G.R. No.

L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358,
359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 5 99, 644, 658, 661, 718,
731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300,
1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204,
205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-
303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498,
501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882,
939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588,
1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751,
1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836,
1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-
1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544,
549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally
and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the
requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the
general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular
interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the
public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless,
"when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High,
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings
brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros
Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this
character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable
to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for
the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon
the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which
surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other
person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this
character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present
petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the
land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the
same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance
for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the
laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special
provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed
is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has
ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for
then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when
the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered
in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress
of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or
abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so
published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of
documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may
authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time
when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by
the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records
no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing
what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts
of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos,
Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall"
used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from
such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As
Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process
and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such
decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the
validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the
Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too
familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District
vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County,
118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the
effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular
conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and
acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination.
These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said
right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which
may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published
in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published.
10
Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject
matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs.
Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal]
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by
respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting
violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some
criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TA;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been
published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise
provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of
this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1 Specifically, they ask the
following questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which
are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should
therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the
publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and
that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting
these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the
supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the internal
administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have to be 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full
and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight
members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have
come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened
or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code
which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general
rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is that such omission would
offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide
that a law e effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to
comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed.
One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect
before they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been
published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights
recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed
especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a
relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public
although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member
of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid,
the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and
t to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever
the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules and regulations
must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly
affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a
favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published
if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in
petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the
wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As
correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts
(e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the
publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act
for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The
evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six
others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another
merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the present
membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited
readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating, the laws to the people as
such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of
publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil
Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been
published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our
function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political
departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under
Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their
effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2.
There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the
executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and
deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all the acts of the government
subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty
residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it
according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are
concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut
unless the naked blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be
published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 18081 March 3, 1922

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CHEONG BOO, deceased.

MORA ADONG, petitioner-appellant,
 vs.
CHEONG SENG GEE, opponent-appellant.

Kincaid, Perkins & Kincaid and P. J. Moore for petitioner-appellant.

Carlos A. Sobral for opponent-appellant.

MALCOLM, J.:

The two question presented for determination by these appeals may be framed as follows: Is a marriage contracted in China and proven
mainly by an alleged matrimonial letter, valid in the Philippines? Are the marriage performed in the Philippines according to the rites of the
Mohammedan religion valid? As the decision of the Supreme Court on the last point will affect marriages consummated by not less than one
hundred and fifty thousand Moros who profess the Mohammedan faith, the transcendental importance of the cause can be realized. We
proposed to give to the subject the serious consideration which it deserves.

Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on August 5, 1919. He left property worth nearly P100,000.
The estate of the deceased was claimed, on the one hand, by Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate child by a marriage
contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The estate was claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora Adong who alleged that she
had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands, and her daughters, Payang, married to Cheng Bian Chay, and
Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried.

The conflicting claims to the estate of Cheong Boo were ventilated in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. The trial judge, the
Honorable Quirico Abeto, after hearing the evidence presented by both sides, reached the conclusion, with reference to the allegations of
Cheong Seng Gee, that the proof did not sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage, but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to
the Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural child. With reference to the allegations of the Mora
Adong and her daughters Payang and Rosalia, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage between the Mora Adong and the
deceased had been adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage;
accordingly, the daughters Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The order of the trial judge, following these conclusions, was
that there should be a partition of the property of the deceased Cheong Boo between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and
Rosalia.

From the judgment of the Judge of First Instance both parties perfected appeals. As to the facts, we can say that we agree in substance with the
findings of the trial court. As to the legal issues submitted for decision by the numerous assignments of error, these can best be resolved under
two heads, namely: (1) The validity of the Chinese marriage; and (2) the validity of the Mohammedan marriage.

1. Validity of the Chinese Marriage

The theory advanced on behalf of the claimant Cheong Seng Gee was that Cheong Boo was married in the city of Amoy, China, during the
second moon of the twenty-first year of the Emperor Quang Su, or, according to the modern count, on February 16, 1985, to a young lady
named Tan Dit. Witnesses were presented who testified to having been present at the marriage ceremony. There was also introduced in
evidence a document in Chinese which in translation reads as follows:

One hundred years ofYour

life nephew, Tan Chao, respecfully answers the venerable Chiong Ing,
and health for both. father of the bridegroom, accepting his offer of marriage, and let this
document serve as proof of the acceptance of said marriage which is to be
celebrated during the merry season of the flowers.

I take advantage of this occasion to wish for your and the spouses much
happiness, a long life, and prolific issue, as noble and great as that which
you brought forth. I consider the marriage of your son Boo with my sister
Lit Chia as a mandate of God and I hope that they treat each other with
great love and mutual courtesy and that both they and their parents be very
happy.

Given during the second moon of the twenty-first year of the reign of the
Emperor Quang Su.

Cheong Boo is said to have remained in China for one year and four months after his marriage during which time there was born to him and
his wife a child named Cheong Seng Gee. Cheong Boo then left China for the Philippine Islands and sometime thereafter took to himself a
concubine Mora by whom he had two children. In 1910, Cheong Boo was followed to the Philippines by Cheong Seng Gee who, as appears
from documents presented in evidence, was permitted to land in the Philippine Islands as the son of Cheong Boo. The deceased, however,
never returned to his native hearth and seems never to have corresponded with his Chinese wife or to have had any further relations with her
except once when he sent her P10.

The trial judge found, as we have said, that the proof did not sustain the allegation of the claimant Cheong Seng Gee, that Cheong Boo had
married in China. His Honor noted a strong inclination on the part of the Chinese witnesses, especially the brother of Cheong Boo, to protect
the interests of the alleged son, Cheong Seng Gee, by overstepping the limits of truthfulness. His Honor also noted that reliable witnesses
stated that in the year 1895, when Cheong Boo was supposed to have been in China, he was in reality in Jolo, in the Philippine Islands. We are
not disposed to disturb this appreciation of fact by the trial court. The immigration documents only go to show the relation of parent and child
existing between the deceased Cheong Boo and his son Cheong Seng Gee and do not establish the marriage between the deceased and the
mother of Cheong Seng Gee.

Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that "All marriages contracted without these Islands, which would be valid
by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these Islands." To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this
comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is
then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.

As a case directly in point is the leading one of Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion ([1910]), 16 Phil., 137; [1913], 228 U.S., 335). Here, the courts
of the Philippines and the Supreme Court of the United States were called upon to decide, as to the conflicting claims to the estate of a
Chinese merchant, between the descendants of an alleged Chinese marriage and the descendants of an alleged Philippine marriage. The
Supreme Courts of the Philippine Islands and the United States united in holding that the Chinese marriage was not adequately proved. The
legal rule was stated by the United States Supreme Court to be this: A Philippine marriage, followed by forty years of uninterrupted marital
life, should not be impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband and administration of his estate, though an alleged prior Chinese
marriage, "save upon proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment." Another
case in the same category is that of Son Cui vs. Guepangco ([1912], 22 Phil., 216).

In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. As
in the Encarnacion case, there is lacking proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the
alleged prior Chinese marriage. Substitute twenty-three years for forty years and the two cases are the same.

The lower court allowed the claimant, Cheong Seng Gee, the testamentary rights of an acknowledged natural child. This finding finds some
support in Exhibit 3, the affidavit of Cheong Boo before the American Vice-Consul at Sandakan, British North Borneo. But we are not called
upon to make a pronouncement on the question, because the oppositor-appellant indicates silent acquiescence by assigning no error.

2. Validity of the Mohammedan Marriage

The biographical data relating to the Philippine odyssey of the Chinaman Cheong Boo is fairly complete. He appears to have first landed on
Philippine soil sometime prior to the year 1896. At least, in the year las mentioned, we find him in Basilan, Philippine Islands. There he was
married to the Mora Adong according to the ceremonies prescribed by the book on marriage of the Koran, by the Mohammedan Iman (priest)
Habubakar. That a marriage ceremony took place is established by one of the parties to the marriage, the Mora Adong, by the Iman who
solemnized the marriage, and by other eyewitnesses, one of whom was the father of the bride, and another, the chief of the rancheria, now a
municipal councilor. The groom complied with Quranic law by giving to the bride a dowry of P250 in money and P250 in goods.

The religious rites began with the bride and groom seating themselves in the house of the father of the bride, Marahadja Sahibil. The Iman
read from the Koran. Then the Iman asked the parents if they had any objection to the marriage. The marital act was consummated by the
groom entering the woman's mosquito net.

From the marriage day until the death of Cheong Boo, twenty-three years later, the Chinaman and the Mora Adong cohabited as husband and
wife. To them were born five children, two of whom, Payang and Rosalia, are living. Both in his relations with Mora Adong and with third
persons during his lifetime, Cheong Boo treated Adong as his lawful wife. He admitted this relationship in several private and public
documents. Thus, when different legal documents were executed, including decrees of registration, Cheong Boo stated that he was married to
the Mora Adong while as late as 1918, he gave written consent to the marriage of his minor daughter, Payang.

Notwithstanding the insinuation of counsel for the Chinese appellant that the custom is prevalent among the Moros to favor in their testimony,
a relative or friend, especially when they do not swear on the Koran to tell the truth, it seems to us that proof could not be more convincing of
the fact that a marriage was contracted by the Chinaman Cheong Boo and the Mora Adong, according to the ceremonies of the Mohammedan
religion.

It is next incumbent upon us to approach the principal question which we announced in the very beginning of this decision, namely, Are the
marriages performed in the Philippines according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion valid? Three sections of the Marriage Law
(General Order No. 68) must be taken into consideration.

Section V of the Marriage Law provides that "Marriage may be solemnized by either a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court,
justice of the peace, or priest or minister of the Gospel of any denomination . . ." Counsel, failing to take account of the word "priest," and
only considering the phrase "minister of the Gospel of any denomination" would limit the meaning of this clause to ministers of the Christian
religion. We believe this is a strained interpretation. "Priest," according to the lexicographers, means one especially consecrated to the service
of a divinity and considered as the medium through whom worship, prayer, sacrifice, or other service is to be offered to the being worshipped,
and pardon, blessing, deliverance, etc., obtained by the worshipper, as a priest of Baal or of Jehovah; a Buddhist priest. "Minister of the
Gospel" means all clergymen of every denomination and faith. A "denomination" is a religious sect having a particular name. (Haggin vs.
Haggin [1892], 35 Neb., 375; In re Reinhart, 9 O. Dec., 441; Hale vs. Everett [1868], 53 N. H. 9.) A Mohammedan Iman is a "priest or
minister of the Gospel," and Mohammedanism is a "denomination," within the meaning of the Marriage Law.

The following section of the Marriage Law, No. VI, provides that "No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties
must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife." The law is quite correct
in affirming that no precise ceremonial is indispensable requisite for the creation of the marriage contract. The two essentials of a valid
marriage are capacity and consent. The latter element may be inferred from the ceremony performed, the acts of the parties, and habit or
repute. In this instance, there is no question of capacity. Nor do we think there can exist any doubt as to consent. While it is true that during
the Mohammedan ceremony, the remarks of the priest were addressed more to the elders than to the participants, it is likewise true that the
Chinaman and the Mora woman did in fact take each other to be husband and wife and did thereafter live together as husband and wife.
(Travers vs. Reinhardt [1907], 205 U.S., 423.

It would be possible to leave out of view altogether the two sections of the Marriage Law which have just been quoted and discussed. The
particular portion of the law which, in our opinion, is controlling, is section IX, reading as follows: "No marriage heretofore solemnized
before any person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority or on account of any informality,
irregularity, or omission, if it was celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that they have been
lawfully married."

The trial judge in construing this provision of law said that he did not believe that the legislative intention in promulgating it was to validate
marriages celebrated between Mohammedans. To quote the judge:

This provisions relates to marriages contracted by virtue of the provisions of the Spanish law before revolutionary authorized to solemnized
marriages, and it is not to be presumed that the legislator intended by this law to validate void marriages celebrated during the Spanish
sovereignty contrary to the laws which then governed.

What authority there is for this statement, we cannot conceive. To our mind, nothing could be clearer than the language used in section IX.
Note for a moment the all embracing words found in this section:

"No marriage" Could more inclusive words be found? "Heretofore solemnized" Could any other construction than that of retrospective
force be given to this phrase? "Before any person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority" Could
stronger language than this be invoked to announce legislative intention? "Or on account of any informality, irregularity, or omission"
Could the legislative mind frame an idea which would more effectively guard the marriage relation against technicality? "If it was celebrated
with the belief of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that they have been lawfully married" What was the purpose of the
legislator here, if it was not to legalize the marriage, if it was celebrated by any person who thought that he had authority to perform the same,
and if either of the parties thought that they had been married? Is there any word or hint of any word which would restrict the curative
provisions of section IX of the Marriage Law to Christian marriages? By what system of mental gymnastics would it be possible to evolve
from such precise language the curious idea that it was restricted to marriages performed under the Spanish law before the revolutionary
authorities?

In view of the importance of the question, we do not desire to stop here but would ascertain from other sources the meaning and scope of
Section IX of General Order No. 68.

The purpose of the government toward the Mohammedan population of the Philippines has, time and again, been announced by treaty, organic
law, statutory law, and executive proclamation. The Treaty of Paris in its article X, provided that "The inhabitants of the territories over which
Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured Instructions to the Philippine Commission imposed on every branch of the
Government of the Philippine Islands the inviolable rule "that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed ... That no form of religion and no minister of religion shall be forced upon any community or upon any citizen of the
Islands; that, upon the other hand, no minister of religion shall be interfered with or molested in following his calling, and that the separation
between state and church shall be real, entire, and absolute." The notable state paper of President McKinley also enjoined the Commission, "to
bear in mind that the Government which they are establishing is designed . . . for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the
Philippine Islands" and that, therefore, "the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their
prejudices. . . . The Philippine Bill and the Jones Law reproduced the main constitutional provisions establishing religious toleration and
equality.

Executive and legislative policy both under Spain and the United States followed in the same path. For instance, in the Treaty of April 30,
1851, entered into by the Captain General of the Philippines and the Sultan of Sulu, the Spanish Government guaranteed "with all solemnity to
the Sultan and other inhabitants of Sulu the free exercise of their religion, with which it will not interfere in the slightest way, and it will also
respect their customs." (See further Decree of the Governor-General of January 14, 1881.) For instance, Act No. 2520 of the Philippine
Commission, section 3, provided that "Judges of the Court of First Instance and justices of the peace deciding civil cases in which the parties
are Mohammedans or pagans, when such action is deemed wise, may modify the application of the law of the Philippine Islands, except laws
of the United States applicable to the Philippine Islands, taking into account local laws and customs. . . ." (See further Act No. 787, sec. 13 [
j]; Act No. 1283, sec. 6 [b]; Act No. 114 of the Legislative Council amended and approved by the Philippine Commission; Cacho vs.
Government of the United States [1914], 28 Phil., 616.) Various responsible officials have so oft announced the purpose of the Government
not to interfere with the customs of the Moros, especially their religious customs, as to make quotation of the same superfluous.

The retrospective provisions of the Philippine Marriage Law undoubtedly were inspired by the governmental policy in the United States, with
regard to the marriages of the Indians, the Quakers, and the Mormons. The rule as to Indians marriages is, that a marriage between two Indians
entered into according to the customs and laws of the people at a place where such customs and laws are in force, must be recognized as a
valid marriage. The rule as to the Society of Quakers is, that they will be left to their own customs and that their marriages will be recognized
although they use no solemnization. The rule as to Mormon marriages is that the sealing ceremony entered into before a proper official by
members of that Church competent to contract marriage constitutes a valid marriage.

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but, it is
a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they
thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our
Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.:" (Sec. 334, No. 28.) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage. (U. S. vs. Villafuerte and Rabano [1905], 4
Phil., 476; Son Cui vs. Guepangco, supra; U.S. vs. Memoracion and Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633; Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)
Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. We can see
no substantial reason for denying to the legislative power the right to remove impediments to an effectual marriage. If the legislative power
can declare what shall be valid marriages, it can render valid, marriages which, when they took place, were against the law. Public policy
should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages. (Coghsen vs. Stonington [1822], 4
Conn, 209; Baity vs. Cranfill [1884], 91 N. C., 273.)

The courts can properly incline the scales of their decisions in favors of that solution which will mot effectively promote the public policy.
That is the true construction which will best carry legislative intention into effect. And here the consequences, entailed in holding that the
marriage of the Mora Adong and the deceased Cheong Boo, in conformity with the Mohammedan religion and Moro customs, was void,
would be far reaching in disastrous result. The last census shows that there are at least one hundred fifty thousand Moros who have been
married according to local custom. We then have it within our power either to nullify or to validate all of these marriages; either to make all of
the children born of these unions bastards or to make them legitimate; either to proclaim immorality or to sanction morality; either to block or
to advance settled governmental policy. Our duty is a obvious as the law is plain.

In moving toward our conclusion, we have not lost sight of the decisions of this court in the cases of United States vs. Tubban ([1915]), 29
Phil., 434) and United States vs. Verzola ([1916, 33 Phil., 285). We do not, however, believe these decisions to be controlling. In the first
place, these were criminal actions and two Justice dissented.. In the second place, in the Tubban case, the marriage in question was a tribal
marriage of the Kalingas, while in the Verzola case, the marriage had been performed during the Spanish regime by a lieutenant of the
Guardia Civil. In neither case, in deciding as to whether or not the accused should be given the benefit of the so-called unwritten law, was any
consideration given to the provisions of section IX of General Order No. 68. We are free to admit that, if necessary, we would unhesitatingly
revoke the doctrine announced in the two cases above mentioned.

We regard the evidence as producing a moral conviction of the existence of the Mohammedan marriage. We regard the provisions of section
IX of the Marriage law as validating marriages performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion.

There are other questions presented in the various assignments of error which it is unnecessary to decide. In resume, we find the Chinese
marriage not to be proved and that the Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a natural child, and we find the Mohammedan
marriage to be proved and to be valid, thus giving to the widow and the legitimate children of this union the rights accruing to them under the
law.

Judgment is reversed in part, and the case shall be returned to the lower court for a partition of the property in accordance with this decision,
and for further proceedings in accordance with law. Without special findings as to costs in this instance, it is so ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-38230 November 21, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BITDU, defendant-appellant.

E.A. Fernandez for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from the following decision of Judge A. Horilleno in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga:

There is no dispute between the prosecution and the defense as to the fact Mora Bitdu was married to Moro Halid before an Imam in Lamitan
of this Province of Zamboanga in accordance with Mohammedan rites more than twelve years ago, and that about seven months ago she was
also married to Moro Hajirol before a Hadji in accordance with Mohammedan customs.

It is therefore a fact admitted by both the prosecution and the defense that the accused contracted two marriages, one with Halid and another
with Hajirol. She claims, however, that the second marriage contracted by her with Hajirol took place after she had been divorced from her
first husband Halid in accordance with Mohammedan customs, said divorce having taken place before Datu Gavino Cuevas, of Isabela de
Basilan.

With this defense, two very important questions are raised before this court: first whether or not the alleged divorce took place in accordance
with Mohammedan customs, and second, assuming that the divorce took place in accordance with such customs, is such divorce legal?

With reference to the first question, two witnesses testified, one for the prosecution and the other for the defense. The first witness testified
that the divorce between Mohammedans in Mindanao may be obtained before any person designated and agreed upon by the parties. The
second testified that divorce, like any other act relative to marriage and separation of Mohammedan spouses, is obtained under certain
conditions, to wit, the interested parties or the spouses intending to secure a divorce select the person before whom the divorce is to take place,
and both parties are represented by persons designated by them:

Chapter IV, section 35 of the Koran says:

"35. And if you fear a breach between the two, then appoint a judge from his people and judge from her people; if they both desire agreement,
Allah will effect harmony between them; surely Allah is knowing; Aware."

The court is inclined to believe that the testimony of the witness for the defense on this question is more in harmony with the doctrines of the
Koran than that of the witness for the prosecution.

Now, has the defense established that the divorce took place in accordance with the commandments of the Koran? The defense presented no
evidence to show that the conditions prescribed by the Koran had been complied with by the parties when they obtained their divorce before
Datu Cuevas. Said divorce therefore between the defendant and Halid does not satisfy the conditions prescribed by the Koran and
consequently said divorce seems to be of doubtful religious validity.

However, even admitting that this divorce was secured in accordance with the conditions prescribed by Mohammedan doctrines, is such
divorce legal? The laws governing marriage and its incidents are moral in nature and as such they are laws relating to public policy. In the
Philippine Islands we have a law (Act No. 2710) enumerating the causes and the conditions under which divorce may be secured and granted.
Any divorce obtained in the Philippine Islands of causes and under conditions other than those enumerated in said law, would have no legal
effect. The habits and customs of a people, the dogmas and doctrines of a religion cannot be superior to or have precedence over laws relating
to public policy, because as stated above laws relating to marriage and its incidents are normal in nature and as such they affect public policy.

The court therefore is of the opinion that even if the divorce alleged by the defense was secured in conformity with Mohammedan doctrines,
such divorce cannot prevail against the Divorce Law of the Philippine Islands prescribing the causes and conditions under which divorce may
be obtained. In this case, as above demonstrated, the divorce in question has not been obtained in accordance with the law.

Examined from whatever angle, the divorce alleged by the defense cannot be accepted by this court for the reasons above set forth.

In view of the foregoing facts and considerations, we cannot escape the conclusion that the defendant herein contracted a second marriage
without her former marriage having been first dissolved.

In the consideration of this case, however, the court cannot but take into account that the defendant is a Mohammedan woman; and being a
follower of Mohammedan doctrines she no doubt contracted the second marriage honestly believing that in doing so she was not committing
any violation of the law, although of course her belief does not justify her act.

In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the defendant is only seventeen years of age and therefore in the opinion of the court it would
be more convenient for her to be sent to the Philippine Training School in Mandaluyong, Manila, (Rizal), it is ordered that the accused be sent
to said institution, to be kept there until she reaches the age of majority, all the proceedings in this case being hereby suspended.

The attorney for the defendant alleges that the lower court erred in finding that the accused committed the crime of bigamy, and in ordering
her to be sent to the Philippine Training School in Mandaluyong, Rizal.

Appellant's attorney admits that the appellant was twice married as alleged in the information, but contends that she was divorced from first
husband in accordance with Mohammedan religious practices, and that said divorce was valid; that if it be true that said divorce is not in
accordance with Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature, the appellant is nevertheless not guilty of bigamy, because she believed that she
had been validly divorced and had no criminal intent when contracted the second marriage.

The Solicitor-General agrees with the attorney for the appellant, and is of the opinion that the divorce was granted in accordance with the
precepts of the Koran and Moro customs and traditions; that fraudulent or criminal intent is an essential element of the crime of bigamy, and
that since the appellant believed that her first marriage had been legally dissolved because she had been granted a divorce under the
Mohammedan laws, she cannot be considered guilty of the crime with which she is charged.
The Solicitor-General further argues that since it is the practice of the Government not to interfere with the customs of the Moros, especially
their religious customs, divorces among them granted in accordance with the Koran ought to be recognized as a matter of public policy.

There is little to add to the well considered decision of the trial judge. It seems to us unnecessary to determine whether or not the divorce in
question was granted in accordance with the Mohammedan religious practices, as to which there seems to exist considerable uncertainty,
because in our view of the case a valid divorce can be granted only by the courts and for the reasons specified in Act No. 2710. It is not
claimed that the appellant was divorced from her first husband in accordance with said Act.lawphil.net

In the case of Francisco vs. Tayao (50 Phil., 42), it was held that in the Philippines the causes for divorce are prescribed by statute or Act No.
2710 and that of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband.

In the recent decision of People vs. Bituanan (Moro), (56 Phil., 23), where the defendant and a Moro woman were married by a datu
according to Moro customs and usages and afterwards divorced by the datu according to the same customs and usages, it was held that the
marriage performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion was valid, and assumed, for the purpose of that case, that the
defendant and his wife were not legally divorced.

Section 25 of the Marriage Law (Act No. 3613) provides that marriages between Mohammedans may be performed in accordance with the
rites or practice of their religion, but there is no provision of law which authorizes the granting of divorces in accordance with the rites or
practices of their religion.

A divorce cannot be had except in that court upon which the state has conferred jurisdiction, and then only for those causes and with those
formalities which the state has by statute prescribed (19 C.J., 19).

It is conceded in all jurisdictions that public policy, good morals, and the interests of society require that the marriage relation should be
sounded with every safeguard and its severance allowed only in the manner prescribed and for the causes specified by law. And the parties can
waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings (19 C.J., 20).

With respect to the contention that the appellant acted in good faith in contracting second marriage, believing that she had been validly
divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say that every one is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that is
act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof. The case of the United States vs. Enriquez (32 Phil.,
202), cited by the Solicitor-General is not in point. In that case the defendant left his wife in the municipality of Orion, Province of Bataan, in
the year 1895, going to the Province of Laguna as a postal employee. When he returned in 1901, after the revolution, he could not find his
wife or obtain the slightest information as to her whereabouts notwithstanding his persistent and diligent search. Believing her to be dead, he
contracted a second marriage in Orion on February 1st, 1905. In December, 1913, his first wife made her appearance in Orion. She had been
in Manila, Tarlac, and Victoria from 1895 to 1913. The defendant was acquitted on appeal to this court because no fraudulent intent could be
charged to him. He believed that his first wife was dead, and that was a well-founded belief, although it was subsequently to be erroneous. It
was a mistake of fact and not of law.

The decisions of American courts, cited by the Solicitor- General, sustaining the validity of divorces granted to members of Indian tribes
according to the customs and usages thereof, are likewise not in point. The various Indian tribes in the United States were dealt with by the
Government of the United States as independent nations and treaties were made with them.

As to the suggestion of the Solicitor-General that divorces among the Moros according to their religious practices should be recognized as
valid as a matter of public policy, because in the contrary case, "there would be no end of criminal prosecutions, for polygamy still abounds
among them, and the remarriages of people divorced under the Koran are the order of the day," that is a matter for the consideration of the
Legislature and the Governor-General.

The decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.

Street, Malcolm, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 125539. July 27, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFONSO PATALIN, JR., ALEX MIJAQUE, AND NESTOR RAS,
accused-appellants.

