STATE OF COLORADO

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS

1525 Sherman Street, 4th Floor, Denver, Colorado 80203

CAMPAIGN INTEGRITY WATCHDOG (CIW),

Complainant,
COURT USE ONLY
v.

DENVER COUNTY REPUBLICAN CENTRAL CASE NUMBER:

COMMITTEE (DCRCC),
OS 2017-0006
Respondent.

RESPONSE TO MOTION TO DISMISS

COMPLAINANT, Campaign Integrity Watchdog LLC, pro se, respectfully submits this
Response to DCRCCs Motion to Dismiss in the case of Campaign Integrity Watchdog (CIW)
v. Denver County Republican Central Committee (DCRCC), OS 2017-0006. In support thereof,
Campaign Integrity Watchdog states as follows:

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This Response sets forth multiple defects in DCRCCs Motion to Dismiss (MtD) submitted in
case OS 2017-0006, Campaign Integrity Watchdog (CIW) v. Denver County Republican Central
Committee (DCRCC).
Respondent fundamentally misrepresents both applicable fact and law in an apparent attempt
to mislead the Court concerning the nature, and consequent date, of DCRCCs violations alleged
in the Complaint. DCRCCs entire argument is based on a flawed interpretation of a violation
as defined under Colorado campaign finance law.
Respondent mischaracterizes its delinquent reporting of contributions and expenditures as
amendments and attempts to shift blame to the manner in which TRACER operates rather
than accept responsibility for the organizations ongoing failures to comply with disclosure.
The violations alleged are reporting violations, which occurred on the date of the final report
filed by DCRCC (26 December 2016). CIW does not allege, contra the mischaracterization by
DCRCC, failure to report but rather failure to timely report (delinquent disclosure) and failure
to disclose data required by law, both of which occurred on the date of (amended & final) filing.
Additionally, DCRCCs ongoing failures to report required information constitute ongoing,
continuing violations; hence, until the violation ceases, the statute of limitations does not start.

1
 I. INTRODUCTION
Respondent DCRCC is the political party committee for Republicans in the City & County
of Denver. As admitted by DCRCC, it has failed to provide full transparency in violation of
the Fair Campaign Practice Act (FCPA) disclosure requirements (full and timely disclosure)
of contributions and expenditures (disbursements per 8 CCR 1505-6 Rule 1.6) for some time.
Contra DCRCCs factual misrepresentations, the alleged violation for all of the contributions
and expenditures at issue in this case took place on DCRCCs filing of its amended final report
on 26 December 2016; as CIWs Complaint was filed 6 June 2017, the reporting violations took
place well within the 180-day statute of limitations per Colo. Const. Art. XXVIII 9(2)(a).
DCRCC attempts to build a case for the Complaint being time-barred because DCRCC
coulda woulda shoulda disclosed the activity at issue in previous reports filed by the entity.
However, the fact is that DCRCC did not disclose the activity in previously filed reports, either
at the time of original filing or in subsequent amendments.
The plain facts are that DCRCC only disclosed the transactions and did so inaccurately
for the first time in its December 2016 Report of Contributions and Expenditures (finalized on 26
December 2016), which establishes the date of the violation(s) as alleged in CIWs Complaint.
Respondent misrepresents DCRCCs delinquent disclosure in the December 2016 report as
having attempted to amend its prior reports through the Secretarys online campaign finance
filing system, TRACER. However, DCRCCs prior reports were not amended, and show no
sign of any attempt to amend, the previously filed disclosures. DCRCC counsel then attempts to
blame the manner in which TRACER operates for the organizations failures to disclose.
Ironically, DCRCC counsel advanced precisely the same argument, reasoning, and excuses in
prior cases involving another serial campaign finance violator.1 The ALJ in those cases refused
to fall for the frivolous argument, and found as fact that the violation(s) as alleged were not time-
barred nor an amendment of previous reports. The Colorado Court of Appeals also rejected
the attempt to persist in the frivolous argument.2 Similarly, another Colorado Court of Appeals
ruling rejected the attempt to bar enforcement actions as time-barred due to supposed expiry of
the statute of limitations for continuing violations (such as are at issue in the instant case).3

