Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellant.
Manuel O. Chan for appellees.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of Republic Act No. 590
unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia
the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to
Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1,1950 to October
19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the same question of law, they were jointly submitted for
determination in the lower court. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg presiding, in a rather exhaustive and well considered decision found and
held that under the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from
the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the
Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes.

We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the proposition and the arguments pro and cons involved in the
case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which are raised, brought up and presented here. In that case, we have held despite the ruling
enunciated by the United States Federal Supreme Court in the case of O 'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing the salary
of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a diminution of such salary and so violates the Constitution. We shall now confine our-selves
to a discussion and determination of the remaining question of whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can
justify and legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers.

According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of
Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduced what he considers the pertinent discussion in the
Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.

For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article VIII of our Constitution:.

SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior, until
they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. They shall receive such
compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Until the Congress
shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand
pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.

As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional provision, we held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers are
exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or
diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter,
according to the Solicitor General, because Congress did not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case, Congress
promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in that decision, at least now to authorize and legalize the collection
of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. We quote section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:
 SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt
from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution
or by law.

So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution, particularly section 9, Article VIII, has held
that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of such
salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Now comes the Legislature and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that "no
salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer) shall be considered as exempt
from the income tax," and proceeds to declare that payment of said income tax is not a diminution of his compensation. Can the
Legislature validly do this? May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official,
specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise? To determine this
question, we shall have to go back to the fundamental principles regarding separation of powers.

Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The
Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and
application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the
Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning
not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two,
because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted
to the courts by the Constitution. (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44N. W., 2nd 341, 342.)

When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts
to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the
courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice
Marshall said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to
the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as to the
constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion
that action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals. (11 Am. Jur., 714-715.)

Under the American system of constitutional government, among the most important functions in trusted to the judiciary are
the interpreting of Constitutions and, as a closely connected power, the determination of whether laws and acts of the
legislature are or are not contrary to the provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur., 905.).

By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a
decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial
officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and
established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was
before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is
not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a
term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied)

The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack
thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am.
Jur., 919, emphasis supplied)

We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws,
but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the
sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution
means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would
surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a
case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and
different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department. That would be neither wise nor desirable,
besides being clearly violative of the fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of government, particularly those governing
the separation of powers.
So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the practical side thereof, we believe that the collection of income tax
on a salary is an actual and evident diminution thereof. Under the old system where the in-come tax was paid at the end of the year or
sometime thereafter, the decrease may not be so apparent and clear. All that the official who had previously received his full salary
was called upon to do, was to fulfill his obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying his income tax on his salary. His salary fixed
by law was received by him in the amount of said tax comes from his other sources of income, he may not fully realize the fact that his
salary had been decreased in the amount of said income tax. But under the present system of withholding the income tax at the source,
where the full amount of the income tax corresponding to his salary is computed in advance and divided into equal portions
corresponding to the number of pay-days during the year and actually deducted from his salary corresponding to each payday, said
official actually does not receive his salary in full, because the income tax is deducted therefrom every payday, that is to say, twice a
month. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. As Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, his salary is fixed at p12,000 a year, that
is to say, he should receive P1,000 a month or P500 every payday, fifteenth and end of month. In the present case, the amount
collected by the Collector of Internal Revenue on said salary is P1,744.45 for one year. Divided by twelve (months) we shall have
P145.37 a month. And further dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to P72.685, which is the income tax deducted form the
collected on his salary each half month. So, if Justice Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not exempt from payment of the
income tax, instead of receiving P500 every payday, he would be actually receiving P427.31 only, and instead of receiving P12,000 a
year, he would be receiving but P10,255.55. Is it not therefor clear that every payday, his salary is actually decreased by P72.685 and
every year is decreased by P1,744.45?

Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House Bill No. 1127, which became Republic Act No. 590, it would
seem that one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law was the feeling among certain legislators that members of the
Supreme Court should not enjoy any exemption and that as citizens, out of patriotism and love for their country, they should pay
income tax on their salaries. It might be stated in this connection that the exemption is not enjoyed by the members of the Supreme
Court alone but also by all judicial officers including Justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of inferior courts. The exemption
also extends to other constitutional officers, like the President of the Republic, the Auditor General, the members of the Commission
on Elections, and possibly members of the Board of Tax Appeals, commissioners of the Public Service Commission, and judges of the
Court of Industrial Relations. Compares to the number of all these officials, that of the Supreme Court Justices is relatively
insignificant. There are more than 990 other judicial officers enjoying the exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court of Appeals,
about 107 Judges of First Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices of the Peace. The reason behind the exemption in the
Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the
Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials.

The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded on public policy. As said by Justice Van
Devanter of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Evans vs. Gore (253 U. S., 245):

The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like the clause in respect of
tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench and to promote that independence of action and judgment which is
essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution and to the
administration of justice without respect to person and with equal concern for the poor and the rich. Such being its purpose, it
is to be construed, not as a private grant, but as a limitation imposed in the public interest; in other words, not restrictively,
but in accord with its spirit and the principle on which it proceeds.

Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines enjoying this exemption, especially when the great bulk
thereof are justices of the peace, many of them receiving as low as P200 a month, and considering further the other exemptions
allowed by the income tax law, such as P3,000 for a married person and P600 for each dependent, the amount of national revenue to
be derived from income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, were if not for the constitutional exemption, could not be large or
substantial. But even if it were otherwise, it should not affect, much less outweigh the purpose and the considerations that prompted
the establishment of the constitutional exemption. In the same case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court declared
"that they (fathers of the Constitution) regarded the independence of the judges as far as greater importance than any revenue that
could come from taxing their salaries.

When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege
. It is already attached to his office, provided and secured by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public
interest, to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. When we come to the members of the Supreme Court,
this excemption to them is relatively of short duration. Because of the limited membership in this High Tribunal, eleven, and due to
the high standards of experience, practice and training required, one generally enters its portals and comes to join its membership quite
late in life, on the aver-age, around his sixtieth year, and being required to retire at seventy, assuming that he does not die or become
incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not in a position to receive the benefit of exemption for long. It is rather to the justices of the
peace that the exemption can give more benefit. They are relatively more numerous, and because of the meager salary they receive,
they can less afford to pay the income tax on it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid would be real, substantial
and onerous.
Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or abhorrent in it, as long as it is based on public policy or public
interest. While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged with the commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House
of Representatives except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace are exempt from arrest, during their attendance in the
session of the Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally liable for any speech, remark or statement, oral or written, tending
to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead, Senators and
Congressmen in making such statements during their sessions are extended immunity and exemption.

