsbury, Ventresca, and
recently addressed this question by combining Hirsch 2003; Minkoff 1994; Rao 1998;
movement and organizations research (Clemens Soule forthcoming). This
Schneiberg 2002;
Direct correspondence toMarc Reed ASR reviewers and editors for comments and
Schneiberg, helpful
College, 3203 SE Woodstock Boulevard, Portland, We owe special thankstoHuggyRao for
suggestions.
OR 97202 (marc.schneiberg@reed.edu). We thank feedback and suggestions at a very early stage of this
Woody Powell, Michael Lounsbury, Steve Barley, project. The
usual caveats apply. This research was
Susse Frank Dobbin, Ove
Georg, Pederson, Paul supported by a National Science Foundation grant
Gronke, Jeffrey Parker, Noel Netusil, members of the (#0318466) to the firstauthor,and by theLevine
International Center for Business and Politics, and the and Corbett-Goldhammer funds at Reed College.
American Sociological Review, 2008, Vol. 73 (August:635-667)
636 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
"new organizational synthesis" goes beyond We thus have little systematic,multivariate,

studying movements as movement
organiza information about basic casual relationships,
tions, aiming instead to trace how movements includingwhether movements affect organiza
shape organizations and fields, and vice versa. tionsdirectly,by pressuring organizations, serv
From an organizational theoryperspective, this
ing as carriers of new forms, or organizing
integrationhas great promise. Bringing move challengers; indirectly,by creating political and
ments (back) in reintroduces agency and poli
institutionalclimates favorable to challengers or
tics into institutional analysis, shifting the
new forms; or conditionally, depending on the
explanatory focus from isomorphism and dif
political or institutional context. Nor is there
fusion to contestation and the production of
much, ifany, research on howmovements shape
multiple logics within fields. Furthermore, by
the context for organizations, acting as a mod
foregrounding contention and collective action,
this synthesis affordsnew leverage for explain erating influencefor theeffectsof economic and
ing organizational outcomes, such as institu political factors on organizational outcomes.
tionalization and deinstitutionalization, therise We address these gaps by analyzing move
of new forms, the constructionof industries,and ment effectson threeorganizational forms in the
structural change (Schneiberg and Lounsbury late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century U.S.
2008). economy?insurance mutuals, dairy coopera

Yet in seeking integration,scholars have bare tives, and grain elevator cooperatives. By pur
lybegun to catalog or systematically assess the suing this study historically,we tap into broad
effectsofmovements on organizations (Guigni political struggles over U.S. economic order
1998). This partly has to do with analytical and see how cooperatives emerged frommove
strategy.One branch of the new synthesis is ments of agrarians and independent producers
less interested indistinguishing phenomena and who opposed consolidation.
corporate
analyzing how movements affectorganizations. Institutionalhistories emphasize the rise of the
Rather, it exploits convergences between the
corporation as American capitalism's central
two, treatingorganizations and theirprocesses
as iftheywere social movements, and uses the organizational tendency during this era. Yet
ories thatexplain movements?resource mobi groups like the Grange and the Farmers'
Alliance repeatedly mobilized cooperatives in
lization,framing, and political opportunity?to
an effort to institutedecentralized and region
explain organizational outcomes (Campbell
2005; Davis and Zald 2005; Strang and Jung ally based alternatives to corporate capitalism.
2005; Swaminathan andWade 2001). Moreover, By pursuing amultivariate approach, we isolate
research addressingmovement effectson organ movement effectson organizations and address
izations is often theoretical (McAdam and Scott differentpossible causal pathways. This is, to
2005; Rao, Morrill, and Zald 2000) or relies on date, the firstanalysis ofmovement effects on
qualitative studies of one or a few cases organizational forms that measures movements
(Armstrong 2002; Clemens 1997; Lounsbury et directly and controls for economic, political,
al. 2003; Moore and Hala 2002; Rao 1998). and community factors thatshape thecollective
Despite a growing body of quantitative organi action costs of creating new forms. It is also the
zational analyses that invokemovement effects firstthataddresses how movements can alter the
(Carroll and Swaminathan 2000; Greve, Pozner, micro-economics of organization by helping
and Rao 2006; Ingram and Simons 2000;
cooperators solve coordination problems and
McLaughlin 1996; Ruef 2000), few studies
or mem
manage organizing costs associated with group
measure movements' presence, activity,
diversity,mobility, and community instability.
bership (Lounsbury 2001; Rojas 2006;
Well developed movements, we suggest, helped
Schneiberg 2002; Soule forthcoming).
produce social ties and sustain cooperative
Quantitative analyses of policy directlymeas
ure movement
forms as theUnited States shifted from a soci
strength (e.g., Amenta,
Carruthers, and Zylan 1992; Soule and Olzak ety of stable communities, local networks, and
2004), but organizational analyses often rely self-governing towns to a more diverse and
on indirect proxies, measuring movement cor impersonal society of geographically mobile
relates or enabling conditions. strangers.
MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 637
COOPERATIVES, CORPORATE integrationby consumers (Sichel 1966). They

CAPITALISM, AND SOCIAL are strategies of collective self-supply inwhich
MOVEMENTS consumers bypass middlemen, obtain other
wise unavailable goods, or opt out ofmarket or
Cooperatives, Mutuals, and
state provision. Producer cooperatives also
Corporate Capitalism eliminate middlemen, but via strategies of for
ward collective-vertical integration inwhich
Cooperatives and mutuals are membership
based, mutual benefit associations of consumers producers seek outlets and betterprices by bar
or producers thatdiffer inkind from for-profit gaining collectively with buyers or by jointly
corporations. Unlike corporations, cooperative marketing or processing theirproduce.
formsunite the roles of owners with consumers Research typically linkscooperatives to idio
or producers. They eliminate the independent, syncratic conditions in specific industries,such
as market
profit-seeking stockholder by assigning prop failure, information costs, or unem
ertyrights in the firm to consumers or produc ployment, or topeculiar circumstances, arguing

ers. Consumer- or
producer-owners become the that cooperatives appear only where stable
residual claimants and ultimate decision communities or common cultures prevail (Ben
making authorities in the firm. In effect,coop Ner 1984; Hansmann 1995; Johnson andWhyte
eratives replace market relations between a 1977; Rao and Neilsen 1992; Rothschild and
corporation and its consumers or producers Whitt 1986; Staber 1993; Whyte and Whyte
with relations of ownership, control, and col 1991). Priorwork also stresseshow cooperatives
lective self-provision.They are typicallyorgan face hostile environments, inpart because cor
ized by consumers or producers, operated by or porate interestsmobilize to suppress competing
for these groups, and returnprofits tomembers alternatives, denying them credit or supplies,
via dividends, improved compensation, and discrediting them in themedia, and using reg
expanded or lower-cost service (Hansmann ulations to handicap theirorganization (Elster
1995; Heflebower 1980; Ware 1989). Due to 1988; Ingram and Simons 2000; Putterman
these structural properties, movements have 1982; Schneiberg 2002).
mobilized cooperatives against bureaucracies, Indeed, analyses ofU.S. capitalism often treat
markets, and corporations to promote commu
cooperatives and kindred forms as transitory
nity, economic self-sufficiency, local owner or aberrant phenomena, focusing instead on the
ship, regional development, and workplace rise of the corporation as theU.S. economy's
democracy (Beito 2000; Furlough and central organizing tendency (Berk 1994;
Strikwerda 1999; Haveman and Rao 1997; Chandler 1977; Dobbin 1994; Fligstein 1990;
Ingram and Simons 2000; Rothschild-Whitt Hollingsworth 1997; Perrow 2002; Roy 1997).
1979; Schneiberg 2002; Whyte and Whyte As financial and state institutionsconcentrated
1991). capital and development inNortheastern urban
Cooperatives vary in theirtypesand structural centers after the Civil War, corporations shed
particulars (Aldrich and Stern 1983; Hansmann theirpublic character, gaining autonomy from
1995; Shirom 1972; Staber 1989).1 Worker the state and new charterpowers, like the right
cooperatives eliminate distinctions between to own other firms. States and municipalities
labor and capital, but theywere rare in the abandoned public ownership.Modernizers and
United States before 1960.Mutuals and con
corporate forces mobilized institutional sup
sumer cooperatives, common in the United
port, including general incorporation laws, the
States, represent backward collective-vertical
recognition of the corporation as a legal person,
and financialmachinery forunderwritingmerg
ers. They also pursued combination and con
1 solidation, first in railroads and infrastructure
Cooperatives and mutuals vary in terms of
whether members have equal shares and votes, sectors, then in theprocessing andmarketing of
whether and how members can sell shares, how agricultural produce, and finally in industry,
capital is paid in and profits allocated, whether institutionalizing the corporation as a general
non-owners can be members, how decisions and dominant form in theU.S. economy.
aremade, and the extent towhich authority is Yet in subjecting whole regions of the coun
delegated to professional managers. trytopredatory combinations, rate discrimina
tion,and credit famines, corporate consolidation immense sum is an annual gift from the hard work
also fueled political conflict, protests, populist people to a set of sharpers who ridicule us for our
revolts,mobilization, and counter-mobilization, stupiditywhile reveling in luxuryon our hard

