Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2. Yes.
Due process is satisfied when a person was notified of the charge against him and he
was given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the
filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer
the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. It
cannot be denied that petitioners were properly notified and were equally afforded the
opportunity to present their side.
FACTS:
The respondent employees were discharged for having written and published a patently
libelous letter tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt of officers, employees of
the bank, employer, and the bank itself. The letter referred to was a letter-charge which
the respondents had written to the bank president, demanding his resignation on the
grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as
discrimination in the promotion of bank employees.
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the
respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. In view of the foregoing,
the prosecutor filed a complaint in the CIR alleging that the Bank's conduct violated
section 4(a) (5) of the Industrial Peace Act which makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an
employee for having filed charges or for having given or being about to give testimony
under this Act."
HELD: YES.
Since the respondents acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-
charge, they were protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise
of their right of self-organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and
protection, interference with which constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 4(a).
Indeed, when the respondents complained against nepotism, favoritism and other
management practices, they were acting within an area marked out by the Act as a
proper sphere of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining does not end with the
execution of an agreement; It is a continuous process. The joining in protests or
demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such,
is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act.
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their
grievances. Good faith bargaining required of the Bank an open mind and a sincere
desire to negotiate over grievances. The grievance committee, created in the collective
bargaining agreements, would have been an appropriate forum for such negotiation.
Indeed, the grievance procedure is a part of the continuous process of collective
bargaining.It is intended to promote, as it were, a friendly dialogue between labor and
management as a means of maintaining industrial peace.
11: PARK HOTEL V. MANOLO SORIANO G.R. NO. 171118, 10 SEPTEMBER 2012
FACTS:
The petitioners were Park Hotel, the company, Gregg Harbutt, the
manager of the hotel and Bill Percy, the owner of the company. Harbutt is an
officer and stockholder of Burgos Corporation, a sister company of Park Hotel.
Manolo Soriano was hired by the petitioner Park Hotel as a Maintenance
Electrician. His co-respondent Lester Gonzales was a Doorman and then
Supervisor. Co-respondent Yolanda Badilla was a bartender of Js Playhouse. They
were dismissed by the company for allegedly stealing company property. At the
time of the case they were all employees of Burgos Corporation.
The respondents filed complaints against the petitioners before the Labor Arbiter
for illegal dismissal, ULP, and damages. They alleged that they were dismissed
because they were allegedly organizing a union. They also alleged that the
petitioners forced them to sign resignation letters in the presence of goons and
that they were not actually given the allegedly issued Memoranda for their
alleged violations.
The LA ruled in the respondents favor finding the employees were illegally
dismissed and that the employers committed the ULP of union busting by
terminating the employees. It ordered the petitioner employer to reinstate the
employees and to pay them damages. The LA rendered a new decision similarly
favoring the employees when the case was remanded to the LA upon appeal by
the petitioners to the NLRC. An appeal to the NLRC was dismissed. The CA
likewise dismissed the certiorari field against the NLRC and affirmed the
judgment.
ISSUE
1. Whether the actions of the employer constitute an unfair labor practice
2. Who among the petitioners are liable for ULP if they are liable
HELD
1. Yes, the petitioners committed ULP.
The Court ruled that an unfair labor practice is committed when an employer
interferes, restrains, or coerces employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization. This includes dismissing an employee from work because of he is
exercising his right to self-organization.
In the case, the immediate impulse of the respondent employers was to
terminate the employees who were organizing a union. The unceremonious
dismissal of the employees was to restrain their attempt to exercise their right to
self-organization.
2. Percy and Harbutt are liable.
The Court ruled that an officer of a corporation may be deemed solidarily liable
for unlawful acts of the corporation. This rule also applies in cases wherein an
employee is terminated and an officer has acted with malice or bad faith.
In the case, both Percy and Harbutt, as officers of Burgos, are liable because they
have acted maliciously in terminating the employees by dismissing them without
any valid ground and doing so to suppress their right to self-organization.
Facts:
Nina Micaller , an employee of petitioner, was found by the trial court to have been illegally
dismissed from her position as a salesgirl. Moreover, it ruled that the owners of Scottys
Department Store are guilty of unfair labor practice.