DECISION

MELO, J.:

Accused-appellants Alex Mijaque and Alfonso Patalin, Jr. were charged before Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of the 6th Judicial
Region stationed in Iloilo City, with the crime of robbery.* The Amended Information dated October 11, 1985 charged:

That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court,
the above named two (2) accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating with three (3) others whose identities are still unknown and who
are still at large, armed with bladed weapons by means of force, violence and intimidation, taking advantage of the nighttime to better realize
their purpose, and in the dwelling of the offended party, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away,
with intent to gain, cash amount of Three Hundred (P300.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, owned by the victim Corazon Aliman and the
following personal property: one (1) adjustable wrench, one (1) vise grip, one (1) screw driver, one (1) pair of levis pants, one (1) travelling
bag and one (1) wallet containing ten (P10.00) pesos, with a total value of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, owned by the
victims Reynaldo Aliman and Josephine Belesario, the over all total of cash and personal property being SEVEN HUNDRED (P700.00)
PESOS, Philippine Currency, without the consent of the above-mentioned offended parties and to their damage and prejudice in the
aforestated amount; that by reason or on the occasion of said Robbery, the above named two (2) accused did then and there hack victim
Reynaldo Aliman twice hitting him and inflicting wounds which required medical attendance of more than thirty (30) days, as well as inflict
physical injuries to the other victims Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belesario causing them to sustain injuries requiring medical attendance
for several number of days.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 92-93, II Record.)

In a Second Amended Information also dated October 11, 1985 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 18305, accused-appellants Alex Mijaque,
Alfonso Patalin, Jr., and Nestor Ras were charged before the same court with the crime of robbery with multiple rape, thusly:

That on or about August 11, 1984, in the municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court,
the above-named three (3) accused, with deliberate intent, and without any justifiable motive, conspiring, confederating and working together
with Richard Doe, Philip Doe and Robert Doe who are still at large, all armed with firearms and other deadly weapons, thereby performing
[sic] themselves into a band, entered the dwelling of Jesusa Carcillar, and once inside, with intent to gain and with violence against, and/or
intimidation of persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos in
cash, one (1) ring worth Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, one (1) pair of earrings worth One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, and one (1) Seiko
wrist watch worth Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, making a total of Six Thousand Five Hundred (P6,500.00) Pesos, against the will
and/or consent of the owner; that on the occasion thereof, the above-named three (3) accused, conspiring and working together with their
companions who are still at large, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with Perpetua Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar and Josephine Belesario, against their will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 90-91, II Record.)

Upon arraignment on November 12, 1985, accused-appellants entered a plea of not guilty to both crimes charged (p. 103, II Record).

After trial on the merits, a joint judgment was rendered, disposing:

Wherefore, premises considered there being sufficient and satisfactory proof showing that the accused in these two cases are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the charges filed against them, they are hereby sentenced as follows:

a) In Crim. Case No. 18376 for Robbery with Physical Injuries, accused Alfonso Patalin, Jr. and Alex Mijaque are penalized to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Ten (10) years, and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four
(4) months of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, to indemnify Corazon Aliman the amount of P700.00 representing the value of her property
robbed from her and also to indemnify Reynaldo Aliman the amount of P8,000.00 representing the expenses he incurred for his medication
and hospitalization due to the wounds he suffered.

b) In Criminal Case No. 18305 for Robbery with Multiple Rapes, accused Alfonso Patalin, Jr., Alex Mijaque and Nestor Ras are sentenced to
a death penalty and to indemnify the members of the Carcillar family the amount of P6,500.00 representing the cash and articles taken from
them.

In both cases the accused are also ordained to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

(p. 80, Rollo.)

The trial court arrived at the aforestated conclusion based on the following findings:

Criminal Case No. 18376

The crime of robbery (with physical injuries) was indeed committed by accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin, Jr. and Alex Mijaque, as well as
by their unidentified companions, based on the positive identification made by complaining witness Corazon Aliman, and corroborated by her
son Reynaldo and the latters half sister Josephine Belisario (p. 77, Rollo).

Criminal Case No. 18305

Accused-appellants Alfonso Patalin, Jr., Alex Mijaque, and Nestor Ras, as well as an unidentified companion, acted in concert to commit the
crime of robbery with multiple rape. They were positively identified by the following witnesses: Juliana Carcillar who was raped twice by
Alex Mijaque; Josephine Belisario who was raped once by Alex Mijaque; Rogelia Carcillar who was raped by Alex Mijaque; and Perpetua
Carcillar, who was raped by Nestor Ras, after Alfonso Patalin, Jr. failed in his attempt to rape her. Accused-appellant Patalin was likewise
identified by Reynaldo Aliman who personally knew him as a former barangay-mate for along time, as well as by Corazon Aliman, mother of
Reynaldo. The identification of accused-appellants was facilitated and aided by a bright full moon and due to the fact that they tarried in the
crime scene for a long period of time, thus allowing their victims to imprint in their memory the countenance or visage of accused-appellants.
Said positive and clear identification by the complaining witnesses, who were not shown to have any ill motive to falsify the truth and to
implicate accused-appellants, prevails over the latters defense of denial. Band, nocturnity, and dwelling, were likewise appreciated against
accused-appellants (pp. 78-79, Rollo).

The errors assigned by accused-appellants in their individual briefs are summarized as follows: (1) The trial court erred in finding that
accused-appellants are responsible for the crimes charged; (2) The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant Patalin notwithstanding the
fact that the latter was arrested without a warrant; (3) Assuming without conceding that accused-appellants (Patalin and Ras) committed the
crimes charged, the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of death as the same was suspended upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution
(pp. 86, 146, 204, Rollo).

The prosecutions version of the August 11, 1984 incident, based on the testimony of prosecution witnesses Dr. Edgardo Carmelo, Dra. Leticia
Sitchon Santiago, Reynaldo Aliman, Corazon Aliman, Josephine Belisario, Juliana Carcillar, Rogelia Carcillar, and Perpetua Carcillar, is
summarized in the Solicitor Generals consolidated Brief, as follows:

At about 7:30 in the evening of August 11, 1984, while Reynaldo Aliman, his half sister Josephine Belisario, and their mother Corazon
Aliman were having a conversation inside their house at Barangay Lumanay, municipality of Lambunao, province of Iloilo, appellant Alfonso
Patalin, Jr., who was outside the fenced perimeter of said house, called out Reynaldo Aliman by his nickname and asked the latter to let him
and the other persons with him in (pp. 5-6, TSN, Dec. 16, 1986).

Reynaldo Aliman opened the window and, because of the moonlight, saw appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. with (2) other persons. Appellant
Alfonso Patalin, Jr. asked again Reynaldo Aliman to let them in (pp. 7-8, ibid.). Reynaldo Aliman opened the gate and Alfonso Patalin
together with his companions, one of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque, entered the premises (pp. 8, 10-11, ibid.). Immediately upon entering,
appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr. pointed the beam of his flashlight at Reynaldo Aliman. At this juncture, appellant Alex Mijaque hacked
Reynaldo Aliman twice with a bolo hitting the latter at the neck, right arm, and the chest (pp. 14-16, ibid.). Thereupon, Reynaldo Aliman
immediately ran away (p. 17, ibid.).

Corazon Aliman and Josephine Belisario, who went to the balcony of their house, witnessed the hacking incident and the former shouted for
help (p. 6, TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 8-9, TSN, June 30, 1988). Two of the assailants, one of whom is appellant Alex Mijaque, pushed Corazon
Aliman and Josephine Belisario inside their house, covered their mouth and told them not to make any noise. Later, appellant Alex Mijaque
dragged Josephine Belisario to the house of the latters aunt (sister of Corazon Aliman) which is beside their house. The other man stayed put
and while holding a double-bladed knife, threatened to kill Corazon Aliman if the latter will not give him money. After Corazon Aliman gave
him three hundred pesos (P300.00) cash, he ransacked the house and took one (1) wrist watch, one (1) vise grip, one (1) screw driver, one (1)
pair of Levis trousers, one (1) travelling bag, and one (1) wallet containing ten pesos (P10.00); the total value thereof is seven hundred pesos
(P700.00) inclusive of the three hundred pesos (P300.00) cash. Thereafter, the man also dragged Corazon Aliman to her sisters house (pp. 6-8,
TSN, July 21, 1987; pp. 11-12, TSN, June 30, 1988).

Josephine Belisario, who was dragged by Alex Mijaque to her aunts house which is just twenty (20) meters away, saw six (6) persons, one of
whom is appellant Alfonso Patalin, Jr., outside the house of her aunt. Josephine Belisario was forced to call out her aunts name and ask that
the door be opened for her. While the door was being opened, it was kicked by one of the six (6) persons. Alfonso Patalin immediately went
in, boxed the aunt of Josephine Belisario on the body and announced that they are staging a hold-up. The other companions of appellant
Alfonso Patalin, Jr., including appellant Alex Mijaque, who were armed with knives, a bolo, and a gun also went in and restrained Josephine
Belisarios cousins, namely Rogelia, Juliana, Perpetua, Roy, and Victoriano, who are all surnamed Carcillar (pp. 11-15, TSN, June 30, 1988; p.
11, TSN, June 29, 1989). Josephine Belisario together with her aunt and cousins were all forced to lie face down on the floor of the sala (p. 15,
TSN, June 30, 1988; p. 7, TSN, Feb. 15, 1990). Appellant Alfonso Patalin got hold of Mrs. Carcillar (Josephine Belisarios aunt and the
mother of her cousins), kicked and boxed the latter and exclaimed: Money, money. It is money we want. Appellant Alfonso Patalin forced
Mrs. Carcillar into a room where the latter gave him money (p. 16, TSN, June 30, 1988; pp. 7-8, February 15, 1990). Then, appellants and
their companions seized the following personalities of the Carcillars: (1) one Seiko 5 wristwatch worth three thousand pesos (P3,000.00), (2)
two (2) pairs of ladys rings worth two thousand (P2,000.00), (3) one (1) pair of earrings, and (4) two (2) travelling bags (p. 9, TSN, February
15, 1990).

Rogelia Carcillar was brought outside their house by appellant Alex Mijaque who was armed with a butchers knife and threatened to kill her if
she will not lie down. Because of fear, she did as she was told (pp. 10, 16-17, TSN, February 15, 1990). Appellant Alex Mijaque forcibly
removed her underwear and placed himself on top of Rogelia. She tried to resist but appellant Alex Mijaque pressed the tip of his knife at the
formers neck and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (pp. 11-12, ibid.). Thereafter, appellant Alex Mijaque brought her inside the
house and ordered her to lie face down on the floor again (pp. 13-14, ibid.). Then, one of the companions of appellant Alex Mijaque who was
armed with a gun took her outside and brought her to a place not far from where she was raped (p. 14, ibid.). This man, at the point of a gun,
threatened to kill her if she will not obey his orders. Rogelia Carcillar, who feared for her life, was left with no choice but to obey the mans
orders. There, she was raped for the second time by this gun-wielding man (pp. 15-16, ibid.). While Rogelia Carcillar was being raped,
appellant Alfonso Patalin was also outside the house standing on guard (p. 18, ibid.).

Juliana Carcillar was likewise brought outside the house by appellant Alex Mijaque who, with his knife, tried to rape her but he initially failed
because of her resistance. This angered appellant Alex Mijaque and he tried to kill Juliana Carcillar by stabbing the latter but was prevailed
upon not to do so by one of his companions (pp. 12-15, TSN, June 29, 1989).

Appellant Alex Mijaque, after delivering fist blows on the body of Juliana Carcillar, turned her over to one of his companions who was in the
garden outside the house and armed with a gun. This man threatened her with the gun and mauled her. She was overpowered and he undressed
her. He inserted his finger on her sex organ and eventually succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (pp. 15-17, ibid.). Then, this
companion of appellant Alex Mijaque brought Juliana Carcillar back inside the house and ordered to look for money. When she told him that
they have no more money, he kept on harming her. In the course thereof, he found and took a Seiko wristwatch owned by Perpetua Carcillar.
Then, he brought her outside the house again where he had a brief conversation with appellants Nestor Ras and Alfonso Patalin. She was then
brought back inside the house and ordered to lie face down on the floor again. While at this position, appellant Alex Mijaque approached her
and brought her outside the house. She refused to obey appellant Alex Mijaques order to lie down on the ground so he pushed her downwards.
Her strength gave out and he succeeded in raping her twice. She was then brought back inside the house (pp. 18-21, TSN, June 29, 1989).

Josephine Belisario, while laying face down on the floor of the sala, was dragged by appellant Alex Mijaque inside one of the rooms. He
threatened her with his knife and was able to undress her. He fondled her breasts, pulled her pubic hair and eventually succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with her. She was then left inside the room. Two companions of appellant Alex Mijaque came in bringing with them her
cousins Rogelia and Perpetua Carcillar. One of them saw Josephine Belisario and brought her to another room. The man demanded money
from her but she was not able to give him money. The man was also carrying a knife and threatened her with the same. She resisted when he
was forcing her to lie down on the bed but her strength finally gave out. He likewise succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. After
raping her, the man took a piggy bank which was at the foot of the bed and brought her back to the room where she was first raped. Her aunt
and cousins were also inside the said room (pp. 17-25, TSN, June 30, 1988).

Perpetua Carcillar suffered the same fate. While laying face down on the floor of the living room, she was pulled by the heir by appellant
Alfonso Patalin and ordered to stand up. When she stood up, she realized that her sister were no longer there. Appellant Alfonso Patalin,
armed with a double-bladed knife, brought her outside the house, ordered her to undress and lie down. Because of fear, Perpetua Carcillar,
who was then only thirteen (13) years old, obeyed appellant Alfonso Patalin. He tried to force his penis into her vagina but did not succeed.
Then, appellant Alfonso Patalin handed her over to appellant Nestor Ras, a member of their group who was only about two (2) arms length
away. Appellant Nestor Ras, armed with a double-bladed knife which he was pointing at Perpetua Carcillar, ordered her to lie down. He
fondled her breasts, kissed her, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. After raping her, appellant Nestor Ras brought her back
inside the house. When she was returned inside the house, the intruders were still demanding for money from her mother and were taking
turns in beating the latter (pp. 4, 15-23, TSN, July 12, 1990).

Appellants left, together with the other assailants, taking with them the valuables stated earlier after threatening them not to report the matter
to the police or else they will return and kill all of them (p. 19, TSN, February 15, 1990).

Reynaldo Aliman was brought to Ricardo Ladrido Memorial Hospital where he received first aid. He was then brought to West Visayas
Medical Center located in Manduriao, Iloilo (pp. 18-20, TSN, December 16, 1986) and was treated by Dr. Edgardo Carmelo (p. 4, TSN, May
14, 1986). Reynaldo Aliman sustained the following injuries: (1) hack wound, mid forearm, area ulnar side middle third forearm, and (2) hack
wound, left side of neck (pp. 5-6, ibid; Exhibit A). Reynaldo Aliman was confined in the hospital for almost three (3) months and he spent
more than eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) for medicines, food and other expenditures (p. 19, TSN, December 16, 1986).

Dr. Leticia Sitchon Santiago examined and treated Josephine Belisario two days after she was raped. A hematoma, about 3x4 inches in
diameter, was found on the left shoulder of Josephine Belisario which could have been caused by forcing the latter to lie down on the ground.
Josephine Belisario vagina admits two (2) fingers. Further, hematoma was noted in the hymen at nine oclock and three oclock positions and
fresh lacerations was also noted at nine, eleven, and three oclock positions. These are indications that a foreign object, which could be a
human penis, was inserted in the vagina and caused the lacerations of the hymen (pp. 6-9, TSN, September 3, 1986).

Rogelia Carcillar, Juliana Carcillar and Perpetua Carcillar were also examined and treated by Dr. Leticia Santiago but such was conducted
three days after the incident (p. 17, ibid).

A hematoma was noted in the occipital region of the head of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 18, ibid). Her vagina admits two fingers snugly and the
perineum has a lacerated wound which is one centimeter in length (pp. 18-19, ibid; pp. 2-3, TSN, November 10, 1986). Fresh lacerations were
likewise noted in her hymen at eight, eleven and three oclock positions (p. 3, TSN, November 10, 1986). Dr. Santiago further testified that a
foreign object was inserted in the vagina of Rogelia Carcillar (p. 19, TSN, September 3, 1986; p. 3, TSN, November 10, 1986).

Juliana Carcillar, 22 years old, sustained a hematoma in the forehead, left and right side of the face, upper right arm, uppermost and lower
portions of the left thigh, occipital region of the head and left side of the mouth. She also sustained the following injuries: (1) cm. lacerated
wound on the left side of the lower lip, (2) bite mark with hematoma on the left shoulder, (3) 1 cm. incised wounds on the right index finger
and right thumb, (4) 4 inches incised wound on the right forearm, and (5) multiple abrasions at the back including the portion below the
waistline, her vagina admits two fingers and fresh lacerations in the hymen were noted at eight, eleven, and four oclock positions (pp. 10-15,
TSN, November 10, 1986).

Perpetua Carcillar, 13 years old, sustained a 1 centimeter lacerated wound on the perineum which was also swollen. Her vagina admits two
fingers snugly (pp. 8-9, ibid). A fresh laceration at six oclock position and a hematoma also at six oclock position were noted on her hymen
(Exhibit C, p. 15, Record).

(pp. 300-311, Rollo.)

Denial and alibi were set up by accused-appellants based on their testimony and that of their witnesses, Alejandro Tabucan, Felizardo Lebona,
Rhodora Losaria, and Cristina Gumban. The denials, together with other arguments, are summarized as follows:

Alfonso Patalin

Accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin alleges that his name was only included by Jesus Larang, whom he described as the landlord of Jesusa
Carcillar and the Carcillar sisters, to force him to reveal the names of the persons who staged the robbery and rape. Verily, he declared on the
stand that when the victims saw him at the police station, two of them (Josephine Belisario and Reynaldo Aliman) even smiled at him (tsn,
August 13, 1993, pp. 10-11, 19-20).
In his brief, he argues that he was not positively identified, rationalizing that when prosecution witness Josephine Belisario was asked on the
stand if she recognized the person who called [her] brother Reynaldo, said witness responded that she did not know the person who called her
brother, and that she only recognized the callers voice (tsn, August 11, 1988, pp. 30-31). Further, accused-appellant Patalin also alleges that he
was arrested without a warrant.

Alex Mijaque

Accused-appellant Alex Mijaque argues that in the sworn statement of Reynaldo Aliman (p. 3, II Record), there is no mention of his name nor
that of accused-appellant Patalin as the perpetrators of the crimes charged. Moreover, during the preliminary examination in the lower court,
accused-appellant Mijaque was also not named as one of the malefactors. He likewise points out that in the police blotter, the first report
mentioned that the alleged offenders were unknown persons. No rape was reported. In the second report, it was blottered that the alleged
offenders were four unidentified persons. Again, no rape was reported. Accused-appellant Mijaque likewise takes note of the report given by
Rogelia Carcillar who merely narrated the robbery but did not report any rape.

According to this accused-appellant, the police authorities of Iloilo, Manduriao (also referred to in the record as Mandurriao) received a
complaint from a resident thereat that his television set was stolen previous to the incidents herein involved. Accused-appellant Mijaque was
suspected as the thief and was picked up by the agents of the Manduriao Police Station without any warrant of arrest and was thence detained
for three days without any complaint (p. 93, Rollo). Meanwhile, the robbery at Lambunao, Iloilo was being flashed at all police stations in
Iloilo. The arresting officers of the Manduriao Police Station, so accused-appellant Mijaque contends, in order to save themselves from
charges of arbitrary detention, immediately referred him for custodial investigation in regard to the Lambunao robbery. Consequently, three
days after his confinement, a criminal complaint for robbery with physical injuries and another for robbery with rape was filed against him by
the Chief of Police of Lambunao, Iloilo.

Nestor Ras

The third accused-appellant, Nestor Ras, argues that his name was never mentioned by Dr. Edgardo Carmelo, and that Josephine Belisario was
merely led by the public prosecutor into mentioning his name. He also states that the witnesses declarations as regards his identification are
confusing and inconsistent (pp. 208-210, Rollo).

Further, it is contended that Rogelio Carcillar himself, when asked by the public prosecutor about what happened to his sister Perpetua
Carcillar, testified that Nothing happened to them (p. 210, id). And when Perpetua Carcillar and the other female prosecution witnesses
reported the alleged incident to the police authorities, they never mentioned that they were raped.

As mentioned, all three accused-appellants, aside from denying the charges, also presented their respective alibis. Accused-appellant Patalin
testified that he was at home with his parents, wife, and children, at Pandan, Lambunao (tsn, August 13, 1993, pp. 16-17) at the time of the
incident. As corroborative witness, he presented Felizardo Lebona, the person in charge of the plantation where he was working, who testified
that accused-appellant Patalin did not leave the plantation house from August 9 to 12, 1984 (tsn, October 15, 1993, pp. 4-5).

For his part, accused-appellant Mijaque insists that he had no opportunity to get out of the farm where he was working which was located in
Manduriao, Iloilo (tsn, May 6, 1993, p. 6). In July, 1985, he was arrested for theft of a television set and detained in the Lambunao jail for
investigation. Although three of the herein complainants were brought in front of his detention cell, he was not identified. Instead, the
policemen pointed to him and said, That is Alex Mijaque who raped you. If you will not include him, he will file a case against you.
Moreover, he testified that he was mauled in jail (tsn, July 29, 1993, pp. 10-13). Defense witness, Alejandro Tabucan, neighbor of accused-
appellant Mijaque, corroborated the latters alibi that on August 11, 1984, they had a drinking spree from 6 oclock in the evening to 12 oclock
midnight, and accused-appellant Mijaque was not able to leave the premises in Manduriao. Tabucan also said that he saw Mijaque still asleep
the following morning (tsn, August 6, 1993, pp. 4-5, 10).

Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras declared that he was in the province of Antique (particularly, in Igbangkal, Dao) on August 11, 1984
(tsn, December 17, 1993, p. 4). As corroborative witness, he presented Cristina Gumban, a vendor who testified that on August 11, 1984, she
bought cassava and sweet potatoes from accused-appellant Ras in Igbangkal, Dao, Antique from 3 oclock to 5 oclock in the afternoon, and
that he saw Ras put the purchased items in a sack (tsn, March 4, 1994, p. 4).

We are not persuaded by the above posturings and are compelled to affirm.

Of primordial consideration in appellate matters is the legal principle that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimony is
a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grilling examination (People vs. Ombrog, 268 SCRA 93 [1997]). We generally uphold and respect this appraisal
since, as an appellate court, we do not deal with live witnesses but only with the cold pages of a written record (People vs. Herbieto, 269
SCRA 472 [1997]).

A close examination of the record convinces us of the prosecution witnesses credibility, particularly the ravished victims, who, for
approximately two agonizing hours, were subjected to a hellish nightmare occurring in the very privacy of their own homes.

As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its consolidated brief, the defense was not able to prove any motive on the part of the
private complainants to falsely testify that they were robbed and raped by accused-appellants. In fact, two of the rape victims, Josephine
Belisario and Rogelia Carcillar, were even married to first cousins of accused-appellant Patalin (pp. 327-328, Rollo), and would not ordinarily
turn against a relative although this be by mere affinity unless they really suffered the fate they narrated.

Accused-appellants rely on the delay or vacillation on the part of the complaining witnesses. As discussed above in their individual defenses,
they emphasize that Reynaldo Aliman failed to mention the names of the perpetrators in his sworn statement; that on August 11, 1984,
Reynaldo instructed a relative, Jesus Larang, to report the hacking and robbery incidents at the Lambunao Police Department, as well as the
robbery committed in the Carcillar household, and that the police blotter stated that the alleged offenders were unknown persons but contained
no report of any rape; and that Rogelia Carcillars report did not mention that she was raped.

Time and again, we have ruled that delay in lodging a criminal accusation does not impair the credibility of a witness if such delay is
satisfactorily explained (People vs. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384 [1997]). An examination of Reynaldo Alimans sworn statement (p. 3, I Record)
shows that he clearly identified one of the callers as accused-appellant Alfonso Patalin. Anent his failure to mention accused-appellant
Mijaques name, he explained on cross-examination that he did not know yet the name of the person who attacked him with the bolo at the
time he executed his sworn statement (tsn, Dec. 16, 1986, pp. 35, 38-39). It was only later that he found out that the name of his assailant was
Alex Mijaque. As regards Jesus Larang, the fact that he mentioned unknown persons in his report does not affect Reynaldos categorical and
positive identification of accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque as the perpetrators of the hacking and robbery incidents at his home.

Anent the rape victims, it was clearly explained that their assailants told them not to report the matter to the police, otherwise, the assailants
will return and kill them (tsn, Feb. 15, 1990, p. 19). The victims were overcome by fear and shame (ibid., p. 31). Besides, the delay in
reporting the multiple rapes was not procrastination as this was only 3 days from the date of the incident (tsn, June 30, 1988, p. 22), a far
shorter period than those mentioned in People vs. Gecomo (254 SCRA 82 [1996]) where we held that a delay of 17 or 35 days, or even 6
months, by a victim of rape in reporting the attack on her honor, does not detract from the veracity of her charge.

The defense also notes certain inconsistencies in the testimony of the complaining witnesses, as follows: (1) Juliana Carcillar testified earlier
that the only light in the house came from a kerosene lamp placed on a small table which was extinguished as a result of it being knocked
down, thus placing the house in darkness, while on the other hand, Perpetua Carcillar, earlier said that although there was no more light in the
house coming from the lamp, yet she could still see because the light of the moon still illuminated their house, allegedly through the plastic
roofing; and (2) the prosecution witnesses could not agree concerning the date they went to San Dionisio, Iloilo to identify accused-appellant
Nestor Ras, as well as the date when Ras was arrested.

Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of
their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony, and do not impair the credibility of such witnesses where there is consistency
in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the assailant (Sumalpong vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 764 [1997]). In
fact, honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime,
especially so when the crime is shocking to the conscience and numbing to the senses (People vs. Agunias, 279 SCRA 52 [1997]).

With respect to the defenses of denial and alibi, significantly, these defenses, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative
and self-serving, deserve no weight in law, and cannot be given evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters (People vs. Gayon, 269 SCRA 587 [1997]). Positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial (People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA 181
[1997]). Verily, even if the defense of denial is supported by the testimony of friends of the accused, it deserves the barest consideration
(People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254 [1995]). It will be given weight only if it would preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been
physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of commission (People vs. Daquipil, 240 SCRA 314 [1995]; People vs.
De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369 [1995]; People vs. Morin, 241 SCRA 709 [1995]; People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 [1995]; People vs. Dela Iglesia,
241 SCRA 718 [1995]; People vs. Umali, 242 SCRA 17 [1995]; People vs. Dayson, 242 SCRA 124 [1995]; People vs. Espinosa, Jr. 243
SCRA 7 [1995]; People vs. Parica, 243 SCRA 557 [1995]; People vs. Escoto, 244 SCRA 87 [1995]).

Accused-appellant Mijaque testified that on August 11, 1984, he was in Manduriao, Iloilo. The overland travel time from the town of
Manduriao to Lambunao is approximately one hour and twenty minutes. Accused-appellant Patalin testified that he was in Barangay Pandan,
which is merely adjacent to Lambunao. Lastly, accused-appellant Nestor Ras testified that he was in Antique, a province neighboring Iloilo,
which is approximately two hours away therefrom via overland transportation. The defense tried to corroborate these alibis by presenting
witnesses who testified on details which happened ten years prior to the date their testimony was given, and hence of naturally doubtful
credibility.