earnings." (Kimball 1960:45)
including two anticorporate movements of
agrarians and independent producers?the The Alliance also supported cooperatives,
Grange, or Patrons of Husbandry, and the leavingmutuals and elevators dotting theplains,
Farmers' Alliance (Buck 1913; Nordin 1974; as did the Farmers Union and Equity, which
Sanders 1999; Schwartz 1976). Centered in the helped centralize creameries, grain pools, and
Midwest, thePlains, and theSouth, bothmove regional exchanges after 1900 (Bell 1941; Filley
ments rejected "corporate liberal" ideals of 1929; Larson 1969). Here, too, movements
national markets and corporations. Instead, they against corporate capitalism made cooperative
espoused producer or "regional republican" forms available across industries, institutional
visions of decentralized development based on izing them alongside corporations as a general
a "cooperative commonwealth" of farmers, organizing form.
independent producers, regional markets, and
self-governing towns (Berk 1994; Goodwyn Movements and Cooperative Forms:
1978; Hattam 1992; Schneiberg 2002; Voss Hypotheses
1996). Both articulated anti-monopoly frames
that cast the heartland's woes in terms of These historical observations dovetail with core
"trusts," dependency, and tributes exacted by claims in organizational and economic sociol
railroads, middlemen, and "Eastern interests." ogy. Forms are neither chosen in a social vac
Both advocated producerist solutions thatcom uum nor simply a given in actors' organizing
bined (1) political programs of antitrust laws, repertoires. Rather, theyhave tobe assembled,
regulation, and finance reformwith (2) eco theorized, disseminated, politically defended,
nomic self-organization via cooperatives, mutu legitimated, and made available as options for
als, and state exchanges. problem solving (Clemens 1997; Meyer et al.
During its firstmid-1870s peak, theGrange 1997; Rao 1998; Scott 1994). As research at the
won landmarkvictorieswith railroad regulation, movements/organizations interfaceand studies
setting precedents for later interventions.The of cooperatives would add, new forms rest crit
Alliance, linked to thePopulist party,peaked at ically on mobilization and social movements.
amillion members in 1890, and like theGrange, Such work supports three hypotheses about
itsought antitrust laws toprotect local industry. movement effects on
cooperatives. It also sup
Both promoted cooperatives and public enter ports hypotheses thatmovements moderate
prise. The Grange fueled bursts of agricultural economic forces, which makes cooperatives
cooperatives in the 1870s, leftGranges and less dependent on specific economic condi
mutuals scattered across the Midwest, and con tions and sustains them as their community
tinued itswork during its revival in the 1910s bases dissolve.
and 1920s, helping farmers to securemarketing
federations and enabling legislation for coop Direct and conditional effects. First,prior
eratives (Knapp 1969; Nordin 1974; Powell work suggests that anticorporate movements
1913; Saloutos and Hicks 1951). As an insur are
"organization-generating organizations"
ance historian notes, the Grange supported
(Stinchcombe 1965) thatfoster cooperatives in
cooperatives inmultiple ways: their efforts to establish alternative economic
Profit seeking insurance companies were often orders (Carroll and Swaminathan 2000;
linkedwith railroads inGranger demonology; it McAdam and Scott 2005; McLaughlin 1996;
was explicit Granger policy to encourage the for Rao et al. 2000; Rothschild and Whitt 1986;
mation of cooperative mutuals_These compa Russell andHanneman 1995; Schneiberg 2002).
nies were often organized under the aegis of the
In this view, movements have direct positive
Granger bulletins published town
effects on cooperative forms.Movements can
Grange....
mutual laws and advocated organization: "Patrons
you cannot afford to pay these high premiums to forge networks and coalitions forprotests, lob
joint stock companies. Insure yourselves and keep bying efforts,and enacting laws,while provid
some money at home. Commercial companies ing new formswith regulatory support, legal
wasted seven-tenths of the premiums: This infrastructure,and political cover. Such cover is
vital for cooperatives, as competition between Rothschild andWhitt 1986;Whyte andWhyte

forms often prompts counter-mobilization by 1991).
vested corporate interests,suppression efforts, We thusexpect thatanticorporatemovements
and political struggles over both themarket and will become more effective in fostering coop
the range of acceptable forms (Ingram and Rao eratives as they grow in strength, scope, or
2004; Schneiberg 2002). organization.
Movements also operate as cultural forces
Hypothesis 1: As anticorporate movements
and agents of theorization and framing (Snow
increase inmembership, organization, or
and Benford 1988; Strang and Meyer 1994).
resources, the prevalence of cooperatives
Through pamphlets, speeches, and word of and mutuals will increase.
movements can and prom
mouth, spark debate
ulgate critiques, "field frames" (Lounsbury et We also expect contemporary and historical
al. 2003; Voss 1996), rhetorical discourses effects.Even "defeated" movements can leave
(Greve et al. 2006; Ruef 2000), and theories of legacies like organizational systems, coopera
order (Dobbin 1994; Hattam 1992) thatcall for, tive traditions, local chapters, newspapers, and
authorize, and legitimate cooperative forms. other resources for cooperative organizing
They can do thisdirectly,or indirectlyvia news (Haveman et al. 2007; Schneiberg 2007).
papers committed to their point of view Second, prior work suggests thatmovement
(Haveman et al. 2007; King and Haveman forth effects depend on the political and institution
coming). In either case, new frames provide al contexts in which groups mobilize.
challengers and cooperators with themeans to Opportunity structures (McAdam 1996; Tarrow
fueldebate, subvert the taken-for-grantedchar 1998), institutionalmediation (Amenta et al.
acter of corporate capitalism, and argue for 1992), and dynamics of contentionmake poli
cooperatives as rational or efficient solutions. ties more or less open to movement demands.
Further, likeprofessional associations, move Movements can more

successfully translate
ments can codify, transpose, or diffuse organ strength in numbers or resources into desired
izing templates, providing cooperators with policies in situations where elites are divided,
model by-laws, articles of organization, and elections are competitive, states rely on mem
technical support (Clemens 1997; Edelman bers for revenues, and bureaucratic governance
1992; Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings 2002; has replaced patronage politics (Soule and King
Russell and Hanneman 1995; Staber 1993). As 2006; Soule and Olzak 2004; Vogus and Davis
organizations, movements can generate social 2005). Moreover, movements often evoke count
capital or community foundations for cooper er-movements, which can blunt challengers'
atives, which reduces collective-action costs by influence,close offopportunities, reverse initial
cultivating social ties, supplying selective incen successes, and prompt insurgents to change
tives, constituting participants as

already-organ venues or strategies (Ingram and Rao 2004;
ized collectivities, and producing members Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Voss 1996; Zald
committed to the cause (Aldrich 1999; andUseem 1987).
Rothschild andWhitt 1986; Schneiberg 2002; In general, this work focuses on movements'
Stryjan 1994). Finally,movements can promote conditional effects on policy outcomes, butwe
favorable environments or "cross form" effects propose parallel arguments about movement
(Minkoff 1994) for cooperatives by forming effects on organizations. Anticorporate move
complementary institutions, related types of ments can pursue economic organization as an
organizations, or communities of similar forms alternative to using the state against corpora
in parallel domains (Ruef 2000; Schneiberg tions, yielding conditional positive effects of
2007). Such organizations and communities movements for cooperative forms (Schneiberg
can supply cooperatives with capital, favored 2002,2007). This strategymay flowfrom a dis
trading relations, and managerial expertise, as trustof politics and a principled rejection of
well as networks and organized groups, vivid states in favor of community and local self-suf
instantiations of alternatives, analogies, and ficiency.Activists often turn to cooperatives as
cognitive or sociopolitical legitimacy (Barnett a "third way" between markets and states or
and Carroll 1987; Baum 1996; Ben-Ner 1984; corporations, or as a way to organize outside
Elster 1988; Ingram and Simons 2000; established institutions(Rothschild-Whitt 1979;
Ware 1989). This strategy can also stem from and lard pitched Midwestern dairy and hog
counter-mobilization by corporations and farmers against beef interests,cotton growers,
blocked political access. Anticorporate move the Southern Alliance, and the Populist Party,
ments may abandon politics for private strate splitting theAlliance and contributing to the
gies and organization when political victories Populists' defeat (Lampard 1963; Nixon 1928).
are subverted by corporate capture of courts or Dairy farmers dissociated themselves from
commissions (Clemens 1997; Hattam 1992). wheat and cotton-beltpopulists, opting to lobby
Both of the above strategic concerns affect on their own as an interest group. Conflicts
ed U.S. anticorporate movements. Agrarians
between cooperative and antimonopoly pro
and independentproducers foughtpolitical bat grams deepened thisrift.Agricultural produc
tles for regulation, antitrust laws, and currency er cooperatives battled "trusts" in theirhome
reform,seeing these as vital elements forregion industries and turned to politics to contest cor
al development. Nonetheless, theywere ambiva porations and to secure enabling legislation.
lent about politics in general, and thirdparty Like unions, however, cooperatives faced
politics in particular (Ostler 1993; Sanders antitrustprosecutions as theyorganized tobar
1999). They "oscillated between fraternalism gain collectively with processors and brokers
and political organization" (Clemens 1997:143), (Guth1982;Young 1991).
periodically declaring their organs to be non Hypothesis 3: As anticorporate movements
political, and opting forprivate self-organiza increase inmembership, organization, or
tionand cooperatives to solve the trustproblem. the prevalence of cooperatives
resources,
Anticorporate movements may thus be most and mutuals will decrease.
productive for cooperative enterprise where
political access isblocked or political means are
rejected, that is, in theabsence of anticorporate Movements as moderating
forces. Finally,
politics. beyond any political engagements or direct
Hypothesis 2: The positive effects of move effects that theymight bring about,movements
ment membership or organization on the are also social infrastructuresfor organization
that can alter how consumers and producers
prevalence of cooperatives and mutuals
will increase in settings characterized by respond to the incentives,collective-action costs,
and trade-offs of
blocked political access or the absence of cooperative enterprise.
Movements could thusmoderate the effectsof
anticorporate political victories. on
micro-economic conditions cooperatives'
Third, prior research suggests thatorganizing forms. Economic sociologists have shown that
dilemmas could prompt movement elites to social structural factors, including profession
oppose cooperatives, yielding a negative effect. al associations, shifts in policy regimes, and
Aldrich and Stern (1983), for example, find new institutional logics, can powerfully mod
thatunion leaders discourage cooperatives for erate economic forces. For example, they trans
fear theywill divide the rank and file between formhow organizations understand and respond
owners and non-owners, undermining solidar tomarket conditions in deciding whether to
ity.Similarly, Schwartz (1976) locates the fail merge, which business strategies to pursue,
ure of Alliance cotton exchanges in conflicts what structures to adopt, orwhether to regulate
between movement elites, who had ties to cor competition (Bartley and Schneiberg 2002;
porations or interests in forgingbroader politi Dobbin and Dowd 1997, 2000; Dobbin and
cal coalitions, and rank-and-file groups, who Sutton 1998; Thornton and Ocasio 1999). We
were interested inbypassing or contesting cor extend this logic to consider movements as
porations throughcooperatives. Both dynamics moderating social factors thatcan buffer coop
would foster negative associations between eratives from collective-action costs associated
movement mobilization and cooperatives. with group diversity or community dissolution.
Conflict among producers or between coop Research argues that, in general, consumers
eratives' and movements' political aims could or producers turn to cooperatives tomanage
also fosternegative associations between coop market failures or costs of contractingwith for
eratives and populist movements. In the 1890s, profit firms (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Ben
struggles overGreenback proposals, margarine, Ner 1984; Hansmann 1995;Williamson 1985).
When markets fail toprevent corporations from areas, as these investmentsentail fixed costs and
benefiting at the expense of consumers or pro agglomeration economies.
ducers, these groups have incentives to organ Hypothesis 4a: As theprices thatconsumers are
ize cooperatives. This occurs when information
charged increase, theprices thatproducers
about products is costly, collective goods are are paid decrease, and population density
involved, or trading partners are locked into
decreases, the prevalence of cooperatives
exchanges due tomonopoly or transaction and mutuals will increase.
specific investments.In these cases, producers or
consumers become vulnerable to exploitation by Yet the costs of collective enterprise associ
corporations and suffer"costs of contracting," ated with population change and declining
such as monopoly over- or under-pricing, qual community or commonality can undermine
itydilution,or service failure.Moreover, theycan gains from solving market failures, leading to
reduce conflicts of interestand contractingcosts Hypothesis 4b:
by unifying ownership with production or con Hypothesis 4b: As population change, residen
sumption via a cooperative ormutual firm. tial instability, and group or community
Yet in choosing cooperative forms,consumers
heterogeneity increase, the prevalence of
and producers are subject to costs of collective
cooperatives and mutuals will decrease.
ownership, which themselves often depend on
the strengthof a common community or culture These baseline hypotheses letus propose two
(Ben Ner 1984; Hansmann 1995; Rothschild ways inwhich movements can serve as social
andWhitt 1986). Cooperative firms relyon col infrastructures for organization, moderating
lective action and decision making among micro-economic effects on cooperative forms.
numerous, often diverse groups. Cooperatives First, to the extent thatmovements expand
may thus sufferfrom differences in interests, actors' choices bymaking cooperative alterna
protracteddeliberation, enforcement issues, and tives available and legitimate, consumers and
declining commitment.Furthermore,by spread producers will turnmore readily to these forms
ingprofits, losses, and decision making across as costs of contracting with corporations
consumer or
producer groups, cooperatives become severe.Well-developed movements will
diminish incentives forowners tomonitor man magnify the effects of adverse pricing, failures
agement, develop expertise, and invest in to provide services, and population density on
improvements. Such "costs of ownership" are cooperative enterprise.
low for stable, homogenous groups, inwhich
Hypothesis 5a: Increased movement member
long-standing relations prevail and community ship, resources, and organization will
or common culture is strong. But as population
increase the effects of adverse prices and
change or influxesof new groups disrupt social
or as group population density on the prevalence of
relations, heterogeneity increases,
cooperatives and mutuals.
these bases for cooperatives dissolve.
Cooperatives face growing organizing costs, Second, by providing cooperatives with social
internaldivision, and shrinkingsocial resources ties, templates, and already-organized collec
for sustaining commitment, trust, and democ tivities,movements may supplement or partly
racy (Bonin, Jones, and Putterman 1993; substitutefor traditionalcommunity.This could
Hansmann 1995; Haveman and Rao 1997; reduce cooperatives' and mutuals' dependence
Hoffman and Libecap 1991; Putterman 1982; on well-established, stable, and homogenous
Whyte andWhyte 1991). groups. As a dairy official noted about market
We thus expect cooperatives to proliferate ing cooperatives (cited inKnapp 1969:200),
as contracting costs increase. They will prolif less organizing work is required when cooper
erate in settingswhere consumers are charged atives can use already-established movement
high prices, where producers receive lowprices, collectivities as organizing platforms:
and where consumers or producers receive lit
Wherever I founda strongGrange, I had the least
tle or no service from for-profitfirms, as when
difficultyin gettingmilk producers to join our
population density is low.Corporations will not associations.Usually I could depend on theGrange
find itprofitable to build processing plants or officers for help and Grange meetings were splen
distribution networks in sparsely populated did opportunities to preach the doctrine of collec
tive bargaining. State granges endorsed and rec ized to insure themselves against fire and other
ommended theNEMPA [New England Milk hazards (Bainbridge 1952:161; Heimer 1985;
Producers to members and Grange
Association]
Schneiberg 2002). These firms included a score
halls were placed at our disposal without charge_
or so ofmultistate "factorymutuals," butmost
It has been the Mother Organization ... that for
were "class mutuals" inwhich property owners
over half a century has been building up the sen
in a town, city, or industrycontracted to cover
timent,developing the leadershipand layingthe
foundation for the work that was to follow. one another against property damage or loss
up to a specified limit.Class mutuals used amix
More generally,movements constitute social of assessment and advanced premium plans,
infrastructurethatcan fosterbroader social ori
and theywere mainly local operations with few
entations, sustain commitment, and facilitate cash assets. Yet were numerous,
they especial
thecommunication and collaboration thatcoop
ly in theMidwest, rural Pennsylvania, and
eratives require (Rothschild andWhitt 1986). To
upstateNew York, with more than3,500 inbusi
the extent that"mother organizations" promote
ness between 1903 and 1929 (see Figure 1). By
solidarity, theycan reduce cooperatives' depen the early twentiethcentury,mutuals wrote 11 to
dence on traditional communities, buffering
12 percent of the nation's fire insurance, cap
themfrom the disruptive effects of residential
turing40 percent of the farm business and key
instability, immigration, and group diversity. commercial lines by 1921, and reaching 35 per
Hypothesis 5b: Increased movement member cent of the insurance in force inWisconsin
ship and organization will decrease the (Bainbridge 1952; Heflebower 1980).
negative effectsof population change, res Property owners formed mutuals to solve
idential instability,and group or community moral hazards they faced with for-profitinsur
heterogeneity on the prevalence of coop ers (Hansmann 1995; Heimer 1985; Schneiberg
eratives and mutuals. 2002). Stock insurers,forexample,made money
from investments rather than insurance and
Indeed, just as movements shape policy
competed without limit for premiums to fund
processes differentlyat differentpoints (King, investments. They thus failed to accumulate
Cornwall, and Dahlin 2005; Soule and King
reserves, eroding their capacity to pay claims
2006), theirorganizational effectsmay also vary and leavingpolicyholders unprotected aftercon
over time, with movements like the Grange
flagrations. Insurers tempered rivalry via cartels,
serving mainly as moderating influences for which subjected the insured to rate hikes and
cooperatives once highly politicized struggles discrimination. In response, property owners
over economic order begin to recede into the
pursued mutuals and anticorporate politics like
past.
anticompact laws and regulation, drawing on
movements against combines in railroads and
CASE SELECTION AND INDUSTRY other sectors formodels, techniques, and per
CONTEXT sonnel (Grant 1979; Kimball 1960). Stock insur
We address movement effectson organizations ers also refused to invest in fire-prevention
by analyzing cooperatives and mutuals in the systems to help consumers. These investments
fire insurance, dairy, and grain industries.All had collective-good and consumer-specific
threewere leading sectors forcooperative organ qualities and did not become common until
via mutuals.
ization in theUnited States. In addition, con consumers aligned incentives
sumers or producers in all threeindustriesfought Dairy cooperatives first appeared in the