1
See OS 2015-0009 & OS 2015-0010 (combined), Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Dan Thurlow/55.
2
See attached Exhibit 3, 15CA1110 Dan Thurlow/55 v. Campaign Integrity Watchdog Court of Appeals ruling
3
See 16CA267, Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Alliance for a Safe and Independent Woodmen Hills, 2017 COA 22

2
 II. ARGUMENT
The statute of limitations does not bar jurisdiction of this court over claims regarding alleged
violations occurring within 180 days before the filing of a complaint. All the reporting violations
alleged in CIWs Complaint occurred when DCRCC filed its amended final December 2016
Report of Contributions and Expenditures on 26 December 2016, well within the 180-day statute
of limitations set forth in Colo. Const. Art. XXVIII 9(2)(a). Consequently, the Court must reject
DCRCCs frivolous motion to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A. Standard for Motion to Dismiss

CIW does not dispute the characterization of the standards for a motion to dismiss pursuant to
C.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(1) set forth in Respondents motion. CIW would direct the Courts attention
to the trial courts examination of the substance of the claim based on the facts alleged in the
actual Complaint, rather than Respondents attempted (mis)characterization of the allegations.

B. All of the reporting violations alleged and cited in CIWs Complaint fall within the 180-
day statute of limitations set forth in Colo. Const. Art. XXVIII Section 9(2)(a)
The plain language of the Colorado Constitution sets a 180-day statute of limitations from the
date of the alleged violation for a complaint to be filed; that is not in dispute.
However, DCRCC attempts to mislead the Court by mischaracterizing the Complaints
allegations and the date of the alleged violation(s), all of which are based on the DCRCC amended
final Report of Contributions and Expenditures filed on 26 December 2016.
For reporting violations, it is the date of the report, not the date of the underlying transaction,
that counts as the date of violation.
This is due in part to the fact that reporting periods vary considerably, ranging up to a full year
for some committee types based on the electoral cycle. It would clearly be absurd to exclude the
transactions taking place more than 180 days from filing the report from the jurisdiction of the
court and constitutional complaint process based on the transaction date rather than the report date.
This absurdity is, of course, precisely what is being argued by DCRCC.
DCRCC variously argues that the date of the underlying transactions, or the date of the report
in which the transactions coulda woulda shoulda been filed, starts the statute of limitations clock,
rather than the actual, factual date on which the report was filed and disclosures were delinquently
made, as actually alleged in the Complaint and for which violations relief is sought. Consequently,
the Colorado Constitution requires this Court to find CIWs claims filed timely and deny
DCRCCs frivolous Motion to Dismiss.

3
 1. The date of the Complaints alleged violation(s) is the final Report filing date
The fact that the Colorado Constitution Article XXVIII Section 9(2)(a) (Section 9(2)(a))
controls determination of this Courts subject matter jurisdiction in regard to the statute of
limitations is not in dispute. Where DCRCC attempts to mislead the Court revolves around setting
the date of the alleged violation(s) claimed in CIWs Complaint.

It is settled law that Colorado courts must adopt the statutory construction that best
effectuates the intent of the General Assembly and the purposes of the legislative scheme.4

The purposes of the legislative scheme are clearly and unambiguously expressed in both the
constitutional Articles and Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA) statutory Purpose statements;
in relevant part:

providing for full and timely disclosure of campaign contributions, independent

expenditures, and funding of electioneering communications, and strong enforcement of
campaign finance requirements. (Colo. Const. Art. XXVIII, Section 1 Purpose and Findings)
full and timely disclosure of campaign contributions, and strong enforcement of campaign
laws. (C.R.S. 1-45-102, Legislative declaration) [Emphasis added in both citations]

DCRCC admits that the 180-day constitutional statute of limitations begins to run on the date
that a violation is alleged to have occurred. MtD at 6. However, DCRCC then attempts to mislead
the Court regarding the alleged violation(s) at issue in this case, stating that the date of an alleged
violation for failure to report is the date when an omitted contribution or expenditures should have
been disclosed.5 In contrast to the alleged violations in the Sias, Nicolais et al case cited below,
which were failure to file a report, in this case CIW does not allege failure to file a report but
rather failure to report payee address information on a filed report, failure to timely report
contributions received on a filed report, and failure to timely report committee disbursements
on a filed report, as required by law. The Complaint specifies the filed report (26 December 2016)
date as the date that a violation is alleged to have occurred and thus the start point on which the
constitutional statute of limitations begins to run. See Complaint at 3-4, 14-23, inclusive.