And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy this exemption. Persons, natural and juridical, are exempt from taxes
on their lands, buildings and improvements thereon when used exclusively for educational purposes, even if they derive income
therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22 [3].) Holders of government bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the income or interest they
receive therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4], National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act No. 566). Payments or income
received by any person residing in the Philippines under the laws of the United States administered by the United States Veterans
Administration are exempt from taxation. (Republic Act No. 360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army
who served in the Armed Forces of the United States, allowances earned by virtue of such services corresponding to the taxable years
1942 to 1945, inclusive, are exempted from income tax. (Republic Act No. 210). The payment of wages and allowances of officers
and enlisted men of the Army Forces of the Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from taxation. (Republic Act No. 35). In other
words, for reasons of public policy and public interest, a citizen may justifiably by constitutional provision or statute be exempted
from his ordinary obligation of paying taxes on his income. Under the same public policy and perhaps for the same it not higher
considerations, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt judicial officers from paying taxes on their
salaries so as not to decrease their compensation, thereby insuring the independence of the Judiciary.

In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax
on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and
application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in
enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court
of the land.

In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with no pronouncement as to costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, and Labrador, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring:

Without expressing any opinion on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, G. R. No. L-2314, in view of
the part I had in that case as former Solicitor General, I wish however to state that I concur in the opinion of the majority to the effect
that section 13, Republic Act No. 590, in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer shall be considered "not to
be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law", constitutes an invasion of the province and jurisdiction of
the judiciary. In this sense, I am of the opinion that said section is null and void, it being a transgression of the fundamental principle
underlying the separation of powers.

PARAS, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

I dissent for the same reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Ozaeta in Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, in which I
concurred. But I disagree with the majority in ruling that no legislation may provide that it be held valid although against a provision
of the Constitution.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent and appellant.

Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner and appellee.

CASTRO, J.:

In the year 1960 the Caltex (Philippines) Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Caltex) conceived and laid the groundwork for a promotional
scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. Denominated "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", it calls for participants
therein to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.
Employees of the Caltex (Philippines) Inc., its dealers and its advertising agency, and their immediate families excepted, participation
is to be open indiscriminately to all "motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers". For the privilege to participate, no fee or
consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available upon
request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.

A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned. At the station level, called "Dealer Contest", the contestant whose estimate is
closest to the actual number of liters dispensed by the hooded pump thereat is to be awarded the first prize; the next closest, the
second; and the next, the third. Prizes at this level consist of a 3-burner kerosene stove for first; a thermos bottle and a Ray-O-Vac
hunter lantern for second; and an Everready Magnet-lite flashlight with batteries and a screwdriver set for third. The first-prize winner
in each station will then be qualified to join in the "Regional Contest" in seven different regions. The winning stubs of the qualified
contestants in each region will be deposited in a sealed can from which the first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners of that
region will be drawn. The regional first-prize winners will be entitled to make a three-day all-expenses-paid round trip to Manila,
accompanied by their respective Caltex dealers, in order to take part in the "National Contest". The regional second-prize and third-
prize winners will receive cash prizes of P500 and P300, respectively. At the national level, the stubs of the seven regional first-prize
winners will be placed inside a sealed can from which the drawing for the final first-prize, second-prize and third-prize winners will be
made. Cash prizes in store for winners at this final stage are: P3,000 for first; P2,000 for second; Pl,500 for third; and P650 as
consolation prize for each of the remaining four participants.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of
communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in
advance for mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent provisions of
which read as follows:

SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter. No matter belonging to any of the following classes, whether sealed as
first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails
of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts:

Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or conveying or purporting to
convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or
chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises.

"SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or company is engaged in conducting any
lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing
of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property
of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of Posts
may instruct any postmaster or other officer or employee of the Bureau to return to the person, depositing the same in the
mails, with the word "fraudulent" plainly written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever
class mailed by or addressed to such person or company or the representative or agent of such person or company.

SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic transfer service.The Director of Posts may,
upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise or scheme
for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or
company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promise, forbid the issue or payment by any postmaster of any
postal money order or telegraphic transfer to said person or company or to the agent of any such person or company, whether
 such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank, corporation, or association of any kind, and may provide by
regulation for the return to the remitters of the sums named in money orders or telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of such
person or company or its agent.

The overtures were later formalized in a letter to the Postmaster General, dated October 31, 1960, in which the Caltex, thru counsel,
enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of
the Postal Law. Unimpressed, the then Acting Postmaster General opined that the scheme falls within the purview of the provisions
aforesaid and declined to grant the requested clearance. In its counsel's letter of December 7, 1960, Caltex sought a reconsideration of
the foregoing stand, stressing that there being involved no consideration in the part of any contestant, the contest was not, under
controlling authorities, condemnable as a lottery. Relying, however, on an opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice on an unrelated
case seven years before (Opinion 217, Series of 1953), the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves
consideration, or that, if it does not, it is nevertheless a "gift enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law, and in his letter of
December 10, 1960 not only denied the use of the mails for purposes of the proposed contest but as well threatened that if the contest
was conducted, "a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives".

Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico
Palomar, praying "that judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law, and
ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public". After issues were joined
and upon the respective memoranda of the parties, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the proposed 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' announced to be
conducted by the petitioner under the rules marked as Annex B of the petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the
respondent has no right to bar the public distribution of said rules by the mails.

The respondent appealed.

The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two basic issues: first, whether the petition states a sufficient cause of
action for declaratory relief; and second, whether the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. We shall take
these up in seriatim.

1. By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, which was the applicable legal basis for the remedy at the
time it was invoked, declaratory relief is available to any person "whose rights are affected by a statute . . . to determine any question
of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute and for a declaration of his rights thereunder" (now section 1, Rule 64, Revised
Rules of Court). In amplification, this Court, conformably to established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions sine
qua non therefor, to wit: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe
for judicial determination (Tolentino vs. The Board of Accountancy, et al., G.R. No. L-3062, September 28, 1951; Delumen, et al. vs.
Republic of the Philippines, 50 O.G., No. 2, pp. 576, 578-579; Edades vs. Edades, et al., G.R. No. L-8964, July 31, 1956). The
gravamen of the appellant's stand being that the petition herein states no sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, our duty is to
assay the factual bases thereof upon the foregoing crucible.

As we look in retrospect at the incidents that generated the present controversy, a number of significant points stand out in bold relief.
The appellee (Caltex), as a business enterprise of some consequence, concededly has the unquestioned right to exploit every legitimate
means, and to avail of all appropriate media to advertise and stimulate increased patronage for its products. In contrast, the appellant,
as the authority charged with the enforcement of the Postal Law, admittedly has the power and the duty to suppress transgressions
thereof particularly thru the issuance of fraud orders, under Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, against
legally non-mailable schemes. Obviously pursuing its right aforesaid, the appellee laid out plans for the sales promotion scheme
hereinbefore detailed. To forestall possible difficulties in the dissemination of information thereon thru the mails, amongst other
media, it was found expedient to request the appellant for an advance clearance therefor. However, likewise by virtue of his
jurisdiction in the premises and construing the pertinent provisions of the Postal Law, the appellant saw a violation thereof in the
proposed scheme and accordingly declined the request. A point of difference as to the correct construction to be given to the
applicable statute was thus reached. Communications in which the parties expounded on their respective theories were exchanged. The
confidence with which the appellee insisted upon its position was matched only by the obstinacy with which the appellant stood his
ground. And this impasse was climaxed by the appellant's open warning to the appellee that if the proposed contest was "conducted, a
fraud order will have to be issued against it and all its representatives."

Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed for. The appellee's insistent assertion of its claim to the use of
the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege demanded,
undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic assertion
of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other, concerning a real not a mere theoretical question or issue. The
contenders are as real as their interests are substantial. To the appellee, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views on the
issue of construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To the appellant, the suppression of the appellee's
proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With the appellee's bent to
hold the contest and the appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders are confronted by the ominous
shadow of an imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo
y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the
time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely the appellee's "desires are thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of
others" which admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy
when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested (III Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing: Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).

We cannot hospitably entertain the appellant's pretense that there is here no question of construction because the said appellant
"simply applied the clear provisions of the law to a given set of facts as embodied in the rules of the contest", hence, there is no room
for declaratory relief. The infirmity of this pose lies in the fact that it proceeds from the assumption that, if the circumstances here
presented, the construction of the legal provisions can be divorced from the matter of their application to the appellee's contest. This is
not feasible. Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the
law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that
the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the case here. Whether or
not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an
inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein. To our mind, this is as much a question of construction or interpretation
as any other.

Nor is it accurate to say, as the appellant intimates, that a pronouncement on the matter at hand can amount to nothing more than an
advisory opinion the handing down of which is anathema to a declaratory relief action. Of course, no breach of the Postal Law has as
yet been committed. Yet, the disagreement over the construction thereof is no longer nebulous or contingent. It has taken a fixed and
final shape, presenting clearly defined legal issues susceptible of immediate resolution. With the battle lines drawn, in a manner of
speaking, the propriety nay, the necessity of setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity distemper, animosity,
passion and violence of a full-blown battle which looms ahead (III Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 132 and
cases cited), cannot but be conceded. Paraphrasing the language in Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh 59 Cal., 2d., 901, 31 Cal. Rptr., 800, 383 P.
2d., 152, cited in 22 Am. Jur., 2d., p. 869, to deny declaratory relief to the appellee in the situation into which it has been cast, would
be to force it to choose between undesirable alternatives. If it cannot obtain a final and definitive pronouncement as to whether the
anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law apply to its proposed contest, it would be faced with these choices: If it launches the contest
and uses the mails for purposes thereof, it not only incurs the risk, but is also actually threatened with the certain imposition, of a fraud
order with its concomitant stigma which may attach even if the appellee will eventually be vindicated; if it abandons the contest, it
becomes a self-appointed censor, or permits the appellant to put into effect a virtual fiat of previous censorship which is
constitutionally unwarranted. As we weigh these considerations in one equation and in the spirit of liberality with which the Rules of
Court are to be interpreted in order to promote their object (section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court) which, in the instant case, is
to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rights and duties under a law we can see in the present
case any imposition upon our jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity in our intervention.

The appellant, we apprehend, underrates the force and binding effect of the ruling we hand down in this case if he believes that it will
not have the final and pacifying function that a declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. At the very least, the appellant will be
bound. But more than this, he obviously overlooks that in this jurisdiction, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall
form a part of the legal system" (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect, judicial decisions assume the same authority as the
statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must
control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto.
Accordingly, we entertain no misgivings that our resolution of this case will terminate the controversy at hand.

It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not without precedent. In Liberty
Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in promotional advertising was advised by the
county prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales promotion were
conducted, the corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to maintain a
declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales promotion plan. In pari materia, see
also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d., 207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs. Scott, 15 N.J. Super.
124, 82 A. 2d., 903.

In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory relief.

2. The Postal Law, chapter 52 of the Revised Administrative Code, using almost identical terminology in sections 1954(a), 1982 and
1983 thereof, supra, condemns as absolutely non-mailable, and empowers the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders against, or
otherwise deny the use of the facilities of the postal service to, any information concerning "any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for
the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind". Upon these words hinges the
resolution of the second issue posed in this appeal.

Happily, this is not an altogether untrodden judicial path. As early as in 1922, in "El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, 44 Phil., 278, 283-284,
which significantly dwelt on the power of the postal authorities under the abovementioned provisions of the Postal Law, this Court
declared that

While countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one for this jurisdiction is that of the United
States Supreme Court, in analogous cases having to do with the power of the United States Postmaster General, viz.: The
term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize
concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First,
consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. (Horner vs. States [1892], 147 U.S. 449; Public Clearing House vs. Coyne
[1903], 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson [1915], 30 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker [1917], 36 Phil., 395; U.S.
vs. Baguio [1919], 39 Phil., 962; Valhalla Hotel Construction Company vs. Carmona, p. 233, ante.)

Unanimity there is in all quarters, and we agree, that the elements of prize and chance are too obvious in the disputed scheme to be the
subject of contention. Consequently as the appellant himself concedes, the field of inquiry is narrowed down to the existence of the
element of consideration therein. Respecting this matter, our task is considerably lightened inasmuch as in the same case just cited,
this Court has laid down a definitive yard-stick in the following terms

In respect to the last element of consideration, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if
no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but does condemn as criminal schemes
in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.

Reverting to the rules of the proposed contest, we are struck by the clarity of the language in which the invitation to participate therein
is couched. Thus

No puzzles, no rhymes? You don't need wrappers, labels or boxtops? You don't have to buy anything? Simply estimate the
actual number of liter the Caltex gas pump with the hood at your favorite Caltex dealer will dispense from to , and win
valuable prizes . . . ." .

Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value
whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry
form which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Viewed from all angles or
turned inside out, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a lottery. Indeed, even as we head
the stern injunction, "look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies
which the law is seeking to prevent" ("El Debate", Inc. vs. Topacio, supra, p. 291), we find none. In our appraisal, the scheme does
not only appear to be, but actually is, a gratuitous distribution of property by chance.

There is no point to the appellant's insistence that non-Caltex customers who may buy Caltex products simply to win a prize would
actually be indirectly paying a consideration for the privilege to join the contest. Perhaps this would be tenable if the purchase of any
Caltex product or the use of any Caltex service were a pre-requisite to participation. But it is not. A contestant, it hardly needs
reiterating, does not have to buy anything or to give anything of value.1awphl.nt

Off-tangent, too, is the suggestion that the scheme, being admittedly for sales promotion, would naturally benefit the sponsor in the
way of increased patronage by those who will be encouraged to prefer Caltex products "if only to get the chance to draw a prize by
securing entry blanks". The required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the contest.
The true test, as laid down in People vs. Cardas, 28 P. 2d., 99, 137 Cal. App. (Supp.) 788, is whether the participant pays a valuable
consideration for the chance, and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution
of the prize. Perspective properly oriented, the standpoint of the contestant is all that matters, not that of the sponsor. The following,
culled from Corpus Juris Secundum, should set the matter at rest:

The fact that the holder of the drawing expects thereby to receive, or in fact does receive, some benefit in the way of
patronage or otherwise, as a result of the drawing; does not supply the element of consideration.Griffith Amusement Co. vs.
Morgan, Tex. Civ. App., 98 S.W., 2d., 844" (54 C.J.S., p. 849).

Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by the appellee is not a lottery
that may be administratively and adversely dealt with under the Postal Law.
But it may be asked: Is it not at least a "gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by
lot, chance, or drawing of any kind", which is equally prescribed? Incidentally, while the appellant's brief appears to have concentrated
on the issue of consideration, this aspect of the case cannot be avoided if the remedy here invoked is to achieve its tranquilizing effect
as an instrument of both curative and preventive justice. Recalling that the appellant's action was predicated, amongst other bases,
upon Opinion 217, Series 1953, of the Secretary of Justice, which opined in effect that a scheme, though not a lottery for want of
consideration, may nevertheless be a gift enterprise in which that element is not essential, the determination of whether or not the
proposed contest wanting in consideration as we have found it to be is a prohibited gift enterprise, cannot be passed over sub
silencio.

While an all-embracing concept of the term "gift enterprise" is yet to be spelled out in explicit words, there appears to be a consensus
among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold
for their market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize (54 C.J.S., 850; 34 Am. Jur., 654;
Black, Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 817; Ballantine, Law Dictionary with Pronunciations, 2nd ed., p. 55; Retail Section of Chamber of
Commerce of Plattsmouth vs. Kieck, 257 N.W., 493, 128 Neb. 13; Barker vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 56 Ga. App., 705; Bell vs. State, 37
Tenn. 507, 509, 5 Sneed, 507, 509). As thus conceived, the term clearly cannot embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is
no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified
contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.

Going a step farther, however, and assuming that the appellee's contest can be encompassed within the broadest sweep that the term
"gift enterprise" is capable of being extended, we think that the appellant's pose will gain no added comfort. As stated in the opinion
relied upon, rulings there are indeed holding that a gift enterprise involving an award by chance, even in default of the element of
consideration necessary to constitute a lottery, is prohibited (E.g.: Crimes vs. States, 235 Ala 192, 178 So. 73; Russell vs. Equitable
Loan & Sec. Co., 129 Ga. 154, 58 S.E., 88; State ex rel. Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, 132 P. 2d., 689, 694, 698,
114 Mont. 52). But this is only one side of the coin. Equally impressive authorities declare that, like a lottery, a gift enterprise comes
within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize, chance and consideration (E.g.: Bills vs. People, 157 P.
2d., 139, 142, 113 Colo., 326; D'Orio vs. Jacobs, 275 P. 563, 565, 151 Wash., 297; People vs. Psallis, 12 N.Y.S., 2d., 796; City and
County of Denver vs. Frueauff, 88 P., 389, 394, 39 Colo., 20, 7 L.R.A., N.S., 1131, 12 Ann. Cas., 521; 54 C.J.S., 851, citing: Barker
vs. State, 193 S.E., 605, 607, 56 Ga. App., 705; 18 Words and Phrases, perm. ed., pp. 590-594). The apparent conflict of opinions is
explained by the fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. In some cases, as pointed out in 54 C.J.S., 851,
the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise" are used interchangeably (Bills vs. People, supra); in others, the necessity for the element of
consideration or chance has been specifically eliminated by statute. (54 C.J.S., 351-352, citing Barker vs. State,supra; State ex rel.
Stafford vs. Fox-Great Falls Theater Corporation, supra). The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is,
therefore, that every case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision.

Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in association with the word "lottery". With the meaning
of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis which Opinion 217 aforesaid
also relied upon although only insofar as the element of chance is concerned it is only logical that the term under a construction
should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is
prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the
law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.

This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law, resort to the determination thereof being an
accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a
medium for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift
enterprises and similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit
and to corrupt public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208). Since in gambling it is inherent that something of
value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that where no consideration is paid by the contestant to
participate, the reason behind the law can hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has been held

Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute "lottery", if it is not resorted to as a device to evade
the law and no consideration is derived, directly or indirectly, from the party receiving the chance, gambling spirit not being
cultivated or stimulated thereby. City of Roswell vs. Jones, 67 P. 2d., 286, 41 N.M., 258." (25 Words and Phrases, perm. ed.,
p. 695, emphasis supplied).

we find no obstacle in saying the same respecting a gift enterprise. In the end, we are persuaded to hold that, under the prohibitive
provisions of the Postal Law which we have heretofore examined, gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are
condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Finding none in the contest here in question, we rule
that the appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.

Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, and that the "Caltex Hooded
Pump Contest" as described in the rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970

AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Amelito R. Mutuc in his own behalf.

Romulo C. Felizmena for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:

The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
in this special civil action for prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of respondent Commission on Elections enjoining the use of
a taped jingle for campaign purposes, was not in vain. Nor could it be considering the conceded absence of any express power granted
to respondent by the Constitutional Convention Act to so require and the bar to any such implication arising from any provision found
therein, if deference be paid to the principle that a statute is to be construed consistently with the fundamental law, which accords the
utmost priority to freedom of expression, much more so when utilized for electoral purposes. On November 3, 1970, the very same
day the case was orally argued, five days after its filing, with the election barely a week away, we issued a minute resolution granting
the writ of prohibition prayed for. This opinion is intended to explain more fully our decision.

In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970, petitioner, after setting forth his being a resident of Arayat,
Pampanga, and his candidacy for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention, alleged that respondent Commission on
Elections, by a telegram sent to him five days previously, informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but
prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers, an order which, according to
him, is "violative of [his] constitutional right ... to freedom of speech." 1 There being no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according
to petitioner, he would seek a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction. On the very next day, this
Court adopted a resolution requiring respondent Commission on Elections to file an answer not later than November 2, 1970, at the
same time setting the case for hearing for Tuesday November 3, 1970. No preliminary injunction was issued. There was no denial in
the answer filed by respondent on November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set forth in the petition, but the justification for the
prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, 2which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase,
produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature),
flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign
origin." 3It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a
tangible propaganda material, under the above statute subject to confiscation. It prayed that the petition be denied for lack of merit.
The case was argued, on November 3, 1970, with petitioner appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C. Felizmena arguing in
behalf of respondent.

This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency, the election being barely a week away, issued on the
afternoon of the same day, a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition, setting forth the absence of statutory authority on the
part of respondent to impose such a ban in the light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis as well as the principle that the construction
placed on the statute by respondent Commission on Elections would raise serious doubts about its validity, considering the
infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner. Its concluding portion was worded thus: "Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent
Commission on Elections is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its
aforesaid order banning the use of political jingles by candidates. This resolution is immediately executory." 4
1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question before us was one of power. Respondent Commission on
Elections was called upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on petitioner. To repeat, no such authority was granted by the
Constitutional Convention Act. It did contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of
electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas,
shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words "and the like." 5 For respondent Commission, the last three words
sufficed to justify such an order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under the well-known
principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as
those specifically referred to. 6 It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind
referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.