"trusts" and "combines," tomovements, Northeast in the 1840s and spread to the
turning
Midwest and Plains region after theCivil War
anticorporate politics, and cooperatives to
resolve theirstruggles.These industriesare thus (Filley 1929;Knapp 1969; Lampard 1963;
Powell 1913;Young 1991). From 1860 through
ideally suited for analyzing how movements,
economics, and politics operate and interact to the 1890s, dairy farmers formed local cheese
affect organizational form. making cooperatives, cooperative creameries
Insurancemutuals firstappeared in the 1820s. (butter), and milk-marketing cooperatives to
They emerged as a "veritable tidalwave" from bargain collectively with city milk dealers.
1870 to 1900 and proliferated through 1925 as Followed in the twentiethcenturyby therise of
merchants, manufacturers, and farmers organ cooperative federations like Land O' Lakes
N. Ins.
Mutuals
^^\/^^^^^^^BB| ^^W
'
i-' "^k 98to266(9)
^^^^^F^*
C ^ ^' l23to 97(9)
\ "v.
J?
\*
9to 22(10)
*< 2t0 8<10>
/C^*5^, ^* oto 1(10)
^^|r ID
JwZ~~^W^^^^^ft *?rJiffC?l\ N-Daify

Coops
<r 1913
x^^^^^^^X
<& \ ^ ' ^^^
Vjy
Hl8to437(ll)
-^ 6to 17(9)
V \ * 3to 5 (8)
?
^* ^-W^
^i lt0 2 <9>
>^ ? (ID
/ TVJl^^^^^^^U-r^ **" ^fa^n^' C00pS

%^~\ / ^^^t?/l\ ^r 1913
^"^^^^^^^Bl. Lr^---A B 6to158
(15)
'
"%
Ii
DO Hi
(27)
l,A% Jf?I
Figure 1. Geography of Cooperative Forms
Creamery, these effortsplaced dairy firstamong larly in the upper Midwest and Plains states,
agricultural sectors in terms of both establish growers were successful (see Figure 1). The
ing cooperatives and their output share. By number of elevator cooperatives reached 1,000
1909, therewere more than 2,700 dairy coop by 1907 and peaked atmore than 4,000 in the
eratives in theUnited States, concentrated, as 1920s, settlingdown to 2,614 by 1936 (Elsworth
Figure 1 shows, inmany of the same places 1928). By 1925, grain cooperatives held 38 per
where mutuals had existed in 1903 (Elsworth cent of themarket, making them first indollar
1928). By 1891, 60 percent of cheese in the volume in agriculture (Heflebower 1980).
United States was manufactured cooperatively; Grain farmerspursued cooperatives to over
by 1936, cooperatives accounted for 40 per come market concentration among "line eleva
cent of butter output; and by 1964, 65 percent tor"companies (Filley 1929; Saloutos andHicks
of butter and 70 to 75 percent of fluidmilk 1951). Line companies were syndicates of com
were produced or marketed via cooperatives mission firms,grain dealers, and exporters that
(Heflebower 1980; Knapp 1969). owned up to 800 or 900 elevators, monopo
Dairymen also combined cooperative self lized distribution along a railroad line, and
organization and politics to contest corpora densely interlockedwith railroads and terminal
tions.At first,
markets underproduced butterand elevators. Line companies received favorable
cheese factories, leaving milk producers who termsfrom railroads and warehouses, and they
needed manufacturing facilities to their own sought to eliminate independent elevators. They
cooperative devices. For-profit factories sub paid farmershigh rates forgrain inplaces where
sequently appeared, but theypaid one price for competition existed, and low rateswhere itdid
all milk grades. This practice, farmers felt,dis not. Line companies also "docked" growers for
criminated unfairly between quality producers mixtures of grain, required bushels over legal
and those who watered theirmilk, and appro weight standards, and paid farmers for lower
priated investments thatfarmersmade in feed, grade grain,which they then repacked and sold
animal care, and equipment toproduce high-fat as higher grade. In response, growers organized
milk (Heflebower 1980; Lampard 1963). For theirown grain elevators and mobilized politi
fluidmilk producers, theproblem involved con cally against line companies. They obtained
centrateddistribution,which leftfarmers facing laws to force railroads to provide sites for ele
"the milk trust"?urban milk dealers who col vators, antitrustprosecutions, antidiscrimina
luded to cut prices (Filley 1929; Knapp 1969; tion laws to prevent overbidding by line
Young 1991). Dairy farmerswere vulnerable in elevators, and a 1906 ICC investigation that
this transactionbecause seasonal surpluses and ended railroads' opposition to the farmers' ele
the perishable nature of their goods made it vatormovement (Filley 1929).
impossible to withhold produce strategically.