The controversy stemmed from the employers allegations of her misconduct and serious
disrespect to the management. As a rebuttal, the respondent claimed that her dismissal was
prompted by her organization of a union which was later on affiliated with the National Labor
Union. Micaller buttressed her allegation with the fact that the owners went to her house and
questioned her further as regards her union activities, in addition to tendering a paper for her to
sign in order to withdraw from the union. Thereafter, the manager of the store asked each
employee about their affiliation with the union. This impelled the Union to file a notice of strike;
an act which likewise pressed the petitioners to employ temporary employees equal in number to
the old.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practices.
Held:
Yes, petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practice under the Industrial Peace Act.
Since, in 1956, the law on this point is of recent enactment, the Court found it difficult to
determine what acts or circumstances may constitute unfair labor practice within its purview for
lack of appropriate precedents. However, there are many American cases that may be resorted to
where been found guilty of unfair labor practice under similar circumstances and was given the
corresponding sanction. One of such cases, which in its opinion is on all fours with the present, is
NLRB vs. Harris-Woodson Co. (CCA-4, 1947, 179 F 2d 720) where the following was held: .
13. Philippine Steam Navigation Co. vs. Philippine Marine Officers Guild, et al. G.R. Nos. L-
20667 and 20669
Facts:
PMOG (herein private respondent) and Cebu Seamen Association (CSA) are rival unions
representing PHILSTEAM officers. On 15 and 18 June 1954, PMOG sent petitioner co. set of
demands and request for CB. Petitioner, in its answer on 29 June 1954, required PMOG to prove
its majority representation. On the same date, petitioner started interrogating and investigating its
captains, deck officers, and engineers, to find out if they had joined PMOG or authorized PMOG
to represent them. PMOG replied insisting its former demands. PMOG filed a notice of strike.
Two conferences were held at DOLE but to no avail.
Meanwhile CSA sent petitioner its own set of demands. The latter recognized the latter as having
majority representation. On August 24, 1954, PHILSTEAM and CSA signed a CBA. On the same
date, PMOG declared a strike. The RP President certified the dispute to CIR.
Held:
Yes, petitioner committed ULP when it conducted investigations to check majority status of
PMOG. The rule in this jurisdiction is that subjection by the company of its employees to a series
of questionings regarding their membership in the union or their union activities, in such a way as
to hamper the exercise of free choice on their part, constitutes unfair labor practice.
Yes, striking employees are entitled to reinstatement, whether or not the strike was the
consequence of the employer's unfair labor practice, unless, where the strike was not the
consequence of any unfair labor practice, the employer has hired others to take the place of the
strikers and has promised them continued employment.
14. Guys refer to case 27, yung digest ni Greg. Parehas lang yung case, same dates and same
citations.
FACTS: Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration
at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the
regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.,
respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed
demonstration.
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not
be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts
should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent
Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a
charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a
"violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic
Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20,
rec.).
Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner
PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino
Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor
Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor
practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the
respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
ISSUE: WHO IS GUILTY OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE?
HELD: The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal
on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass
demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the
respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities
for ... mutual aid or protection" while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in
Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the
respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged
police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees
to engage in such common action to better shield themselves against such alleged police
indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning
and regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal,
was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech."
FACTS: Digitel Employees Union became the exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file
employees in Digitel in 1994. The Union and Digitel then commenced collective bargaining
negotiations which resulted in a bargaining deadlock. No CBA was forged between Digitel and the
Union. Some Union members abandoned their employment with Digitel. The Union later became
dormant.
10 years thereafter, Digitel received a letter from the president of the Union containing
the list of officers, CBA proposals and ground rules. Digitel was reluctant to negotiate with the
union and demanded the latter to show compliance with the provisions of the unions CBL on
union membership and election of officers.
Thereafter, the president and his group filed a case for preventive mediation before the
NCMB based on Digitels violation of duty to bargain.
During the pendency of the controversy, Digitel Service Inc. (Digiserv) filed with DOLE
an Establishment Termination Report stating that it will cease its business operation. The closure
affected at least 100 employees, 42 of whom are members of the respondent. Alleging that the
affected employees are its members and in reaction to Digiservs action, Esplana (president) filed
a notice of strike for union busting, illegal lockout and violation of assumption order. The
Secretary of Labor and Employment ordered the notice subsumed by a previous assumption order.
Meanwhile, Digitel filed a petition with BLR seeking cancellation of the Unions
registration which the Regional Director dismissed for lack of merit. The Secretary of Labor
directed Digitel to commence the CBA negotiation with the union and certified compulsory
arbitration before the NLRC the issue of ULP.