4
Watson v. Public Service Co. of Colorado, 207 P. 3d 860, 863 (Colo. App. 2008) quoting State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d
493, 501 (Colo. 2006)
5
DCRCC cites In the Matter of the Complaint filed by Lang Sias and Mario Nicolais Regarding Alleged Campaign
Finance Violations by Christian Coalition of Colorado, National Family Coalition, Colorado Family Values and
Colorado Citizens for Right to Work, OS 2014-0043 (Office of Admin. Cts. Feb. 2, 2015) Final Agency Decision, p.
4-7, 9. However, as the ALJ made clear in his ruling, the alleged violation in that case was failure to file a report
rather than actually filing a report which included delinquent disclosures, as alleged in CIWs Complaint.

4
 2. All of the Complaints alleged violation(s) occurred in the 26 December 2016 Report,
and therefore fall within the 180-day statute of limitations
The alleged violations listed in CIWs Complaint all occurred within the 26 December 2016
amended final Report, and therefore fall within the 180-day constitutional statute of limitations.
CIW detailed the specific contributions and expenditures forming the basis of its Complaint in the
General Allegations paragraphs 11(a)-11(bb) and 12(a)-12(v) and specifically in the Complaints
First Claim for Relief paragraphs 17(a)-17(bb) and 18(a)-18(v) citing the committees 8 December
2016 Report of Contributions & Expenditures as the source documenting the alleged violations,
as well as the Second Claim for Relief paragraph 22(a)-22(v) specifically citing the fact that the
disbursements at issue were disclosed for the first time in the 8 December 2016 Report of
Contributions & Expenditures as amended and filed on 26 December 2016.

In each instance, CIW cites the date listed on the 8 December 2016 Report (filed 26 Dec 2016)
as evidence of DCRCCs delinquent disclosures submitted on that report, which report sets the
date of the alleged violations listed in the Complaint.

DCRCC then launches into a lengthy disquisition on when the contributions and expenditures
should have been disclosed on a prior report to bolster its failed argument for establishing prior
report dates not alleged as a basis for violations as the start date to run the statute of limitations.6

The date of any shoulda coulda woulda report filing is irrelevant; the transactions were in
FACT reported in DCRCCs 8 December 2016 Report, as finalized on the amended filing date of
26 December. It is the ACTUAL report filing date, rather than the coulda shoulda woulda
putative filing date(s), that establishes the date of the violation (as alleged, delinquent and
untimely disclosure of transactions and omission of data in that report that was required by law).

Significantly, both of the cases cited by DCRCC to bolster its argument that CIW is very
familiar with the statute of limitations list the actual report date as the basis for dismissing part
of CIWs allegations (contra DCRCCs misrepresentations, not multiple claims) in those cases.
Additionally, in both cases the statute of limitations was held to have expired solely due to the
delay from CIWs original filing of the written complaint per Colo. Const. Art. XXVIII 9(2)(a)
and completion of the Complaint with a hardcopy and signed cover sheet not here at issue.

6
DCRCC also misrepresents the latest date of any listed transaction as due to be reported on 18 October 2016, when
in fact the latest transaction date listed in CIWs Complaint and DCRCCs 8 December Report filed 26 December
2016 was 26 October 2016. See Complaint at 5 22(l) and Exhibit 2, DCRCC RCE 20161208 filed 20161226

5
 Additionally, DCRCC willfully and maliciously misrepresents or omits applicable precedent
establishing the date of the violation with respect to enforcement of continuing violations as
here, DCRCCs failure to disclose contribution and expenditure data required by law remained an
open and continuing violation until closed out with the final (26 December 2016) report filing.