Mutatis Mutandi People vs. Queliza (279 SCRA 145 [1997]), considering that the places where accused-appellants alleged they were at could
be traversed by motorized vehicles, it was not impossible that accused-appellants could not have been at the crime scene by 7 oclock or 7:30
o'clock in the evening on August 11, 1984. More importantly and damming yet is the positive identification of their presence thereat by the
victims.

The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling in Criminal Case No. 18376 considering that
nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime and the evidence shows that accused-appellants took advantage of the darkness to
successfully consummate their plans (People vs. Apduhan, Jr., 24 SCRA 798 [1968]). Dwelling is clear from the abuse of confidence which
the victims reposed in the offenders by opening the door to them, as well as the violation of the sanctity of privacy in the victims homes. He
who goes to anothers house to slander him, hurt him, or do him wrong, is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere (Reyes, The Revised
Penal Code Criminal Law, Vol. I, 1993 ed., citing the dissenting opinion of Justice Villareal in People vs. Ambis, 68 Phil. 635 [1939] and
Viada, 5th ed., Vol. II, pp. 323-324). We further affirm the trial courts finding on the presence of the aggravating circumstance of band
considering that Reynaldo Aliman testified that accused-appellants Patalin and two other companions (one of whom was later identified as
accused-appellant Mijaque) entered his home (tsn, p. 7, Dec. 16, 1986). This was corroborated by Josephine Belisario who even saw four (4)
persons enter their gate, one of whom was accused-appellant Patalin (tsn, p. 10, June 30, 1988). These same aggravating circumstances
likewise attended the commission of the crime of robbery with multiple rape in Criminal Case No. 18305 and this was clearly testified to by
the victims thereof who stated that five persons, including accused-appellant Patalin, armed with a bolo, a knife, and a long gun, entered their
dwelling that unfortunate night (tsn, June 29, 1989, p. 10; February 15, 1990, p. 5).

With respect to accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaques defense that they were arrested without warrants, suffice it to say that any objection,
defect, or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea (Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402 [1997]). As
correctly pointed out in the Peoples consolidated brief, the record shows no objection was ever interposed prior to arraignment and trial (p.
324, Rollo).
It is indubitable that there was conspiracy in the commission of the crimes in both Criminal Cases No. 18376 and 18305. In the first criminal
case, the evidence clearly shows that accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque, together with unidentified companions, committed the crime
charged. Said culprits shared the common criminal objective of robbing the victims and inflicting wounds upon Reynaldo Aliman on the
occasion of the robbery. In the second case, all three accused-appellants (together with unidentified companions), who were positively
identified by the victims themselves, undoubtedly had the common criminal design of robbing the household of Jesusa Carcillar, and of
committing multiple rape on the occasion of the robbery. Accused-appellant Mijaque dragged Josephine Belisario to her aunts house and the
other culprits followed suit. Accused-appellant Patalin boxed Jesusa Carcillar and announced that they were staging a hold-up. After robbing
the household, they proceeded in ravishing the four young female victims, Rogelia, Juliana, Josephine, and Perpetua, one after the other, thus
truly exhibiting their concerted acts.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons came to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it (People vs.
Abarri, 242 SCRA 39 [1995]). It cannot be merely presumed. Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of
conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

In the case at bar, although there was no proof of previous actual agreement among accused-appellants adduced at the trial

...direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express terms to
enter into and pursue a common design. The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy maybe, and from the secrecy
of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the court from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they
are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, then a conspiracy maybe inferred though no actual meeting among them to
concert means is proved (People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868; See also People vs. Viray, 147 SCRA 146; People vs. Balignasay, G.R. No.
76743, May 22, 1992; People vs. Galit, 230 SCRA 486)...

(People vs. Miranday, 242 SCRA 620 [1995]).

Verily, the participation of each of the accused-appellants was exhibited by the straightforward testimony of the victims themselves.

This brings us to the crucial issue raised by accused-appellants on the death penalty. At the time the crimes charged were committed in 1984,
robbery with rape was punishable by death (Art. 294, Revised Penal Code). However, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
specifically Paragraph (1), Section 19 of Article III thereof, the death penalty was abolished. Hence, the argument that it could not be imposed
upon accused-appellants. Said provision reads as follows:

Sec. 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

The constitutional abolition of the death penalty immediately took effect upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. However, said
provision left the matter open for Congress to revive capital punishment at its discretion, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Simply stated, it did not prevent the legislature from reimposing the death penalty at some future time (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., pp. 507-508).

Congress eventually restored the death penalty by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 or the Death Penalty Law which took effect on January 1,
1994.

Accused-appellants are of the position that since the Constitutions abolition of the death penalty had retroactive effect, being beneficial to the
accused, the restoration or imposition of the death penalty on January 1, 1994 would no longer cover them notwithstanding the fact that the
decision was rendered by the trial court on June 14, 1995, when the Death Penalty Law had already taken effect.

Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code provides that no felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.
At the time of the commission of the crime in 1984, as held by the trial court, robbery with rape, if committed with the use of a deadly weapon
or by two or more persons, was punishable by reclusion perpetua to death (Article 294[2], Revised Penal Code [as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 767]).

True, in 1987, the Constitution abolished the death penalty subject to Congress future restoration thereof for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes. At the time of such ratification, the instant case was still at its trial stage. No penalty had as yet then been imposed.
Considering that the provision provides that [a]ny death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua, it is clear that the
framers intended said provision to have a retroactive effect on cases pending without any penalty of death having been imposed yet.
Consequently, upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution, any death penalty already imposed is automatically without need for any executive
action commuted (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508).

The instant case poses the following issue: When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was retroactively applied to herein accused-
appellants, did they gain a vested right thereto so that any future act restoring the death penalty would no longer cover them? An affirmative
answer would free accused-appellants from the fatal clutches of the death penalty.

Ours is a government of laws and not of men. The idea that an individual may be compelled to hold his life (or lose it), or the means of living,
at the mere will of another, is intolerable in any country where freedom prevails (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil 778 [1919]). Before us is a
heinous crime indeed where People were harmed, robbed, ravished, and abused in the defaced sanctity of their own homes. It is but human
nature to feel some measure of loathing, disgust, and hatred for the offenders considering the inhuman aspect of the crime committed.
However, the ascendancy of the law is axiomatic in our type of government. Every official act must be based on and must conform to the
authority of a valid law, lacking which the act must be rejected (Cruz, Phil. Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 51). The nobility of our intention is
insufficient.

There is no doubt that the abolition of the death penalty in 1987 retroactively affected and benefited accused-appellants. Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that [p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal . . . although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the
same.

A statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed against the state (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed.,
p. 5). The above-cited provision of the Constitution is penal in character since it deals with the penalty to be imposed for capital crimes. This
penal provision may be given retroactive effect during three possible stages of a criminal prosecution: (a) when the crime has been committed
and the prosecution began; (b) when sentence has been passed but the service has not begun; and (c) when the sentence is being carried out
(Gregorio, Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 1988 ed., p. 167, citing Escalante vs. Santos, 56 Phil 483 [1932]).

In the light of the discussion above, there is no question that the abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused-appellants. Perforce, the
subsequent reimposition of the death penalty will not affect them. The framers of the Constitution themselves state that the law to be passed
by Congress reimposing the death penalty (Republic Act 7659) can only have prospective application (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution the
Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 508, citing I RECORD, p. 748; Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers,
1995 ed., p. 227, citing I Record, p. 747-748).

There is no question that a person has no vested right in any rule of law which entitles him to insists that it shall remain unchanged for his
benefit, nor has he a vested right in the continued existence of a statute which precludes its change or repeal, nor in any omission to legislate
on a particular matter. However, a subsequent statute cannot be so applied retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the old law
(Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1986 ed., p. 264, citing Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil 711 [1956]; Laurel vs. Misa,
76 Phil 372 [1946]). Courts have thus given statutes strict construction to prevent their retroactive operation in order that the statutes would
not impair or interfere with vested or existing rights. Clearly, accused-appellants right to be benefited by the abolition of the death penalty
accrued or attached by virtue of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. This benefit cannot be taken away from them.

Since the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested (Benzonan vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA
515 [1992]), the rule in statutory construction is that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose
and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used
(Balatbat vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 419 [1992]).

By analogy, we apply the rule in labor law which provides that benefits accruing to workmen under the old law cannot be taken away from
them by a succeeding law. In the case at bar, there is greater reason to apply this principle since the very taking of life is involved and is at
issue.

As regards accused-appellants civil liability, the trial court, in Criminal Case No. 18376, correctly awarded P700.00 to Corazon Aliman
representing the total value of the cash and personal property forcibly taken, and P8,000.00 to Reynaldo Aliman representing expenses
incurred for medication and hospitalization. However, in Criminal Case No. 18305, the trial court failed to order indemnification for the
multiple rapes. Thus, in line with the pronouncement in People vs. Victor (G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998) wherein we said:

One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue unabated and the legislative response has been in the form of
higher penalties. The Court believes that, on like considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the same direction.
Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the
death penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not less than
P75,000.00. this is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an
expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.

accused-appellants should be made to pay P375,000.00 as indemnification for five counts of rape (considering that Juliana Carcillar was twice
raped by accused-appellant Mijaque) in addition to the sum of P6,500.00 representing the value of the cash and articles that were taken from
the victims. In line with the recent ruling in People vs. Prades (G.R. No. 127569, July 30, 1998), moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
for each count of rape, or a total of P250,000.00 is likewise awarded. Lastly, so that the instant case may serve as an object lesson to the
public, exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000 per count of rape is further awarded (People vs. Burce, 269 SCRA 293 [1997]).

Because of the findings of conspiracy, accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and severally liable for the amounts awarded in
Criminal Case No. 18376; whereas all three accused-appellants are solidarily liable for the amounts awarded in Criminal Case No. 18305.

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS said judgment,
with the following modifications:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 18376, for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, considering that the aggravating circumstances of band,
nighttime, and dwelling attended the commission of the crime, accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum;

(b) Accused-appellants Patalin and Mijaque are jointly and severally held liable for the amounts awarded by the trial court in said criminal
case, particularly, the amount of P700.00 representing the total value of the cash and articles taken from Corazon Aliman, and P8,000.00
representing the expenses incurred by Reynaldo Aliman for medication and hospitalization;

(c) In Criminal Case No. 18305, the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and
(d) Aside from the amount of P6,500.00 already awarded by the trial court to the Carcillar family representing the value of the cash and
articles taken, the victims in Criminal Case No. 18305 are hereby awarded an additional P75,000 as indemnity for each count of rape,
P50,000.00 for each count of rape as moral damages, and P10,000 for each count of rape as exemplary damages, for which amounts all three
accused-appellants are jointly and severally liable.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-
Santiago, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., on leave.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002]

ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN BERNABE, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect
cannot be impaired or taken away. The minors have up to four years from attaining majority age within which to file an action for recognition.

Statement of the Case

Before us is a Petitioni[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying for (1) the nullification of the July 7, 1999
Court of Appealsii[2] (CA) Decisioniii[3] in CA-GR CV No. 51919 and the October 14, 1999 CA Resolutioniv[4] denying petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration, as well as (2) the reinstatement of the two Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City (Branch 109)
concerning the same case. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissing Civil Case No. 94-0562 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the
records of this case be remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits.v[5]

The Facts

The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:

The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-three (23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina
Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife
Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.

On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate
son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole
surviving heir.

On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the provisions of the Family Code as well as the case of
Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the complaint is now barred x x x.vi[6]

Orders of the Trial Court

In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted Ernestina Bernabes Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts Decision and ordered
the dismissal of the Complaint for recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative father had
barred the action.

In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in
writing, the action for recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm
or deny the childs filiation.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son
of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for
recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of majority. The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not
take away that right.
Hence, this appeal.vii[7]

Issues

In her Memorandum,viii[8] petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the legitimate daughter of the putative father, for recognition
and partition with accounting after the putative fathers death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.

II

Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents had four years from the attainment of minority to file an
action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, in complete disregard of its repeal by the [express] provisions of the Family
Code and the applicable jurisprudence as held by the Honorable Court of Appeals.

III

Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petition[er] is fatally defective for failure to implead the Court of Appeals as one of the
respondents.ix[9]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First and Second Issues: Period to File Action for Recognition

Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall discuss them jointly.

Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for recognition, because Article 285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted
by the provisions of the Family Code. She argues that the latter Code should be given retroactive effect, since no vested right would be
impaired. We do not agree.

Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for recognition as follows:

ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the
following cases:

(1) If the
father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority;

(2) If after
the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents
recognize the child.

In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.

The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been omitted by Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code,
which we quote:

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should
the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the
action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of
Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family
Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a
chance to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family
being aware of their existence. x x x The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs filiation, and this, he
or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.x[10]

Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or
impaired as follows:

ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.

The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrians right to an action for recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil
Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Our answer is affirmative.

A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency x x x.xi[11] Respondent however contends that the filing of an action
for recognition is procedural in nature and that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to [or] arise from procedural laws.xii[12]

Bustos v. Luceroxiii[13] distinguished substantive from procedural law in these words:

x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term
which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part
of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of
the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or
obtains redress for their invasion.xiv[14] (Citations omitted)

Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,xv[15] the Court laid down the test for determining whether a rule is procedural or substantive:

[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or
modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes
away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if
it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.xvi[16]

Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his
petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to file
an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.

Uyguangco v. Court of Appealsxvii[17] is not applicable to the case at bar, because the plaintiff therein sought recognition as an illegitimate
child when he was no longer a minor. On the other hand, in Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appealsxviii[18] the Court ruled that an action for
recognition filed while the Civil Code was in effect should not be affected by the subsequent enactment of the Family Code, because the right
had already vested.

Not Limited to Natural Children

To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for recognition of natural children. Thus, petitioner contends that the provision
cannot be availed of by respondent, because at the time of his conception, his parents were impeded from marrying each other. In other words,
he is not a natural child.

A natural child is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not disqualified by any legal impediment from marrying each other.
Thus, in De Santos v. Angeles,xix[19] the Court explained:

A childs parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a natural child.xx[20]

A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been frowned upon by this Court in the aforesaid case of Aruego, which allowed
minors to file a case for recognition even if their parents were disqualified from marrying each other. There, the Complaint averred that the
late Jose Aruego Sr., a married man, had an extramarital liason with Luz Fabian. Out of this relationship were born two illegitimate children
who in 1983 filed an action for recognition. The two children were born in 1962 and 1963, while the alleged putative father died in 1982. In
short, at the time of their conception, the two childrens parents were legally disqualified from marrying each other. The Court allowed the
Complaint to prosper, even though it had been filed almost a year after the death of the presumed father. At the time of his death, both
children were still minors.

Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira,xxi[21] the Court said that the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment of
natural children, as well as the prescriptive period for filing such action, may likewise be applied to spurious children. Pertinent portions of the
case are quoted hereunder:

The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural children, commonly known as bastards, include those adulterous
children or those born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with
a woman other than his wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights. But their filiation must be duly proven.

How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of the paternity or maternity or spurious children
under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of
natural children are applicable to spurious children.

Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the rules on
voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious children.

That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as that term is used with respect to natural children. What is simply meant
is that the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children.

A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing.
These are the modes of voluntary recognition of natural children.

In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child, then his filiation may be established by means of the
circumstances or grounds for compulsory recognition prescribed in the aforementioned articles 283 and 284.

The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of natural children, as provided for in article 285 of the
Civil Code, applies to spurious children.xxii[22] (Citations omitted, italics supplied)

Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional rights over spurious ones.xxiii[23] However, Rovira treats them as
equals with respect to other rights, including the right to recognition granted by Article 285.

To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their
minority are thus given the right to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining
majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.

Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could not have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of
their putative parents. As respondent aptly points out in his Memorandum,xxiv[24] the State as parens patriae should protect a minors right.
Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and only twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The
minor must be given his day in court.

Third Issue: Failure to Implead the CA

Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is no longer required to implead the lower courts or judges x x x either as
petitioners or respondents. Under Section 3, however, the lower tribunal should still be furnished a copy of the petition. Hence, the failure of
petitioner to implead the Court of Appeals as a party is not a reversible error; it is in fact the correct procedure.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., no part. Relationship with family.

 G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987
Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision
reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community." 3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with
the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:
__________ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the
same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet
the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year
residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration
Record 94-No. 3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and
canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood"
in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for
the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on
or before the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In
said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition
seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First
District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but
of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence
therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued
such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the
First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the town
of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner
now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and
verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1)
finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues,
namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and
petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation
or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that what was
asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she
could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First
District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she
tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since
childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a
resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be registering in
Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer
of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly
acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for
RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is
curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual
and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in
the Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the
election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The
reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the
result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court
in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of
form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a
substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material representation in
the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds
of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since
childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the
respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January
28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition).
Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the
cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995
will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not complied with the one year residency
requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo
Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the
residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color
of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent
in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in
Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In
1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as
the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if she
had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992,
she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election
officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-
registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This
debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and
on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have
abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the
Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2)
intention to remain there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus manendi with animus
non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a
voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to
the effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of
her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to
reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner
correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she
placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be inconsequential
as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First
District of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district for six
months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
16
of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First
Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters having been
raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she
obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC
reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the
highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional
seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995.
Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent
Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public
respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9,
1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus
Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications
after the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of
"Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the
purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of
domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective
position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural
persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent
home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the
sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in
a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person
in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to
leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or
health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22
It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single
domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic,
23
we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary;
"domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one
place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited
time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of
residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of
remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have
evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously
with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a
fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the
same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros
Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other
than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in
these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the
intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle
that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in
the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election.
This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has
been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to
reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on
Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by
domicile and not physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously
adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article
VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence
in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual
has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for
a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the
residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First
district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second
Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that she would be
registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that
petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which is
Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the
possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency
where a candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it
appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8
the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's
registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest
mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the
COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some
years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the
fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the
Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election
of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a
member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident
of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in
different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal
residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of
residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she
filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court
carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without
having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his
residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having been
a candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes
study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to
improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he
may not absent himself from his professional or business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one
and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections.
Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the
explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth.
This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual)
residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the
constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the
COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied
in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St.
Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte
Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office
in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and
registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan,
Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him
in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came
home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she
indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different
purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in
Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during
her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized
projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held
positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her
domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in
the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of
petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was
eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-
establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the
fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established
only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires
an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence
adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of
origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's
former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and
"residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred
from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well
delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations between a person and a place;
but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should
live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage
yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of
residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla
de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to
establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family
home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same
provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another
home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only once, but as often as the
husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing
the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family
unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account the situations where the
couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife
should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and
not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or
other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a
question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is
used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more
residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile can exist
without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an
intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases
applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where the
spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her
husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs.
Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the
existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new
residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately
from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled
to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one
of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an
action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process
of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no
other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice have
assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England,
formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the
facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience,
requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges
who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate,
Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as that
which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be
obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the
practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can
still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in
the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory
order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband,
who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a
provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine
evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by
process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid
requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain
money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and
interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear
that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be
visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily
have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the
Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several
places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did
fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained
upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential
experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the
Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69)
distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of
women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in
political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife the
term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new
home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new
one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose
her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters
to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in
Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested
in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been
previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as
temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the
female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical
for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where
situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts
established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First
District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April
24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that
it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House
of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so
that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly
indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view
held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury
results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may
be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with impunity, without
affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the
aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed
merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision after the period stated in the
Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to
render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent
Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after
the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not
being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions
in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many
established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on
these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an
individual what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly
elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961

EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.

G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.

E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, absolving defendant Arellano University from
plaintiff's complaint, with costs against the plaintiff, and dismissing defendant's counter claim, for insufficiency of proof thereon.

In the language of the decision appealed from:

The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As established by the agreement of facts Exhibits X and by the respective oral and
documentary evidence introduced by the parties, it appears conclusive that plaintiff, before the school year 1948-1949 took up preparatory law
course in the defendant University. After finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant from
the school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and including the first semester of the fourth
year. During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying law in defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of the mother
of plaintiff, was the dean of the College of Law and legal counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last semester of his law
studies in the defendant university but failed to pay his tuition fees because his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano having severed his
connection with defendant and having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the College of Law of Abad Santos University, plaintiff
left the defendant's law college and enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of the Abad Santos University
graduating from the college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying law in defendant university was
awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the ends of semester and when his
scholarship grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the latter
from the first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year in the college of law or the fourth year, is in total P1,033.87. After
graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar examination. To secure permission to take the bar he needed the
transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. The defendant
refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar examination
without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from
defendant in this case.

Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he was made to sign the following contract covenant and
agreement:

"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my right to transfer to another school without
having refunded to the University (defendant) the equivalent of my scholarship cash.

(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".

It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the subject of
"Scholarship," addressed to "All heads of private schools, colleges and universities," reading:

1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show that some schools offer full or partial scholarships to deserving
students for excellence in scholarship or for leadership in extra-curricular activities. Such inducements to poor but gifted students
should be encouraged. But to stipulate the condition that such scholarships are good only if the students concerned continue in the
same school nullifies the principle of merit in the award of these scholarships.

2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that such scholarships are merited and earned. The amount in
tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they
decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a
school.

3. Several complaints have actually been received from students who have enjoyed scholarships, full or partial, to the effect that they
could not transfer to other schools since their credentials would not be released unless they would pay the fees corresponding to the
period of the scholarships. Where the Bureau believes that the right of the student to transfer is being denied on this ground, it reserves
the right to authorize such transfer.

that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that plaintiff asked the Bureau of Private Schools to pass upon the issue on
his right to secure the transcript of his record in defendant University, without being required to refund the sum of P1,033.87; that the
Bureau of Private Schools upheld the position taken by the plaintiff and so advised the defendant; and that, this notwithstanding, the
latter refused to issue said transcript of records, unless said refund were made, and even recommended to said Bureau that it issue a
written order directing the defendant to release said transcript of record, "so that the case may be presented to the court for judicial
action." As above stated, plaintiff was, accordingly, constrained to pay, and did pay under protest, said sum of P1,033.87, in order that
he could take the bar examination in 1953. Subsequently, he brought this action for the recovery of said amount, aside from P2,000 as
moral damages, P500 as exemplary damages, P2,000 as attorney's fees, and P500 as expenses of litigation.

In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the Bureau of Private Schools, namely, that the provisions of its contract
with plaintiff are valid and binding and that the memorandum above-referred to is null and void. It, likewise, set up a counterclaim for
P10,000.00 as damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees.

The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former
waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not.
The lower court resolved this question in the affirmative, upon the ground that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of
Private Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory, not mandatory in nature; and that, although the contractual
provision "may be unethical, yet it was more unethical for plaintiff to quit studying with the defendant without good reasons and
simply because he wanted to follow the example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in its brief that the aforementioned
memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is null and void because said officer had no authority to issue it, and because it had
been neither approved by the corresponding department head nor published in the official gazette.

We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower court did, the question whether plaintiff had sufficient reasons or
not to transfer from defendant University to the Abad Santos University. The nature of the issue before us, and its far reaching effects,
transcend personal equations and demand a determination of the case from a high impersonal plane. Neither do we deem it essential to
pass upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for, regardless of the same, we are of the opinion that the stipulation in question is
contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. The aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of public
policy. As the Director of Private Schools correctly pointed, out in his letter, Exhibit B, to the defendant,

There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or not the contract entered into between Cui and Arellano University
on September 10, 1951 was void as against public policy. In the case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 19
Ann. Case 127, the court said: 'In determining a public policy of the state, courts are limited to a consideration of the Constitution, the
judicial decisions, the statutes, and the practice of government officers.' It might take more than a government bureau or office to lay
down or establish a public policy, as alleged in your communication, but courts consider the practices of government officials as one
of the four factors in determining a public policy of the state. It has been consistently held in America that under the principles relating
to the doctrine of public policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a transaction which its
object, operation, or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty (Ritter vs.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139; Heding vs. Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811; Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano University
understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the motives which prompted this office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949,
it should have not entered into a contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our Memorandum
and an open challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound morality and
civic honesty. And finally, in Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order to declare a
contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some
established interest of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of
individual rights. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of
merit not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that university scholarships award is a
business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with
sound policy but also good morals. But what is morals? Manresa has this definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted
principles of morality which have received some kind of social and practical confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to
attract students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except
in some private institutions as in Arellano University. The University of the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of
the Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the
corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So also with the leading colleges and universities of the
United States after which our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions scholarships are granted not to attract
and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom society has an
established interest or a first lien. (Emphasis supplied.)

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as
well as the costs, and dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Parades, Dizon, De Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., reserves his vote.
 G.R. No. L-11002 January 17, 1916

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MATEO P. PALACIO, defendant-appellant.

Antonio Belmonte for appellant.

Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.

ARAULLO, J.:

These proceedings for violation of section 87 of Act No. 82, the Municipal Code, were brought against the defendant, Mateo P.
Palacio, in the Court of First Instance of Leyte by the following complaint filed therein by the fiscal on December 18, 1914.

The undersigned charges Mateo P. Palacio with having violated section 87 of Act No. 82, in the following manner, to wit: Said
accused, on or about the 26th day of September, 1914, in the municipality of Tacloban, Province of Leyte, P.I., he being then and
there a deputy to the provincial assessor of Leyte, charged with the duty of assessing real property, did wilfully, unlawfully, and
criminally upon revising the assessment and in reassessing the property of Francisco Madlonito, situated in the barrio of Di-it,
municipality of Tacloban, omit from the tax list certain real properties and improvements belonging to said Francisco Madlonito,
knowing that the properties omitted were lawfully taxable; in violation of law.

A demurrer having been filed by defendant's counsel on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint did not constituted the crime
provided for and punished by said section 87 of Act No. 82, the same was overruled, and, defendant having pleaded not guilty, the
case came to trial. Evidence was introduced by both the prosecution and the defense, and, on January 15, 1915, said Court of First
Instance rendered judgment in which, insisting upon the overruling of the demurrer interposed to the complaint, and finding of the
demurrer interposed to the complaint, and finding the defendant guilty of the crime therein charged, he sentenced him to the penalty of
forty days' imprisonment in the provincial jail, to pay a fine of P100, or, in case of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment and to pay the costs. Defendant has appealed from this judgment and has assigned thereto various errors which, as
stated by the Attorney-General in his brief, may be reduced to the following:

1. That the lower court erred in holding that the evidence adduced at trial proves defendant's guilt beyond all reasonable doubt.

2. That the facts alleged in the complaint and proven at trial do not constitute the infraction provided for and punished by section 87 of
Act No. 82, known as the Municipal Code.