The NLRC dismissed the ULP charge against Digitel but declaring the dismissal of the 13
employees as illegal and ordering their reinstatement. The union maintains that out of 42
employees, only 13 remained as most had already accepted separation pay. Digitel filed before
CA, challenging the NLRCs decision arguing mainly that Digiserv employees are not employees
of Digitel. CA partially granted the case for ULP thus modifying the the assailed NLRC
dispositions. CA likewise sustained the finding that Digiserv is engaged on labor only contracting
and that its employees are actually employees of Digitel. Hence this petition.
HELD: The affected employees were illegally dismissed. In addition to finding that Digiserv is a
labor contractor, records show that its dismissed employees are in fact employees of Digitel. The
remaining affected employees, except 2, were already hired by Digitel even before the existence
of Digiserv. Likewise, the remaining affected employees continuously held the position of
Customer Service Representative, which was earlier known as Traffic Operator from the time they
were appointed until they were terminated.
Although Digitel maintains that the affected employees were already terminated on the ground of
closure of Digiserv, a department within Digitel. The court refers the closure of a department or
division of a company as retrenchment.
In this case, not all elements for a valid retrenchment were satisfied. There was no good faith in
the retrenchment. The closure of the department is not illegal per se. what makes it unlawful is
when the closure is undertaken in bad faith. Bad faith was evidenced by the timing of and reasons
of the closure and the timing of and reasons for all subsequent opening.
HELD: Under the Labor Code, an employee may be validly terminated on the
following grounds: (1) just causes under Art. 282; (2) authorized causes under
Art. 283; (3) termination due to disease under Art. 284; and (4) termination by
the employee or resignation under Art. 285.
Another cause for termination is dismissal from employment due to the
enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA. Here, Art. II of the CBA
on Union security contains the provisions on the Union shop and maintenance
of membership shop. There is union shop when all new regular employees
are required to join the union within a certain period as a condition for their
continued employment. There is maintenance of membership shop when
employees who are union members as of the effective date of the agreement,
or who thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a
condition for continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out
of the bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated.
SC ruled that the Club substantially complied with the due process
requirements before it dismissed the three respondents.
In the above case, we pronounced that while the company, under a
maintenance of membership provision of the CBA, is bound to dismiss any
employee expelled by the union for disloyalty upon its written request, this
undertaking should not be done hastily and summarily.
Facts:
Respondents were regular rank-and-file employees of PRI and bona fide members of
Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa PRI Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (NAMAPRI-SPFL),
which is the collective bargaining agent for the rank-and-file employees of petitioner PRI.
PRI has a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with NAMAPRI-SPFL for a period of five (5)
years from May 22, 1995 until May 22, 2000. The CBA contained union security provisions.
On May 16, 2000, Atty. Proculo P. Fuentes (Atty. Fuentes) sent a letter to the management of PRI
demanding the termination of employees who allegedly campaigned for, supported and signed the
Petition for Certification Election of the Federation of Free Workers Union (FFW) during the
effectivity of the CBA. NAMAPRI-SPFL considered said act of campaigning for and signing the
petition for certification election of FFW as an act of disloyalty and a valid basis for termination
for a cause in accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws, and the terms and conditions of the
CBA, specifically Article II, Sections 6.1 and 6.2 on Union Security Clause.
Respondents asserted that the act of PRI, Wilfredo Fuentes and Atty. Boniel in giving in to the
wishes of the Union in discharging them on the ground of disloyalty to the Union amounted to
interference with, restraint or coercion of respondents exercise of their right to self-organization.
The act indirectly required petitioners to support and maintain their membership with NAMAPRI-
SPFL as a condition for their continued employment. The acts of NAMAPRI-SPFL, Atty. Fuentes
and Trujillo amounted to actual restraint and coercion of the petitioners in the exercise of their
rights to self-organization and constituted acts of unfair labor practice.
Issue:
Whether the respondents committed acts of disloyalty.
Held:
No.
We are in consonance with the Court of Appeals when it held that the mere signing of the
authorization in support of the Petition for Certification Election of FFW on March 19, 20 and 21,
or before the freedom period, is not sufficient ground to terminate the employment of respondents
inasmuch as the petition itself was actually filed during the freedom period. Nothing in the records
would show that respondents failed to maintain their membership in good standing in the Union.