The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent Commission was its failure to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle
of construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional
command or prescription. 7 Thus, certain Administrative Code provisions were given a "construction which should be more in
harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law." 8 The desirability of removing in that fashion the taint of constitutional infirmity
from legislative enactments has always commended itself. The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning of words to avert any
collision between what a statute provides and what the Constitution requires. The objective is to reach an interpretation rendering it
free from constitutional defects. To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the conclusion reached must avoid not only that it is
unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score. 9

2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has in its favor obeisance to such a cardinal precept. The view advanced
by him that if the above provision of the Constitutional Convention Act were to lend itself to the view that the use of the taped jingle
could be prohibited, then the challenge of unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For, in unequivocal language, the
Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding that this preferred freedom calls
all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the
equally vital right of suffrage. What respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against
which this constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify its action by the assertion that petitioner, if he
would not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the
constitutional guarantee is not to be emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by
him through tape or other mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent Commission, then the effect would hardly
be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in express
terms assures. 10

3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act
whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest
fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments
of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its
authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what
it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what
is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in
the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any
governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law.

To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent Commission was aptly summed up by the present Chief Justice thus:
"Lastly, as the branch of the executive department although independent of the President to which the Constitution has given the
'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of decision of the
Commission is limited to purely 'administrative questions.'"11 It has been the constant holding of this Court, as it could not have been
otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law
than the Constitution. 12 Our decisions which liberally construe its powers are precisely inspired by the thought that only thus may its
responsibility under the Constitution to insure free, orderly and honest elections be adequately fulfilled. 13 There could be no
justification then for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to
nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech. Petitioner's case, as was obvious from the time of its filing, stood on solid footing.

WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3, 1970, respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited
from enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political taped jingles. Without
pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer 1 on the unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions of the 1971
Constitutional Convention Act, I concur with the views of Mr. Justice Fernando in the main opinion that "there could be no
justification .... for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to
nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech." I would only add the following observations:

This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test of reasonableness required by the due process clause of our
Constitution. Originally, respondent Commission in its guidelines prescribed summarily that the use by a candidate of a "mobile unit
roaming around and announcing a meeting and the name of the candidate ... is prohibited. If it is used only for a certain place for a
meeting and he uses his sound system at the meeting itself, there is no violation." 2Acting upon petitioner's application, however,
respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a sound system by anyone be he a candidate or not whether stationary or part of a
mobile unit is not prohibited by the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act" but imposed the condition "provided that there are no
jingles and no streamers or posters placed in carriers."

Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle,' a verbally recorded form of election propaganda, is no different
from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster,' a printed form of election propaganda, and both forms of election advertisement fall under the
prohibition contained in sec. 12 of R.A. 6132," and "the record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been recorded can be subject of
confiscation by the respondent Commission under par. (E) of sec. 12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern day and age of the electronically
recorded or taped voice which may be easily and inexpensively disseminated through a mobile sound system throughout the
candidate's district, respondent Commission would outlaw "recorded or taped voices" and would exact of the candidate that he make
use of the mobile sound system only by personal transmission and repeatedly personally sing his "jingle" or deliver his spoken
message to the voters even if he loses his voice in the process or employ another person to do so personally even if this should prove
more expensive and less effective than using a recorded or taped voice.

Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore, petitioner's basic freedom of speech and expression. They cannot pass
the constitutional test of reasonableness in that they go far beyond a reasonable relation to the proper governmental object and are
manifestly unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary.

Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the mobile unit or carrier is concerned, respondent Commission's
adverse ruling that the same falls within the prohibition of section 12, paragraphs (C) and (E) has not been appealed by petitioner. I
would note that respondent Commission's premise that "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster' "in
that these both represent forms of election advertisements to make the candidate and the fact of his candidacy known to the voters
is correct, but its conclusion is not. The campaign appeal of the "jingle" is through the voters' ears while that of the "streamers" is
through the voters' eyes. But if it be held that the Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges unreasonably, oppressively and arbitrarily
the candidate's right of free expression, even though such "jingles" may occasionally offend some sensitive ears, the Commission's ban
on "streamers" being placed on the candidate's mobile unit or carrier, which "streamers" are less likely to offend the voters' sense of
sight should likewise be held to be an unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of the candidate's same constitutional right.

The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondent Commission, laudable as it may be, should not be
sought at the cost of the candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit of his candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the strict and
effective implementation of the Act's limitation in section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate or by
another person with his knowledge and consent.

# Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer 1 on the unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions of the 1971
Constitutional Convention Act, I concur with the views of Mr. Justice Fernando in the main opinion that "there could be no
justification .... for lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to
nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech." I would only add the following observations:

This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test of reasonableness required by the due process clause of our
Constitution. Originally, respondent Commission in its guidelines prescribed summarily that the use by a candidate of a "mobile unit
roaming around and announcing a meeting and the name of the candidate ... is prohibited. If it is used only for a certain place for a
meeting and he uses his sound system at the meeting itself, there is no violation." 2Acting upon petitioner's application, however,
respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a sound system by anyone be he a candidate or not whether stationary or part of a
mobile unit is not prohibited by the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act" but imposed the condition "provided that there are no
jingles and no streamers or posters placed in carriers."

Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle,' a verbally recorded form of election propaganda, is no different
from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster,' a printed form of election propaganda, and both forms of election advertisement fall under the
prohibition contained in sec. 12 of R.A. 6132," and "the record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been recorded can be subject of
confiscation by the respondent Commission under par. (E) of sec. 12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern day and age of the electronically
recorded or taped voice which may be easily and inexpensively disseminated through a mobile sound system throughout the
candidate's district, respondent Commission would outlaw "recorded or taped voices" and would exact of the candidate that he make
use of the mobile sound system only by personal transmission and repeatedly personally sing his "jingle" or deliver his spoken
message to the voters even if he loses his voice in the process or employ another person to do so personally even if this should prove
more expensive and less effective than using a recorded or taped voice.

Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore, petitioner's basic freedom of speech and expression. They cannot pass
the constitutional test of reasonableness in that they go far beyond a reasonable relation to the proper governmental object and are
manifestly unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary.

Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the mobile unit or carrier is concerned, respondent Commission's
adverse ruling that the same falls within the prohibition of section 12, paragraphs (C) and (E) has not been appealed by petitioner. I
would note that respondent Commission's premise that "the use of a 'jingle' ... is no different from the use of a 'streamer' or 'poster' "in
that these both represent forms of election advertisements to make the candidate and the fact of his candidacy known to the voters
is correct, but its conclusion is not. The campaign appeal of the "jingle" is through the voters' ears while that of the "streamers" is
through the voters' eyes. But if it be held that the Commission's ban on "jingles" abridges unreasonably, oppressively and arbitrarily
the candidate's right of free expression, even though such "jingles" may occasionally offend some sensitive ears, the Commission's ban
on "streamers" being placed on the candidate's mobile unit or carrier, which "streamers" are less likely to offend the voters' sense of
sight should likewise be held to be an unreasonable, oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of the candidate's same constitutional right.

