EN BANC of the complaint.
The prayer in the original complaint was
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON,
GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP,
Facts: Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee
must be assessed on the basis of the amended complaint cite the
case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. They contend that the Court of
Appeals erred in that the filing fee should be levied by considering
the amount of damages sought in the original complaint.
The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that
damages alleged in the original complaint as it did not consider the
1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land with damages. 2While the present
case is an action for torts and damages and specific performance
with prayer for temporary restraining order, etc. 3
2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only
the annulment of title of the defendant to the property, the
declaration of ownership and delivery of possession thereof to
plaintiffs but also asks for the payment of actual moral, exemplary
damages and attorney's fees arising therefrom in the amounts
specified therein. 4 However, in the present case, the prayer is for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during
the pendency of the action against the defendants' announced
forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the
property in question, to attach such property of defendants that
maybe sufficient to satisfy any judgment that maybe rendered, and
after hearing, to order defendants to execute a contract of
purchase and sale of the subject property and annul defendants'
illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff, ordering defendants
jointly and severally to pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and
exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as maybe
proved during the trial as attorney's fees and declaring the tender
of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and producing
the effect of payment and to make the injunction permanent. The
amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although
the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78
Million as damages suffered by plaintiff. 5
3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference
of opinion as to the nature of the action in the Magaspi case. The
complaint was considered as primarily an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The damages
stated were treated as merely to the main cause of action. Thus,
the docket fee of only P60.00 and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee were
paid. 6
In the present case there can be no such honest difference of
opinion. As maybe gleaned from the allegations of the complaint
as well as the designation thereof, it is both an action for damages
and specific performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of
complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by considering the action
to be merely one for specific performance where the amount
involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously
erroneous. Although the total amount of damages sought is not
stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the body
of the complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which
should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee.
4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was
brought to the attention of this Court together with similar other
cases an investigation was immediately ordered by the Court.
Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court
filed an amended complaint on September 12, 1985 for the
inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff and
by emanating any mention of the amount of damages in the body
maintained. After this Court issued an order on October 15, 1985
ordering the re- assessment of the docket fee in the present case
and other cases that were investigated, on November 12, 1985 the
trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by
stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then that
plaintiffs specified the amount of damages in the body of the
complaint in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. 7 Still no
amount of damages were specified in the prayer. Said amended
complaint was admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the
plaintiffs to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the
damages to be merely an or incidental to the action for recovery of
ownership and possession of real property. 8 An amended
complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court to include the
government of the Republic as defendant and reducing the amount
of damages, and attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said
amended complaint was also admitted. 9 In the Magaspi case, the
action was considered not only one for recovery of ownership but
also for damages, so that the filing fee for the damages should be
the basis of assessment. Although the payment of the docketing
fee of P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was
held that since the payment was the result of an "honest difference
of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee" the
court "had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings
thereafter had were proper and regular." 10 Hence, as the
amended complaint superseded the original complaint, the
allegations of damages in the amended complaint should be the
basis of the computation of the filing fee. 11 In the present case no
such honest difference of opinion was possible as the allegations
of the complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that it
is an action for damages and specific performance. The docketing
fee should be assessed by considering the amount of damages as
alleged in the original complaint.
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a
case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court . Thus, in the present
case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the
payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the
amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the
Court. 13 For an legal purposes there is no such original complaint
that was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the
order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent
proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that
the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of
damages sought in the original complaint and not in the amended
complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making the observation
that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original
complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of
damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is
alleged in the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no
other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees
if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing
fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this
Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an
investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended
complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being
asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when in
obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial
court directed that the amount of damages be specified in the
amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the damages
sought in the much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body
of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid
payment of the required docket fee is obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a
repetition of this unethical practice. To put a stop to this irregularity,
henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for
not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said
damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees
in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement
shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby
vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket
fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The
ruling in the Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J.
WARBY, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge,
Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and MANUEL
CHUA UY PO TIONG,
Issue: Whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when
the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid.
Facts: On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
filed a complaint with the RTC for the consignation of a premium
refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial
declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po
Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the
required answer within the reglementary period.
On the other hand private respondent filed a complaint in the RTC for
the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially
against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J.
Warby as additional defendants. The complaint sought, among others,
the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated
damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit.
Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of
damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the
complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket
fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said
objection was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who
was then presiding over said case. Upon the order of this Court, the
records of said case together with twenty-two other cases assigned to
different branches of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which
were under investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were
transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter returned the said
records to the trial court with the directive that they be re-raffled to the
other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge Castro. Civil
Case No. Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then
vacant.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc directed the judges in said
cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to
order its payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to
issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were
likewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be
recovered in their complaints.
The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in not
finding that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. Q-41177 on the ground of nonpayment of the correct and proper
docket fee. Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private
respondent had paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as
herein-above related, and considering that the total amount sought to
be recovered in the amended and supplemental complaint is
P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by private
respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same,
petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all
incidents arising therefrom should be annulled.
Ruling: The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the
present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of
the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original
complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket
fee until] the case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus,
in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this
Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case and that the amended complaint could not have been admitted
inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is
called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the
decision in Manchester must have had that sobering influence on
private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as
ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change of stance
by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as
may be ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid
is still insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is
a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly
authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and,
thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the private
respondent to pay the same.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party
claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until
and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also
allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of
the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the
court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk
of Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and
determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by private
respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in the
original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned
from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private
respondent to pay the deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as to
costs. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 146611 February 6, 2007
TANCREDO REDEA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LEOCADIO
REDEA, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner Tancredo Redea
(Tancredo, hereafter) seeks the annulment and setting aside of
the Resolution1 dated April 28, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 59641, as reiterated in its Resolution2 of
November 16, 2000, denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The present controversy sprung from an action for partition
filed by petitioner Tancredo against his older half-brother,
herein private respondent Leocadio Redea (Leocadio, for
brevity) before the then Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court [RTC]) of San Pablo City, Laguna, and thereat
docketed as Civil Case No. S-241 which was subsequently
inherited by Branch 33 of the RTC, Siniloan, Laguna.
The basic complaint for partition alleges that plaintiff Tancredo
and defendant Leocadio are both sons of one Maximo Redea:
Tancredo, by Maximos marriage to Magdalena Fernandez,
and Leocadio, by Maximos previous marriage to Emerenciana
Redea. The complaint further alleged that the parties
common father, Maximo, left several pieces of realty, to wit: a
residential lot at M. Calim Street, Famy, Laguna; a riceland at
Poroza, Famy, Laguna; and another parcel of land at Maate,
also in Famy, Laguna.