Respondents did not resign or withdraw their membership from the Union to which they belong.
Respondents continued to pay their union dues and never joined the FFW.
Moreover, the last sentence of Article 253 which provides for automatic renewal pertains only to
the economic provisions of the CBA, and does not include representational aspect of the CBA. An
existing CBA cannot constitute a bar to a filing of a petition for certification election. When there
is a representational issue, the status quo provision in so far as the need to await the creation of a
new agreement will not apply. Otherwise, it will create an absurd situation where the union
members will be forced to maintain membership by virtue of the union security clause existing
under the CBA and, thereafter, support another union when filing a petition for certification
election. If we apply it, there will always be an issue of disloyalty whenever the employees
exercise their right to self-organization. The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy
that should not be circumvented,[23] or compromised
22. DEL PILAR ACADEMY, EDUARDO ESPEJO and ELISEO OCAMPO, JR., vs. DEL PILAR
ACADEMY EMPLOYEES UNION,
G.R. No. 170112. April 30, 2008
NACHURA, J.:
Facts:
In September 1997, the UNION negotiated for the renewal of the CBA. DEL PILAR, however,
refused to renew the same unless the provision regarding entitlement to two (2) months summer
vacation leave with pay will be amended by limiting the same to teachers, who have rendered at
least three (3) consecutive academic years of satisfactory service. The UNION objected to the
proposal claiming diminution of benefits. DEL PILAR refused to sign the CBA, resulting in a
deadlock. The UNION requested DEL PILAR to submit the case for voluntary arbitration, but the
latter allegedly refused, prompting the UNION to file a case for unfair labor practice with the
Labor Arbiter against DEL PILAR; Eduardo Espejo, its president; and Eliseo Ocampo, Jr.,
chairman of the Board of Trustees.
Traversing the complaint, DEL PILAR denied committing unfair labor practices against the
UNION. It justified the non-deduction of the agency fees by the absence of individual check off
authorization from the non-union employees. As regards the proposal to amend the provision on
summer vacation leave with pay, DEL PILAR alleged that the proposal cannot be considered
unfair for it was done to make the provision of the CBA conformable to the DECS Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools.
Issue:
Whether the school committed unfair labor practice.
Held:
No. Anent the proposal to decrease the coverage of the 11th and 12th month vacation with pay, we
do not believe that such was done in bad faith but rather in an honest attempt to make perfect
procession following the DECS Manuals. Moreso, it is of judicial notice that in the course of
negotiation, almost all provisions are up for grabs, amendments or change. This is something
normal in the course of a negotiation and does not necessarily connote bad faith as each every one
(sic) has the right to negotiate reward or totally amend the provisions of the contract/agreement.
All told while there was error on [the] part of [DEL PILAR] for the first issue, [it] came through in
the second. But as it is, we do not believe that a finding of unfair labor practice can be had
considering the lack of evidence on record that said acts were done to undermine the union or
stifle the members right to self organization or that the [petitioners] were in bad faith. If at all, its
(sic) error may have been the result of a mistaken notion that individual check-off authorization is
needed for it to be able to validly and legally deduct assessment especially after individual[s]
concerned registered their objection. On the other hand, it is not error to negotiate for a better term
in the CBA. So long as [the] parties will agree. It must be noted that a CBA is a contract between
labor and management and is not simply a litany of benefits for labor. Moreso, for unfair labor
practice to prosper, there must be a clear showing of acts aimed at stifling the workers right to
self-organization. Mere allegations and mistake notions would not suffice.
Facts:
Issue:
Issue:
Whether Nestle committed Unfair Labor Practice?
Held:
No. Basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and he who
alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. By imputing bad
faith unto the actuations of Nestl, it was UFE-DFA-KM who had the
burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support the
allegation of unfair labor practice.
An ordinary striking worker may not be declared to have lost his employment status
by mere participation in an illegal strike.
The Arellano University Employees and Workers Union (the Union), the exclusive
bargaining representative of about 380 rank-and-file employees of Arellano
University, Inc. (the University), filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike charging the University with Unfair Labor Practice
(ULP). After several controversies and petitions, a strike was staged.