The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by respondent Commission, laudable as it may be, should not be
sought at the cost of the candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit of his candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the strict and
effective implementation of the Act's limitation in section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by a candidate or by
another person with his knowledge and consent.

# Footnotes

1 Petition, paragraphs 1 to 5.

2 Republic Act No. 6132 (1970).

3 Section 12 (E), Ibid.

4 Resolution of Nov. 3, 1970.

5 Section 12(E), Constitutional Convention Act.

6 Cf. United States v. Santo Nino, 13 Phil. 141 (1909); Go Tiaoco y Hermanos v. Union Insurance Society of
Canton, 40 Phil. 40 (1919); People vs. Kottinger 45 Phil. 352 (1923); Cornejo v. Naval, 54 Phil. 809 (1930); Ollada
v. Court of Tax Appeals, 99 Phil. 605 (1956); Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security
Commission, L-15045, Jan. 20, 1961, 1 SCRA 10.

7 Cf. Herras Teehankee v. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945); Manila Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Employees
Association, 79 Phil. 409 (1947); Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949); Guido v. Rural Progress
Administration, 84 Phil. 847 (1949); City of Manila v. Arellano Law Colleges, 85 Phil. 663 (1950); Ongsiako v.
Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 (1950); Radiowealth v. Agregado, 86 Phil. 429 (1950); Sanchez v. Harry Lyons Construction,
Inc., 87 Phil. 532 (1950); American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957); Gonzales v. Hechanova,
L-21897, Oct. 22, 1963, 9 SCRA 230; Automotive Parts and Equipment Co., Inc. v. Lingad, L-26406, Oct. 31,
1969, 30 SCRA 248; J. M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, L-21064, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA
413.

8 Radiowealth v. Agregado, 86 Phil. 429 (1950).

9 Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Ross, 289 US 373 (1933).

10 Cf. Saia v. People of the State of New York, 334 US 558 (1948).

11 Abcede v. Hon. Imperial, 103 Phil. 136 (1958). The portion of the opinion from which the above excerpt is taken
reads in full: 'Lastly, as the branch of the executive department although independent of the President to which
the Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely 'administrative questions.'
(Article X, sec. 2, Constitution of the Philippines) It has no authority to decide matters 'involving the right to vote.' It
may not even pass upon the legality of a given vote (Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, 47 Off. Gaz.,
[6], 2851). We do not see, therefore, how it could assert the greater and more far-reaching authority to determine
who among those possessing the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, who have complied with the
procedural requirements, relative to the filing of certificate of candidacy should be allowed to enjoy the full
benefits intended by law therefore. The question whether in order to enjoy those benefits a candidate must be
capable of 'understanding the full meaning of his acts and the true significance of election,' and must have over a
month prior to the elections (when the resolution complained of was issued) 'the tiniest chance to obtain the
favorable indorsement of a substantial portion of the electorate, is a matter of policy, not of administration and
enforcement of the law which policy must be determined by Congress in the exercise of its legislative functions.
Apart from the absence of specific statutory grant of such general, broad power as the Commission claims to have, it
is dubious whether, if so granted in the vague, abstract, indeterminate and undefined manner necessary in order
that it could pass upon the factors relied upon in said resolution (and such grant must not be deemed made, in the
absence of clear and positive provision to such effect, which is absent in the case at bar) the legislative enactment
would not amount to undue delegation of legislative power. (Schechter vs. U.S., 295 US 495, 79 L. ed. 1570.)" pp.
141-142.

12 Cf. Cortez v. Commission on Elections, 79 Phil. 352 (1947); Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, 85
Phil. 149 (1949); Guevara v. Commission on Elections, 104 Phil. 268 (1958); Masangcay v. Commission on
Elections, L-13827, Sept. 28, 1962, 6 SCRA 27; Lawsin v. Escalona, L-22540, July 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 643;
Ututalum v. Commission on Elections,
L-25349, Dec. 3, 1965, 15 SCRA 465; Janairo v. Commission on Elections, L-28315, Dec. 8, 1967, 21 SCRA 1173;
Abes v. Commission on Elections, L-28348, Dec. 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 1252; Ibuna v. Commission on Elections,
L-28328, Dec. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 1457; Binging Ho v. Mun. Board of Canvassers,
L-29051, July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 829.

13 Cf. Cauton v. Commission on Elections, L-25467, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 911. The other cases are Espino v.
Zaldivar, L-22325, Dec. 11, 1967, 21 SCRA 1204; Ong v. Commission on Elections, L-28415, Jan. 29, 1968, 22
SCRA 241; Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, L-28517, Feb. 21, 1968, 22 SCRA 662; Pedido v. Commission on
Elections, L-28539, March 30, 1968, 22 SCRA 1403; Aguam v. Commission on Elections, L-28955, May 28, 1968,
23 SCRA 883; Pelayo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, L-28869, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1374; Pacis v.
Commission on Elections, L-29026, Sept. 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 377; Ligot v. Commission on Elections, L-31380,
Jan. 21, 1970, 31 SCRA 45; Abrigo v. Commission on Elections, L-31374, Jan. 21, 1970, 31 SCRA 27; Moore v.
Commission on Elections, L-31394, Jan. 23, 1970, 31 SCRA 60; Ilarde v. Commission on Elections, L-31446, Jan.
23, 1970, 31 SCRA 72; Sinsuat v. Pendatun,
L-31501, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 630.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

 1 L-32546 & 32551, Oct. 17, 1970, re: sections 8(A) and 12(F) and other related provisions.

2 Petition, page 9.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-
appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the appointment to and holding of
the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The
undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as
follows: That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully
and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial
number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the
corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May
counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to
possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm
without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question
the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly
specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm."

Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked
the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the
information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license
or permit thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor."
Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused
admits."

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented
four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June
2, 1962;1 another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay
and Quezon City on a confidential mission; 2 the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963,
to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste. 4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the
above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such
of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties
were given time to file their respective memoranda.1wph1.t
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and
ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the Government."

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm,
detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to
officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment
of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers,
municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such
officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties." 6

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first
and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them." 7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.

Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the
appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes,
sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by
section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a
statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer
speaks with authority.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3629 March 19, 1951

ELISEO SILVA, petitioner,

vs.
BELEN CABRERA, respondent.