To protect themselves, farmers organized mar METHODS AND DATA
keting cooperatives and sought trust-busting
Methods and Dependent Variables
measures against dealers (Powell 1913). The
use of antitrustmechanisms against marketing We analyze movement effects on cooperatives
cooperatives, though, leftdairymen ambivalent in two stages. First,we conduct cross-section
toward radical agrarian politics. al analyses of thenumber,per state,of insurance
Grain elevator cooperatives appeared in mutuals in 1903, and dairy and grain coopera
Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota in the late tives in 1913. In this stage we ask, to what
1850s and 1860s and spread east, south, and extent did the anticorporate movements and
west in twowaves (Fetrow and Elsworth 1947; constitutional struggles over economic order in
Filley 1929; Larson 1969). Both waves pro the latenineteenth century shape the initialdis
duced local associations that built elevators; tribution of cooperatives in these industries?
purchased, sorted,and graded grain; and shipped We thenconduct pooled, time-series analyses of
it to terminal markets for storage or sale. the number of insurancemutuals from 1903 to
Growers also formed state associations, termi 1929, and dairy and grain cooperatives from
nal marketing agencies, cooperative exchanges, 1913 to 1927. In this stage we ask, to what
and wheat pools in a failed bid to controlmar extent did movements continue to shape coop
kets. On the local level, however, and particu eratives and mutuals beyond the Populist-era
struggles over trustsand combines by moder Bartley 2001). States are arenas, "attractors,"
ating theeconomic and community dynamics of and targets formovement mobilization and
organization? political activity.We focus on the number of
We chose this strategy based on historical cooperatives and mutuals per statebecause we
considerations and data availability. The years are interestedin theirprevalence and persistence
1903 and 1913 are the earliest forwhich sys across states and over time.We use negative
tematic data exist, respectively, on insurance binomial regressions because theyare suitable
mutuals and agricultural cooperatives. The 1903 for count data and, unlike Poisson models, they
to 1929 and 1913 to 1927 periods also cover key do not assume that themeans and variances of
thedependent variables are equal (Long 1997).
periods of cooperative organization.Yet the ear
liestwaves of anticorporate movement mobi Data on insurance mutuals per state come
lization and the fiercest political struggles over from Best's Insurance Report and Spectator's
censuses
corporations predated 1900. Indeed, coopera
Insurance Year Book?annual of insur
tives first emerged in force together with ers?and have been compiled into seven state
level panels for 1903, 1905,1909,1914,1919,
Granger railroad laws and antitrustand Populist
politics in the lastquarter of thenineteenth cen 1924, and 1929. Spectator changed its report
tury.Moreover, anticorporate mobilization ing method in this period, so we include a
occurred in cycles. The firstwave occurred in dummy variable to control for this shift.Data on
thePopulist era,with theGrange and Farmers' cooperatives come from theU.S. Department of
Alliance peaking, respectively, in themid-1870s Agriculture's Agricultural Cooperative
and 1890. Both movements participated direct Associations, Marketing and Purchasing
ly inpolitical struggles over the emerging cor (Elsworth 1928) and Cooperative Purchasing
and Marketing (Elsworth 1930). These reports
porate order.The second wave occurred during
the Progressive decades of the early twentieth list thenumber of dairy cooperatives in opera
tionper state for five panels (1913,1915,1922,
centuryandwas marked by the resurgenceof the
1925, and 1927) and grain elevator cooperatives
Grange and the rise of other groups, like the
Farmers' Union. Such groups seemed more for four panels (1913, 1915, 1925, and 1927).
committed to sectoral agendas than to the
wholesale reconstitution of economic order Independent Variables
throughpolitical means. Unless noted, data for the independent vari
These historical shiftswarrant a two-part
ables come from theU.S. Census reports on
analytical strategy.We first examine how anti
movements Population, Agriculture, andManufacturers for
corporate engaged in the late nine
1900, 1919, 1920, 1930, and 1940. For the
teenth-centurypolitical struggles shaped the cross-sectional we measure econom
analyses,
early distributions of cooperatives andmutuals. ic factors and controls using 1900 data, and
We use the earliest available cross-sectional
social movements and political factors at their
data on those forms, and exploit the Populist
dates of occurrence.2 For time-series
era conjunction analyses,
of movements and anticorporate
politics to examine the direct and conditional

effects of movements on organizational form. 2
We considered measuring independent variables?
We thenanalyze the second wave, using data on economic factors and controls?as early as 1870 or
cooperatives, mutuals, and movements in the 1880, since the first cooperative waves predated 1900.
first three decades of the twentieth century. Yet the earliest years forwhich cooperative data exist
Here, we exploit time-seriesdata to see ifmove are 1903 and 1913,which leaves too great a time
ments moderated the organizational effects of span between independentand dependentvariables
economic and community conditions, shaping we shoulduse 1900or 1910
and suggestsinsteadthat
data for independent variables. Further, the historical
cooperatives in an ongoing fashionwhile whole record indicates that the three forms have common
sale struggles over the corporation receded into
social and political roots, hence using the same time
thepast and the economy settled into its"mod
period for economic factors and controls for the three
ern" form.
forms would be appropriate. We chose 1900 as a con
We conduct state-level analyses as states are sidered compromise. Fortunately, independent vari
key sites for regulating agricultural finance and ables correlated very strongly (typically .90 or higher)
trade (Ingram and Rao 2004; Schneiberg and across decades from 1880 to 1910.
we use decennial data, time-varyingindependent 1896, or (3) an anticompact law for insurance
variables, and linear interpolation for panel before 1903. A watershed in the struggles over
years, lagging independent variables for one corporate order, theGranger laws subjected the
year. railroads to public controls of rates, bans on
discrimination, and strong,as opposed to advi
Social movements. To analyze movement sory,regulatorycommissions (Berk 1994; Buck
effects in the cross-sectional analyses, we use 1913; Dobbin 1994; Kanazawa and Noll 1994).
These lawswere a decisive political victory for
fourmeasures ofGrange strength: (1) thenum
ber of national Grange family members per agrarians and producers over corporate forces.
state in 1875, (2) national Grange familymem They also left important legacies, generating
bers in 1876, (3) the number of members per arguments andmodels for struggles against cor
state Grange in 1875, and (4) the number of porations inother sectors at the state and nation
al levels. Antitrust laws likewise reflected
Grange organizations in 1875. All fourmeas decisive victories against corporations, both
urements were taken at the height of the first
generally (James 1999; Sanders 1999) and in
Granger mobilization and come from Tonz
insurance,where "anti-compact" laws targeted
(1964) and Buck (1913). We use peak years insurers (Grant 1979; Schneiberg 1999). We
because we are interested in the effects of the
code states forGranger laws using Buck (1913),
Grange on cooperative organization during its for general antitrust laws using James (1999),
heyday, and whether itsorganization-promoting and for anticompact laws using Spectator's Fire
effectswere conditional on political forces.We Insurance: Laws, Taxes, Fees (Schneiberg and
also use peak years because fourmeasures of
Bartley2001).
Grange strengthare available, andmembership
declined precipitously in the 1880s and 1890s,
Economic conditions. We include econom
although we obtained similar resultswith 1880
and 1890 data.We also considered including a ic factors as controls and to analyze whether
variable for the Farmers' Alliance using mem movements moderated economic forces. To tap
bers per state in 1890, reported inAppleton s contracting costs, we use Census data on the
Annual Cylcopedia and Register (see Sanders average price per gallon of milk thatwas paid
to dairy farmers, the average price per bushel
1999), butmembership is reported for only 25
states and no figures appear for key Alliance paid for wheat, and population density.
states.We thereforefocus solely on theGrange. Producers and consumers have greater incen
tives to form cooperatives when con
We retain this focus on theGrange in the corporate
time-series its effects dur

solidation yields high prices forkey inputs (like
analyses, examining
and meas insurance) or low prices for outputs (like farm
ing its twentieth-century resurgence,
goods), and in sparsely populated areas, as these
uring its strength using national Grange
are often underserved by for-profitfirms.
members per statefrom 1900 to 1940, as report
We develop fivemeasures for the collective
ed by Tonz (1964).
action costs and community bases of coopera
tive forms. For residential instability, we
Political factors. We includemeasures of calculate the absolute value of thepercent pop
anticorporate politics both to control forpoten ulation change over the prior decade and the
tial confounds and to analyze interactions percent foreign born. Including bothmeasures
between movements and politics during the lets us tap two dimensions of community dis
Populist era.We measure the strengthof pop ruption?change from immigration and insta
ulist forces using the Populist and bility due to change and migration within the
Democratic-Populist vote per state in the 1892 United States.
and 1896 presidential elections from the To measure the heterogeneity of producer
Congressional Quarterly's Presidential and consumer communities,we use Census data
Elections, 1789-1992. We measure anticorpo on states' racial compositions and thedistribu
rate political victories in threeways, creating tionof farms andmanufacturing establishments
dummy variables forwhether a state enacted (1) by size. We calculate the percent non-white
a Granger-railroad regulation law during the population to tap ethnic and racial heterogene
1870s, (2) a general antitrust law up through ity,as racial divisions might hamper coopera
tion.We use the size distributions to calculate opt for economic self-organization
as an alter
twomeasures of economic heterogeneity?one native topolitics, or theymight turn to cooper

for farmers and one formanufacturing groups. atives with particular force ifpolitical access is
The Census lists the number of farms in each blocked.
of seven to eight categories, measured by acres To determine whether movements moderate
per farm, and the number of manufacturing the effects of economic or community factors
establishments in eight to ten categories, meas in time-series models, we create interaction
ured by employees per establishment.We use terms by multiplying themovement strength
these data to calculate an index of qualitative variable by each economic variable.Movements
variation for each group:
might ease the turnto cooperatives in response
k tomonopoly ormarket failure, amplifying the
effectsof prices or population density on organ
(i-2^) ization. They might also buffer cooperatives
from problems posed by community instabili
This is a standardized measure of heterogene ty and heterogeneity, reducing these negative
ity,which varies from 0, when all units are in
effects.
one category (complete where k = the number We pursue parallel strategies for all three
of categories homogeneity), increases as units industries,with minor modifications where suit
become more heterogeneous, and reaches 1 able. In the cross-sectional analyses, we focus
when all units are equally distributed across on the direct and conditional effects ofmove
categories. We use both measures of econom ments on organizational forms.We fitmain
ic heterogeneity for insurance because farm effectsmodels with controls, economic factors,
ers and manufacturers organized mutuals, but and theanticorporate politics variables.We then
we use only the farmmeasure for dairy and add movement measures to assess direct effects
grain cooperatives, which were organized only and interaction terms to consider conditional
by farmers.We expect to find cooperatives in effects. In the time-series analyses, we focus on
stable, homogenous communities. Increasing movements as moderating influences.We begin
population change, immigration, racial diver with main-effects models for economic and
sity, farm heterogeneity, and manufacturing community bases pertaining to cooperatives
should all decrease cooperative and mutual and mutuals, add our movement measure, and
organization. then add interaction terms to assess whether