In a decision3 dated August 20, 1997, the trial court, based on
the evidence presented, confined the partition to only the
property actually pertaining to the estate of the parties
deceased father and co-owned by them, namely, the parcel of
land at Maate, and accordingly rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the defendant [now respondent Leocadio] to
partition only the property located at Maate, Famy, Laguna
after plaintiffs [Tancredos] reimbursement of the expenses
incurred by the defendant in relation to the said lot. However,
partition cannot be effected with regard to properties located at
M. Calim Street, Famy, Laguna and the property located at
Poroza, Famy, Laguna, as the same belong to the defendant.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Words in brackets supplied)
On December 11, 1997, petitioner filed with the trial court a
Notice of Appeal.4 The court gave due course to the notice and
directed the elevation of the records of the case to the CA
whereat petitioners appeal was docketed as CA-G.R.CV No.
59641.
On September 28, 1998, the CA issued a resolution directing
petitioner, as appellant, to file his appellants brief. Evidently,
the period for filing the brief was even extended by the CA.
On March 9, 1999, there being no appellants brief filed within
the extended period, the CA issued a resolution5considering
the appeal abandoned and accordingly dismissing the same.
The dismissal resolution reads:
For failure of plaintiff-appellant [now petitioner] to file the
required brief within the extended period, the instant appeal is
hereby considered ABANDONED and accordingly
DISMISSED, pursuant to Section 1(e), Rule 50, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
On November 8, 1999 or eight (8) months after the CA issued
the above resolution, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration6 thereof. In a resolution7 of November 25,
1999, the CA denied the motion.
Then, on December 28, 1999, in the same CA-G.R. CV No.
59641, petitioner filed a Petition for Relief8 bearing date
December 27, 1999, anchored on Section 2,9 Rule 38 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In that pleading, petitioner
prays the CA to set aside its dismissal resolution of March 9,
1999, supra, reinstate his appeal and grant him a fresh period
of forty-five (45) days from notice within which to file his
appellants brief.
In the herein assailed Resolution10 dated April 28, 2000, the CA
denied the aforementioned Petition for Relief, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition for relief dated 27 December 1999
is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Explains the CA in said resolution:
Petition for relief is not among the remedies available in the
Court of Appeals. In fact, authorities in remedial law (noted
authors Regalado, Herrera, and Feria) are one in their
commentaries that these petitions are filed with the trial courts.
Not one of them has advanced an opinion or comment that this
equitable relief can be obtained in the Court of Appeals. Under
Rule 47, an annulment of judgment or final orders and
resolutions may be filed before this court based on the ground
of extrinsic fraud which seems to be the premise of the petition.
Perhaps it is worth looking into by the petitioner if the factual
basis of the present petition for relief may qualify as an
extrinsic fraud, under Rule 47.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned
resolution was likewise denied by the CA in its equally
challenged Resolution11 of November 16, 2000, wherein the
appellate court further wrote:
Under the 1964 Rules of Court, there was only one court
where a petition for relief may be filed the Court of First
Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. Section 1 thereof
governs a petition to Court of First Instance for relief from
judgment of inferior court while Section 2 thereof governs
petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or
other proceeding thereof. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
has altered the said precept. Now, it must be filed before the
Municipal Trial Courts or Metropolitan Trial Courts for
judgments or final orders or other proceedings taken in said
courts, and in the same case. And for judgment, order, or other
proceedings in the Regional Trial Court, it must be filed in the
same Regional Trial Court which rendered the judgment or
final order, or other proceedings taken and in the same case.
In other words, under the present rule, such a petition may be
filed in the same court which rendered the judgment or final
order, or proceedings taken and in the same case. This is in
accordance with uniform procedure rule for Municipal and
Regional Trial Courts.
The above construction to limit the term "any court" to
Municipal Trial Court and Regional Trial Court and not to
include the Court of Appeals finds support in Section 7 of the
Rules which states:
Sec. 7. Procedure where the denial of an appeal is set aside.
Where the denial of an appeal is set aside, the lower court
shall be required to give due course to the appeal and to
elevate the record of the appealed case as if a timely and
proper appeal had been made.
Significantly, there is no specific provision in both the 1964 and
1997 Rules of Court making the petition under Rule 38,
applicable in the Court of Appeals. The procedure in the Court
of Appeals from Rule 44 to Rule 55 with the exception of Rule
45 which pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies the
remedies available before said court such as annulment of
judgment or final orders and resolution (Rule 47); motion for
reconsideration (Rule 52); and, new trial, (Rule 53). Nowhere is
petition for relief under Rule 38 mentioned.
But even as the CA stood firm on its stand that a petition for
relief from denial of appeal is not among the remedies
available before the CA itself, the appellate court, in the same
Resolution of November 16, 2000, left the final determination
of the question to this Court, thus:
Parenthetically, the main question presented herein is novel in
that there is yet no definite and definitive jurisprudence from
the Supreme Court. Perhaps, the case will clarify this gray area
in our adjective law for guidance of the Bench and Bar. The
issue should be elevated to that Tribunal.
Presently, petitioner is now before this Court via the instant
recourse on his submission that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion when it -
I application of technical rules must concede. The facts are
XXX RULED THAT A PETITION FOR RELIEF IS NOT AN
AVAILABLE REMEDY IN THE COURT OF APPEALS.
II
XXX REFUSED TO GRANT THE PETITION DESPITE A
CLEAR SHOWING THAT (A) PETITIONER, BY REASON OF
FRAUD AND MISTAKE, WAS PREVENTED FROM
PROSECUTING HIS APPEAL, AND (B) PETITIONER HAS A
GOOD AND SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
We DISMISS.
In Hagonoy Market Vendor Association v. Municipality of
Hagonoy, Bulacan, G.R. No. 137621, February 6, 2002, then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
reminded us that
Laws are of two (2) kinds: substantive and procedural.
Substantive laws, insofar as their provisions are unambiguous,
are rigorously applied to resolve legal issues on the merits. In
contrast, courts generally frown upon an uncompromising
application of procedural laws so as not to subvert substantial
justice. Nonetheless, it is not totally uncommon for courts to
decide cases based on a rigid application of the so-called
technical rules of procedure as these rules exist for the orderly
administration of justice.
From the petition, it is clear that this Court is called upon to
relax the application of procedural rules, or suspend them
altogether, in favor of petitioners substantial rights. There is no
doubt as to the power of this Court to do that. In a fairly recent
case, we reiterated:
The Court has often stressed that rules of procedure are
merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the
court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or
robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In
rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to
be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and
not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules
would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always
within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular
case from its operation.12
The Rules itself expressly states in Section 2 of Rule 1 that the
rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.
