JOHAYVEER S.

GUINDO
20 OCTOBER 2015

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Malinias v. COMELEC
GR 146943
October 4, 2002

ISSUE: Did Corpuz and Tangilag, who entered the canvassing room, violate Section 232 of B.P.
Blg. 881?

RULING: The provision of law which Corpuz and Tangilag allegedly violated is quoted as
follows:

Sec. 232. Persons not allowed inside the canvassing room. It shall be unlawful for any officer or
member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including the Philippine Constabulary, or the
Integrated National Police or any peace officer or any armed or unarmed persons belonging to an
extra-legal police agency, special forces, reaction forces, strike forces, home defense forces,
barangay self-defense units, barangay tanod, or of any member of the security or police
organizations or government ministries, commissions, councils, bureaus, offices, instrumentalities,
or government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries or of any member of a
privately owned or operated security, investigative, protective or intelligence agency performing
identical or similar functions to enter the room where the canvassing of the election returns are
held by the board of canvassers and within a radius of fifty meters from such room: Provided,
however, That the board of canvassers by a majority vote, if it deems necessary, may make a call in
writing for the detail of policemen or any peace officers for their protection or for the protection of
the election documents and paraphernalia in the possession of the board, or for the maintenance
of peace and order, in which case said policemen or peace officers, who shall be in proper uniform,
shall stay outside the room within a radius of thirty meters near enough to be easily called by the
board of canvassers at any time.

The COMELEC and private respondents overlooked that Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not
one of the election offenses explicitly enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. While
Section 232 categorically states that it is unlawful for the persons referred therein to enter the
canvassing room, this act is not one of the election offenses criminally punishable under Sections
261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881. Thus, the act involved in Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not punishable
as a criminal election offense. Section 264 of B.P. Blg. 881 provides that the penalty for an election
offense under Sections 261 and 262 is imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than
six years.

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 Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there is
no ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of
Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act.

It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing,
or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar
maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One
variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is
implied. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited
to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are canons of restrictive
interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human
mind. They are predicated upon ones own voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed
from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumeration in a statute had
the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

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Republic v. Lacap
GR 158253
March 2, 2007

ISSUE: Does a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects?

RULING:

A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed projects, but does
not exonerate him from corresponding fines thereof. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly
provides:

SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts
to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a
supervisory capacity of a construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a
license to engage in the business of contracting in this country; or who shall present or file the
license certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof
in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate
or license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay
a fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos.

The "plain meaningrule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
interpretation. The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly,
as void contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless,
such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be
paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice to the payment
of the fine prescribed under the law. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.

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People v. Temporada (Separate Opinion of J. Corona)
GR 173473
December 17, 2008

ISSUE:

Is the affirmation of the Second School of Thought, which construe penal statutes
strictly against the accused, rather than the First School of Thought, which is more favorable to
the accused proper as applied to the Indeterminate Sentence Law?

SEPARATE OPINION:

The primary defect of the so-called second school of thought is that it contradicts the in
dubio pro reo principle. It also violates the lenity rule. Instead, it advocates a stricter interpretation
with harsher effects on the accused. In particular, compared to the first school of thought, it
lengthens rather than shortens the penalty that may be imposed on the accused. Seen in its proper
context, the second school of thought is contrary to the avowed purpose of the law that it
purportedly seeks to promote, the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

The second school of thought limits the concept of modifying circumstance to either a
mitigating or aggravating circumstance listed under Articles 13 and 14 of the Revised Penal Code. It
contends that the respective enumerations under the said provisions are exclusive and all other
circumstances not included therein were intentionally omitted by the legislature. Casus omissus
any person, object or thing omitted from the enumeration shall be believed to have been omitted
intentionally.

The second school of thought strictly construes the term attending circumstances against
the accused. It refuses to recognize anything that is not expressed, takes the language used in its
exact meaning and admits no equitable consideration.

To the point of being repetitive, however, where the accused is concerned, penal statutes
should be interpreted liberally, not strictly.

The fact that there are two schools of thought on the matter by itself shows that there is
uncertainty as to the concept of attending or modifying circumstances. Pursuant to the in dubio
pro reo principle, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused and not against him.

Moreover, laws must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which they
are enacted. The meaning of a word or phrase used in a statute may be qualified by the purpose
which induced the legislature to enact the statute. The purpose may indicate whether to give a
word or phrase a restricted or expansive meaning. In construing a word or phrase, the court should
adopt the interpretation that best serves the manifest purpose of the statute or promotes or
realizes its object. Where the language of the statute is fairly susceptible to two or more
constructions, that which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and

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promote the object for which the statute was enacted should be adopted. Taken in conjunction
with the lenity rule, a doubtful provision of a law that seeks to alleviate the effects of incarceration
ought to be given an interpretation that affords lenient treatment to the accused.