Specifically, the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected the attempt by DCRCCs counsel in case
15CA1110 Dan Thurlow/55 v. Campaign Integrity Watchdog, affirming the ALJs ruling in
combined cases OS 2015-0009 and -0010, Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Dan Thurlow/55, to
argue that disclosures belatedly made in a report filed 7 April 2015 constituted an amendment
of prior reports, and affirmed the ALJ ruling that the 24 April 2015 report filing date constituted
the date of alleged violation(s) for the purposes of the ruling, including imposition of penalties.7

More specifically, the Colorado Court of Appeals even more recently rejected an attempt to
rely upon the constitutional statute of limitations to run out the clock with regard to enforcing
penalties against a committee, finding that a violation remains open and continuing until closed:

We conclude that violation means the act(s) of breaking or dishonoring the FCPA or
Amendment and, thus, the statute of limitations begins running the day following the last such
act. 16CA267 Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Alliance for a Safe and Independent
Woodmen Hills, 2017COA22 at 2, 1 announced 23 February 2017 [emphasis added]
Specifically, the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected ASIWHs argument that the violation
date was the date on which the committee first should have registered or should have filed reports,
but concluded that the date of the violation for the purpose of applying the Section 9(2)(a) statute
of limitations was the last act of registering or filing a report, as required by law.

Specifically, the Court of Appeals found that to the extent the district court found that the last
date of the penalty range, June 26, 2014, corresponded with the date of the violation in 9 of the
Amendment, this conclusion was erroneous 2017COA22 at 23, 34

The Court of Appeals stated that since the violation continued we conclude that the
complaint states a plausible claim of a continuing violation sufficient to withstand a 12(b)(5)
motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. 2017COA22 at 23, 358

7
See attached Exhibit 3, 15CA1110, Campaign Integrity v. Thurlow 10-20-2016 at 20, noting that the committee
nondisclosures had been corrected by April 24, 2015 closing out the violation for the purpose of imposing penalties
8
In contrast to the record in the ASIWH case which the Court found does not show when or if the continuing violation
ended in this case the record shows (Exhibit 2, DCRCC RCE 20161208 amended 20161226) the violation ended 26
December on filing the amended final report, with regard to the delinquent disclosure of information required by law.

6
 3. DCRCCs argument that the 8 December 2016 Report initial filing date defines the
violation date willfully misrepresents both fact and applicable law
Finally, DCRCC argues that because the 8 December 2016 Report of Contributions and
Expenditures was initially filed on 7 December 2016 (prior to subsequently being amended and
finalized on 26 December 2016) the Complaint should be time-barred as falling outside the statute
of limitations. Not only does this contradict DCRCCs own argument that the report due date sets
the start of the statute of limitations, it contradicts a previous ruling of this Court that an early-filed
report is not final for the purpose of filing a campaign finance complaint, finding a complaint
filed based on an early-filed report premature because the report was not due until May 5th
Thus, because CFBF had until May 5, 2014 to amend its report to correct any deficiencies, CIWs
complaint was premature. OS 2014-0004 Final Agency Decision at 5.
Consequently, DCRCCs 8 December 2016 Report of Contributions and Expenditures (RCE)
was not final when initially filed on 7 December 2016; it was in fact still not final until amended
on 26 December 2016, the date of the violation alleged in CIWs Complaint; even more clearly,
the alleged violations listed in the Complaints 10, 15 and 17 occurred specifically on that date.
Therefore, DCRCCs argument that CIWs Complaint is time-barred based on the early filing
of its 8 December 2016 RCE, rather than the reports actual final filing date of 26 December 2016,
is substantially frivolous and knowingly contradicts rulings personally known to DCRCC counsel.