Courts, therefore, not only have the power but the duty to
construe and apply technical rules liberally in favor of
substantive law and substantial justice. Furthermore, this
Court, unlike courts below, has the power not only to liberally
construe the rules, but also to suspend them, in favor of
substantive law or substantial rights. Such power inherently
belongs to this Court, which is expressly vested with rule-
making power by no less than the Constitution.13 1awphi1.net
It is equally settled, however, that this Courts power to liberally
construe and even to suspend the rules, presupposes the
existence of substantial rights in favor of which, the strict
borne out by the records pertaining to petitioners purported
undivided share in the property at M. Calim Street, Famy,
Laguna, and the property in Poroza clearly showed that these
two properties had been subject of an agreement (Exh. "1")
whereby petitioner recognized respondents rights to said
properties. This fact binds this Court, there being nothing on
record with the trial court as to the herein alleged fraud against
the petitioner. Upon thorough deliberation of the supposed
substantial rights claimed by the petitioner with the court below,
the Court finds no cogent basis to favorably rule on the merits
of the appeal even if it may be given due course which is
indispensable to justify this Court in considering this case as
an exception to the rules.
The present case will have to be decided in accordance with
existing rules of procedure. We apply the settled principle that
petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is of
equitable character, allowed only in exceptional cases as when
there is no other available or adequate remedy.14 Hence, a
petition for relief may not be availed of where a party has
another adequate remedy available to him, which is either a
motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse decision of the
lower court, and he is not prevented from filing such motion or
taking the appeal. The rule is that relief will not be granted to a
party who seeks to be relieved from the effect of the judgment
when the loss of the remedy at law is due to his own
negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the
petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of
appeal which has already been lost either because of
inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of
procedure taken by counsel.15
Under Section 2 of Rule 38, supra, of the Rules of Court, a
party prevented from taking an appeal from a judgment or final
order of a court by reason of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, may file in the same court and in the
same case a petition for relief praying that his appeal be given
due course. This presupposes, of course, that no appeal was
taken precisely because of any of the aforestated reasons
which prevented him from appealing his case. Hence, a
petition for relief under Rule 38 cannot be availed of in the CA,
the latter being a court of appellate jurisdiction. For sure, under
the present Rules, petitions for relief from a judgment, final
order or other proceeding rendered or taken should be filed in
and resolved by the court in the same case from which the
petition arose. Thus, petition for relief from a judgment, final
order or proceeding involved in a case tried by a municipal trial
court shall be filed in and decided by the same court in the
same case, just like the procedure followed in the present
Regional Trial Court.16
Here, the record shows that petitioner in fact filed a Notice of
Appeal with the trial court, which the latter granted in its order
of December 11, 1997 and ordered the elevation of the records
to the CA. In turn, the CA, in its resolution of September 28,
1998, required the petitioner, thru his former counsel, Atty.
Geminiano Almeda, to file his appellants brief. But petitioner
failed to comply. Consequently, in its resolution of March 9,
1999, the CA considered the appellants appeal as
ABANDONED and DISMISSED the same.
Additionally, after the dismissal of his appeal, petitioner filed
with the CA a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal
resolution. Unfortunately, however, the motion was filed very
much late on November 8, 1999. Expectedly, in its
resolution17 of November 25, 1999, the CA denied the motion
for reconsideration, to wit:
The last day to file a motion for reconsideration was on 06 April
1999 and as of 18 October 1999 no such motion was ever
filed; in fact on 19 October 1999 the court resolved that an
entry of judgment may now be issued. The motion for
reconsideration, however, pleas for leniency on account of his
former lawyers inefficiency and negligence in that he failed to
appeal the case. This is not well taken.
His former lawyers lack of fidelity and devotion to his client in
the discharge of his duty of perfecting the appeal on time
without demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence cannot be a basis for judicial relief. The client has
to bear the adverse consequences of the inexcusable mistake
or negligence of his counsel or of the latters employee and
may not be heard to complain that the result of the litigation
might have been different had he proceeded differently
(Inocando v. Inocando, 100 Phil. 266)
WHEREFORE, the motion is hereby DENIED.
Petitioner presents himself as a mere farmer seeking the
Courts leniency to the point of disregarding the rules on
reglementary period for filing pleadings. But he fails to point out
any circumstance which might lead the Court to conclude that
his station in life had in any way placed his half-brother in a
more advantageous position. As we see it, petitioner failed to
show diligence in pursuing his cause. His condition as a
farmer, by itself alone, does not excuse or exempt him from
being vigilant on his right. He cannot lay the blame solely on
his former lawyer. It is settled that clients are bound by the
mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel.18 While,
exceptionally, a client may be excused from the failure of his
counsel, the circumstances obtaining in this case do not
convince the Court to take exception.
In seeking exemption from the above rule, petitioner claims
that he will suffer deprivation of property without due process
of law on account of the gross negligence of his previous
counsel. To him, the negligence of his former counsel was so
gross that it practically resulted to fraud because he was
allegedly placed under the impression that the counsel had
prepared and filed his appellants brief. He thus prays the
Court reverse the CA and remand the main case to the court of
origin for new trial.
Admittedly, this Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect
of counsels negligence and allowed a litigant another chance
to present his case (1) where the reckless or gross negligence
of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when
application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the
clients liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice
so require.19 None of these exceptions obtains here.
For a claim of counsels gross negligence to prosper, nothing
short of clear abandonment of the clients cause must be
shown. Here, petitioners counsel failed to file the appellants
brief. While this omission can plausibly qualify as simple
negligence, it does not amount to gross negligence to justify
the annulment of the proceedings below.
In Legarda v. Court of Appeals,20 where the Court initially held
that the counsels failure to file pleadings at the trial court and
later on appeal amounted to gross negligence, the Court, on
motion of the respondent therein, granted reconsideration and
applied the general rule binding the litigant to her counsels
negligence. In said case, the Court noted that the proceedings
which led to the filing of the petition "were not attended by any
irregularity." The same observation squarely applies here.
To recapitulate, petitioner is not entitled to relief under Rule 38,
Section 2 of the Rules of Court. He was not prevented from
filing his notice of appeal by fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, as in fact he filed one. The relief
afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to
be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of
the remedy of law was due to his own negligence, or a
mistaken mode of procedure for that matter; otherwise, the
petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of
appeal which has already been lost, either because of
inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake of procedure by
counsel.21 The Rules allow a petition for relief only when there
is no other available remedy, and not when litigants, like the
petitioner, lose a remedy by negligence.
On a final note, the extraordinary writ of certiorari may be
issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and
gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility.22 The Court finds no such abuse
of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the
assailed resolutions of the CA are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 139596 January 24, 2006
CHARLES CU-UNJIENG, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and UNI0N BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
By this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Charles Cu-
Unjieng seeks the reversal of the following issuances of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 8177-B-
UDK, entitled Charles Cu-Unjieng, plaintiff-appellant vs. Union
Bank of the Philippines, et al., defendants-appellees, to wit:
1. Resolution1 dated May 10,1999, dismissing, for
non-payment of docket and other lawful fees,
petitioners appeal from an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court at Malolos, Bulacan which
dismissed his complaint for specific performance and
damages against respondent Union Bank of the
Philippines and others; and
2. Resolution2 dated July 30, 1999 which denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and ordered
expunged the appeal brief thereto attached.