movements moderate theorganizational effects
and Estimation of economic and community factors.
Controls, Models,
We estimate cross-sectional models with the
All models control for state size and the geo
nbreg routine in STATA version 9.2, using
graphical distribution of the sector.We control robust standard errors. We estimate time-series
for state population to eliminate the confound
models with thenbreg routine, specifying clus
ing effects of the size of a state and its econo terrobustoption to correct forheteroskedasticity
my.We control for thedistribution of industries and correlations of observations within a state
across states by including gallons ofmilk pro
over time. This routine uses both differences
duced per capita in dairy models, bushels of
across states and changes within states over
wheat produced per capita in grain models,
time to estimate effects.
and manufacturing value added per capita (as
a proxy for insurable values) in insurance
models. RESULTS
To assess conditional effects ofmovements
Cross-Sectional Analyses
on in the cross-sectional
cooperatives models,
we create interaction terms by multiplying We mainly focus here on movements' direct
movement strengthmeasures by the dummy (Hypotheses 1 and 3) and conditional effects
variable forwhether a state passed a Granger (Hypothesis 2) on organization. We first con
railroad law.We expect movement effects tobe sidermovement effectsforeach sector,and then
stronger (or positive) in the absence of anticor other factors. Descriptive statistics and corre
porate politics or victories. Movements may lations are in theAppendix, Tables Al toA4.
Table 1. Effects of Social Movements on Insurance Mutuals State, 1903

per
3
_Model 1_Model 2_Model
Controls
Population(000,000) .533**
.499*
.480**
(.0593) (.062) (.067)
Value added -17.8** -15.4** -13.7**
(4.92) (4.70) (4.84)
Economics Organization
5.29 ** 4.14**
Populationdensity(000) 4.32**
(1.51) (1.61) (1.57)
Percent population change -.035** -.037** -.036**
(.0075) (.0076) (.0077)
Percent foreign-born white .063** .079** .073**
(.013) (.012) (.013)
Percent non-white -.023* -.015 -.014
(.0092) (.0089) (.0092)
Farmer diversity -4.81** -5.24** -5.37**
(1.18) (1.144) (1.09)
Manufacturerdiversity 6.61*5.06* 4.89*
(2.67) (2.38) (2.36)
Anticorporate Politics
Percent populist vote -.029** -.030** -.028**
(.0075) (.0074) (.0077)
Granger railroad law .850** .623** .982**
(.173) (.164) (.252)
General antitrust law -.511** -.571** -.537**
(.193) (.181) (.1821)
Anticompact law .659** .580* .610**
(.212) (.225) (.221)
Social Movements
National Grange members (000) .019* .025*
(.0088) (.010)
Members by railroad law -.019|
(.011)
Constant 1.796
3 3.07
(2.316) (2.22) (2.19)
Observations_42_39_39_
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
<
t/> .10; *p < .05; **/? < .01 (two-tailed tests).
Insurance. Table 1 shows models of the porting a view ofmovements as "organization

number of insurancemutuals per state in 1903. generating organizations."3 Further, the signif
Model 1 includes controls, economic factors, icant, negative interaction term inModel 3
and anticorporatepolitics.Model 2 adds nation shows that thiseffect is conditional on thepolit
al Grange membership in itspeak year to assess ical context. Positive movement effects are
movement effects.Model 3 adds an interaction weaker in stateswhere theGrangers won hall
term to assess conditional effects.Results for mark political victories against railroads. These
otherGrange measures appear in theAppendix, results are also consistent across measures and
Table A5. confirmHypothesis 2.4 In itsheyday, theGrange
Model 2 confirms Hypothesis 1 over
Hypothesis 3. Grange membership has a posi
3
tive, significant effect on mutuals, controlling The coefficients for all Grange strength measures
for state size, economic and community condi are positive; all but the state member measures are
tions, and anticorporate politics. These results statisticallysignificant(see theAppendix,TableA5).

4The
are consistent across movement measures, sup patternof (1) positivecoefficientsformove
ment strength coupled with (2) negative and small
Table 2. Effects of Social Movements on Dairy and Grain Elevator Cooperatives per State, 1913
Dairy Cooperatives Grain Elevator Cooperatives
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Controls
Population .272** .179** .159* .814** .474 .629
(.091) (.068) (.065) (.269) (.296) (.561)

Milk produced/grain
sold (000) .634 1.72 2.35 13.9| 6.51 1.30
(2.60) (1.963) (1.77) (7.81) (5.31) (6.46)
Economics of Organization
Population density -7.55** -6.49** -5.05** -20.1 -11.8 -21.9
(2.10) (1.70) (1.66) (20.0) (12.2) (28.0)

Price milk/grain -12.9* -11.1* -8.47* -11.4** -11.8* -11.5**
(5.71) (5.12) (4.03) (3.67) (5.390) (3.73)

Percent population change .0016 .0050 .0059 .0011 .0097 .022
(.012) (.0094) (.0086) (.017) (.021) (.026)

Percent foreign-born white .067** .114** .098** -.124 -.033 -.112
(.002) (.027) (.026) (.095) (.065) (.075)

Percent non-white -.039* -.018 -.027 -.226** -.198** -.277*
(.019) (.023) (.025) (.070) (.058) (.109)

Farmer diversity -.303 -.110 .027 -8.50* -6.80 -7.02*
(1.43) (1.643) (1.45) (3.80) (4.61) (3.33)

Anticorporate Politics
Percent populist vote -.036** -.029** -.026** -.039 -.0082 -.021
(.011) (.0092) (.0087) (.034) (.035) (.030)

Grangerrailroadlaw 1.15** .853 1.94** .469 .642 3.55**
(.385) (.560) (.690) (.902) (1.01) (1.16)
General antitrust measure -.051 -.285 -.125 1.39* 1.35* 1.98**
(.240) (.251) (.275) (.601) (.596) (5.57)

Social Movements
National Grange members .050* .060**
.079.092*
(.022) (.017) (.048) (.036)

Grange members X railroad law -.058**
-1.95**
(.022) (.046)
Constant 3.29| 1.5 1.05 16.9** 13.2| 14.1**

(1.89) (1.70) (1.53) (5.35) (6.77) (4.40)
Observations_42_39_39_42_39_39^
t/?< 10; *p<.05; **/?<.01 (two-tailedtests).
fueled mutual self-organization in insurance, tives inboth sectors, supportingHypothesis 1.

but itdid so either as an alternative to politics For dairy, the coefficients for all fourmove
or in response to blocked political access. ment measures are positive and significant. For
grain too, the coefficients for all measures are
positive (coefficients for national members in
Dairy and grain. Table 2 shows models for
1876 and state members are significant, see
dairy and grain cooperatives in 1913. Results Table A5 in theAppendix). Moreover, move
from the second models in each set show that ment effects inboth sectors are again conditional
increasing Grange strength increased coopera on thepolitical context. In the interaction-effect
models, movement coefficients are positive and
er coefficients for the interaction term emerged for significant,while the interactiontermsare neg
all movement statistical signifi
ative and significant. This result occurs for all
measures, reaching
cance both for National Grange and measures inboth sectors, supportingHypothesis
membership
number of Granges. 2. Finally, robustness checks zero-inflat
using
Table 3. Effects of Grange on the Number of Insurance and Grain

Membership Mutuals, Dairy,
Elevator Cooperatives per State
Industry Unconditional Effect Effectwith No Granger Law Effectwith Granger Law

Insurance 21.4% 28.9% 5.9%
65.6%
Dairy 83.8%
1.6%
Grain
124.1% 154.2%-64.9%
Note: Figures tabled are the predicted percent change in the number of mutuals or cooperatives per state for a
standard deviation increase in national Grange members.
ed, negative binomial models to account for the ismuch larger,however, for grain. Increasing
numbers of zeros in thedata generate virtually Grange strengtha standard deviation increases
identical results for all three sectors (available grain cooperatives by 154 percent in stateswith
from the authors on request). outGranger laws,but decreases theirnumber by
Table 3 gives the sizes of these movement 65 percent in stateswith Granger laws.
effects.The unconditional effectscome from the In sum,we find that the late nineteenth-cen
secondmain-effectmodels foreach sector.They tury agrarian-producerist movements fueled
give thepredicted percent change in the num cooperative forms.They did so, however, as an
ber ofmutuals and cooperatives for a one stan alternative topolitical attacks on corporations,
dard deviation increase in national Grange or in response to corporate counter-mobilization
membership.5 All show substantial effects. and blocked political access. Moreover, these
Increasing the number of Grange members by movements may have thwarted cooperative
a standard deviation generates a 21.4 percent enterprise in grain as theymobilized political
increase in the number of insurance mutuals ly against corporations.
per state,and a 65.6 and 124.1 percent increase,
respectively, in dairy and grain cooperatives. Economic, community, and political con
The conditional effects come from themod ditions. Consistent with Hypothesis 4a, agri
els with interaction effects.They give the size cultural cooperatives proliferatedwhere farmers
of movement effects in each sector for states
received low prices forproduce, and in sparse
with and without Granger laws. They come
lypopulated places where corporations lacked
from the interactioneffects inTables 1 and 2 and incentives to invest inprocessing, distribution,
show effects that are largely as expected. or supply networks. The coefficients inTable 2
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the positive for prices and population density are all nega
effects ofmovements areweaker inpoliticized
tive,although population density ingrain isnot
settingswhere theGrange pursued politics. In significant. Moreover, consistent with
one stan
insurance, increasing Grange strength Hypothesis 4b, residential instability,hetero
dard deviation increasesmutuals by 28.9 percent
geneity, and racial divisions made cooperative
in states without Granger laws, but only 5.9
enterprisesmore costly,decreasing theirpreva
percent in stateswith such laws. In dairy,Grange lence. Population change reduced thenumber of
strength increases cooperatives by 83.8 percent insurancemutuals. Heterogeneity among farm
in stateswithout laws, but only 1.6 percent in ers decreased thenumber of insurancemutuals
stateswith Granger laws. The interactioneffect and grain cooperatives. Racial diversity lowered
the number ofmutuals and cooperatives in all
three sectors.
5
figures were calculated
These using the stan
Surprisingly, population density and manu
dard formula for the magnitude of effects for nega facturingdiversityhad positive effectson insur
tivebinomial models: (exp [b * s] - 1) X 100%, ancemutuals. Mutuals may have benefited from
where b is the regression coefficient, and s is the stan critical-mass dynamics: heterogeneity indense
dard deviation of the independentvariable (Long ly settled areas increased the chance that some
1997). subgroupwould shoulder the costs of collective
action (Marwell and Oliver 1993). The preva white coefficient ispositive, but only significant
lence of foreign-bornwhites also had positive inModel 3.
effects in insurance and dairy, suggesting that Second, Model 2 shows a negative "main"
immigrationpromoted, rather than suppressed, effectofGrange strengthonmutuals. Model 3,
cooperatives. This might reflecteconomic self however, shows that theGrange in this period
organization in immigrantcommunities, which acted mainly as a moderating influence for the
resulted from dense networks, scarce resources, effectsof economic and community conditions
and exclusion from mainstream economies on mutuals. A significant negative effect for
(Bonacich andModell 1980;Gamm and Putnam population change is coupled with a smaller,
1999; Portes and Manning 1986). Or, immi positive, and significantcoefficient for the inter
action between population change and Grange
gration could have been a conduit for organiz
ing templates.Rochdale cooperatives inEngland strength.Increasingmovement strengthdecreas
es the negative effect of population change.
produced models thatdiffused across mid-nine
This confirms Hypothesis 5b.Movements can
teenth-century Europe, which were then import
ed to theMidwest by immigrantsfromGermany buffermutuals from thedisruptive effectof res
and theNordic countries (Ford 1913; Furlough idential instability,reducing theirdependence on
and Strikwerda 1999; Knapp 1969; Schneiberg stable communities.
2002). Third, the positive coefficient forforeign