Upon the lifting of the strike, the University filed a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The NLRC issued a
Resolution holding that the University was not guilty of ULP. Consequently, the strike
was declared illegal. All the employees who participated in the illegal strike were
thereafter declared to have lost their employment status.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employee is deemed to have lost his employment by mere
participation in an illegal strike
HELD:
Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, an ordinary striking worker may not be declared
to have lost his employment status by mere participation in an illegal strike. There
must be proof that he knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts during
the strike. While the University adduced photographs showing strikers picketing
outside the university premises, it failed to identify who they were. It thus failed to
meet the substantiality of evidence test applicable in dismissal cases.
With respect to the union officers, as already discussed, their mere participation in
the illegal strike warrants their dismissal.
The question of whether an employee was discharged because of his union activities is
essentially a question of fact as to which the findings of the Court of Industrial Relations
are conclusive and binding if supported by substantial evidence considering the record as
a whole. 1 This is so because the Industrial Court is governed by the rule of substantial
evidence, rather than by the rule of preponderance of evidence as in any ordinary civil
cases. 2Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 3 It means such
evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably
inferred. 4 Examining the evidence on hand on this matter, We find the same to be
substantially supported.
It is admitted by petitioner that it accepted the invitation of Baylon for a grievance
conference on October 5, 1963. Yet, two hours after it accepted the letter of invitation, it
dismissed Baylon without prior notice and/or investigation. Such dismissal is undoubtedly
an unfair labor practice committed by the company.
Under these facts and circumstances, Baylon and the members of the Union had
valid reasons to ignore the schedule grievance conference and declared a strike.
When the Union declared a strike in the belief that the dismissal of Baylon was due to
union activities, said strike was not illegal . 6 It is not even required that there be in
fact an unfair labor practice committed by the employer. It suffices, if such a belief in
good faith is entertained by labor, as the inducing factor for staging a strike. 7 The
strike declared by the Union in this case cannot be considered a violation of the "no
strike" clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement because it was due to the
unfair labor practice of the employer. Moreover, a no strike clause prohibition in a
Collective Bargaining Agreement is applicable only to economic strikes. 8
The strike cannot be declared as illegal for lack of notice. In strikes arising out
of and against a company's unfair labor practice, a strike notice is not
necessary in view of the strike being founded on urgent necessity and
directed against practices condemned by public policy, such notice being
legally re. required only in cases of economic strikes. 9
35. CLLC E.G. GOCHANGCO WORKERS UNION v NLRC 161 SCRA 655
FACTS:
Petitioner union is a local chapter of the Central Luzon Labor Congress (CLLC),
a legitimate labor federation duly registered with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, while the individual petitioners are former employees of private
respondent who were officers and members of the petitioner union. Private
respondent is a corporation engaged in packing and crating, general hauling,
warehousing, sea van and freight forwarding.
Sometime in January 1980, the majority of the rank and file employees of
respondent firm organized the E.G. Gochanco workers Union as an affiliate of
CLLC. On January 23, 1980 the union filed a petition for certification election.
On February 7,1980, the CLLC National President wrote the general manager of
respondent firm informing him the organization of the union and requesting for
a labor management conference to normalize employer-employee relations. On
February 26, 1980, the union sent a written notice to respondent firm
requesting permission for certain members of the union to attend the hearing of
the petition for certification election.
The management refused to acknowledge receipt of the said notice. On February
28, 1980, private respondent preventively suspended the union officers and
members who participated in the hearing. The common ground alleged by
private respondent for its action was abandonment of work. All the gate passes
of the employees to Clark air base were confiscated by a base guard. Claiming
that the private respondent instigated the confiscation of their gate passes to
prevent them from performing their duties and that the respondent firm did not
pay them their overtime pay, 13th month pay and other benefits, petitioner
union and its members filed a complaint for constructive lockout and unfair
labor practice against private respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether there is ULP.
HELD:
Yes.
Respondent company is guilty of ULP. It is no coincidence that at the time of
suspension and termination orders, the petitioners were in the midst of
certification election preliminary to a labor-management conference,
purportedly, to normalize employee-employer relationship It was within the
legal right of the petitioners to do so, the exercise of which was their sole
prerogative, and in which management may not as a rule interfere. It is not only
an act of arrogance, but a brazen interference as well, witht the employees right
to self-organization, contrary to the prohibition of labor code against unfair labor
practice.
As a consequence of such a suspension, the Clark Air Base guards confiscated
the employees gate passes, and banned then from the base premise. We cannot
be befooled by the companys pretenses that the subsequent confiscation by the
Americans of the complainants passes is beyond the powers of management.