Rivera, Castao, Medina and Lozada and Roman Cruz for petitioner.
Evaristo R. Sandoval for respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

In the Public Service Commission Belen Cabrera filed an application for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain, and
operate in the City of Lipa, an ice plant with a 15-ton daily productive capacity and to sell the produce of said plant in several
municipalities of Batangas province as well as in the City of Lipa. Eliseo Silva and Opulencia & Lat, holdres of certificates of public
convenience to operate each a 15-ton ice plant, opposed the application on the ground that their service was adequate for the needs of
the public, and that public convenience did not require the operation of the ice plant applied for by Cabrera. Instead of the
Commission conducting the corresponding hearing in order to receive the evidence to be presented by applicant and oppositors,
Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo by order dated July 14, 1949, commissioned Atty. Antonio H. Aspillera, Chief of the Legal Division
"to take the testimony of witnesses" in this case pursuant to the provisions of section 32 of Commonwealth Act No. 146 known as the
Public Act Attorney Aspillera conducted hearings, and received extensive evidence, oral and documentary, the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken consisting of 227 pages. Thereafter, the Commission in banc rendered a decision, the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:

In view of the foregoing, and finding from the evidence that public interests and convenience will be promoted in a proper
and suitable manner by authorizing the applicant to operate a 10-ton ice plant in Lipa City, and that applicant is a Filipino
citizen and is financially qualified to install and operate a 10-ton ice plant, the oppositions of Eliseo Silva and Opulencia &
 Lat are hereby overruled, and a certificate of public convenience to operate a 10-ton ice plant in the City of Lipa is hereby
granted to the applicant herein, Belen Cabrera, the said certificate to be subject to the following.

Eliseo Silva, one of the oppositors filed the present petition for review assigning two errors, to wit:

ERROR I. That section 3 prohibits a hearing before any person other than a Commissioner in contested cases;
consequently, the delegation made by the Commission to Attorney Aspillera is illegal and contrary to law.

ERROR II. That the decision is not supported by evidence to warrant the Grant of the certificate to applicant-respondent
Belen Cabrera.

We shall address ourselves to the first assigned error because the determination of the same disposes of this appeal. The legal point
raised in this assignment of error was also raised before the Commission. At the beginning of the hearing before Attorney Aspillera,
counsel for oppositors, Silva, now petitioner, asked that the hearing be had before one of the Commissioners because it was a
contested case. When his petition was overruled, he made it of record that his continuing "with the hearing of this case shall not be
understood as a waiver of our objection" (t. s. n., p. 3). It is therefore clear that petitioner is not raising this issue here for the first time.

While petitioner Silva contends that the delegation made by the Commission to Attorney Aspillera to take the testimony of witnesses
was illegal and contrary to the provisions of section 3 of the Public Service Act as amended by Republic Act No. 178, respondent
equally claims that said delegation is perfectly proper and legal. It will be remembered that the delegation to receive testimony was
made under the provisions of section 32 of the Public Service Act (Com. Act No. 146). Said section reads as follows:

SEC. 32. The Commission may, in any investigation or hearing, by its order in writing, cause the depositions of witnesses
residing within or without the Philippines to be taken in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. The
Commission may also, by proper order, commission any of the attorneys of the Commission or chiefs of division to receive
evidence, and it may likewise commission any clerk the court of first instance of justice of the Peace of the Philippines to
take the testimony of the witnesses any case pending before the Commission where such witnesses reside in places distant
from Manila and it would be inconvenient and expensive for them to appear personally before the Commission. It shall be the
duty of the clerk of the Court of First Instance or justice of the peace so commissioned to designate promptly a date or dates
for the taking of such evidence, giving timely notice to the parties, and on such date to proceed to take the evidence, reducing
it to writing. After the evidence has been taken, the justice of the peace shall forthwith certify to the correctness of the
testimony of the witnesses and forward it to the Commission. It shall be the duty of the respective parties to furnish
stenographers for taking and transcribing the testimony taken. In case there was no stenographers available, the testimony
shall be taken in long-hand by such person as the justice of the peace may designate. For the convenience of the parties the
Commission may also commission any other person to take the evidence in the same manner.

For purpose of reference we are also reproducing the pertinent portion of section 3 of the same Act as amended by Republic Act No.
178, relied upon by the petitioner:

All the powers herein vested upon the Commission shall be considered vested upon any of the Commissioner, acting either
individually or jointly as hereinafter provided. The Commissioners shall equitably divide among themselves all pending cases
and those that may hereafter be submitted to the Commission, in such manner and from as they determine, and shall proceed
to hear and determine the cases assigned to each; Provided, however, That (1) all contested cases, (2) all cases involving the
fixing of rates, and (3) all petitions for reconsideration of orders or decisions shall be heard by the Commission in banc, and
the affirmative vote of at least two Commissioner shall be necessary for the promulgation of a decision or a non-interlocutory
order: And, provided, further, That in cases (1) and (2) the Commission may delegate thereception of the evidence to one of
the Commissioners, who shall report to the Commission in banc, the evidence so received by him to enable it to render its
decision. (Underlining is ours)

After examining the law, particularly the language used in section 3 and 32, above-quoted, we agree with the petitioner that the
delegation made to Attorney Aspillera especially considering the manner in which he received the evidence, was contrary to the
provisions of the public Service Act.

The law (sec. 3) is clear that in a contested case like the present, only the Commission in banc is authorized to conduct the hearing,
although said Commission may delegate the reception of the evidence to one of the Commissioners who shall report to the
Commission in banc, the evidence so received by him.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 146 before it was amended by Republic Act No. 178, the Public Service Commission only of a Public
Service Commissioner and a deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner acted only on matters delegated to him by the Public
Service Commissioner, and in case of the latter's absence, illness or incapacity, he acted in his stead. The Public Service
Commissioner alone heard and disposed of all cases, contested and non-contested. There could therefore be no hearing or decision in
banc. The Legislature in promulgating Commonwealth Act 146 evidently believed that one Commissioner, either the Public Service
Commissioner or his deputy if properly commissioned, was sufficient to hear and decide even contested cases and cases involving the
fixing of rates. Under said Commonwealth Act 146 before amendment, particularly section 32 thereof, the Commission besides
authorizing the taking of depositions and the testimonies of the witnesses by clerk of courts of first instance and justice of the peace in
the provinces, also authorized the reception of evidence by the Commission's attorneys and chiefs of divisions. Then came Republic
Act 178 amending sections 2 and 3 of Commonwealth Act 146 making the Commission to consist of one Public Service
Commissioners and two Associate Public Service Commissioner under the second section, and under section 3, as already seen from
the reproduction of said section, requiring that all contested cases involving the fixing of rates, he heard and decided by the three
Commissioners in banc although the reception of evidence may be delegated to one of the Commissioners alone. The inference is
obvious. In contested cases like present, the Legislature did not wish to entrust the holding of a hearing and the reception of evidence
to anyone but the three Commissioners acting in banc or one of them when properly authorized.

It is urged on the part of the respondent that the order of delegation in favor of Atty. Aspillera "was a mere authority `to take the
testimony of witnesses in the above-entitled case', which in fact is in the form of a deposition and not a reception of evidence, much
less a hearing" (p. 9, brief for respondent), and so does not violate section 3. An examination of the record does not support this
contention. What Atty. Aspillera did was to represent the Commission, act as a sort of Commissioner, conduct hearings, receive
evidence, oral and documentary, and pass upon petitions and objections as they came up in the course of said hearing. He even
addressed questions to the witnesses. He passed upon the competency and admissibility of exhibits and admitted them. In the
transcript of the stenographic notes, Atty. Aspillera is repeatedly referred to as the "Commission" and the proceedings had before him
on different dates as "hearings". (t. s. n. pp. 1, 3, 52, 62, 86, 90.) After the submission of the evidence Atty. Aspillera declared the
"Case submitted". (t. s. n. p. 227.) It is obvious that the evidence received by Atty. Aspillera were not mere depositions or testimonies,
and that his actuation that of a mere official like a justice of the peace receiving a deposition under the provisions of Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court. The role played by Atty. Aspillera was rather that of a Commissioner under Rule 34 wherein he acted as a
representative of the Commission that made the delegation to him, passed upon petitions and objections during the trial, either
overruling or sustaining the same and ordered witnesses to answer if the objection to the question was overruled, and then making his
findings and report to the body that commissioned him.