The Indeterminate Sentence Law is intended to favor the accused, particularly to shorten
his term of imprisonment. The reduction of his period of incarceration reasonably helps uplift and
redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness. The law, being penal in character, must receive an interpretation
that benefits the accused. This Court already ruled that in cases where the application of the law on
indeterminate sentence would be unfavorable to the accused, resulting in the lengthening of his
prison sentence, said law on indeterminate sentence should not be applied. In the same vein, if an
interpretation of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is unfavorable to the accused and will work to
increase the term of his imprisonment, that interpretation should not be adopted. It is also for this
reason that the claim that the power of this Court to lighten the penalty of lesser crimes carries
with it the responsibility to impose a greater penalty for grave penalties is not only wrong but also
dangerous.

Nowhere does the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribe that the minimum term of the
penalty be no farther than one degree away from the maximum term. Thus, while it may be true
that the minimum term of the penalty in an indeterminate sentence is generally one degree away
from the maximum term, the law does not mandate that its application be rigorously and narrowly
limited to that situation.

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Amores v. HRET
GR 189600
June 29, 2010

ISSUE: Is the requirement for youth sector representatives apply to respondent Villanueva?

RULING:

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list

representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a
resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the
day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who
attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term.

The Court finds no textual support for public respondents interpretation that Section 9
applied only to those nominated during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of
the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as
representing the youth sector.

Verba Legis. A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free
from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only
room for application.

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Guzman v. COMELEC
GR 182380
August 28, 2009

ISSUE:

Are the acquisition of Lots 5860 and 5881 during the period of the election ban was covered
by the term public works as to be in violation of Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code?

RULING:

As the legal provision shows, the prohibition of the release, disbursement or expenditure of
public funds for any and all kinds of public works depends on the following elements: (a) a public
official or employee releases, disburses or spends public funds; (b) the release, disbursement and
expenditure is made within 45 days before a regular election or 30 days before a special election;
and (c) the public funds are intended for any and all kinds of public works except the four situations
enumerated in paragraph (v) of Section 261.

It is decisive to determine, therefore, whether the purchase of the lots for use as a public
cemetery constituted public works within the context of the prohibition under the Omnibus
Election Code.

We first construe the term public works which the Omnibus Election Code does not
define with the aid of extrinsic sources.

The Local Government Code of 1991 considers public works to be the fixed infrastructures
and facilities owned and operated by the government for public use and enjoyment. According to
the Code, cities have the responsibility of providing infrastructure facilities intended primarily to
service the needs of their residents and funded out of city funds, such as, among others, roads and
bridges; school buildings and other facilities for public elementary and secondary schools; and
clinics, health centers and other health facilities necessary to carry out health services.

Likewise, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the engineering and
construction arm of the government, associates public works with fixed infrastructures for the
public. In the declaration of policy pertinent to the DPWH, Sec. 1, Chapter 1, Title V, Book
IV, Administrative Code of 1987, states:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall maintain an engineering and construction arm and
continuously develop its technology, for the purposes of ensuring the safety of all infrastructure
facilities and securing for all public works and highways the highest efficiency and the most
appropriate quality in construction. The planning, design, construction and maintenance
of infrastructure facilities, especially national highways, flood control and water resources
development systems, and other public works in accordance with national development objectives,

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shall be the responsibility of such an engineering and construction arm. However, the exercise of
this responsibility shall be decentralized to the fullest extent feasible.

The enumeration in Sec. 1, supra infrastructure facilities, especially national highways, flood
control and water resources development systems, and other public works in accordance with
national development objectives means that only the fixed public infrastructures for use of the
public are regarded as public works. This construction conforms to the rule
of ejusdem generis, which Professor Black has restated thuswise:

It is a general rule of statutory construction that where general words follow an

enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general
words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons
or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. But this rule must be
discarded where the legislative intention is plain to the contrary.

Accordingly, absent an indication of any contrary legislative intention, the term public
works as used in Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code is properly construed to refer to any
building or structure on land or to structures (such as roads or dams) built by the Government for
public use and paid for by public funds. Public works are clearly works, whether of construction or
adaptation undertaken and carried out by the national, state, or municipal authorities, designed to
subserve some purpose of public necessity, use or convenience, such as public buildings, roads,
aqueducts, parks, etc.; or, in other words, all fixed works constructed for public use.

It becomes inevitable to conclude, therefore, that the petitioner's insistence that the
acquisition of Lots 5860 and 5881 for use as a public cemetery be considered a disbursement of the
public funds for public works in violation of Section 261(v) of the Omnibus Election Code was
unfounded and unwarranted.

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NPC v. City of Cabanatuan
GR 149110
April 9, 2003

ISSUES:

Is the tax exemption granted to NPC in accordance with sec. 13 of Rep. Act No. 6395
still subsisting despite the passage of the Local Government Code?

