CASE COMMENT: CHIEF ENGINEER, HYDEL PROJECT AND ORS. VS.

RAVINDER NATH AND ORS. (AIR 2008 SC 1315)

SUBMITTED BY: SUBMITTED TO:

KANCHAN L. VERMA DEEPANKAR SHARMA

ROLL NO- 1443 FACULTY OF LAW

B.A. LL.B. (Hons)

III SEMESTER

NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, JODHPUR

SUMMER SESSION,

(JULY-NOVEMBER 2017)
 CONTENTS

FACTS IN BRIEF........................................................................................................................... 3

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION ................................................................................................. 4

RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISIONS ............................................................................................. 4

APPELLANTS CONTENTIONS ................................................................................................. 5

RESPONDENTS CONTENTIONS .............................................................................................. 5

HOLDING ...................................................................................................................................... 6

AUTHORS CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 7

RATIO ............................................................................................................................................ 9

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 FACTS IN BRIEF

The plaintiff-respondents filed a civil suit praying for a declaration that the orders of termination

of their services/retrenchment passed by the defendant-appellants were illegal, and claimed

reinstatement with back wages. It was stated that the principle of `last come first go' was not

followed and the action of the employer was based on pick and choose policy, which was

discriminatory and arbitrary. The defendant-appellants contended that engagement of the

plaintiffs was purely temporary on work-charge basis, and after the completion of the project

their services were terminated as per Rule 20(1) read with Rule 3(9) of the Certified Standing

Orders. The trial court decreed the suit holding that the principle of `last come first go' was not

followed in effecting the retrenchment. The Trial Court also relied on the judgment of the Punjab

and Haryana High Court in Piara Singh &Ors. v. State of Haryana1 wherein the High Court had

given directions that the workers so retrenched should be accommodated somewhere-else in

some other projects and such appointments in the new projects would be treated as new

appointments for the purpose of seniority and that the relief given to such workers would be

without prejudice to the retrenchment and any other compensation that such workers would be

entitled to under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.. The appeal of the

employers was dismissed. In the second appeal filed by the employers, the High Court first

granted an interim stay but later vacated the same which led to filing of a Special Leave Petition

before the Supreme Court wherein a ground was raised that the civil court had no jurisdiction in

the matter as the relief of reinstatement was available only under the Industrial Disputes Act. The

Supreme Court at that stage only directed expeditious disposal of the second appeal. Ultimately,

the High Court dismissed the second appeal and affirmed the decree.

1
Piara Singh &Ors. v. State of Haryana[1989 PLR 396]

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In this appeal, it was contended that the matter fell within the ambit of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947, and the jurisdiction of the civil court stood impliedly excluded. For the respondent-

workers it was contended that the issue of jurisdiction was not raised before the courts below

and, therefore, the same could not be allowed to be raised at such a late stage.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

The questions for consideration before the Court were:

(i) Whether the issue regarding reinstatement and payment of back-wages could be

said to be covered under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act; and

(ii) Whether the plea of jurisdiction that was not raised either before the first appellate

court or in the second appeal could be allowed to be raised before the Supreme

Court in the instant appeal?

RELEVANT LEGAL PROVISIONS

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 2

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 2A

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 25G

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 33C

Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act;

Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Section 9

Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Section 16

Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - Section 80

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 APPELLANTS CONTENTIONS

The jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded since the matter clearly falls within the

ambit of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. There is a specific remedy that is available to

the respondents under the Industrial Disputes Act and all the below courts were wrong in

deciding the issues much less adverse to the appellants.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTIONS

This issue relating to jurisdiction was not raised by the respondents before

and it is only for the first time that the objection to the jurisdiction has been raised before

this Court and therefore t should not be taken into consideration.

The issue is not covered under the labor jurisprudence and under the provisions of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court could not be said to

be barred.

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 HOLDING

Once the original decree itself has been held to be without jurisdiction and hit by the doctrine of

coram non judice, there would be no question of upholding the same merely on the ground that

the objection to the jurisdiction was not taken at the initial, First Appellate or the Second

Appellate stage. It must, therefore, be held that the civil court in this case had no jurisdiction to

deal with the suit and resultantly the judgments of the Trial Court, First Appellate Court and the

Second Appellate Court are liable to be set aside for that reason alone and the appeal is liable to

be allowed.It cannot be said that there was no question of law involved as we have pointed out

that the issues squarely fell in the area covered by the Industrial Disputes Act and was, therefore,

specifically barred. The court decided not to go into the merits of the matter because of lack of

jurisdiction.

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 AUTHORS CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSION

The author feels that the Honorable Supreme Court was correct in pronouncing the above

decision in this case. The legitimacy of a claim that was not brought up in the prior proceedings

before this is the main in the present matter. The issue was not contended in any of the initial

stages of the proceedings and has been raised only in the last stage. Herein, this is with regard to

the claim that the Civil Court does not have jurisdiction in this case as it clearly falls within the

ambit of the Industrial Disputes Resolution Act 1947.

The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories, the important categories of

which are:

(i) territorial or local jurisdiction

(ii) pecuniary jurisdiction

(iii) jurisdiction over the subject-matter

An objection to territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction has to be raised at the earliest possible

opportunity and before the settlement of issues. It should be done in the first round of hearings.

If a contention as to territorial or pecuniary is not raised earlier, it cannot be raised later in

subsequent appeals in higher courts. This is a well settled position of law. Jurisdiction as to

subject-matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has

no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute,

charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having

no jurisdiction is a nullity.2

2
HarshadChimanLalModi v. DLF Universal Ltd. &Anr. (2005) 7 SCC 791

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The court held, and the author agrees that the time or stage at which a claim is raised is

immaterial as opposed to the value of the claim in the eyes of law, as far as the jurisdiction with

regard to subject matter is concerned. Neither consent nor waiver nor acquiescence can confer

jurisdiction upon a court, otherwise incompetent to try the suit. It is well settled that where a

court takes upon itself to exercise a jurisdiction it does not possess, its decision amounts to

nothing. A decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction is nonest and its invalidity can be set

up whenever it is sought to be enforced as a foundation for a right, even at the stage execution or

in collateral proceedings. A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a coram non judice.

This is because, unlike territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction, a want of jurisdiction over subject-

matter strikes right at the root of the matter and questions the courts ability to judge the matter

from a subjective point of view, as opposed to a technical point of view, as is the case with

pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction. In the present matter, it is clear that the case clearly falls

under the ambit of the Industrial Disputes Resolution Act 1947. The court has not absolved the

employers of all responsibility, the court has just said that it does not have the required

jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter and the employers could still be held liable under the

Industrial Disputes Resolution Act 1947. The declaration claimed by the plaintiffs in this suit

could be granted by the Labour Court under the Industrial Disputes Act and consequential relief

was also exclusively outside the jurisdiction of the civil court. The plaintiff respondents are

basing their case mainly on the provision of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thus the claim of

the plaintiffs/respondents could only be adjudicated by the Labour Court.

I therefore conclude that the Supreme Court was correct in not hearing the case on merits and

allowing the petition as the Civil court clearly does not have the requisite jurisdiction to try this

matter.

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 RATIO

Once the original decree itself has been held to be without jurisdiction and hit by the doctrine of

coram non judice, there would be no question of upholding the same merely on the ground that

the objection to the jurisdiction was not taken at the initial, First Appellate or the Second

Appellate stage.

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