The facts:
Respondent Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) is the owner
of a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 218,769 square
meters situated in Barangay Sta. Maria, San Miguel, Bulacan
and registered in its name under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. TC-1062 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.
Sometime in January 1994, UBP caused the posting on the
bulletin boards of its branch offices of a three-page list of
acquired realty assets available for sale to interested parties.
Included in said list was the aforementioned parcel of land,
offered to be sold for P2,200,000.00.
Petitioner, through a letter3 dated April 11, 1994 and addressed
to Joselito P. Valera, manager of UBPs Acquired Assets
Department, offered to buy the subject property for a lesser
amount of P2,078,305.50, payable as follows: 50% as down
payment with the balance to be paid in equal monthly
installments over a period of two (2) years. Petitioner explained
that his offer for an amount lesser than UBPs asking price was
on account of five (5) tenants occupying the subject land who
were allegedly demanding P500,000.00 to voluntarily vacate
the same.
As proof of his interest to buy the property, petitioner tendered
PCIB Check No. 565827 for P103,915.27, purportedly
representing 10% of the 50% down payment as earnest money
or deposit. UBP acknowledged receipt thereof by way of Union
Bank Receipt No. 495081 dated April 11, 1994.
On August 30, 1994, petitioner wrote a follow-up letter to UBP
inquiring on the status of his offer to buy the subject premises.4
Via a reply-letter dated August 31, 1994, the manager of UBPs
Acquired Assets Department advised petitioner that his offer to
purchase is yet to be acted upon because the bank was still
awaiting the opinion of its legal division regarding the sale of
"CARPable" agricultural assets acquired by the bank.5
As it turned out, UBP rejected petitioners offer as shown by
the fact that in another letter6 dated December 19, 1994, the
bank informed petitioner that his offer could not be favorably
acted upon on account of the legal divisions opinion that sales
of lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
without prior Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approval
are considered null and void. Accordingly, UBP advised
petitioner to pick up the refund of his P103,915.27 "earnest
money" at the banks disbursing unit.
Unable to accept UBPs rejection of his offer, petitioner,
through counsel, made a formal demand7 for the bank to
comply with its obligation to transfer and deliver the title of the
subject property to him by executing the proper deed of
conveyance, under the terms and conditions set forth in his
April 11, 1994 offer.
Responding thereto, UBP, thru its counsel, Atty. Luzano, in a
letter8 dated July 19, 1995, reiterated the banks rejection of
petitioners offer as "the land being carpable could only be
disposed of by the bank either thru Voluntary Offer to Sell
(VOS) or compulsory acquisition, the procedure of which is
outlined in Sec. 16" of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657.
It was against the foregoing backdrop of events that, on
February 6, 1997, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Malolos,
Bulacan, petitioner filed his complaint9 in this case for Specific
Performance and Damages against UBP, impleading as co-
defendant in the suit the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 80-M-97 and raffled to Branch 9 of
the court, the complaint principally sought UBPs compliance
with an alleged perfected contract of sale between it and
petitioner relative to the parcel of land in question. More
specifically, the complaint prays for a judgment ordering UBP
to:
a) accept payments from the plaintiff [petitioner] for
the sale of the Property in accordance with the terms
and conditions of the letter dated 11 April 1994;
b) execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the Property
covered by TCT No. TC 1062 of the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Bulacan upon the plaintiffs
full payment of the amount of Two Million Seventy
Eight Thousand Three Hundred Five & 50/100
(P2,078,305.50), failing in which, the deputy sheriff
should be ordered to execute such deed and the
Registry of Deeds to cancel the title of the Bank and
issue a new one in favor of the plaintiff;
c) pay plaintiff the sum of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) as moral damages;
d) pay plaintiff the sum of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) as exemplary damages;
e) pay plaintiff the sum of Four Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P400,000.00) as attorneys fees; and
f) pay the costs of the suit.
Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises, are
likewise respectfully prayed for.
After due proceedings, the trial court, in a decision dated
September 1, 1998,10 upon a finding that no perfected contract
of sale transpired between the parties, dismissed petitioners
complaint for lack of sufficient cause of action, thus:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence adduced and the
laws/jurisprudence applicable thereon, judgment is hereby
rendered DISMISSING the complaint in the above entitled
case for want of sufficient cause of action as well as the
defendants counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees for
lack of proof to warrant the same.
However, defendant Union Bank of the Philippines is ordered
to reimburse plaintiff Charles Cu-Unjieng the amount of
P103,915.27 representing the face value of PCIBank Check
No. 565827 tendered by the latter to the former as purported
"earnest money", with interest thereon at the prevailing rates of
interest periodically bestowed by UBP to its savings depositors
from April 11, 1994, through the succeeding years, and until
the full amount thereof shall have been delivered to the
plaintiff.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
With his motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioner filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal11therein
making known that he is taking an appeal from the adverse
decision to the CA. Acting thereon, the trial court issued an
Order12 directing the elevation of the records of the case to the
CA, whereat petitioners appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 8177-B-UDK.
As things would have it, in the herein first assailed Resolution
dated May 10, 1999, the CA dismissed petitioners appeal for
nonpayment of the required docket and other lawful appeal
fees, to wit:
For failure of the appellant [petitioner] to pay the docket and
other lawful fees (Sec. 4, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure), the Court Resolved to DISMISS the appeal
pursuant to Sec. 1(c), Rule 50 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED.13
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, attaching thereto
his appellants brief. However, in a subsequentResolution
dated July 30, 1999,14 the appellate court denied the motion
and even expunged from the record the appellants brief
thereto attached:
Acting on the motion of the plaintiff-appellant [petitioner] for a
reconsideration of the Resolution of May 10, 1999, which
dismissed the appeal for the reason stated therein, and
considering the opposition interposed thereto by defendant-
appellee [respondent] Union Bank of the Philippines and it
appearing that the filing of the notice of appeal of November 5,
1988, was not accompanied by the full and correct payment of
the corresponding appellate court docket and other lawful fees,
and for such tardiness of more than four (4) months, the Court
resolved toDENY the motion for reconsideration and the
attached brief thereto ordered EXPUNGED.
In Pedrosa vs. Hill, 257 SCRA 373, the Supreme Court, citing
Rodillas vs. Commission on Elections (245 SCRA 702 aptly
said:
xxx the mere filing of the notice of appeal was not enough. It
should be accompanied by the payment of the correct amount
of appeal fee. In other words, the payment of the full amount of
the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an
appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees. Well-rooted is the principle that
perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary
period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure
to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory,
and deprives the appellate court or body of jurisdiction to alter
the final judgment much less to entertain the appeal. This
requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere
technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement
without which the decision appealed from would become final
and executory, as if no appeal was filed at all.