born white is coupled with a smaller, negative
Anticorporate politics also affected cooper
coefficient for its interaction term. Increasing
atives, but differentlyacross sectors. Insurance
mutuals and were associat
movement strengthdecreases thepositive effect
dairy cooperatives
ed with early anticorporate politics, notably the of foreign-bornwhites on mutuals. This is not
Granger victories of the 1870s, and mutuals quite consistent with Hypothesis 5b, which
were associated with anticompact laws that tar assumes a negative immigration effect, but it
does indicate thatmovements reducedmutuals'
geted insurance cartels. Yet in both sectors,
cooperatives were negatively associated with dependence on immigrant communities or the
the Populist vote and antitrust laws favored by templates they imported.Here, too,movements
serve as a functional substitute for supportive
Populists and theAlliance. This may reflectdis
communities.
comfortamong thepropertied insuredand dairy
farmerswith the radical Populist politics of the
1890s. In contrast, grain farmers seemed to Dairy. Table 5 analyzes dairy cooperatives
draw sustenance and political cover from from 1913 to 1927. Baseline Models 1 and 2 are
Populists and their trust-bustingprograms, as also largely consistentwith Hypotheses 4a and
general antitrustmeasures had positive effects 4b. Coefficients are positive for foreign-born
on elevator
cooperatives. whites and negative fornon-whites; both are sig
nificant. Coefficients for heterogeneity, popu
Time-Series Analysis lation density, and change are all negative, but
only reach significance inModel 3. The effect
Insurance. Table 4 showsmodels of insurance ofmilk price isnegative and significant.Dairy
mutuals per statefrom 1903 to 1929. Model 1
cooperatives proliferated in communities with
provides a baseline forhow economic and com few racial divisions andmany European immi
munity factors affectmutuals. Model 2 adds grants, and where farmers received low prices
the time-varyingGrange strengthmeasure, and formilk.
Model 3 adds interaction terms to see ifmove Models 2 and 3 showmovement effects,but
ments moderate economic forces. Three find indicate again that the Grange was mainly a
ings emerge. moderating force.Model 3 pairs a significant
First, results fromModels 1 and 2 are con
negative coefficient forpopulation change with
sistentwith Hypothesis 4b: mutuals depend on a smaller, positive coefficient for its interac
stable, homogenous, and supportive communi tion term. It also pairs a positive coefficient for
ties. Population change and farmheterogeneity foreign-born whites with a smaller, negative
have significant, negative effects. The racial coefficient for its interaction term. Increasing
diversity coefficient is also consistently nega movement strengthdecreased theeffectsof both
tive,although not significant.The foreign-born population change and foreign-bornwhites on
Table 4. Negative Binomial Models of theNumber of InsuranceMutuals per State, 1903 to 1929
3
Controls
Population(000,000) .297**
.386** .408**
(.072) (.063) (.089)
Value added .743 1.09 .585
(1.02) (.895) (.916)
Populationdensity(000) .661-.216 .592

(1.22) (1.29) (1.57)
Percent population change -.029** -.033** -.046*
(.010) (.011) (.013)

Percent foreign-born white .022 .027 .051*
(.025) (.025) (.023)

Percent non-white -.029 -.041 -.017
(.032) (.032) (.030)

Farm diversity -4.86t -3.96f -2.73
(2.53) (2.22) (2.20)

Manufacturer diversity -.190 1.60 -.463
(1.95) (1.61) (1.80)

Social Movements
National Grange members (000) -.035** .199
(.013) (.282)
Members X Population density -.054
(.085)
Members X Percent population change .0032**
-.0012
Members X Percent foreign born -.0033**

(.00094)
Members X Percent non-white -.0074
(.0061)
Members X Farmer diversity -.201
(.224)
Members X Manufacture diversity .083
(.196)
-1.45** -1.35** -1.50**
Reporting Change
(.187) (.181) (.188)
Constant7.64** 5.70*
5.52*
(2.64) (2.34) (2.54)
Observations 195 195195

Log likelihood_-777.76_-767.85_-754.76
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,
< < < .01
t/? .10; */? .05; **p (two-tailed tests).
cooperatives. in insurance, the Grange

As Grain cooperatives. Table 6 showsmodels
reduced dairy cooperatives' dependence on sta of grain cooperatives, with Models 1 and 2
ble and European immigrant communities. yielding results consistent with Hypotheses 4a
and 4b. Coefficients for population density,
Model 3 also pairs a negative coefficient for the
non-whites, heterogeneity, and prices are all
milk price with a positive interaction.
negative and significant. The coefficient for
Movements moderate economic incentives; but
population change is negative but not signifi
rather thanboosting organization in response to cant. Grain cooperatives proliferated in sparse
monopoly, the Grange reduced cooperatives' lypopulated areas, inhomogenous and perhaps
dependence on adverse pricing. stable communities with few economic and
Table 5. Negative Binomial Models of the Number of Dairy Cooperatives per State, 1913 to 1927
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Controls
Population (000,000) .278** .417** .372*
(.076) (.118) (.146)

Gallons of milk produced .010** .0091** .0083**
(.0027) (.0026) (.0022)

Price of milk per gallon -6.52* -4.68 -7.18*
(3.20) (2.99) (2.92)

Population density (000) -2.591 -3.21 -6.18*
(2.05) (1.95) (2.57)

Percent population change -.0051 -.0074 -.028**
(.0085) (.0077) (.0096)

Percent foreign-born white .062* .066* .100**
(.031) (.030) (.030)

Percent non-white -.07If -.104* -.073
(.038) (.052) (.053)

Farm diversity
-7.59 -5.95 -4.30
(6.08) (5.54) (5.69)

Social Movements
National -.
Grange members (000) -.032 109
(.021) (.414)
Members X Price of milk .535**
(.193)
Members X Population .226
Density
(.147)
Members X Percent population .0049**
change
(.0014)
X Percent
Members foreign born -.0044**
(.0016)
(.0076)
Members X Farmer diversity -.061
(.439)
Constant9.32| 7.56
6.79
(5.66) (5.03) (5.38)
Observations 143 143143
Log
likelihood_-581.56_-576.99_-560.44
< * **
tp .10; p < .05; p < .01 (two-tailed tests).
racial divisions, and where farmers faced low negative, but not significant, coefficient for
prices. foreign-born whites.
Here,too, Models 2 and 3 show that the Table 7 charts themagnitude ofmovements'
Grange moderated economic and community moderating influences by listing the size of the
effects of economic and community factors
Model
forces. 3 pairs a negative coefficient for
across three levels of Grange strength?low
population change with a positive coefficientfor
the interaction term. As above, the Grange (25th percentile), medium (50th percentile),
and high (75th percentile). The table firstgives
reduced the negative
effect of population
thepredicted change in thenumber ofmutuals,
change, buffering grain cooperatives from res dairy, and grain cooperatives per state for a
idential instability.
Model 3 also yields a nega standard deviation increase in population
tive coefficient for the interaction of change for each level of Grange strength. In
foreign-born whites and Grange strength,and a insurance, the negative effect of population
Table 6. Negative Binomial Models of theNumber ofGrain Elevator Cooperatives per State, 1913
_to 1927_
3
Controls
Population(000,000) .537**.668** .640**

(.195) (.139) (.105)
Bushels of grain sold .031** .030** .031**
(.011) (.0089) (.0073)
Price ofwheat perbushel -3.88** -3.75** -3.06**
(.648) (.603) (.725)
Populationdensity(000) -1.13** -8.58** -12.5**
(3.21) (3.14) (3.60)
Percent population change -.0029.0051 -.046**
(.013) (.013) (.011)

Percent foreign-born white -.038 -.071 -.00020
(.041) (.050) (.031)

Percent non-white -.163* -.213** -.183f
(.066) (.073) (.101)
Farm diversity -20.5** -19.2** -11.9f
(7.87) (7.01) (6.80)
Social Movements
National Grange members (000) -.065** -.236
(.021) (.720)
Members X Price of wheat .013
(.093)
Members X Population density .423
(.397)
Members X Percent .0091**
population change
(.0021)
X Percent -.0095*
Members foreign born
(.0047)
(.034)
Members X Farmer diversity . 134
(.809)
27.6**
Constant 26.6** 18.9**
(7.80) (7.06) (6.36)

Observations 114 114 114
Log likelihood_-438.88_-430.08_-411.18
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses,
< < .05; ** < .01
t/? .10; *p p (two-tailed tests).
change onmutuals consistently falls as Grange low, a standard deviation increase inpopulation
strength increases. Where Grange strength is change decreases the number of dairy cooper
low,a standard deviation increase inpopulation atives by 32.9 percent; where Grange strength
change decreases the number of mutuals by is at themedian,that change decreases dairy
50.0 percent; where Grange strength is at the cooperatives by only 22.6 percent. Similarly,
median, thatchange decreases mutuals by 46.2 where Grange strength is low, the increase in
percent; where Grange strength is high, it population change decreases the number of
decreases mutuals by 22.5 percent.The negative grain cooperatives by 49.8 percent; where
effectof population change on dairy and grain Grange strength is at themedian, itdecreases
cooperatives also falls as Grange strengthgoes grain cooperatives by only 32.5 percent.
from low tomedian. Where Grange strength is Movements buffered cooperatives from the
Table 7. Effects of Economic and Community Factors on theNumber ofMutuals and

Cooperatives per State, by Level ofGrange Strength
Level ofGrange Strength

LowMedian High
Effects of Population Change
Insurance -50.0% -46.2% -22.5%
Dairy -32.9% -22.6% 39.7%
Grain_-49.8%_-32.5%_112.6%
Effects of Foreign-Born Whites
Insurance 49.4% 43.6% 17.9%