III. Request for Costs and Attorneys Fees

Consequently, DCRCCs request for costs and attorneys fees under C.R.S. 1-45-111.5 and
C.R.S. 24-4-105(4), and C.R.C.P. Rule 11 is devoid of legal merit, substantially groundless, and
advanced without substantial justification for purposes of harassment and thus subject to sanctions.
As discussed above, CIWs Complaint is substantially justified and well-grounded in fact and
law. Furthermore, DCRCC maliciously misrepresents (to the point of suborning perjury from
DCRCC officers) statements by CIWs non-attorney representative during confidential settlement
discussions. Because the attorney or party who defended the action advanced arguments lacking
substantial justification and unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by improper conduct including
malicious misrepresentation of fact and law, it is CIW that is entitled to recovery of its costs.
CIW therefore respectfully requests the Court to deny DCRCCs request for attorneys fees,
and instead award CIW reasonable costs incurred in prosecuting the well-grounded Complaint,
including costs for service of process to DCRCC officers.

7
 A. Legal Standard

DCRCC admits that under well-established law, an argument is frivolous if the proponent can
establish no rational argument based on the evidence or law in support of the claim or defense
and is groundless if the allegations are not supported by any credible evidence.9 DCRCC also
admits that a vexatious claim or defense is one brought or maintained in bad faith to annoy or
harass, and may include conduct that is arbitrary, abusive, stubbornly litigious, or disrespectful of
truth.10 [Emphasis added]

Similarly, DCRCC admits that C.R.C.P. Rule 11 imposes four independent duties on an
attorney upon signing a pleading:

(1) before a pleading is filed there must be a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law;
(2) based on this investigation, the signer must reasonably believe the pleading is well
grounded in fact;
(3) the legal theory asserted in the pleading must be based on existing legal principles or a
good faith argument for the modification of existing law; and
(4) the pleading must not be filed for the purpose of causing delay, harassment, or an increase
in the cost of litigation.11
DCRCCs highly selective citations of cases (a mere two out of the 73 cases brought, and
overwhelmingly successfully prosecuted, by CIW according to DCRCCs own reckoning) is a
blatant attempt to prejudice the Court with scandalous, impertinent, and immaterial matters not
relevant to determination of the factual and legal matters properly before the Court.

In particular, the sanctions previously issued against CIW and its principal, Matt Arnold
have not stood up in court; in fact, such sanctions have either been reversed (see 2017 COA 22)
or not sustained on appeal (including the second case cited by DCRCCs counsel, now pending
before the Colorado Court of Appeals, appealed by losing party Colorado Pioneer Action (CPA)
against prevailing party Campaign Integrity Watchdog in case OS 2016-0014 and -0030, combined
(Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Colorado Pioneer Action et. al.). Such impertinent, immaterial
and scandalous statements should be disregarded by this Court and stricken from the record.

9
See Remote Switch Systems, Inc. v. Delangis, 126 P.3d 269, 275 (Colo. App. 2005), cert. denied, 2006 WL 380434;
see also Schmidt Const. Co. v. Becker-Johnson Corp., 817 P.2d 233, 235 (Colo. App. 1994)
10
Engel v. Engel, 902 P.2d 442, 446 (Colo. App. 1995); see also Bd. of Commrs of Boulder v. Easton, 976 P.2d 271,
273-72 (Colo. App. 1998); Bockar v. Patterson, 899 P.2d 233, 235 (Colo. App. 1994)
11
Stearns Mgmt. Co. v. Missouri River Servs. Inc., 70 P.3d 629, 632 (Colo. App. 2003) citing Maul v. Shaw, 843 P.2d
139, 141-2 (Colo. App. 1992)

8
 B. CIWs claims were neither frivolous nor groundless; contrariwise, DCRCCs
defenses were both frivolous and groundless

As discussed above, CIWs Complaint is well grounded in both fact and law, and thus legally
and factually sustainable based on both the clear letter of the law and guiding case law precedent.
Because the 180-day statute of limitations had not expired before CIW filed its Complaint, based
on the standard set by the Colorado Court of Appeals defining violation for purposes of applying
the statute of limitation per Colo. Const. Art. XXVIII 9(2)(a) as the day after the last act of
filing a report or disclosure required by law, which was 26 December 2016. 2017 COA 22, at 23