SO ORDERED.
Undaunted, petitioner is now with us via the present recourse
seeking a relaxation of procedural rules and ultimately the
reversal and setting aside of the assailed twin resolutions of
the appellate court.
Petitioner would have the Court view his failure to pay the
appeal docket fees on time as a non-fatal lapse, or a non-
jurisdictional defect which the CA should have ignored in order
to attain substantial justice. Further, petitioner passes the
blame to the RTC clerk of court who allegedly made the
erroneous computation of docket fees.
We are not persuaded.
Doctrinally entrenched is the pronouncement that the right to
appeal is merely statutory and a party seeking to avail of that
right must comply with the statute or rules.15
Rule 41, Section 4, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Within
the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the
clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket
and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be
transmitted to the appellate court together with the original
record or the record on appeal.
Well-settled is the rule that payment of the docket and other
legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and
jurisdictional,16 noncompliance with which is fatal to an appeal.
For, to stress, appeal is not a matter of right, but a mere
statutory privilege.17
An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to
the CA must be made within fifteen (15) days from
notice.18 And within this period, the full amount of the appellate
court docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of
the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from.
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that full
payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such
payment, the appeal is not perfected and the appellate court
does not acquire jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, thereby
rendering the decision sought to be appealed final and
executory.19
For sure, nonpayment of the appellate court docket and other
lawful fees within the reglementary period as provided under
Section 4, Rule 41, supra, is a ground for the dismissal of an
appeal under Section 1(c) of Rule 50, to wit:
SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.- An appeal may
be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on
that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
c. Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful
fees as provided in section 4 of Rule 41; xxx
This Court has invariably sustained the CAs dismissal on
technical grounds under the aforequoted provision unless
considerations of equity and substantial justice present cogent
reasons to hold otherwise. True, the rules may be relaxed but
only for persuasive and weighty reasons, to relieve a litigant of
an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure.20 So it is that in La Salette College vs.
Victor Pilotin,21 we held:
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of
payment of appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its
strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay
those fees within the reglementary period allows only
discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power
should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of
sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and
fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in
consideration of all attendant circumstances
Then, too, in Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA) vs. Mangubat,22 we held that late payment of docket
fees may be admitted when the party showed willingness to
abide by the Rules by immediately paying the required
fees. Mactan, however, cannot be a source of comfort for
herein petitioner. For there, the appellate docket fees were
paid six (6) days after the timely filing of the notice of appeal.
Unlike in Mactan, payment of the appellate docket fees in this
case was effected by petitioner only after four (4) months
following the expiration of the reglementary period to take an
appeal.
With the reality obtaining in this case that payment of the
appellate docket fees was belatedly made four (4) months after
the lapse of the period for appeal, it appears clear to us that
the CA did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioners appeal
except to order its dismissal,23 as it rightfully did. Thus, the
September 1, 1998 decision of the RTC has passed to the
realm of finality and became executory by operation of law.
We must emphasize that invocation of substantial justice is not
a magical incantation that will automatically compel this Court
to suspend procedural rules. Rules of procedure are not to be
belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance
may have resulted in prejudice to a partys substantive rights.
Like all rules, they are required to be followed. So it must be
here.
WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED and the assailed
resolutions dated May 10,1999 and July 30, 1999 of the Court
of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 162772 March 14, 2008
MERLIZA A. MUOZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
By way of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, Merliza A. Muoz (petitioner) assails the
November 19, 2003 Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
sustaining her conviction for violation ofBatas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22); and the March 10, 2004 CA
Resolution2 denying her Motion for Reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as stated by the trial courts.
Petitioner is the wife of Ludolfo P. Muoz Jr. (Ludolfo), owner
and operator of L.P. Munoz Construction (Muoz
Construction). On August 3, 2000, Ludolfo took a loan
of P500,000.00, at 5% interest, from Sunwest Construction and
Development Corporation (Sunwest). Ludolfo issued to
Sunwest a Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) check,
postdated September 3, 2000, for P500,000.00.3
On September 3, 2000, Ludolfo sought an extension of his
loan by replacing the DBP check with Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC) Check No. 0000057285
for P500,000.00, drawn by petitioner4 and postdated December
3, 2000. Sunwest accepted the replacement check.5
On February 5, 2001 Sunwest deposited the RCBC check with
the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), Legaspi City,6 which
presented it to the drawee bank RCBC, but the latter
dishonored the check for insufficiency of funds.7Thus, on
February 8, 2001, Sunwest sent by registered mail a letter
addressed to Ludolfo, informing him of the dishonor of the
RCBC check and demanding that he make good the check or
pay the amount thereof within five days from receipt of said
notice.8 The letter was received on the same day by Eden
Barnedo at the postal address "L.P. Muoz, Jr. [sic]
Construction, Fernando Avenue, Doa Maria Subd., Daraga,
Albay."9
On March 14, 2001, Sunwest sent by registered mail another
letter, this time addressed to petitioner, informing her of the
dishonor of the RCBC check and demanding that she pay the
said check within five days from receipt of the letter.10 The letter
was received on March 20, 2001 by Eden Barnedo at the
postal address, "Fernando Avenue, Doa Maria Subd.,
Daraga, Albay".11
In her March 20, 2001 reply to Sunwest, petitioner explained
that Sunwest and Muoz Construction had mutual claims
against each other: Muoz Construction had a claim against
Sunwest for P10,000,000.00, including a 15% advance
payment, for two river control projects, while Sunwest had a
claim against Muoz Construction forP500,000.00. Given that
the claim of Muoz Construction was bigger than that of
Sunwest, petitioner treated the first claim as having
automatically offset, covered or paid the second claim as
represented by the amount of the RCBC check. This explains
why petitioner did "not give emphasis" anymore to the RCBC
check, the amount of which she considered as having been
already settled. Petitioner reminded Sunwest that it was made
aware of the offsetting of the amount of the RCBC check as
early as February 15, 2001.12
Upon a criminal complaint13 filed by Elizaldy S. Co, Sunwest
president, an Information14 was filed by the City Prosecutor
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Legaspi City,
charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner
entered a plea of "Not Guilty."15
After trial, the MTCC rendered a Decision dated August 19,
2003,16 finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, and sentencing her to pay a fine
of P200,000.00; to pay Sunwest P500,000.00, representing the
amount of RCBC Check No. 0000057285, plus interest thereon
at the rate of 12% per annum computed from April 23, 2001,
the date of the filing of the information, until fully paid; and to
pay the costs. 17
On appeal by petitioner, the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Legaspi City, in a Decision dated October 16, 2003, affirmed
the MTCC Decision in toto.18
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CA but the latter
dismissed it outright in the November 19, 2003 Resolution
assailed herein, citing the following grounds:
(a) Failure to attach or incorporate an Affidavit of
Service as required under Section 13, Rule 13 in
relation to Section 3, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended; and
(b) Failure to furnish copy of the petition and its
annexes to the Office of the Solicitor General which is
the counsel of the People of the Philippines.19
With the denial by the CA of her Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner is now before the Court raising the following issues:
Whether or not the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals
gravely erred in dismissing the petition for review filed by
herein petitioner purely on technical grounds.