Dairy_104.8%_93.2%_52.0%
Effects of Price Paid forMilk
Dairy_26.1%_23.0%_8.5%
Note: Figures tabled are the predicted percent change in the number of mutuals or cooperatives per state for a one
standard deviation increase in population change or foreign-born whites, and a one standard deviation decrease in
milk prices.
adverse effectsof population change, reducing invariant,state-leveleffects,and (3) both.We did

their dependence on stable communities. Yet, this to rninimizeautocorrelation and unobserved
raisingGrange strengthto high levels reversed heterogeneity bias due to omitted time-invari
the effects of population change in dairy and ant, state-level factors (Halaby 2004). We also
grain. At high Grange strength, population wanted to see ifmovements similarly affected
change increased cooperatives. Highly organ thenumber and change innumber of coopera
izedmovements may have helped cooperatives tives over time.These analyses all yield results
harness new ideas or members produced by virtually identical to those reported (available
population growth. from the authors on request). Results forpop
Table 7 also shows how theeffectsof foreign ulation change are robust across all specifica
born whites and milk price vary bymovement tions for all sectors. Results for foreign-born
strength.The effectsconsistently fall as Grange whites in insurance hold up with a lagged
strength increases.Where theGrange isweak, dependent variable, losing significance after
a standard deviation increase in foreign-born that.Results for foreign-bornwhites and prices
whites increases thenumber ofmutuals by 49.4 for dairy persist across all models. Not sur
percent and dairy cooperatives by 104.8 percent. prisingly, our results fare less well in fixed
Where theGrange is strong, that increase has effectmodels, given our short but wide data
smaller effects, increasingmutuals by 17.9 per sets. Even here, though, we could replicate
cent and cooperatives by 52.0 percent. Similarly, results forpopulation change and thenumber of
where the Grange is weak, the drop inmilk foreign-bornwhites in the dairy industry.
prices increases the number of dairy coopera We also fit zero-inflated negative binomial
tives by 26.1 percent; where the Grange is models with andwithout lagged dependent vari
strong, the effect is only 8.5 percent. ables to see if thenumber of zeros affected our
In sum, theGrange substantiallymoderated findings. This yields virtually identical results
the effects on organization ofmicro-economic as those tabled here for insurance and dairy.
forces and community dynamics during the The grain data contain more zeros, but zero
early twentiethcentury.The movement buffered inflatedmodels produce stronger results for
cooperatives andmutuals from population insta that industry.Inmodels of non-zero counts, the
bility, substituted for supportive communities, coefficients for interactionsbetween theGrange
and reduced cooperatives' dependence on and price, population change, and percent non
adverse market conditions. whites are all positive and significant. In this
To assess the robustness of these results,we industry,theGrange buffered cooperatives from
added (1) lagged dependent variables, (2) anti the adverse effects of both population instabil
corporate politics variables to capture time ityand racial divisions. As indairy, theGrange
also reduced grain cooperatives' dependence pers, new discourses, or communities of simi
on particular economic (price) conditions. lar forms in nearby domains?that in turnfos
ter new forms in a sector. Yet neither those
both move
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION works nor the current study measure
ments and their intermediate organizational or
How do social movements promote new organi discursive outcomes, leaving it to future
zational forms and alternatives to for-profitcor researchers to sortout direct and indirectmove
porations? Recent scholarship reemphasizes ment effects (but see King and Haveman forth
how contestation and collective action play crit
coming). Fortunately, we have abundant
ical roles in thedevelopment of institutionsand resources for thatwork, including possibilities
organizational forms,generating new syntheses byMinkoff(1994),Ruef (2000),and
identified
of movements and organizations research Greve and colleagues (2006) for integrating
andMinkoff Davis et al. 2005;
(Clemens 2004; analyses of movement effects on forms with
Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006; Schneiberg and discourse analysis and ecological work on or
Yet few studies combine mul
Lounsbury 2008). ganizational communities.
tivariatemethods and directmeasures ofmove Our analyses also contribute tomovement
ments to catalog and assess movement effects research. Until recently,movement scholars
on organizations. focused on the emergence of movements, leav
We advance research at the movements/ ing outcomes largely unanalyzed (Guigni
organizations interfaceby analyzing movement 1998).We join effortsto close thisgap with new
effects on cooperative enterprise in threeU.S. evidence thatmovements have important?
industries over threedecades. Using multivari organizational?effects. We also extendmove
ate techniques to consider various causal rela ment analyses of political opportunity,
tionships, we found that anticorporate mobilization, and counter-mobilization.
movements were "organization-generating Scholars have documented features of political
organizations" (Stinchcombe 1965) during the systems that render themmore or less open to
late nineteenth century. Increasing Grange movements' demands, generating conditional
strengthhad positive effects inall three sectors movement effectson policy outcomes (Amenta
on the prevalence of cooperative alternatives et al. 1992; Soule and King 2006; Soule and
to corporations. These effects were condition Olzak 2004). Scholars argue furtherthatmobi
al on thepolitical context,with theGrange fuel lization and its outcomes emerge from inter
ing cooperative formsmost vigorously as either actions in which movements and
an alternative topolitics or a response toblocked counter-movements shape the environment and
political access. Further,we found thatmove political opportunities for one another (Meyer
ments continued to foster cooperatives beyond and Staggenborg 1996; Vogus and Davis 2005;
the nineteenth-century populist revolts, serv Zald and Useem 1987). Movements evoke
ing as social infrastructurethatmoderated the counter-mobilization, which can blunt chal
organizational effects of economic forces. The lengers' efficacy, reverse gains, create or close
Grange partly substituted for community sup off opportunities, and prompt challengers to
ports, insulating cooperatives from ownership shift venues or tactics.We develop this rea
costs associated with population change, and soning by documenting conditional movement
reducing theirdependence on immigrant com effects on organizations and rooting this find
munities or carriers. In effect,theGrange helped ing in the dynamics of contention. Counter
sustain cooperative forms as theUnited States mobilization by corporate forces prompted
shiftedfrom a society of stable, local commu producer movements to shiftfrompolitics and
nities to a diverse and impersonal society of anticorporate policies to private strategies of
geographically mobile strangers. economic self-organization.
Furtherwork isneeded to clarify these causal Our study relies on crude proxies for corpo
relations.We propose multiple mechanisms for rate counter-mobilization and blocked politi
movement effects. Moreover, Haveman and col cal access; with our data, we cannot rule out the
leagues (2007) and Schneiberg (2007) argue possibility that agrarians rejected politics on
thatmovements have indirect effectson forms. principled rather thanpragmatic grounds. Our
Movements may produce outcomes?newspa study does suggest, though, that research on
opportunity,mobilization, and counter-mobi mobilization are critical in creating markets,

lization can be fruitfullyextended beyond post industries,and economic institutions(Abolafia
war movements and policy outcomes to consider 1996;Aldrichand Fiol 1994;Fligstein2001;
new periods and movements, organizational Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006; Scott et al.
outcomes, and shifts inmovement agendas from 2000; Van de Ven and Garud 1993). To this
policy to independent organization. It suggests work, we add hypotheses thatmovements can
furtherthat these dynamics of contention can also aid market creation as both organization
produce historical, path-dependent trajectories generating organizations and social infrastruc
and a sequence over time of differentmove ture.By contesting existing arrangements and
ment effects (King et al. 2005; Soule and King providing entrepreneurswith political support,
2006). Agrarians and independent producers field frames, standards, and organizing tem
mobilized against corporations in thenineteenth plates, movements carve out space for new mar
century, realizing early political and organiza kets, generate institutionalsupports for industry
tional victories as they grew in strength development, and populate markets with new
(Schneiberg and Soule 2005). As corporations forms of enterprise.Moreover, as social infra
counter-mobilized, though, they could some structures,movements help institutionalizekey
times deny their opponents political access, forms andmarket supports,bufferingthemfrom
prompting agrarians towork outside the state adverse or short-term economic forces.
and build alternative orders throughcooperative Our findings aboutmovement effectsduring
enterprise.Further,as politicized national strug the "age of corporate consolidation" suggest
gles over the corporate order receded into the that cooperative alternatives to corporations
past, agrarian-producerist
movements served
emerged as integral and enduring, rather than
increasingly as social infrastructurefor coop aberrant or transitory,elements ofU.S. capital
eratives, moderating economic forces and ism during the early twentieth century
buffering these forms from adverse economic (Schneiberg 2007). Economic sociologists and
and community conditions. institutionalistsrightly take the rise to domi
Finally,we contribute to core agendas in eco nance of the corporation as a key tendency in
nomic sociology by analyzing how social struc the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-centu
tures moderate economic forces, facilitate ryU.S. economy. Our work suggests, though,
market development, and shape economic thatcorporate consolidation was a continuous
organization. Economic sociologists have shown ly contested historical process. Reformers and
how social structuralfactors?policy regimes, anticorporatemovements successfully promot
institutional logics, and professional associa ed and sustained across
cooperative enterprises
tions?condition theeffectsof economic forces industrieswith very different economic char
on institutionsand organizations. They trans acteristics, rendering them less dependent on
form,forexample, how organizations and indus peculiar economic forces, common cultures,
tries understand and respond to market and other idiosyncratic local conditions. In so
conditions, such as deciding whether tomerge, doing,movements like theGrange helped insti
which structures and strategies to adopt, and tutionalize cooperatives andmutuals alongside
how to regulate competition (Bartley and
corporations, fostering substantial and lasting
Schneiberg 2002; Dobbin and Dowd 2000; organizational diversity within American cor
Dobbin and Sutton 1998; Lounsbury 2007;
porate capitalism.
Mizurchi, Stearns, andMarquis 2006; Thornton
and Ocasio 1999).We add thatmovements like Marc Schneiberg is theJohnC Pock Professor of
wise qualify as moderating social factors.As Sociology at Reed College. He is currently studying
alternatives to corporations in nineteenth- and twen
producers of social ties, templates, and already
formed collectivities, movements can alter the tieth-century American capitalism, including mutu
als, cooperatives, and local, state-owned enterprise.
micro-economics of organizational choice, mit
He is collaborating with Gerald Berk on a study of
igating costs of cooperative ownership and ren associations and collaborative learning, and with
dering forms less dependent on specific Matt Kraatz on a study of mutual bank conversion to
economic conditions.
for-profit corporations. His research appears injour
Economic sociologists and others also show nals such as Politics and Society, American Journal
how social factors, networks, and collective of Sociology, Research in the Sociology of
Organizations, and Socio-Economic Review. He currently examining the role of social processes,
recently coauthored
a Sociological Theory article such as diagnostic expansion, substitution, and dif
with Elisabeth Clemens on research strategies for fusion, in the autism epidemic.
institutional analysis. Thomas SmithgraduatedfromReed College with a
Marissa King graduatedfromReed College with a BA in history. He wrote a senior thesis on squatter
BA in sociology. is now a postdoctoral
She research societiesandfederal landpolicy in theOhio Territory
fellow at Columbia University where she completed after theAmerican Revolution. He currently resides
her PhD. Her previous work analyzed the organiza inPhiladelphia, PA andplans tostartworkingon his
tional foundations of early social movements. She is MBA nextfall.
APPENDIX
Table Al. Descriptive Statistics for Cross-Sectional Analyses
Variable
Obs Mean Min.
SD Max.
Population 48 1,578,164 1,545,227 42,335 7,268,894