Respondent cites the case of Abel G. Flores, applicant vs. A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc., oppositor, case No. 27141 of the
Public Service Commission wherein the same point of the legality of a delegation to take testimony was involved. The oppositor in
that case believing that the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction in making the delegation, brought the case to this Supreme Court
under G.R. No. L-1637 but its petition for certiorari was dismissed for lack of merit. From this, respondent infers that even in
contested cases the reception of evidence may be delegated to a person other than one of the Commissioners. We have examined that
case and we find that the authority given there was not to receive evidence but to take a deposition and that the person delegated was a
justice of the peace. We quote a portion of the order of Associate Commissioner Gabriel P. Prieto in that case:

Es verdad que el articulo 3 de la Ley claramente dispone que en los asuntos contenciosos y en que envuelven la fijacion de
tarifas la Comision solo puede delegar la recepcion de lads pruebas a cualquiera de sus Comisionados. Pero tambien es cierto,
que la deposicion no una delegacion de la recepcion de las pruebas, porque al funcionario que la toma, la ley no le concede
las facultades del tribunal que ha ordenado dicha deposicion. En efecto, la Regla 18 de los Reglamentos que regula esta
actuacion, no autoriza al funcionario que toma la deposicion para resolver las cuestiones que surgen o se suscitan durante su
actuacion; no le faculta para hacer sus conclusiones de hecho o de derecho; ni le permite, siquiera, rendir informe o report de
todo lo actuado. Su unica ogligacion es certificar la declaracion tal como ha sido prestada por el deponente. El que toma la
deposicion no es como el arbitro o comisionado de que habla la Regla 34 de los Reglamentos, que actua por delegacion y
obra en representacion del tribunal que le ha nombrado.

It will readily be noticed from the portion of the order above-quoted that Commissioner Prieto admits that under section 3 as amended,
in contested cases and cases involving the fixing of rates, the Commission may delegate the reception of evidence only to one of the
Commissioners and to no one else.

The respondent also calls our attention to the case of Cebu Transit Co. Inc., vs. Jereza, (58 Phil., 760), wherein this court held that the
Commission was authorized to designate Commissioners for the purpose of receiving evidence, and that the law did not contain any
prohibition. That case is inapplicable for at that time in the year 1933 when the case was decided, Republic Act 178 had not yet been
promulgated, said Act having passed only in 1947.

In conclusion, we hold that under the provisions of section 3 of the Public Service Act as amended by Republic Act 178, the reception
of evidence in a contested case may be delegated only to one of the Commissioners and to no one else, it being understood that such
reception of evidence consists in conducting hearings, receiving evidence, oral and documentary, passing upon the relevancy and
competency of the same, ruling upon petitions and objections that come up in course of the hearings, and receiving and rejecting
evidence in accordance with said rulings. However, under section 32, of the same Act, even in contested cases or cases involving the
fixing of rates, any attorney of chief of division of the Commission, a clerk of court of Courts of First Instance, or a Justice of the
Peace, may be authorized to take depositions or receive the testimonies of witnesses, provided that the same is done under provisions
of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.

We realize that our present ruling will greatly handicap the Public Service Commission and slow down its tempo in the disposal of
contested cases and cases involving the fixing of rates, especially where the witnesses reside in the provinces; but where the law is
clear, neither this court nor the commission may on grounds of convenience, expediency or prompt dispatch of cases, disregard the
law or circumvent the same. The remedy lies with the Legislature if it could be convinced of the necessity of amending the law, and
persuaded to approve a suitable amendment.

Finding that the delegation of the reception of evidence in this case as well as the exercise of the authority so given, are in violation of
section 3 of the Public Service Act as amended, we set aside the order of delegation of July 14, 1949, and declare all the proceedings
had thereunder to be null and void. Setting aside the decision appealed from, let this case be returned to the Public Service
Commission so that evidence may be submitted by the parties in a hearings before the Commission in banc of before any of the
Commissioners if properly authorized, unless of course, said parties agree at said hearing or hearings to re-submit the evidence already
presented and taken down, with such modifications and under such conditions as they may agree upon, including such other evidence
which they may wish to present. There is no pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988

RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO DAOANG, petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY and AMANDA RAMOS-
AGONOY, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated 30 June 1971, rendered by the respondent judge * in Spec. Proc. No. 37
of Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos; Antero
Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy, petitioners", the dispositive part of which reads, as follows:

Wherefore, Court renders judgment declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to all
legitimate intents and purposes, the children by adoption of the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda R.
Agonoy and that the former be freed from legal obedience and maintenance by their respective parents, Miguel
Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos
and their family names 'Bonilla' and 'Marcos' be changed with "Agonoy", which is the family name of the
petitioners.

Successional rights of the children and that of their adopting parents shall be governed by the pertinent provisions of
the New Civil Code.

Let copy of this decision be furnished and entered into the records of the Local Civil Registry of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte, for its legal effects at the expense of the petitioners. 1

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The case, entitled: "In re Adoption of the
Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos, Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, petitioners", was docketed therein as Spec.
Proc. No. 37. 2
The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused to be served upon the office of the Solicitor General
and ordered published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in the province of Ilocos Norte, with
editorial offices in Laoag City. 3

On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein,
filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a
legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were
disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code. 4

After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was presented. Thereafter, the Municipal Court of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte rendred its decision, granting the petition for adoption. 5

Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners (oppositors in the lower court).

The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-
Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:

Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:

(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction;

xxx xxx xxx

In overruling the opposition of the herein petitioners, the respondents judge held that "to add grandchildren in this article where no
grandchil is included would violate to (sic) the legal maxim that what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not
included".

But, it is contended by the petitioners, citing the case of In re Adoption of Millendez, 6 that the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson
Marcos would not only introduce a foreign element into the family unit, but would result in the reduction of their legititimes. It would
also produce an indirect, permanent and irrevocable disinheritance which is contrary to the policy of the law that a subsequent
reconciliation between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to disinherit and renders ineffectual any
disinheritance that may have been made.

We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt,
are clear and unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the
respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.

Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted;
stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction. 7

Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines, obviously intended that only those persons who
have certain classes of children, are disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the Philippines, and
which served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Article 174, disqualified persons who have legitimate or
legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to
adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein. But, when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word
"descendants" was changed to "children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335.

Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have no child of their own the consolation
of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. 8 The
present tendency, however, is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities
for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective. 9 Under the law now in force, having
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to
adopt. 10

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is
AFFIRMED. Without pronouncement as to costs in this instance.