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the
petitioner notwithstanding the fact that the criminal complaint
was filed by an unauthorized representative of the private
complainant corporation.
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the
petitioner notwithstanding the fact that the prosecution failed to
prove the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds in or
credit with the drawee bank on the part of the petitioner.
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred when it held the
petitioner civilly liable notwithstanding the absence of authority
of Elizaldy S. Co to file the instant case for and in behalf of the
private complainant corporation.20
The Court finds no merit in the Petition.
Except in criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or death, an appeal is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion. It may be availed of only
in the manner provided by law and the rules.21
Rule 42 prescribes the following requirements for the filing with
the CA of a petition for review from a decision of the RTC:
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to
appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified
petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the
same time to the clerk of said Court the corresponding docket
and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for
costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse
party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and
served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision
sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion for
new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment.
Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the
docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before
the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals
may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within
which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall
be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no
case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, therefore, the timeliness of a petition depends not only
on its seasonable filing but also on the prompt service of copy
thereof on the adverse party and the RTC. Thus, the petition
must be accompanied by proof of service as prescribed under
Rule 13, viz:
Section 13. Proof of service. Proof of personal service shall
consist of a written admission of the party served, or the official
return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving,
containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of
service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall
consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing
compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by
registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the
registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return
card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender,
or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified
or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the
addressee.
Failure to serve copy of the petition on the adverse party or to
show proof of service thereof is a fatal defect,22 for which the
petition can be dismissed under Section 3, Rule 42, thus:
Section 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The
failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other
lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the
petition, and the contents of and the documents which should
accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.
In the present case, petitioner failed to serve copy of her
petition on the Solicitor General as counsel of the adverse
party, the People of the Philippines.23 Hence, the CA did not
commit any reversible error in dismissing her petition.24
Petitioner did not even show substantial compliance with the
requirement of service of pleading.25 Although she served copy
of her Petition for Review on Assistant City Prosecutor Catalino
C. Serrano, the latter was no longer counsel of the adverse
party when the case was brought to the CA, nor was he
specifically deputized or designated by the Solicitor General to
represent him or receive notices for him.26 Hence, service on
the Assistant City Prosecutor did not amount to service on the
Solicitor General.27
However, petitioner argues that, rather than dismiss her
petition, the CA should have advised her to correct the
deficiency or taken the initiative of furnishing the Solicitor
General with a copy of the petition and requiring the latter to
comment on it.28 Furthermore, petitioner appeals for liberality in
the treatment of her appeal, so that it may be decided on the
merits rather than on technicality.29
It is true that oftentimes the Court applied the rules with
flexibility in order that the merits of a case will be fully
adjudicated upon, not-withstanding its technical
imperfections.30 But what impels the Court to do so is neither a
party's empty invocations of liberality nor its mechanical
correction of the imperfections.31 Rather, only a clear showing
of prima facie merit of the petition will persuade the Court to
take the extraordinary effort of setting aside its rules to give
way to the imperfect petition.32 After all, the rationale for
liberality is to bring to light the merits of the petition,
unobstructed by mere deficiencies in its form, such that if the
petition has not an iota of merit in it, then there is nothing for
the Court to bring to light at all.
In the present case, while upon motion for reconsideration,
petitioner supplied what were lacking in her petition for review
filed with the CA,33 she utterly failed to convince the Court that
the substantial grounds cited therein fartranscend its technical
deficiencies as would justify the resolution of her petition on its
merits rather than form.
A cursory assessment of the arguments of petitioner is
necessary.
First, petitioner insists that the criminal case filed against her,
as well as the civil case that was deemed instituted with it,
should have been dismissed for lack of authority of Elizaldy Co
to file the same on behalf of Sunwest, the payee of the RCBC
check.34
The issue of whether a corporate officer may bring suit on
behalf of his corporation for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is not
novel. In Tam Wing Tak v. Makasiar,35 the Court affirmed the
dismissal of a criminal case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for lack
of authority of the private complainant, thus:
Second, it is not disputed in the instant case that Concord, a
domestic corporation, was the payee of the bum check, not
petitioner. Therefore, it is Concord, as payee of the bounced
check, which is the injured party. Since petitioner was neither a
payee nor a holder of the bad check, he had neither the
personality to sue nor a cause of action against Vic Ang
Siong. Under Section 36 of the Corporation Code, read in
relation to Section 23, it is clear that where a corporation
is an injured party, its power to sue is lodged with its
board of directors or trustees. Note that petitioner failed to
show any proof that he was authorized or deputized or
granted specific powers by Concord's board of director to
sue Victor And Siong for and on behalf of the firm. Clearly,
petitioner as a minority stockholder and member of the
board of directors had no such power or authority to sue
on Concord's behalf. x x x36 (Emphasis supplied)
We applied the same rule just recently to Ilusorio v.
Ilusorio,37 which involved a criminal complaint for robbery and
qualified trespass.
However, it bears emphasis that in both cases, the deficiency
in the complaint was challenged by the accused at the
preliminary investigation stage, or before he entered a plea
upon arraignment. On the contrary, in the present case,
petitioner questioned the authority of Elizaldy Co after
arraignment and completion of the prosecution's presentation
of evidence. Thus, she is barred from raising such objection
under Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground
therefor. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a
motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a
waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds
provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of
this Rule.
The deficiency in the complaint/information arising from the
lack of authority of Elizaldy Co was not jurisdictional. It did not
detract from the unquestioned authority of the Assistant City
Prosecutor to file the Information, nor impair the jurisdiction of
the MTCC to act on the same.38
Second, petitioner harps on the purported lack of notice to her
of the dishonor of the RCBC check. This contention flies in the
face of documentary evidence consisting of the March 20,
2001 letter of petitioner to Sunwest where she expressly
acknowledged receiving the March 14, 2001 notice of dishonor
of the RCBC check.39
In fine, for deficiency in form and for lack of showing that her
appeal to the CA was meritorious, the petition for review of
petitioner was correctly dismissed by the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 173956 August 6, 2008
FRISCO F. SAN JUAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assails the February 6, 2006 Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case No. 27808 granting the prosecutions
Manifestation with Motion for Additional Marking of
Documentary Exhibits and the June 21, 2006
Resolution2 denying the motions for reconsideration separately
filed by petitioner and his co-accused.