Manufacturing value added 48 .062 .050 .003 .205
Milk output(galsper cap) 48 98.0 70.6 17.3405.3
Wheat output (bush per cap) 48 15.6 33.6 .001
205.5
Population density 48 58.2 84.8 401.6

.4
Price of milk per gallon 48 .123 .047 .056 .262
Price of wheat per bushel 48 .679 .124 .473 .952
Percent population 48 27.9 30.9 .343 205.6
change
Farm heterogeneity 48 .774 .140 .362 .932
Percent foreign-born white 48 9.95 35.3
13.5 .232
Percent non-white 48 13.2 16.8 .194 58.7
Percent populist vote 42 16.7
14.1 70.4
.069
Granger railroad law 48 .104 01

.309
General antitrust law 48 .417 01
.498
law 48 .458 .503 1 0
Anticompact
National Grange members 42 9,519 199 42,136
10,152
Number of
Granges_41_463_466_15_1,901
in OZ > O OiUICO
Milk
Added
Change
Wheat
Pop
Output
Density
het
born
Antitrust
law
white
Vote
Anticomp
Member
RR
Population
Wheat
Milk
Value
Plst
Foreign
Pop
Price
Grange
Non-
Farm
| .945
Number
Granges_.441
-.234
.046
-.417
-.039-.264
-.122
-.172
-.009
-.143
.360_.308
.400
-.280
-.086
.178
Grange
-.341
-.190
.082
-.308
-.047
-.136
-.124
.083
.401
-.194
-.211
.369
.468
.349
O of
members
Anticompact
law
-.372
.044
.170
-.025
-.224
-.285
-.006
-.048
-.133
.296
-.367
.087
.097
.240
Q
General
antitrust
.223
-.290
.272
.133
-.237
-.191
-.193
-.332
-.043
.032
.041
.255
.265?
Granger
railroad
law
.272
.011
.305
-.049
-.000
-.344
-.234
-.187
-.056
.186
-.233
-.207
j>
Percent
populist
vote
-.390
.041
-.533
.375
-.452
-.030
-.390
.209
-.423
-.001
.1063?
-.675
Percent
-.188
-.229
-.032
-.463
-.424
.447
-.072
.451
.316
non-white
Z
Percent
foreign-born
Farm.584
-.006
-.549
-.670
-.514
.305
.344
.209
.494
.412 .276
.355
.389
-.261
-.210
.039
-.256 ?
jgheterogeneity
Price
of
wheat
.132
.312
-.246
-.391
.406
.350
Percent
pop.
change
-.180
-.182
-.117
.242
-.144
.106
-.334 g
Price
.016
-.271
-.299
-.647
.012
milk
of
Table
Correlation
A2.
Matrix
for
Cross-Sectional
Analyses
Wheat
output
-.266
-.214
.319
density
Population
-.232
-.240
.785
.311
output
Milk
-.059
-.087
M
.268
added
value
Table A3. Descriptive Statistics for Time-Series Analyses
Obs
Variable Mean Min.
SD Max.
Population 192 2,048,183 2,040,070 42,335 12,400,000

Manufacturing value added 192 .125 .003
.114 .509
Milk output(galsper cap) 144 85.9 10.8
67.5 405.3
Wheat output (bush per cap) 144 13.9 29.0.000 205.5
Population density 192 75.0 115.3 .400 641.5

Price milk per gallon 144 .211 .056
.094 .473
Price wheat per bushel 144 1.36 .619 2.50
.473
Percent population change 192 22.7 24.2
.317 205.6
Percent foreign-born 192 11.7 9.1 .232 35.3
Percent non-white 192 12.5 15.5 .155 58.7
Farm heterogeneity 192 .865 .095 .990
.362
Manufacturer heterogeneity 192 .742 .082.886
.464
Percent populist vote 168 14.1 16.6 .069 70.4
Granger railroad law 192 .104 1 0

.306
General antitrust 192 .494
.417 10
Anticompact law 192 0 1 .458

.5
National Grange
members_124_6,951_11,895_23_69,092
s? o O 050)M
PopAdded
Output
Output Density MilkWheat born white het het Vote law Antitrust
Anticomp
Change
N
Grange
members
.664
.432
-.126
-.238
.244
.073
.179
-.081
-.206
.304
.120
.311
-.287
-.220
-.053_.027
R
Value Milk WheatPopulation
Price Pop ForeignNon-FarmManPlst RR
Price
Anticompact
law
.009
-.200
.127
.000
-.286
-.015
.027
-.147
-.354
.269
-.140
-.092
.087
.097
.240
|
General
antitrust
-.199
.191
.126
.295
-.081
-.233
-.055
-.072
-.032
.023
-.239
-.270
.255
.265
O
Granger
railroad
law
.209
.047
.331
-.022
-.061
-.196
-.035
-.130
-.230
.142
-.108
-.033
-.207
g
B-.592
-.123
-.101
-.094
-.003
-.426
.425
.064
.231
.081
Percent
-.437
populist
-.367
vote
Manu
heterogeneity
.328
.543
-.263
-.433
.535
-.058
-.085
-.233
.179
.029
.046?
3 -.121
heterogeneity
-.320
-.450
-.333
.265
.470
.422
.150
.002
Farm
.092
Table
Correlation
A4.
Matrix
Variables
Independent
Time-Series
of
for
Analysis
Percent
non-white
-.077
-.439
-.342
-.251
-.199
.294
.068
-.025
-.662Z
| -.127
-.285
Percent
.259
.235
.461
.157
.414
foreign
born
.104
Percent
pop.
change
-.141
-.182
-.130
.241
-.124
-.128
-.272 J?
Price
wheat
bushel
.150
-.071
.507
-.144
.177
.846
O
Price
milk
gallon
.004
-.334
.330
-.143
.111
-
Wheat
output
-.244
-.195
.326
density
Population
-.224
-.275
.689
.318
Milk
-.092
-.121
Man. added
.421
output
value
Table A5. Direct and Conditional Effects of Movements on the Number of Mutuals and
Cooperatives Using Alternative Measures of Movement Strength
Main EffectModels InteractionEffectModels

Insurance Mutuals 1903
National members 1876 .027*

.023f
State membership .0033
.0023
Number of granges .065*
.080**
Grange strength X law

_-.026_-.0049
-.050*
Dairy Cooperatives 1913
National members 1876 .084**

.087***
State membership .022*
.020*
Number of granges .13**
.14**
Grange law X
strength -.14**
_-.055_-.025*
Grain Elevator Cooperatives 1913
National members 1876 .14**

.12*
State membership .048*
.040|
Number of granges .13 .16f
Grange strength X law_-.34**

-.10** -.40**
Note: All models the controls, economic and community

include conditions, and political variables included in
the corresponding models inTables 1 and 2.
< < ** < .01
fp .10; *p .05; p (two-tailed tests).
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Social Movements and Organizational Form: Cooperative Alternatives to Corporations in the

American Insurance, Dairy, and Grain Industries

How do social movements promote diversity and alternative We

Grange?a leading anticorporate movement in the United States the late

findings. First, theGrange had positive effectson cooperatives and mutuals

political efforts. Grangers pursued economic organization as an alternative topolitics

and in response toblockedpolitical access. Third, theGrange continued tofoster

effectsand by isolatingdifferentcausal pathways throughwhich mobilization, counter

provide economic with new evidence on how social structure moderates

American Sociological Review, 2008, Vol. 73 (August:635-667)

"new organizational synthesis" goes beyond We thus have little systematic,multivariate,

2008). economy?insurance mutuals, dairy coopera

COOPERATIVES, CORPORATE integrationby consumers (Sichel 1966). They

ertyrights in the firm to consumers or produc ployment, or topeculiar circumstances, arguing

revolts,mobilization, and counter-mobilization, stupiditywhile reveling in luxuryon our hard

vital for cooperatives, as competition between Rothschild andWhitt 1986;Whyte andWhyte

Further, likeprofessional associations, move Movements can more

tives, constituting participants as

sumers or producers in all threeindustriesfought Dairy cooperatives first appeared in the

JwZ~~^W^^^^^ft *?rJiffC?l\ N-Daify

/ TVJl^^^^^^^U-r^ **" ^fa^n^' C00pS

Figure 1. Geography of Cooperative Forms

impossible to withhold produce strategically.

politics to examine the direct and conditional

time-series its effects dur

twomeasures of economic heterogeneity?one native topolitics, or theymight turn to cooper

organization. then add interaction terms to assess whether

Table 1. Effects of Social Movements on Insurance Mutuals State, 1903

Insurance. Table 1 shows models of the porting a view ofmovements as "organization

tions, and anticorporate politics. These results statisticallysignificant(see theAppendix,TableA5).

Dairy Cooperatives Grain Elevator Cooperatives

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

(.091) (.068) (.065) (.269) (.296) (.561)

Population density -7.55** -6.49** -5.05** -20.1 -11.8 -21.9

(2.10) (1.70) (1.66) (20.0) (12.2) (28.0)

(5.71) (5.12) (4.03) (3.67) (5.390) (3.73)

(.012) (.0094) (.0086) (.017) (.021) (.026)

(.002) (.027) (.026) (.095) (.065) (.075)

(.019) (.023) (.025) (.070) (.058) (.109)

(1.43) (1.643) (1.45) (3.80) (4.61) (3.33)

(.011) (.0092) (.0087) (.034) (.035) (.030)

(.240) (.251) (.275) (.601) (.596) (5.57)

(.022) (.017) (.048) (.036)

Constant 3.29| 1.5 1.05 16.9** 13.2| 14.1**

t/?< 10; *p<.05; **/?<.01 (two-tailedtests).

fueled mutual self-organization in insurance, tives inboth sectors, supportingHypothesis 1.

Table 3. Effects of Grange on the Number of Insurance and Grain

Industry Unconditional Effect Effectwith No Granger Law Effectwith Granger Law

2002). Third, the positive coefficient forforeign

Populationdensity(000) .661-.216 .592

(.010) (.011) (.013)

(.025) (.025) (.023)

(.032) (.032) (.030)

(2.53) (2.22) (2.20)

(1.95) (1.61) (1.80)

Members X Percent foreign born -.0033**

(2.64) (2.34) (2.54)

Observations 195 195195

cooperatives. in insurance, the Grange

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Population (000,000) .278** .417** .372*

(.076) (.118) (.146)

(.0027) (.0026) (.0022)

(3.20) (2.99) (2.92)

Population density -7.55 -6.49 -5.05** -20.1 -11.8 -21.9

Constant 3.29| 1.5 1.05 16.9 13.2| 14.1

Population (000,000) .278 .417 .372*

Population(000,000) .537.668 .640**