Contrariwise, DCRCCs defense and Motion to Dismiss is both frivolous and groundless, for
the reasons and citations to authority listed above. Specifically, DCRCC knowingly misrepresents
the date of alleged violations advanced in CIWs Complaint, which specifically reference the
committees 8 December 2016 RCE (as amended, finalized and filed by DCRCC on 26 Dec. 2016).
Specifically, DCRCC knowingly misrepresents extant cases finding that an early filing of a report
is not final and therefore cannot constitute the basis for running out the statute of limitations.12
Specifically, DCRCC counsel failed to exercise due diligence and reasonable inquiry into the
law governing application of the constitutional statute of limitations in campaign finance cases; in
fact, deliberately omitting relevant precedent (2017 COA 22) of which counsel was aware due to
legislative hearing testimony in which both counsel and CIWs representative participated.13

Because of the fact that the constitutional 180-day statute of limitations for reporting violations
alleged in CIWs Complaint had not expired based on the facts (26 December 2016 finalized report
filing date), clear letter of the law (establishing the report date as the date of a reporting violation),
and extant case law (particularly the binding precedential standards for applying the constitutional
statute of limitations established by the Colorado Court of Appeals in 2017 COA 22), all of which
were known and/or reasonably should have been known to DCRCC counsel, DCRCCs defenses
and rationale argued in its Motion to Dismiss lack both factual and legal basis and are frivolous
and groundless according to the legal standards propounded by DCRCC by and through counsel.
Therefore, DCRCC and counsel should be sanctioned and CIW awarded its reasonable costs per
C.R.S. 1-45-111.5(2) and C.R.C.P. Rule 11.

12
See DCRCCs own citation of case OS 2014-0004, Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Coloradans for a Better Future
FAD at 5, in which DCRCC counsel participated, establishing early report filings as not final for complaints.
13
See House State, Veterans, and Military Affairs committee hearing testimony on HB17-1155, 9 March 2017

9
 C. CIWs actions were not vexatious; contrariwise, DCRCCs malicious
misrepresentations of both fact and law were vexatious
DCRCC, by and through counsel, has engaged in impermissible conduct that is arbitrary,
abusive, stubbornly litigious, or disrespectful of truth14 throughout this matter. First and foremost
DCRCC maliciously misrepresents CIWs non-attorney representatives statements made in the
course of confidential settlement negotiations with DCRCC officers, who non-credibly and falsely
testify as to the content of discussions in the context of a potential negotiated settlement. In fact,
the actual statement was the reason youre on my radar was due to DCRCC officers abusing
their position to disparage CIW and its non-attorney representative; the reason for bringing the
complaint was DCRCCs repeated violations of its disclosure obligations under the law. DCRCC
officer affidavits should be stricken from the record as immaterial, prejudicial, and non-credible
due to the obvious material interest of DCRCC officers in casting the Complainant in the worst
possible light to prejudice the Court, unrelated to the merits of the underlying Complaint.

DCRCC has also maintained its frivolous defense despite being informed that its request to
dismiss the Complaint lacks both factual and legal merit, and despite being informed during the
telephonic case management conference that DCRCCs claims that the Complaint was time-barred
lacked legal merit. As part of its defense, DCRCC has failed to comply with the constitutional
mandate to produce records for inspection at any hearing held pursuant to this Article expressly
set forth in Colo. Const. Art. XXVIII 3(9) and has issued threats against CIWs nonprofessional
process server when attempting to serve DCRCC Chairman Jake Viano.15 Since CIWs discovery
requests are not only allowable, but mandatory according to the clear letter of the law, DCRCCs
allegations that the requests are improper is both factually and legally unsustainable.

DCRCCs factual and legal misrepresentations are both disrespectful of truth and, being
advanced in full knowledge of the same legal arguments having been rejected both in this Court
and at the Court of Appeals, stubbornly litigious. DCRCC knew and/or reasonably should have
known that the actual report filing date established the date of the alleged violations in CIWs
Complaint, and knew that a violation is not closed for purposes of the statute of limitations
until the day after the last act of finalizing the disclosure required by law by filing a report.