Those passes would not have been confiscated had not management ordered the
suspension. Conversely, in the absence of such suspension order, there was no
ground to seize such gate passes. Base guards, by themselves cannot bar
legitimate employees without the proper sanction of such employees, employers.
RULING:
It appears from the facts that petitioner was deliberately dismissed from the service
by reason of his active involvement in the activities of the union groups of both the
rank and file and the supervisory employees of PCSO, which unions he himself
organized and headed. Respondent PCSO first charged petitioner before the Civil
Service Commission for alleged neglect of duty and conduct prejudicial to the service
because of his union activities. The Civil Service Commission recommended the
dismissal of petitioner. Respondent PCSO immediately served on petitioner a letter of
dismissal even before the latter could move for a reconsideration of the decision of
the Civil Service Commission. Respondent PCSO may not impute to the Civil Service
Commission the responsibility for petitioner's illegal dismissal as it was respondent
PCSO that first filed the administrative charge against him. As found by the CIR,
petitioner's dismissal constituted unfair labor practice. It was done to interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization.
FACTS: Respondent Bayolo Salamuding, Mariano Gulanan and Rodolfo Raif were
of petitioner Polymer Rubber Corporation (Polymer), who were dismissed after
allegedly committing certain irregularities against Polymer.The three employees filed
a complaint against Polymer and Ang for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, non-
payment of overtime services, violation of Presidential Decree No. 851, with prayer
for reinstatement and payment of back wages, attorneys fees, moral and exemplary
damages. The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complainant unfair labor practice with
conditions such as reinstatement, overtime pay and payment of back wages.
The petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).The
NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA with modifications. The NLRC deleted the
award of moral and exemplary damages, service incentive pay, and modified the
computation of 13th month pay.The case was subsequently elevated to the Supreme
Court (SC) on a petition for certiorari. The Court affirmed the disposition of the
NLRC with the further modification that the award of overtime pay to the
complainants was deleted.
Upon motion, the Labor arbiter a quo issued a writ of execution but the same was
returned unsatisfied and in the latter part of 2004, Polymer was gutted by fire.
Labor arbiter issued a 5th alias writ of execution so that in its implementation, the
shares of stocks of Ang and USA Resources Corp. were levied.
Polymer and Ang moved to quash said 5th alias writ of execution and to lift notice of
garnishment. They alleged that Ang should not be held jointly and severally liable
with Polymer since it was only the latter which was held liable in the decision of the
LA, NLRC and the Supreme Court. LA granted the motion and the same was affirmed
by the NLRC. Salamuding file a petition for certiorari with CA.
CA stated that there has to be a responsible person or persons working in the interest
of Polymer who may also be considered as the employer. Since Ang as the director of
Polymer was considered the highest ranking officer of Polymer, he was therefore
properly impleaded and may be held jointly and severally liable for the obligations of
Polymer to its dismissed employees
ISSUE: Whether or not Ang as Officer of the Corporation cannot be personally held
liable and be made to pay the liability of the corporation
HELD: YES
A corporation, as a juridical entity, may act only through its directors, officers and
employees. Obligations incurred as a result of the directors and officers acts as
corporate agents, are not their personal liability but the direct responsibility of the
corporation they represent. As a rule, they are only solidarily liable with the
corporation for the illegal termination of services of employees if they acted with
malice or bad faith.29To hold a director or officer personally liable for corporate
obligations, two requisites must concur:
(1) it must be alleged in the complaint that the director or officer assented to patently
unlawful acts of the corporation or that the officer was guilty of gross negligence or
bad faith; and
(2) there must be proof that the officer acted in bad faith.In the instant case, the CA
imputed bad faith on the part of the petitioners when Polymer ceased its operations
the day after the promulgation of the SC resolution in 1993 which was allegedly
meant to evade liability. The CA found it necessary to pierce the corporate fiction and
pointed at Ang as the responsible person to pay for Salamudings money claims.
Except for this assertion, there is nothing in the records that show that Ang was
responsible for the acts complained of. At any rate, we find that it will require a great
stretch of imagination to conclude that a corporation would cease its operations if
only to evade the payment of the adjudged monetary awards in favor of three (3) of its
employees.
In labor cases, for instance, the Court has held corporate directors and officers
solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of employment of employees
done with malice or in bad faith.
To hold Ang personally liable at this stage is quite unfair. The judgment of the LA, as
affirmed by the NLRC and later by the SC had already long become final and
executory.