Petitioner Frisco F. San Juan, in his capacity as Chairman of
the Public Estates Authority (PEA), together with 26 other
accused, composed of PEA Board of Directors, PEA Officers,
Officers of the Commission on Audit and the contractor of
Central Boulevard Project (now the President Diosdado
Macapagal Boulevard), Jesusito D. Legaspi, were charged
before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Sec. 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 30193 in an Information which reads:
That in or about the period from April 1999 to August
2002, in Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused public
officials of the Public Estates Authority (PEA), namely:
CARLOS P. DOBLE, former General Manager (with
Salary Grade 30) and ex-oficio member of the PEA
Board, BENJAMIN V. CARIO, PEA General
Manager (with Salary Grade 30) and ex-oficio
member of the Board, and other responsible public
officials of PEA, namely: FRISCO FRANCISCO SAN
JUAN, former Chairman of the Board, CARMELITA
DE LEON-CHAN, DANIEL T. DAYAN, SALVADOR P.
MALBAROSA, LEO V. PADILLA and ELPIDIO G.
DAMASO, all former members of the Board, ERNEST
FREDERICK O. VILLAREAL, Chairman of the Board,
and JOEMARI D. GEROCHI, ANGELITO M.
VILLANUEVA, MARTIN S. SANCIEGO, JR., and
RODOLFO T. TUAZON, all Board members, JAIME
R. MILLAN, Assistant General Manager, MANUEL R.
BERIA, JR., Deputy General Manager for
Operations & Technical Services and Chairman of the
Ad Hoc Committee responsible for the bidding and
award of the construction contract for the President
Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard Project, THERON
VICTOR V. LACSON, Deputy General Manager for
Finance, Legal and Administration and member of the
Ad Hoc Committee, BERNARDO T. VIRAY, Manager
for Technical Services Department and member of the
Ad Hoc Committee, RAPHAEL POCHOLO A.
ZORILLA, Project Management Officer, ERNESTO L.
ENRIQUEZ, Senior Corporate Attorney and member
of the Ad Hoc Committee, and CRISTINA AMPOSTA-
MORTEL, Department Manager, Legal Department,
and other responsible public officials of the
Commission on Audit (COA), namely: MANUELA E.
DELA PAZ, State Auditor V, ARTURO S. LAYUG,
State Auditor V and Chief of the Technical Services
Audit Division A, Technical Services Office, BENILDA
E. MENDOZA, Supervising Technical Audit Specialist,
EPIFANIO L. PUREZA, Assistant Chief of the
Technical Services Audit Division A, JOSE G.
CAPISTRANO, Technical Audit Specialist II, and MA.
CECILIA A. DELA RAMA, Technical Audit Specialist I,
all of whom were public officials during the times
material to the subject offense, while said public
officials were occupying their respective positions as
just stated, acting in such capacity and committing the
subject offense in relation to office and while in the
performance of their functions and duties, with
manifest partiality and evident bad faith (or at the very
least, gross inexcusable negligence), conspiring and
confederating with accused JESUSITO D. LEGASPI,
a private contractor doing business under the name of
J.D. Legaspi Construction, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted
benefits, advantage and preference to accused
JESUSITO D. LEGASPI, through the commission of
numerous illegal related acts all pertaining to the
President Diosdado Macapagal Boulevard Project,
such as (but not limited to) the bidding out of the said
project and illegally awarding the same to accused
JESUSITO D. LEGASPIs J.D. Legaspi Construction
and approving the award of the project to, as well as
the Construction Agreement with, J.D. Legaspi
Construction despite the lack of compliance with the
mandatory requirements and procedure for bidding,
even if no funds are yet available to finance the
project, without the requisite certificate of availability
of funds and without complying with the mandatory
conditions imposed by the Office of the President of
the approval thereof, per Memorandum dated 29
January 2000 from the Office of the Executive
Secretary, Malacaang, and approving/allowing
several improper variation/change orders and
overruns to be implemented without the requisite
presidential approval and the appropriate funds,
recognizing, affirming and causing the implementation
of the just-mentioned void contract, allowing and
paying or causing the allowance and payment of
several claims of accused JESUSITO D. LEGASPI for
 initial contract price, contract price adjustment,
variation orders, overruns and other claims even
when the same were clearly improper, illegal and
without the requisite presidential approval, thereby
paving the way for accused JESUSITO D. LEGASPI
to claim and receive undue payments from the
Government totaling millions of pesos in improper
overprice, thereby causing undue injury and grave
damage to the government in the aggregate amount
of at least FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY TWO MILLION
NINE HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED TWENTY AND 39/100 PESOS
(P532,926,420.39), more or less, constituting the total
illegal overprice paid to accused JESUSITO D.
LEGASPI for the subject Project.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned on January 21, 2005, petitioner and his co-
accused pleaded "not guilty."
The People, represented by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP), filed its pre-trial brief with proposed Exhibits
A to HHHH dated March 16, 2005. Petitioner filed his pre-trial
brief on June 23, 2005.
Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial Order,5 the
pertinent portions of which state:
The Prosecution reserves the right to present
additional documentary evidence, although this
reservation was objected to by the accused on the
ground that it violates their constitutional right.6
xxxx
Accused Frisco F. San Juan reserves the right to
present additional documentary evidence.7
xxxx
This Pre-Trial Order shall bind the parties, limit the
issues and control the course of the trial, unless
modified by the Court to prevent manifest injustice.
SO ORDERED.8
On November 10, 2005, trial commenced with the OSP
presenting Karen Villamil as its first witness, without prejudice
to the signing of the Pre-Trial Order by the parties.
At the scheduled hearing on January 24, 2006, instead of
proceeding with the presentation of its evidence, the OSP filed
a manifestation with motion for additional marking of
documentary exhibits.9
Petitioner filed an Opposition10 alleging that the motion fails to
comply with the three (3) day notice rule, thus, it is fatally
defective which must be dismissed outright; that the
prosecutions attempt to introduce additional evidence after
Pre-Trial has been completed, without petitioner having been
confronted by such evidence, violates petitioners fundamental
rights under the Constitution; that petitioners right to due
process has been violated by the presentation of the
prosecutions "additional evidence" when such pieces of
evidence ought to have been presented during the pre-trial of
the case; that the prosecution failed to show "good cause" in
order for the "additional evidence" to be accepted, since only
those pieces of evidence which are identified and marked are
allowed by the court.