14
Engel v. Engel, 902 P.2d 442, 446 (Colo. App. 1995); see also Bd. of Commrs of Boulder v. Easton, 976 P.2d 271,
273-72 (Colo. App. 1998); Bockar v. Patterson, 899 P.2d 233, 235 (Colo. App. 1994)
15
See Affidavit of Service Cook Viano 20170619 at 1, in which Viano issued threats of violence and filing a report of
harassment with the Denver Police (filing false reports is a misdemeanor criminal offense per C.R.S. 18-8-111)

10
 DCRCC counsel also engages in malicious misrepresentation of a descriptive article written
by CIWs non-attorney representative prior to CIW ever engaging in campaign finance cases as a
prescriptive advocacy for action in a transparent attempt to prejudice the Court in this proceeding.
DCRCC also implies that CIW (or any other Complainant, for that matter) is somehow
obligated to minimize penalties for campaign finance violators, citing the case of CIW v. Colorado
Republican Party PAC16 for missing information related to two three dollar contributions while
maliciously omitting the relevant fact that in the case of a limited liability company (at issue in
that case) the law requires disclosure regardless of the dollar amount of the contribution.17

Most disconcertingly, DCRCC by and through counsel scandalously and falsely alleges that
CIW regularly leverages the cost of litigation and threat of onerous penalties to profit through
settlements with the committees he (sic) brings suit against. Such false, scandalous, immaterial,
and prejudicial accusations levied without basis in fact and law should not only be stricken from
the record but sanctioned as both an example of harassment and behavior disrespectful of truth.18

This pattern of behavior is consistent with previous acts by DCRCC counsel in other cases,
including submitting perjurious testimony in sworn affidavits19 (apparently repeated in this case)
presented in support of actions to absolve repeat violators of accountability under the law.

Finally, DCRCC counsels actions to unnecessarily expand the proceedings and increase the
cost of litigation is evidenced by refusal to accept the extremely generous stipulated judgment
offered by CIW to simply accept responsibility, pay the bare minimum fines, and correct DCRCC
reports in the interest of full transparency and accountability under the law. Instead, DCRCC
expanded the proceedings, engaged in malicious misrepresentations and disparagement of CIW
and its non-attorney representative, and now attempts not only to inflate the cost of proceedings
but frivolously pursue recovery of attorney fees that need never have been incurred.

16
OS 2016-0002 Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Colorado Republican Party Political Action Committee (Office
of Admin. Cts. Apr. 12, 2016), http://tracer.sos.colorado.gov/PublicSite/SearchPages/ComplaintDetail.aspx?ID=389
17
C.R.S. 1-45-108(1)(a)(IV)
18
DCRCC cites a slanderous statement reported in a media article as evidence of abusive behavior taken out of
context of the Respondent Colorado Republican Party having previously reneged on payment of a $23,000 suspended
penalty to the Secretary of State for previous stipulated violations of the law. Similarly, DCRCCs citation of a listed
campaign finance report entry by Protect and Defend Colorado is neither evidence of misconduct nor material to
any issue or question of law properly before this Court.
19
See case OS 2014-0008, Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Coloradans for a Better Future, in which counsel Nicolais
submitted a perjurious affidavit characterizing CBF officer Andy George as a volunteer rather than the
organizations officer exercising sole authority and control over the entitys activities, despite knowing full well that
George was not a volunteer but the organizations decisionmaker.

11
 D. CIW is not subject to attorneys fees under C.R.S. 13-17-102
At the time of this filing, DCRCC has not withdrawn its substantially unjustified, frivolous,
and groundless Motion to Dismiss despite knowing that its arguments and defenses were factually
and legally unsustainable and devoid of merit. Additionally, because DCRCC chose to continue
and expand the litigation well beyond the time when the relevant facts and legal precedent were
known to DCRCC counsel, it has unnecessarily expanded the proceedings without substantial
justification and seeks to inflate costs in pursuit of its frivolous and harassing attempt to extract
fees from CIW exercising a constitutional right to bring a case and prosecute violations of the law.