The evidence shows beyond all doubt that while defendant was serving as a deputy to the provincial assessor of Leyte, duly appointed
and such, and having proceeded under orders of said assessor, given in the month of September, 1914, to verify the measurement,
evaluation, and assessment of the properties of one Francisco Madlonito, situated in the barrio of Di-it, municipality of Tacloban of
said province, he presented in performance of his duty a report in which he recorded as real property belonging to said Francisco
Madlonito a rectangular parcel of unirrigated land which was adjoined on the north by the land of Anacleto Condes; on the east, by
that of Ventura Vias; on the south, by that of Jose Guardino; and on the west, by woods; it measured 3 hectares 51 ares and 23
centiares in area, the only improvements consisting of 500 hemp plants; that several days afterwards, in the following month of
October, the provincial assessor, having been advised that defendant's report was false, proceeded in company with another deputy to
remeasure and to make a new valuation and assessment of the same land, under guidance of and in accordance with date furnished by
the same Francisco Madlonito who had previously conducted and furnished information to defendant; as a result of this proceeding on
the part of said provincial assessor, it was ascertained that said land was unirrigated hemp or corn land; that it was polygonal in form
and was adjoined on the north by the property of Anacleto Condes and Basilio Espejo; on the east, by that of Nicanor Dolina, Basilio
Espejo and Ventura Vias; on the south, by the land of Tomas Tabosa and a wood; and by a wood on the west; it was found to
measure 15 hectares 17 ares and 65 centiares in extent, the improvements thereon consisting of a plantation of hemp, a dwelling house
of mixed material, 80 clumps of banana trees, 9 cacao trees, 24 coconut trees 5 years of age, and one coconut tree in bearing. It was
therefore apparent that in the tax list of real property which, as deputy to the provincial assessor, defendant was charged to prepare
that is, the report presented by him he had omitted real property belonging to Francisco Madlonito, which property consisted of 12
hectares 66 ares and 42 centares of land and all the improvements mentioned, with the exception of the 500 hemp plants specified in
this report.

Defendant endeavored in a way to explain this omission by attributing it to the fact that in making his report he relied upon the
information furnished by Francisco Madlonito himself, and, with respect to the area, on that given him at the time by the two laborers
who measured the land and who assured him that said measurement was correct, because it was the same as that which has been
pointed out to them by the owner of the land. Defendant further explained that he also accepted the informations furnished by said
laborers with respect to the improvements specified in said report as consisting of a plantation of hemp; that these men had told him
that there were no other improvements except the hemp plantation and some banana trees of which he did not know how many there
were; with respect to the house, Francisco Madlonito told him that it belonged to Emiliano, Francisco's brother; that this latter was
absent at the time and therefore defendant did not measure the property, deciding to postpone doing so until the 15th of January of the
following year, when he intended to return.

These explanations of the defendant are not satisfactory, nor can they serve to exonerate him as he claims because, in the first place,
he should not have relied on what the interest party himself, Francisco Madlonito, told him, nor upon the information which, at the
time he inspected and measured the lands, was furnished him by the two laborers of whose services he availed himself for the actual
performance of that labor. He himself ought to have verified the correctness of the information and have informed himself of the true
area of the land and of all the improvements thereon, they being in sight, in order to include them in the report which it was his duty to
render to the provincial assessor in fulfillment of the mission confined to him. In the second place, Francisco Madlonito himself
testified at the trial that he had furnished defendant with the same date and information which he subsequently gave to the provincial
assessor and to the latter's other deputy when they both went to verify and investigate the defendant's work, form which verification
and investigation it was disclosed that the land was larger by 12 hectares 66 ares and 42 centiares and that it contained many other
improvements such as clumps of coconut, cacao and banana trees, besides the 500 hemp plants mentioned in defendant's report. We
therefore fail to understand and it has not been explained how said improvements could have been omitted from the report, nor how
defendant could have failed to mentioned therein such a large tract of land as that of the 12 hectares above referred to. This, together
with the circumstances of defendant's having passed the previous night in Francisco Madlonito's own house, and having had,
therefore, sufficient opportunity and time to inform himself of exactly what the latter's property, which was to be measure and
recorded in said report, consisted of, constitute proof that defendant (exception made in so far as the house is concerned, for it might
be true that it did belong to Francisco Madlonito's brother), willfully omitted from his report and extensive portion of Francisco
Madlonito's real property that he knew was lawfully taxable and which it was his duty to record in said document. The lower court did
not, therefore, incur the first error assigned by defendant's counsel in his brief.

Defendant's counsel alleges, however, that the act committed by his client and which, as aforesaid, was proven at trial, does not
constitute an infraction provided for and punished by section 87 of Act No. 82, known as the Municipal Code."

That section provides as follows:

Any officer charged with the duty of assessing real property, who shall willfully omit from the tax lists real property which he knows
to be lawfully taxable, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos, or imprisonment
not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.

Section 49 of the same Act, No. 82, provides that the real estate of the municipality shall be valued and assessed for taxation by a
board, to consist of the president, the municipal treasurer, and a specially authorized deputy of the provincial treasurer, which board
shall be known as the municipal board of assessors.

Said section 49 was amended by section 1 of Act No. 1930, so that the aforementioned municipal board of assessors should consist of
the municipal president the municipal treasurer and, instead of the deputy to the provincial treasurer, of a third member to be
appointed by the provincial board.

Subsequently, on February 11, 1913, Act No. 2238 was passed, section 1 of which created the position of provincial assessor for each
province containing municipalities organized under the provisions of the Municipal Code. Section 2 of this Act provides that
provincial assessors shall be allowed such number of deputies and clerks as shall be fixed by the provincial board with the approval of
the Executive Secretary, and section 4, in reciting the duties of the provincial assessor, and, consequently, those of his deputies,
provides that, when directed by provincial board, he shall revise and correct the assessments and valuations of real property for the
purpose of taxation, and , in the manner set forth in the Act, revise and correct, when so directed, any and all assessments and
valuations for taxation, make a correct and just assessments and state the true value of the real property. Other sections of this Act
confer upon the provincial assessor various powers in connection with the preparation of the lists of property subject to assessment,
and, finally, establishes the procedure that must be followed where any municipality or any property owner does not agree with the
assessment and valuation so made.

As may be seen, the purpose of Act No. 2238, in creating the office of provincial assessor and allowing him such number of deputies
and clerks as shall be fixed by the provincial board with the approval of the Executive Secretary, was the same as that of Act No. 82,
in creating, in section 49 thereof, the municipal board of assessors; and Act No. 1930, in amending said section in the manner
aforementioned, to wit, by providing that all the real property, taxable or subject to the land tax, existing in the municipalities of these
Islands, should be assessed, and, for this purpose and in order that the provincial board should exercise the necessary and proper
supervision over acts of the municipalities relative to said tax, provided that someone representing the provincial board or better said,
a provincial official, should be a member of the municipal board of assessors a purpose and object which are more accentuated in
Act No. 2238 by expressly creating the office of provincial assessor for the revision and correction of assessments and valuations of
real property declared in the municipalities and to enable this official to take a direct and active part in preparing the lists of
property subject to said tax. Said Act 2238 is therefore intimately related to the two Acts Nos. 82 and 1930 aforecited, and is virtually
a complement of the same in so far as regards the declaration and assessment of taxable property.

Said Act No. 2238 provides in section 18 that all Acts or parts of Acts in conflict therewith are repealed. In the two aforementioned
Acts, Nos. 82 and 1930, in so far as relates to the assessment and valuation of taxable real property in municipalities, there is, strictly
speaking, nothing which may be said to be in conflict with said Act no. 2238, not only for the reason above stated, but also because
this Act has done nothing but change the method and procedure provided in Act No. 82, the Municipal Code, for determining the
taxable real property in the municipalities and the value thereof, by means of the intervention which in said procedure is given to the
provincial assessors. But that municipalities are not excluded from taking part in the proceedings is shown by the fact that section 9 of
this Act No. 2238 provides that, prior to directing the provincial assessor in accordance with the provisions thereof, to proceed to
revise and correct the assessments and valuations of real property, the provincial board shall require each municipal council of the
municipalities organized under the provisions of the Municipal Code (Act No. 82) to prepare, in such form and detail as the Executive
Secretary may prescribe, a general schedule of the values of the different classes of land for the municipality which shall be forwarded
to the provincial board for approval, and such schedule, when approved by the provincial board, shall serve the assessor as basis for
the valuation and assessment. It also provides in section 13 that it shall be the duty of the municipal president, secretary and treasurer
and all municipal employees, to render every assistance in their power to the provincial assessor.

Furthermore, one of the rules of interpretation, as very properly said by defendant's counsel in his brief, is that "when there are two
laws on the same subject enacted on different dates, and it appears evidently by the form and essence of the later law that it was the
intention of the legislator to cover therein the whole of the subject, and that it is a complete and perfect system, or is in itself a
provision, the latest law should be considered as a legal declaration that all that is comprised therein shall continue in force and that all
that is not shall rejected and repealed." A simple perusal of Act No. 2238 is sufficient to show that it was not the intention of the
legislature to cover all matters relative to the assessment and valuation of the taxable real property of the municipalities, and subject,
because, as aforesaid, the Act in question is closely related to Act No. 82, of which it is virtually a complement in so far as regards the
organization of the service of making the lists for the complete and adequate collection to the tax on the real property in municipalities
organized under said Act No. 82. It cannot, therefore, be maintained that section 87 of this latter Act should be considered as repealed,
in so far as it prescribes the penalty incurred by any official who, being charged with the duty of assessing real property, wilfully
omits form the tax lists any real property which he knows to be lawfully taxable.

Repeals by implications are not favored, and will not be decreed, unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are
presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude
that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to same matter, unless the repugnancy
between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the
later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure removed.
Hence, every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the later act will
not operate as a repeal of the earlier. (23 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 489, and cases there cited [vol. 26, pp. 721, 726].)

As said Act No. 2238 provides no penalty for the provincial assessor or his deputy who, in revising the assessment and preparing the
tax list of real property, wilfully makes any omission such as that aforestated; and as the provincial assessor, or his deputy, is a public
official or an official of the class referred to in section 87, it being immaterial whether he be a provincial or a municipal official (for it
is sufficient that it be the duty of such official to assess real property) it is evident that the said penal provisions in force and is
applicable to the provincial assessors and their deputies referred to in Act No. 2238, and that the lower court did not err in sentencing
defendant, under the provisions of said section 87, to the penalty specified in the judgment appealed from.

The fact that the cadastral survey of the municipality of Tacloban was to terminated at the time of the discovery of the omission made
by the defendant in the report presented by him to the provincial assessor, and that such omission might have been repaired by
correcting the list or report by means of revision and new assessment made by the provincial assessor himself on his proceeding with
the investigation of the misdemeanor committed by defendant, does not exempt the latter from liability, because what the law
punished in said section 87 is the fact of the willful omission, by the official charged with the duty of assessing the real property in the
tax list, of any property which he knows to be lawfully taxable; and it is immaterial whether said omission can or cannot subsequently
be remedied, because it constitutes in itself a false representation in that document and a fraud committed by the public official to
prejudice of the Government or with intent to cause such prejudice.

By reason of the foregoing, and the judgment appealed from being in accordance with the merits of the case and the law, we hereby
affirm the same, with the costs against appellant. So ordered.
 G.R. No. L-19628 December 4, 1922

LICHAUCO & COMPANY, INC., petitioner,

vs.
SILVERIO APOSTOL, as Director of Agriculture, and RAFAEL CORPUS, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, respondents.

Gibbs, McDonough and Johnson for petitioner.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents.

STREET, J.:

This is an original petition for the writs of mandamus and injunction, filed in this court by Lichauco & Company against the
respondents, Silverio Apostol, as Director of Agriculture, and Rafael Corpus, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. An
order having been issued by this court requiring the respondents to appear and show cause why the relief prayed for should not be
granted, the Attorney-General presented a return, in the nature of a demurrer, in their behalf; and the cause is now before us for the
determination of the questions thus presented.

It is alleged in the complaint that the petitioner is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands and that it has
been engaged for several years in the business of importing carabao and other draft animals into the Philippine Islands and that it is
now desirous of importing from Pnom-Pehn, in French Indo-China, a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of
serum but that the respondent Director of Agriculture refuses to admit said cattle, except upon the condition, stated in Administrative
Order No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture, that said cattle shall have been immunized from rinderpest before embarcation at Pnom-
Pehn. The petitioner therefore asks for an order requiring the respondents to admit the contemplated importation of cattle into the
Islands and enjoining them from the enforcement of said administrative order in the future.

The petitioner asserts that under the first proviso to section 1762 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3052 of the
Philippine Legislature, it has "an absolute and unrestricted right to import carabao and other draft animals and bovine cattle for the
manufacture of serum from Pnom-Pehn, Indo-China, into the Philippine Islands" and that the respondents have no authority to impose
upon the petitioner the restriction referred to above, requiring the immunization of the cattle before shipment.

The respondents, on the other hand, rely upon section 1770 of the Administrative Code and upon Administrative Order No. 21 of the
Bureau of Agriculture, promulgated on July 29, 1922, by the Director of Agriculture, in relation with Department Order No. 6,
promulgated on July 28, 1922, by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as supplying authority for the action taken.

Such portions of the laws above-mentioned as are material to the present controversy will be set out in full, preceded by section 1762
of the Administrative Code, as originally enacted, to which will be appended the pertinent parts of the orders referred to and the
communication of the Director of Agriculture of August 31, 1922.

1. First paragraph of section 1762 of Administrative Code in original form:

SEC. 1762. Bringing of diseased animal into Islands forbidden. Except upon permission of the Director of Agriculture, with the
approval of the head of Department first had, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or otherwise bring into the
Philippine Islands any animal suffering from, infected with, or dead of any dangerous communicable disease, or any effects pertaining
to such animal which are liable to introduce such disease into the Philippine Islands.

2. First paragraph of section 1762 of Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3052 of the Philippine Legislature:

SEC. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. It shall be unlawful for any person or
corporation to import, bring or introduce live cattle into the Philippine Islands from any foreign country. The Director of Agriculture
may, with the approval of the head of the department first had, authorize the importation, bringing or introduction of various classes of
thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands, and such as may be necessary for
the improvement of the breed, not to exceed five hundred head per annum: Provided, however, That the Director of Agriculture shall
in all cases permit the importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum: Provided,
further, That all live cattle from foreign countries the importation, bringing or introduction of which into the Islands is authorized by
this Act, shall be submitted to regulations issued by the Director of Agriculture, with the approval of the head of the department, prior
to authorizing its transfer to other provinces.
3. Section 1770 of Administrative Code:

SEC. 1770. Prohibition against bringing of animals from infected foreign countries. When the Department Head shall by general
order declare that a dangerous communicable animal disease prevails in any foreign country, port, or place and that there is danger of
spreading such disease by the importation of domestic animals therefrom, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or
bring into the Philippine Islands any such animal, animal effects, parts, or products from such place, unless the importation thereof
shall be authorized under the regulation of the Bureau of Agriculture.

4. Department Order No. 6, promulgated on July 28, 1922, by Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources:

DEPARTMENT ORDER
}
}Series of 1922.
NO. 6. }

Owing to the fact that a dangerous communicable disease known as rinderpest exist in Hongkong, French Indo-China and British
India, it is hereby declared, in accordance with the provisions of section 1770 of Act No. 2711 (Administrative Code of the Philippine
Islands of 1917), that rinderpest prevails in said countries, and as there is danger of spreading such disease by the importation of cattle,
carabaos, and pigs therefrom, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or bring into the Philippine Islands any such
animal, animal effects, parts, or products from Hongkong, French Indo-China and British India, unless the importation thereof shall be
authorized under the regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture.

The provisions of this order shall take effect on and after August 1, 1922.

5. Administrative Order No. 21, of the Bureau of Agriculture, promulgated July 29, 1922, by the Director of Agriculture:

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
}
}
NO. 21 }

Re importation of cattle, carabaos, and pigs from French Indo-China, Hongkong and India.

1. Pursuant to the provisions of Department Order No. 6, series of 1922, of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the
present regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture governing the importation of livestock from French Indo-China and Hongkong are
hereby amended to the effect that the importation of livestock of the species named in the aforementioned Department Order is hereby
prohibited from French Indo-China, Hongkong and India. However, animals immunized against rinderpest, for which the importer
before placing his order shall have obtained from the Director of Agriculture a written permit to import them from the above named
countries, may be allowed entrance into the Philippine Islands.

2. This order shall take effect on and after August 1, 1922.

6. Communication of August 31, 1922, from the Acting Director of Agriculture to Faustino Lichauco (in part):

SIR: In reply to your application for permission to import from 300 to 400 carabaos immunized against rinderpest from Pnom-Pehn,
French Indo-China, I have the honor to inform you that the permission is hereby granted, under the following conditions:

1. Animals must be immunized by the simultaneous method before shipment. At least 10 c.c. of good virulent blood must be injected
at the first injection simultaneously with the serum. Ten days after the simultaneous inoculation all non-reactors must receive another
injection of not less than 10 c.c. of virulent blood (alone).

2. The immunization must be done by a veterinarian designated by the French Government for the purpose, who must issue a
certificate stating the fact that the animal has been immunized according to the requirements in number 1 and it must not be embarked
until ten days after the second injection of virulent blood.

xxx xxx xxx

Very respectfully,

SILVERIO APOSTOL,
Acting Director of Agriculture.

Upon glancing over the matter above collated, it will be seen at once that section 1770 of the Administrative Code on its face
authorizes the action taken by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in closing our ports (in the manner and to the extent
indicated in Department Order No. 6) to the importation of cattle and carabao from French Indo-China, supposing of course, as
everybody knows and as the petitioner does not deny, that the disease of rinderpest exists in that country.

It is claimed, however, that section 1762 of the Administrative Code, so far as it authorizes restriction upon the importation of draft
cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum, has been impliedly repealed by the amendatory Act No. 3052, which is of later
enactment that the Administrative Code; and in this connection reliance is chiefly placed on the first proviso to section 1762, as
amended by said Act No. 3052, which is in these words: "Provided, however, That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit
the importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum." This then is the first and
principal question in the case, namely, whether section 1770 has been repealed by implication, in so far as it relates to draft animals
and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. We say repealed by implication, for it will be noted that that Act No. 3052 has no
repealing clause, and it contains only one section, i. e., that amending section 1762 of the Administrative Code.

We are of the opinion that the contention of the petitioner is untenable, for the reason that section 1762, as amended, is obviously of a
general nature, while section 1770 deals with a particular contingency not made the subject of legislation in section 1762. Section
1770 is therefore not to be considered as inconsistent with section 1762, as amended; on the other hand, it must be treated as a special
qualification of section 1762. Of course the two provisions are different, in the sense that if section 1762, as amended, is considered
alone, the cattle which the petitioner wishes to bring in can be imported without restriction, while if section 1770 is still in force the
cattle, under the conditions stated in the petition, can be brought in only upon compliance with the requirements of Administrative
Order No. 21. But this difference between the practical effect of the two provisions does not make then inconsistent in the sense that
the earlier provision (sec. 1770) should be deemed repealed by the amendatory Act (3052).

That section 1770 is special, in the sense of dealing with a special contingency not dealt with in section 1762, is readily apparent upon
comparing the two provisions. Thus, we find that while section 1762 relates generally to the subject of the bringing of animals into the
Island at any time and from any place, section 1770 confers on the Department Head a special power to deal with the situation which
arises when a dangerous communicable disease prevails in some defined foreign country, and the provision is intended to operate only
so long as that situation continues. Section 1770 is the backbone of the power to enforce animal quarantine in these Islands in the
special emergency therein contemplated; and if that section should be obliterated, the administrative authorities here would be
powerless to protect the agricultural industry of the Islands from the spread of animal infection originating abroad.

We note that the argument for unrestricted importation extends only to the importation of cattle for draft purposes and bovine cattle
for the manufacture of serum, leaving section 1770 theoretically in full effect as regards the importation of cattle for other purposes, as
where they are imported for slaughter; but the importation of cattle for draft purposes is the principal thing, and unless that can be
regulated under the conditions and to the extent attempted by the respondents in this case, the power given in section 1770 is
obviously worthless.

In our opinion section 1762, as amended, and section 1770 must be construed in pari materia as harmonious parts of the law dealing
with animal quarantine; and section 1762, as amended, can be given effect only in so far as it is not restricted by section 1770. Here,
as always, the general must yield to the particular.

If the Congress of the United States should this day repeal the Chinese Exclusion Law so far as it affects these Islands, and should
declare that all persons of Chinese nationality shall be at liberty to enter the Philippine Islands without restriction, would anybody
suppose that such enactment would have the effect of abolishing the power to maintain quarantine against any Chinese port where
cholera or bubonic plaque might hereafter be raging in epidemic form? Yet the question now before us is not fundamentally different
from the one thus supposed.

The judicial precedents are conclusive to the effect that no implied repeal of a special provisions of the character of the one now under
consideration will result from the enactment of broader provision of a general nature. In other words, a general statute without
negative words does not repeal a previous statute which is particular, even though the provisions of one be different from the other.
(Rymer vs. Luzerne County, 12 L. R. A., 192; Petri vs. F. E. Creelman Lumber Co., 199 U. S., 487; 50 L. ed., 281.)

Wherever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute, and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive
sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only
the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply. (Sir John Romilly, Master of the Rolls, in Pretty vs. Solly, 26 Beav., 606,
610.)

The additional words of qualification needed to harmonize a general and a prior special provision in the same statute should be added
to the general provision, rather than to the special one. (Rodgers vs. United States, 185 U. S., 82; 46 L. ed., 816.)

Specific legislation upon a particular subject is not affected by a general law upon the same subject unless it clearly appears that the
provision of the two laws are so repugnant that the legislature must have intended by the later to modify or repeal the earlier
legislation. The special act and the general law must stand together, the one as the law of the particular subject and the other as the
general law of the land. (Ex Parte United States, 226 U. S., 420; 57 L. ed., 281; Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S., 556; 27 L. ed., 1030;
Partee vs. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 204 Fed. Rep., 970.)

Where there are two acts or provisions, one of which is special and particular, and certainly includes the matter in question, and the
other general, which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act or provision, the special
must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general act or provision, especially when such general and special acts or
provisions are contemporaneous, as the Legislature is not to be presumed to have intended a conflict. (Crane vs. Reeder and Reeder,
22 Mich., 322, 334; University of Utah vs. Richards, 77 Am. St. Rep., 928.)

It is well settled that repeals by implication are not to be favored. And where two statutes cover, in whole or in part, the same matter,
and are not absolutely irreconcilable, the duty of the court no purpose to repeal being clearly expressed or indicated is, if
possible, to give effect to both. In other words, it must not be supposed that the Legislature intended by a latter statute to repeal a prior
one on the same subject, unless the last statute is so broad in its terms and so clear and explicit in its words as to show that it was
intended to cover the whole subject, and therefore to displace the prior statute. (Frost vs. Wenie, 157 U. S., 46; 39 L. ed., 614, 619.)
As stated in the pages of the two most authoritative legal encyclopedias, the rule is that a prior legislative act will not be impliedly
repealed by a later act unless there is a plain, unavoidable and irreconcilable repugnancy between the two. If both acts can by any
reasonable construction stand together, both will be sustained. (36 Cyc., 1074- 1076; 26 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law, 2d ed., 725-726.)

A masterly analysis of the decisions of the United States Courts pertinent to the matter now in hand will be found in the monographic
article on "Statutes and Statutory Construction," written by Chas. C. Moore and prefixed as a General Introduction to Federal Statutes
Annotated. The discussion there given is too lengthy to be here reproduced in full, but some of the observations of the learned author
are so appropriate to the case before us that we cannot forego the temptation to include the same in this opinion. Says the writer: "The
various provisions of an act should be read so that all may, if possible, have their due and conjoint effect without repugnancy or
inconsistency. The sections of a code relative to any subject must be harmonized and to that end the letter of any section may
sometimes be disregarded. But where absolute harmony between parts of a statute is demonstrably non-existent, the court must reject
that one which is least in accord with the general plan of the whole, or if there be no such ground for choice between inharmonious
section, the later section being the last expression of the legislative mind must, in construction, vacate the former to the extent of the
repugnancy." (1 Fed. Stat. Ann., 2d ed., 49-50.)

And speaking with reference to the rule by which special provisions are held to dominate over general provisions in the same or later
laws, the author proceeds: " 'it is an old and familiar rule,' said Mr. Justice Lamar, 'that where there is in the same statute a particular
enactment, and also a general one, which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the
particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language
as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.' And the Justice proceeded to apply that rule in the construction of a
statute upon which there had been much ingenious argument and a decided conflict of authority in the inferior federal courts. The
stature was an act of Congress of 1876, declaring nonmailable 'every obscene . . . book, pamphlet, paper, writing, print, or other
publication of an indecent character,' and other enumerated articles, and making it a misdemeanor to deposit any of them for mailing.
In a prosecution under the act, the Circuit Court certified to the Supreme Court the following question: 'Is the knowingly depositing in
the mails of an obscene letter, inclosed in an envelope or wrapper upon which there is nothing but the name and address of the person
to whom the letter is written, an offense within the act?' On behalf of the government it was contended that the word 'writing'
comprehended such a letter, but the Supreme Court held otherwise. In the course of his argument in support of the view of the court,
Justice Lamar pointed out that the statute, after enumeration what articles shall be nonmailable, adds a separate and distinct clause
declaring that 'every letter upon the envelope of which . . . indecent, lewd, obscene, or lascivious delineations, epithets, terms, or
language may be written or printed . . . shall not be conveyed in the mails,' and the person knowingly or willfully depositing the same
in the mails 'shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,' etc. 'This distinctly additional clause,' continued the Justice, 'specifically
designating and describing the particular class of letters which shall be nonmailable, clearly limits the inhibitions of the statute to that
class of letters alone whose indecent matter is exposed on the envelope.' " (1 Fed. Stat. Ann., 2d ed., 50-51; also at pp. 164-166.)

The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the assumption that if the act of latter date clearly reveals an
intention on the part of the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law, this intention must be given effect; but there must always be a
sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has become an unbending rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a
former law will not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears that the two statute, or provisions, with reference to which the
question arises bear to each other the relation of general to special. It is therefore idle to speculate whether in the case before us the
Philippine Legislature may or may not have intended to modify or abrogate section 1770 of the Administrative Code at the time the
amendment to section 1762 was enacted, for if any such intention was entertained, it was not revealed in a way that would justify a
court in giving this intention effect. We may add, however, that, in the opinion of the majority of the Justices participating in this
decision, the Legislature in amending section 1762 could not possibly have entertained a design to modify section 1770; for, as we
have already shown, the abrogation of that provision, even as regards draft animals alone, would leave the animal industry of the
Islands exposed to the danger incident to the unrestricted importation of infected animals from districts where rinderpest prevails. The
unreasonableness of this interpretation of the amendatory law alone supplies sufficient warrant for rejecting it. The Legislature could
not possibly have intended to destroy the effectiveness of quarantine as regards imported animals.

Our conclusion then is that section 1770 of the Administrative Code remains in full force; and the determination of this question is we
think necessarily fatal to the petitioner's case.