On February 6, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued the herein
assailed Resolution11 granting the motion of the OSP, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
Acting on the Prosecutions Manifestation with Motion
for Additional Marking of Documentary Exhibits dated
January 23, 2006, with the comments and/or
oppositions thereto separately filed by accused: (1)
Layug, (2) de Leon-Chan, (3) Pureza and Capistrano,
(4) Legaspi, (5) Padilla, (6) Beria, Millan, Viray and
Zorilla, (7) San Juan, and (8)Amposta-Mortel, the
Court resolves to GRANT the aforementioned motion
but only insofar as to allow additional marking of
documentary exhibits which have been sufficiently
described in the said motion, over the objection of the
defense, in order to give the Prosecution the
opportunity to fully present its case, and considering
that the Pre-Trial Order has not been signed by the
parties. The defense may register their objections to
the documentary exhibits at the time that the same
are introduced in evidence. As prayed for, the
prosecution may present the additional documents
enumerated in its aforesaid motion for marking, and
the same shall be included in its list of exhibits in the
Amended Pre-Trial Order to be issued by the Court.12
Petitioner and his co-accused filed separate motions for
reconsideration but were denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
June 21, 2006 Resolution,13 the pertinent portions of which
state:
While it is true that pre-trial has already been
terminated, records show that, before the Pre-Trial
Order dated November 7, 2005 was issued, the Court
made clear to all the parties, considering the
numerous documentary evidence sought to be
marked and presented by the parties, that the said
Order was "without prejudice to the comment [on the
Pre-Trial Order] of the prosecution and the accused;"
that is, the Court may still accept any modification of
the said Order from both the prosecution and the
accused. Upon request of the parties, the Court gave
the prosecution and the accused a period of time "to
file a formal manifestation with respect to some
changes they would like to propose in the Pre-Trial
Order" notwithstanding the commencement of the
trial.14
xxxx
Apparent from the foregoing is the fact that while the
pre-trial has effectively been terminated, the Court
gave both the prosecution and the accused the
opportunity to submit comments to the Pre-Trial Order
or to modify their submissions or in some instances,
even to withdraw the stipulations they made during
the pre-trial. The Courts position is consistent with the
exercise of its discretion to decide how best to
dispense justice in accordance with the
circumstances of the proceedings before it. The
 decision to grant the prosecutions motion for
additional marking of documentary exhibits is another
exercise of this judicial prerogative, which prerogative
was made known to the parties in the Pre-Trial Order
dated November 7, 2005, when the Court stated that
such was subject to modification "in order to prevent
manifest injustice."
The guidelines on the conduct of the pre-trial,
including A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, were prescribed by
the Honorable Supreme Court to "abbreviate court
proceedings, ensure prompt disposition of cases and
decongest court dockets." The Court does not mean
to disregard or ignore these guidelines but the Court
is compelled to take into consideration, in the interest
of substantial justice, the various submissions of both
the prosecution and the accused mentioned above in
connection with the agreements reached by the
parties that they be allowed to submit their comments
on the pre-trial order, even while the trial had begun
so as not to delay the proceedings.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
Motions for Reconsideration of the accused-movants
are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.15
Hence, this petition.
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion when it granted OSPs motion for
additional marking of exhibits; and (2) whether the admission
of the "additional evidence" constitutes a violation of
petitioners constitutional right to due process.
The petition lacks merit.
Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, reads:
SEC. 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions
which the court may act upon without prejudicing the
rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall
be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the
notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a
manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at
least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless
the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter
notice.
While it is true that any motion that does not comply with the
requirements of Rule 15 should not be accepted for filing and,
if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, however, this Court
has likewise held that where a rigid application of the rule will
result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice,
technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the
case.16 Besides, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the
court may disregard procedural lapses, so that a case may be
resolved on its merits based on the evidence presented by the
parties.17 Moreover, under the above-cited Rule, the Court is
granted the authority to set the hearing on shorter notice upon
showing of good cause.
In the instant case, petitioner was served with the
Manifestation with Motion for Additional Marking of
Documentary Exhibits on January 24, 2006, or two days prior
to the scheduled hearing date on January 26, 2006.18 Although
the three-day notice rule was not complied with, the
Sandiganbayan allowed the motion based on good cause, i.e.,
that the markings of the additional documentary evidence at
this period was due to the sheer volume of the supporting
documents to the disbursement vouchers and the fact that
such supporting documents were only recently completed and
secured.19
This Court allows a liberal construction of this rule where the
interest of substantial justice will be served and where the
resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and
judicious discretion of the court,20 as in the instant case. Thus,
the Sandiganbayan correctly held that:
Apparent from the foregoing is the fact that while the
pre-trial has effectively been terminated, the Court
gave both the prosecution and the accused the
opportunity to submit comments to the Pre-Trial Order
or to modify their submissions or in some instances,
even to withdraw the stipulations they made during
the pre-trial. The Courts position is consistent
with the exercise of its discretion to decide how
best to dispense justice in accordance with the
circumstances of the proceedings before it. The
decision to grant the prosecutions motion for
additional marking of documentary exhibits is
another exercise of this judicial prerogative,
which prerogative was made known to the parties
in the Pre-Trial Order dated November 7, 2005,
when the Court stated that such was subject to
modification "in order to prevent manifest
injustice.21 (Emphasis supplied)
There is likewise no merit to petitioners contention that his
right to due process was violated when the OSPs motion was
granted. In its Resolution of February 6, 2006, the
Sandiganbayan declared, thus:
T]he Court resolves to GRANT the aforementioned motion but only insofar as to allow
additional marking of documentary exhibits which have been sufficiently described in the said
motion, over the objection of the defense, in order to give the Prosecution the opportunity to
fully present its case, and considering that the Pre-Trial Order has not been signed by the
parties. The defense may register their objections to the documentary exhibits at the time that
the same are introduced in evidence. x x x22
In its Resolution dated June 21, 2006, the Sandiganbayan also
held that:
While it is true that pre-trial has already been
terminated, records show that, before the Pre-Trial
Order dated November 7, 2005 was issued, the Court
made clear to all the parties, considering the
numerous documentary evidence sought to be
marked and presented by the parties, that the said
Order was "without prejudice to the comment [on the
Pre-Trial Order] of the prosecution and the accused;"
that is, the Court may still accept any modification of
the said Order from both the prosecution and the
accused. Upon request of the parties, the Court gave
the prosecution and the accused a period of time "to
file a formal manifestation with respect to some
changes they would like to propose in the Pre-Trial
 Order" notwithstanding the commencement of the
trial.23

Thus, petitioner can still file his objections to the documentary

evidence during trial on the merits of the case.

Finally, there is no basis to petitioners contention that the

additional pieces of documentary evidence were "surprise
evidence" because during the filing of their respective pre-trial
briefs, both parties have made reservations to present
additional documentary and testimonial evidence, as may be
necessary in the course of the trial;24 such reservations were
incorporated in the Pre-Trial Order.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The

February 6, 2006 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 27808 granting OSPs Manifestation with Motion for
Additional Marking of Documentary Exhibits, and the June 21,
2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.