RULING:

As a rule, tax exemptions are construed strongly against the claimant. Exemptions must be
shown to exist clearly and categorically, and supported by clear legal provisions. In the case at bar,
the petitioners sole refuge is section 13 of Rep. Act No. 6395 exempting from, among others, all
income taxes, franchise taxes and realty taxes to be paid to the National Government, its provinces,
cities, municipalities and other government agencies and instrumentalities. However, section 193
of the LGC withdrew, subject to limited exceptions, the sweeping tax privileges previously enjoyed
by private and public corporations. Contrary to the contention of petitioner, section 193 of the LGC
is an express, albeit general, repeal of all statutes granting tax exemptions from local taxes. It
reads:

Sec. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges.- Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax
exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or
juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and
educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. (Emphases
supplied)

It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing,
act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. Not being a local water district, a cooperative registered under R.A. No. 6938, or a
non-stock and non-profit hospital or educational institution, petitioner clearly does not belong to
the exception. It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to point to some provisions of the LGC
that expressly grant it exemption from local taxes.

But this would be an exercise in futility. Section 137 of the LGC clearly states that the LGUs
can impose franchise tax notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special
law. This particular provision of the LGC does not admit any exception

The explicit language of section 137 which authorizes the province to impose franchise tax
notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law is all-encompassing and
clear. The franchise tax is imposable despite any exemption enjoyed under special laws.

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Nereo v. St. James Hospital
GR 166735
September 5, 2006

ISSUE:

Is St. James Hospital, a non-conforming structure under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance allowed
for expansion into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution within the Mariquita Pueblo
Subdivision under the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance?

RULING

To address this matter, we deem it necessary to reiterate our discussion in our Decision
dated 5 September 2006, wherein we have thoroughly examined the pertinent provisions of the
1981 and 1991 Zoning Ordinances, to wit:

Likewise, it must be stressed at this juncture that a comprehensive scrutiny of both

Ordinances will disclose that the uses formerly allowed within a residential zone under the 1981
Zoning Ordinance such as schools, religious facilities and places of worship, and clinics and hospitals
have now been transferred to the institutional zone under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance. This clearly
demonstrates the intention of the Sangguniang Bayan to delimit the allowable uses in the
residential zone only to those expressly enumerated under Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance, which no longer includes hospitals.

It is lamentable that both the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals gave undue
emphasis to the word "institutional" as mentioned in Section 2, Article VI of the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance and even went through great lengths to define said term in order to include hospitals
under the ambit of said provision. However, they neglected the fact that under Section 4, Article VI
of said Ordinance, there is now another zone, separate and distinct from a residential zone, which
is classified as "institutional", wherein health facilities, such as hospitals, are expressly enumerated
among those structures allowed within said zone.

Moreover, both the Office of the President and the appellate court failed to consider that
any meaning or interpretation to be given to the term "institutional" as used in Section 2, Article VI
must be correspondingly limited by the explicit enumeration of allowable uses contained in the
same section. Whatever meaning the legislative body had intended in employing the word
"institutional" must be discerned in light of the restrictive enumeration in the said article. Under
the legal maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius, the express mention of one thing in a law,
means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. Thus, in interpreting the whole of Section
2, Article VI, it must be understood that in expressly enumerating the allowable uses within a
residential zone, those not included in the enumeration are deemed excluded. Hence, since
hospitals, among other things, are not among those enumerated as allowable uses within the
residential zone, the only inference to be deduced from said exclusion is that said hospitals have

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been deliberately eliminated from those structures permitted to be constructed within a residential
area in Santa Rosa, Laguna.

Furthermore, according to the rule of casus omissus in statutory construction, a thing

omitted must be considered to have been omitted intentionally. Therefore, with the omission of
the phrase "hospital with not more than ten capacity" in the new Zoning Ordinance, and the
corresponding transfer of said allowable usage to another zone classification, the only logical
conclusion is that the legislative body had intended that said use be removed from those allowed
within a residential zone. Thus, the construction of medical institutions, such as St. James Hospital,
within a residential zone is now prohibited under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.

Having concluded that the St. James Hospital is now considered a non-conforming structure under
the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, we now come to the issue of the legality of the proposed expansion of
said hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed medical institution. We shall decide this said issue in
accordance with the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance relating to non-conforming buildings,
the applicable law at the time of the proposal. As stated in Section 1 of Article X of the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance:

Section 1. EXISTING NON-CONFORMING USES AND BUILDINGS. The lawful uses of any building,
structure or land at the point of adoption or amendment of this Ordinance may be continued,
although such does not conform with the provisions of this Ordinance.

1. That no non-conforming use shall be enlarged or increased or extended to occupy a greater area
or land that has already been occupied by such use at the time of the adoption of this Ordinance, or
moved in whole or in part to any other portion of the lot parcel of land where such non-conforming
use exist at the time of the adoption of this Ordinance. (Emphasis ours.)

Verba Legis where the law is clear, the same should be interpreted as according to its
plain meaning. It is clear from the above quoted provision of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance that the
expansion of a non-conforming building is prohibited. Hence, we accordingly resolve that the
expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution within
the Mariquita Pueblo Subdivision as prohibited under the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.

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