It is insisted, however, that even supposing section 1770 of the Administrative Code to be in force, nevertheless, the requirement of
immunization at the port of embarcation is unreasonable, inasmuch as the immunization of the cattle at that port, under the supervision
of the Government veterinarians of French Indo-China, is not unconditionally accepted as efficacious by the Philippine authorities, as
shown by the fact that the latter further require tests to be made upon the arrival of the cattle here, consisting of inoculation with
virulent blood of animals suffering from rinderpest which involves additional expenses and exposes the importer to the loss of his
entire herd.

Considerations of this nature are we think more proper to be addressed to the authorities responsible for the regulations than to this
court. About the principal fact that rinderpest exists in the regions referred to in Department Order No. 6, there is, and can be no
dispute; and when the Department Head declared that the disease prevails in those regions and that there is danger of spreading it by
the importation of cattle and carabao into this country, he was acting upon a matter within his province, and we are not disposed to
review the conclusion.

It has been suggested that the regulative power vested in the Director of Agriculture under section 1770 of the Administrative Code
with respect to the admission of cattle into the Philippine Islands attaches only when the importation has been effected; and that the
said Director has no authority to dictate the measures to be taken by the importer before the cattle are embarked for transportation to
these Islands. This contention, in our opinion, reflects a mistaken point of view with reference to the effect of the regulations; and the
answer is to be found in the consideration that the regulation in question has prospective reference to the condition of the cattle upon
their arrival here. In other words, the prior immunization of the cattle is made a condition precedent to the right to bring them in; as
much as to say, that only animals conforming to the required type will be admitted. The importer is thus left at entire liberty in respect
to the taking of the necessary measures to gain admittance for his cattle in our ports; and if he fails to do so, the penalty merely is that
the cattle are not admitted.

Upon the whole we are of the opinion that the petition does not show sufficient ground for granting the writs of mandamus and
injunction. The demurrer interposed thereto by the respondents in their return to the order to show cause, dated October 7, 1922, is
therefore sustained, and the temporary restraining order heretofore promulgated in this cause, dated September 21, 1922, is dissolved;
and unless within five days after notification hereof the petitioner shall so amend his petition as to show a sufficient cause of action, an
order absolute will be entered, dismissing the same, with costs. So ordered.

Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

JOHNS, J., dissenting:

The question involved is the meaning and construction of Act No. 3052 of the Legislature at its special session approved March 14,
1922, as it amends section 1762 of Act No. 2711, and to what extent, if any, it repeals or modifies section 1770 of Act No. 2711.

It will be noted that section 1 of Act No. 3052 reads as follows:

Section seventeen hundred and sixty-two of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven, known as the Administrative Code, is
hereby amended to read as follows:

Hence, Act No. 3052 becomes, and is, a complete substitute for section 1762 of Act No. 2711, which reads as follows:

SEC. 1762. Bringing of diseased animal into Islands forbidden. Except upon permission of the Director of Agriculture, with the
approval of the head of Department first had, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or otherwise bring into the
Philippine Islands any animal suffering from, infected with, or dead of any dangerous communicable disease, or any effects pertaining
to such animal which are liable to introduce such disease into the Philippine Islands.

Any such animal or its effects may be permitted by the Director of Agriculture, with the approval of the head of Department first had,
to enter the Islands under such conditions as to quarantine, cremation, or other disposal as he may direct, or which shall be deemed by
him sufficient to prevent the spread of any such disease.

As amended by Act No. 3052, section 1762 reads as follows:

SEC. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. It shall be unlawful for any person or
corporation to import, bring or introduce live cattle into the Philippine Islands from any foreign country. The Director of Agriculture
may, with the approval of the head of the department first had, authorize the importation, bringing or introduction of various classes of
thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands, and such as may be necessary for
the improvement of the breed, not to exceed five hundred head per annum: Provided, however, That the Director of Agriculture shall
in all cases permit the importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum: Provided,
further, That all live cattle from foreign countries the importation, bringing or introduction of which into the Islands is authorized by
this Act, shall be submitted to regulations issued by the Director of Agriculture, with the approval of the head of the department, prior
to authorizing its transfer to other provinces.

At the time of the approval of this Act, the Governor-General shall issue regulations and others to provide against a raising of the price
of both fresh and refrigerated meat. The Governor-General also may, by executive order, suspend this prohibition for a fixed period in
case local conditions require it.

It was approved March 14, 1922.

It will be noted that the original Act was entitled:

Bringing of diseased animal into Islands forbidden.

And that , as amended by Act No. 3052, it is now entitled:

Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.

Of course, it must follow that any animal imported into the Philippine Islands must be brought here from a foreign country within the
meaning of either Act. It will be noted that the word "diseased," as found in the title of the original Act, is not found in the title of the
Act as amended. To my mind this is important, especially in view of the language used in the amended Act, which reads:

It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to import, bring or introduce live cattle into the Philippine Islands from any foreign
country.

Standing alone that language would be construed as an express prohibition against bringing cattle of any kind into the Philippine
Islands "from any foreign country." The Act then says:
The Director of Agriculture may, with the approval of the head of the department first had, authorized the importation, bringing or
introduction of various classes of thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands,
and such as may be necessary for the improvement of the breed, not to exceed five hundred head per annum.

By those provisions the Director of Agriculture, with the approval of the head of the department first had and obtained, may authorize
the importation of thoroughbred cattle for breeding purposes not to exceed five hundred head per annum. To import such cattle, the
shipper must obtain the consent of the Director of Agriculture, together with the approval "of the head of the department," and it must
appear that the cattle "are thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands," and
that they are of the kind which will improve the breed of the native cattle, and the number must not exceed five hundred head per
annum. That is to say, by the express terms of the Act, thoroughbred cattle cannot be imported without the express consent and
approval of the Director of Agriculture and the head of his department, and then only for specific purposes, and then in a limited
quantity. Such provision will not admit of any other construction. Bearing those provisions and such construction in mind, the Act
further says:

Provided, however, That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle
and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum.

Under the former provision of the Act thoroughbred cattle cannot be imported without the consent of the Director of Agriculture,
"without the approval of the head of the department first had." But as to draft cattle and bovine cattle, the Act expressly provides:

That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation.

That is to say, as to thoroughbred cattle, he may or may not grant the permit, and then only in a limited number. But as to draft cattle
and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum, he "shall in all cases permit the importation." As to such cattle it is not a matter of his
choice or discretion. But the majority opinion holds that he is given that power and discretion under section 1770 of Act No. 2711,
which reads as follows:

SEC. 1770. Prohibition against bringing of animals from infected foreign countries. When the Department Head shall be general
order that a dangerous communicable animal disease prevails in any foreign country, port, or place and that there is danger of
spreading such disease by the importation of domestic animals therefrom, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or
bring into the Philippine Islands any such animal, animal effects, parts, or products from such place, unless the importation thereof
shall be authorized under the regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture.

It will be noted that section 1770 was enacted in 1917, and that Act No. 3052 was enacted March 14, 1922, five years after section
1770 became a law. It will also be noted that the rules and regulation here sought to be enforced were promulgated in July, 1922,
under section 1770, and four months after Act No. 3052 became a law. That is to say, that here you have rules and regulations of a
subordinate department promulgated in July, 1922, that are in dire0ct conflict with an Act of the Legislature approved March, 1922.
But it is contended that one is a special and the other a general law, and that the two Acts should be construed in pari materia. The
construction overlooks the fact that the force and effect of section 1770 of Act No 2711 is founded upon section 1762, and that both
are sections of the same general Act, and that when section 1762 is repealed, as it is, by Act No. 3052, in so far as it applies to draft
and bovine cattle, there is nothing left upon which section 1770 can operate or to which it would apply. That is to say, that section
1762 and section 1770 are both sections of a general Act, and part of one and the same Act, and Act No. 3052 expressly repeals
section 1762, and by doing so it repeals section 1770, in so far as it applies to draft and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum.

For illustration: Suppose that section 1762 had never been amended by Act No. 3052, and that the Legislature enacted a law expressly
repealing the whole section, how then would section 1770 operate, and to what would it apply, and how and where would it be in
force and effect? There would be nothing to which it could apply. Section 1770 is absolutely dependent upon section 1762, without
which it cannot be of any force or effect. Both of them are sections of the same general law, and one is dependent upon the other,
hence, when you amend or repeal section 1762, you modify or repeal section 1770, in so far as it relates to, or is a part of, section
1762.lawphil.net

Section 1770 is entitled:

Prohibition against bringing of animals from infected foreign countries.

Section 1762, as amended by Act No. 3052, is entitled:

Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.

Section 1762, as amended, recites:

That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation, etc.

The word "importation" has a well-defined meaning, and must have been used with reference to its legal meaning.

Words and Phrases, volume IV, page 3438, says:

"The literal meaning of "importation" is to bring in with intent to land. It means a bringing into some port, harbor, or haven, with an
intent to land the goods there. It takes place when the vessel arrives at a port of entry, intending there to discharge her cargo." (Kidd
vs. Flagler [U.S.], 54 Fed., 367, 369; The Mary [U.S.], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.)

Importation is not the making entry of goods at the customhouse, but merely the bringing them into port; and the importation is
complete before entry at the customhouse. (United States vs. Lyman [U.S.], 26 Fed. Cas., 1024, 1028; Perots vs. United States, 19 Fed.
Cas., 258.)

Act Cong. July 1, 1812, c. 112, providing a double duty on all goods, wares, and merchandise imported into the United States from
and after the passage of the acts, means not only that there shall be an arrival within the limits of the United States and of a collection
district, but also within the limits of some port of entry. (Arnold vs. United States, 13 U. S. [9 Cranch], 104, 120; 3 L. ed., 671.)

An article is not imported from a foreign country, within the meaning of the tariff laws, until it actually arrives at a port of entry of the
United States, and the importation is governed by the law in force at the time of such arrival; and hence under the Treaty of Paris, by
which Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States, and which took effect by the exchange of ratification and the president's
proclamation on April 1, 1899, which repealed the existing tariff duties on goods brought from those islands, the goods, arriving at a
port of entry of the United States from Philippine ports after its taking effect, were not subject to duty, although they were shipped
before April 11th. (American Sugar Refining Co. vs. Bidwell [U.S.], 124 Fed., 677, 681.)lawphil.net

Applying this definition, the legislative Act says:

That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation, etc.

Giving to the word "importation," as used in the Act, its legal meaning, it is the express duty of the Director of Agriculture to permit
the bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle with the ports and harbors of the Philippine Islands when they are brought
here with intent to land. That is the definition given to the word "importation" by both the Federal and the Supreme Courts of the
United State. That is to say, that in all cases it is the express duty of the Director of Agriculture to permit the bringing or introduction
of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum within the jurisdiction, ports and harbors of the Philippine Islands. If that
part of Act No. 3052 does not mean what it says, it does not mean anything. Again, it must be conceded that the Legislature of the
Philippine Islands has no authority to make or enforce any law beyond its jurisdiction, and that it never intended to do so.

As the majority opinion states, the case is submitted to the court on the demurrer of the defendants to the complaint. Hence, all of the
material allegations of the complaint are admitted.

The defendants rely upon Department Order No. 6, as follows:

DEPARTMENT ORDER
}
}Series of 1922.
NO. 6. }

Owing to the fact that a dangerous communicable disease known as rinderpest exist in Hongkong, French Indo-China and British
India, it is hereby declared, in accordance with the provisions of section 1770 of Act No. 2711 (Administrative Code of the Philippine
Islands of 1917), that rinderpest prevails in said countries, and as there is danger of spreading such disease by the importation of cattle,
carabaos, and pigs therefrom, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or bring into the Philippine Islands any such
animal, animal effects, parts, or products from Hongkong, French Indo-China and British India, unless the importation thereof shall be
authorized under the regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture.

The provisions of this order shall take effect on and after August 1, 1922.

And Administrative Order No. 21, as follows:

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER
}
}
NO. 21. }

Re importation of cattle, carabaos, and pigs from French Indo-China, Hongkong and India.

1. Pursuant to the provisions of Department Order No. 6, series of 1922, of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the
present regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture governing the importation of livestock from French Indo-China and Hongkong are
hereby amended to the effect that the importation of livestock of the species named in the aforementioned Department Order is hereby
prohibited from French Indo-China, Hongkong and India. However, animals immunized against rinderpest, for which the importer
before placing his order shall have obtained from the Director of Agriculture a written permit to import them from the above named
countries, may be allowed entrance into the Philippine Islands.

2. This order shall take effect on and after August 1, 1922.

Hence, you have this situation. You have an Act of the Legislature which says:
"That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for
the manufacture of serum," passed by the Legislature in March, 1922, and you have rules and regulations of a subordinate department
of the Government which absolutely prohibits the importation of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum, "unless
the importation thereof shall be authorized under the regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture," and "that the importation of livestock
of the species named in the aforementioned Department Order is hereby prohibited from French Indo-China, Hongkong and India,"
and where the important, before placing his order in a foreign country, shall obtain a written permit from the Director of Agriculture,
and then he may be allowed to import cattle into the Philippine Islands.

The question is thus squarely presented whether the rules and regulations of a subordinate department can overthrow and destroy the
express provisions of a legislative Act. It will be noted that Act No. 3052 expressly provides that with certain limitations and
reservations, and with the consent and approval of the Director of Agriculture and the head of the department, thoroughbred cattle may
be brought into the Islands in limited number for certain purposes. There are no such restriction or limitations for the bringing in or
introduction of draft and bovine cattle. Under that provision, the Legislature has said in express terms that the Director of Agriculture
shall grant the permit in all cases. If it had been the purpose and intent of the Legislature to place any restrictions or limitations upon
"the importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum," it would have said so, as it
did in the previous provision of the Act for the importation of thoroughbred cattle. But it is contended that, notwithstanding Act No.
3052, section 1770 is not repealed and remains in full force and effect.

Upon the question of where and how a statute is repealed, Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction is a recognized as standard
authority in all the courts. In section 247 (vol. I), the author says:

. . . therefore, the former law is constructively repealed, since it cannot be supposed that the law-making power intends to enact or
continue in force laws which are contradictions. The repugnancy being ascertained, the later act or provision in date or position has
full force, and displace by repeal whatever in the precedent law is inconsistent with it.

Subsequent legislation repeals previous inconsistent legislation whether it expressly declares such repeal or not. In the nature of things
it would be so, not only on the theory of intention, but because contradictions cannot stand together.

"Where the later or revising statute clearly covers the whole subject-matter of antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the
purpose of the legislature to give expression in it to the whole law on the subject, the latter is held to be replaced by necessary
implication."

An affirmative enactment of a new rule implies a negative of whatever is not included, or is different; and if by the language used a
thing is limited to be done is a particular form or manner, it includes a negative that it shall not be done otherwise. An intention will
not be ascribed to the law-making power to establish conflict and hostile systems upon the same subject, or to leave in force
provisions of law by which the later will of the legislature may be thwarted and overthrown. Such a result would render legislation a
useless and idle ceremony, and subject the law to the reproach of uncertainly and unintelligibility. (Sec. 249.)

Where a later act grants to an officer or tribunal a part of a larger power already possessed, and in terms which interpreted by
themselves import a grant of all the power the grantee is intended to exercise, it repeals the prior act from which the larger power had
been derived. (Sec. 250.)

In the leading case of Gorham vs. Luckett (6 B. Mon., 146), Marshall, J., says:

This is not a case of the re-enactment of a former law in the same words, or with additional provisions, nor of a regrant of a pre-
existing power to the same or a greater extent. It is not a case of cumulative or additional power or right or remedy. Nor does it come
within the rule that a subsequent affirmative statute does not repeal a previous one, which can only apply where both statute can have
effect. This is a formal and express grant of limited power to a depository which already had unlimited power. And it can have no
effect, nor be ascribed to any other purpose, but that of limiting the extent of the pre-existing power. If certain provisions of two
statutes are identical, the last need not be construed as repealing, but merely as continuing or re-affirming, the first, for which there
might be various reasons. So, if a statute give a remedy, or provide that certain acts shall be sufficient for the attainment or security of
certain objects, and a subsequent statute declare that a part of the same remedy or some of the same acts, or other acts entirely
different, shall suffice for the accomplishment of the same object, here the latter act does not necessarily repeal the former, except so
far as it may be expressed or implied in the former that the end shall be attained by no other mode but that which it prescribes. If there
be no such restriction in the first, there is no conflict between them. Both may stand together with full effect, and the provisions of
either may be pursued.

But if a subsequent statute requires the same, and also more than a former statute had made sufficient, this is in effect a repeal of so
much of the former statute as declares the sufficient of what it prescribes. And if the last act professes, or manifestly intends to
regulate the whole subject to which it relates, it necessary supersedes and repeals all former acts, so far as it differs from them in its
prescriptions. The great object, then is, to ascertain the true interpretation of the last act. That being ascertained, the necessary
consequence is, that the legislative intention thus decided from, it must prevail over any prior inconsistent intention to be deduced
from a previous act.

. . . The difficulty, or rather the embarrassment in the case, arises from the fact that a previous law had given to the same grantee
unlimited power on the same subject, and that this twentieth section makes no reference to the previous law, and contains no express
words or restriction or change, but granting an express and limited power, is framed as if it were the first and only act on the subject.
But do not these circumstance indicate that it is to be construed as if it were the only act on the subject? Or shall the first act, which is
inferior in authority so far as they conflict, so far affect the construction of the last, as to deprive it of all effect? We say the last act
must have effect according to its terms and its obvious intent. And as both cannot have full operation according to their terms and
intent, the first and not the last act must yield.
Section 1770 was enacted in 1917, and Act No. 3052 in 1922, five years later, and the rules and regulations sought to be enforced are
founded upon section 1770 and were promulgated about five months after Act No. 3052 became a law. The two sections are not only
inconsistent, but there is a direct conflict between them as to the importation of draft and bovine cattle, especially as to the
promulgated rules and regulations. The Legislature says that as to draft and bovine cattle, the permit shall be granted in all cases, and
defendants say that we will not grant the permit under any circumstances, unless you comply with the rules and regulations that we
have promulgated, which are impossible of performance, and are in direct conflict with Act No. 3052 of the Legislature.

As Lewis' Sutherland says:

. . . therefore, the former law is constructively repealed, since it cannot be supposed that the law-making power intends to enact or
continue in force laws which are contradictions. The repugnancy being ascertained, the later act or provision in date or position has
full force, and displaces by repeal whatever in the precedent law is inconsistent with it.

And

Subsequent legislation repeals previous inconsistent legislation whether it expressly declares such repeal or not. In the nature of things
it would be so, not only on the theory of intention, but because contradictions cannot stand together.

It must be conceded that any authority of the defendants to promulgated rules and regulations must be found upon some legislative act,
and that in the absence of legislative authority, the defendants have no right or license to promulgate any rules and regulations for any
purpose. Hence, you have this situation; that the Legislature in positive and express language has said that "the Director of Agriculture
shall in all cases permit the importation, bringing and introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum," and
the defendants have said that we will not comply with the legislative act, you shall not import cattle until you comply with rules and
regulations which we have made and promulgated, which rules and regulations, in legal effect, absolutely prohibit the importation of
such cattle for any purpose.

It is not for this court to legislate or to say whether or not Act No. 3052 is a good law or a bad law. Suffice it to say that it was enacted
by the Legislative, which, to say the least, knows as much about the cattle business in the Philippine Islands as do the members of this
court.

In its petition, the plaintiff offers to comply with all the port, harbor and quarantine rules and regulations of the Philippine Islands. But
it is contended that they are not sufficient to prevent the spread of disease among the cattle. If not, they should be amended, and other
and more strict quarantine regulations within the Philippine Islands should be adopted, and the Legislature has the power to absolutely
prohibited the importation of cattle into the Islands for any and all purposes, which it did in Act No. 3052, except as to certain
limitations and provisions, among which are "that in all cases the Director of Agriculture shall permit the importation, bringing and
introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum."

Under the facts alleged, the petitioner has brought itself squarely within those provisions and the Director of Agriculture has denied
him the permit which the Legislature says he must grant, and has imposed upon it the performance of impossible rules and regulations
as a condition precedent to the granting of the permit.

Under the majority opinion, as to the importation of draft and bovine cattle, we have a government of rules and regulations
promulgated by a subordinate of the government which are in direct conflict with the legislative Act.

By the majority opinion all that portion of Act No. 3052, which says "that the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the
importation, etc.," becomes a nullity and is overruled by a subordinate branch of the Government. In legal effect, it holds that, in so far
as there is a conflict between them, the provisions of section 1770 must prevail over the provisions of Act No. 3052. That is not good
law. In so far as there is a conflict, Act No. 3052 should be construed as repealing section 1770, for the simple reason that Act No.
3052 became a law about five years after section 1770.

The majority opinion violates every canon of statutory construction. For such reasons, with all due respect to it, I vigorously dissent.

Araullo, C. J., and Romualdez, J., concur.

 A.M. No. MTJ-95-1070. February 12, 1997]

MARIA APIAG, TERESITA CANTERO SECUROM and GLICERIO CANTERO, complainants, vs. JUDGE
ESMERALDO G. CANTERO, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Judges ought to be more learned than witty, more reverend than plausible, and more advised than confident. Above all things, integrity
is their portion and proper virtue.xi[1]

The eminent Francis Bacon wrote the foregoing exhortation some 400 years ago. Today, it is still relevant and quotable. By the nature
of their functions, judges are revered as models of integrity, wisdom, decorum, competence and propriety. Human as they are,
however, magistrates do have their own weaknesses, frailties, mistakes and even indiscretions. In the case before us, respondent Judge
Esmeraldo G. Cantero was charged administratively in the twilight of his government service, as a result of a failed love affair that
happened some 46 years ago. After an otherwise unblemished record, he would have reached the compulsory retirement age of 70
years on August 8, 1997 had death not intervened a few months ago on September 26, 1996. Notwithstanding his death, this Court still
resolved to rule on this case, as it may affect his retirement benefits.

Antecedent Facts

In a letter-complaintxi[2] dated November 10, 1993, Maria Apiag Cantero with her daughter Teresita A. Cantero Sacurom and son
Glicerio A. Cantero charged the respondent, Judge Esmeraldo G. Cantero of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pinamungajan-
Aloquinsan, Cebu, with gross misconduct for allegedly having committed bigamy and falsification of public documents.

After receipt of the respondent's Comment, the Court on February 5, 1996, referred this casexi[3] to Executive Judge Gualberto P.
Delgado of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu for investigation, report and recommendation. The latter submitted his
Report and Recommendationxi[4] dated July 26, 1996. Thereafter, the Court referred this case also to the Office of the Court
Administratorxi[5] for evaluation, report and recommendation.

According to the complainants:

"Sometime in August 11, 1947, defendant (should be respondent) and plaintiff (should be complainant) Maria Apiag, joined together
in holy matrimony in marriage after having lived together as husband and wife wherein they begot a daughter who was born on June
19, 1947, whom they named: Teresita A. Cantero; and then on October 29, 1953, Glicerio A. Cantero was born. Thereafter, defendant
left the conjugal home without any apparent cause, and leaving the plaintiff Maria Apiag to raise the two children with her meager
income as a public school teacher at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte. Plaintiffs suffered a lot after defendant abandoned them for no
reason whatsoever. For several years, defendant was never heard of and his whereabout unknown.

Few years ago, defendant surfaced at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte, whereupon, plaintiffs begged for support, however, they were
ignored by defendant. x x x"xi[6]

On September 21, 1993, complainants, through Atty. Redentor G. Guyala, wrote a letter to respondent as follows:

"Judge Esmeraldo Cantero

Pinamungajan, Cebu

Dear Judge Cantero:

We are writing in behalf of your legal wife, Maria Apiag, and your two legitimate children by her, Teresita (Mrs. Sacurom) and
Glicerio.

It appears that sometime in the 1950's for reasons known only to you, you left your conjugal home at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte,
and abandoned without any means of support your said wife and children. Since then and up to now, they have not seen or heard from
you.

They would wish now that you do them right by living up to your duty as husband and father to them, particularly that expressly
provided under Art. 68 and Art. 195 of the Family Code (Art. 109 and 195 of the Civil Code) in relation to Art. 203 of the same Code.
You will please consider this letter as a formal demand for maintenance and support for three of them, and a request that they be
properly instituted and named as your compulsory heirs and legal beneficiaries in all legal documents now on file and to be filed with
the Supreme Court and other agencies or offices as may be required under applicable laws, such as, the insurance (GSIS) and
retirement laws.

We hope this matter can be amicably settled among you, your wife and children, without having to resort to judicial recourse.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) REDENTOR G. GUYALA"xi[7]

The letter elicited no action or response from the respondent. Subsequently, complainants learned that respondent Judge had another
family. In their own words,

"x x x The plaintiffs later on learned that defendant has another wife by the name of Nieves C. Ygay, a Public School teacher from
Tagao, Pinamungajan, Cebu. According to some documents obtained by plaintiffs, the herein defendant and Nieves C. Ygay have
children of their own, named as follows with their date of births: Noralyn Y. Cantero -- May 19, 1968; Ellen Y. Cantero -- February 4,
1970; Erwin Y. Cantero -- April 29, 1979; Onofre Y. Cantero -- June 10, 1977; and Desirie Vic Y. Cantero -- December 2, 1981.