Moreover, CIW is not subject to imposition of attorney fees under C.R.S. 13-17-102(6) due to
the fact that the action is not substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially
vexatious (as well-documented in arguments and citations to authority, supra). CIW reasonably
relied on both the clear letter of the law and precedential authority establishing the definition of
violation for the purpose of applying the constitutional statute of limitations in campaign finance
cases. Contrariwise, it is DCRCCs arguments that are substantially frivolous and groundless, and
DCRCC counsel who knew or reasonably should have known per C.R.S. 13-17-102(6) that his
defense, or any part thereof, was substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially
vexatious and consequently subject to sanction per C.R.S. 1-45-111.5(2).
DCRCC counsel is an experienced (albeit largely unsuccessful) campaign finance litigator and
self-described super-lawyer who knew, or reasonably should have known, that his defense(s) in
these proceedings were substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, and/or substantially
vexatious. DCRCC and Nicolais are clearly aware of the burden they must meet under the FCPA
and Article XXVIII, and their disclosure obligations under the law, but have consciously failed to
meet either (and, in both cases, have failed to do so for a considerable amount of time).20
Specifically, DCRCC counsels failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law related
to application of the Articles statute of limitations, in cases of which he had personal knowledge,
and actions to expand and inflate the cost of this litigation, is sanctionable under C.R.C.P. 11.

20
It is appropriate to take judicial notice of the fact that DCRCCs published disclosures in its periodic filings of
Reports of Contributions and Expenditures bear at best a tenuous relation to the truth of the committees finances,
since the committee has reported operating with a negative account balance in the thousands over the last several
reporting cycles a situation that no bank would sustain over such a long period. Thus, far from providing full and
timely disclosure to the public and its own members as required by law, it is clear that DCRCC is engaged in long-
term and sustained failure to meet the disclosure requirements imposed by law. See the DCRCC committee page at
http://tracer.sos.colorado.gov/PublicSite/SearchPages/CommitteeDetail.aspx?OrgID=18408 with negative balances
showing in the majority of reports filed over the last year.

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 WHEREFORE, for the reasons, argument, and citations to authority discussed supra,
Complainant Campaign Integrity Watchdog respectfully requests the Court deny DCRCCs
substantially frivolous and substantially groundless Motion to Dismiss, with prejudice, and deny
DCRCCs substantially frivolous, groundless, and vexatious request for attorneys fees, and enter
an Order
A. Denying Respondent DCRCCs Motion to Dismiss, with prejudice;
B. Denying Respondent DCRCCs request for attorneys fees;
C. Granting Complainant CIWs reasonable request for costs;
D. Proceeding to the scheduled merits hearing to adjudicate DCRCCs violations and
determine appropriate penalties; and
E. Directing such other further relief as this Court deems appropriate.

Respectfully submitted this 10th day of August 2017,

MATTHEW ARNOLD, pro se for

Campaign Integrity Watchdog

___/signed/ Matt Arnold________________

Campaign Integrity Watchdog
Matthew Arnold, pro se for CIW
P.O. Box 372464, Denver, Colorado 80237

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 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of this RESPONSE TO MOTION
TO DISMISS was served via electronic transmission, as indicated, on this 10th day of August
2017 addressed to the following:

Office of Administrative Courts (Electronically filed via CaseConnect)

1525 Sherman Street 4th Floor
Denver, CO 80202

Mario Nicolais Esq., No. 38589 (E-mail)

KNB Law, LLC
7830 W. Alameda Avenue, Suite 103-301
Lakewood, CO 80226
Phone: 720-773-1526
E-mail: MarioNicolaisEsq@gmail.com

MATTHEW ARNOLD, pro se for

Campaign Integrity Watchdog

___/signed/ Matt Arnold________________

Campaign Integrity Watchdog
Matthew Arnold, pro se for CIW
P.O. Box 372464, Denver, Colorado 80237

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