It was shocking to the senses that in all of the public documents required of defendant Judge Cantero to be filed with the Supreme
Court such as his sworn statement of assets and liabilities, his personal data sheet (SC Form P. 001), income tax returns and his
insurance policy with the Government Service Insurance System, defendant misrepresented himself as being married to Nieves C.
Ygay, with whom he contracted a second marriage. The truth of the matter is that defendant is married to plaintiff Maria Apiag with
whom they have two legitimate children, namely: Teresita A. Cantero and Glicerio A. Cantero."xi[8]

The respondent Judge, in his Comment, explained his side as follows:

"x x x I admit the existence and form of Annex 'A' of the said complaint, but vehemently deny the validity of its due execution, for the
truth of the matter is that such alleged marriage was only dramatized at the instance of our parents just to shot (sic) their wishes and
purposes on the matter, without my consent freely given. As a matter of fact, I was only called by my parents to go home to our town
at Hinundayan, Southern Leyte to attend party celebration of my sister's birthday from Iligan City, without patently knowing I was
made to appear (in) a certain drama marriage and we were forced to acknowledge our signatures appearing in the duly prepared
marriage contract(.) That was 46 years ago when I was yet 20 years of age, and at my second year high school days."xi[9]

Furthermore, Judge Cantero related that:

"x x x sometime in the year 1947, when both respondent and complainant, Maria Apiag were still in their early age and in their second
year high school days, they were engaged in a lovely affair which resulted to the pregnancy of the said complainant, and then and
there gave birth to a child, named Teresita Apiag, having (been) born out of wedlock on June 19, 1947, now Mrs. Teresita Sacurom,
one of the complainants. That in order to save name and shame, parents of both the respondent and the complainant came to an
agreement to allow the respondent, and the complainant (to) get married in the (sic) name, but not to live together as husband, wife for
being close relatives, thereby forcing the respondent to appear in a marriage affair where all the pertinent marriage papers were all
ready (sic) prepared (sic), and duly signed by somebody; that after the said affair both respondent and the complainant immediately
separated each other (sic) without living together as husband, and wife even for a day, nor having established a conjugal home. From
that time respondent and the complainant have never met each other nor having (sic) communicated (with) each other for the last 40
years; that respondent continued his studies at Cebu City, and eventually became member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examination in the year 1960, that is 14 years after the affair of 1947; that in 1964, respondent was first connected in the government
service as Comelec Registrar of the Commission on Elections, assigned at Pinamungajan, Cebu(,) that is 16 years after the affair of
1947; that in the year 1982, respondent was appointed as CLAO lawyer, now PAO, of the Department of Justice, that is 35 years after
the after the affair of 1947; and finally, on October 3, 1989, respondent was appointed to the Judiciary as Municipal Circuit Trial
Judge (MCTC) of the Municipalities of Pinamungajan and Aloguinsan, province of Cebu, that is 42 years from August 11, 1947; that
respondent is (sic) already 32 years in the government service up to the present time with more than 6 years in the Judiciary; that
respondent is already 69 years old, having been born on August 8, 1927, and retirable by next year if God willing; that respondent has
served in the government service for the last 32 years, faithfully, honestly and judiciously without any complaint whatsoever, except
this instant case; that respondent as member of the Judiciary, has live-up (sic) to the standard required by the (sic) member (sic) of the
bar and judiciary; that the charges against the respondent were all based or rooted from the incedent (sic) that happened on August 11,
1947 and no other; that the complainants are morally dishonest in filing the instant (case) just now, an elapsed (sic) of almost 42 years
and knowing that respondent (is) retirable by next year, 1997; that this actuation is very suspicious, and intriguing;

xxx xxx xxx

That complainant Maria Apiag has been living together with another man during her public service as public school teacher and have
begotten a child, name (sic) Manuel Apiag and respondent promised (sic) the Honorable Court to furnish a complete paper regarding
this case in order to enlighten the Honorable (Court) that, he who seek (sic) justice must seek justice with cleab (sic) hand;

That respondent did not file any annullment (sic) or judicial declaration (of nullity) of the alleged marriage because it is the contention
and honest belief, all the way, that the said marriage was void from the beginning, and as such nothing is to be voided or nullified, and
to do so will be inconsistent with the stand of the respondent; that this instant case (was) simply filed for money consideration as
reflected in their letter of demand; (t)hat as a matter of fact, respondent and the complainant have already signed a compromised (sic)
agreement, copy of which hereto (sic) attached as Annex '1', stating among other things that respondent will give a monthly allowance
to Terecita (sic) Sacurom in the (amount) of P4,000.00 and the complainant will withdraw their complaint from the Supreme Court.,
and that respondent had already given the said allowance for three consecutive months plus the amount of P25,000.00 for their
Attorney to withdraw the case, and that respondent stop (sic) the monthly allowance until such time the complainant will actually
withdraw the instant case, and without knowledge of the respondent, complainant proceeded (sic) their complaint after the elapsed
(sic) of three (3) years."xi[10]

Relevant portions of said compromise agreement which was executed sometime in March 1994 by Esmeraldo C. Cantero and Teresita
C. Sacurom and witnessed by Maria Apiag and Leovegardo Sacurom are reproduced thus:

"That this COMPROMISE AGREEMENT is executed and entered into by ESMERALDO C. CANTERO, of legal age, married,
Filipino, and with residence and postal address at Pinamungajan, Cebu, Philippines, otherwise called as the FIRST PARTY, and
TERESITA C. SACUROM, also of legal age, married, Filipino, representing her mother and her brother, and a residence (sic) of 133-
A J. Ramos Street, Caloocan City, after having duly swirn (sic) to in accordance with law do hereby depose and say:

1. That the First Party is presently a Municipal Circuit Trial Judge of Pinamungajan-Aloguinsan, Cebu, is charged by Second Party for
Misconduct before the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court now pending action;

2. That the parties have came (sic) to agreement to have the said case settled amicably in the interest of family unity and
reconciliation, and arrived at compromise agreement based on law of equity, as follows:

(a) That both parties have agreed voluntarily, the Second Party will get ONE FOURTH (1/4) of the retirement that the First will
receive from the GSIS, and the rest of it will be for the First Party;

(b) That the Second Party and his brother will be included as one of the beneficiaries of the First Party, in case of death;

(c) That the Second party and his only brother will inherit the properties of the First party inherited from his parents;

(d) That the Second Party, representing her brother, is authorized to receive and collect P4,000.00, monthly out of the second check
salary of the First Party (The second half salary only);

3. That it was further voluntarily agreed that the Second Party will cause the withdrawal and the outright dismissal of the said pending
case filed by her and her mother;

4. That it was also agreed that the above agreement, shall never be effective and enforceable unless the said case will be withdrawn
and dismiss (sic) from the Supreme Court, and said dismissal be received by the First Party, otherwise the above-agreement is void
from the beginning; and the Second Party must desist from further claining (sic) and filing civil abd (sic) criminal liabilities.

5. That this agreement is executed voluntarily, in good faith, and in the interest of good will and reconciliation and both parties is (sic)
duty bound to follow faithfully and religiously."xi[11]

In line with the foregoing, the respondent wrote a letter dated 14 March, 1994 addressed to the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) designating Teresita Cantero Sacurom and Glicerio Cantero as additional beneficiaries in his life insurance policy.xi[12]

The Issues

The respondent Judge formulated the following "issues":

"1. That the first marriage with the complainant, Maria Apiag on August 11, 1947 is void;

2. The absence of his first wife complainant Maria Apiag for more than seven (7) years raise the presumption that she is already dead,
that there was no need for any judicial declaration;

3. The charge of Grave Misconduct is not applicable to him because assuming that he committed the offense, he was not yet a member
of the judiciary;

4. The crime of Bigamy and Falsification had already prescribed;

5. The charges have no basis in fact and in law."xi[13]

Report and Recommendation of Investigating Judge and Court Administrator

Investigating Judge Gualberto P. Delgado recommended in his report that:

"After a careful perusal of the evidence submitted by the parties, this Office finds respondent Guilty of the crime of Grave Misconduct
(Bigamy and Falsification of Public Documents) however, considering his length of service in the government, it is recommended that
he be suspended for one (1) year without pay."xi[14]

The Office of the Court Administrator also submitted its reportxi[15] recommending respondent Judge's dismissal, as follows:
"After a careful review of all the documents on file in this case, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the investigating
judge.

Extant from the records of the case and as admitted by respondent, he was married to complainant Maria Apiag on August 11, 1947
and have (sic) two (2) children with her. Respondent's contention that such marriage was in jest and assuming that it was valid, it has
lost its validity on the ground that they never met again nor have communicated with each other for the last 40 years cannot be given a
(sic) scant consideration. Respondent's argument that he was not yet a lawyer, much more, a member of the bench when he contracted
his first marriage with the complainant, is unavailing for having studied law and had become a member of the Bar in 1960, he knows
that the marriage cannot be dissolved without a judicial declaration of death. Respondent's second marriage with Nieves Ygay was
therefore bigamous for it was contracted during the existence of a previous marriage.

We are likewise not persuaded by the assertion of the respondent that he cannot be held liable for misconduct on the ground that he
was not yet a lawyer nor a judge when the act(s) complained of were committed. The infraction he committed continued from the time
he became a lawyer in 1960 to the time he was appointed as a judge in October 23, 1989. This is a continuing offense (an unlawful act
performed continuously or over and over again, Law Dictionary, Robert E. Rothenberg). He can therefore be held liable for his
misdeeds.

On the charge of falsification, it was shown with clarity in his Personal Data Sheet for Judges, Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities
and Networth, Income Tax Return (pp. 99-102, rollo), that he had committed a misrepresentation by stating therein that his spouse is
Nieves Ygay and (had) eight (8) children (with her) which is far from (the) truth that his wife is Maria Apiag with whom he had two
(2) children.

Aside from the admission, the untenable line of defense by the respondent presupposes the imposition of an administrative sanction
for the charges filed against him. 'A judge's actuation of cohabiting with another when his marriage was still valid and subsisting - his
wife having been allegedly absent for four years only constitutes gross immoral conduct' (Abadilla vs. Tabiliran Jr., 249 SCRA 447).
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. While deceit employed
by respondent, existed prior to his appointment as a x x x Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with x x x began and
continued when he was already in the judiciary. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial
guidepost to(sic) self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the judiciary (Atienza vs. Brilliantes, Jr., 243 SCRA 32-33).

ACCORDINGLY, it is respectfully recommended that respondent judge be DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave
and retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-appointment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations."

As earlier indicated, respondent Judge died on September 27, 1996 while this case was still being deliberated upon by this Court.

The Court's Ruling

In spite of his death, this Court decided to resolve this case on the merits, in view of the foregoing recommendation of the OCA
which, if affirmed by this Court, would mean forfeiture of the death and retirement of the respondent.

Gross Misconduct Not Applicable

The misconduct imputed by the complainants against the judge comprises the following: abandonment of his first wife and children,
failing to give support, marrying for the second time without having first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage,
and falsification of public documents. Misconduct, as a ground for administrative action, has a specific meaning in law.

"'Misconduct in office has definite and well understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects
his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been
said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of man from the character of an officer. x x x It is settled that misconduct,
misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer, must have direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of official duties x x x .' More specifically, in Buenaventura vs. Benedicto, an administrative proceeding against a judge
of the court of first instance, the present Chief Justice defines misconduct as referring 'to a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer.' That is to abide by the
authoritative doctrine as set forth in the leading case of In re Horilleno, a decision penned by Justice Malcolm, which requires that in
order for serious misconduct to be shown, there must be 'reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or
inspired by an intention to violate the law or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.'"xi[16]

The acts imputed against respondent Judge Cantero clearly pertain to his personal life and have no direct relation to his judicial
function. Neither do these misdeeds directly relate to the discharge of his official responsibilities. Therefore, said acts cannot be
deemed misconduct much less gross misconduct in office. For any of the aforementioned acts of Judge Cantero" x x x (t)o warrant
disciplinary action, the act of the judge must have a direct relation to the performance of his official duties. It is necessary to separate
the character of the man from the character of the officer."xi[17]

Nullity of Prior Marriage

It is not disputed that respondent did not obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Maria Apiag prior to marrying
Nieves C. Ygay. He argued however that the first marriage was void and that there was no need to have the same judicially declared
void, pursuant to jurisprudence then prevailing. In the en banc case of Odayat vs. Amante,xi[18] complainant charged Amante, a clerk
of court, with oppression, immorality and falsification of public document. The complainant Odayat alleged among others " x x x that
respondent is cohabiting with one Beatriz Jornada, with whom he begot many children, even while his spouse Filomena Abella is still
alive x x x." In order to rebut the charge of immorality, Amante " x x x presented in evidence the certification (of the) x x x Local
Civil Registrar x x x attesting that x x x Filomena Abella was married to one Eliseo Portales on February 16, 1948. Respondent's
contention is that his marriage with Filomena Abella was void ab initio, because of her previous marriage with said Eliseo Portales."
This Court ruled that "Filomena Abella's marriage with the respondent was void ab initio under Article 80 [4] of the New Civil Code,
and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages."xi[19]

Now, per current jurisprudence, "a marriage though void still needs x x x a judicial declaration of such fact"xi[20] before any party
thereto "can marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void."xi[21] This was expressly provided under Article 40xi[22]
of the Family Code. However, the marriage of Judge Cantero to Nieves Ygay took place and all their children were born before the
promulgation of Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy and before the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, the doctrine in Odayat vs. Amante
applies in favor of respondent.

On the other hand, the charge of falsification will not prosper either because it is based on a finding of guilt in the bigamy charge.
Since, as shown in the preceding discussion, the bigamy charge cannot stand, so too must the accusation of falsification fail.
Furthermore, the respondent judge's belief in good faith that his first marriage was void shows his lack of malice in filling up these
public documents, a valid defense in a charge of falsification of public document,xi[23] which must be appreciated in his favor.

Personal Conduct of a Judge

However, the absence of a finding of criminal liability on his part does not preclude this Court from finding him administratively
liable for his indiscretion, which would have merited disciplinary action from this Court had death not intervened. In deciding this
case, the Court emphasizes that "(t)he personal behavior of a judge, not only upon the bench but also in his everyday life, should be
above reproach and free from the appearance of impropriety. He should maintain high ethical principles and sense of propriety without
which he cannot preserve the faith of the people in the judiciary, so indispensable in an orderly society. For the judicial office
circumscribes the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of restrictions thereon, which he has to observe faithfully as the
price he has to pay for accepting and occupying an exalted position in the administration of justice."xi[24] It is against this standard
that we must gauge the public and private life of Judge Cantero.

The conduct of the respondent judge in his personal life falls short of this standard because the record reveals he had two families. The
record also shows that he did not attend to the needs, support and education of his children of his first marriage. Such is conduct
unbecoming a trial magistrate. Thus, the late Judge Cantero "violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandates that
'[a] judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and
in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach,' and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which provides that '[a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.'"xi[25]

A Penalty of Suspension is Warranted

Finally, the Court also scrutinized the whole of respondent's record. Other than this case, we found no trace of wrongdoing in the
discharge of his judicial functions from the time of his appointment up to the filing of this administrative case, and has to all
appearances lived up to the stringent standards embodied in the Code of Judicial Conduct. Considering his otherwise untarnished 32
years in government service,xi[26] this Court is inclined to treat him with leniency.

Man is not perfect. At one time or another, he may commit a mistake. But we should not look only at his sin. We should also consider
the man's sincerity in his repentance, his genuine effort at restitution and his eventual triumph in the reformation of his life.

This respondent should not be judged solely and finally by what took place some 46 years ago. He may have committed an
indiscretion in the past. But having repented for it, such youthful mistake should not forever haunt him and should not totally destroy
his career and render inutile his otherwise unblemished record. Indeed, it should not demolish completely what he built in his public
life since then. Much less should it absolutely deprive him and/or his heirs of the rewards and fruits of his long and dedicated service
in government. For these reasons, dismissal from service as recommended by the Office of the Court Administrator would be too
harsh.

However, we also cannot just gloss over the fact that he was remiss in attending to the needs of his children of his first marriage --
children whose filiation he did not deny. He neglected them and refused to support them until they came up with this administrative
charge. For such conduct, this Court would have imposed a penalty. But in view of his death prior to the promulgation of this
Decision, dismissal of the case is now in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.

Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the
Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short,
and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been
performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior
subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly
forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage
(assuming the presence of force exerted against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the
validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence-

(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and

(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.

Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties of the first marriage
had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of therespondent Judge-

(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for resolution based on "agreed facts;" and

(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.

We find the petition devoid of merit.

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming
this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no
annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband,
consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each
other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such fact and for all legal
intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl
Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Feria (Chairman), Fernan Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

 G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985

PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and
ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA, JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA,
JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN S. FLORESCA;

LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children LINDA, ROMEO,
ANTONIO JEAN and ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ;

SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE, ESTELA,
JULITA SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed OBRA;

LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDNA, GEORGE and
LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;

DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDITHA,
ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and AURELIO, JR. all surnamed LANUZA;

EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE, LORENZO, JR.,
MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed ISLA, petitioners,
vs.
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First
Instance of Manila, respondents.

Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners.

Tito M. Villaluna for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:

This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, dated December 16, 1968
dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while
working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried
them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations,
negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground.
Portion of the complaint reads:

xxx xxx xxx

9. That for sometime prior and up to June 28,1967, the defendant PHILEX, with gross and reckless negligence and imprudence and
deliberate failure to take the required precautions for the due protection of the lives of its men working underground at the time, and
in utter violation of the laws and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the Government pursuant thereto, allowed great
amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above Block 43-S-1 which seeped through and saturated the
600 ft. column of broken ore and rock below it, thereby exerting tremendous pressure on the working spaces at its 4300 level, with
the result that, on the said date, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, with the collapse of all underground supports due to such
enormous pressure, approximately 500,000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks, mud and water, accompanied by surface boulders,
blasted through the tunnels and flowed out and filled in, in a matter of approximately five (5) minutes, the underground workings,
ripped timber supports and carried off materials, machines and equipment which blocked all avenues of exit, thereby trapping within
its tunnels of all its men above referred to, including those named in the next preceding paragraph, represented by the plaintiffs
herein;

10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHILEX's mine on the said date, five (5) were able to
escape from the terrifying holocaust; 22 were rescued within the next 7 days; and the rest, 21 in number, including those referred to
in paragraph 7 hereinabove, were left mercilessly to their fate, notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a great many of them were
still alive, entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued due to defendant PHILEX's decision to abandon rescue
operations, in utter disregard of its bounden legal and moral duties in the premises;
xxx xxx xxx

13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities as set out by the Special Committee above referred to, in their Report of investigation, pages 7-13, Annex 'B' hereof, but
also failed completely to provide its men working underground the necessary security for the protection of their lives
notwithstanding the fact that it had vast financial resources, it having made, during the year 1966 alone, a total operating income of
P 38,220,254.00, or net earnings, after taxes of P19,117,394.00, as per its llth Annual Report for the year ended December 31, 1966,
and with aggregate assets totalling P 45,794,103.00 as of December 31, 1966;

xxx xxx xxx

(pp. 42-44, rec.)

A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of petitioners based on an industrial
accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA 772) and that the
former Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an opposition dated May 27, 1968 to the said
motion to dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but on
the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, particularly:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict.

(b) Art. 1173The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.

Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x

In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which
may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.

Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.

After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27, 1968 dismissing the case on the
ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. On petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the said order, respondent Judge, on September 23, 1968, reconsidered and set aside his order of June 27, 1968
and allowed Philex to file an answer to the complaint. Philex moved to reconsider the aforesaid order which was opposed by
petitioners.

On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that in accordance with the
established jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or
compensation claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of workmen or employees, irrespective of whether or not the
employer was negligent, adding that if the employer's negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries, the employer shall,
pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, pay additional compensation equal to 50% of the compensation
fixed in the Act.

Petitioners thus filed the present petition.

In their brief, petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS- PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT FOR
LACK OF JURISDICTION.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN
CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER
THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.

In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower court has jurisdiction over the cause of action since the complaint
is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on damages, particularly Articles 2176, 2178, 1173, 2201 and 2231, and not on the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. They point out that the complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on the
part of Philex in failing to take the necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground. They
also assert that since Philex opted to file a motion to dismiss in the court a quo, the allegations in their complaint including those
contained in the annexes are deemed admitted.

In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that respondent Judge failed to see the distinction between the claims for
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the claims for damages based on gross negligence of Philex under the
Civil Code. They point out that workmen's compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from injury,
disability or death of the working man through industrial accident or disease, without regard to the fault or negligence of the
employer, while the claim for damages under the Civil Code which petitioners pursued in the regular court, refers to the
employer's liability for reckless and wanton negligence resulting in the death of the employees and for which the regular court has
jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.

On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively under the provisions of Sections 5 and
46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which read:

SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by
reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to
the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil
Code and other laws because of said injury ...

SEC. 46. Jurisdiction. The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme
Court, ...

Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. 855 [1956]) where it was held that "all claims of workmen against
their employer for damages due to accident suffered in the course of employment shall be investigated and adjudicated by the
Workmen's Compensation Commission," subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent, does not remove the case from the exclusive character of recoveries
under the Workmen's Compensation Act; because Section 4-A of the Act provides an additional compensation in case the
employer fails to comply with the requirements of safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. In fact, it points out that Philex
voluntarily paid the compensation due the petitioners and all the payments have been accepted in behalf of the deceased miners,
except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca who insisted that they are entitled to a greater amount of damages under the Civil Code.

In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo, then Atty. Edgardo Angara, now President of the
University of the Philippines, Justice Manuel Lazaro, as corporate counsel and Assistant General Manager of the GSIS Legal
Affairs Department, and Commissioner on Elections, formerly UP Law Center Director Froilan Bacungan, appeared as amici
curiae and thereafter, submitted their respective memoranda.

The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26, 1976, is:

Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under the
Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative, that is to say, whether his or his heirs'
action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen's
Compensation Act or whether they have a right of selection or choice of action between availing of the worker's
right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher
damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer
or of his other employees or whether they may avail cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.

There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured employee or worker, or the heirs in case
of his death, may initiate a complaint to recover damages (not compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act) with the
regular court on the basis of negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. Atty. Angara believes otherwise.
He submits that the remedy of an injured employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section
5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, while Atty. Bacungan's position is that the action is selective. He opines that the heirs of
the employee in case of his death have a right of choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided under the Workmen's
Compensation Act or to sue in the regular court under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by virtue of
negligence of the latter. Atty. Bocobo's stand is the same as that of Atty. Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect the remedy
provided for under the Act, they are no longer entitled to avail themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil Code by
filing an action for higher damages in the regular court, and vice versa.

On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that they
have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex. In the resolution of September 7, 1978, WE dismissed the petition only
insofar as the aforesaid petitioners are connected, it appearing that there are other petitioners in this case.

WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case,

It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's Compensation Act but a
complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00)
pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder.
In fact, no allegation appeared in the complaint that the employees died from accident arising out of and in the course of their
employments. The complaint instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to protect
the lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting in the death of the employees working
underground. Settled is the rule that in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's compensation
claim or a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or allegations in the complaint
(Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100).

In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a contractual relationship. The alleged gross and
reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part of Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which
it may be held liable for damages. The provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract when there is fraud or bad faith,
read:

Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is able
shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the
parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.

In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which
may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.

Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all kinds of damages, as assessed by the court.

The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs from that in giving damages under the
Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages,
payments under the acts being made as compensation and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate the
harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is liable whether negligence exists
or not since liability is created by law. Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the
employer (99 C.J.S. 36).

In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for loss of income, as long as the
death, sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the employer
(Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of
his rights. It is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his person, property or relative rights,
through the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452).

The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal relation between the defendant's negligence
and the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered. While under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a presumption in
favor of the deceased or injured employee that the death or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated; and the employer has
the burden to prove otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria Cristina Fertilizer
Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).

The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's Compensation Commission then, now Employees
Compensation Commission, is strengthened by the fact that unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's Compensation Act did not
contain any provision for an award of actual, moral and exemplary damages. What the Act provided was merely the right of the
heirs to claim limited compensation for the death in the amount of six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos plus burial expenses of two
hundred (P200.00) pesos, and medical expenses when incurred (Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's Compensation Act), and an
additional compensation of only 50% if the complaint alleges failure on the part of the employer to "install and maintain safety
appliances or to take other precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational disease" (Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case at
bar, the amount sought to be recovered is over and above that which was provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act and
which cannot be granted by the Commission.

Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits should be paid to an employee who suffered an
accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of his employer but caused by factors outside the industrial
plant of his employer. Under the Civil Code, the liability of the employer, depends on breach of contract or tort. The Workmen's
Compensation Act was specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or workmen. It is a social legislation designed to
give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an accident causing his death or ailment or injury in the pursuit of his
employment (Abong vs. WCC, 54 SCRA 379).

WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or
choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the
regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that
negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.

In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker has a
choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an
ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.
In Pacaa WE said:

In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma, involving the application of Section 6 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to sue third- party tortfeasors in the regular courts, Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, again speaking for the Court, pointed out that the injured worker has the choice of remedies but
cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and thus balanced the relative advantage of recourse under
the Workmen's Compensation Act as against an ordinary action.

As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot maintain his action for damages against the respondents
(defendants below), because he has elected to seek compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law, and
his claim (case No. 44549 of the Compensation Commission) was being processed at the time he filed this
action in the Court of First Instance. It is argued for petitioner that as the damages recoverable under the Civil
Code are much more extensive than the amounts that may be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
they should not be deemed incompatible. As already indicated, the injured laborer was initially free to choose
either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an
ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages. While perhaps not as profitable, the smaller
indemnity obtainable by the first course is balanced by the claimant's being relieved of the burden of proving
the causal connection between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury, and of having to establish the
extent of the damage suffered; issues that are apt to be troublesome to establish satisfactorily. Having staked his
fortunes on a particular remedy, petitioner is precluded from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the
prior claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission. Anyway, under the proviso of Section 6 aforequoted,
if the employer Franklin Baker Company recovers, by derivative action against the alleged tortfeasors, a sum
greater than the compensation he may have paid the herein petitioner, the excess accrues to the latter.

Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), applies to third-party tortfeasor, said rule should
likewise apply to the employer-tortfeasor.

Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as already stated, the petition has been dismissed in the resolution of
September 7, 1978 in view of the amicable settlement reached by Philex and the said heirs.

With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a quo,
that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino
Martinez submitted notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of
them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in
installments (pp. 106-107, rec.). Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss
dated May 27, 1968 (pp. 121-122, rec.) in the lower court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the
Workmen's Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the committee created to investigate the accident which
established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to
the then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only (p. 76, rec.).

WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not
preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been
remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners
been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought
redress under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the
first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case
should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid
before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that
may be decreed in their favor.

Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court does not legislate in the instant case. The Court merely applies and
gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of Article XIV
of the 1935 Constitution, and now by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article 11 of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and
2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950.

To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:

Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should
be the concern of the State (Art. II).

Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women, and minors, and shall regulate
the relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. The
State may provide for compulsory arbitration (Art. XIV).

The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to insure the dignity, welfare, and security of all
the people "... regulate the use ... and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits
"establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services in, the field of education, health, housing, employment, welfare and
social security to guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II, 1973
Constitution); "... afford protection to labor, ... and regulate the relations between workers and employers ..., and assure the
rights of workers to ... just and humane conditions of work" (Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973 Constitution, emphasis supplied).

The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor institutionalized in Section 9 of Article 11 of the 1973 Constitution and
re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in Article 3 of the New Labor Code, thus:

Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers
and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security
of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. (emphasis supplied).

The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned articles of the New Civil Code cannot be
impliedly repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173 of the New Labor Code. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act (before it was amended by R.A. No. 772 on June 20, 1952), predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor Code, has been
superseded by the aforestated provisions of the New Civil Code, a subsequent law, which took effect on August 30, 1950, which
obey the constitutional mandates of social justice enhancing as they do the rights of the workers as against their employers.
Article 173 of the New Labor Code seems to diminish the rights of the workers and therefore collides with the social justice
guarantee of the Constitution and the liberal provisions of the New Civil Code.

The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and 9 of Article II of the 1973 Constitution are statements of legal
principles to be applied and enforced by the courts. Mr. Justice Robert Jackson in the case of West Virginia State Board of
Education vs. Barnette, with characteristic eloquence, enunciated:

The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles
to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome
of no elections (319 U.S. 625, 638, 87 L.ed. 1638, emphasis supplied).

In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor Code, both the New Labor Code and the Civil
Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of the workers and employees.

Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, promulgated on May 1,
1974, but which took effect six months thereafter, provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Art. 2, Labor
Code).

Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the law-
making body intended right and justice to prevail. "

More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer."

Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act
provided:

Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason
of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the
employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code
and other laws, because of said injury (emphasis supplied).

Employers contracting laborecsrs in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same may stipulate with such
laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands
through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment; and all service
contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section shall be presumed to include such agreement.

Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428, was amended by Commonwealth Act No.
772 on June 20, 1952, thus:

Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason
of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the
employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code
and other laws, because of said injury.

Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate with such
laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply to injuries received outside the Island through
accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment. Such stipulation shall not
prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the
 accident occurs, should such law be more favorable to them (As amended by section 5 of Republic Act No.
772).

Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the applicable provisions of the New Civil Code,
because said Article 173 provides:

Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.- Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund under
this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents
or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment of
compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act
Numbered One hundred eighty- six, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended,
Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred Sixty-four, as amended, and other laws whose benefits are
administered by the System during the period of such payment for the same disability or death, and conversely
(emphasis supplied).

As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed only Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code,
R.A. No. 1161, as amended, C.A. No. 186, as amended, R.A. No. 610, as amended, R.A. No. 4864, as amended, and all other
laws whose benefits are administered by the System (referring to the GSIS or SSS).

Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as aforequoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not even
remotely, much less expressly, repeal the New Civil Code provisions heretofore quoted.

It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from negligence, is not barred by Article 173
of the New Labor Code. And the damages recoverable under the New Civil Code are not administered by the System provided for
by the New Labor Code, which defines the "System" as referring to the Government Service Insurance System or the Social
Security System (Art. 167 [c], [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code).

Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the law of the land.

Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines.

The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People vs. Licera ruled:

Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not laws,
constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is
part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect"
(65 SCRA 270, 272-273 [1975]).

WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself (Caltex vs. Palomer, 18
SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).

The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, before and after it was amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, limited the right of recovery in favor of the deceased, ailing or injured employee
to the compensation provided for therein. Said Section 5 was not accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in the
1970 case of Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA 442) when WE ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to
recover from the employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action
against the tortfeasor for greater damages; but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. Said Pacana case penned
by Mr. Justice Teehankee, applied Article 1711 of the Civil Code as against the Workmen's Compensation Act, reiterating the
1969 ruling in the case of Valencia vs. Manila Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724, June 30,1969) and the 1958 case of Esguerra vs.
Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), both penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes. Said Pacana case was concurred in by Justices J.B.L. Reyes,
Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Villamor.

Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a re-statement of the first paragraph of Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and does not even refer, neither expressly nor impliedly, to the Civil Code as Section
5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act did, with greater reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same interpretation
adopted in the cases of Pacana, Valencia and Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three (3) cases is faithful to
and advances the social justice guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social justice in the American Federal Constitution, nor in the
various state constitutions of the American Union. Consequently, the restrictive nature of the American decisions on the
Workmen's Compensation Act cannot limit the range and compass of OUR interpretation of our own laws, especially Article
1711 of the New Civil Code, vis-a-vis Article 173 of the New Labor Code, in relation to Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of
Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution then, and now Sections 6, 7 and 9 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of
Article II of the 1973 Constitution.
The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of the employer. The right to life is guaranteed
specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. To relieve the employer from liability for the death of his workers
arising from his gross or wanton fault or failure to provide safety devices for the protection of his employees or workers against
the dangers which are inherent in underground mining, is to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to recover
indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the consequent loss to his family without due process of law. The dissent in
effect condones and therefore encourages such gross or wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply with his legal
obligation to provide safety measures for the protection of the life, limb and health of his worker. Even from the moral viewpoint
alone, such attitude is un-Christian.

It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the
New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental
law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.

The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case.

It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision.

The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New Labor Code subvert the rights of the
petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining employees. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and Article 173
of the New Labor Code are retrogressive; because they are a throwback to the obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of Adam Smith
enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth of Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 21, p. 93, 1964), which has been discarded soon
after the close of the 18th century due to the Industrial Revolution that generated the machines and other mechanical devices
(beginning with Eli Whitney's cotton gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for production and transportation which
are dangerous to life, limb and health. The old socio-political-economic philosophy of live-and-let-live is now superdesed by the
benign Christian shibboleth of live-and-help others to live. Those who profess to be Christians should not adhere to Cain's selfish
affirmation that he is not his brother's keeper. In this our civilization, each one of us is our brother's keeper. No man is an island.
To assert otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian as the 1837 case of Prisley vs. Fowler (3 MN 1,150 reprint 1030)
invoked by the dissent, The Prisley case was decided in 1837 during the era of economic royalists and robber barons of America.
Only ruthless, unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic reactionaries continue to pay obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. The
Prisley rule humiliates man and debases him; because the decision derisively refers to the lowly worker as "servant" and utilizes
with aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer." It robs man of his inherent dignity and dehumanizes him. To stress this
affront to human dignity, WE only have to restate the quotation from Prisley, thus: "The mere relation of the master and the
servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be
expected to do himself." This is the very selfish doctrine that provoked the American Civil War which generated so much hatred
and drew so much precious blood on American plains and valleys from 1861 to 1864.

"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man's survival and
ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."

It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot legislate.

That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "No judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. "

Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, recognizes that in certain instances, the court, in the
language of Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all
human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply Nor has the human mind the
infinite capacity to anticipate all situations.

But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code, the founding fathers of the American Constitution foresaw and
recognized the eventuality that the courts may have to legislate to supply the omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the
American Constitution and the statutes.

'Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation may be justified but denies that the power of the
Judiciary to nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny (The Federalist, Modern Library, pp. 503-511, 1937 ed.). Thomas
Jefferson went farther to concede that the court is even independent of the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs. American Sash Company,
1949 335 US 538).

Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution likewise share the same view. Chief Justice Marshall pronounced: "It
is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs. Madison I Cranch 127 1803),
which was re-stated by Chief Justice Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is what the judge says it is (Address on May 3,
1907, quoted by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9, 1937). This was reiterated by Justice Cardozo who pronounced
that "No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. " (The
Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 113). In the language of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, "The only limit to the judicial legislation
is the restraint of the judge" (U.S. vs. Butler 297 U.S. 1 Dissenting Opinion, p. 79), which view is also entertained by Justice
Frankfurter and Justice Robert Jackson. In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter, "the courts breathe life, feeble or strong, into the
inert pages of the Constitution and all statute books."
It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act or Article 173 of the
New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury caused by the nature of the work, without any fault on the part of the
employers. It is correctly termed no fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or Article 173 of
the New Labor Code, does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable negligence in failing
to provide the safety devices required by the law for the protection of the life, limb and health of the workers. Under either
Section 5 or Article 173, the employer remains liable to pay compensation benefits to the employee whose death, ailment or
injury is work-connected, even if the employer has faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety measures and contrivances
decreed by the law to protect the employee.

The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman." In the epigrammatic language of Mr. Justice Cardozo, "the law has
outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal" (Wood vs.
Duff Gordon 222 NW 88; Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 100). Justice Cardozo warned that: "Sometimes the
conservatism of judges has threatened for an interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. ... Precedents established in those items
exert an unhappy influence even now" (citing Pound, Common Law and Legislation 21 Harvard Law Review 383, 387).

Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically admitted, although with a cautionary undertone: "that
judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially they are confined from molar to molecular motions" (Southern
Pacific Company vs. Jensen, 244 US 204 1917). And in the subsequent case of Springer vs. Government (277 US 188, 210-212,
72 L.ed. 845, 852- 853), Justice Holmes pronounced:

The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more
specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. x x x.
When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received with a certain
latitude or our government could not go on.

To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action would be free from it is to
legislate yet it is what the judges do whenever they determine which of two competing principles of policy shall
prevail.

xxx xxx xxx

It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and
cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide
the branches into waterlight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that
it is, or that the Constitution requires.

True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not legislate, but grudgingly concede that in certain cases
judges do legislate. They criticize the assumption by the courts of such law-making power as dangerous for it may degenerate into
Judicial tyranny. They include Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, Justice Black, Justice Harlan, Justice Roberts, Justice David Brewer,
Ronald Dworkin, Rolf Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. But said Justices, jurists or legal commentators, who
either deny the power of the courts to legislate in-between gaps of the law, or decry the exercise of such power, have not pointed
to examples of the exercise by the courts of such law-making authority in the interpretation and application of the laws in specific
cases that gave rise to judicial tyranny or oppression or that such judicial legislation has not protected public interest or individual
welfare, particularly the lowly workers or the underprivileged.

On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and statutory enactments expanding the scope of
such provisions to protect human rights. Foremost among them is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. Arizona (384 US 436
1964), Gideon vs. Wainright (372 US 335), Escubedo vs. Illinois (378 US 478), which guaranteed the accused under custodial
investigation his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights as even as it protects him against the use
of force or intimidation to extort confession from him. These rights are not found in the American Bill of Rights. These rights are
now institutionalized in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Only the peace-and-order adherents were critical of the
activism of the American Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren.

Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the double jeopardy provision was developed by American judicial
decisions, not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on double jeopardy (see Justice Laurel in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260, 261-
268). And these judicial decisions have been re-stated in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as well
as in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. In both provisions, the second offense is the same as the first
offense if the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or frustration thereof or necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the first offense.

The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. They were also developed by judicial decisions in the
United States and in the Philippines even before people vs. Ylagan (58 Phil. 851-853).

Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs. Ferguson (163 US 537) as securing to the Negroes
equal but separate facilities, which doctrine was revoked in the case of Brown vs. Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294),
holding that the equal protection clause means that the Negroes are entitled to attend the same schools attended by the whites-
equal facilities in the same school-which was extended to public parks and public buses.

De-segregation, not segregation, is now the governing principle.

Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted in the case of People vs. Pomar (46 Phil. 440) by a conservative,
capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting maternity leave to working women-according primacy to property rights over human
rights. The case of People vs. Pomar is no longer the rule.

As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US 45, 76, 49 L. ed. 937, 949), Justice Holmes had been railing
against the conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of due process to protect property rights as against human rights or
social justice for the working man. The law fixing maximum hours of labor was invalidated. Justice Holmes was vindicated
finally in 1936 in the case of West Coast Hotel vs. Parish (300 US 377-79; 81 L. ed. 703) where the American Supreme Court
upheld the rights of workers to social justice in the form of guaranteed minimum wage for women and minors, working hours not
exceeding eight (8) daily, and maternity leave for women employees.

The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the rule on political questions have been evolved
and grafted into the American Constitution by judicial decisions (Marbury vs. Madison, supra Coleman vs. Miller, 307 US 433,
83 L. ed. 1385; Springer vs. Government, 277 US 210-212, 72 L. ed. 852, 853).

It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be against judicial legislation, penned a separate concurring opinion in the case
of Coleman vs. Miller, supra, affirming the doctrine of political question as beyond the ambit of judicial review. There is nothing
in both the American and Philippine Constitutions expressly providing that the power of the courts is limited by the principle of
separation of powers and the doctrine on political questions. There are numerous cases in Philippine jurisprudence applying the
doctrines of separation of powers and political questions and invoking American precedents.

Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions expressly vest in the Supreme Court the
power to review the validity or constitutionality of any legislative enactment or executive act.

WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND THE
CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE
DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. L-29701 March 16, 1987

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. LUDIVICO D. ARCIAGA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, Branch I Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
TAURINO SINGSON AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Eufrocino R. Tagayuma for respondent.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the August 5, 1968 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 41582R *
which dismissed petitioner's petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction on the ground that the allegations
made therein are insufficient to justify further process.

The undisputed facts of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

On August 24, 1960, Taurino Singson, resident of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, as paying passenger on board bus No.
215 belonging to the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. sustained multiple serious physical injuries when the
said bus crashed against an acacia tree at La Union, so he brought a complaint for contractual tort (Record
2731). In its answer, defendant interposed the defense that the collision was due to a fortuitous event (Rec. 42).
The case was set for trial on December 23, 1965 (45), but upon motion of both counsels, the same was
transferred to February 3 and 4, 1966 (55). On October 6, 1966, the Court noted that no pre-trial has ever been
conducted in the case and so both parties were ordered to confer with one another for a compromise agreement
at the office of the Philippine Rabbit at Tarlac, Tarlac, and the trial was postponed to November 14, 1966 (57),
and then transferred again upon petition filed by counsel for Philippine Rabbit for January 20, 1967 (58) and
then postponed again to April 29, 1967. At the scheduled trial of April 29, 1967, at 8:40 are only the defendant
Philippine Rabbit appeared and upon motion of its counsel, the Court dismissed the case for non-appearance of
plaintiff (59).

It appears that the order of dismissal of April 29, 1967 alluded to was sent to Atty. Constants Pimentel counsel
for plaintiff Taurino Singson, at Vigan, Ilocos Sur, by registered mail on May 3, 1967 and was received by Miss
 May altuna addressee's agent, on May 6, 1967 (70). On July 6, 1967 (61 days from receipt of dismissal),
counsel for plaintiff Taurino Singson filed a Petition for Relief accompanied by an affidavit of said plaintiff
alleging that on April 29, 1967 (the date of the trial), he went to Vigan for the purpose of attending the trial of
his case, boarding a passenger jeepney at Cabugao, his hometown, but when the vehicle reached Lapog, it had
engine trouble, causing him to reach the court 15 minutes late and found thereupon that the court had already
dismissed the case (60-62). Opposition was filed to the Petition for Relief by defendant Philippine Rabbit. On
August 16, 1967, the lower court granted plaintiff Taurino Singson's Petition for Relief (66). On September 14,
1967, counsel for Philippine Rabbit filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting the petition for
Relief (67-69). In an order dated November 28, 1967, the lower court denied the motion for reconsideration of
the Philippine Rabbit on the ground that "considering the particular nature and circumstances of the case at bar
and also the fact that petition for relief under Rule 38 is premised on equity and is allowed on exceptional
circumstances, and that as far as possible failure of justice should be avoided; and that, further, in the absence of
a clear lack of intention to delay, a case should not be allowed to go off on procedural points to the end that
technicalities should not override the merits of the case, this court believes that justice is best served if in this
particular case the plaintiff will be given his day in court" (79-72). (pp. 22-25, Rollo)

On July 9, 1968, herein petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. filed a Petition for certiorari and mandamus with Preliminary
Injunction in the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 41582-R.

In a Resolution dated August 5, 1968, the Court of Appeals denied the petition on the ground that the allegations made therein are
insufficient to justify its giving it due course. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration, but in a Resolution dated October 1, 1968,
the Court of Appeals denied the same. Hence, the instant petition (Record, pp. 4-20).

In a Resolution dated November 15, 1968 (Ibid., p. 47), this Court gave due course to the petition.

On January 23, 1969, petitioner filed its Brief (Ibid., p. 56), and on February 19, 1969, private respondent filed his Brief (Ibid., p.
63). On March 29, 1969, petitioner filed its Reply Brief (Ibid., P. 67).

In its brief, petitioner raised the following assignment of errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE 60-DAY PERIOD PROVIDED IN SEC. 38 OF THE
RULES OF COURT IS MANDATORY AND NON-EXTENDIBLE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULE OF EQUITY IN THE CASE AT BAR.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT certiorari DOES NOT LIE IN THE INSTANT CASE.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Sec. 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court clearly states that "A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this rule
must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside,
and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was entered or said proceeding was taken."

It is undisputed that the Petition for Relief in this case was filed 61 days from receipt of the notice of dismissal or one day late. In
fact, the records show that counsel for private respondent learned of the dismissal on the same day, April 29, 1967, when he
arrived late for the hearing so that the Petition for Relief was at least eight (8) days late. The records further show that counsel for
private respondent did not move for reconsideration of the Order of dismissal, nor for new trial Neither did he appeal, thereby
allowing the decision to become final and executory. As a last resort, he could have availed of the sixty day period provided for
by Rule 38 to file a Petition for Relief from judgment but again he allowed this opportunity to lapse. Indeed, to him is applicable,
the well known maxim that "equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights." (Henson v. Director of Lands, 55
Phil. 586).

In the case of Turqueza v. Hernando (97 SCRA 488 119801) the Supreme Court in disallowing the reopening of the case which
has become final ruled that there is no justification in law and in fact, for respondent judge's void act of ordering the reopening of
the case which has become final and executory.

Thus, the Court held:

The Court has said time and again that the doctrine of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error the judgments of courts
must become final at some definite date fixed by law. The law gives an exception or "last chance" of a timely
petition for relief from judgment within the reglementary period (within 60 days from knowledge and 6 months
from entry of judgment) under Rule 38 supra, but such grace period must be taken as "absolutely fixed,
 inextendible, never interrupted and cannot be subject to any condition or contingency. Because the period fixed
is itself devised to meet a condition or contingency (fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect), the equitable
remedy is an act of grace, as it were, designed to give the aggrieved party another and last chance'" "and failure
to avail of such last chance within the grace period fixed by the statute or Rules of Court is fatal." (Turqueza v.
Hernando, supra).

In expressly reiterating [1985]), held that the Rule is that, for a petition for relief under Rule 38 to be entertained by the court, the
petitioner must satisfactorily show that he has faithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of said Rule. Consequently, it is
incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the said petition was filed within the reglementary period specified in Sec. 3, of the
same, otherwise on this ground alone, the petition should be dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons, neither can private respondent invoke equity as a ground for the reopening of the case "there being an
express provision of law under which the remedy can be invoked." (Barrios v. Go Thong & Co., 7 Phil. 542 [1963]). The rule is,
"equity follows the law" and as discussed in Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence Vol. 2 pp. 188-189 (as cited in Appellant's Brief p.
20), the meaning of the principle is stated as follows:

There are instances, indeed, in which a court of equity gives a remedy, where the law gives none; but where a
particular remedy is given by the law, and that remedy is bounded and circumscribed by particular rules, it
would be very improper for the court to take it up where the law leaves it and to extend it further than the law
allows.

In the same manner, the issue as to whether or not certiorari is proper in the instant case, has been laid to rest in the case of
Turqueza vs. Hernando, (supra) where a petition for certiorari directly filed with the Supreme Court was granted and the Court
set aside the questioned order issued by respondent judge to reopen the case below for reception of respondent-defendant's
evidence notwithstanding the lapse of the reglementary period within which respondent could file a petition for relief from
judgment.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 41582-R and the questioned Order dated
August 16, 1967 of Judge Ludivico D. Arciaga in Civil Case No. 2539 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and said Civil
Case is declared TERMINATED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 119064. August 22, 2000]

NENG KAGUI KADIGUIA MALANG, petitioner, vs. HON. COROCOY MOSON, Presiding Judge of 5th Sharia District
Court, Cotabato City, HADJI MOHAMMAD ULYSSIS MALANG, HADJI ISMAEL MALINDATU MALANG,
FATIMA MALANG, DATULNA MALANG, LAWANBAI MALANG, JUBAIDA KADO MALANG, NAYO OMAL
MALANG and MABAY GANAP MALANG, respondents.

DECISION

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Presented for resolution in this special civil action of certiorari is the issue of whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains governed the property relationship of two Muslims who contracted marriage prior to the effectivity of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines (hereafter, P.D. 1083 or Muslim Code). The question is raised in connection with the settlement
of the estate of the deceased husband.

Hadji Abdula Malang, a Muslim, contracted marriage with Aida (Kenanday) Limba. They begot three sons named Hadji
Mohammad Ulyssis, Hadji Ismael Malindatu and Datulna, and a daughter named Lawanbai. Hadji Abdula Malang was engaged
in farming, tilling the land that was Aidas dowry (mahr or majar). Thereafter, he bought a parcel of land in Sousa, Cotabato. Hadji
Abdula and Aida already had two children when he married for the second time another Muslim named Jubaida Kado in
Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao. No child was born out of Hadji Abdulas second marriage. When Aida, the first wife, was
pregnant with their fourth child, Hadji Abdula divorced her.

In 1965, Hadji Abdula married another Muslim, Nayo H. Omar but they were childless. Thereafter, Hadji Abdula contracted
marriage with Hadji Mabai (Mabay) H. Adziz in Kalumamis, Talayan, Maguindanao and soon they had a daughter named Fatima
(Kueng). Hadji Abdula and Hadji Mabai stayed in that place to farm while Hadji Abdula engaged in the business of buying and
selling of rice, corn and other agricultural products. Not long after, Hadji Abdula married three other Muslim women named
Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai but he eventually divorced them.

Hadji Abdula then migrated to Tambunan where, in 1972, he married petitioner Neng Kagui Kadiguia Malang, his fourth wife,
excluding the wives he had divorced. They established residence in Cotabato City but they were childless. For a living, they relied
on farming and on the business of buying and selling of agricultural products. Hadji Abdula acquired vast tracts of land in Sousa
and Talumanis, Cotabato City, some of which were cultivated by tenants. He deposited money in such banks as United Coconut
Planters Bank, Metrobank and Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank.

On December 18, 1993, while he was living with petitioner in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula died without leaving a will. On
January 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Sharia District Court in Cotabato City a petition for the settlement of his estate with a
prayer that letters of administration be issued in the name of her niece, Tarhata Lauban.

Petitioner claimed in that petition that she was the wife of Hadji Abdula; that his other legal heirs are his three children named
Teng Abdula, Keto Abdula and Kueng Malang, and that he left seven (7) parcels of land, five (5) of which are titled in Hadji
Abdulas name married to Neng P. Malang, and a pick-up jeepney.

On February 7, 1994, the Sharia District Court ordered the publication of the petition.xix[1] After such publicationxix[2] or on
March 16, 1994, Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang (Hadji Mohammad, for brevity), the eldest son of Hadji Abdula, filed his
opposition to the petition. He alleged among other matters that his fathers surviving heirs are as follows: (a) Jubaida Malang,
surviving spouse; (b) Nayo Malang, surviving spouse; (c) Mabay Malang, surviving spouse; (d) petitioner Neng Malang,
surviving spouse; (e) oppositor Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang who is also known as Teng Abdula, son; (f) Hadji Ismael
Malindatu Malang, also known as Keto Abdula, son, (g) Fatima Malang, also known as Kueng Malang, daughter; (h) Datulna
Malang, son, and (i) Lawanbai Malang, daughter. Oppositor Hadji Mohammad Ulyssis Malang alleged that since he and his
brother, Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang, had helped their father in his business, then they were more competent to be
administrators of his estate.xix[3]

On March 30, 1994, Jubaida Malang, Ismael Malindatu Malang, Nayo Malang, Fatima Malang, Mabay Malang, Datulna Malang
and Lawanbai Malang filed an opposition to the petition, adopting as their own the written opposition of Hadji Mohammad.xix[4]

On April 7, 1994, the Sharia District Court issued an Order appointing Hadji Mohammad administrator of his fathers properties
outside Cotabato City. The same order named petitioner and Hadji Ismael Malindatu Malang as joint administrators of the estate
in Cotabato City. Each administrator was required to post a bond in the amount of P100,000.00.xix[5] On April 13, 1994, letters
of administration were issued to Hadji Mohammad after he had posted the required bond. He took his oath on the same day.xix[6]
The following day, Hadji Ismael and petitioner likewise filed their respective bonds and hence, they were allowed to take their
oath as administrators.xix[7]

On April 25, 1994 and May 3, 1994, petitioner filed two motions informing the court that Hadji Abdula had outstanding deposits
with nine (9) major banks.xix[8] Petitioner prayed that the managers of each of those banks be ordered to submit a bank statement
of the outstanding deposit of Hadji Abdula.xix[9] The Sharia District Court having granted the motions,xix[10] Assistant Vice
President Rockman O. Sampuha of United Coconut Planters Bank informed the court that as of April 24, 1994, the outstanding
deposit of Hadji Abdula amounted to one million five hundred twenty thousand four hundred pesos and forty-eight centavos
(P1,520,400.48).xix[11] The Senior Manager of the Cotabato branch of Metrobank also certified that as of December 18, 1993,
Hadji Abdula Malang or Malindatu Malang had on savings deposit the balance of three hundred seventy-eight thousand four
hundred ninety-three pesos and 32/100 centavos (P378,493.32).xix[12] PCIB likewise issued a certification that Hadji Abdula had
a balance of eight hundred fifty pesos (P850.00) in his current account as of August 11, 1994.xix[13]

During the pendency of the case, petitioner suffered a congestive heart failure that required immediate medical treatment. On May
5, 1994, she filed a motion praying that on account of her ailment, she be allowed to withdraw from UCPB the amount of three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) that shall constitute her advance share in the estate of Hadji Abdula.xix[14] After due
hearing, the Sharia District Court allowed petitioner to withdraw the sum of two hundred fifty thousand pesos
(P250,000.00).xix[15]

On May 12, 1994, the Sharia District Court required petitioner and Hadji Ismael as joint administrators to submit an inventory
and appraisal of all properties of Hadji Abdula.xix[16] In compliance therewith, Hadji Ismael submitted an inventory showing
that in Cotabato City, Hadji Abdula had seven (7) residential lots with assessed value ranging from P5,020.00 to P25,800.00, an
agricultural land with assessed value of P860.00, three (3) one-storey residential buildings, and one (1) two-storey residential
building.xix[17] All these properties were declared for taxation purposes in Hadji Abdulas name.

For her part, petitioner submitted an inventory showing that Hadji Abdula married to Neng Malang had seven (7) residential lots
with a total assessed value of P243,840.00 in Cotabato City, an Isuzu pick-up jeepney valued at P30,000.00 and bank
deposits.xix[18]

In the Memorandum that she filed with the Sharia District Court, petitioner asserted that all the properties located in Cotabato
City, including the vehicle and bank deposits, were conjugal properties in accordance with Article 160 of the Civil Code and
Article 116 of the Family Code while properties located outside of Cotabato City were exclusive properties of the
decedent.xix[19]

On the other hand, the oppositors contended in their own Memorandum that all the properties left by Hadji Abdula were his
exclusive properties for various reasons. First, Hadji Abdula had no conjugal partnership with petitioner because his having
contracted eight (8) marriages with different Muslim women was in violation of the Civil Code that provided for a monogamous
marriage; a conjugal partnership presupposes a valid civil marriage, not a bigamous marriage or a common-law relationship.
Second, the decedent adopted a complete separation of property regime in his marital relations; while his wives Jubaida Kado,
Nayo Hadji Omal and Mabay Ganap Hadji Adzis contributed to the decedents properties, there is no evidence that petitioner had
contributed funds for the acquisition of such properties. Third, the presumption that properties acquired during the marriage are
conjugal properties is inapplicable because at the time he acquired the properties, the decedent was married to four (4) women.
Fourth, the properties are not conjugal in nature notwithstanding that some of these properties were titled in the name of the
decedent married to Neng Malang because such description is not conclusive of the conjugal nature of the property. Furthermore,
because petitioner admitted in her verified petition that the properties belonged to the estate of decedent, she was estopped from
claiming, after formal offer of evidence, that the properties were conjugal in nature just because some of the properties were titled
in Hadji Abdulas name married to Neng Malang. Fifth, if it is true that the properties were conjugal properties, then these should
have been registered in the names of both petitioner and the decedent.xix[20]

In its Order of September 26, 1994, the Sharia District Court presided by Judge Corocoy D. Moson held that there was no
conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and the decedent primarily because the latter married eight times. The Civil Code
provision on conjugal partnership cannot be applied if there is more than one wife because conjugal partnership presupposes a
valid civil marriage, not a plural marriage or a common-law relationship. The court further found that the decedent was the chief,
if not the sole, breadwinner of his families and that petitioner did not contribute to the properties unlike the other wives named
Jubaida, Nayo and Mabay. The description married to Neng Malang in the titles to the real properties is no more than that -- the
description of the relationship between petitioner and the decedent. Such description is insufficient to prove that the properties
belong to the conjugal partnership of gains. The court stated:

In the instant case, decedent had four (4) wives at the time he acquired the properties in question. To sustain the contention of the
petitioner that the properties are her conjugal property with the decedent is doing violence to the provisions of the Civil Code. Be
it noted that at the time of the marriage of the petitioner with the decedent, there were already three (3) existing marriages.
Assuming for the moment that petitioner and the decedent had agreed that the property regime between them will be governed by
the regime of conjugal partnership property, that agreement is null and void for it is against the law, public policy, public order,
good moral(s) and customs.

Under Islamic law, the regime of property relationship is complete separation of property, in the absence of any stipulation to the
contrary in the marriage settlements or any other contract (Article 38, P.D. 1083). There being no evidence of such contrary
stipulation or contract, this Court concludes as it had begun, that the properties in question, both real and personal, are not
conjugal, but rather, exclusive property of the decedent.xix[21]

Thus, the Sharia District Court held that the Islamic law should be applied in the distribution of the estate of Hadji Abdula and
accordingly disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court orders the following:

1) That the estate shall pay the corresponding estate tax, reimburse the funeral expenses in the amount of P50,000.00, and the
judicial expenses in the amount of P2,040.80;

2) That the net estate, consisting of real and personal properties, located in Talayan, Maguindanao and in Cotabato City, is hereby
ordered to be distributed and adjudicated as follows:

a) Jubaida Kado Malang ------------------------- 2/64 of the estate

b) Nayo Omar Malang ------------------------- 2/64 - do -

c) Mabai Aziz Malang ------------------------- 2/64 - do -

d) Neng Kagui Kadiguia Malang ------------------- 2/64 - do -

e) Mohammad Ulyssis Malang-------------------------14/64 - do -

f) Ismael Malindatu Malang---------------------------14/64 - do -

g) Datulna Malang ------------------------- 14/64 - do -

h) Lawanbai Malang ------------------------- 7/64 - do -

i) Fatima (Kueng) Malang ------------------------- 7/64 - do -

Total------------------------ 64/64

3) That the amount of P250,000.00 given to Neng Kagui Kadiguia Malang by way of advance be charged against her share and if
her share is not sufficient, to return the excess; and
4) That the heirs are hereby ordered to submit to this court their Project of Partition for approval, not later than three (3) months
from receipt of this order.

SO ORDERED.

On October 4, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of that Order. The oppositors objected to that motion. On
January 10, 1995, the Sharia District Court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.xix[22] Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a
notice of appeal.xix[23] However, on January 19, 1995, she filed a manifestation withdrawing the notice of appeal on the strength
of the following provisions of P.D. No. 1083:

Art. 145. Finality of Decisions The decisions of the Sharia District Courts whether on appeal from the Sharia Circuit Court or not
shall be final. Nothing herein contained shall affect the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the
Constitution.

Petitioner accordingly informed the court that she would be filing an original action of certiorari with the Supreme Court.xix[24]

On March 1, 1995, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. She
contends that the Sharia District Court gravely erred in: (a) ruling that when she married Hadji Abdula Malang, the latter had
three existing marriages with Jubaida Kado Malang, Nayo Omar Malang and Mabay Ganap Malang and therefore the properties
acquired during her marriage could not be considered conjugal, and (b) holding that said properties are not conjugal because
under Islamic Law, the regime of relationship is complete separation of property, in the absence of stipulation to the contrary in
the marriage settlement or any other contract.xix[25]

As petitioner sees it, the law applicable on issues of marriage and property regime is the New Civil Code, under which all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. The Sharia Court, meanwhile, viewed the Civil Code
provisions on conjugal partnership as incompatible with plural marriage, which is permitted under Muslim law, and held the
applicable property regime to be complete separation of property under P.D. 1083.

Owing to the complexity of the issue presented, and the fact that the case is one of first impression --- this is a singular situation
where the issue on what law governs the property regime of a Muslim marriage celebrated prior to the passage of the Muslim
Code has been elevated from a Sharia court for the Courts resolution --- the Court decided to solicit the opinions of two amici
curiae, Justice Ricardo C. Punoxix[26] and former Congressman Michael O. Masturaxix[27]. The Court extends its warmest
thanks to the amici curiae for their valuable inputs in their written memorandaxix[28] and in the hearing of June 27, 2000.

Resolution of the instant case is made more difficult by the fact that very few of the pertinent dates of birth, death, marriage and
divorce are established by the record. This is because, traditionally, Muslims do not register acts, events or judicial decrees
affecting civil status.xix[29] It also explains why the evidence in the instant case consisted substantially of oral testimonies.

What is not disputed is that: Hadji Abdula contracted a total of eight marriages, counting the three which terminated in divorce;
all eight marriages were celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Muslim Code; Hadji
Abdula divorced four wives --- namely, Aida, Saaga, Mayumbai and Sabai --- all divorces of which took place before the
enactment of the Muslim Code; and, Hadji Abdula died on December 18, 1993, after the Muslim Code and Family Code took
effect, survived by four wives (Jubaida, Nayo, Mabay and Neng) and five children, four of whom he begot with Aida and one
with Mabay. It is also clear that the following laws were in force, at some point or other, during the marriages of Hadji Abdula:
the Civil Code, which took effect on August 30, 1950; Republic Act No. 394 (R.A. 394), authorizing Muslim divorces, which was
effective from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969; the Muslim Code, which took effect February 4, 1977; and the Family Code,
effective August 3, 1988.

Proceeding upon the foregoing, the Court has concluded that the record of the case is simply inadequate for purposes of arriving
at a fair and complete resolution of the petition. To our mind, any attempt at this point to dispense with the basic issue given the
scantiness of the evidence before us could result in grave injustice to the parties in this case, as well as cast profound implications
on Muslim families similarly or analogously situated to the parties herein. Justice and accountability dictate a remand; trial must
reopen in order to supply the factual gaps or, in Congressman Masturas words, missing links, that would be the bases for
judgment and accordingly, allow respondent court to resolve the instant case. In ordering thus, however, we take it as an
imperative on our part to set out certain guidelines in the interpretation and application of pertinent laws to facilitate the task of
respondent court.

It will also be recalled that the main issue presented by the petition --- concerning the property regime applicable to two Muslims
married prior to the effectivity of the Muslim Code --- was interposed in relation to the settlement of the estate of the deceased
husband. Settlement of estates of Muslims whose civil acts predate the enactment of the Muslim Code may easily result in the
application of the Civil Code and other personal laws, thus convincing the Court that it is but propitious to go beyond the issue
squarely presented and identify such collateral issues as are required to be resolved in a settlement of estate case. As amicus
curiae Congressman Mastura puts it, the Court does not often come by a case as the one herein, and jurisprudence will be greatly
enriched by a discussion of the watershed of collateral issues that this case presents.xix[30]

The Court has identified the following collateral issues, which we hereby present in question form: (1) What law governs the
validity of a Muslim marriage celebrated under Muslim rites before the effectivity of the Muslim Code? (2) Are multiple
marriages celebrated before the effectivity of the Muslim Code valid? (3) How do the Courts pronouncements in People vs.
Subano, 73 Phil. 692 (1942), and People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935), affect Muslim marriages celebrated before the
effectivity of the Muslim Code? (4) What laws govern the property relationship of Muslim multiple marriages celebrated before
the Muslim Code? (5) What law governs the succession to the estate of a Muslim who died after the Muslim Code and the Family
Code took effect? (6) What laws apply to the dissolution of property regimes in the cases of multiple marriages entered into
before the Muslim Code but dissolved (by the husbands death) after the effectivity of the Muslim Code? and (7) Are Muslim
divorces effected before the enactment of the Muslim Code valid?

The succeeding guidelines, which derive mainly from the Compliance of amicus curiae Justice Puno, are hereby laid down by the
Court for the reference of respondent court, and for the direction of the bench and bar:

First Collateral Issue: The Law(s) Governing Validity of Muslim Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code

The time frame in which all eight marriages of Hadji Abdula were celebrated was during the effectivity of the Civil Code which,
accordingly, governs the marriages. Article 78 of the Civil Codexix[31] recognized the right of Muslims to contract marriage in
accordance with their customs and rites, by providing that ---

Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces may be performed in accordance with their
customs, rites or practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall be necessary. Nor shall the persons solemnizing these
marriages be obliged to comply with article 92.

However, thirty years after the approval of this Code, all marriages performed between Muslims or other non-Christians shall be
solemnized in accordance with the provisions of this Code. But the President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the
Commissioner of National Integration, may at any time before the expiration of said period, by proclamation, make any of said
provisions applicable to the Muslims and non-Christian inhabitants of any of the non-Christian provinces.

Notably, before the expiration of the thirty-year period after which Muslims are enjoined to solemnize their marriages in
accordance with the Civil Code, P.D. 1083 or the Muslim Code was passed into law. The enactment of the Muslim Code on
February 4, 1977 rendered nugatory the second paragraph of Article 78 of the Civil Code which provides that marriages between
Muslims thirty years after the approval of the Civil Code shall be solemnized in accordance with said Code.

Second and Third Collateral Issues: The Validity of Muslim Multiple Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code; The Effect of People vs. Subano and People vs. Dumpo

Prior to the enactment of P.D. 1083, there was no law in this jurisdiction which sanctioned multiple marriages.xix[32] It is also
not to be disputed that the only law in force governing marriage relations between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil
Code of 1950.

The Muslim Code, which is the first comprehensive codificationxix[33] of Muslim personal laws,xix[34] also provides in respect
of acts that transpired prior to its enactment:

Art. 186. Effect of code on past acts. --- (1) Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in
force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their validity or
legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or liability incurred thereby.

The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is
clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied;xix[35] accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved
against the retroactive opertion of laws.xix[36] Article 186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its
provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically, the Civil
Code --- in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Codes enactment.

Admittedly, an apparent antagonism arises when we consider that what the provisions of the Civil Code contemplate and nurture
is a monogamous marriage. Bigamous or polygamous marriages are considered void and inexistent from the time of their
performance.xix[37] The Family Code which superseded the Civil Code provisions on marriage emphasizes that a subsequent
marriage celebrated before the registration of the judgment declaring a prior marriage void shall likewise be void.xix[38] These
provisions illustrate that the marital relation perceived by the Civil Code is one that is monogamous, and that subsequent
marriages entered into by a person with others while the first one is subsisting is by no means countenanced.

Thus, when the validity of Muslim plural marriages celebrated before the enactment of the Muslim Code was touched upon in two
criminal cases, the Court applied the perspective in the Civil Code that only one valid marriage can exist at any given time.

In People vs. Subano, supra, the Court convicted the accused of homicide, not parricide, since ---

(f)rom the testimony of Ebol Subano, father of the deceased, it appears that the defendant has three wives and that the
deceased was the last in point of time. Although the practice of polygamy is approved by custom among these non-
Christians, polygamy, however, is not sanctioned by the Marriage Lawxix[39], which merely recognizes tribal marriage
rituals. The deceased, under our law, is not thus the lawful wife of the defendant and this precludes conviction for the crime
of parricide.

In People vs. Dumpo, supra, Mora Dumpo was prosecuted for bigamy when, legally married to Moro Hassan, she allegedly
contracted a second marriage with Moro Sabdapal. The Court acquitted her on the ground that it was not duly proved that the
alleged second marriage had all the essential requisites to make it valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. As it
appears that the consent of the brides father is an indispensable requisite to the validity of a Muslim marriage, and as Mora
Dumpos father categorically affirmed that he did not give his consent to her union with Moro Sabdapal, the Court held that such
union could not be a marriage otherwise valid were it not for the existence of the first one, and resolved to acquit her of the charge
of bigamy.

The ruling in Dumpo indicates that, had it been proven as a fact that the second marriage contained all the essential requisites to
make it valid, a conviction for bigamy would have prospered. xix[40]

Fourth Collateral Issue: Law(s) Governing Property Relations of Muslim Marriages Celebrated Before the Muslim Code

This is the main issue presented by the instant petition. In keeping with our holding that the validity of the marriages in the instant
case is determined by the Civil Code, we hold that it is the same Code that determines and governs the property relations of the
marriages in this case, for the reason that at the time of the celebration of the marriages in question the Civil Code was the only
law on marriage relations, including property relations between spouses, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Inasmuch as the Family
Code makes substantial amendments to the Civil Code provisions on property relations, some of its provisions are also material,
particularly to property acquired from and after August 3, 1988.

Which law would govern depends upon: (1) when the marriages took place; (2) whether the parties lived together as husband and
wife; and (3) when and how the subject properties were acquired.

Following are the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:

Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.

Art. 135. All property brought by the wife to the marriage, as well as all property she acquires during the marriage, in accordance
with article 148, is paraphernal.

Art. 136. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property.

Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate
property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

Art. 143. All property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.

The Civil Code also provides in Article 144:

When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In a long line of cases, this Court has interpreted the co-ownership provided in Article 144 of the Civil Code to require that the
man and woman living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage must not in any
way be incapacitated to marry.xix[41] Situating these rulings to the instant case, therefore, the co-ownership contemplated in
Article 144 of the Civil Code cannot apply to Hadji Abdulas marriages celebrated subsequent to a valid and legally existing
marriage, since from the point of view of the Civil Code Hadji Abdula is not capacitated to marry. However, the wives in such
marriages are not precluded from proving that property acquired during their cohabitation with Hadji Abdula is their exclusive
property, respectively.xix[42] Absent such proof, however, the presumption is that property acquired during the subsistence of a
valid marriage --- and in the Civil Code, there can only be one validly existing marriage at any given time --- is conjugal property
of such subsisting marriage. xix[43]

With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, the following provisions of the said Code are pertinent:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition of the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and
owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of the cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default or of waiver by any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or
her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

It will be noted that while the Civil Code merely requires that the parties live together as husband and wife the Family Code in
Article 147 specifies that they live exclusively with each other as husband and wife. Also, in contrast to Article 144 of the Civil
Code as interpreted by jurisprudence, Article 148 of the Family Code allows for co-ownership in cases of cohabitation where, for
instance, one party has a pre-existing valid marriage, provided that the parties prove their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry and only to the extent of their proportionate interest therein. The rulings in Juaniza vs. Jose, 89 SCRA 306,
Camporodendo vs. Garcia, 102 Phil. 1055, and related cases are embodied in the second paragraph of Article 148, which declares
that the share of the party validly married to another shall accrue to the property regime of such existing marriage.

Fifth and Sixth Collateral Issues: Law(s) on Succession and Dissolution of Property Regimes

Hadji Abdula died intestate on December 16, 1993. Thus, it is the Muslim Code which should determine the identification of the
heirs in the order of intestate succession and the respective shares of the heirs.

Meanwhile, the status and capacity to succeed on the part of the individual parties who entered into each and every marriage
ceremony will depend upon the law in force at the time of the performance of the marriage rite.

The status and capacity to succeed of the children will depend upon the law in force at the time of conception or birth of the child.
If the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the governance of the Civil Code, the Civil Code provisions on
the determination of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child would appear to be in point. Thus, the Civil Code provides:

Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred
days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husbands having access
to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

(1) By the impotence of the husband;

(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that access was not
possible;

(3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.

If the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the governance of the Muslim Code, i.e., from February 4, 1977
up to the death of Hadji Abdula on December 18, 1993, the Muslim Code determines the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child.
Under the Muslim Code:

Art. 58. Legitimacy, how established. --- Legitimacy of filiation is established by the evidence of valid marriage between the
father and the mother at the time of the conception of the child.

Art. 59. Legitimate children. ---

(1) Children conceived in lawful wedlock shall be presumed to be legitimate. Whoever claims illegitimacy of or impugns
such filiation must prove his allegation.

(2) Children born after six months following the consummation of marriage or within two years after the dissolution of the
marriage shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of physical
impossibility of access between the parents at or about the time of the conception of the child.
Art. 60. Children of subsequent marriage. --- Should the marriage be dissolved and the wife contracts another marriage after the
expiration of her idda, the child born within six months from the dissolution of the prior marriage shall be presumed to have been
conceived during the former marriage, and if born thereafter, during the latter.

Art. 61. Pregnancy after dissolution. --- If, after the dissolution of marriage, the wife believes that she is pregnant by her former
husband, she shall, within thirty days from the time she became aware of her pregnancy, notify the former husband or his heirs of
that fact. The husband or his heirs may ask the court to take measures to prevent a simulation of birth.

Upon determination of status and capacity to succeed based on the foregoing provisions, the provisions on legal succession in the
Muslim Code will apply. Under Article 110 of the said Code, the sharers to an inheritance include:

(a) The husband, the wife;

(b) The father, the mother, the grandfather, the grandmother;

(c) The daughter and the sons daughter in the direct line;

(d) The full sister, the consanguine sister, the uterine sister and the uterine brother.

When the wife survives with a legitimate child or a child of the decedents son, she is entitled to one-eighth of the hereditary
estate; in the absence of such descendants, she shall inherit one-fourth of the estate.xix[44] The respective shares of the other
sharers, as set out in Article 110 abovecited, are provided for in Articles 113 to 122 of P.D. 1083.

Seventh Collateral Issue: Muslim Divorces Before the Effectivity of the Muslim Code

R.A. 394 authorized absolute divorce among Muslims residing in non-Christian provinces, in accordance with Muslim custom,
for a period of 20 years from June 18, 1949 (the date of approval of R.A. 394) to June 13, 1969.xix[45] Thus, a Muslim divorce
under R.A. 394 is valid if it took place from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969.

From the seven collateral issues that we discussed, we identify four corollary issues as to further situate the points of controversy
in the instant case for the guidance of the lower court. Thus:

1. Which of the several marriages was validly and legally existing at the time of the opening of the succession of Hadji Abdula
when he died in 1993? The validly and legally existing marriage would be that marriage which was celebrated at a time when
there was no other subsisting marriage standing undissolved by a valid divorce or by death. This is because all of the marriages
were celebrated during the governance of the Civil Code, under the rules of which only one marriage can exist at any given time.

Whether or not the marriage was validly dissolved by a Muslim divorce depends upon the time frame and the applicable law. A
Muslim divorce under R.A. No. 394 is valid if it took place from June 18, 1949 to June 13, 1969, and void if it took place from
June 14, 1969. xix[46]

2. There being a dispute between the petitioner and the oppositors as regards the heirship of the children begotten from different
marriages, who among the surviving children are legitimate and who are illegitimate? The children conceived and born of a
validly existing marriage as determined by the first corollary issue are legitimate. The fact and time of conception or birth may be
determined by proof or presumption depending upon the time frame and the applicable law.

3. What properties constituted the estate of Hadji Abdula at the time of his death on December 18, 1993? The estate of Hadji
Abdula consists of the following:

a. Properties acquired during the existence of a valid marriage as determined by the first corollary issue are conjugal properties
and should be liquidated and divided between the spouses under the Muslim Code, this being the law in force at the time of Hadji
Abdulas death.

b. Properties acquired under the conditions prescribed in Article 144 of the Civil Code during the period August 30, 1950 to
August 2, 1988 are conjugal properties and should be liquidated and divided between the spouses under the Muslim Code.
However, the wives other than the lawful wife as determined under the first corollary issue may submit their respective evidence
to prove that any of such property is theirs exclusively.

c. Properties acquired under the conditions set out in Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code during the period from and after
August 3, 1988 are governed by the rules on co-ownership.

d. Properties acquired under conditions not covered by the preceding paragraphs and obtained from the exclusive efforts or assets
of Hadji Abdula are his exclusive properties.

4. Who are the legal heirs of Hadji Abdula, and what are their shares in intestacy? The following are Hadji Abdulas legal heirs:
(a) the lawful wife, as determined under the first corollary issue, and (2) the children, as determined under the second corollary
issue. The Muslim Code, which was already in force at the time of Hadji Abdulas death, will govern the determination of their
respective shares.
As we have indicated early on, the evidence in this case is inadequate to resolve in its entirety the main, collateral and corollary
issues herein presented and a remand to the lower court is in order. Accordingly, evidence should be received to supply the
following proofs: (1) the exact dates of the marriages performed in accordance with Muslim rites or practices; (2) the exact dates
of the dissolutions of the marriages terminated by death or by divorce in accordance with Muslim rites and practices, thus
indicating which marriage resulted in a conjugal partnership under the criteria prescribed by the first, second, and third collateral
issues and the first corollary issue; (3) the exact periods of actual cohabitation (common life under a common roof) of each of the
marriages during which time the parties lived together; (4) the identification of specific properties acquired during each of the
periods of cohabitation referred to in paragraph 3 above, and the manner and source of acquisition, indicating joint or individual
effort, thus showing the asset as owned separately, conjugally or in co-ownership; and (5) the identities of the children (legitimate
or illegitimate) begotten from the several unions, the dates of their respective conceptions or births in relation to paragraphs 1 and
2 above, thereby indicating their status as lawful heirs.

Amicus curiae Congressman Mastura agrees that since the marriage of petitioner to decedent took place in 1972 the Civil Code is
the law applicable on the issue of marriage settlement, xix[47] but espouses that customs or established practices among Muslims
in Mindanao must also be applied with the force of law to the instant case.xix[48] Congressman Masturas disquisition has proven
extremely helpful in impressing upon us the background in which Islamic law and the Muslim Code need to be interpreted,
particularly the interconnectedness of law and religion for Muslimsxix[49] and the impracticability of a strict application of the
Civil Code to plural marriages recognized under Muslim law.xix[50] Regrettably, the Court is duty-bound to resolve the instant
case applying such laws and rights as are in existence at the time the pertinent civil acts took place. Corollarily, we are unable to
supplant governing law with customs, albeit how widely observed. In the same manner, we cannot supply a perceived hiatus in
P.D. 1083 concerning the distribution of property between divorced spouses upon one of the spouses death.51

WHEREFORE, the decision dated September 26, 1994 of the Fifth Sharia District Court of Cotabato City in Special Proceeding
No. 94-40 is SET ASIDE, and the instant petition is REMANDED for the reception of additional evidence and the resolution of
the issues of the case based on the guidelines set out in this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-
Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
 G.R. No. L-2935 March 23, 1909

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GEORGE I. FRANK, defendant-appellant.

Bishop and O'Brien for appellant.

Attorney-General Wilfley for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

Judgment was rendered in the lower court on the 5th day of September, 1905. The defendant appealed. On the 12th day of
October, 1905, the appellant filed his printed bill of exceptions with the clerk of the Supreme Court. On the 5th day of December,
1905, the appellant filed his brief with the clerk of the Supreme Court. On the 19th day of January, 1906, the Attorney-General
filed his brief in said cause. Nothing further was done in said cause until on or about the 30th day of January, 1909, when the
respective parties were requested by this court to prosecute the appeal under the penalty of having the same dismissed for failure
so to do; whereupon the appellant, by petition, had the caused placed upon the calendar and the same was heard on the 2d day of
February, 1909.

The facts from the record appear to be as follows:

First. That on or about the 17th day of April, 1903, in the city of Chicago, in the state of Illinois, in the United States, the
defendant, through a respective of the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, entered into a contract for a period of two
years with the plaintiff, by which the defendant was to receive a salary of 1,200 dollars per year as a stenographer in the service of
the said plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of
Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said period of travel.

Second. Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of the defendant, he should become
liable to the plaintiff for the amount expended by the Government by way of expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to
Manila and one-half salary paid during such period.

Third. The defendant entered upon the performance of his contract upon the 30th day of April, 1903, and was paid half-salary
from that date until June 4, 1903, the date of his arrival in the Philippine Islands.

Fourth. That on the 11th day of February, 1904, the defendant left the service of the plaintiff and refused to make further
compliance with the terms of the contract.

Fifth. On the 3d day of December, 1904, the plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to
recover from the defendant the sum of 269.23 dollars, which amount the plaintiff claimed had been paid to the defendant as
expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as half salary for the period consumed in travel.

Sixth. It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should constitute a part of said
contract.

To the complaint of the plaintiff the defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging in his special defense that the
Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby materially altered the said contract,
and also that he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into and was therefore not responsible under the law.

To the special defense of the defendant the plaintiff filed a demurrer, which demurrer the court sustained.

Upon the issue thus presented, and after hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the lower court rendered a
judgment against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of 265.90 dollars. The lower court found that at the time
the defendant quit the service of the plaintiff there was due him from the said plaintiff the sum of 3.33 dollars, leaving a balance
due the plaintiff in the sum of 265.90 dollars. From this judgment the defendant appealed and made the following assignments of
error:
1. The court erred in sustaining plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's special defenses.

2. The court erred in rendering judgment against the defendant on the facts.

With reference to the above assignments of error, it may be said that the mere fact that the legislative department of the
Government of the Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No. 80 and No. 224 by the Acts No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have
the effect of changing the terms of the contract made between the plaintiff and the defendant. The legislative department of the
Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of the Act of Congress of 1902 from altering or changing the terms of the
contract. The right which the defendant had acquired by virtue of Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not been changed in any respect
by the fact that said laws had been amended. These acts, constituting the terms of the contract, still constituted a part of said
contract and were enforceable in favor of the defendant.

The defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor and therefore the contract could not be enforced against him. The
record discloses that, at the time the contract was entered into in the State of Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that State
and had full authority to contract. The plaintiff [the defendant] claims that, by reason of the fact that, under the laws of the
Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, male persons in said Islands did not reach their majority until they had
attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed. It
is not disputed upon the contrary the fact is admitted that at the time and place of the making of the contract in question the
defendant had full capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution,
interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. (Scudder vs. Union
National Bank, 91 U. S., 406.) Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of
performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations,
depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought. (Idem.)

The defendant's claim that he was an adult when he left Chicago but was a minor when he arrived at Manila; that he was an adult
at the time he made the contract but was a minor at the time the plaintiff attempted to enforce the contract, more than a year later,
is not tenable.

Our conclusions with reference to the first above assignment of error are, therefore:

First. That the amendments to Acts No. 80 and No. 224 in no way affected the terms of the contract in question; and

Second. The plaintiff [defendant] being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place and time the contract was made, he
can not plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is being enforced.

We believe that the above conclusions also dispose of the second assignment of error.

For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs.