G.R. No. L-45130 February 17, 1937 true mental condition of the patient. Dr. Jose A.
rue mental condition of the patient. Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, assistant alienist
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
LAUREL, J.:
On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed an
information charging Celestino Bonoan, the defendant-appellant herein, with
the crime of murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the City of
Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused, with evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, without any justifiable motive and with the decided
purpose to kill one Carlos Guison, attack, assault and stab the said
Carlos Guison on the different parts of his body with a knife, thereby
inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit:
"One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating one cm.
into the superior surace of the right lobe of the liver; and three non-
penetrating stab wounds located respectively at the posterior and
lateral lumbar region, and left elbow", which directly caused the
death of the said Carlos Guison three days afterwards.
On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the
accused. The defense counsel forthwith objected to the arraignment on the
ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and was at the time
confined in the Psychopatic Hospital. The court thereupon issued an order
requiring the Director of the Hospital to render a report on the mental
condition of the accused. Accordingly, Dr. Toribio Joson, assistant alientist,
rendered his report,Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated. On March 23, 1935,
the case was again called for the arraignment of the accused, but in view of
the objection of the fiscal, the court issued another order requiring the doctor
of the Psyhopatic Hospital who examined the defendant to appear and
produce the complete record pertaining to the mental condition of the said
defendant. Pursuant to this order, Dr. Toribio Joson appeared before the
court on March 26, 1935 for the necessary inquiry. Thereafter, the
prosecution and the defense asked the court to summon the other doctors of
the hospital for questioning as to the mental condition of the accused, or to
place the latter under a competent doctor for a closer observation. The trial
court then issued an order directing that the accused be placed under the
chief alienist or an assistant alienist of the Psychopatic Hospital for his
personal observation and the subsequent submission of a report as to the
of the Psychopathic Hospital, rendered his report, Exhibit 5, on June 11,
1935. On June 28, 1935, the case was called again. Dr. Fernandez appeared
before the court and ratified his report, Exhibit 5, stating that the accused
was not in a condition to defend himself. In view thereof, the case was
suspended indefinitely.
On January 21, 1936, Dr. Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the
defendant could be discharged from the hospital and appear for trial, as he
was "considered a recovered case." Summoned by the court, Dr. Fernandez,
appeared and testified that the accused "had recovered from the disease."
On February 27, 1936, the accused was arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and
trial was had.
After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged in
the information above-quoted and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the
costs.
The defendant now appeals to this court and his counsel makes the following
assignment of errors:
A. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence establishes that
the accused has had dementia only occasionally and intermittently
and has not had it immediately prior to the commission of the
defense.
B. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence in this case
further shows that during and immediately after the commission of
the offense, the accused did not show any kind of abnormality either
in behavior, language and appearance, or any kind of action showing
that he was mentally deranged.
C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the circumstances
that burden was on the defense to show hat the accused was
mentally deranged at the time of the commission of the offense, and
that the defense did not establish any evidence to this effect.
D. The court a quo in finding the accused guilty of the offense
charged and in not acquitting him thereof.
It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the defendant
Celestino Bonoan met the now deceased Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal
near a barbershop close to Tom's Dixie Kitchen. Francisco Beech, who was
at the time in the barbershop, heard the defendant say in Tagalog, "I will kill
you." Beech turned around and saw the accused withdrawing his right hand,
which held a knife, from the side of Guison who said, also in Tagalog, "I will
pay you", but Bonoan replied saying that he would kill him and then stabbed
Guison thrice on the left side. The assaultt was witnessed by policeman
Damaso Arnoco who rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan and took
possession of the knife, Exhibit A. Guison was taken to the Philippine
General Hospital where he died two days later. Exhibit C is the report of the
autopsy performed on December 15, 1934, by Dr. Sixto de los Angeles.
As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is admitted, it does
not seem necessary to indulge in any extended analysis of the testimony of
the witnesses for the prosecution. The defense set up being that of insanity,
the only question to be determined in this appeal is whether or not the
defendant-appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime
charged.
On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and the incidental
corollaries as to the legal presumption and the kind and quantum of evidence
required, theories abound and authorities are in sharp conflict. Stated
generally, courts in the United States proceed upon three different theories.
(See Herzog, Alfred W., Medical Jurisprudence [1931], sec. 655 et seq., p.
479 et seq.; also Lawson, Insanity in Criminal Cases, p. 11 et seq.) The first
view is that insanity as a defense in a confession and avoidance and as must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt when the commission of a crime is
established, and the defense of insanity is not made out beyond a
reasonable doubt, conviction follows. In other words, proof of insanity at the
time of committing the criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order
to acquit the accused on the ground of insanity (Hornblower, C. J., in State
vs. Spencer, 21 N. J. L., 196). The second view is that an affirmative verdict
of insanity is to be governed by a preponderance of evidence, and in this
view, insanity is not to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. According
to Wharton in his "Criminal Evidence" (10th ed.,vol. I, sec. 338), this is the
rule in England (Reg. vs. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C., 149; Reg. vs. Higginson, 1
Car. & K., 130), and in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. The third view is that the
prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt (Dais vs. United
States, 160 U. S. 496; 40 Law. ed., 499; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 353; Hotema vs.
United States, 186 U. S., 413; 46 Law. ed., 1225; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895;
United States vs. Lancaster, 7 Biss., 440; Fed. Cas. No. 15,555; United
States vs. Faulkner, 35 Fed., 730). This liberal view is premised on the
proposition that while it is true that the presumption of sanity exists at the
outset, the prosecution affirms every essential ingredients of the crime
charged, and hence affirms sanity as one essential ingredients, and that
a fortiori where the accused introduces evidence to prove insanity it becomes
the duty of the State to prove the sanity of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter view (People
vs. Bacos [1922], 44 Phil., 204). The burden, to be sure, is on the
prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime, but insanity is presumed, and ". . . when a defendant in
a criminal case interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of
establishing that fact rests upon him. . . ." (U. S. vs. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil.,
305, 308, 309; U. S. vs. Bascos, supra.) We affirm and reiterate this doctrine.
In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that the defendant was
insane at the time he killed the deceased, the obligation of proving that
affirmative allegation rests on the defense. Without indulging in fine
distinctions as to the character and degree of evidence that must be
presented sufficiently convincing evidence, direct or circumstantial, to a
degree that satisfies the judicial mind that the accused was insane at the
time of the perpetration of the offense? In order to ascertain a person's
mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of
the condition of his mind a reasonable period both before and after that time.
Direct testimony is not required (Wharton, Criminal Evidence, p. 684; State
vs. Wright, 134 Mo., 404; 35 S. W., 1145; State vs. Simms, 68 Mo., 305;
Rinkard vs. State, 157 Ind., 534; 62 N. E., 14; People vs. Tripler, I Wheeler,
Crim. Cas., 48), nor are specific acts of derangement essential (People vs.
Tripler, supra) to established insanity as a defense. Mind can only be known
by outward acts. Thereby, we read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of
a person and come to determine whether his acts conform to the practice of
people of sound mind. To prove insanity, therefore, cicumstantial evidence, if
clear and convincing, suffice (People vs. Bascos [1922], 44 Phil., 204).
The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendantwas not insane at
the time of the commission of the act for which he was prosecuted on the
theory that the insanity was only occassional or intermittent and not
permanentor continuous (32 C. J., sec. 561, p. 757). We are appraised of the
danger of indulging in the preseumption ofcontinuity in cases of temporary or
spasmodic insanity.We appreciate the reason forthe contrary rule. To be
sure, courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or
eccentricity, mental weakness or mere depression resulting from physical
ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers escaping
punishment through a general plea of insanity. In the case at bar, however,
we are not cconcerned with connecting two or more attacks of insanity to
show the continuance thereof during the intervening period or periods but
with the continuity of a particular and isolated attack prior to the commission
of the crime charged, and ending with a positive diagnosis of insanity
immediately following the commission of the act complained of. Upon the
other hand, there are facts and circumstances of record which can not be
overlooked.The following considerations have weighed heavily upon the
minds of the majority of this court in arriving at a conclusion different from
that reached by the court below:.
(a) From the evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by
the prosecution, it appears that the herein defendant-appellant,
during the periods from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and from January
6 to January 10, 1926, was confined in the insane department of the
San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a disease diagnosed as dementia
prcox. His confinement during these periods, it is true, was long
before the commission of the offense on December 12, 1934, but this
is a circumstance which tends to show that the recurrence of the
ailment at the time of the occurence of the crime is not entirely
lacking of any rational or scientific foundation.
(b) All persons suffering from dementia prcox are clearly to be
regarded as having mental disease to a degree that disqualifies them
for legal responsibility for their actions (Mental Disorder in Medico-
Legal Relations by Dr. Albert M. Barrett in Peterson, Haines and
Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology, vol. I, p. 613). According to
Dr. Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the Insular Psychopathic Hospital,
the symptoms of dementia prcox, in certain peeriods of excitement,
are similar to those of manic depresive psychosis (p. 19, t. s. n.) and,
in either case, the mind appears "deteriorated" because, "when a
person becomes affected by this kind of disease, either dementia
prcox or manic depresive psychosis, during the period of
excitement, he has no control whatever of his acts." (P. 21, t. s. n.)
Even if viewed under the general medico-legal classification of
manic-depressive insanity, "it is largely in relation with the question
of irrestible impulse that forensic relations of manic actions will have
to be considered. There is in this disorder a pathologic lessening or
normal inhibitions and the case with which impulses may lead to
actions impairs deliberations and the use of normal checks to motor
impulses" (Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and
Toxology [2d ed., 1926], vol, I, p. 617).
(c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Celedonio S.
Francisco, at one time an interne at San LazaroHospital, for four (4)
days immediately preceding December 12, 1934 the date when
the crime was committed the defendant and appellant had "an
attack of insomnia", which is one of the symptoms of, and may lead
to, dementia prcox (Exhibit 3, defense testimony of Dr. Celedonio
S. Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.).
(d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and
taken to the police station on the very same day of the perpetration
of the crime, and although attempted were made by detectives to
secure a statement from him (see Exhibit B and D and testimony of
Charles Strabel, t. s. n. pp. 9, 10) he was sent by the police
department to the Psychopathic Hospital the day following the
commission of the crime. This is an indication that the police
authorities themselves doubted the mental normalcy of the acused,
which doubt found confirmation in the official reports submitted by
the specialists of the San Lazaro Hospital.
(e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in charge, Dr.
Toribio Joson, which report was made within the first month of
treatment, the defendant was suffering from a form of psychosis,
called manic depressive psychosis.We quote the report in full:
INSULAR PSYCHOPATIC HOSPITAL
MANDALUYONG, RIZAL
January 15, 1935.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The chief Alienist, Insular Psychopatic
Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
SUBJECT: Patient Celestino Bonoan, male,
Filipino, 30 years old, sent by the
Secret Service of the City of Manila
for mental examinition.
1. MENTAL STATUS:
(a) General behavior. The patient is undetective, staying
most of the time in his bed with his eyes closed and
practically totally motionless. At other times, however, but on
very rare occassions and at short intervals he apparently
wakes up and then he walks around, and makes signs and
ritualistic movements with the extremities and other parts of
the body. Ordinarily he takes his meal but at times he
refuses to take even the food offered by his mother or sister,
so that there have been days in the hospital when he did not
take any nourishment. On several occassions he refused to
have the bath, or to have his hair cut and beard shaved, and
thus appear untidy. He would also sometimes refuse his
medicine, and during some of the intervals he displayed
impulsive acts, such as stricking his chest or other parts of
the body with his fists and at one time after a short interview,
he struck strongly with his fist the door of the nurse's office
without apparent motivation. He also sometimes laughs, or
smiles, or claps his hands strongly without provocation.
(b) Stream of talk. Usually the patient is speechless, can't
be persuaded to speak, and would not answer in any form
the questions propounded to him. Very often he is seen with
his eyes closed apparently praying as he was mumbling
words but would not answer at all when talked to. At one
time he was seen in this condition with a cross made of small
pieces of strick in his hand. He at times during the interviews
recited passages in the literature as for example the
following.
"La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la verdadera
nobleza del hombre. (Truthfulness, honesty and
loyalty are among the attributes of a dependable
character.)"
At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very loud voice in
the hospital.
(c) Mood. Patient is usually apathetic and indifferent but at
times he looks anxious and rather irritable. He himself states
that the often feels said in the hospital.
(d) Orientation. During the periods that he was
acccessible he was found oriented as to place and person
but he did not know the day or the date.
(e) Illusion and hallucination. The patient states that
during the nights that he could not sleep he could hear
voices telling him many things. Voices, for example, told that
he should escape. That he was going to be killed because
he was benevolet. That he could sometimes see the shadow
of his former sweetheart in the hospital. There are times
however when he could not hear or see at all anything.
(f ) Delusion and misinterpretation. On one occassion he
told the examiner that he could not talk in his first day in the
hospital because of a mass he felt he had in his throat. He
sometimes thinks that he is already dead and already buried
in the La Loma Cemetery.
(g) Compulsive phenomena. None.
(h) Memory. The patient has a fairly good memory for
remote events, but his memory for recent events or for
example, for events that took place during his stay in the
hospital he has no recollection at all.
(i) Grasp of general informartion. He has a fairly good
grasp of general information. He could not, however, do
simple numerial tests as the 100-7 test.
( j) Insight and judgment. At his fairly clear periods he
stated that he might have been insane during his first days in
the hospital, but just during the interview on January 14,
1935, he felt fairly well. Insight and judgment were, of
course, nil during his stuporous condition. During the last two
days he has shown marked improvement in his behavior as
to be cooperative, and coherent in his speech.
2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:
The patient during his confinement in the hospital has been
found suffering from a form of physchosis, called Manic
depressive psychosis.
(Sgd.) TORIBIO JOSON, M. D.
Assistant Alienist
In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935 (Exhibit 5), filed by Dr. Jose
A. Fernandez, another assistant alienist in the Insular Pshychopatic Hospital,
the following conclusion was reached:
I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick. He is
suffering from the Manic Depressive form of psychosis. It
might be premature to state before the court has decided this
case, but I believe it a duty to state, that this person is not
safe to be at large. He has a peculiar personality make-up, a
personality lacking in control, overtly serious in his dealings
with the every day events of this earthly world, taking justice
with his own hands and many times executing it in an
impulsive manner as to make his action over proportionate
beyond normal acceptance. He is sensitive, overtly
religious, too idealistic has taste and desires as to make him
queer before the average conception of an earthly man.
He will always have troubles and difficulaties with this world
of realities.
 (Sgd.) J. A. Fernandez, M. D.
Assistant Alienist
To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normlacy of the
accused at the time of the commission of the crime, the prosecution called on
policeman Damaso Arnoco. Arnoco testified that upon arresting the
defendant-appellant he inquired from the latter for the reason for the assault
and the defendant-appellant replied that the deceased Guison owed him P55
and would pay; that appellant bought the knife, Exhibit A, for 55 centavos in
Tabora Street and that for two days he had been watching for Guison in
order to kill him (pp. 5, 6, t. s. n.). Benjamin Cruz, a detective, was also called
and corroborated the testimony of policeman Arnoco. That such kind of
evidence is not necessarily proof of the sanity of the accused during the
commission of the offense, is clear from what Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius
Professor of Forensic Medicine, University of Edinburg, said in his work on
Forensic Medicine (3d ed. [London], p. 382), that in the type of dementia
prcox, "the crime is ussually preceded by much complaining and planning.
In these people, homicidal attcks are common, because of delusions that
they are being interfered with sexually or that their property is being taken."
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-appellant
was demented at the time he perpetrated the serious offense charged in the
information and that conseuently he is exempt from criminal liability.
Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, and the
defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio in both instances. In
conforminty with paragraph 1 of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, the
defendant shall kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or such other
hospital for the insane as may be desiganted by the Director of the Philippine
Health Service, there to remain confined until the Court of First Instance of
Manila shall otherwise order or decree. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-52688 October 17, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HONORATO AMBAL, accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:
Honorato Ambal appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Camiguin convicting him of parricide, sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua and ordering him to pay an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos to
the heirs of his deceased wife, Felicula Vicente-Ambal (Criminal Case No.
155-C).
In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay captain found under some
flowering plants near the house of Honorato Ambal located in Barrio
Balbagon, Mambajao, Camiguin, Felicula Vicente-Ambal, 48, mortally
wounded. She asked for drinking water and medical assistance.
She sustained seven incised wounds in different parts of her body. She was
placed in an improvised hammock and brought to the hospital where she
died forty minutes after arrival thereat (Exh. B and G).
On that same morning, Honorato Ambal, husband of Felicula, after entrusting
his child to a neighbor, went to the house of the barangay captain and
informed the latter's spouse that he (Honorato) had killed his wife Feling.
After making that oral confession, Ambal took a pedicab, went to the
municipal hall and surrendered to a policeman, also confessing to the latter
that he had liquidated his wife.
The policeman confiscated Ambal's long bolo, the tip of which was broken
(Exh. F). Ambal was bespattered with blood. His shirt was torn. He appeared
to be weak.
The killing was the climax of a fifteen-year-old marriage featured by quarrels
and bickerings which were exacerbated by the fact that the wife sometimes
did not stay in the conjugal abode and chose to spend the night in the
poblacion of Mambajao. The couple had eight children.
The immediate provocation for the assault was a quarrel induced by
Felicula's failure to buy medicine for Ambal who was afflicted with influenza.
The two engaged in a heated alteration. Felicula told her husband that it
would be better if he were dead ("Mas maayo ka pang mamatay"). That
remark infuriated Ambal and impelled him to attack his wife (Exh. 1).
On January 27, 1977, a police lieutenant charged Ambal with parricide in the
municipal court. After a preliminary examination, the case was elevated to
the Court of First Instance where on March 4, 1977 the fiscal filed against
Ambal an information for parricide. At the arraignment, Ambal, assisted by
counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.
After the prosecution had presented its evidence, accused's counsel de oficio
manifested that the defense of Ambal was insanity.
The trial court in its order of September 15, 1977 directed the municipal
health officer, Doctor Maximino R. Balbas, Jr., a 1960 medical graduate who
had undergone a six-month training in psychiatry in the National Mental
Hospital, to examine Ambal and to submit within one month a report on the
latter's mental condition (p. 65, Record).
Doctor Balbas in his report dated November 3, 1977 found that Ambal was a
"passive-aggressive, emotionally unstable, explosive or inadequate
personality" (Exh. 1).
Doctor Balbas testified that during the period form February 1 (twelve days
after the killing) to November 3, 1977, when he placed Ambal under
observation, the latter did not show any mental defect and was normal (44-46
tsn November 3,1977).
Asked directly whether Ambal suffered from a mental disease or defect,
Doctor Balbas replied: "Before the commission of the crime, he was normal.
After the commission of the crime, normal, but during the commission of the
crime, that is what we call "Psychosis" due to short frustration tolerance" (45
tsn).
Doctor Cresogono Llacuna,a 1937 medical graduate who undertook a two-
month observation of mental cases and who in the course of his long practice
had treated around one hundred cases of mental disorders, attended to
Ambal in 1975. He found that Ambal suffered from a psychoneurosis, a
disturbance of the functional nervous system which is not insanity (65
November 15, 1977). The doctor concluded that Ambal was not
insane. Ambal was normal but nervous (68 He had no mental disorder.
Ambal, 49, who reached Grade four, testified on November 16, 1977 or
about ten months after the incident. He said that at the time of the killing he
did not know what he was doing because he was allegedly not in full
possession of his normal mental faculties. He pretended not to know that he
was charged with the capital offense of having killed his wife.
But he admitted that he knew that his wife was dead because he was
informed of her death. During his confinement in jail he mopped the floor and
cooked food for his fellow prisoners. Sometimes, he worked in the town plaza
or was sent unescorted to buy food in the market.
He said that his wife quarrelled with him. She was irritable. he admitted that
he rode on a tricycle when he surrendered on the day of the killing. He
remembered that a week before the incident he got wet while plowing. He
feel asleep without changing his clothes. At midnight, when he woke up, he
had chills. That was the commencement, his last illness.
The trial court concluded from Ambal's behavior immediately after the
incident that he was not insane and that he acted like a normal human being.
We agree with the court's conclusion.
Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from
passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or mere
depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should
guard against sane murderers escaping punishment through
a general plea of insanity. (People vs. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87,
94.)
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability an
imbecile or an insane person unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval. *
According to the dictionary imbecile is a person marked by mental deficiency
while an insane person is one who has an unsound mind or suffers from a
mental disorder. "imbecil vale tanto como escaso de razon y es loco el que
ha perdido el juico." An insane person may have lucid intervals but "el
embecil no puede tener, no tiene estos intervalos de Corazon, pues en el no
hay una alteracion, sino una carencia del juico mismo" (1 Viada, Codigo
Penal, 4th Ed., p. 92.)
Insanity has been defined as "a manifestation in language or conduct of
disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or
disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized
by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the
intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition" (Sec. 1039,
Revised Administrative Code).
The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the
absence of proof to the contrary (Art. 800, Civil Code re
Testamentary Succession; U.S. vs. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305,
308). The law always presumes all acts to be voluntary. It is
improper to presume that acts were executed unconsciously
(People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292; People vs. Tagasa, 68
Phil. 147, 153; U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil. 547; People vs.
Fausto, 113 Phil. 841).
When there is no proof that the defendant was not of sound
mind at the time he performed the criminal act charged to
him, or that he performed it at the time of madness or of
mental derangement, or that he was generally considered to
be insane his habitual condition being, on the contrary,
healthy the legal presumption is that he acted in his
 ordinary state of mind and the burden is upon the defendant
to overcome this presumption (U.S. vs. Zamora, 32 Phil.
218.)
Without positive proof that the defendant had lost his reason
or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a
normal condition (U.S. vs. Hontiveros Carmona, 18 Phil. 62).
A defendant in a criminal case, who interposes the defense of mental
incapacity, has the burden of establishing that fact, meaning that he was
insane at the very moment when the crime was committed (People vs.
Bascos, 44 Phil. 204.)
What should be the criterion for insanity or imbecility? We have adopted the
rule, based on Spanish jurisprudence, that in order that a person could be
regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and
freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime (People vs.
Formigonez, 87 Phil. 658, 660)
In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there
must be complete deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act or
that the accused acted without the least discernment. Mere abnormality of
his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. (People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil.
288,292; People vs. Renegado, L-27031, May 31,1974,57 SCRA 275, 286.)
A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and who tried to vindicate his
honor by taking violent measures to the extent of killing his wife (whom he
suspected of infidelity) can hardly be regarded as an imbecile (Formigones
case).
Where the accused had a passionate nature, with a tendency to having
violent fits when angry, his acts of breaking glasses and smashing dishes are
indications of an explosive temper and not insanity, especially considering
that he did not turn violent when a policeman intercepted him after he had
killed his wife. (Cruz case.)
There is a vast difference between an insane person and
one who has worked himself up into such a frenzy of anger
that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he
does. Persons who get into a quarrel or fight seldom, if ever,
act naturally during the fight. An extremely angry man, often,
if not always, acts like a madman. The fact that a person
acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular
meaning of the word I "crazy" is not synonymous with the
legal terms "insane", "non compos mentis," "unsound
mind","idiot", or "lunatic" (U.S. vs. Vaquilar, 27 Phil. 88, 91.)
The heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of
anger, hatred, or revenge is not insanity. (People vs. Foy,
138 N.Y. 664, cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 92.)
One who, in possession of a sound and, commits a criminal
act under the impulse of passion or revenge, which may
temporarily dethrone reason and for the moment control the
will, cannot nevertheless be shielded from the consequences
of the act by the plea of insanity. Insanity will only excuse the
commission of a criminal act, when it is made affirmatively to
appear that the person committing it was insane, and that
the offense was the direct consequence of his insanity (State
vs. Strickly, 41 Iowa 232, cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 94.)
The defense of insanity was rejected in a case where the accused killed by
strangulation a sixteen-year-old girl, who got leaves from his banana plants,
and sliced the flesh of her legs, thighs and shoulders, cooked the flesh and
ate it like a cannibal. (People vs. Balondo, L-27401, October 31, 1969, 30
SCRA 155).
Being weak-minded does not necessarily mean that the accused is insane
(People vs. Martin, 120 Phil. 14, 20-21).
Justice Cardozo in his article, "What Medicine Can Do For The Law", traces
briefly the origin of the rule regarding insanity as a defense. He says:
In the early stages of our law, way back in medieval times,
insanity was never a defense for crime. The insane killer, like
the man who killed in self-defense, might seek a pardon from
the king, and would often get one. He had no defense at law.
Gradually insanity was allowed, but only within narrow limits
This was what was become known as the wild-beast stage of
the defense. Then the limits of the defense were expanded,
but still slowly and narrowly. The killer was excused if the
disease of the mind was such that he was incapable of
appreciating the difference between right and wrong. At first
this meant, not the right and wrong of particular case, but
right and wrong generally or in the abstract, the difference,
as it was sometimes said, between good and evil. Later, the
rule was modified in favor of the prisoner so that capacity to
distinguish between right and wrong generally would not
 charge with responsibility if there was no capacity to
understand the difference in relation to the particular act, the
subject of the crime.
The rule governing the subject was crystallized in England in
1843 by the answer made by the House of Lords to
questions submitted by judges in the famous case of
McNaghten, who was tried for the murder of one Drummond,
the secretary of Sir Robert Peel.
In the M'Naghten case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, Clark and Finelly 200, the following
rule was laid down: "To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must
be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused
was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not,
to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it,
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."
In the M'Naghten case, it appears that Daniel M'Naghten shot Edward
Drummond on January 20, 1843. Drummond died as a consequence of the
gunshot wound on April 25, 1843. Drummond was the private secretary of Sir
Robert Peel, prime minister M'Naghten shot Drummond, thinking he was Sir
Robert. M'Naghten labored under the the insane delusion that he was being
hounded by his enemies and that the prime minister was one of them.
Medical evidence tended to prove that M'Naghten was affected by morbid
delusions which carried him beyond the power of his own control, leaving him
unable to distinguish right and wrong, and that he was incapable of
controlling his conduct in connection with the delusion. The jury found him
not guilty by reason of insanity.
As stated in another case, the "test of the responsibility for criminal acts,
when insanity is asserted, is the capacity of the accused to distinguish
between right and wrong at the time and with respect to the act which is the
subject of the inquiry. (Coleman's case,1 N.Y. Cr. Rep. 1.)
Another test is the so-called "irresistible impulse" test which means that
"assuming defendant's knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and his
knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of disease of the mind,
defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would
enable him to prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found
guilty." The commission of the crime is excused even if the accused knew
what he was doing was wrong provided that as a result of mental disease he
lacked the power to resist the impulse to commit the act. (State v. White, 270
Pac. 2d. 727, 730; Leslie Kast, 31 North Dakota Law Review, pp. 170, 173.)
The latest rule on the point is that "the so-called right wrong test,
supplemented by the irresistible impulse test, does not alone supply
adequate criteria for determining criminal responsibility of a person alleged
mental incapacity." "An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful
act is the product of a mental disease or a mental defect. A mental disease
relieving an accused of criminal responsibility for his unlawful act is a
condition considered capable of improvement or deterioration; a mental
defect having such effect on criminal responsibility is a condition not
considered capable of improvement or deterioration, and either congenital, or
the result of injury or of a physical or mental disease." (Syllabi, Durham v.
U.S., 214 F. 2nd. 862, 874, 45 A.L.R. 2d. 1430 [1954].)
As stated in 22 C.J.S. 203, "the general test of criminal responsibility may be
stated to be the capacity to understand the nature and consequences of the
act charged and the ability to distinguish between right and wrong as to such
act, and in a majority of jurisdictions this is the exclusive test."
And, as noted in 21 Am Jur 2d. 118, the rule in the M'Naghten case exists
along with the "irresistible impulse" test or some other formula permitting a
defendant to be exculpated on the ground that, although he knew the act was
wrong, he was unable to refrain from committing it.
Since the broadest test suggested, which is the Durham or
"Product" rule, also permits inability to distinguish between
right and wrong to be considered, even though it refuses to
limit the inquiry to that topic, it would appear that insanity
which meets this test is a defense in all Anglo-American
jurisdictions and that the only controversy is over whether
there are some cases in which the right-and-wrong test is not
met, but in which a defense on grounds of insanity should
nevertheless be recognized. (21 Am Jur 2d 118.)
In the instant case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was not substantiated by
any sufficient evidence. The presumption of sanity was not overthrown. He
was not completely bereft of reason or discernment and freedom of will when
he mortally wounded his wife. He was not suffering from any mental disease
or defect.
The fact that immediately after the incident he thought of surrendering to the
law-enforcing authorities is incontestable proof that he knew that what he had
done was wrong and that he was going to be punished for it.
Ambal is guilty of parricide with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender to the authorities. Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code punishes
parricide with reclusion perpetua to death. The lesser penalty should be
imposed because of the presence of one mitigating circumstance and the
absence of aggravating circumstances (Art. 63[3], Revised Penal Code).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's decision is affirmed. Costs against the
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33211 June 29, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ERNESTO PUNO y FILOMENO, Accused whose death sentence is under
review.
AQUINO, J.:
This is a murder case where the accused interposed as a defense the
exempting circumstance of insanity.
There is no doubt that at about two o'clock in the afternoon of September 8,
1970, Ernesto Puno, 28, a jeepney driver, entered a bedroom in the house of
Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), 72, a widow. The house was located in the area
known as Little Baguio, Barrio Tinajeros Malabon, Rizal
On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by saying:
"Mangkukulam ka mambabarang mayroon kang bubuyog". Then, he
repeatedly slapped her and struck her several times on the head with a
hammer until she was dead.
The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, who was in the
bedroom with the old woman, and by Lina Pajes, 27, a tenant of the adjoining
room. They testified that Puno's eyes were reddish. His look was baleful and
menacing. Puno was a neighbor of Aling Kikay.
After the killing, Puno went to the room of Lina, where Hilaria had taken
refuge, and, according to Hilaria, he made the following confession and
threat: "Huwag kayong magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin ninyo na
umalis kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa
matanda." Or, according to Lina, Puno said: "Pinatay ko na iyong matanda.
Huwag kayong tumawag ng pulis. Pag tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang
paghihigantihan ko. "
After the killing, Puno fled to his parents' house at Barrio Tugatog, Malabon
and then went to the house of his second cousin, Teotimo Puno, located at
Barrio San Jose, Calumpit, Bulacan, reaching that place in the evening. How
he was able to go to that place, which was then flooded, is not shown in the
record.
Disregarding Puno's threat, Lina, after noting that he had left, notified the
Malabon police of the killing. Corporal Daniel B. Cruz answered the call. He
found Aling Kikay sprawled on her bed already dead, Her head was bloody.
Her blanket and pillows were bloodstained. He took down the statements of
Lina and Hilaria at the police station. They pointed to Puno as the killer (pp.
15- 17, Record).
A medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted an
autopsy. He certified that the victim had lacerated wounds on her right
eyebrow and contusions on the head caused by a hard instrument, On
opening the skull, the doctor found extensive and generalized hemorrhage.
The cause of death was intracranial, traumatic hemorrhage (Exh. A).
Puno's father surrendered him to the police. Two Malabon policemen brought
him to the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Rizal on September 10,
1970 (p. 14, Record). He was charged with murder in the municipal court. He
waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation.
On October 21, 1970, he was indicted for murder in the Circuit Criminal Court
at Pasig, Rizal. Alleged in the information as aggravating circumstances were
evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex.
Puno, a native of Macabebe, Pampanga, who testified about five months
after the killing, pretended that he did not remember having killed Aling
Kikay- He believes that there are persons who are "mangkukulam,"
"mambabarang" and "mambubuyog and that when one is victimized by those
persons, his feet might shrink or his hands might swan. Puno believes that a
person harmed by a "mambabarang" might have a headache or a swelling
nose and ears and can be cured only by a quack doctor (herbolaryo).
Consequently, it is necessary to kill the "mangkukulam" and "mambabarang".
Puno is the third child in a family of twelve children. He is married with two
children. He finished third year high school. His father is a welder. Among his
friends are drivers. (Exh- B).
Zenaida Gabriel, 30, Puno's wife, testified that on the night before the
murder, Puno's eyes were reddish. He complained of a headache. The
following day while he was feeding the pigs, he told Zenaida that a bumble
bee was coming towards him and he warded it off with his hands. Zenaida
did not see any bee.
Puno then went upstairs and took the cord of the religious habit of his
mother. He wanted to use that cord in tying his dog. He asked for another
rope when Zenaida admonished him not to use that cord. Puno tied the dog
to a tree by looping the rope through its mouth and over its head. He
repeatedly boxed the dog.
Aida Gabriel, Zenaida's elder sister, saw Puno while he was boxing that dog.
Aida observed that Puno's eyes were bloodshot and his countenance had a
ferocious expression.
Teotimo Puno testified that on the night of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno
came to their house in Barrio San Jose, Calumpit. Ernesto was soaking wet
as there was a flood in that place. He was cuddling a puppy that he called
"Diablo". He called for Teotimo's mother who invited him to eat. Ernesto did
not eat. Instead, he fed the puppy.
Ernesto introduced Teotimo to his puppy. Then, he sang an English song.
When Teotimo asked him to change his wet clothes, Ernesto refused. Later,
he tried on the clothes of Teotimo's father. When told that Teotimo's father
had been dead for a couple of years already, Ernesto just looked at Teotimo.
While he was lying down, Ernesto began singing again. Then he emitted a
moaning sound until he fell asleep. Ernesto was awakened the next morning
by the noise caused by persons wading in the flood. Ernesto thought they
were his fellow cursillistas.
The defense presented three psychiatrists. However, instead of proving that
puno was insane when he killed Aling Kikay, the medical experts testified
that Puno acted with discernment.
Thus, Doctor Araceli Maravilla of the Psychiatry Section of the Dr. Jose R.
Reyes Memorial Hospital, to whom Puno was referred for treatment ten times
between September 8, 1966 and July 24, 1970, testified that Puno was an
out-patient who could very well live with society, although he was afflicted
with "schizophrenic reaction"; that Puno knew what he was doing and that he
had psychosis, a slight destruction of the ego. Puno admitted to Doctor
Maravilia that one cause of his restlessness, sleeplessness and irritability
was his financial problem (7 tsn November 4, 1970). Doctor Maravilla
observed that Puno on July 4, 1970 was already cured.
Doctor Reynaldo Robles of the National Mental Hospital testified that Puno
was first brought to that hospital on July 28, 1962 because his parents
complained that he laughed alone and exhibited certain eccentricities such
as kneeling, praying and making his body rigid. Doctor Robles observed that
while Puno was suffering from "schizophrenic reaction", his symptoms were
"not socially incapacitating" and that he could adjust himself to his
environment (4 tsn January 20, 1971). He agreed with Doctor Maravilla's
testimony.
Doctor Carlos Vicente, a medical specialist of the National Mental Hospital,
testified that from his examination of Puno, he gathered that Puno acted with
discernment when he committed the killing and that Puno could distinguish
between right and wrong (5 tsn January 1 1, 197 1). Doctor Vicente also
concluded that Puno was not suffering from any delusion and that he was not
mentally deficient; otherwise, he would not have reached third year high
school (8-19 tsn January 1 1, 197 1).
On December 14, 1970 or three months after the commission of the offense,
Doctors Vicente, Robles and Victorina V. Manikan of the National Mental
Hospital submitted the following report on Puno (Exh. B or 2):
Records show that he had undergone psychiatric treatment
at the Out-Patient Service of the National Mental Hospital for
schizophrenia in 1962 from which he recovered; in 1964 a
relapse of the same mental illness when he improved and in
1966 when his illness remained unimproved.
His treatment was continued at the JRR Memorial Hospital at
the San Lazaro Compound up to July, 1970. He was relieved
of symptoms and did not come back anymore for medication.
On September 8, 1970, according to information, he was
able to kill an old woman. Particulars of the offense are not
given.
MENTAL CONDITION
... Presently, he is quiet and as usual manageable. He is
fairly clean in person and without undue display of emotion.
He talks to co-patients but becomes evasive when talking
with the doctor and other personnel of the ward. He knows
he is accused of murder but refuses to elaborate on it.
xxx xxx xxx
REMARKS
 In view of the foregoing findings, Ernesto Puno, who
previously was suffering from a mental illness called
schizophrenia, is presently free from any social
incapacitating psychotic symptoms.
The seeming ignorance of very simple known facts and
amnesia of several isolated accounts in his life do not fit the
active pattern of a schizophrenic process. It may be found in
an acutely disturbed and confused patient or a markedly,
retarded individual of which he is not.
However, persons who recover from an acute episode of
mental illness like schizophrenia may retain some residual
symptoms impairing their judgment but not necessarily their
discernment of right from wrong of the offense committed.
The foregoing report was submitted pusuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court
and the order of the trial court dated November 16, 1970 for the mental
examination of Puno in the National Mental Hospital to determine whether he
could stand trial and whether he was sane when he committed the killing.
The trial court concluded that Puno was sane or knew that the killing of
Francisca Col was wrong and that he would be punished for it, as shown by
the threats which he made to Hilaria de la Cruz and Lina Pajes, the old
woman's companions who witnessed his dastardly deed.
The trial court also concluded that if Puno was a homicidal maniac who had
gone berserk, he would have killed also Hilaria and Lina. The fact that he
singled out Aling Kikay signified that he really disposed of her because he
thought that she was a witch.
Judge Onofre A. Villaluz said that during the trial he "meticulously observed
the conduct and behavior of the accused inside the court, most especially
when he was presented on the witness stand" and he was convinced "that
the accused is sane and has full grasp of what was happening" in his
environment.
The trial court convicted Puno of murder, sentenced him to death and
ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim an indemnity of twenty-two
thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. 509).
His counsel de oficio in this review of the death sentence, contends that the
trial court erred in not sustaining the defense of insanity and in appreciating
evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex as
aggravating circumstances.
When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from responsibility, the
evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of its execution (U.S. vs. Guevara, 27
Phil. 547). Insanity should be proven by clear and positive evidence (People
vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204).
The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed Francisca Col
because he had chronic schizophrenia since 1962; he was suffering from
schizophrenia on September 8, 1970, when he liquidated the victim, and
schizophrenia is a form of psychosis which deprives a person of discernment
and freedom of will.
Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the accused
must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the
will at the time of committing the crime (People vs- Formigones, 87 Phil. 658,
660).
Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without
the least discernment because there is complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability." (People vs.
Ambal, G.R. No. 52688, October 17, 1980; People vs. Renegade, L-27031,
May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 275, 286; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292. As to
"el trastorno mental transitorio as an exempting circumstance, see I Cuello
Calon, Codigo Penal, 15th Ed., 1974. pp. 498-504 and art. 8 of the Spanish
Penal Code.)
After evaluating counsel de oficio's contentions in the light of the strict rule
just stated and the circumstances surrounding the killing, we are led to the
conclusion that Puno was not legally insane when he killed the hapless and
helpless victim. The facts and the findings of the psychiatrists reveal that on
that tragic occasion he was not completely deprived of reason and freedom
of will.
In People vs. Fausto y Tomas, 113 Phil. 841, the accused was confined in
the National Mental Hospital for thirteen days because he was suffering from
schizophrenia of the paranoid type. His confinement was recommended by
Doctor Antonio Casal of the San Miguel Brewery where the accused used to
work as a laborer. About one year and two months later, he killed Doctor
Casal because the latter refused to certify him for re-employment. His plea of
insanity was rejected. He was convicted of murder.
In the instant case, the trial court correctly characterized the killing as
murder. The qualifying circumstance is abuse of superiority. In liquidating
Francisco Col, Puno, who was armed with a hammer, took advantage of his
superior natural strength over that of the unarmed septuagenarian female
victim who was unable to offer any resistance and who could do nothing but
exclaim " Diyos ko ".
Thus, it was held that "an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon
an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse
of that superiority which qqqs sex and the weapon used in the act afforded
him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself" (People vs.
Guzman, 107 Phil. 1122, 1127 citing U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; U.S.
vs. Camiloy 36 Phil. 757 and People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil. 446).
Evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) cannot be appreciated
because the evidence does not show (a) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the
culprit had clung to his determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time
between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act (People vs. Ablates, L-33304, July
31, 1974, 58 SCRA 241, 247).
The essence of premeditation "es la mayor perversidad del culpable
juntamente con su serenidad o frialdad de animo." It is characterized (1) "por
la concepcion del delito y la resolucion de ejecutarlo firme, fria, reflexival
meditada y detenida" and (2) "por la persistencia en la resolucion de
delinquir demostrada por el espacio de tiempo transcurrido entre dicha
resolucion y la ejecucion del hecho Premeditation should be evident,
meaning that it should be shown by "signos reiterados v externos, no de
meras sospechas" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 1974 or 15th Ed., pp- 582-
3).
Dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of her old
age should be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances. Disregard
of sex is not aggravating because there is no evidence that the accused
deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim or showed
manifest disrespect to her womanhood (People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548;
People vs. Mori, L-23511-2, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 404, People
vs, Jaula, 90 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. De Jesus, 14 Phil. 190).
However, those two aggravating circumstances are off-set by the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender to the authorities and, as contended by
counsel de oficio, the offender's mental illness (mild psychosis or
schizophrenic reaction) which diminished his will-power without however
depriving him of consciousness of his acts. (See People vs. Francisco, 78
Phil. 694, People vs. Amit, 82 Phil. 820 and People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil.
658.)
Thus, it was held that la equivocada creencia de los acusados de que el
matar a un brujo es un bien al publico puede considerarse como una
circunstancia atenuante pues los que tienen la obsession de que los brujos
deben ser eliminados estan en la misma condicion que aquel que, atacado
de enfermedad morbosa pero consciente aun de lo que hace, no tiene
verdadero imperio de su voluntad" (People vs. Balneg 79 Phil. 805, 810).
It results that the medium period of the penalty for murder should be imposed
(Arts. 64[41 and 248, Revised Penal Code).
WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua The indemnity imposed by the trial court is affirmed.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 89420 July 31, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant.
PARAS, J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision* of the Regional Trial Court of the
Third Judicial Region, Branch 54, Macabebe, Pampanga, convicting the
accused of the crime of murder.
The pertinent facts of the case are:
On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Pampanga
filed an information charging Rosalino Dungo, the defendant-appellant
herein, with the felony of murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the Municipality of
Apalit, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROSALINO
DUNGO, armed with a knife, with deliberate intent to kill, by means
of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Mrs.
Belen Macalino Sigua with a knife hitting her in the chest, stomach,
throat and other parts of the body thereby inflicting upon her fatal
wounds which directly caused the death of said Belen Macalino
Sigua.
 All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia,
evident premeditation and the generic aggravating circumstance of
disrespect towards her sex, the crime was committed inside the field
office of the Department of Agrarian Reform where public authorities
are engaged in the discharge of their duties, taking advantage of
superior strength and cruelty. (Record, p. 2)
On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established that on March
16, 1987 between the hours of 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a male
person, identified as the accused, went to the place where Mrs. Sigua was
holding office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After
a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and
stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. Accomplishing the morbid act, he went
down the staircase and out of the DAR's office with blood stained clothes,
carrying along a bloodied bladed weapon. (TSN, pp. 4-19, 33-46, April 13,
1987; TSN, pp. 5-21, 28-38, April 20, 1987).
The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra. Melinda dela Cruz
Cabugawan reveals that the victim sustained fourteen (14) wounds, five (5)
of which were fatal.
Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that, sometime in the
latter part of February, 1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him
concerning the actuations of his wife (the victim) in requiring so many
documents from the accused. Rodolfo Sigua explained to the accused the
procedure in the Department of Agrarian Reform but the latter just said
"never mind, I could do it my own way." Rodolfo Sigua further testified that
his wife's annual salary is P17,000.00, and he spent the amount of
P75,000.00 for the funeral and related expenses due to the untimely death of
his wife. (TSN, pp. 4-21, April 22, 1987).
The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the
time of the commission of the offense.
The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the wife of the
accused. According to her, her husband had been engaged in farming up to
1982 when he went to Lebanon for six (6) months. Later, in December 1983,
her husband again left for Saudi Arabia and worked as welder. Her husband
did not finish his two-year contract because he got sick. Upon his arrival, he
underwent medical treatment. He was confined for one week at the Macabali
Clinic. Thereafter he had his monthly check-up. Because of his sickness, he
was not able to resume his farming. The couple, instead, operated a small
store which her husband used to tend. Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987,
she noticed her husband to be in deep thought always; maltreating their
children when he was not used to it before; demanding another payment
from his customers even if the latter had paid; chasing any child when their
children quarrelled with other children. There were also times when her
husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth
they were not. On the fateful day of March 16, 1987, at around noon time,
her husband complained to her of stomach ache; however, they did not
bother to buy medicine as he was immediately relieved of the pain therein.
Thereafter, he went back to the store. When Andrea followed him to the
store, he was no longer there. She got worried as he was not in his proper
mind. She looked for him. She returned home only when she was informed
that her husband had arrived. While on her way home, she heard from
people the words "mesaksak" and "menaksak" (translated as "stabbing" and
"has stabbed"). She saw her husband in her parents-in-law's house with
people milling around, including the barangay officials. She instinctively
asked her husband why he did such act, but he replied, "that is the only cure
for my ailment. I have a cancer in my heart." Her husband further said that if
he would not be able to kill the victim in a number of days, he would die, and
that he chose to live longer even in jail. The testimony on the statements of
her husband was corroborated by their neighbor Thelma Santos who heard
their conversation. (See TSN, pp. 12-16, July 10, 1987). Turning to the
barangay official, her husband exclaimed, "here is my wallet, you surrender
me." However, the barangay official did not bother to get the wallet from him.
That same day the accused went to Manila. (TSN, pp. 6-39, June 10, 1981)
Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for
Mental Health testified that the accused was confined in the mental hospital,
as per order of the trial court dated August 17, 1987, on August 25, 1987.
Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino Dungo was
psychotic or insane long before, during and after the commission of the
alleged crime and that his insanity was classified under organic mental
disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke. (TSN, pp. 4-33,
June 17, 1988; TSN, pp. 5-27, August 2, 1988).
Rosalino Dungo testified that he once worked in Saudi Arabia as welder.
However, he was not able to finish his two-year contract when he got sick.
He had undergone medical treatment at Macabali Clinic. However, he
claimed that he was not aware of the stabbing incident nor of the death of
Mrs. Belen Sigua. He only came to know that he was accused of the death of
Mrs. Sigua when he was already in jail. (TSN, pp. 5-14, July 15, 1988)
Rebuttal witnesses were presented by the prosecution. Dr. Vicente Balatbat
testified that the accused was his patient. He treated the accused for
ailments secondary to a stroke. While Dr. Ricardo Lim testified that the
accused suffered from oclusive disease of the brain resulting in the left side
weakness. Both attending physicians concluded that Rosalino Dungo was
somehow rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their clinic. Dr.
Leonardo Bascara further testified that the accused is functioning at a low
level of intelligence. (TSN, pp. 620, September 1, 1988; TSN, pp. 4-29,
November 7, 1988).
On January 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principal for the crime of murder, the Court hereby renders
judgment sentencing the accused as follows:
1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessories of
the law;
2. To indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00
as actual damage, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and
P30,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. (p. 30, Rollo)
The trial court was convinced that the accused was sane during the
perpetration of the criminal act. The act of concealing a fatal weapon
indicates a conscious adoption of a pattern to kill the victim. He was
apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila which indicates that he embarked
on a flight in order to evade arrest. This to the mind of the trial court is
another indication that the accused was sane when he committed the crime.
It is an exercise in futility to inquire into the killing itself as this is already
admitted by the defendant-appellant. The only pivotal issue before us is
whether or not the accused was insane during the commission of the crime
changed.
One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense
charged cannot in a legal sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be
held criminally responsible for his acts. His unlawful act is the product of a
mental disease or a mental defect. In order that insanity may relieve a person
from criminal responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be
deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least discernment; that there
be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will. (People v.
Puno, 105 SCRA 151)
It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined
border between sanity and insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three
major criteria in determining the existence of insanity, namely: delusion test,
irresistible impulse test, and the right and wrong test. Insane delusion is
manifested by a false belief for which there is no reasonable basis and which
would be incredible under the given circumstances to the same person if he
is of compos mentis. Under the delusion test, an insane person believes in a
state of things, the existence of which no rational person would believe. A
person acts under an irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress or
mental disease, he has lost the power to choose between right and wrong, to
avoid the act in question, his free agency being at the time destroyed. Under
the right and wrong test, a person is insane when he suffers from such
perverted condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render him
incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S. 2)
So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a
definite test or criterion for insanity. However, We can apply as test or
criterion the definition of insanity under Section 1039 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which states that insanity is "a manifestation in
language or conduct, of disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less
permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or
organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by disordered function
of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered
volition." Insanity as defined above is evinced by a deranged and perverted
condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in language or conduct.
An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and
consequence of his act.
Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing
light on the subject, such as evidence of the alleged deranged person's
general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct inconsistent with his
previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his
improvident bargains.
Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the
person whose sanity is in issue, at the very time of doing the act which is the
subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible to receive evidence of his
mental condition for a reasonable period both before and after the time of the
act in question. Direct testimony is not required nor the specific acts of
derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. The vagaries of
the mind can only be known by outward acts: thereby we read the thoughts,
motives and emotions of a person; and through which we determine whether
his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. (People v. Bonoan,
64 Phil. 87)
In the case at bar, defense's expert witnesses, who are doctors of the
National Center for Mental Health, concluded that the accused was suffering
from psychosis or insanity classified under organic mental disorder
secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke before, during and after the
commission of the crime charged. (Exhibit L, p. 4). Accordingly, the mental
illness of the accused was characterized by perceptual disturbances
manifested through impairment of judgment and impulse control, impairment
of memory and disorientation, and hearing of strange voices. The accused
allegedly suffered from psychosis which was organic. The defect of the brain,
therefore, is permanent.
Dr. Echavez, defense's expert witness, admitted that the insanity of the
accused was permanent and did not have a period for normal thinking. To
quote
Q Is there such a lucid intervals?
A In this case, considering the nature of the organic mental disorder,
the lucid intervals unfortunately are not present, sir.
(TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988)
However, Dr. Echavez disclosed that the manifestation or the symptoms of
psychosis may be treated with medication. (TSN, p. 26, August 2, 1988).
Thus, although the defect of the brain is permanent, the manifestation of
insanity is curable.
Dr. Echavez further testified that the accused was suffering from psychosis
since January of 1987, thus:
Q In your assessment of the patient, did you determine the length of
time the patient has been mentally ill?
A From his history, the patient started (sic) or had a stroke abroad. If
I may be allowed to scan my record, the record reveals that the
patient had a stroke in Riyadh about seven (7) months before his
contract expired and he was brought home. Sometime in January of
1987, the first manifestation is noted on the behavioral changes. He
was noted to be in deep thought, pre-occupied self, complaining of
severe headache, deferment of sleep and loss of appetite; and that
was about January of 1987, Sir. (TSN, pp. 21-22, August 2, 1988)
The defense reposed their arguments on the findings of the doctors of the
National Center for Mental Health, specifically on Dr. Echavez's assessment
that the accused has been insane since January of 1987 or three (3) months
before the commission of the crime charged. The doctors arrived at this
conclusion based on the testimonies of the accused's wife and relatives, and
after a series of medical and psychological examinations on the accused
when he was confined therein. However, We are still in quandary as to
whether the accused was really insane or not during the commission of the
offense.
The prosecution aptly rebutted the defense proposition, that the accused,
though he may be insane, has no lucid intervals. It is an undisputed fact that
a month or few weeks prior to the commission of the crime charged the
accused confronted the husband of the victim concerning the actuations of
the latter. He complained against the various requirements being asked by
the DAR office, particularly against the victim. We quote hereunder the
testimony of Atty. Rodolfo C. Sigua:
Q In the latter part of February 1987 do you remember having met
the accused Rosalino Dungo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A At our residence, sir, at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga.
Q Could you tell us what transpired in the latter part of February
1987, when you met the accused at your residence?
A Accused went to our residence. When I asked him what he
wanted, accused told me that he wanted to know from my wife why
she was asking so many documents: why she was requiring him to
be interviewed and file the necessary documents at the Office of the
DAR. Furthermore, he wanted to know why my wife did not want to
transfer the Certificate of Land Transfer of the landholding of his
deceased father in his name.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the accused informed you in the latter part of February 1987
that your wife the late Belen Macalino Sigua was making hard for him
the transfer of the right of his father, what did you tell him?
A I asked the accused, "Have you talked or met my wife? Why are
you asking this question of me?"
 Q What was his answer?
A Accused told me that he never talked nor met my wife but sent
somebody to her office to make a request for the transfer of the
landholding in the name of his deceased father in his name.
Q When you informed him about the procedure of the DAR, what
was the comment of the accused?
A The accused then said, "I now ascertained that she is making
things difficult for the transfer of the landholding in the name of my
father and my name."
(TSN, pp. 5-7, April 22, 1987)
If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused was
supposed to be mentally ill during this confrontation. However, it is not usual
for an insane person to confront a specified person who may have wronged
him. Be it noted that the accused was supposed to be suffering from
impairment of the memory, We infer from this confrontation that the accused
was aware of his acts. This event proves that the accused was not insane or
if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid intervals.
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the effect that
the appellant could have been aware of the nature of his act at the time he
committed it. To quote:
Q Could you consider a person who is undergoing trial, not
necessarily the accused, when asked by the Court the whereabouts
of his lawyer he answered that his lawyer is not yet in Court and that
he is waiting for his counsel to appear and because his counsel did
not appear, he asked for the postponement of the hearing of the
case and to reset the same to another date. With those facts, do you
consider him insane?
A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.
Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be insane?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q How about if you applied this to the accused, what will be your
conclusion?
A Having examined a particular patient, in this particular case, I
made a laboratory examination, in short all the assessment
necessary to test the behavior of the patient, like for example praying
for postponement and fleeing from the scene of the crime is one
situation to consider if the patient is really insane or not. If I may
elaborate to explain the situation of the accused, the nature of the
illness, the violent behavior, then he appears normal he can reason
out and at the next moment he burst out into violence regardless
motivated or unmotivated. This is one of the difficulties we have
encountered in this case. When we deliberated because when we
prepared this case we have really deliberation with all the members
of the medical staff so those are the things we considered. Like for
example he shouted out "Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigua!" at that particular
moment he was aware of what he did, he knows the criminal case.
COURT
Q With that statement of yours that he was aware when he shouted
that he killed the victim in this case, Mrs. Sigua, do we get it that he
shouted those words because he was aware when he did the act?
A The fact that he shouted, Your Honor, awareness is there. (TSN,
pp. 37-41, August 2, 1983; emphasis supplied)
Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence.
The statement of one of the expert witnesses presented by the defense, Dr.
Echavez, that the accused knew the nature of what he had done makes it
highly doubtful that accused was insane when he committed the act charged.
As stated by the trial court:
The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he
perpetrated the act was sane. The evidence shows that the accused,
at the time he perpetrated the act was carrying an envelope where
the fatal weapon was hidden. This is an evidence that the accused
consciously adopted a pattern to kill the victim. The suddenness of
the attack classified the killing as treacherous and therefore murder.
After the accused ran away from the scene of the incident after he
stabbed the victim several times, he was apprehended and arrested
in Metro Manila, an indication that he took flight in order to evade
arrest. This to the mind of the Court is another indicia that he was
conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the
victim (Rollo, p. 63)
There is no ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the
evidence presented. (People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646). The trial court had
the privilege of examining the deportment and demeanor of the witnesses
and therefore, it can discern if such witnesses were telling the truth or not.
Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the
accused.1wphi1 However, in the defense of insanity, doubt as to the fact of
insanity should be resolved in fervor of sanity. The burden of proving the
affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense. Thus:
In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution for
crime, the starting premise is that the law presumes all persons to be
of sound mind. (Art. 800, Civil Code: U.S. v. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305)
Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that
it is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously (People
v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288). . . . Whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a
defense has the burden of proving its existence. (U.S. v. Zamora, 52
Phil. 218) (People v. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451)
The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity is a defense in a confession and
avoidance and as such must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity
must be clearly and satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the
ground of insanity. Appellant has not successfully discharged the burden of
overcoming the presumption that he committed the crime as charged freely,
knowingly, and intelligently.
Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping punishment
through a general plea of insanity. (People v. Bonoan, supra) PREMISES
CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is hereby
AFFIRMED without costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 126116. June 21, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERLINDO YAM-ID
alias ELY, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Before us on automatic review is the decision dated June 17, 1997 of
Branch 29 of the Regional Trial Court of the 7th Judicial Region stationed in
Toledo City in its Criminal Cases No. TCS-2381 and 2382 finding accused-
appellant ERLINDO YAM-ID guilty of murder and frustrated homicide,
respectively, and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death in the
first case. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, in Crim. Case No.
TCS-2381 this Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crime of Murder and
pursuant to Rep. Act 7659 hereby imposes the Mandatory penalty of DEATH
and to indemnify the parents of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay
actual damages in the amount of P40,000.00.
In Crim. Case No. TCS-2382, this Court finds the accused GUILTY of the
crime of Frustrated Homicide under Art. 249 RPC in relation to Art. 50 and
after applying the indeterminate sentence law, it is hereby the sentence of
this Court that said accused will suffer the penalty of SIX (6) Years and ONE
(1) DAY of Prision Mayor in its minimum period to TEN (10) YEARS of
Prision mayor in its maximum period. The OIC, Branch Clerk of Court is
hereby directed to remand the records of these cases to the Supreme Court
for automatic review.
SO ORDERED.
(p. 45, Rollo.)
The case for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the Solicitor
General as follows:
Julius Cantutay was a resident of Saksak, Pinamungajan, Cebu. Appellant
Erlindo was his neighbor. So, too, was Danilo Tejamo, his uncle, and six (6)
year old Jerry Tejamo his cousin (p. 2, tsn, July 31, 1995).
On April 1, 1994, at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, Julius was sent by
his grandmother, Amanda Ceniza, to Brgy. Tutay, Pinamungajan, Cebu, to
deliver benignit, a local delicacy, to his aunt Bebing Dequiado. Jerry Tejamo
was with Julius. On their way to Dequiados house, they passed by the house
of appellant who greeted them, Good Evening. After said salutation,
appellant suddenly unsheathed a long bolo. On instinct, Julius pushed Jerry,
who was then walking in front of him, and told the latter to run. Appellant ran
after the two. Jerry was overtaken by Julius. Julius momentarily stopped to
wait for Jerry, but appellant caught up with Jerry. Appellant stabbed Jerry
with the bolo on the left portion of his back. Not content, appellant held Jerry
by the hair and hacked him on the nape. Jerry fell to the ground. As a coup
de grace, appellant stabbed Jerry on the right side of his back. Jerry died on
the spot. Appellant then knelt over the prostrate body of Jerry and sucked the
blood from his neck (pp. 3-9, tsn, July 31, 1995).
Scared out of his wits, Julius ran towards the house of Jerry to the latters
father, Danilo Tejamo. Danilo was then sleeping, Julius narrated the
harrowing incident to Aniceta Tejamo, wife of Danilo. Aniceta Tejamo is the
sister of Juliuss father, hence, an aunt (p. 5, tsn, Oct. 26, 1995).
Aniceta roused Danilo from his sleep and both of them ran to the site of the
incident. Before they could reach the place, however, they were met by
appellant, who had a bolo in hand. Danilo asked appellant the whereabouts
of his son. Appellant instead answered, I will kill all of you, and immediately
hacked Danilo. Danilo was able to dodge the attack, but he slipped and fell to
the ground.Appellant struck at the fallen Danilo, who tried to parry the attack,
but Danilo nevertheless got hit on the bridge of his nose. Danilo tried to
stand, but appellant hacked him anew. This time, Danilo was hit on the head,
and he fell to the ground, bloodied (pp. 7-11, tsn, Oct. 26, 1995).
Since Danilo was not moving anymore, Aniceta shouted that Danilo was
already dead. Appellant took hold of Danilos collar to finish him
off. Inexplicably, the tip of the bolo hit appellants stomach and blood oozed
from the wound. Perturbed, appellant ran towards his house and threw the
bolo to the ground. Danilo regained consciousness and sought treatment (pp.
12-15, tsn, Oct. 26, 1995).
Expenses for the wake and burial of Jerry amounted to P40,000.00 (p. 14,
tsn, ibid.)
(pp. 109-112, Rollo.)
During the trial, accused-appellant denied killing the 6-year old Jerry
Tejamo and pleaded self-defense for his assault on Danilo Tejamo, Jerrys
father. He contended that due to a land dispute between his family and the in-
laws of Danilo Tejamo, the latter tried to kill him by firing at his house. In
retaliation, he hacked Danilo Tejamo at the forehead but Danilo shot him,
hitting him below the navel, in the process, causing a prolapse (the exposure
of his intestines). Then, he lost consciousness.
The trial court did not give credence to accused-appellants tale and after
trial on the merits, it found him guilty as charged.
In this automatic review, accused-appellant now makes a complete turn-
around and admits killing Jerry Tejamo. He, however, would plead insanity,
and, as to his conviction for frustrated homicide regarding his attack on Danilo
Tejamo, accused-appellant seeks reversal on the ground that the prosecution
failed to prove his intent to kill.
The People contends that accused-appellant should not be allowed to
change his theory on appeal. We do not agree. An appeal in a criminal case
opens the whole action for review on any question including those not raised
by the parties (People vs. Villaruel, 261 SCRA 386 (1996); People vs.
Godines, 196 SCRA 765 [1991]; People vs. Villagracia, 226 SCRA 374 [1993];
see also Tabuenavs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 [1997]). The reason for
this rule is that every circumstance in favor of the accused should be
considered (Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]). This legal
maxim acquires greater significance in this case where accused-appellant
faces the supreme penalty of death. It is our policy that in a death penalty case,
the Court cannot rush to judgment even when a despicable homicidal felon is
involved for an erroneous conviction will have a lasting stain in our escutcheon
of justice (People vs. Alicundo, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]).
At this instance, the defense, now as represented by the Public Attorneys
Office (PAO), contends that at the time of the incident, accused-appellant was
suffering from a chronic mental disorder, otherwise known
as schizophrenia, which is characterized by a persons inability to distinguish
between fantasy and reality and is often accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions (Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, Miller-
Keane, p. 860 cited in the Brief for the Accused-Appellant, p. 63, Rollo).
Accused-appellants defense of insanity is anchored on the testimony of
Dr. Antonio Yapha who treated his wound. Said doctor testified that contrary
to accused-appellants claim that Danilo shot him, he did not find any entrance
for the alleged gunshot wound. The doctor said that a wound caused by a .38
caliber slug will not result in a prolapse, that is, the intestines slipping out of
the usual place. In the words of the defense, this belied the testimony of
accused-appellant that his stomach had a prolapse and instead bolstered the
testimony of the prosecution witness that accused-appellant tried to kill himself
with a long bolo (Brief for the Accused-Appellant. p. 63, Rollo). As further proof
of insanity, the defense cites accused-appellants gruesome act of sucking
Jerry Tejamos blood after he had mercilessly stabbed the boy to death.
 Insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and avoidance, and as
such must be proved beyond reasonable doubt (People vs. Ambal, 100 SCRA
35[1980]). In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a criminal
prosecution, the starting premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of
sound mind, or otherwise stated, the law takes for granted that acts are done
consciously.Insanity being the exception rather than the rule in the human
condition, the moral and legal presumption is that freedom and intelligence
constitute the normal condition of a person and that a felonious or criminal act
(delicto deloso) has been done with deliberate intent, that is, with freedom,
intelligence and malice and that whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a
defense has the burden of proving its existence (People vs. Aldemita, 145
SCRA 451 [1987] citing Article 800, Civil Code; US vs. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305,
308 [1916]; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292 [1960]; People vs. Tagasa, 68
Phil. 147, 153 [1939]; US vs. Guevarra, 27 Phil. 547 [1914]; People vs.
Renegado, 57 SCRA 275, 286 [1974]; US vs. Zamora, 32 Phil. 218
[1915]; People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204 [1923]).
In the case at bar, the defense regrettably failed to discharge its burden
of proving that accused-appellant was insane at the time of the commission of
the crime. The only intimation of insanity that accused-appellant could point at
is the non-medical opinion of the PAO that accused-appellant was suffering
from schizophrenia because he sipped his victims blood and tried to kill himself
afterwards. No medical certificate was presented to substantiate the claim of
insanity. No testimony was proffered to support the allegation. We are not
aware that the PAO now has the expertise, more so the authority, to diagnose
its clients of their mental condition. While we agree that sucking Jerrys blood
and stabbing ones self in the stomach are not acts expected of a normal
person, we, however, have to be careful in distinguishing between insanity and
passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or mere depression resulting from
some physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers
escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity (People vs. So, 247
SCRA 708 [1995]; People vs. Dungo, 199 SCRA 860 [1991] citing People vs.
Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87; see also People vs. Ambal, supra).
We do not discount the possibility that accused-appellant may have lost
his mind after killing the 6-year old Jerry as manifested by his slurping of the
boys blood and his attempt to commit suicide. However, for insanity to be
appreciated as an exempting circumstance, it must be present immediately
before or at the very moment the crime is committed, and not thereafter. We
do not believe that accused-appellant was insane when he killed Jerry and
hacked Danilo before attempting to take his own life. To reiterate, no iota of
evidence was presented to prove the same. Verily, the defense of insanity was
not even raised during the trial of the case. It is invoked only now on appeal,
giving us the impression that it is but an afterthought.
And now to the propriety of the penalty imposed.
The trial court cited the following as the attendant circumstances that
qualified the killing of Jerry Tejamo to murder, or aggravated the same, to wit:
1. Bad blood existed between the family of the accused and the
complainants father-in-law due to a land dispute prior to the
incident therefore premeditation exist;
2. Treachery - the sudden and unexpected attack by the accused
against unarmed minor who is 6 years old without any means to
defend himself and the suddenness and unexpectedness of the
attack (Pp. vs. Molato, G.R. No. 66634, 29 February 1989; Pp.
vs. Canzano, 95 SCRA);
3. The killing of the victim Jerry Tejamo, a minor 6 year old child
constitutes an aggravating circumstance. There is treachery
when an adult illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes
his death (U.S. vs. Butag, 38 Phil. 746).
(p. 43, Rollo.)
and having earlier explained that
. . . The brutal and senseless killing of Jerry Tejamo, a 6 year old child
manifest accuseds perversity and callousness as a cold blooded murderer
and brings him to fore as a heinous criminal under Rep. Act 7659 which
defines heinous as a grievous, odious and hateful offense by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity and
repugnant and outrageous to the common standard and norms of decency
and morality in a just civilized and orderly society. This is the kind of man the
accused is.
(p. 42, Rollo.)
meted out on accused-appellant the supreme penalty of death in Criminal
Case No. TCS-2381.
We affirm the finding of the trial court that treachery attended the killing
of the 6-year old Jerry Tejamo for when an adult person illegally attacks a child
of tender years and causes his death, treachery exists (People vs. Sancholes,
271 SCRA 527 [1997]; see also People vs. Caritativo, 256 SCRA 1 [1996]).
The trial court, however, erred in finding that evident premeditation
attended the commission of the crime. The following requisites must concur
before evident premeditation may be appreciated: (a) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that
the accused had clung to his determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time
between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act (People vs. Magno, 260 SCRA 300 [1996]). Here, the
prosecution omitted or failed to present any evidence to show any, much less,
all of the above elements. The bad blood that allegedly exists between
accused-appellants family and the in-laws of Danilo Tejamo, Jerrys father,
does not, in any way, prove evident premeditation.
It was thus treachery that qualified the killing of Jerry Tejamo to
murder. However, there being neither an aggravating nor a mitigating
circumstance, the maximum penalty of death imposed by the trial court must
be reduced to the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua in line with our
decisions in People vs. Magno, supra, and People vs. Lucas, (240 SCRA 66
[1995]) where we explained that if there are neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, then the crime, although falling under Republic Act No. 7659,
will not be punished by death but by the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Anent the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. TCS-2382, the Office of
the Solicitor General correctly observes that the crime committed by accused-
appellant in stabbing Danilo Tejamo constituted only attempted homicide since
the wounds suffered by Danilo were not life threatening. Article 253 of the
Revised Penal Code provides the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime
of homicide. Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an
attempted crime is two degrees lower than that prescribed by law. Attempted
homicide is thus punishable by prision correccional. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty to be meted out on
accused-appellant should be anywhere within the range of one (1) month and
one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor, and the maximum should be
taken from the medium period of prision correccional (Art. 64, par. 1) the range
of which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, to four (4) years and
two (2) months. Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance
attended the commission of the Attempted Homicide, the accused-appellant
shall be sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of two (2) months and one
(1) day of arresto mayor as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional medium as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED, finding
accused-appellant GUILTY of MURDER in Criminal Case No. TCS-2381 and
sentencing him to suffer the reduced penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. He
is likewise ordered to indemnify the parents of the victim the sum of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos and to pay actual damages in the amount of
Forty Thousand (P40,000.00) Pesos. In Criminal Case No. TCS-2382,
accused-appellant is found guilty of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE instead and
sentenced to two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correcional, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 148695. May 27, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RANDY
BELONIO y LANDAS, appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review before this Court is the Decision [1] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental (Branch 50 stationed in Bacolod City)
in Criminal Case No. 00-20595, dated February 26, 2001, finding Randy
Belonio y Landas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and
sentencing him to death.
The Amended Information dated April 27, 2000, charged appellant with
Murder as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of January, 2000, in the City of Talisay, Province
of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with an improvised
knife, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
one RAMY TAMAYO, thus causing injuries in the vital parts of the body of
the latter which caused his instantaneous death.
That accused RANDY BELONIO y LANDAS is a recidivist for having been
convicted by final judgment of 4 years, two (2) months, one day to six years
in Crim. Case 94-16609 entitled: People of the Philippines vs. Randy Belonio
y Landas for Homicide.[2]
Upon his arraignment on May 24, 2000,[3] appellant, assisted by his
counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.
In his Brief,[4] the Solicitor General narrates the factual antecedents of the
case, as summarized by the trial court, as follows:
Jennifer Carampatana testified that on January 6, 2000, her grandmother
was buried and there was a wake in their house at Brgy. Zone 14 in the
evening. Her first cousin, the late Ramy Tamayo, also called Ramon
Tamayo, arrived in their house at about 10:00 P.M. together with his wife.
Jennifer invited Ramy to talk outside of their house. Before they could sit on
a nearby bench, Ramy decided to buy cigarettes from a store only a few
meters away. The store was furnished with a small opening for the store-
keeper to attend to the customers and Ramy was occupying that space in
front of the opening to pay when the accused Randy Belonio arrived. Randy
tried to force his way in front of the opening and as a consequence, he
bumped on Ramy. Jennifer saw that Randy gave Ramy a long and hard look.
Jennifer said that he and Ramy sat and talked on the bench. The accused
came over and sat on the other end of the bench. Then the accused asked
Ramy for the latters cigarette lighter. The accused asked Ramy from what
place did he come from and why was he there. Ramy answered the accused
in a normal manner.
The accused left but after a few minutes he returned, Jennifer, who was
facing the direction of the approaching accused, saw him and noticed that he
was wearing long sleeves. Ramy Tamayo could not see the accused as he
was facing sideways to Jennifer. Without saying a word and without warning,
the accused delivered a stabbing blow with a dagger which was concealed in
his hand. Ramy was hit on the right chest, Jennifer stood up and ran towards
her house shouting for help. There at the gate of the fence of her house, she
heard another thudding sound of a stabbing blow. When Jennifer entered her
house, she announced that Ramy was stabbed.
Jennifer and her relatives rushed out of the house. Jennifer saw the accused
running away towards the back of the barangay hall. The Tanods who came
over failed to find the accused. Then when the Barangay Captain and the
policemen arrived, Jennifer informed them of the direction towards which the
accused fled. The accused was arrested from one (1) of the houses near the
barangay hall where he took refuge.
Dr. Raul V. Pama, Jr. was the acting City Health Officer of Talisay City on
January 6, 2000. He conducted an autopsy on the remains of Ramy Tamayo
and listed his findings in a necropsy report which he prepared. These
findings are as follows:
1. Stabbed wound, 1.7 cm. in length, sutured sharp on one (1) and (inferior
portion) and blunt on the other end (superior portion) located at the
4th intercostal space;
Dr. Pama explained that the wound is just above the left nipple and it
penetrated downward hitting the left side on the heart;
2. Stabbed wound at the sternal. The wound is situated just above the site of
the first wound.
The first wound was fatal as it damaged the heart.[5]
In his Brief,[6] Randy Belonio adopted the above findings of the trial court
and the prosecution. However, he raises the defense of insanity, an exempting
circumstance, and for such purpose, depends on the expert assessment of his
witness, Dr. Antonio Gauzon, who certified thus:
This is an individual who is suffering from (Schizophrenia), Chronic
Undifferentiated and probably triggered by (s)ubstance abuse of Shabu and
Marijuana.
Recommending treatment and rehabilitation in a mental institution like the
National Center for Mental (H)ealth in Mandaluyong City or treatment in the
psychiatric unit of the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Regional Hospital in
Bacolod City and later rehabilitation in the Negros (O)ccidental Mental Health
Center at Paglaum Village, Bacolod City.[7]
The RTC was convinced beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was
guilty of Murder and that he had full control of his mental faculties. It held that
the testimony of Dr. Ester Regina Servando was more weighty and credible
than that of Dr. Gauzon.[8]
The trial court convicted appellant, thus:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Randy Belonio y
Landas GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as charged in the
Information, as Principal by Direct (Participation) with the qualifying
aggravating circumstance of treachery and the special aggravating
circumstance of recidivism.There are no other aggravating circumstances nor
is there any mitigating circumstance. Accordingly, the accused is sentenced
to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH.
The accused is held civilly liable to pay the heirs of Randy Tamayo the
following amounts:
1. The sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
2. The sum of P3,629.70 as reimbursement for hospital
expenses;
3. The sum of P940,716.00 as compensatory damages; and
4. The sum of P100,000.00 in favor of Mrs. Jinky Tamayo as
moral damages.[9]
Hence this automatic review.
 In his brief, appellant assigns this lone alleged error of the court a quo for
our consideration:
The trial court seriously erred in not appreciating the exempting circumstance
of insanity pursuant to Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
favoring the accused-appellant.[10]
In support of his appeal, appellant argues that he was not in his right and
normal frame of mind when the killing took place. He avers that no normal
person would ever bump another person, give the latter a hard look and
eventually stab him to death. He adds that he and the victim did not know each
other at that time.[11]
Appellant also asseverates that Dr. Gauzon is a reliable expert witness
and is more knowledgeable and experienced than Dr. Servando. [12] He
explains that Dr. Servando was once under the tutelage of Dr. Gauzon and
that at the time of their respective testimonies, the former was only 37 years
old, while the latter was 57 years old.[13] Appellant also cites portions of the trial
courts Decision where Dr. Gauzon referred him to the Bacolod City Health
Office for psychiatric examination. The trial court also branded the accused as
a homicidal maniac, which appellant says, is judicial notice of his mental
sickness.[14] In sum, he concludes that all of these circumstances show that he
was insane at the time of the killing.
We find these arguments without merit.
The moral and legal presumption is that one acts with free will and
intelligence, and that a felonious or criminal act has been done with deliberate
intent, that is, with freedom and intelligence.[15] Whoever, therefore, invokes
insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its existence.
Insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and avoidance, and as
such must be adequately proved.[16] The law presumes that all persons are of
sound mind, and that acts are done consciously.[17]
In the case at bar, the defense utterly failed to discharge its burden of
proving that appellant was insane. The testimony or proof of appellants
insanity must relate to the time preceding or the very moment of the
commission of the offense charged.[18] We find the evidence adduced by the
defense sorely insufficient to establish his claim that he was insane at the time
he killed Tamayo.
The main circumstances presented by the defense that remotely evinces
that appellant was insane at that time was his act of bumping the victim, without
any apparent reason, giving him a long hard look, and then eventually stabbing
him. However, this sequence of events cannot overcome the legal
presumption of sanity, let alone prove appellants insanity.
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation
of intelligence in committing the act. Proof of the existence of some
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability, if it can be
shown that the offender was not completely deprived of freedom and
intelligence.[19] As culled from the trial courts findings, Belonio, after giving the
victim a hard and resentful look, sat near the latter, lighted his cigarette and
conversed with him.[20] Afterwards, he left and came back armed with a dagger
with which he stabbed Tamayo. Immediately thereafter, he escaped and went
into hiding. Contrary to a finding of the existence of insanity, these acts tend
to establish that Belonio was well aware of what he had just committed, and
was capable of distinguishing right from wrong. Otherwise, he would not have
attempted to escape and go into hiding.
Aside from the bumping incident earlier discussed, the only other
evidence of insanity that appellant could relevantly point to is the medical
certificate prepared by Dr. Antonio Gauzon stating that Belonio was suffering
from schizophrenia. This witness was presented to refute the findings of the
prosecutions expert witness Dr. Ester Regina Servando which negated the
existence of this mental condition.
A run-through of Dr. Gauzons testimony strengthens this Courts resolve
to affirm the lower courts findings. Part of his testimony is reproduced as
follows:
ATTY. JACILDO:
Q. Now, from this Medical Certificate, Doctor, there is specifically
mentioned here that the subject here was found to be incoherent and
irrelevant and disoriented as to time, person and place, and that
there was plight of ideas and adjustment, as well as insights. Will you
kindly explain this to this Honorable Court?
A. What meant there is that, when you talk to the individual, sometimes
you get answers right, sometimes it is wrong. That is when you say
that he is incoherent. When you say irrelevant, that pertain to the
question. Now, as far as dates, he could not remember the date. As
far (as) the place, he could not recall the place when he was in my
office. And some of the persons that were with him, he could not
identify them. Now, when I say that there was plight of ideas, that
(was) when he was talking. As a matter of fact, I gave an example,
when I asked a question when I asked him about the first killing
incident and his answer was, face to face kami, simbahan namon
kag inagaw namon ang baril because of warship. That is only one,
because there were others that you could not understand what he
was talking about whether you have to rely only on other things. And
sometimes, he would talk on things which are not there. That means
he was hallucinating. Now, judgment is usually poor. Because, when
I asked him of what he will do regarding the case, he would just say
 that, Ti, amo na ya. And he said, Ano kamo da ya? kay ang
warship. So, I was asking him about the values of what he was doing
and he could not give me that answer. And he does not know what
he was doing. That means that there was no reality testing. He does
not know what is the real fantasy.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Now in your opinion as an expert in terms of Psychiatry, about how
long has the subject, Randy Belonio, been suffering from his mental
disorder that you mentioned in your Medical Certificate?
A. Since childhood. If you would notice, I put there in the history that his
father was medically disabled when he was ten (10) years old, and
the mother was only a fish vendor and there were, I think, eight (8)
to ten (10) in the family and with a meager income and have to (fend)
for themselves. And in a very young age of ten (10), the parents had
the attitude of Bahala na ang kabata-an. That means, they have to
take care of themselves. At age 13, he was brought by the relative
to Manila, and although he was incoherent, you can get from his
answer by mentioning so many places, (like) Manila, Pasay,
Caloocan, Novaliches, MRT, Cubao. That means, at age 13, he was
already around these areas (f)ending for himself. And the (s)treet
(u)rchins, you know for a fact, that they are influenced by drugs. So,
by that time, with that dysfunctional family, and without any family to
take care of himself, he was not doing what the society expects him
to do. So that they have dysfunctional family and with dysfunctional
relatives. So, the value system was really poor. So that the thinking
process of this individual was not developed to what the society
expects him to be. So, it started at that time. So, when he was taking
shabu, it triggered every tissue that the symptoms came out. Thats
why, he became suspicious, (he) became irritable and anybody who
would try to not befriend him and tried to be angry with him, he would
immediately suspect that something would happen to him in which
he would react by defending himself, and probably by killing. This
individual had, actually, committed, say, killing. I would not say
murder because thats your term, but he had killed already three (3)
persons in different years. So, he does not already know what he
was doing because he was psychotic, which in your parlance is
insane.
Q. Now, Doctor, on January 6, 2000, and even prior to this date, what you
are trying to say is that, this subject, Randy Belonio, was already
suffering from schizophrenia?
A. Yes.[21]
Dr. Gauzon testified that based on his interview with Belonio on October
25, 2000 (around nine months after the stabbing incident) the latter was
suffering from schizophrenia. However, the evidence of insanity after the fact
of commission of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also proof
of alleged abnormal behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the
commission of the crime.[22]
The first set of facts narrated by the doctor relates to Belonios condition
during the interview, months after the incident. His report was silent as regards
the incidents occurring prior to or during the circumstance for which Belonio
stands trial. The second part of his testimony dwelt on Belonios life history,
which was offered to prove that he had been suffering from his alleged
condition since childhood.
However, perusing the story as narrated by the doctor, the same was a
mere statement of Belonios life and family history, explaining what brought
about his supposed mental condition. There was no showing that he was
actually suffering from schizophrenia during his juvenile years. To
demonstrate that he had been suffering from this condition, the doctor pointed
to the fact that he has already killed three (3) persons, including the present
incident. However, such conclusion is non sequitur and, at best, a circuitous
argument. Further, the veracity of these findings is belied by the fact that the
accused did not raise this defense during his prosecutions for the other killings.
No other circumstances evincing its existence were presented during trial.
Furthermore, Dr. Gauzons examination cannot surmount Dr. Servandos
punctilious and overwhelming analysis, which took two days to narrate. She
explained the history of the accused, including his family and medical
background, conducted a mental status examination, which was based on her
direct interviews with him, and gave a series of other written psychological
examinations.[23]
The portion of Dr. Servandos testimony pertinent to her findings regarding
Belonios mental condition is quoted as follows:
FISCAL AGRAVIADOR:
Q. Can you please read for the record this (r)esult which consist only of
one (1) sentence?
A. Psychiatric Evaluation Result. Base(d) on history, mental status
examination, and psychological examination, patient was noted to
be evasive, suspicious, and manipulative but no psychotic features
were observed upon evaluation. x x x.
Q. So, let us first, may I ask, what do you me(a)n by patient was noted to
be evasive, suspicious, and manipulative?
A. Actually, during the psychological examination, we have to give series
of questions. And then the patient (does) not answer directly to our
question. He would go around the bush. And then, after that, we also
 found out during the result of the psychological examination that the
same pattern was noted.
Q. Does this mean that he was totally capable of being manipulative or
evasive?
A. Yes.
Q. He did it intentionally?
A. Yes.
Q. With the knowledge that he knew the answer but does not want to give
the answer?
A. Yes.
Q. Meaning to say, that he has full control of his mental faculties that
time?
A. Yes.
Q. Because there was an intention to be manipulative and there was an
intention to be evasive because he was suspicious?
A. Yes.
Q. When you said that there was no psychotic features(,) x x x (w)hat
does this mean?
A. When you say psychosis, those are compose[d] of symptoms such as
delusion and hallucination that are being extracted from the patient
or being displayed by the patient. However, during the examination,
the symptom or the patients answers are not enough to put him to a
criteria of psychosis because the delusion and the hallucination as
well as the thought process, the thought contents must be
concretized enough in order for us to determine to diagnose that this
patient is actually suffering from psychosis.
Q. So, subjected to your examination, this patient did not come up to the
level where he could be diagnosed as having delusion and
hallucinations?
A. Leading to psychotic features.
Q. So, that is the meaning of not having psychotic features?
A. Yes.[24]
The insanity issue raised by appellant boils down to the credibility of these
two expert witnesses and their respective testimonies. The time-honored
doctrine is that the question of which witness to believe is one best addressed
by the trial court. The findings of fact of the judges who heard the evidence are
accorded great respect and are seldom disturbed on appeal for they had the
opportunity to directly observe the witnesses, and to determine by their
demeanor on the stand the probative value of their testimonies. [25] The Court
finds no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court which found Dr.
Servandos testimony more credible for the following reasons:
1. It could not be gainsaid that Dr. Servando is a disinterested and unbiased
witness. She does not know the accused and she is not known to the
accused. She will not be benefited if the Court upholds her findings and she
had no reason to testify falsely. On the other hand, Dr. Gauzon was
admittedly paid for his services, hence, it could not be truly said that he is an
impartial and disinterested witness. If his findings (are) upheld, the benefit to
the practice of his profession is enormous;
2. As a government official, Dr. Servando has the presumption of regularity in
the performance of her duty. No such presumption arises in favor of Dr.
Gauzon;
3. The findings of Dr. Servando that the accused is evasive and manipulative
is supported by the Courts own observation. x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
4. The conclusion of Dr. Gauzon is principally based on his interview with the
accused and the members of the accuseds family. It was the members of the
accuseds family, the sister of the accused who informed Dr. Gauzon that at
the age of 13, the accused began to use drugs. The information that the
family of the accused was impoverished; that the accused spent his
adolescence in Metro-Manila; that the accused was a neglected child were
all supplied by the kins of the accused who were not presented as
witnesses. There was no showing that Dr. Gauzon took precautionary steps
to validate the information. On the other hand, Dr. Servando also conducted
interview of the accused and his accompanying relatives including the BJMP
guard who escorted him. In addition, Dr. Servando conducted a series of
written tests which are tailored to determine the mental capacity of a
person. The result of the written tests confirms the observation of Dr.
Servando in the interview that the accused is evasive and manipulative.[26]
Unlike in other jurisdictions, Philippine courts have established a more
stringent criterion for the acceptance of insanity as an exempting
circumstance. In our jurisdiction, mere abnormality of the mental faculties is
not enough; there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act.
Every individual is presumed to have acted with complete grasp of ones
mental faculties. Appellants past does not discredit the facts that (1) he did not
act with complete absence of the power to discern; (2) he was not deprived of
reason; and (3) he was not totally deprived of his will.
As held in People vs. Madarang,[27]
An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason
thereof. He admits committing the crime but claims that he is not guilty
because he was insane at the time of its commission. Hence, the accused is
tried on the issue of sanity alone and if found to be sane, a judgment of
conviction is rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt as he had already
admitted committing the crime. x x x.[28]
Inasmuch as Belonio failed to present convincing evidence to establish
his alleged insanity at the time he stabbed Tamayo, we are constrained to
affirm his conviction.
We must add that we have meticulously reviewed the records of this case,
especially the evidence of the prosecution. We find no reason to modify, much
less reverse, the findings of the trial court that, indeed, appellants guilt for
murder has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
We now look into the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court.
Under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, any
person found guilty of murder shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death. The same Code further instructs that when in the commission of the
crime there is present an aggravating circumstance which is not offset by any
mitigating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.[29]
A review of the records supports the conclusion of the trial court on the
presence of treachery, which qualified the crime to murder. For treachery to
be appreciated, two elements must concur: (1) the means of execution
employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted.[30]
In the present case, Jennifer Carampatana testified on how the killing was
executed, as follows:
Q. What did you do there?
A. While we were conversing at that bench, after a short while, or five (5)
minutes, Randy Belonio came and he asked to light his cigarette
because Ramy was smoking at that time. He was allowed by Ramy
to light his cigarette.
Q. Was there any conversation between Ramy Tamayo and Randy
Belonio aside from asking lighting of cigarette?
A. While asking to light the cigarette, Randy inquired from Ramy why
he was there, Ramy told him that he is attending the wake of
his grandmother. Further, Randy asked him where he came
from? And Ramy answered that he is from Hda. Bubog.
Q. After that what did Randy Belonio do if he did anything?
A. He (sat) for a while, and a little while after that, he took a look at
Ramy. After some minutes, he went out.
Q. And after few minutes was there any incident happened?
A. After three (3) minutes Randy went back. He just walk normally,
and when he was near Ramy he stabbed Ramy hitting on the
chest and while the weapon was still on the breast of Ramy I
stood up and ran away.
Q. From what direction did Randy came when he approach you?
A. He came from their house because their house is near our house.
Q. In relation to you, where is this house located?
A. Witness indicating that he came from her side, where the house
is situated.
Q. And which side did you sit, the side near the direction of the house
of Randy Belonio or far from the house of Belonio?
A. The other side.
COURT:
It was Ramy who was sitting near the house of Ramy?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
APP AGRAVIADOR:
Q. And what was the position of Ramy Tamayo when he was
suddenly stab.
A. He was sitting in this manner.
COURT INTERPRETER:
Witness illustrating by crossing her legs over the other legs and
move slightly her body was in side way.
APP AGRAVIADOR:
 Q. That means that Ramy Tamayo did not see Randy Belonio who was
coming from the house?
A. Yes, Maam.
COURT:
Let me interrupt. He was facing you? Ramy was facing you while you
were facing the direction where the house of Randy Belonio, so that
Ramy was facing on the other side?
WITNESS:
A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Proceed.
APP AGRAVIADOR:
Q. When Randy Belonio suddenly thrust the knife on the chest of
Ramy Tamayo, did you see the reaction of Ramy Tamayo?
A. He was not able to move. After that, I want to ran to the house.
APP AGRAVIADOR:
Q. When for the first time did you see the weapon used by Randy
Belonio in taking the life of Ramy Tamayo?
A. When he thrusted that knife.
COURT:
Before or after he delivered the stabbing blow?
A. At the moment he delivered the stabbing blow, that was the first
time I saw that knife.
APP AGRAVIADOR:
Q. When you saw Randy Belonio approaching Ramy Tamayo x x x,
you did not see the knife?
A. Because he was wearing long sleeve to cover his hand.[31]
Appellants acts of leaving, then returning after a few minutes armed with
a knife -- which he concealed while approaching the victim and which he used
in stabbing him -- while the latter was sitting, unaware and not forewarned of
any danger, manifest a deliberate employment of means to ensure the killing
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim might make.
The aggravating circumstance of recidivism, which was alleged in the
Information was also duly proven. A recidivist is one who at the time of his trial
for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of
another crime embraced in the same title of this Code.[32] The records[33] show
that appellant was previously convicted by final judgment of Homicide, which
like Murder, falls under the title of Crimes against Persons.
The award by the court a quo of P50,000 as civil indemnity is in
accordance with jurisprudence.[34] The amount of P25,000 as exemplary
damages should also be given because of the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism. However, the court erred in awarding the amount
of P940,716 as loss of earning capacity. In accordance with the formula
adopted by the Court in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. CA (31 SCRA 511 [1970]),
and using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, [35] the loss of Tamayos
earning capacity is to be computed as follows:
Net earning capacity = Life expectancy x (Gross Annual Income Living
Expense
s)
where: Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 the age of the deceased)
= 2/3 (80-24) x [(P200x365)- P36,500]
=P1,362,545
The award for loss of earning capacity should therefore be P1,362,545.
There being testimonial evidence in support of moral damages, an award
for it is proper. However, it should be reduced to the more reasonable amount
of P50,000 considering that it is not meant to enrich an injured party.
Actual damages for the hospital expenses in the amount of P3,627.70
were duly supported by receipts. However instead of awarding actual
damages, we grant temperate damages in accordance with People vs.
Andres,[36] where the Court said:
[W]e declared in the case of People vs. Villanueva that:
when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial
amount to less than P25,000, as in this case, the award of
temperate damages for P25,000 is justified in lieu of actual
damages of a lesser amount. Conversely, if the amount of
actual damages proven exceeds P25,000, then temperate
damages may no longer be awarded; actual damages based
 on the receipts presented during trial should instead be
granted.
The victims heirs should, thus, be awarded temperate damages in
the amount of P25,000.[37]
Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that R.A. No. 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty. Nevertheless they
submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death
penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision in Criminal Case No. 00-20595
convicting the appellant of the crime of murder and sentencing him
to DEATH is AFFIRMED. The award for loss of earning capacity
is INCREASED to P1,362,545; moral damages is REDUCED to P50,000;
actual damages is DELETED but temperate damages of P25,000 and
exemplary damages of P25,000 are awarded.
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659 amending Section 23 of the
Revised Penal Code, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded, upon
finality of this decision, to the Office of the President for possible exercise of
the pardoning power.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-37673 March 31, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.
AVANCEA, C.J.:
Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of
Dolores, municipality of Ormoc, Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was
being celebrated in the said barrio and visitors were entertained in the house.
Among them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon,
Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left
the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, he
wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred Tanner and
Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after which he wounded himself.
Potenciano's wife who was then seven months pregnant, died five days later
as a result of her wound, and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in the
mother's womb.
An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon
conviction he was sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties, to indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P500 and to pay the costs. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime
the defendant had a quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and
Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to come down to fight, and when he was
about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of
the commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and
weak, and early in the afternoon he had a severe stomachache which made
it necessary for him to go to bed. It was then when he fell asleep. The
defendant states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was
trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of which
he got up; and as it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to
come down, he armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he
met his wife who seemed to say to him that she was wounded. Then he
fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation wounded himself.
As his enemies seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that
came his way.
The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble
with his wife, but that he loved her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute
with Tanner and Malinao, or have any motive for assaulting them.
Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts,
with which he is charged, were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal
liability.
In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the fact that the
apparent lack of a motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily
mean that there are none, but that simply they are not known to us, for we
cannot probe into depths of one's conscience where they may be found,
hidden away and inaccessible to our observation. We are also conscious of
the fact that an extreme moral perversion may lead a man commit a crime
without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. But under the
special circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the defendant's
own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that
the defendant tried to attack also his father, in whose house and under
whose protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests,
whom he himself invited as may be inferred from the evidence presented, we
find not only a lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts
complained of, but also motives for not committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion.
The doctor stated that considering the circumstances of the case, the
defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of an hallucination and
not in his right mind.
We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the wound of
the deceased was direct result of the defendant's act performed in order to
inflict it. Nevertheless we may say further that the evidence does not clearly
show this to have been the case, but that it may have been caused
accidentally. Nobody saw how the wound was inflicted. The defendant did
not testify that he wounded his wife. He only seemed to have heard her say
that she was wounded. What the evidence shows is that the deceased, who
was in the sala, intercepted the defendant at the door of the room as he was
coming out. The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his wife but
he was defending himself from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife
was really wounded, in desperation, he stabbed himself.
In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment appealed
from, the courts finds that the defendant is not criminally liable for the offense
with which he is charged, and it is ordered that he be confined in the
Government insane asylum, whence he shall not be released until the
director thereof finds that his liberty would no longer constitute a menace,
with costs de oficio. So ordered.
[G.R. No. 162052. January 13, 2005]
ALVIN JOSE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289 affirming with modification the
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36,
convicting the accused therein of violation of Section 21(b), Article IV in relation
to Section 29, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
The records show that Alvin Jose and Sonny Zarraga were charged with
the said crime in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about November 14, 1995, in the municipality of Calamba,
Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, not being licensed or authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to other person
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (or shabu) weighing 98.40
grams, a regulated drug, and in violation of the aforestated law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
As culled by the trial court, the evidence of the prosecution established
the following:
[O]n November 14, 1995, P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro of the Fourth Regional
Narcotics Unit received an information from an unnamed informant. Said
unnamed informant was introduced to him by former Narcom P/Senior
Inspector Recomono. The information was that a big time group of drug
pushers from Greenhills will deliver 100 grams of shabu at Chowking
Restaurant located at Brgy. Real, Calamba, Laguna.
Acting on such report, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra was assigned to act as the
poseur-buyer. SPO2 William Manglo and SPO2 Wilfredo Luna were the other
members of the team. SPO1 Guevarra was provided with marked money
consisting of a P1,000.00 bill on top of a bundle of make-believe money bills
supposedly amounting to P100,000.00. P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro, SPO2
William Manglo and Wilfredo Luna went to the place on a Mitsubishi Lancer
while SPO1 Guevarra and the informant boarded an L-300 van. They arrived
at the Chowking Restaurant at about 11:00 in the morning. They positioned
their cars at the parking area where they had a commanding view of people
going in and out (TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 2-8 and TSN, July 11, 1996, pp.
4-7).
It was about 4 oclock in the afternoon when a Toyota Corolla with Plate No.
UBV-389 arrived. Sonny Zarraga was the driver with Alvin Jose. The
unnamed informant approached and talked to Sonny Zarraga. Then, the
informant called SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra and informed the latter that Sonny
Zarraga had with him 100 grams of shabu. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra offered
to buy the shabu. Sonny Zarraga asked SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra if he had
the money to buy 100 grams of shabu. Guevarra responded in the
affirmative. He showed the aforecited bundle of money bills. Sonny Zarraga
then asked Alvin Jose to bring out the shabu and handover (sic) to Bonifacio
Guevarra. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, in turn, handed the bundle of money
bills.
Guevarra scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal to signify that the
transaction was consummated (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 3-8). Immediately
thereafter, William Manglo and Wilfredo Luna approached and introduced
themselves as Narcom Operatives. They arrested Sonny Zarraga and Alvin
Jose. The buy-bust bundle of money bills and the shabu were recovered.
The two were brought to Camp Vicente Lim for investigation. Edgar Groyon
conducted the investigation. The shabu was brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 9-10 and TSN, October
3, 1996, pp. 9-13). P/Senior Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo examined
the shabu. She reported and testified that the specimen, indeed, was a
second or low grade methamphetamine hydrochloride (TSN, July 30, 1996,
pp. 31-36).[4]
On the other hand, the accused therein were able to establish the
following facts:
Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose claimed that, on November 13, 1995, they
were at SM Mega Mall (sic), Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, to change money.
Suddenly, a person with a hand bag appeared and ordered them to handcuff
themselves. They were later able to identify three of these people as Police
Supt. Joseph Roxas Castro, SPO3 Noel Seno and a certain Corpuz. They
were all in civilian clothes.
They proceeded to where Sonny Zarragas car was parked. Sonny Zarraga
was forced to board another car while another person drove Sonny Zarragas
car with Alvin Jose as passenger. They drove towards Greenhills. They were
eventually blindfolded. On the way to Greenhills, one of the men opened the
gloves compartment of Sonny Zarragas car. One of the men saw a
substance inside the said compartment. He tasted it. Said person asked
Sonny Zarraga if he could come up with P1.5 Million peso (sic). Col. Castro
even showed the picture of Sonny Zarragas mother-in-law who was
supposed to be a rich drug pusher.
They ended up inside a room with a lavatory. While inside the said room,
Sonny Zarragas cellular phone rung. It was a call from Sonny Zarragas wife.
Col. Castro talked to Pinky Zarraga and asked her if she could pay P1.5
Million as ransom for the release of Sonny Zarraga. Sonny Zarraga instead
offered to withdraw money from the bank in the amount of P75,000.00. The
agreement was that in the bank, Pinky Zarraga would withdraw the money
and deliver it to Col. Castro in exchange for Sonny Zarragas release. The
agreement did not materialize. Col. Castro and Pinky Zarraga met inside the
bank but Pinky Zarraga refused to withdraw the money as Sonny Zarraga
was nowhere to be seen. There was a commotion inside the bank which
prompted the bank manager to call the police.
Col. Castro left the bank in a hurry, passed by for Alvin Jose who was left at
the room and brought them to Camp Vicente Lim. There, they were
investigated.
The defense claimed that SPO3 Noel Seno got Sonny Zarragas
jewelry, P85,000.00 in cash and Sonny Zarragas car spare tire, jack and
accessories. Noel Seno was even able to withdraw the P2,000.00 using
Sonny Zarragas ATM card.[5]
On June 10, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment convicting both
accused of the crime charged and sentencing each of them to an
indeterminate penalty. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused Sonny Zarraga and Alvin
Jose guilty beyond reasonable doubt, for violation of R.A. 6425, as amended,
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of, after
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, six (6) years and one (1) day to
ten (10) years.
Both accused are hereby ordered to pay the fine of P2 million each and to
pay the cost of suit.
In the service of sentence, the preventive imprisonment undergone both by
the accused shall be credited in their favor.
Atty. Christopher R. Serrano, Branch Clerk of Court, is hereby ordered to
deliver and surrender the confiscated Methamphetamine Hydrochloride to
the Dangerous Drugs Board.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellants averred that the trial court
erred as follows:
I ONLY 13 YEARS OLD WHEN THE CRIME WAS ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL
CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE MERE PRESENTATION OF THE SHABU IN COURT
IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO FIND, WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY,
THAT THE APPELLANTS COMMITTED THE CRIME OF
SELLING PROHIBITED DRUGS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE
IDENTITY OF THE DRUG WAS NOT PARTICULARLY SET OUT
IN THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III
EVEN GRANTING THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
FOUND THE APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED
AGAINST THEM:
(a) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPOSE THE PROPER
PENALTY AGAINST THEM.
(b) EACH OF THE APPELLANTS CANNOT BE MADE TO
PAY A FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF P2 MILLION
PESOS (SIC) AND THE COST OF THE SUIT.[7]
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision appealed from with
modification. The appellate court reduced the penalty imposed on appellant
Alvin Jose, on its finding that he was only thirteen (13) years old when he
committed the crime; hence, he was entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority and to a reduction of the penalty by two degrees. The
appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that since the Information
failed to allege that he acted with discernment when the crime was committed
and that the prosecution failed to prove the same, he should be acquitted. The
appellate court denied the motion.
Appellant Jose, now the petitioner, filed his petition for review
on certiorari, alleging that
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
PETITIONER DESPITE (1) THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT PETITIONER, WHO WAS
BY HIM IN CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED SONNY ZARRAGA,
ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, AND (2) THE ABSENCE OF A
DECLARATION BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER SO ACTED
WITH DISCERNMENT, PURSUANT TO THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE.[8]
The petitioner asserts that, under paragraph 3, Article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code, a minor over nine (9) and under fifteen (15) years of age at the
time of the commission of the crime is exempt from criminal liability unless he
acted with discernment, in which case he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as
amended by P.D. No. 1179, as provided for in Article 68 of the Revised Penal
Code. He avers that the prosecution was burdened to allege in the Information
and prove beyond reasonable doubt that he acted with discernment, but that
the prosecution failed to do so. The petitioner insists that the court is mandated
to make a finding that he acted with discernment under paragraph 1, Article 68
of the Revised Penal Code and since the CA made no such finding, he is
entitled to an acquittal.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that the
allegation in the Information that the petitioner and his co-accused conspired
and confederated to sell the shabu subject of the Information sufficiently avers
that the petitioner acted with discernment; hence, there was no need for the
public prosecutor to allege specifically in the Information that the petitioner so
acted. It contends that it is not necessary for the trial and appellate courts to
make an express finding that the petitioner acted with discernment. It is
enough that the very acts of the petitioner show that he acted knowingly and
was sufficiently possessed with judgment to know that the acts he committed
were wrong.
The petition is meritorious.
Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years
of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony.
The law applies even if such minor is charged with a crime defined and
penalized by a special penal law. In such case, it is the burden of the minor to
prove his age in order for him to be exempt from criminal liability. The reason
for the exemption is that a minor of such age is presumed lacking the mental
element of a crime the capacity to know what is wrong as distinguished from
what is right or to determine the morality of human acts; wrong in the sense in
which the term is used in moral wrong.[9] However, such presumption is
rebuttable.[10] For a minor at such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution
is burdened[11] to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial
evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what he was
doing and that it was wrong.[12] Such circumstantial evidence may include the
utterances of the minor; his overt acts before, during and after the commission
of the crime relative thereto; the nature of the weapon used in the commission
of the crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his
hiding the corpus delicti.
Q And after you answer (sic) in the affirmative, what was his
response?
A He let his companion to (sic) bring out the shabu, Sir.
Q Did his companion bring out the shabu?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened to the shabu?
A Alvin Jose handed the shabu to his companion Sonny Zarraga.
Q After that, what did Sonny Zarraga do with the shabu?

In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the petitioner, who was thirteen (13) years of age when the crime
charged was committed, acted with discernment relative to the sale
of shabu to the poseur-buyer. The only evidence of the prosecution against
the petitioner is that he was in a car with his cousin, co-accused Sonny
Zarraga, when the latter inquired from the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Bonifacio
Guevarra, if he could afford to buy shabu. SPO1 Guevarra replied in the
affirmative, after which the accused Zarraga called the petitioner to bring out
and hand over the shabu wrapped in plastic and white soft paper. The
petitioner handed over the plastic containing the shabu to accused Zarraga,
who handed the same to the poseur-buyer:
A He handed it to me, Sir.
Q After this shabu was handed to you, what happened next?
A After examining the shabu, I put it in my pocket and then I
handed to him the money, Sir.
Q When you say money, which money are you referring to?
A The P1,000.00 bill with the bundle of boodle money, Sir.
Q Now, after you handed the money to the accused, what
happened next?

Q Whom did you approach to buy the shabu? A I made signs to my companions, Sir.

A The two of them, Sir. Q What signs did you give?

Q While the two of them was (sic) sitting inside the car, what did
you tell them?
A They asked me if I can afford to buy the 100 grams, Sir.
Q And what was your response?
A I acted upon our agreement by scratching my head, Sir.
Q And how did your companions respond to your signal?
A After scratching my head, my companions approached us and
arrested them.

A I answer in (sic) affirmative, Sir. Q Now, tell us, do you know, in particular, who arrested Sonny
Zarraga?
Q And what happened next?
A Yes, Sir.
A After that I showed my money, Sir.
Q Tell us.
Q Now, tell us when you said they reply (sic) in the affirmative
specifically. I withdraw that. A SPO1 William Manglo and PO3 Wilfredo Luna, Sir.

Q When you said they asked you whether you can afford to buy Q Can you describe to us the manner by which Sonny Zarraga was
100 grams tell us who asked you that question? arrested by these police officers?

A Sonny Zarraga, Sir. A Yes, Sir.

Q Please tell us.
 A They introduced themselves as NARCOM operatives, Sir. Q Mr. Guevarra, may I remind you that, in your affidavit, you stated
the age of the boy?
Q And after that, what happened?
A I cannot recall anymore, Sir.
A They recovered the money from Sonny Zarraga, Sir.[13]
Q Were you not surprised from just looking at the boy at his age,
Q What happened to the shabu which was handed to you by the were you not surprised that a young boy like that would be in a
accused? group selling drugs?
A It was brought by our office to the crime laboratory, Sir. FISCAL:
Q Who made the request for its examination? It calls for an opinion, Your Honor.
A SPO3 Edgar Groyon, Sir. ATTY. VERANO:
Q Earlier, you said that the shabu was handed to you. What did you May I ask, Your Honor, if he did not further interrogate why or how
do with the shabu? this very young boy (sic) selling 100 grams of shabu.
A While we were at the area, I handed it to SPO1 William Manglo, COURT:
Sir.
The witness may answer.
Q Tell us, when this shabu was handed to you by the accused, in
what container was it contained? WITNESS:
A When it was handed to me by Sonny Zarraga it was wrapped in a A No more, Sir, because I know that young boys are being used by
plastic and white soft paper, Sir.[14] pushers.[15]
It was accused Zarraga who drove the car and transacted with the Even on cross-examination, the public prosecutor failed to elicit from the
poseur-buyer relative to the sale of shabu. It was also accused Zarraga who petitioner facts and circumstances showing his capacity to discern right from
received the buy-money from the poseur-buyer. Aside from bringing out and wrong. We quote the questions of the public prosecutor on cross-examination
handing over the plastic bag to accused Zarraga, the petitioner merely sat and the petitioners answers thereto:
inside the car and had no other participation whatsoever in the transaction
between the accused Zarraga and the poseur-buyer. There is no evidence that FISCAL:
the petitioner knew what was inside the plastic and soft white paper before and Cross, Your Honor. May I proceed.
at the time he handed over the same to his cousin. Indeed, the poseur-buyer
did not bother to ask the petitioner his age because he knew that pushers used COURT:
young boys in their transactions for illegal drugs. We quote the testimony of
Please proceed.
the poseur-buyer:
FISCAL:
ATTY. VERANO:
Q Mr. Witness, you started your narration that it started on
November 13, 1995 and did I hear it right that you went to
Q Did you try to find out if they were friends of your informant? Manuela at 5 oclock in the afternoon?
A No, Sir. WITNESS:
Q Did you find out also the age of this Mr. Alvin Yamson? A Yes, Sir.
A I dont know the exact age, what I know is that he is a minor, Sir. Q Now, when you went to Manuela, you came from Filinvest,
Q Eventually, you find (sic) out how old he is (sic)? Quezon City? You left Filinvest, Quezon City, at 12 oclock?

A I dont know, Sir. A No, Sir.

Q What time did you leave?
A After lunch, Sir.
Q Now, on the second day which you claimed that you were in the
custody of the police, you said that at one occasion on that
day, you have (sic) a chance to be with your cousin in a
[L]ancer car and it was inside that [L]ancer car when your
cousin saw his own cellular phone on one of the seats of the
car, is that correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Did your cousin tell you that that was his first opportunity to make
a call to anybody since the day that you were arrested?
A He did not say anything, he just get (sic) the cellular phone.
Q Did you come to know the reason how that cellular phone
appeared inside that [L]ancer car?
A No, Sir.
Q Now, going back to the first day of your arrest. You said that you
were accosted by a male person at the workshop and then
you went out of Megamall and when you went outside, this
man saw the key of the car dangling at the waist. At whose
waist?
A From my cousin.
Q And at that time, that person did not have any knowledge where
your car was?
A No, Sir.
Q And your cousin told him that your car was parked at the third
level parking area of SM Megamall, is that correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And at that time, that man did not make any radio call to
anybody?
A No, Sir.
Q Until the time that you reached the third level parking of
Megamall, he had not made any call?
A No, Sir.
Q And yet when you reach (sic) the third level parking of the
Megamall, you claimed that there was already this group
which met you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And this group were the policemen who are the companions of
the male person who arrested you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Do you know the reason why they were there at that time?
A No, Sir.
Q These people do not know your car?
A No, Sir.
FISCAL:
No further question, Your Honor.
ATTY. VERANO:
No re-direct, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q Mr. Witness, earlier you stated that you are not a drug user nor
have you seen any shabu. In support of your claim, are you
willing to submit yourself to an examination?
WITNESS:
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Are you willing to submit a sample of your urine to this Court?
A Yes, Sir.
COURT:
The witness is discharged.[16]
The claim of the OSG that the prosecution was able to prove that the
petitioner conspired with his co-accused to sell shabu to the poseur-buyer, and
thereby proved the capacity of the petitioner to discern right from wrong, is
untenable. Conspiracy is defined as an agreement between two or more
persons to commit a crime and decide to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes
capacity of the parties to such conspiracy to discern what is right from what is
wrong. Since the prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner acted with
discernment, it cannot thereby be concluded that he conspired with his co-
accused. Indeed, in People v. Estepano,[17] we held that:
Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish Renes mental capacity
to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Moreover, its cross-
examination of Rene did not, in any way, attempt to show his discernment.
He was merely asked about what he knew of the incident that transpired on
16 April 1991 and whether he participated therein. Accordingly, even if he
was, indeed, a co-conspirator, he would still be exempt from criminal liability
as the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of non-discernment on his
part by virtue of his age. The cross-examination of Rene could have provided
the prosecution a good occasion to extract from him positive indicators of his
capacity to discern. But, in this regard, the government miserably
squandered the opportunity to incriminate him.[18]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289 which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, is SET
ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for insufficiency of
evidence.[19]
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
NIEL F. LLAVE, G.R. No. 166040
v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review of the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26962 affirming, with modification, the
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109, in
Criminal Case No. 02-1779 convicting Petitioner Neil F. Llave of rape.
On September 27, 2002, an Information charging petitioner (then only
12 years old) with rape was filed with the RTC of Pasay City. The inculpatory
portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 24th day of September 2002, in
Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, NEIL LLAVE Y FLORES, aka NIEL F. LLAVE, a
minor over nine (9) years of age and under fifteen (15) but
acting with discernment, by means of force threat and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the complainant, DEBBIELYN
SANTOS y QUITALES, a minor, seven (7) years of age,
against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[3]
The Case for the Prosecution
The spouses Domingo and Marilou Santos were residents
of Pasay City.[4] One of their children, Debbielyn, was born on December 8,
1994.[5] In 2002, she was a Grade II student at the Villamor Air Base
Elementary School in Pasay City[6] and attended classes
from 12:00 noon to 6:00 p.m. [7]
Domingo eked out a living as a jeepney driver, while Marilou sold quail
eggs at a nearby church.[8] Adjacent to their house was that of Teofisto Bucud,
a barbecue vendor who would usually start selling at 6:30 p.m.[9] Next to
Teofistos residence was a vacant house.[10]
Debbielyn testified that on September 24, 2002, she arrived home at past 6:00
p.m. She changed her clothes and proceeded to her mothers store. Marilou
asked her daughter to bring home the container with the unsold quail
eggs.[11] Debbielyn did as told and went on her way. As she neared the vacant
house, she saw petitioner, who suddenly pulled her behind a pile of hollow
blocks which was in front of the vacant house. There was a little light from the
lamp post.[12] She resisted to no avail.[13] Petitioner ordered her to lie down on
the cement. Petrified, she complied. He removed her shorts and underwear
then removed his own. He got on top of her.[14] She felt his penis being inserted
into her vagina. He kissed her.[15] She felt pain and cried.[16] She was sure
there were passersby on the street near the vacant house at the time.
It was then that Teofisto came out of their house and heard the girls cries. He
rushed to the place and saw petitioner on top of Debbielyn, naked from the
waist down. Teofisto shouted at petitioner, and the latter fled from the
scene. Teofisto told Debbielyn to inform her parents about what
happened.[17] She told her father about the incident.[18] Her parents later
reported what happened to the police authorities.[19] Debbielyn told the police
that petitioner was a bad boy because he was a rapist.[20]
Teofisto testified that at about 6:25 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he went out
of their house to get his barbecue grill. He heard someone moaning from within
the adjacent vacant house.[21] He rushed to the place and saw petitioner,
naked from waist down, on top of Debbielyn, making pumping motions on her
anus.[22] The girl was crying. He shouted at petitioner, Hoy, bakit ginawa mo
yan?[23] Petitioner hurriedly put his shorts on and fled. [24] Neighbors who had
heard Teofisto shouting arrived.[25] Later, Teofisto gave a written statement to
the police investigator regarding the incident.[26]
Domingo Santos testified that at about 6:30 p.m. that day, he was inside their
house. His daughter, Kimberly Rose, suddenly told him that Debbielyn had
been raped near the vacant house by petitioner.[27] He rushed to the place and
found her daughter crying. When he asked her what happened, she replied
that she had been abused. He brought Debbielyn to their house and then
left.[28] He then looked for petitioner and found him at his grandmothers house.
A barangay tanod brought petitioner to the barangay hall.[29] On September
25, 2002, he brought her daughter to the Philippine General Hospital Child
Protection Unit at Taft Avenue, Manila where she was examined by Dr.
Mariella S. Castillo.
Dr. Castillo declared on the witness stand that she was a physician at the Child
Protection Unit of the Philippine General Hospital. On September 25, 2002,
she interviewed the victim who told her Masakit ang pepe ko, Ni-rape
ako.[30] Dr. Castillo also conducted a genital examination on the child, and
found no injury on the hymen and perineum, but found scanty yellowish
discharge between the labia minora.[31] There was also a fresh abrasion of the
perineal skin at 1 oclock position near the anal opening.[32] She declared that
the findings support the theory that blunt force or penetrating trauma (such as
an erect penis, finger, or any other foreign body[33]) was applied to the perineal
area[34] not more than six or seven days before.[35] The abrasion could have
been caused on September 24, 2002. She found no spermatozoa in the
vaginal area or injury at the external genitalia;[36] neither did she find any other
injury or abrasion on the other parts of the victims body.[37] She concluded that
her findings were consistent with the victims claim that she was sexually
abused by petitioner.
Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez, for his part, testified that on September
24, 2002, Marilou Santos arrived at the barangay hall and reported that her
daughter had been raped by petitioner who was then in his aunts house
at Cadena de Amor Street. Barangay Captain Greg Florante ordered him
and Barangay Tanod Efren Gonzales to proceed to Cadena de Amor
Street and take the boy into custody, and they did as they were told. [38]
The Case for the Accused
Petitioner, through counsel, presented Dr. Castillo as witness. She
declared that the abrasions in the perineal area could have been caused while
the offender was on top of the victim.[39] She explained that the distance
between the anus and the genital area is between 2.5 to 3 centimeters. [40] The
abrasion was located at of an inch from the anal orifice.
Petitioner testified and declared that he was a freshman at
the Pasay City South High School.[41] He had been one of the three
outstanding students in grade school and received awards such as Best in
Mathematics.[42] He also finished a computer course and received a Certificate
of Completion from the Philippine Air Force Management Information
Center.[43] He denied having raped the private complainant. He declared that
at 6:30 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he was outside of their house to buy rice
in the carinderia[44] and he saw her on his way back.[45] He also met his father,
who asked him what he had done to their neighbor. He was also told that the
victims father was so angry that the latter wanted to kill him.[46] He did not ask
his father for the name of the angry neighbor. He was also told to pass
by Cadena de Amor Street in going to his aunts house. Petitioner also
declared that his mother prodded him to go to his aunts house. [47] Later,
Domingo and Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez arrived at his aunts house
and brought him to the barangay hall. He did not know of any reason why
Debbielyn and her parents would charge him with rape.[48]
Petitioner also declared that he played cards with Debbielyn.[49] While
confined at the Pasay City Youth Home during trial, he had a crush on Issa, a
young female inmate. Using a piece of broken glass (bubog) about half-an-
inch long, he inscribed her name on his right thigh, left leg and left arm.[50]
Nida Llave testified and identified her sons Certificate of Live Birth, in
which it appears that he was born on March 6, 1990.[51] She declared that at
about 6:30 p.m. on September 24, 2000, Marilou Santos and Marilyn Bucud
arrived in their house looking for her son. According to Marilyn, her son had
raped the private complainant. She went to their house to look for her son and
came across Domingo Santos who threatened to kill her son. She and her
husband proceeded to the house of his sister Josefina at Cadena de Amor
Street where petitioner had hidden for a while.[52]
At the conclusion of the trial, the court rendered judgment convicting
Neil of the crime charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
FROM ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court opines that
the prosecution has proven the guilt of the xxx Niel Llave y
Flores beyond reasonable doubt when he forcibly pulled the
complainant towards the vacant lot, laid on top of her and had
carnal knowledge with the [complainant] against her will and
consent who is only seven (7) years old (sic). Moreover, he
being a minor, he cannot be meted with the Death penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the CICL [Child in
Conflict with the Law] Niel Llave y Flores guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, and crediting him with the special mitigating
 circumstance of minority, this Court hereby sentences him
to prision mayor minimum, Six (6) years and One (1) day to
Eight (8) years, and pay civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (Php50,000.00).[53]
The trial court declared that based on the evidence of the prosecution
that petitioner pushed the victim towards the vacant house and sexually
abused her, petitioner acted with discernment. It also considered petitioners
declaration that he had been a consistent honor student.[54]
Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA, where he averred the
following in his Brief as appellant therein:
I appellant does not have the mental faculty to grasp the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED
THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES OF THE TESTIMONY
OF COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH THAT OF THE
MEDICAL REPORT ON THE FACTUAL ALLEGATION OF
BLEEDING.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT GAVE CREDENCE
TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS
TEOFISTO BUCUD WHO HAS REASON TO FABRICATE A
SCENARIO AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT BECAUSE
HE HAS PERSONAL VENDETTA AGAINST THE LATTERS
FAMILY/RELATIVES.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION OF RAPE BY HAVING
CARNAL KNOWLEDGE, BEING CONTRARY TO THE
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE.[55]
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision with modification as
to the penalty meted on him.
WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the instant
appeal is hereby MODIFIED in that the accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and
four (4) months of prision correccional medium as the
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor medium as the maximum. Additionally, the accused-
appellant is ordered to pay the complaining witness the
amount of P50,000 by way of moral damages and P20,000 by
way of exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[56]
Petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration,[57]contending that the
prosecution failed to adduce proof that he acted with discernment; hence, he
should be acquitted. The appellate court denied the motion in a
Resolution[58] dated November 12, 2004 on the following finding:
As regards the issue of whether the accused-
appellant acted with discernment, his conduct during and after
the crime betrays the theory that as a minor, the accused-
propriety and consequences of the act he made. As correctly
pointed out by the prosecution, the fact that forthrightly upon
discovery, the accused-appellant fled the scene and hid in his
grandmothers house intimates that he knew that he did
something that merits punishment.
Contrary to the urgings of the defense, the fact that
the accused-appellant is a recipient of several academic
awards and is an honor student further reinforces the finding
that he [is] possessed [of] intelligence well beyond his years
and is thus poised to distinguish, better at least than other
minors his age could, which conduct is right and which is
morally reprehensible.[59]
Petitioner now raises the following issues and arguments in the instant
petition before this Court:
ISSUES
I
WHETHER OR NOT EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO
CONVICT PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, WHO WAS A MINOR
ABOVE 9 YEARS BUT BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE AT THE
TIME OF THE CRIME, ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT.
III
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.
 ARGUMENTS
I prosecution failed to prove the cause of the abrasion.
THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN
THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH THE
MEDICAL REPORT BELIE THE FINDING OF RAPE.
II
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IS NOT A CREDIBLE WITNESS.
III
PETITIONER ACTED WITHOUT DISCERNMENT.
IV
THE TESTIMONY RELIED UPON BY THE PROSECUTION
IS HEARSAY.
V Milagros Carroso.
THE COMPLAINT IS FABRICATED.
VI
PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.[60]
The issues raised by the petitioner in this case may be summarized
as follows: (1) whether he was deprived of his right to a preliminary
investigation; (2) whether he had carnal knowledge of the private complainant,
and if in the affirmative, whether he acted with discernment in perpetrating the
crime; (3) whether the penalty imposed by the appellate court is correct; and
(4) whether he is liable to pay moral damages to the private complainant.
On the first issue, petitioner avers that he was deprived of his right to
a preliminary investigation before the Information against him was filed.
On the second issue, petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that he had carnal knowledge of
Debbielyn. He insists that her testimony is inconsistent on material points. He
points out that she claimed to have felt pain in her vagina when petitioner
inserted his penis to the point that she cried; this, however, is negated by Dr.
Castillos report stating that there was no evidence of injury on the victims
external genitalia. Petitioner maintains that as against the victims testimony
and that of Dr. Castillos report, the latter should prevail.
According to petitioner, mere touching of the female organ will not
suffice as factual basis of conviction for consummated rape. Moreover, the
victims testimony lacks credibility in view of her admission that, while she was
being allegedly ravished by him, there were passersby along the street.
Besides, petitioner avers, an abrasion may be caused by an invasion of the
body through the protective covering of the skin. Petitioner insists that the
Petitioner also claims that the victim was tutored or coached by her
parents on her testimony before the trial court. Dr. Castillo testified that when
she interviewed Debbielyn, the latter admitted to her that she did not
understand the meaning of the word rape and its Filipino translation, hinalay,
and that the genital examination of the girl was at the insistence of the latters
parents.
Petitioner avers that Teofisto Bucuds testimony has no probative
weight because and had an ill-motive to testify against him. Petitioner stated,
on cross-examination, that his uncle, Boy, had the house rented by Teofisto
demolished. Petitioner avers that the witness persuaded the victims parents to
complain against him, as gleaned from the testimony of Police Investigator
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that
petitioner was subjected to an inquest investigation under Section 7, Rule 112
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as gleaned from the Certification
of the City Prosecutor incorporated in the Information. It avers that the absence
of external injuries does not negate rape; neither is it necessary that
lacerations be found on the hymen of a victim. Rape is consummated if there
is some degree of penetration within the vaginal surface. Corroborative
evidence is not necessary to prove rape. As long as the testimony of the victim
is credible, such testimony will suffice for conviction of consummated
rape. When the victim testified that she was raped, she was, in effect, saying
all that is necessary to prove that rape was consummated. Petitioners
evidence to prove ill-motive on the part of Teofisto Bucud in testifying against
him is at best flimsy. Moreover, it is incredible that the victim and her parents
would charge petitioner with rape solely on Teofistos proddings.
The OSG insists that the petitioner acted with discernment before,
during, and after the rape based on the undisputed facts. The submission of
the OSG follows:
Petitioner argues that since he was only 12 years old
at the time of the alleged rape incident, he is presumed to
have acted without discernment under paragraph 3 of Article
12 of the Revised Penal Code. Under said provision, the
prosecution has the burden of proving that he acted with
discernment. In the instant case, petitioner insists that there
was no evidence presented by the prosecution to show that
he acted with discernment. Hence, he should be exempt from
criminal liability.

Petitioners arguments are bereft of merit.
Discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal
Code is defined as follows: the discernment that constitutes
an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor
under fifteen (15) years of age but over nine (9), who commits
an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand
the difference between right and wrong (People v. Doquena,
68 Phil. 580 [1939]). For a minor above nine but below fifteen
years of age, he must discern the rightness or wrongness of
the effects of his act (Guevarra v. Almodova, G.R. No. 75256,
January 26, 1989).
Professor Ambrocio Padilla, in his annotation of Criminal Law
(p. 375, 1998 Ed.), writes that discernment is more than the
mere understanding between right and wrong. Rather,
it means the mental capacity of a minor between 9 and 15
years of age to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act (People v. Navarro, [CA] [51 O.G. 4062]). Hence,
in judging whether a minor accused acted with discernment,
his mental capacity to understand the difference between right
and wrong, which may be known and should be determined
by considering all the circumstances disclosed by the record
of the case, his appearance, his attitude and his behavior and
conduct, not only before and during the commission of the act,
but also after and even during the trial should be taken into
consideration (People v. Doquena, supra).
In the instant case, petitioners actuations during and after the
rape incident, as well as his behavior during the trial showed
that he acted with discernment.
The fact appears undisputed that immediately after
being discovered by the prosecutions witness, Teofisto
Bucud, petitioner immediately stood up and ran away. Shortly
thereafter, when his parents became aware of the charges
against him and that private complainants father was looking
for him, petitioner went into hiding. It was not until the
Barangay Tanod came to arrest him in his grandmothers
house that petitioner came out in the open to face the charges
against him. His flight as well as his act of going into hiding
clearly conveys the idea that he was fully aware of the moral
depravity of his act and that he knew he committed something
wrong. Otherwise, if he was indeed innocent or if he was not
least aware of the moral consequences of his acts, he would
have immediately confronted private complainant and her
parents and denied having sexually abused their daughter.
During the trial, petitioner submitted documentary
evidence to show that he was a consistent honor student and
has, in fact, garnered several academic awards. This
allegation further bolstered that he acted with discernment,
with full knowledge and intelligence. The fact that petitioner
was a recipient of several academic awards and was an honor
student further reinforces the finding that he was possessed
of intelligence well beyond his years and thus was able to
distinguish, better than other minors of his age could, which
conduct is right and which is morally reprehensible. Hence,
although appellant was still a minor of twelve years of age, he
possessed intelligence far beyond his age. It cannot then be
denied that he had the mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong. This is important in cases
where the accused is minor. It is worthy to note that the basic
reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances
under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete
absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent on the part
of the accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second
element of dolus, the Supreme Court has stated: The second
element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary
to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit
from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because the infant
has no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal
liability (Guevarra v. Aldomovar, 169 SCRA 476 [1989], at
page 482).
The foregoing circumstances, from the time the
incident up to the time the petitioner was being held for trial,
sufficiently satisfied the trial court that petitioner acted with
discernment before, during and after the rape incident. For a
boy wanting in discernment would simply be gripped with fear
or keep mum. In this case, petitioner was fully aware of the
nature and illegality of his wrongful act. He should not,
therefore, be exempted from criminal liability. The prosecution
has sufficiently proved that petitioner acted with
discernment.[61]
In reply, petitioner asserts that the only abrasion found by Dr. Castillo
was on the peri-anal skin and not in the labia of the hymen. He further insists
that there can be no consummated rape absent a slight penetration on the
female organ. It was incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the accused
acted with discernment but failed. The mere fact that he was an honor student
is not enough evidence to prove that he acted with discernment.
The petition is not meritorious.
On the first issue, petitioners contention that he was deprived of his
right to a regular preliminary investigation is barren of factual and legal basis.
The record shows that petitioner was lawfully arrested without a warrant.
Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without
warrant. When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant
involving an offense which requires a preliminary
investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a
prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an
inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules.
In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the
complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer
directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the
offended party or arresting officer or person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person
arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance
with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the
presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may
apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within
fifteen (15) days from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court
without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within
five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a
preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce
evidence in his defense as provided for in this Rule.
As gleaned from the Certification[62] of the City Prosecutor which was
incorporated in the Information, petitioner did not execute any waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before the Information was
filed. He was arraigned with the assistance of counsel on October 10, 2002,
and thereafter filed a petition for bail.[63] Petitioners failure to file a motion for a
preliminary investigation within five days from finding out that an Information
had been filed against him effectively operates as a waiver of his right to such
preliminary investigation.[64]
On the second issue, a careful review of the records shows that the
prosecution adduced evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner had carnal knowledge of the private complainant as charged in the
Information. In People v. Morata[65] the Court ruled that penetration, no matter
how slight, or the mere introduction of the male organ into the labia of the
pudendum, constitutes carnal knowledge. Hence, even if the penetration is
only slight, the fact that the private complainant felt pains, points to the
conclusion that the rape was consummated.[66]
From the victims testimony, it can be logically concluded that
petitioners penis touched the middle part of her vagina and penetrated the
labia of the pudendum. She may not have had knowledge of the extent of the
penetration; however, her straightforward testimony shows that the rape
passed the stage of consummation.[67] She testified that petitioner dragged her
behind a pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house and ordered her to lie
down. He then removed her shorts and panty and spread her legs. He then
mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: From what time up to what time?
A: From 12:00 oclock noon up to 6:00 p.m.
Q: September 24, 2002 and going over the calendar, it was
Tuesday. Did you go to school from 12:00
oclock noon up to 6:00 p.m.?
A: Yes, Sir, on the same date I went to school.
Q: At about 6:00 p.m., Sept. 24, 2002, where were you?
A: I went home.
Q: And by whom you are referring to your house at 1-C
Carnation St., R. Higgins, Maricaban, Pasay City?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And what did you do after you went home?
A: I changed my clothes and then I proceeded to the store of
my mother.
Q: And where is that store of your mother where you went?
A: It is near our house, walking distance.
Q: What is your mother selling in that store?
A: She sells quail eggs.
Q: And were you able to immediately go to the store of your Q: After Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina and
mother where she was selling quail eggs? kissed you on your lips, what did you do?
A: Yes, sir. A: I cried.

Q: And that was past 6:00 p.m. already? Q: What happened when you were crying when he inserted
A: Yes, sir. his penis inside your vagina and kissed you on your
lips. What happened next?
Q: And what happened when you went to the store where your A: Somebody heard me crying.
mother is selling quail eggs past 6:00 p.m.?
A: My mother asked me to bring home something. Q: Who heard you crying?
A: Kuya Teofe, Sir.
Q: What were these things you were asked by your mother to
bring home?
A: The things she used in selling.
Q: What happened after you cried and when somebody heard
Q: And did you obey what your mother told you to bring home you crying?
something? A: Totoy ran away.
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: After Totoy ran away, what happened next?
Q: And what happened to you in going to your house? A: When Totoy ran away, I was left and Kuya Teofe told me
A: Totoy pulled me. to tell the matter to my parents.

Q: Pulled you where? Q: Did you tell your parents what Totoy did to you?
A: Totoy pulled me towards an uninhabited house. A: Yes, Sir.[68]

Q: What happened after Totoy pulled you in an uninhabited

house? On cross-examination, the victim was steadfast in her declarations:
A: He told me to lie down on the cement.

Q: What happened after he laid you down on the cement? ATTY. BALIAD:
A: He removed my shorts and panty. He also removed his
shorts. Q: Again, in what particular position were you placed by Totoy
when he inserted his penis inside your vagina?
Q: After Totoy removed your shorts and panty and he also A: I was lying down.
removed his shorts, what happened next?
A: He inserted his penis inside my vagina. Q: Aside from lying down, how was your body positioned at
that time?
Q: What did you feel when Totoy inserted his penis inside your A: He placed on top of me.
vagina?
A: It was painful. Q: After he placed on top of you, what else did he do to you,
if any?
Q: Aside from inserting his penis inside your vagina, what else A: He started to kiss me and then he inserted his penis inside
did you do to you? my vagina.
A: He kissed me on my lips.
Q: Did you feel his penis coming in into your vagina?
A: Yes, Sir.
 Q: Are you sure that his penis was inserted inside your
vagina?
A: Yes, Sir.[69]
When questioned on cross-examination whether she could distinguish a
vagina from an anus, the victim declared that she could and proceeded to
demonstrate. She reiterated that the penis of petitioner penetrated her vagina,
thus, consummating the crime charged:
Atty. Baliad:
Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the
accused, Neil Llave or Totoy inserted his penis in your
vagina, do you recall that?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel that the penis of
Neil entered your vagina?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Where is your pepe?
A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)
Q: Where is your anus?
A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)
Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the accused
in this case penetrated only in your vagina and not in
your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused
neither by his penis touched any part of your anus?
A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir.[70]
While it is true that Dr. Castillo did not find any abrasion or laceration in the
private complainants genitalia, such fact does not negate the latters testimony
the petitioner had carnal knowledge of her. The absence of abrasions and
lacerations does not disprove sexual abuses, especially when the victim is a
young girl as in this case.[71] According to Dr. Castillo, the hymen is elastic and
is capable of stretching and reverting to its original form.[72] The doctor testified
that her report is compatible with the victims testimony that she was sexually
assaulted by petitioner:
Atty. Baliad:
Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the
accused, Neil Llave or Totoy inserted his penis in your
vagina, do you recall that?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel (sic) that the penis
of Neil entered your vagina?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Where is your pepe?
A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)
Q: Where is your anus?
A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)
Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the accused
in this case penetrated only in your vagina and not in
your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused
neither by his penis touched any part of your anus?
A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir.
xxxx
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: Based on your testimony doctor, and the medico genital
examination propounded on the report that the victim
here, Debbielyn Santos is complaining that around
6:00 in the evening of September 24, 2002, she was
sexually abused and that on the following day,
September 25, you interviewed her and stated to you
that her genitalia was hurting and in binocular (sic)
masakit ang pepe ko, ni-rape ako, would your findings
as contained in this Exh. B and C be compatible with
the allegation if the minor victim that she was sexually
abused on September 24. 2002 at around 6:00 p.m.?
Atty. Baliad:
Objection, Your Honor. The one who narrated the
incident is the mother.

Court:
What is your objection?
Atty. Baliad:
The objection, Your Honor, is the question
propounded is that it was the minor who made the
complaint regarding the allegation.
Fiscal Barrera:
The answer were provided..
Court:
The doctor is being asked whether or not her findings
is compatible with the complaint of the
minor. Overruled. Answer.
Witness:
A It is compatible with the allegation of the minor.
Fiscal Barrera:
Confronting you again with your two (2) medico-
genital documents, the Provincial and Final Report
mark[ed] in evidence as Exhs. B and C, at the lower
portion of these two exhibits there appears to be a
signature above the typewritten word, Mariella
Castillo, M.D., whose signature is that doctor?
A Both are my signatures, Sir.[73]
Dr. Castillo even testified that the abrasion near the private complainants anal
orifice could have been caused by petitioner while consummating the crime
charged:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: With your answer, would it be possible doctor that in the
process of the male person inserting his erect penis
inside the vagina, in the process, would it be possible
that this abrasion could have been caused while in the
process of inserting the penis into the vagina touch
the portion of the anus where you find the abrasion?
A: It is possible, Sir.
Q: Now, are you aware, in the course of your examination,
that the alleged perpetrator is a 12-year-old minor?
A: I only fount it out, Sir, when I testified.
Q: Do you still recall your answer that a 12-year-old boy could
cause an erection of his penis?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: To enlight[en] us doctor, we, not being a physician, at what
age could a male person can have erection?
A: Even infants have an erection.[74]
Petitioners contention that the private complainant was coached by
her parents into testifying is barren of merit. It bears stressing that the private
complainant testified in a straightforward and spontaneous manner and
remained steadfast despite rigorous and intensive cross-examination by the
indefatigable counsel of the petitioner. She spontaneously pointed to and
identified the petitioner as the perpetrator.
It is inconceivable that the private complainant, then only a seven-
year old Grade II pupil, could have woven an intricate story of defloration
unless her plaint was true.[75] The Presiding Judge of the trial court observed
and monitored the private complainant at close range as she testified and
found her testimony credible. Case law is that the calibration by the trial court
of the evidence on record and its assessment of the credibility of witnesses,
as well as its findings of facts and the conclusions anchored on said findings,
are accorded conclusive effect by this Court unless facts and circumstances
of substance were overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted, which, if
considered would merit a nullification or reversal of the decision. We have held
that when the offended party is young and immature, from the age of thirteen
to sixteen, courts are inclined to give credence to their account of what
transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame
and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter to which
they testified is not true.[76]
Neither do we lend credence to petitioners claim that the charge
against him is but a fabrication and concoction of the private complainants
parents. Indeed, petitioner admitted in no uncertain terms that the spouses had
no ill-motive against him. Thus, Neil testified as follows:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: As you testified earlier that you have played post cards with
Debbielyn Santos alias Lyn-lyn and you have no
quarrel or misunderstanding with Lyn-lyn. Do you
know of any reason why Lyn-lyn complaint (sic)
against you for sexual abuse?
A: I dont know of any reason, Sir.
 Q: You also testified that you do not have any quarrel or
misunderstanding with Lyn-lyns parents, spouses
Domingo Santos, Jr. and Marilou Santos, do you think
of any reason as to why they would file a complaint
against you for molesting their 7-year-old daughter?
A: I do not know of any reason why they filed a complaint
against me, Sir.
Fiscal Barrera:
That would be all, Your Honor.[77]
There is no evidence that the parents of the offended party coached
their daughter before she testified. No mother or father would stoop so low as
to subject their daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public
trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage their daughters
psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true.[78]
On the other hand, when the parents learned that their daughter had
been assaulted by petitioner, Domingo tried to locate the offender and when
he failed, he and his wife reported the matter to the barangay authorities. This
manifested their ardent desire to have petitioner indicted and punished for his
delictual acts.
That petitioner ravished the victim not far from the street where
residents passed by does not negate the act of rape committed by
petitioner. Rape is not a respecter of time and place. The crime may be
committed by the roadside and even in occupied premises. [79] The presence
of people nearby does not deter rapists from committing the odious act. [80] In
this case, petitioner was so daring that he ravished the private complainant
near the house of Teofisto even as commuters passed by, impervious to the
fact that a crime was being committed in their midst.
Case law has it that in view of the intrinsic nature of rape, the only evidence
that can be offered to prove the guilt of the offender is the testimony of the
offended party. Even absent a medical certificate, her testimony, standing
alone, can be made the basis of conviction if such testimony is
credible. Corroborative testimony is not essential to warrant a conviction of the
perpetrator.[81] Thus, even without the testimony of Teofisto Bucud, the
testimonies of the offended party and Dr. Castillo constitute evidence beyond
reasonable doubt warranting the conviction of petitioner.
Teofistos testimony cannot be discredited by petitioner simply because his
uncle caused the demolition of the house where Teofisto and his family were
residing. It bears stressing that Teofisto gave a sworn statement to the police
investigator on the very day that the petitioner raped Debbielyn and narrated
how he witnessed the crime being committed by the petitioner.[82] In the
absence of proof of improper motive, the presumption is that Teofisto had no
ill-motive to so testify, hence, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. [83]
The trial court correctly ruled that the petitioner acted with discernment when
he had carnal knowledge of the offended party; hence, the CA cannot be
faulted for affirming the trial courts ruling.
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a
person over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability,
unless he acted with discernment. The basic reason behind the exempting
circumstance is complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action of the
offender which is an essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa.
Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the morality of human acts to
distinguish a licit from an illicit act.[84] On the other hand, discernment is the
mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. The
prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by
evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and
during the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. [85] The
surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he
was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome
nature of the crime and the minors cunning and shrewdness.
In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged the
resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure
that passersby would not be able to discover his dastardly acts. When he was
discovered by Teofisto Bucud who shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled
from the scene to escape arrest. Upon the prodding of his father and her
mother, he hid in his grandmothers house to avoid being arrested by
policemen and remained thereat until barangay tanods arrived and took him
into custody.
The petitioner also testified that he had been an outstanding grade
school student and even received awards. While in Grade I, he was the best
in his class in his academic subjects. He represented his class in a quiz bee
contest.[86] At his the age of 12, he finished a computer course.
In People v. Doquea,[87] the Court held that the accused-appellant
therein acted with discernment in raping the victim under the following facts:
Taking into account the fact that when the accused
Valentin Doquea committed the crime in question, he was a
7th grade pupil in the intermediate school of the municipality of
Sual, Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was one of the
brightest in said school and was a captain of a company of the
 cadet corps thereof, and during the time he was studying
therein he always obtain excellent marks, this court is
convinced that the accused, in committing the crime, acted
with discernment and was conscious of the nature and
consequences of his act, and so also has this court observed
at the time said accused was testifying in his behalf during the
trial of this case.[88]
The CA ordered petitioner to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. There is no factual basis for the
award of exemplary damages. Under Article 2231, of the New Civil Code,
exemplary damages may be awarded if the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances. In this case, no aggravating circumstance
was alleged in the Information and proved by the People; hence, the award
must be deleted.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26962
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages
is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA, G.R. No. 182941
v bore him a grudge for the beatings he gave her. The parties mother (CCC)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition of Robert Sierra y Caneda (petitioner) for the review
on certiorari[1] of the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals[4] (CA) that affirmed with modification his conviction for the crime of
qualified rape rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 159, Pasig
City, in its decision of April 5, 2006.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA[5] was playing with her friend BBB in the
second floor of her familys house in Palatiw, Pasig. The petitioner arrived
holding a knife and told AAA and BBB that he wanted to play with them. The
petitioner then undressed BBB and had sexual intercourse with
her. Afterwards, he turned to AAA, undressed her, and also had sexual
intercourse with her by inserting his male organ into hers. The petitioner
warned AAA not to tell anybody of what they did.
AAA subsequently disclosed the incident to Elena Gallano (her teacher) and
to Dolores Mangantula (the parent of a classmate), who both accompanied
AAA to the barangay office. AAA was later subjected to physical examination
that revealed a laceration on her hymen consistent with her claim of sexual
abuse. On the basis of the complaint and the physical findings, the petitioner
was charged with rape under the following Information:
On or about August 5, 2000, in Pasig City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, a minor, 15
years old, with lewd designs and by means of force, violence
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with his (accused) sister,
AAA, thirteen years of age, against the latters will and
consent.
Contrary to law.[6]
The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge and raised the defenses
of denial and alibi. He claimed that he was selling cigarettes at the time of the
alleged rape. He also claimed that AAA only invented her story because she
supported the petitioners story; she also stated that AAA was a troublemaker.
Both CCC and son testified that the petitioner was fifteen (15) years old when
the alleged incident happened.[7]
The defense also presented BBB who denied that the petitioner raped
her; she confirmed the petitioners claim that AAA bore her brother a grudge.
On April 5, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified rape as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the
accused ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape (Violation of R.A. 8353
in relation to SC A.M. 99-1-13) and hereby sentences the said
juvenile in conflict with law to suffer the penalty of
 imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the may have resulted from the offense
victim the amount of P75,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as committed. However, instead of
moral damages, and P25,000 as exemplary damages. pronouncing the judgment of
conviction, the court shall place the
SO ORDERED.[8] child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need
The petitioner elevated this RTC decision to the CA by attacking AAAs of application: Provided, however,
credibility. He also invoked paragraph 1, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenile That suspension of sentence shall
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006)[9] to exempt him from criminal liability still be applied even if the juvenile is
considering that he was only 15 years old at the time the crime was already eighteen (18) years of age or
committed. more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
The CA nevertheless affirmed the petitioners conviction with modification as
to penalty as follows: Upon suspension of sentence and
WHEREFORE, finding that the trial court did not err after considering the various
in convicting Robert Sierra, the assailed Decision is circumstances of the child, the court
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Robert shall impose the appropriate
Sierra has to suffer the penalty of imprisonment disposition measures as provided in
of RECLUSION TEMPORAL MAXIMUM. The award the Supreme Court on Juveniles in
of damages are likewise affirmed. Conflict with the Law.

SO ORDERED.[10] The law merely amended Article 192 of

In ruling that the petitioner was not exempt from criminal liability, the
CA held:
As to the penalty, We agree with the Office of the Solicitor
General that Robert is not exempt from liability. First, it was
not clearly established and proved by the defense that Robert
was 15 years old or below at the time of the commission of
the crime. It was incumbent for the defense to present Roberts
birth certificate if it was to invoke Section 64 of Republic Act
No. 9344. Neither is the suspension of sentence available to
Robert as the Supreme Court, in one case, clarified that:
We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act
No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006.
Section 38 of the law reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of
Sentence. Once the child who is
under eighteen (18) years of age at
the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court shall determine
and ascertain any civil liability which
P.D. No. 603, as amended by A.M. No. 02-1-
18-SC, in that the suspension of sentence
shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is
already 18 years of age or more at the time
of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. The
other disqualifications in Article 192 of P.D.
No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M.
No. 02-1-18-SC have not been deleted from
Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344.
Evidently, the intention of Congress was to
maintain the other disqualifications as
provided in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as
amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-
18-SC. Hence, juveniles who have been
convicted of a crime the imposable penalty
for which is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death
or death, are disqualified from having their
sentences suspended.[11]
The CA denied the petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration;
hence, the present petition.
 THE ISSUES
The petitioner no longer assails the prosecutions evidence on his guilt
of the crime charged; what he now assails is the failure of the CA to apply
paragraph 1, Section 6[12] of R.A. No. 9344 under the following issues:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the provisions of R.A.
No. 9344 on the petitioners exemption from criminal liability;
(2) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that it was incumbent for the
defense to present the petitioners birth certificate to invoke
Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 when the burden of proving his age
lies with the prosecution by express provisions of R.A. No. 9344;
and
(3) Whether or not the CA erred in applying the ruling in Declarador v.
Hon. Gubaton[13] thereby denying the petitioner the benefit of
exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344.
The threshold issue in this case is the determination of who bears the
burden of proof for purposes of determining exemption from criminal liability
based on the age of the petitioner at the time the crime was committed.
The petitioner posits that the burden of proof should be on the
prosecution as the party who stands to lose the case if no evidence is
presented to show that the petitioner was not a 15-year old minor entitled to
the exempting benefit provided under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344. [14] He
additionally claims that Sections 3,[15] 7,[16] and 68[17] of the law also provide a
presumption of minority in favor of a child in conflict with the law, so that any
doubt regarding his age should be resolved in his favor.
The petitioner further submits that the undisputed facts and evidence
on record specifically: the allegation of the Information, the testimonies of the
petitioner and CCC that the prosecution never objected to, and the findings of
the RTC established that he was not more than 15 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime.
The Peoples Comment, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), counters that the burden belongs to the petitioner who should have
presented his birth certificate or other documentary evidence proving that his
age was 15 years or below. The OSG also stressed that while petitioner is
presumed to be a minor, he is disqualified to have his sentence suspended
following the ruling in Declarador v. Hon. Gubaton.[18]
THE COURTS RULING
We grant the petition.
We examine at the outset the prosecutions evidence and the findings
of the lower courts on the petitioners guilt, since the petition opens the whole
case for review and the issues before us are predicated on the petitioners guilt
of the crime charged. A determination of guilt is likewise relevant under the
terms of R.A. No. 9344 since its exempting effect is only on the criminal, not
on the civil, liability.
We see no compelling reason, after examination of the CA decision
and the records of the case, to deviate from the lower courts findings of guilt.
The records show that the prosecution established all the elements of the
crime charged through the credible testimony of AAA and the other
corroborating evidence; sexual intercourse did indeed take place as the
information charged.[19] As against AAAs testimony, the petitioner could only
raise the defenses of denial and alibi defenses that, in a long line of cases, we
have held to be inherently weak unless supported by clear and convincing
evidence; the petitioner failed to present this required evidentiary
support.[20] We have held, too, that as negative defenses, denial and alibi
cannot prevail over the credible and positive testimony of the
complainant.[21] We sustain the lower courts on the issue of credibility, as we
see no compelling reason to doubt the validity of their conclusions in this
regard.
While the defense, on appeal, raises a new ground i.e., exemption
from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344 that implies an admission of guilt,
this consideration in no way swayed the conclusion we made above, as the
defense is entitled to present all alternative defenses available to it, even
inconsistent ones. We note, too, that the defenses claim of exemption from
liability was made for the first time in its appeal to the CA. While this may
initially imply an essential change of theory that is usually disallowed on appeal
for reasons of fairness, [22] no essential change is really involved as the claim
for exemption from liability is not incompatible with the evidence submitted
below and with the lower courts conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of the
crime charged. An exempting circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal
and civil liabilities exist, but the accused is freed from criminal liability; in other
words, the accused committed a crime, but he cannot be held criminally liable
therefor because of an exemption granted by law. In admitting this type of
defense on appeal, we are not unmindful, too, that the appeal of a criminal
case (even one made under Rule 45) opens the whole case for review, even
on questions that the parties did not raise.[23] By mandate of the Constitution,
no less, we are bound to look into every circumstance and resolve every doubt
in favor of the accused.[24] It is with these considerations in mind and in
obedience to the direct and more specific commands of R.A. No. 9344 on how
the cases of children in conflict with the law should be handled that we rule in
this Rule 45 petition.
We find a review of the facts of the present case and of the applicable
law on exemption from liability compelling because of the patent errors the CA
committed in these regards. Specifically, the CAs findings of fact on the issues
of age and minority, premised on the supposed absence of evidence, are
contradicted by the evidence on record; it also manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties that, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.[ 2 5 ]
In tackling the issues of age and minority, we stress at the outset that
the ages of both the petitioner and the complaining victim are material and are
at issue. The age of the petitioner is critical for purposes of his entitlement to
exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344, while the age of the latter
is material in characterizing the crime committed and in considering the
resulting civil liability that R.A. No. 9344 does not remove.
Minority as an Exempting Circumstance
R.A. No. 9344 was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and took effect
on May 20, 2006. Its intent is to promote and protect the rights of a child in
conflict with the law or a child at risk by providing a system that would
ensure that children are dealt with in a manner appropriate to their well-being
through a variety of disposition measures such as care, guidance and
supervision orders, counseling, probation, foster care, education and
vocational training programs and other alternatives to institutional
care.[26] More importantly in the context of this case, this law modifies as well
the minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility for minor offenders; it
changed what paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended, previously provided i.e., from under nine years of age
and above nine years of age and under fifteen (who acted without
discernment) to fifteen years old or under and above fifteen but below 18 (who
acted without discernment) in determining exemption from criminal liability. In
providing exemption, the new law as the old paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 12 of
the RPC did presumes that the minor offenders completely lack the intelligence
to distinguish right from wrong, so that their acts are deemed involuntary ones
for which they cannot be held accountable.[27] The current law also drew its
changes from the principle of restorative justice that it espouses; it considers
the ages 9 to 15 years as formative years and gives minors of these ages a
chance to right their wrong through diversion and intervention measures.[28]
In the present case, the petitioner claims total exemption from criminal liability
because he was not more than 15 years old at the time the rape took
place. The CA disbelieved this claim for the petitioners failure to present his
birth certificate as required by Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344. [29] The CA also
found him disqualified to avail of a suspension of sentence because the
imposable penalty for the crime of rape is reclusion perpetua to death.
Burden of Proof
Burden of proof, under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules on
Evidence, refers to the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
in order to establish his or her claim or defense. In a criminal case, the burden
of proof to establish the guilt of the accused falls upon the prosecution which
has the duty to prove all the essential ingredients of the crime. The prosecution
completes its case as soon as it has presented the evidence it believes is
sufficient to prove the required elements. At this point, the burden of evidence
shifts to the defense to disprove what the prosecution has shown by evidence,
or to prove by evidence the circumstances showing that the accused did not
commit the crime charged or cannot otherwise be held liable therefor. In the
present case, the prosecution completed its evidence and had done everything
that the law requires it to do. The burden of evidence has now shifted to the
defense which now claims, by an affirmative defense, that the accused, even
if guilty, should be exempt from criminal liability because of his age when he
committed the crime. The defense, therefore, not the prosecution, has the
burden of showing by evidence that the petitioner was 15 years old or less
when he committed the rape charged.[30]
This conclusion can also be reached by considering that minority and
age are not elements of the crime of rape; the prosecution therefore has no
duty to prove these circumstances. To impose the burden of proof on the
prosecution would make minority and age integral elements of the crime when
clearly they are not. [31] If the prosecution has a burden related to age, this
burden relates to proof of the age of the victim as a circumstance that qualifies
the crime of rape.[32]
Testimonial Evidence is Competent Evidence
to Prove the Accuseds Minority and Age
The CA seriously erred when it rejected testimonial evidence showing that the
petitioner was only 15 years old at the time he committed the crime. Section 7
of R.A. No. 9344 expressly states how the age of a child in conflict with the law
may be determined:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may
be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the
absence of these documents, age may be based on
information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of
other persons, the physical appearance of the child and
other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of
the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor. [Emphasis
supplied]

Rule 30-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 9344 provides
the implementing details of this provision by enumerating the measures that
may be undertaken by a law enforcement officer to ascertain the childs age:
(1) Obtain documents that show proof of the childs age, such
as
(a) Childs birth certificate;
(b) Childs baptismal certificate ;or
(c) Any other pertinent documents such as but not
limited to the childs school records, dental records, or
travel papers.
(2) x x x
(3) When the above documents cannot be obtained or
pending receipt of such documents, the law enforcement
officer shall exhaust other measures to determine age by:
(a) Interviewing the child and obtaining information that
indicate age (e.g. date of birthday, grade level in
school);
(b) Interviewing persons who may have knowledge that
indicate[s] age of the child (e.g. relatives, neighbors,
teachers, classmates);
(c) Evaluating the physical appearance (e.g. height,
built) of the child; and
(d) Obtaining other relevant evidence of age.
xxx
Section 7, R.A. No. 9344, while a relatively new law (having been
passed only in 2006), does not depart from the jurisprudence existing at that
time on the evidence that may be admitted as satisfactory proof of the
accuseds minority and age.
In the 1903 case of U.S. v. Bergantino,[33] we accepted testimonial
evidence to prove the minority and age of the accused in the absence of any
document or other satisfactory evidence showing the date of birth. This was
followed by U.S. v. Roxas[34] where the defendants statement about his age
was considered sufficient, even without corroborative evidence, to establish
that he was a minor of 16 years at the time he committed the offense
charged. Subsequently, in People v. Tismo,[35] the Court appreciated the
minority and age of the accused on the basis of his claim that he was 17 years
old at the time of the commission of the offense in the absence of any
contradictory evidence or objection on the part of the prosecution. Then,
in People v. Villagracia,[36] we found the testimony of the accused that he was
less than 15 years old sufficient to establish his minority. We reiterated these
dicta in the cases of People v. Morial[37] and David v. Court of Appeals,[38] and
ruled that the allegations of minority and age by the accused will be accepted
as facts upon the prosecutions failure to disprove the claim by contrary
evidence.
In these cases, we gave evidentiary weight to testimonial evidence on
the accuseds minority and age upon the concurrence of the following
conditions: (1) the absence of any other satisfactory evidence such as the birth
certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar documents that would prove the
date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence of testimony from accused and/or
a relative on the age and minority of the accused at the time of the complained
incident without any objection on the part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of
any contrary evidence showing that the accuseds and/or his relatives
testimonies are untrue.
All these conditions are present in this case. First, the petitioner and
CCC both testified regarding his minority and age when the rape was
committed.[39] Second, the records before us show that these pieces of
testimonial evidence were never objected to by the prosecution. And lastly, the
prosecution did not present any contrary evidence to prove that the petitioner
was above 15 years old when the crime was committed.
We also stress that the last paragraph of Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344
provides that any doubt on the age of the child must be resolved in his
favor.[40] Hence, any doubt in this case regarding the petitioners age at the time
he committed the rape should be resolved in his favor. In other words, the
testimony that the petitioner as 15 years old when the crime took place should
be read to mean that he was not more than 15 years old as this is the more
favorable reading that R.A. No. 9344 directs.
Given the express mandate of R.A. No. 9344, its implementing rules,
and established jurisprudence in accord with the latest statutory
developments, the CA therefore cannot but be in error in not appreciating and
giving evidentiary value to the petitioners and CCCs testimonies relating to the
formers age.
Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 9344
That the petitioner committed the rape before R.A. No. 9344 took
effect and that he is no longer a minor (he was already 20 years old when he
took the stand) will not bar him from enjoying the benefit of total exemption that
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 grants.[41] As we explained in discussing
Sections 64 and 68 of R.A. No. 9344[42] in the recent case of Ortega v.
People:[43]
 Section 64 of the law categorically provides that
cases of children 15 years old and below, at the time of the
commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed
and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social
welfare and development officers (LSWDO). What is
controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from
criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICLs age at the
time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICLs age
at the time of the commission of the offense. In short, by
virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has
been raised from 9 to 15 years old. [Emphasis supplied]
The retroactive application of R.A. No. 9344 is also justified under Article 22 of
the RPC, as amended, which provides that penal laws are to be given
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused who is not found to be a
habitual criminal. Nothing in the records of this case indicates that
the petitioner is a habitual criminal.
Civil Liability
The last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that the
accused shall continue to be civilly liable despite his exemption from criminal
liability; hence, the petitioner is civilly liable to AAA despite his exemption from
criminal liability. The extent of his civil liability depends on the crime he would
have been liable for had he not been found to be exempt from criminal liability.
The RTC and CA found, based on item (1) of Article 266-B of the RPC,
as amended, that the petitioner is guilty of qualified rape because of his
relationship with AAA within the second civil degree of consanguinity and the
latters minority.[44] Both courts accordingly imposed the civil liability
corresponding to qualified rape.
The relationship between the petitioner and AAA, as siblings, does not
appear to be a disputed matter. Their mother, CCC, declared in her testimony
that AAA and the petitioner are her children. The prosecution and the defense
likewise stipulated in the proceedings below that the relationship exists. We
find, however, that AAAs minority, though alleged in the Information, had not
been sufficiently proven.[45] People v. Pruna[46] laid down these guidelines in
appreciating the age of the complainant:
In order to remove any confusion that may be
engendered by the foregoing cases, we hereby set the
following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element
of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended
party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate
of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic
documents such as baptismal certificate and school records
which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to
prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown
to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a
member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who
is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as
the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant
to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years
of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years
of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years
of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic
document, or the testimony of the victims mother or
relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the
age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to
object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall
not be taken against him. [Emphasis supplied]
The records fail to show any evidence proving the age of AAA. They
do not likewise show that the petitioner ever expressly and clearly admitted
AAAs age at the time of the rape. Pursuant to Pruna, neither can his failure to
object to AAAs testimony be taken against him.
 Thus, the required concurrence of circumstances that would upgrade
the crime to qualified rape i.e., relationship within the third degree of
consanguinity and minority of the victim does not exist. The crime for which
the petitioner should have been found criminally liable should therefore only
be simple rape pursuant to par. 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, not qualified
rape. The civil liability that can be imposed on the petitioner follows the
characterization of the crime and the attendant circumstances.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections in Muntinlupa City for its immediate implementation. The Director
of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court within five days
from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.
Let a copy of this Decision be likewise furnished the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Council.

Accordingly, we uphold the grant of moral damages of P50,000.00 but SO ORDERED.

increase the awarded exemplary damages P30,000.00, both pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence.[47] Moral damages are automatically awarded to rape
victims without the necessity of proof; the law assumes that the victim suffered
moral injuries entitling her to this award.[48] Article 2230 of the Civil Code
justifies the award of exemplary damages because of the presence of the
aggravating circumstances of relationship between AAA and petitioner and
dwelling.[49] As discussed above, the relationship (between the parties) is not
disputed. We appreciate dwelling as an aggravating circumstance based on
AAAs testimony that the rape was committed in their house.[50] While dwelling
as an aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the Information,
established jurisprudence holds that it may nevertheless be appreciated as
basis for the award of exemplary damages.[51]

We modify the awarded civil indemnity of P75,000.00 to P50,000.00,

the latter being the civil indemnity appropriate for simple rape [52] on the
finding that rape had been committed.[53]

In light of the above discussion and our conclusions, we see no need

to discuss the petitions third assignment of error.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition

is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 29, 2008 and Resolution dated
May 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR.-H.C. No. 02218
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Pursuant to Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344, Criminal Case No. 120292-

H for rape filed against petitioner Robert Sierra y Caneda is
hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is REFERRED to the appropriate local social
welfare and development officer who shall proceed in accordance with the
provisions of R.A. No. 9344. Petitioner is ORDERED to pay the victim,
AAA, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Unless there are other valid causes for petitioners continued

detention, we hereby ORDER his IMMEDIATE RELEASE under the above
terms.
G.R. No. L-34665 August 28, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DONATO BINDOY, defendant-appellant.
Florentino Saguin for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLAMOR, J.:
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Misamis to the penalty of twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal,
with the accessories of law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The crime charged against the
accused is homicide, according to the following information:
That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of Calunod,
municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, the
accused Donato Bindoy willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked
and with his bolo wounded Emigdio Omamdam, inflicting upon the
latter a serious wound in the chest which caused his instant death, in
violation of article 404 of the Penal Code.
The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and his counsel in
this instance contends that the court erred in finding him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, and in convicting him of the crime of homicide.
The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose
in a tubawineshop in the barrio market of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao,
Province of Occidental Misamis, started by some of the tuba drinkers. There
were Faustino Pacas (alias Agaton), and his wife called Tibay. One Donato
Bindoy, who was also there, offered some tuba to Pacas' wife; and as she
refused to drink having already done so, Bindoy threatened to injure her if
she did not accept. There ensued an interchange of words between Tibay
and Bindoy, and Pacas stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take
away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. This occasioned a disturbance which
attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam, who, with his family, lived near
the market. Emigdio left his house to see what was happening, while Bindoy
and Pacas were struggling for the bolo. In the course of this struggle, Bindoy
succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the
latter's hand towards the left behind the accused, with such violence that the
point of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's chest, who was then behind
Bindoy.
There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between Bindoy and
Pacas. Neither is there any indication that the accused was aware of Emigdio
Omamdam's presence in the place, for, according to the testimony of the
witnesses, the latter passed behind the combatants when he left his house to
satisfy his curiosity. There was no disagreement or ill feeling between Bindoy
and Omamdam, on the contrary, it appears they were nephew and uncle,
respectively, and were on good terms with each other. Bindoy did not try to
wound Pacas, and instead of wounding him, he hit Omamdam; he was only
defending his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench
away from him, and his conduct was perfectly lawful.
The wound which Omamdam received in the chest, judging by the
description given by the sanitary inspector who attended him as he lay dying,
tallies with the size of the point of Bindoy's bolo.
There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which produced Emigdio
Omamdam's death, but the defendant alleges that it was caused accidentally
and without malicious intent.
Pacas and the widow of the deceased, Carmen Angot, testified having seen
the accused stab Omamdam with his bolo. Such testimony is not
incompatible with that of the accused, to the effect that he wounded
Omamdam by accident. The widow testified that she knew of her husband's
wound being caused by Bindoy from his statement to her before his death.
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show that the
accused stabbed Omamdam in the chest with his bolo on that occasion. The
defendant, indeed, in his effort to free himself of Pacas, who was
endeavoring to wrench his bolo from him, hit Omamdam in the chest; but, as
we have stated, there is no evidence to show that he did so deliberately and
with the intention of committing a crime. If, in his struggle with Pacas, the
defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of doing so,
had wounded Omamdam, he would have had to answer for his act, since
whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability,
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. (Art.
1 of the Penal Code.) But, as we have said, this is not the case.
The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the defendant
to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually struggling for the
possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former had pulled
so violently that it flew towards his left side, at the very moment when
Emigdio Omamdam came up, who was therefore hit in the chest, without
Donato's seeing him, because Emigdio had passed behind him. The same
witness adds that he went to see Omamdam at his home later, and asked
him about his wound when he replied: "I think I shall die of this wound." And
then continued: "Please look after my wife when I die: See that she doesn't
starve," adding further: "This wound was an accident. Donato did not aim at
me, nor I at him: It was a mishap." The testimony of this witness was not
contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.
We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind, which, had it
existed, would have greatly facilitated the solution of this case. And we deem
it well to repeat what this court said in United States vs. Carlos (15 Phil., 47),
to wit:
The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of provincial
fiscals, directed to the importance of definitely ascertaining and
proving, when possible, the motives which actuated the commission
of a crime under investigation.
In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in completing
the proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the
introduction of evidence disclosing the motives which tempted the
mind of the guilty person to indulge the criminal act.
In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold, that the
appellant is entitled to acquittal according to article 8, No. 8, Penal Code.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the accused
Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-5418 February 12, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CECILIO TAEDO, defendant-appellant.
O'Brien & De Witt, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of murder committed,
as alleged in the information, as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the said
accused, with the intention of killing Feliciano Sanchez, invited him to
hunt wild chickens, and, upon reaching the forest, with premeditation
shot him in the breast with a shotgun which destroyed the heart and
killed the said Sanchez, and afterwards, in order to hide the crime,
buried the body of the deceased in a well. The motive is unknown.
The premeditation consists in that the accused had prepared his
plans to take the deceased to the forest, there to kill him, so that no
one could see it, and to bury him afterwards secretly in order that the
crime should remain unpunished.
The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Tarlac and sentenced to fourteen years eight months and
one day of reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnification and costs. The
defendant appealed.
There is very little dispute about the facts in this case, in fact no dispute at all
as to the important facts. The accused was a landowner. On the morning of
the 26th of January, 1909, he, with Bernardino Tagampa, Casimiro Pascual,
Valeriano Paulillo, and Juan Arellano, went to work on a malecon or dam on
his land. The defendant took with him a shotgun and a few shells, with the
intention to hunt wild chickens after he had set his laborers at work. He
remained with his laborers an hour or so and then went a short distance
away across a stream to see how the alteration which he had made in
the malecon affected the flow of water from the rice filed on the other side of
the stream. He carried his shotgun with him across the stream. On the other
side of the stream he met the deceased, who, with his mother and uncle, had
been living in a small shack for a month or so during the rice-harvesting
season. The accused asked the uncle of the deceased where he could find a
good place in which to hunt wild chickens. The uncle was lying on the floor in
the interior of the shack sick of fever. The deceased, a young man about 20
years of age, was working at something under a manga tree a short distance
from the shack. Although the accused directed his question to the uncle
inside of the shack, the deceased answered the question and pointed out in
a general way a portion of the forest near the edge of which stood the shack.
There is some contradiction between the testimony of the accused and the
Government witnesses just at this point. The uncle of the deceased testified
that the boy and the accused invited each other mutually to hunt wild
chickens and that the accused accepted the invitation. The accused,
however, testified that he did not invite the deceased to go hunting with him,
neither did the deceased go with him, but that he remained under the manga
tree "trying something." At any rate the accused went into the forest with his
gun. What took place there is unknown to anybody except the accused.
Upon that subject he testified as follows:
And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to me, that place
where the wild chickens were to be found, I proceeded to hunt,
because, in the first place, if I could kill some wild chickens we would
have something to eat on that day. So when I arrived at that place I
 saw a wild chickens and I shot him. And after I shot that chicken I be found in the fact of a sudden quarrel between them during the hunt. That
heard a human cry. I picked up the chicken and went near the place idea is wholly negative by the fact that the chicken and the man were shot at
where I heard the noise, and after I saw that I had wounded a man I the same time, there having been only one shot fired.
went back toward the malecon, where my companions were working,
running back, and when I arrived there I left my shotgun behind or by Article 1 of the Penal Code says:
a tree not far from where my companions were working; and I called
Bernardino Tagampa to tell him about the occurrence, and to him I
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished
told of that occurence because he is my friend and besides that he by law.
was a relative of the deceased, and when Tagampa heard of this he
and myself went together to see the dead body.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be
voluntary unless the contrary shall appear.
Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by gunshot
wound. Chicken feathers were found in considerable qualities at the point
where the chicken was shot and where the accident occurred. The defendant Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as follows:
within a few minutes after the accident went out of the woods to
the malecon where he had left his laborers at work, carrying the dead He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes some
chicken with him. The accused called Bernardino Tagampa, on of the injury by mere accident without liability or intention of causing it.
laborers, to go with him and they disappeared for some time. Tagampa says
that they went a little way toward the woods and came back. The accused Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:
says that they went to the place where the body of the deceased lay and
removed it to a place in the cogon grass where it would not be easily A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent
observed. It is certain, however, that the body was concealed in the cogon until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt that
grass. During the afternoon Tagampa left the malecon, where his fellow his guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal.
laborers were working, probably to hunt for a place in which to hide the body.
The rest of the laborers saw the witness Yumul take the chicken which had
The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly held that if life
been killed by the accused. He delivered it to the wife of the accused, who
is taken by misfortune or accident while in the performance of a lawful act
testified that she received the chicken from Yumul and that it had been killed
executed with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is no
by a gunshot wound. That evening the accused and Tagampa went together
criminal liability. (Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33; State vs. Benham, 23 Ia.,
to dispose of the body finally. They took it from the cogon grass where it lay
154, 92 Am. Dec., 417; Bertrong vs. State, 2 Tex. Ap., 160;
concealed and carried it about seventeen or eighteen hundred meters from
Williamson vs. State, 2 Ohio C. C., 292; U. S. vs. Meagher, 37 Fed. Rep.,
the place where it had originally fallen, and buried it in an old well, covering it
875; U. S. vs.Castro, Fed. Cas., 14752; State vs. Legg, 3 L. R. A., N. S.,
with straw and earth and burning straw on top of the well for the purpose of
1152.)
concealing it. Tagampa said that he helped the accused dispose of the body
because he was afraid of him, although he admits that the accused in no way
threatened or sought to compel him to do so. The defendant prior to the trial In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of
denied all knowledge of the death of the deceased or the whereabouts of the the accused. Neither is there any question that he was engaged in the
body. On the trial, however, he confessed his participation in the death of the commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there any
deceased and told the story substantially as above. evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the deceased.
The only thing in the case at all suspicious upon the part of the defendant are
his concealment and denial.
So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations between
the accused and the deceased had been normal. The deceased was a
tenant on land belonging to a relative of the accused. There was no enmity In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said (p.1165):
and no unpleasant relations between them. No attempt was made to show
any. There appears to have been no motive whatever for the commission of Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is
the crime. The Government has not attempted to show any. The only not required to prove such a defense by a preponderance of the
possible reason that the accused could have for killing the deceased would evidence, because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the
 burden is upon the State to show that it was intentional, and if, from a
consideration of all the evidence, both that for the State and the
prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing
was accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit. . . . But where
accidental killing is relied upon, the prisoner admits the killing but
denies that it was intentional. Therefore, the State must show that it
was intentional, and it is clearly error to instruct the jury that the
defendant must show that it was an accident by a preponderance of
the testimony, and instruction B in the Cross case was properly held
to be erroneous.
In 3 L. R. A., N. S., page 1163, it is said:
Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in a
prosecution for homicide, which must be submitted to the jury. And
since a plea of misadventure is a denial of criminal intent (or its
equivalent) which constitutes an essential element in criminal
homicide, to warrant a conviction it must be negative by the
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
In support of such contention the author cites a number of cases.
We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment
of conviction.
The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted,
and his discharge from custody ordered, costs de oficio. So ordered.
[G.R. No. 150647. September 29, 2004]
ROWENO POMOY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Well-established is the principle that the factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the highest court of the
land. However, when facts are misinterpreted and the innocence of the
accused depends on a proper appreciation of the factual conclusions, the
Supreme Court may conduct a review thereof. In the present case, a careful
reexamination convinces this Court that an accident caused the victims
death. At the very least, the testimonies of the credible witnesses create a
reasonable doubt on appellants guilt. Hence, the Court must uphold the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the February 28, 2001 Decision[2] and the October 30,
2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAGR CR No. 18759. The
CA affirmed, with modifications, the March 8, 1995 judgment[4] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC)[5] of Iloilo City (Branch 25) in Criminal Case No. 36921,
finding Roweno Pomoy guilty of the crime of homicide. The assailed CA
Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, MODIFIED as to penalty in the sense
that the [Petitioner] ROWENO POMOY is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of six (6) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days
of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years eight (8)
months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum,
the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. [6]
The challenged CA Resolution denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Petitioner was charged in an Information worded thus:
That on or about the 4th day of January 1990, in the Municipality of Sara,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, armed with his .45 service pistol, with
deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and without any justifiable
cause or motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and shoot one TOMAS BALBOA with the service pistol he
was then provided, inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on the vital parts
of his body, which directly caused the death of said victim thereafter.[7]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented respondents version
of the facts as follows:
Tomas Balboa was a master teacher of the Concepcion College of Science
and Fisheries in Concepcion, Iloilo.
On January 4, 1990, about 7:30 in the morning, some policemen arrived at
the Concepcion College to arrest Balboa, allegedly in connection with a
robbery which took place in the municipality in December 1989. With the
arrest effected, Balboa and the policemen passed by
the Concepcion Elementary School where his wife, Jessica, was in a get-
together party with other School Administrators.When his wife asked him,
Why will you be arrested? [H]e answered [Even I] do not know why I am
arrested. That is why I am even going there in order to find out the reason for
my arrest.
Balboa was taken to the Headquarters of the already defunct 321st Philippine
Constabulary Company at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo. He was detained in
the jail thereat, along with Edgar Samudio, another suspect in the robbery
case.
Later that day, about a little past 2 oclock in the afternoon, petitioner, who is
a police sergeant, went near the door of the jail where Balboa was detained
and directed the latter to come out, purportedly for tactical interrogation at the
investigation room, as he told Balboa: Lets go to the investigation room. The
investigation room is at the main building of the compound where the jail is
located. The jail guard on duty, Nicostrado Estepar, opened the jail door and
walked towards the investigation room.
At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in a holster
which was hanging by the side of his belt. The gun was fully embedded in its
holster, with only the handle of the gun protruding from the holster.
When petitioner and Balboa reached the main building and were near the
investigation room, two (2) gunshots were heard. When the source of the
shots was verified, petitioner was seen still holding a .45 caliber pistol, facing
Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood, about two (2) feet away. When the
Commanding Officer of the Headquarters arrived, he disarmed petitioner and
directed that Balboa be brought to the hospital. Dr. Palma (first name not
provided) happened to be at the crime scene as he was visiting his brother in
the Philippine Constabulary. When Dr. Palma examined Balboa, he (Dr.
Palma) said that it was unnecessary to bring Balboa to the hospital for he
was dead.
Upon the request of Mrs. Jessica Balboa, the wife of the deceased, Dr.
Ricardo Jabonete, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Region VI, Iloilo City, conducted an autopsy on the remains of
Tomas Balboa. The following were his findings:
Pallor, integumens and nailbeds.
Wound, gunshot: (1) ENTRANCE, downwards and medially, edges, modified
by sutures, surrounded by abrasion collar, 0.6 cm. In its chest, left side, 10.0
cms. from anterior midline, 121.0 cms. From left heel, directed medially
backwards from left to right, penetrating chest wall thru 5th intercostals space
into thoracic cavity, perforating thru and thru, upper lobe, left lung, lacerating
left ventricular wall causing punched out fracture, 8th thoracic vertebra and
make an EXIT, stallate in shape, 1.0 x 0.8 cm. Edges, modified by sutures,
back, right side, 8.0 cms. From posterior midline, 117.0 cms. From right heel
(2) ENTRANCE, ovaloid, oriented medially downwards, edges sutured, 0.7
cm. on its widest portion, at infero-medial border, hypochondriac region, left
side, 4.0 cms. From anterior midline, 105.0 cms. From left heel, directed
backwards, laterally wall into penetrating abdominal cavity, perforating thru
and thru, stomach, head of the pancreas and mesentery, make an exit,
ovalid, 1.0 x 0.8 cm., oriented medially upwards, edges, sutured, back, left
side, level of 9th intercostal space, 4.5 cms. From posterior midline, 110.0
cms. From left heel. x x x.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, massive secondary to gunshot wounds on
chest and abdomen.
REMARKS: Body previously embalmed and autopsied.
Dr. Jaboneta testified that the two (2) wounds he found on x x x Balboas
body were gunshot wounds. The entrance of [W]ound No. 1 was to the left
side of the chest about the left nipple and exited to the right side of the
back. Its trajectory was backwards then downwards from left to right. As to
the possible position of the assailant, Dr. Jaboneta opined that the nozzle of
the gun was probably in front of the victim and was more to the left side, and
the gun must have been a little bit higher than the entrance wound. Wound
No. 2 was located immediately below the arch of the ribs, left side. Its
direction was backwards and laterally upwards. Dr. Jaboneta estimated that
when it was inflicted, the assailant must have pointed the guns nozzle to the
right side front of the victim. The distance between the entrance points of
wounds No. 1 and No. 2 was found to be about 16.0 centimeters.[8]
Version of the Defense
The Petition adopted the narration of facts in the assailed CA Decision,
which in turn culled them from the trial court. The RTC summarized the
testimonies of Defense Witnesses Erna Basa, the lone eyewitness to the
incident; Eden Legaspi; Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.; and petitioner himself, as
follows:
Erna Basa:
x x x [O]n January 4, 1990, she was working in their office in the camp up to
the afternoon; at about past 2 oclock that afternoon while working on the
backlogs, she heard some noise and exchange of words which were not
clear, but it seemed there was growing trouble; she opened the door to verify
and saw Roweno Pomoy and Tomas Balboa grappling for the possession of
the gun; she was inside the room and one meter away from the door; Pomoy
and Balboa while grappling were two to three meters away from the door; the
grappling happened so fast and the gun of Pomoy was suddenly pulled out
from its holster and then there was explosion; she was not certain who pulled
the gun. x x x.
Eden Legaspi:
x x x [A]s early as 1:30 oclock in the afternoon of January 4, 1990 she was
inside the investigation room of the PC at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo; at
about 2 oclock that same afternoon while there inside, she heard a
commotion outside and she remained seated on the bench; when the
commotion started they were seated on the bench and after the commotion
that woman soldier (referring to Erna Basa) stood up and opened the door
and she saw two persons grappling for the possession of a gun and
immediately two successive shots rang out; she did not leave the place
where she was seated but she just stood up; after the shots, one of the two
men fall down x x x.
Accused-petitioner Roweno Pomoy:
He is 30 years old and a PNP member of the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force
Company then attached to the defunct 321st PC Company; he was one of the
investigators of their outfit; about 2 oclock or past that time of January 4,
1990 he got Tomas Balboa from their stockade for tactical interrogation; as
he was already holding the door knob of their investigation room and about to
open and enter it, all of a sudden he saw Tomas Balboa approach him and
take hold or grab the handle of his gun; Tomas Balboa was a suspect in a
robbery case who was apprehended by the police of Concepcion and then
turned over to them (PC) and placed in their stockade; he asked the sergeant
of the guard to let Balboa out of the stockade for interrogation; from the
stockade with Balboa walking with him, he had his .45 caliber pistol placed in
his holster attached to his belt on his waist; then as he was holding the
doorknob with his right hand to open the door, the victim, who was two
meters away from him, suddenly approached him and grabbed his gun, but
all of a sudden he held the handle of his gun with his left hand; he released
his right hand from the doorknob and, with that right hand, he held the handle
of his gun; Tomas Balboa was not able to take actual hold of the gun
because of his efforts in preventing him (Balboa) from holding the handle of
his gun; he used his left hand to parry the move of Balboa; after he held the
handle of his gun with his right hand, in a matter of seconds, he felt
somebody was holding his right hand; he and Balboa grappled and in two or
three seconds the gun was drawn from its holster as both of them held the
gun; more grappling followed and five seconds after the gun was taken from
its holster it fired, the victim was to his right side when the attempt to grab his
gun began and was still to his right when the gun was drawn from its holster
until it fired, as they were still grappling or wrestling; his gun was already
loaded in its chamber and cocked when he left his house, and it was locked
when it fired; during the grappling he used his left hand to prevent Balboa
from holding his gun, while the victim used his right hand in trying to reach
the gun; after the gun fired, they were separated from each other and Balboa
fell; he is taller than Balboa though the latter was bigger in build; he cannot
say nor determine who of them was stronger; after Balboa fell, Sgt. Alag
shouted saying stop that and he saw Sgt. Alag approaching; sometime after,
Capt. Rolando Maclang, their commanding officer, came, got his gun, and
said that the case be investigated as to what really happened. He said that
when his gun was put in its holster only its handle protrudes or comes out
from it.
Upon cross-examination, he said that Balboa was a suspect in a robbery
case that happened during the first week of December, 1989; he was the one
who filed that case in the town of San Dionisio and that case involves other
persons who were also detained; before January 4, 1990 he had also the
chance to invite and interrogate Balboa but who denied any robbery case; x x
x [I]t was after he took his lunch that day when Capt. Maclang called him to
conduct the interrogation; when he took Balboa from the stockade he did not
tell him that he (Balboa) was to be investigated in the investigation room
which was housed in the main building which is fifty meters, more or less,
from the stockade, likewise houses the administrative office, the office of the
commanding officer, officer of the operations division and that of the signal
division; his gun was in its holster when the victim tried to grab it (gun); from
the time he sensed that the victim tried to grab his gun, he locked the victim;
the hand of the victim was on top of his hand and he felt the victim was
attempting to get his gun; that the entire handle of his gun was exposed
when placed inside its holster; he cannot tell whether the victim, while
struggling with him, was able to hold any portion of his gun from the tip of its
barrel to the point where its hammer is located; during the incident his gun
was fully loaded and cocked; Sgt. Alag did not approach, but just viewed
them and probably reported the incident to their commanding officer; he was
not able to talk to Sgt. Alag as he (Pomoy) was not in his right sense; when
his commanding officer came some five to ten minutes later and took away
his gun he did not tell him anything.
Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.
He is the Rural Health Physician of Sara who conducted the autopsy on the
cadaver of Tomas Balboa that afternoon of January 4, 1990; in his autopsy
findings respecting which he made an autopsy report he said he found two
entrance wounds on the victim, the first on the left chest with trajectory
medially downward, while the second one is on the left side of the stomach
with trajectory somewhat going upward; at the same time of his examination
he saw this victim to be wearing a light-colored T-shirt and a jacket; other
than the T-shirt worn by the victim, he did not see or find any powder burns
and marks and that those dotted marks in the T-shirt were believed by him to
be powder burns as they look like one; he also found a deformed slug in the
pocket of the jacket of the victim.[9]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA anchored its Decision on the following factual findings: 1) the
victim was not successful in his attempts to grab the gun, since petitioner had
been in control of the weapon when the shots were fired; 2) the gun had been
locked prior to the alleged grabbing incident and immediately before it went
off; it was petitioner who released the safety lock before he deliberately fired
the fatal shots; and 3) the location of the wounds found on the body of the
deceased did not support the assertion of petitioner that there had been a
grappling for the gun.
To the appellate court, all the foregoing facts discredited the claim of
petitioner that the death of Balboa resulted from an accident. Citing People v.
Reyes,[10] the CA maintained that a revolver is not prone to accidental firing if
it were simply handed over to the deceased as appellant claims because of
the nature of its mechanism, unless it was already first cocked and pressure
was exerted on the trigger in the process of allegedly handing it over. If it were
uncocked, then considerable pressure had to be applied on the trigger to fire
the revolver. Either way, the shooting of the deceased must have been
intentional because pressure on the trigger was necessary to make the gun
fire.[11]
Moreover, the appellate court obviously concurred with this observation
of the OSG:
[Petitioners] theory of accident would have been easier to believe had the
victim been shot only once. In this case, however, [petitioner] shot the victim
not only once but twice, thereby establishing [petitioners] determined effort to
kill the victim. By any stretch of the imagination, even assuming without
admitting that the first shot was accidental, then it should not have been
followed by another shot on another vital part of the body. The fact that
[petitioner] shot the victim two (2) times and was hit on two different and
distant parts of the body, inflicted from two different locations or angles,
means that there was an intent to cause the victims death, contrary to
[petitioners] pretensions of the alleged accidental firing. It is an oft-repeated
principle that the location, number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on the
victim have a more revealing tale of what actually happened during the
incident. x x x.[12]
Furthermore, the CA debunked the alternative plea of self-defense. It held
that petitioner had miserably failed to prove the attendance of unlawful
aggression, an indispensable element of this justifying circumstance.
While substantially affirming the factual findings of the RTC, the CA
disagreed with the conclusion of the trial court that the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of public position had attended the commission of the
crime. Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the RTC was modified by the
appellate court in this manner:
x x x [F]or public position to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance,
the public official must use his influence, prestige and ascendancy which his
office gives him in realizing his purpose. If the accused could have
perpetrated the crime without occupying his position, then there is no abuse
of public position. (People vs. Joyno, 304 SCRA 655, 670). In the instant
case, there is no showing that the [petitioner] had a premeditated plan to kill
the victim when the former fetched the latter from the stockade, thus, it
cannot be concluded that the public position of the [petitioner] facilitated the
commission of the crime. Therefore, the trial courts finding that the said
aggravating circumstance that [petitioner] took advantage of his public
position to commit the crime cannot be sustained.Hence, there being no
aggravating and no mitigating circumstance proved, the maximum of the
penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, a
penalty imposable for the crime of homicide. x x x.[13]
Hence, this Petition.[14]
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner submitted the following issues for the
Courts consideration:
I. The Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in
affirming petitioners conviction despite the insufficiency of the
prosecutions evidence to convict the petitioner, in contrast to
petitioners overwhelming evidence to support his theory/defense
of accident.
 II. The Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in
affirming the conviction of the petitioner on a manifestly mistaken
inference that when the gun fired, the petitioner was in full control
of the handle of the gun, because what the testimonies of
disinterested witnesses and the petitioner reveal was that the gun
fired while petitioner and Balboa were both holding the gun in
forceful efforts to wrest the gun from each other.
III. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the solicitor
generals observation that the fact that petitioner shot the victim
twice establishes petitioners determined effort to kill the victim.
IV. The appellate court committed serious misapprehension of the
evidence presented when it ruled that the trajectory of the
wounds was front-to-back belying the allegation of petitioner that
he and the victim were side-by-side each other when the
grappling ensued.
V. The Court of Appeals failed to discern the real import of petitioners
reaction to the incident when it stated that the dumbfounded
reaction of petitioner after the incident strongly argues against his
claim of accidental shooting.
VI. The appellate court committed grave error when it disregarded
motive or lack of it in determining the existence of voluntariness
and intent on the part of petitioner to shoot at the victim when the
same was put in serious doubt by the evidence presented.
VII. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in ruling that the defense of
accident and self-defense are inconsistent.
VIII. The Court of Appeals obviously erred in the imposition of the
penalties and damages.[15]
In sum, the foregoing issues can be narrowed down to two: First, whether
the shooting of Tomas Balboa was the result of an accident; and second,
whether petitioner was able to prove self-defense.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Accidental Shooting
Timeless is the legal adage that the factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive. [16] Both courts possess time-
honored expertise in the field of fact finding. But where some facts are
misinterpreted or some details overlooked, the Supreme Court may overturn
the erroneous conclusions drawn by the courts a quo.Where, as in this case,
the facts in dispute are crucial to the question of innocence or guilt of the
accused, a careful factual reexamination is imperative.
Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code:
Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following
are exempt from criminal liability:
xxxxxxxxx
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an
injury by mere accident without fault or intent of causing it.
Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to
the victim was not due to the fault or negligence of the accused, but to
circumstances that could not have been foreseen or controlled.[17] Thus, in
determining whether an accident attended the incident, courts must take into
account the dual standards of lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or
negligence. This determination inevitably brings to the fore the main question
in the present case: was petitioner in control of the .45 caliber pistol at the very
moment the shots were fired?
Petitioner Not in Control
of the Gun When It Fired
The records show that, other than petitioner himself, it was Erna
Basa who witnessed the incident firsthand. Her account,
narrated during cross-examination, detailed the events of that
fateful afternoon of January 4, 1990 as follows:
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. You said that while you were inside the investigation room you
heard a commotion. That commotion which you heard, did you
hear any shouting as part of that commotion which you heard?
A. Moderately there was shouting and their dialogue was not
clear. It could not be understood.
Q. Did you hear any voices as part of that commotion?
A. No, sir.
Q. From the time you entered the investigation room you did not
hear any voice while you were inside the investigation room as
part of that commotion?
A. There was no loud voice and their conversation could not be
clarified. They were talking somewhat like murmuring or in a
low voice but there was a sort of trouble in their talks.
COURT:
Q. Was there a sort of an exchange of words in their conversation?
A. Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. When you opened the door, you saw Sgt. Pomoy and Mr.
Balboa the deceased in this case? Am I correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you saw Sgt. Pomoy was he holding a gun?
A. Not yet, the gun was still here. (Witness illustrating by pointing to
her side) and I saw both of them grappling for that gun.
Q. Where was the gun at that time?
A. The gun was in its holster. (Witness illustrating by pointing to
[her] side.)
Q. When you demonstrated you were according to you saw the
hands holding the gun. It was Sgt. Pomoy who was holding
the gun with his right hand?
A. I saw two hands on the handle of the gun in its holster, the
hand of Sir Balboa and Sgt. Pomoy.
COURT:
Q. At that precise moment the gun was still in its holster?
A. When I took a look the gun was still in its holster with both
hands grappling for the possession of the gun.
Q. How many hands did you see?
A. Two.
Q. One hand of Sgt. Pomoy and one hand is that of the victim?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY TEODOSIO:
Q. Which hand of Sgt. Pomoy did you see holding the gun?
A. Right hand of Sgt. Pomoy.
Q. And when you see that right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, was it holding
the gun?
A. The right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was here on the gun and Sir
Balboas hand was also there. Both of them were holding
the gun.
Q. Which part of the gun was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding?
A. The handle.
Q. And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun
with his right hand?
A. At first they were not directly facing each other.
Q. So later, they were facing each other?
A. They were not directly facing each other. Their position did
not remain steady as they were grappling for the
possession of the gun force against force.
COURT:
Q. What was the position of the victim when the shots were fired?
A. When I saw them they were already facing each other.
Q. What was the distance?
A. Very close to each other.
Q. How close?
A. Very near each other.
Q. Could it be a distance of within one (1) foot?
A. Not exactly. They were close to each other in such a manner
that their bodies would touch each other.
Q. So the distance is less than one (1) foot when the gun fired?
A. One (1) foot or less when the explosions were heard.
Q. And they were directly facing each other?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Proceed.
Q. Were you able to see how the gun was taken out from its
holster?
A. While they were grappling for the possession of the gun,
gradually the gun was released from its holster and then
there was an explosion.
Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?
A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was
when it fired because they were grappling for the possession
of the gun.
Q. Did you see when the gun fired when they were grappling for its
possession?
A. Yes sir, I actually saw the explosion. It came from that very gun.
Q. Did you see the gun fired when it fired for two times?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?
A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the
gun was pointed to because the gun was turning.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Could you tell the court who was holding the gun when the gun
fired?
A. When the gun exploded, the gun was already in the possession
of Sgt. Pomoy. He was the one holding the gun.
Q. After the gun went off, you saw the gun was already in the hand
of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How soon after the gun went off when you saw the gun in the
hand of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. After Balboa had fallen and after they had separated themselves
with each other, it was then that I saw Sgt. Pomoy holding the
gun.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. When the gun was taken out from its holster, Sgt. Pomoy was
the one holding the handle of the gun? Am I correct?
A. Both of them were holding the handle of the gun.
Q. So when the gun was still in its holster, two of them were holding
the gun?
A. Yes sir, they were actually holding the gun, Sgt. Pomoy and Sir
Balboa.
Q. It was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle
of the gun as you testified?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Which hand of Balboa was holding the handle of the gun?
A. Left hand.
Q. At the time Balboa was holding the handle of the gun with his
left hand, was he in front of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. They had a sort of having their sides towards each
other. Pomoys right and Balboas left sides [were] towards
each other. They were side by side at a closer distance
towards each other.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. It was actually Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the
gun during that time?
A. When I looked out it was when they were grappling for the
possession of the gun and the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy
was holding the handle of the gun.
Q. When you saw them did you see what position of the handle of
the gun was being held by Tomas Balboa? The rear portion of
the handle of the gun or the portion near the trigger?
A. When I looked at them it was the hand of Sgt. Pomoy
holding the handle of the gun with his right hand with the
hand of Sir Balboa over the hand of Pomoy, the same
hand holding the gun.
Q. It was in that position when the gun was removed from its
holster?
A. When the gun pulled out from its holster, I was not able to
notice clearly anymore whose hand was holding the gun
when I saw both their hands were holding the gun.
Q. When you said this in [the] vernacular, Daw duha na sila
nagakapot, what you really mean?
A. Both of them were holding the gun.
Q. But Sgt. Pomoy still holding the handle of the gun?
A. Still both of them were holding the handle of the gun.
Q. With the hand of Balboa still on the top of the hand of Sgt.
Pomoy as what you have previously said when the gun was in
the holster of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. When the gun was pulled from its holster, I saw that Sgt.
Pomoys right hand was still on the handle of the gun with
the left hand of Sir Balboa over his right hand of Sgt.
Pomoy, like this (witness illustrating by showing his right
hand with her left hand over her right hand as if holding
something. The thumb of the left hand is somewhat over the
index finger of the right hand.)
COURT:
Which hand of the victim was used by him when the gun was
already pulled out form its holster and while the accused was
holding the handle of the gun?
A. Left hand.
Q. So, he was still using the same left hand in holding a portion of
the handle of the gun up to the time when the gun was pulled
out from its holster?
A. Yes sir, the same left hand and that of Pomoy his right hand
because the left hand of Pomoy was used by him in parrying
the right hand of Sir Balboa which is about to grab the handle
of the gun.
COURT:
Q. So in the process of grappling he was using his left hand in
pushing the victim away from him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What about the right hand of the victim, what was he doing with
his right hand?
A. The victim was trying to reach the gun with his right hand
and Pomoy was using his left hand to protect the victim
from reaching the gun with his right hand.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. Did you say a while ago that Mr. Balboa was able to hold
the barrel of the gun of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that was at the time before the shots were fired?
A. Yes, he was able to hold the tip of the barrel of the gun using his
right hand.
COURT:
Q. That was before the gun fired?
A. Yes, sir.[18]
The foregoing account demonstrates that petitioner did not have control
of the gun during the scuffle. The deceased persistently attempted to wrest the
weapon from him, while he resolutely tried to thwart those attempts. That the
hands of both petitioner and the victim were all over the weapon was
categorically asserted by the eyewitness. In the course of grappling for the
gun, both hands of petitioner were fully engaged -- his right hand was trying to
maintain possession of the weapon, while his left was warding off the victim. It
would be difficult to imagine how, under such circumstances, petitioner would
coolly and effectively be able to release the safety lock of the gun and
deliberately aim and fire it at the victim.
It would therefore appear that there was no firm factual basis for the
following declaration of the appellate court: [Petitioner] admitted that his right
hand was holding the handle of the gun while the left hand of the victim was
over his right hand when the gun was fired. This declaration would safely lead
us to the conclusion that when the gun went off herein [petitioner] was in full
control of the gun.[19]
Release of the Guns Safety Lock and
Firing of the Gun Both Accidental
Petitioner testified that the .45 caliber service pistol was equipped with a
safety lock that, unless released, would prevent the firing of the gun. Despite
this safety feature, however, the evidence showed that the weapon fired and
hit the victim -- not just once, but twice. To the appellate court, this fact could
only mean that petitioner had deliberately unlocked the gun and shot at the
victim. This conclusion appears to be non sequitur.
It is undisputed that both petitioner and the victim grappled for possession
of the gun. This frenzied grappling for the weapon -- though brief, having been
finished in a matter of seconds -- was fierce and vicious. The eyewitness
account amply illustrated the logical conclusion that could not be
dismissed: that in the course of the scuffle, the safety lock could have been
accidentally released and the shots accidentally fired.
That there was not just one but two shots fired does not necessarily and
conclusively negate the claim that the shooting was accidental, as the same
circumstance can easily be attributed to the mechanism of the .45 caliber
service gun. Petitioner, in his technical description of the weapon in question,
explained how the disputed second shot may have been brought about:
x x x Petitioner also testified on cross-examination that a caliber .45 semi-
automatic pistol, when fired, immediately slides backward throwing away the
empty shell and returns immediately carrying again a live bullet in its
chamber. Thus, the gun can, as it did, fire in succession. Verily, the location
of, and distance between the wounds and the trajectories of the bullets jibe
perfectly with the claim of the petitioner: the trajectory of the first shot going
downward from left to right thus pushing Balboas upper body, tilting it to the
left while Balboa was still clutching petitioners hand over the gun; the second
shot hitting him in the stomach with the bullet going upward of Balboas body
as he was falling down and releasing his hold on petitioners hand x x x. [20]
Thus, the appellate courts reliance on People v. Reyes[21]
was
misplaced. In that case, the Court disbelieved the accused who described how
his gun had exploded while he was simply handing it over to the victim. Here,
no similar claim is being made; petitioner has consistently maintained that the
gun accidentally fired in the course of his struggle with the victim. More
significantly, the present case involves a semi-automatic pistol, the mechanism
of which is very different from that of a revolver, the gun used
in Reyes.[22] Unlike a revolver, a semi-automatic pistol, as sufficiently
described by petitioner, is prone to accidental firing when possession thereof
becomes the object of a struggle.
Alleged Grappling Not Negated
by Frontal Location of Wounds
On the basis of the findings of Dr. Jaboneta showing that the wounds of
the deceased were all frontal, the appellate court rejected petitioners claim that
a grappling for the weapon ever occurred. It held that if there was indeed a
grappling between the two, and that they had been side [by] side x x x each
other, the wounds thus inflicted could not have had a front-to-back trajectory
which would lead to an inference that the victim was shot frontally, as observed
by Dr. Jaboneta.[23]
Ordinarily, the location of gunshot wounds is indicative of the positions of
the parties at the precise moment when the gun was fired. Their positions
would in turn be relevant to a determination of the existence of variables such
as treachery, aggression and so on.
In the factual context of the present case, however, the location of the
wounds becomes inconsequential. Where, as in this case, both the victim and
the accused were grappling for possession of a gun, the direction of its nozzle
may continuously change in the process, such that the trajectory of the bullet
when the weapon fires becomes unpredictable and erratic. In this case, the
eyewitness account of that aspect of the tragic scuffle shows that the parties
positions were unsteady, and that the nozzle of the gun was neither definitely
aimed nor pointed at any particular target. We quote the eyewitness testimony
as follows:
Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?
A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was
when it fired because they were grappling for the possession
of the gun.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?
A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the
gun was pointed to because the gun was turning.[24]
xxxxxxxxx
Q And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun
with his right hand?
A At first, they were not directly facing each other.
Q So later, they were facing each other?
A They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not
remain steady as they were grappling for the possession of
the gun force against force.[25]
In his Petition, this explanation is given by petitioner:
x x x. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Balboa was shot
frontally. First, because the position of the gun does not necessarily indicate
the position of the person or persons holding the gun when it fired. This is
especially true when two persons were grappling for the possession of
the gun when it fired, as what exactly transpired in this case. x x x.
[The] testimony clearly demonstrates that the petitioner was on the left side
of the victim during the grappling when the gun fired. The second wound was
thus inflicted this wise: when the first shot hit Balboa, his upper body was
pushed downward owing to the knocking power of the caliber .45 pistol. But
he did not let go of his grip of the hand of petitioner and the gun, Balboa
pulling the gun down as he was going down. When the gun went off the
second time hitting Balboa, the trajectory of the bullet in Balboas body was
going upward because his upper body was pushed downward twisting to the
left. It was then that Balboa let go of his grip. On cross-examination,
petitioner testified, what I noticed was that after successive shots we
separated from each other. This sequence of events is logical because
the protagonists were grappling over the gun and were moving very
fast. x x x. [26]
Presence of All the
Elements of Accident
The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time
performing a lawful act with due care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by
mere accident; and 3) on the part of the accused, there was no fault or no
intent to cause the injury.[27] From the facts, it is clear that all these elements
were present. At the time of the incident, petitioner was a member --
specifically, one of the investigators -- of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company. Thus, it was in the
lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer that, under the
instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latters cell for a
routine interrogation.
Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that
petitioner tried to defend his possession of the weapon when the victim
suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer of the law, petitioner
was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone,
especially by a detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be
used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in the vicinity, including
petitioner himself.
Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the
necessary precautions to prevent his service weapon from causing accidental
harm to others. As he so assiduously maintained, he had kept his service gun
locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster at all times, especially
within the premises of his working area.
At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any intent to
cause injury to the deceased, much less kill him. Furthermore, Nicostrato
Estepar, the guard in charge of the detention of Balboa, did not testify to any
behavior on the part of petitioner that would indicate the intent to harm the
victim while being fetched from the detention cell.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victims death was limited only
to acts committed in the course of the lawful performance of his duties as an
enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its holster, the release of the
safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots -- all of which led to the
death of the victim -- were sufficiently demonstrated to have been
consequences of circumstances beyond the control of petitioner. At the very
least, these factual circumstances create serious doubt on the latters
culpability.
Petitioners Subsequent Conduct
Not Conclusive of Guilt
To both the trial and the appellate courts, the conduct of petitioner
immediately after the incident was indicative of remorse. Allegedly, his guilt
was evident from the fact that he was dumbfounded, according to the CA; was
mum, pale and trembling, according to the trial court. These behavioral
reactions supposedly point to his guilt. Not necessarily so. His behavior was
understandable. After all, a minute earlier he had been calmly escorting a
person from the detention cell to the investigating room; and, in the next breath,
he was looking at his companions bloodied body. His reaction was to be
expected of one in a state of shock at events that had transpired so swiftly and
ended so regrettably.
Second Issue:
Self-Defense
Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative. Granting arguendo
that he intentionally shot Balboa, he claims he did so to protect his life and limb
from real and immediate danger.
Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident,
in which there is no intent to kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily
contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to defend oneself from
imminent danger.[28] Apparently, the fatal shots in the instant case did not occur
out of any conscious or premeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill the victim
for the purpose of self-defense against any aggression; rather, they appeared
to be the spontaneous and accidental result of both parties attempts to
possess the firearm.
Since the death of the victim was the result of an accidental firing of the
service gun of petitioner -- an exempting circumstance as defined in Article 12
of the Revised Penal Code -- a further discussion of whether the assailed acts
of the latter constituted lawful self-defense is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision REVERSED. Petitioner is ACQUITTED.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 1352 March 29, 1905
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appelle,
vs.
APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
MAPA, J.:
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu
to the penalty of seven years of presidio mayor as accessories after the fact
in the crime of assassination or murder perpetrated on the persons of the
American school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells,
and Ernest Eger, because, without having taken part in the said crime as
principals or as accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of the
victims in order to conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards
Roberto Baculi, although he confessed to having assisted in the burial of the
corpses, it appears that he did so because he was compelled to do so by the
murderers of the four teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this,
but he is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate,
who, by the way, is a witness for the prosecution. This witness says he was
present when the Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a
member of the group who killed the Americans, but the he was in a banana
plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that when he heard the
shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro,
the leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and striking him with the
butts of their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by
reason of irresistible force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such
circumstances when he executed the acts which are charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that
he took any part in any way in the execution of the crime with which he has
been charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary, since Baculi, as well
as one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly
declare that he, Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid
corpses, nor was he even in the place of the occurrence when the burial took
place. The confession of his supposed liability and guilt, made before an
official of the division of information of the Constabulary, Enrique Calderon,
as the latter states when testifying as a witness, can not be considered as
legal proof, because the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only
one of the defendants who made a confession to him voluntarily. It appears
besides, from the statements of another witness for the prosecution, Meliton
Covarrubias, that the confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through
the promise made to him and to the other defendants that nothing would be
done to them. Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely
and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be
accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine
Commission).
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of
the crime, which seems to be one of the motives for the conviction and which
the court below takes into consideration in his judgment, is not punished by
the Penal Code and therefore that can not render the defendants criminally
liable according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the
judgment appealed from, we acquit the defendants, appellants, with the
costs de oficio in both instances. So ordered.
G.R. No. 1481 February 17, 1904
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
LIBERATO EXALTACION, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
TORRES, J.:
March 26, 1903, the provincial fiscal of Bulacan presented to the court of that
province an information charging Liberato Exaltacion and Buenaventura
Tanchinco with the crime of rebellion, in that they, subsequently to the 4th
day of November, 1901, willfully and illegally bound themselves to take part
in a rebellion against the Government of the United States in these Islands,
swearing allegiance to the Katipunan Society, the purpose of which was to
overthrow the said Government by force of arms, this against the statute in
the case made and provided.
In the course of the trial Don Pablo Tecson, the provincial governor of
Bulacan, testified under oath that the two defendants were arrested in the
month of March, 1903, the police some days before having captured a
number of documents in the encampment of one Contreras, as so-called
general of bandits, situated at a place called Langca, of the town of
Meycauayan, among which documents appeared the papers now on pages 2
and 3 of the record, signed by the said Exaltacion and Tanchinco, who
recognized the said documents when they were exhibited to them; that the
said defendants stated to the witness that they had signed the said
documents under compulsion; that the purpose of the Katipunan Society was
to obtain the independence of the Philippines; that this statement was made
in the house of the parish priest of Meycauayan in the presence of Exequiel The evidence for the prosecution, and especially the two documents above
Casas and Fernando Nieto. The latter, upon their examination as witnesses, referred to, signed by the accused, is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the
testified to the same facts, stating that the defendants told Governor Tecson latter or to justify the imposition upon them of the penalty inflicted by the
that they had signed the said documents under fear of death at the hands of judgment of the court below.
the thieves by whom they had been captured. The witness Casas, the
municipal president of Meycauayan, testified that he held office as such in The facts, established by the evidence, that the defendants were kidnapped
place of the former president, Don Tomas Testa, who was kidnapped in the by brigands who belonged to the Contreras band, and that they signed the
month of October, 1902. said documents under compulsion and while in captivity, relieve them from all
criminal liability from the crime of rebellion of which they are charged. The
The said documents, the first of which was dated July 4 and the second July conduct of the defendants in presenting themselves first to the local
17, 1902, were written in Tagalog, and contain an oath taken in the name of president of Meycauayan and subsequently to Lieut. Bonifacio Morales, of
God, and a covenant on the part of the subscribers to carry out the superior the Bulacan Government Volunteers, as soon as they were released by the
orders of the Katipunan, and never disobey them until their death in the bandits is corroborative of their testimony, and is the best demonstration of
defense of the mother country. The two accused, under oath, testified to their innocence. This conclusion is not overcome by the trifling discrepancy
having signed the said documents and alleged that they did so under between the testimony of the witness Yusay and that of the defendant
compulsion and force while they were held as captives by the thieves; that Tanchinco nor the fact the Exaltacion was unable to determine the date when
the defendant Tanchinco was captured in the fields one day when he was he was captured or that on which he appeared before President Testa.
going to work on his farm by three armed men, unknown to him, who asked
him if he was an agent or friend of President Testa, and upon his replying in The guilt of the defendants of the crime defined and punished by Act No. 292
the negative they compelled him in view of his denial to sign a document, not having been established at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt, we are of
now on page 3 of the record. the opinion that the judgment below must be reversed and the defendants
acquitted with the costs de oficio. The judge below will be informed of this
The defendant Tanchinco cited Lazaro Yusay to testify to the fact that he was decision and a copy of the judgment entered herein will be furnished him for
captured at a place called Kaibiga in the township of Novaliches, and that on his information and guidance. So ordered.
the day following his release, having been unable to pay the $300 which was
demanded of him, he reported to the president, Tomas Testa. The defendant
Liberato Exaltacion under oath testified that he was captured near
Meycauayan by five persons, unknown, dressed as policemen and armed
with guns or revolvers; that these men bound him and took him into the forest
and there compelled him by threats of death to sign the documents now on
page 2 of the record; that thereupon they allowed him to go upon promise to
return. This defendant testified that Antero Villano and Tomas Rivera saw
him while on the road in the hands of the thieves. Both the accused testified
that as soon as they were released they presented themselves to the
president, Don Tomas Testa, in the presence of witnesses, and subsequently
went to Bonifacio Morales, a lieutenant of volunteers, and reported to him the
fact that they had been captured.

The witnesses Morales, Lazaro Yusay, Antero Villano, Dalmacio Ferrer, and
Hipolito de Leon of whom the last two were present when Tanchinco
appeared before Senor Testa, the president of Meycauayan, and reported to
him what had happened to him all testified to the same fact and
corroborated the statements of the accused with respect to their capture and
their subsequent report to President Testa and to the witness Morales.
G.R. No. L-6082 March 18, 1911
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISIDRO VICENTILLO, defendant-appellant.
CARSON, J.:
The defendant in this case was found guilty in the court below of the crime of
"illegal and arbitrary detention" of the complaining witness for a period of
three days, and sentenced to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial.
We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case there can be
no doubt of the lawful authority of the defendant, in the exercise of his
functions as municipal president, to make arrest of the complaining witness
which resulted in his alleged unlawful detention. As we understand the
evidence, the alleged offense with which the complaining witness in this case
was charged was committed by him in the presence of the municipal
president, who must be held to have had all the usual powers of a police
officer for the making of arrest without warrant, under the doctrine laid down
in the case of U.S. vs. Fortaleza (12 Phil. Rep., 472).
The judgment of conviction of the court below must therefore be reversed,
unless the evidence discloses that having made the arrest, the defendant
arbitrarily and without legal authority, as it is alleged, cause the complaining
witness to be detained for a period of three days without having him brought
before the proper judicial authority for the investigation and trial of the charge
on which he was arrested. But so far as we can gather from the extremely
meagre record in this case the arrested man was in fact brought before a
justice of the peace as soon as "practicable" after his arrest. True, three days
were expended in doing, so, but it was conclusively proven at the trial that at
the time of the arrest neither the local justice of the peace nor his auxiliary
were in the municipality, and to reach the justice of the peace of either of the
two adjoining municipalities, it was necessary to take a long journey by boat.
The evidence discloses, moreover, that with all practicable dispatch, the
prisoner was forwarded first to one and then to the other of the adjoining
municipalities for trial, the failure to secure trial on the first occasion being
due to the fact that the written complaint, which was intrusted to the
policeman in charge of the prisoner, was either lost or stolen. It does not
appear why the prisoner was not sent to the same municipality on both
occasions, but in the absence of proof we must assume that in this respect
the officers in charge were controlled by local conditions, changes in the
weather, or the like, which, as appears from the uncontradicted evidence of
record, made the journey by boats safer and more commodious sometimes
to one and sometimes to the other of the two adjoining municipalities.
It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man, and that he
was not sorry to see him exposed to considerable inconvenience and delay
in the proceedings incident to his trial, but there is nothing in this record upon
which to base a finding that his defendant caused the arrest and the
subsequent detention of the prisoner otherwise than in the due performance
of his official duties; and there can be no doubt of his lawfully authority in the
premises. The trial judge lays great stress upon the trivial nature of the
offense for which the arrest was made, but keeping in mind the fact that there
was no judicial officer in the remote community where the incident occurred
at the time of the arrest, and no certainty of the early return of the absent
justice of the peace, or his auxiliary, we are not prepared to hold, in the
absence of all the evidence on this point that in a particular case of a
defiance of local authority by the willful violation of a local ordinance, it was
not necessary, or at least expedient, to make an arrest and send the offender
forthwith to the justice of the peace of a neighboring municipality, if only to
convince all would-be offenders that the forces of law and order were
supreme, even in the absence of the local municipal judicial officers.
The judgment of the lower court convicting and sentencing the defendant
must be reversed and he is hereby acquitted of the offense with which he is
charged, with the costs in both instances de oficio. So ordered.
G.R. No. 45186 September 30, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.
DIAZ, J.:
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and the corresponding accessory penalties, with the
costs of the suit, Josefina Bandian appealed from said sentence alleging that
the trial court erred:
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission to
Dr. Nepomuceno that she had thrown away her newborn babe, and
II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt, and
in sentencing her to reclusion perpetua, with costs.
The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the
appellant's neighbor, saw the appellant go to a thicket about four or
five brazas from her house, apparently to respond to a call of nature because
it was there that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few
minutes later, he again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes
stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing
signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and, having
noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up
to her house and placed her in her own bed. Upon being asked before
Aguilar brought her to her house, what happened to her, the appellant merely
answered that she was very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant
in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived
nearby, to help them, and later requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop
the hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant. Comcom had scarcely
gone about five brazas when he saw the body of a newborn babe near a
path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments
before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it and latter told him to bring the body to
the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the baby which had just
been shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day,
Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary division of Talisayan,
Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant's house and found her lying in bed
still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and beneath it, directly under
the bed, were full of blood. Basing his opinion upon said facts, the physician
in question declared that the appellant gave birth in her house and in her own
bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it for the
purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she
had theretofore been living maritally, because the child was not his but of
another man with whom she had previously had amorous relations. To give
force to his conclusions, he testified that the appellant had admitted to him
that she had killed her child, when he went to her house at the time and on
the date above-stated.
The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr.
Nepomuceno whose testimony was not corroborated but, on the contrary,
was contradicted by the very witnesses for the prosecution and by the
appellant, as will be stated later, they were of the opinion and the lower court
furthermore held, that the appellant was an infanticide. The Solicitor-General,
however, does not agree with both. On the contrary, he maintains that the
appellant may be guilty only of abandoning a minor under subsection 2 of
article 276 of the Revised Penal Code, the abandonment having resulted in
the death of the minor allegedly abandoned.
By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the
child in question died. Dr. Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds
found in the body of the child were not caused by the hand of man but by
bites animals, the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket where it was
found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be
committed wilfully or consciously, or at least it must be result of a voluntary,
conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said crimes are
committed through mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under
said circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or
must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her
child's death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so
wilfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to
expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not
unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol, took place three years before the
incident; her married life with Kirol she considers him her husband as he
considers her his wife began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he
knew that the appellant was pregnant and he believed from the beginning,
affirming such belief when he testified at the trial, that the child carried by the
appellant in her womb was his, and he testified that he and she had been
eagerly waiting for the birth of the child. The appellant, therefore, had no
cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin
Aguilar and Adriano Comcom that the child was taken from the thicket and
carried already dead to the appellant's house after the appellant had left the
place, staggering, without strength to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to
the extent of having to be as in fact she was helped to go up to her house
and to lie in bed, it will clearly appear how far from the truth were Dr.
Nepomuceno's affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these the fact that
the appellant denied having made any admission to said physician and that
from the time she became pregnant she continuously had fever. This illness
and her extreme debility undoubtedly caused by her long illness as well as
the hemorrhage which she had upon giving birth, coupled with the
circumstances that she is a primipara, being then only 23 years of age, and
therefore inexperienced as to childbirth and as to the inconvenience or
difficulties usually attending such event; and the fact that she, like her lover
Luis Kirol a mere laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a day is
uneducated and could supplant with what she had read or learned from
books what experience itself could teach her, undoubtedly were the reasons
why she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her
or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which causes may be
considered lawful or insuperable to constitute the seventh exempting
circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal Code), to take her child from the thicket
where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to
the danger of losing its life.
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into
the thicket, according to her, to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the
fact that she had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by doing so she
caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and
later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that
she was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she should not
be blamed therefor because it all happened by mere accident, from liability
any person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (art. 12,
subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and
granting that the appellant was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the
thicket and that she later failed to take her child therefrom, having been so
prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it should be
held that the alleged errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant are
true; and it appearing that under such circumstances said appellant has the
fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, is hereby acquitted
of the crime of which she had bee accused and convicted, with costs de
oficio, and she is actually confined in jail in connection with this case, it is
ordered that she be released immediately. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-30801 March 27, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO URAL, accused-appellant.
This is an appeal of defendant Domingo Ural from the decision of Judge
Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur,
convicting him of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering
him to indemnify the heirs of Felix Napola in the sum of twelve thousand
pesos and to pay the costs (Criminal Case No. 3280).
The judgment of conviction was based on the testimony of Brigido Alberto, a
twenty-six year old former detention prisoner in Buug, Zamboanga del Sur.
He had been accused of murder and then set at liberty on June 9, 1966 after
posting bail. He went to Barrio Camongo, Dumalinao where his father
resided. On July 31, 1966, he intended to go to his residence at Barrio Upper
Lamari, Buug but night overtook him in the town. He decided to sleep in the
Buug municipal building where there would be more security.
Upon arrival in the municipal building at around eight o'clock, he witnessed
an extraordinary occurrence. He saw Policeman Ural (with whom he was
already acquainted) inside the jail. Ural was boxing the detention prisoner,
Felix Napola. As a consequence of the fistic blows, Napola collapsed on the
floor. Ural, the tormentor, stepped on his prostrate body.
Ural went out of the cell. After a short interval, he returned with a bottle. He
poured its contents on Napola's recumbent body. Then, he ignited it with a
match and left the cell. Napola screamed in agony. He shouted for help.
Nobody came to succor him.
Much perturbed by the barbarity which he had just seen, Alberto left the
municipal building. Before his departure, Ural cautioned him: "You better
keep quiet of what I have done" (sic). Alberto did not sleep anymore that
night. From the municipal building, he went to the crossing, where the cargo
trucks passed. He hitchhiked in a truck hauling iron ore and went home.
Doctor Luzonia R. Bakil, the municipal health officer, certified that the thirty-
year old victim, whom she treated twice, sustained second-degree burns on
the arms, neck, left side of the face and one-half of the body including the
back (Exh. A). She testified that his dermis and epidermis were burned. If the
burns were not properly treated, death would unsue from toxemia and
tetanus infection. "Without any medical intervention", the burns would cause
death", she said. She explained that, because there was water in the burnt
area, secondary infection would set in, or there would be complications.
Napola died on August 25, 1966. The sanitary inspector issued a certificate
of death indicating "burn" as the cause of death (Exh. B).
The trial court fittingly deplored the half-hearted manner in which the
prosecution (represented by Fiscal Roque and the private prosecutor, Delfin
Agbu) handled the case. It bewailed the prosecution's failure to present as
witnesses Juanito de la Serna and Ernesto Ogoc, the detention prisoners
who saw the burning of Napola. They had executed a joint affidavit which
was one of the bases of the information for murder.1
It noted that Rufina Paler, the victim's widow, who was present in court, was
a vital witness who should have been presented as a witness to prove the
victim's dying declaration or his statements which were part of the res
gestae.2
In this appeal appellant's three assignment of error may be condensed into
the issue of credibility or the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
His story is that at around nine o'clock in the evening of July 31, 1966 he was
in the municipal jail on guard duty. He heard a scream for help from Napola.
He entered the cell and found Napola's shirt in flames. With the assistance of
Ernesto Ogoc and Anecio Siton, Ural removed Napola's shirt. Ural did not
summon a doctor because, according to Napola, the burns were not serious.
Besides, he (Ural) was alone in the municipal building.
Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, whom the trial court branded
"as a complete liar", testified that she heard Napola's scream for help. She
saw that Napola's shirt was burning but she did not know how it happened to
be burned. She said that Ural and Siton removed the shirt of Napola and put
out the fire.
Teofilo Matugas, a policeman, declared that he was relieved as guard by
Ural at eight-thirty in the evening of July 31st. Matugas denied that Alberio
was in the municipal building at eight o'clock.
The trial court held that Ural's denials cannot prevail over the positive
testimony of Alberio. It observed that Ural's alleged act of removing Napola's
burning shirt was at most an indication that he was "belatedly alarmed by the
consequence of his evil act" but would not mean that he was not the
incendiary.
Appellant Ural (he was thirty-four years old in March, 1969), in assailing the
credibility of Alberio, pointed out that he was not listed as a prosecution
witness and that he was convicted of murder.
Those circumstances would not preclude Alberio from being a credible
witness. It should be noted that the accused was a policeman. Ordinarily, a
crime should be investigated by the police. In this case, there was no police
investigation. The crime was investigated by a special counsel of the fiscal's
office. That might explain why it was not immediately discovered that Alberio
was an eyewitness of the atrocity perpetrated by Ural.
The testimonies of Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, and
Policeman Matugas are compatible with the prosecution's theory that Ural
burned Napola's shirt. Ultimately, the factual issue is: who should be given
credence, Alberio or Ural? As already stated, the trial court which had the
advantage of seeing their demeanor and behavior on the witness stand,
chose to believe Alberio. This Court, after a searching scrutiny of the whole
record, does not find any justification for disbelieving Alberio.
This case is covered by article 4 of the Revised Penal code which provides
that "criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended". The presumption is "that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).
The rationale of the rule in article 4 is found in the doctrine that "el que es
causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused)."Conforme a dicha doctrina no alteran
la relacion de causalidad las condiciones preexistentes (como las
condiciones patologicasdel lesionado, la predisposicion del ofendido, la
constitucion fisica del herido, etc.); ni las condiciones sobrevenidas (como el
tetanos, la pulmonia, o la gangrena sobrevenidos a consequencia de la
herida)" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 12th Ed., 1968, p. 335-336).
The similar rule in American jurisprudence is that "if the act of the accused
was the cause of the cause of death, no more is required" (40 C.J.S. 854).
So, where during a quarrel, the accused struck the victim with a lighted lamp,
which broke and fell to the floor, causing the oil to ignite and set fire to the
rug, and, in the course of the scuffle, which ensued on the floor, the victim's
clothes caught fire, resulting in burns from which he died, there was a
sufficient causal relation between the death and the acts of the accused to
warrant a conviction of homicide (Williams vs. U.S., 20 Fed. 2nd 269, 40
C.J.S. 854, note 90).
There is a rule that "an individual who unlawfully inflicts wounds upon
another person, which result in the death of the latter, is guilty of the crime of
homicide, and the fact that the injured person did not receive proper medical
attendance does not affect the criminal responsibility" (U.S. vs. Escalona, 12
Phil. 54). In the Escalona case, the victim was wounded on the wrist. It would
not have caused death had it been properly treated. The victim died sixty
days after the infliction of the wound. It was held that lack of medical care
could not be attributed to the wounded man. The person who inflicted the
wound was responsible for the result thereof.
The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of
fire (incendio) (Par. 3, Art. 248, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Masin, 64
Phil. 757; U.S. vs. Burns, 41 Phil. 418, 432, 440).3
The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public
position (Par. 1, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code). He could not have maltreated
Napola if he was not a policeman on guard duty. Because of his position, he
had access to the cell where Napola was confined. The prisoner was under
his custody. "The policeman, who taking advantage of his public position
maltreats a private citizen, merits no judicial leniency. The methods
sanctioned by medieval practice are surely not appropriate for an enlightened
democratic civilization. While the law protects the police officer in the proper
discharge of his duties, it must at the same time just as effectively protect the
individual from the abuse of the police." U.S. vs. Pabalan, 37 Phil. 352).
But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance "that the
offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed"
(Par. 3, Art. 13, Revised Penal Code). It is manifest from the proven facts
that appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola. His design was only to
maltreat him may be because in his drunken condition he was making a
nuisance of himself inside the detention cell. When Ural realized the fearful
consequences of his felonious act, he allowed Napola to secure medical
treatment at the municipal dispensary.
Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating,
circumstance of abuse of his official position. The trial court properly imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the penalty
for murder (Arts. 64[4] and 248, Revised Penal Code).
Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the same is affirmed with costs
against the appellant.
So ordered.
[G.R. No. 125053. March 25, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHRISTOPHER
CAA LEONOR, accused-appellant.
In the decision[1] of 22 March 1996 in Criminal Case No. 95-212, the
Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274, found accused-appellant
Christopher Caa Leonor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to
pay the heirs of the victim P50,000 as death indemnity; P44,318 as actual
damages; P2 million as moral damages; and P50,000 as attorneys fees.
CHRISTOPHER was charged in an information[2] whose accusatory
portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of May 1995, in the Municipality of Paraaque,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to gain and against the will of
complainant Ma. Teresa Tarlengco and by means of force, violence and
intimidation employed upon the person of said complainant did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously divest her cash money
worth P900.00 and Titus wrist watch valued at an undetermined amount,
belonging to said Ma. Teresa Tarlengco, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter, in the aforementioned amount; that on the occasion of the said
Robbery, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, without justifiable
reason, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab said Ma. Teresa Tarlengco, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious
stab wounds which caused her death.
At his arraignment on 14 June 1995, CHRISTOPHER entered a plea of
not guilty.[3]
It is undisputed that on 15 May 1995 at the Hermanos Building in General
Santos Avenue, Bicutan Extension, Paraaque City, at around 11:30 a.m.,
CHRISTOPHER stabbed dentist Dr. Maria Teresa Tarlengco, which wound
ultimately led to her death. That much is admitted by CHRISTOPHER. The
prosecution and the defense differ, however, in the circumstances surrounding
the incident.
The prosecution had as witnesses Reynaldo Baquilod, SPO1 Luis F.
Galeno, PO3 Mateo Interia, Dr. Ravell Ronald Baluyot, Dr. Edgardo de
Guzman, Dr. Paul Pepa, Beverly Vidanes, Dr. John Enrique Franco, Fernando
Tarlengco, Geraldine Tarlengco, Joseph Sumalbar, and Asst. Public
Prosecutor Elizabeth Yu Guray. The defense presented CHRISTOPHER,
Leopoldo Leonor Leonidas, Dr. Alfredo Besa, Renato Leonor and Alexander
Pagubasan.
The Office of the Solicitor General partly summarized the evidence for the
prosecution as follows:
In the morning of May 15, 1995, Dr. Maria Teresa Tarlengco, a dentist by
profession, was at her clinic at the third floor of the Hermanos Building,
Bicutan, Paraaque, Metro Manila, when a man entered and inquired about
the cost of tooth extraction. After Dr. Tarlengco quoted her professional fee,
the man, who was later on identified as Christopher Leonor, said that he
would come back and then left in a hurry. Minutes later, Leonor came back[,]
and Dr. Tarlengco told him to take a seat and wait. Dr. Tarlengco was
preparing her dental instruments when Leonor barged in and demanded
money. Dr. Tarlengco told Leonor that her money [was] on the table. On
hearing this, Leonor stabbed Dr. Tarlengco, grabbed her watch and ran
away. Dr. Tarlengco struggled out of the clinic and saw the man running out
of the building, Dr. Tarlengco shouted for help.
Reynaldo Baquilod, building security guard, heard Dr. Tarlengco shouting,
Tulungan ninyo ako, sinaksak ako ng taong iyon. Baquilod noticed that Dr.
Tarlengco was referring to the man running out of the building, coming from
upstairs. Baquilod chased Leonor up to Daang Hari Street where he was
joined by traffic policeman Luis Galeno who was alerted by people running
after a person with bloodied shirt. When Galeno and Baquilod caught up with
Leonor, Baquilod grabbed Leonors hand and took therefrom a Titus
wristwatch and P900 cash. When queried, Leonor readily answered, Sir,
hindi ko naman gusto po ito. Ginawa ko lang ito dahil kailangan ng pamilya
ko. Leonor was brought to the Paraaque Police Block Station, PO3 Interia
who was instructed to investigate proceeded to Dr. Tarlengcos clinic, where
they saw, among other[ ] [things], a bloodied balisong (fan knife) at the
ground floor of the Hermanos building. Baquilod turned over the watch and
money he took from Leonor to Interia. Thereafter, Galeno and Interia
returned to the police station where they were interrogated.
Dr. Tarlengco was brought to the South Super Highway Medical Center
where she underwent an emergency operation for a stab wound on her
chest. After the operation, Dr. Tarlengcos father, with the doctors permission,
was allowed to talk to his daughter inside the operating room. Although Dr.
Tarlengco was gasping for breath, she spoke to her father, viz:
Q: So were you able to talk with your daughter while in the Operating
Room? What did she say, if any, Mr. Tarlengco?
A: She said that this man pretended to be a patient.
Q: And what else did she say?
A: He asked her how much would it cost to pull a tooth and then she said,
Dad, when I quoted my price, he said that he would come back and
left in a hurry.
Q: What else did she say, if any, Mr. Tarlengco?
A: After a minute, he came back, I told him to wait, to sit down first at my
Waiting Area because I [had] to still prepare the instruments needed.
Q: Then, what happened after that?
A: She said, while I was busy preparing my instrument, Dad, this man
barged in. He demanded for my money. I told him it [was] on my
table. And after telling that, Dad, he stabbed me and then he grabbed
my watch and he [ran] away and she said, I struggled Dad, to come
out of the clinic and when I was on the porch, I saw this man coming
[sic] out of the building. I shouted for help, I said Saklolo, saklolo,
sinaksak ako ng taong iyan. Hulihin ninyo.
Q: Then what else did she say after she narrated to you that incident, Mr.
Tarlengco?
A: After that, in tears, she said that Dad, I dont know, why inspite of getting
my money this man stabbed me and I was numbed at that point of
time, I [could not] talk anymore, I [could not] tell anything to her
anymore, I just combed her hair with my fingers.
Thereafter, Dr. Tarlengco was brought to a private room where she
subsequently died.
Dr. Ronaldo Baluyot, the NBI Medico-legal Officer who conducted the post-
mortem examination of the deceased, testified that Tarlengcos stab wound
on the chest could have been caused by single bladed fan knife.
Geraldine Tarlengco, who stayed with her sister Dr. Tarlengco while
reviewing for the BAR Examination, owned a Titus watch similar to that of her
sister. Both watches were given to them by another sister Cecille. On the
morning of May 15, 1995, Geraldine saw Dr. Tarlengco strap the watch on
her wrist. Geraldine, likewise, saw her sister, Dr. Tarlengco, place in her
wallet one 500-peso bill and four 100-peso bills, after showing the same to
Geraldine, who earlier was teasing her sister, Dr. Tarlengco, that the reason
why she did not buy the dress she wanted to buy at Cinderellas was because
she had no money. If only to prove her sister Geraldine wrong, Dr. Tarlengco
showed her money which she took from her wallet.[4]
Additionally, Dr. John Enrique Franco, a friend of the victim, testified that
he got to talk with Dr. Tarlengco at the hospital. He asked Dr. Tarlengco what
happened, and she answered that a man posing as a patient held her up and
stabbed her.[5]
Joseph B. Sumalbar, Dr. Tarlengcos fiance, testified that when he learned
about his fiancees killing, he immediately went to the crime scene and,
thereafter, to the Block 7 police station where he confronted the suspected
killer, Christopher. Sumalbar recalled his conversation with the latter, thus:
Q: And what happened after that, when you proceeded to the cell of this
suspect?
A: I found this man who was half naked from the waist up. I found this man
without any shirt on and he was sitting at the corner and he was trying
to avoid me and I asked him, Bakit mo ginawa iyon? Sabi niya, hindi
ko po naman gusto. Kailangan ko lamang ang pera.
Q: When you confronted the accused at Block 7, what else did he say, if
any?
A: While I was shouting at him, Hinold-up mo na, sinaksak mo pa. Bakit mo
ginawa iyon? Hindi ko po naman gusto iyon, mahuhuli na po ako, sabi
niya. Mahuhuli na po ako kaya ginawa ko iyon.
Q: Then what else did he say when you confronted him, if any?
A: And he told me that he needed the money.[6]
SPO3 Mateo Interia testified that on 16 May 1995, he took the statement
of Dr. Tarlengcos father and executed a Referral[7] to the Provincial Prosecutor
of Rizal for CHRISTOPHERs inquest. Interia reported in the referral that
CHRISTOPHER was being held for robbery with homicide but forgot to state
the property stolen from Dr. Tarlengco. After Mr. Tarlengco reminded Interia of
the stolen items, the latter intercalated into the referral a reference to P900 and
a Titus wristwatch forming part of the evidence against CHRISTOPHER.[8]
Fernando Tarlengco, father of the victim, described the impact of her
daughters death, viz.:
Q: In connection with the death of your daughter, Mr. Tarlengco, did your
family incur any expenses?
A: Not just expenses but more on the agony, the tribulations we are having
up to this time. You know, up to this time, we kept on weeping. My
father, the grandfather of my daughter, was shocked and in anguish,
he also succumbed to death in less than two months, because of what
this evil person [had] done to us. My work was affected. My wifes work
is affected. There are times when we are at home, we dont know what
to do anymore. We are in total misery. I dont know why this was done
to us by the devil deeds of this person has done to us [sic].[9]
In relation to Dr. Tarlengcos death, her family spent P8,718 for hospital
expenses; about P2,500 to P3,500 charged by Funeraria Malaya where she
was brought; P22,500 for her casket; P8,250 paid to Manila Memorial,
Inc.; P5,000 for the masses held for Dr. Tarlengco; and about P10,000 for the
food served to the guests at Dr. Tarlengcos wake.[10]
CHRISTOPHER, on the other hand, testified that on 15 May 1995, at
about 6:00 a.m., he left his town Calauag, Quezon, and boarded a Jam Transit
bus bound for Manila, with P800 and a fan knife in his pocket. He was to fetch
his family for the town fiesta to be held on 25 May 1995. His head and two of
his molar teeth were then aching. He alighted at Alabang and took a bus bound
for Bicutan Extension.[11]
Upon reaching Bicutan Extension, he looked for a dentist to have his
aching teeth pulled. He found Dr. Tarlengcos dental clinic at the third floor of a
certain building in General Santos Avenue. He asked Dr. Tarlengco how much
an extraction cost, and was told that the fee was P150 per
tooth. CHRISTOPHER negotiated a charge of P100 per tooth, but Dr.
Tarlengco rejected the offer.CHRISTOPHER then proceeded to look for
another dentist, but before he could make his way out of the clinic, Dr.
Tarlengco stopped him and agreed to charge P100 per
extraction. CHRISTOPHER was made to sit on the dental chair as
Dr.Tarlengco prepared the instruments for the extraction. Just as she was
about to inject anesthesia, she remarked that she changed her mind and would
charge P150 per tooth pulled. CHRISTOPHER pushed away Dr. Tarlengcos
hand, which angered her. She castigated and cursed CHRISTOPHER for
asking for an extraction without being able to pay for it.[12]
As CHRISTOPHER was making his way out of the clinic, Dr. Tarlengco
cursed and pushed him, at which moment he blacked out. [13] He then sensed
that the dentist was in pain, and he saw blood spurting. He realized that he
had stabbed the dentist. In shock, CHRISTOPHER stepped back, lost the grip
on his fan knife, and ran out of the clinic and out of the building. When he
looked back at the clinic, he saw Dr. Tarlengco shouting for help. A security
guard, with his shotgun aimed at CHRISTOPHER, ran after the latter.[14]
CHRISTOPHER ran to where there were many people. Then he came
across Police Officer Galeno, who grabbed him by the hand an asked what
happened. He replied, Sir, nakadisgrasya ako.[15] Galeno warded off the
pursuing security guard who insisted on apprehending
CHRISTOPHER. Galeno brought CHRISTOPHER to Block 7, Paraaque
Police Station, and later, to the Police Headquarters along the Coastal Road
in Paraaque. Four policemen, including PO3 Interia, took turns in mauling and
kicking him, and one policeman even took money from his wallet. Also, his
clothes were confiscated.[16]
During the investigation, CHRISTOPHER admitted that he had stabbed
Dr. Tarlengco, but denied that he had taken P900 and a Titus wristwatch from
the victim. He was surprised when later, he was informed by Assistant Public
Prosecutor Elizabeth Yu Guray that he would be charged with Robbery with
homicide, not homicide only.[17]
Leopoldo Leonor Leonidas, CHRISTOPHERs uncle, revealed that at
about noon of 15 May 1995, while he was at home, he received a telephone
call from CHRISTOPHER saying that he had stabbed someone. When he
asked CHRISTOPHER why he stabbed someone the latter answered, Aburido
ako, Kuya Ding, aburido ako (I am troubled, Kuya Ding, I am troubled).[18]
Renato Leonor, CHRISTOPHERs father, testified that he went to see his
son at his detention cell but could hardly recognize him because he was
bloodied. He remembered that CHRISTOPHER complained of toothache
before he left for Manila.[19]
Dr. Alfredo Besa, a dentist, examined CHRISTOPHER three hours before
the former took the stand. Unassisted by any dental aid or nurse, he
determined that two of CHRISTOPHERs teeth were due for extraction[20] and,
at the condition they were in, were probably aching as early as a year
before. Citing his experience, Dr. Besa claimed that people complaining of
tootache are usually irritable, although he admitted that none of his patients
complaining from a tootache has ever killed a person or even brought a fan
knife to his clinic. In fact, he never heard of any patient with a toothache who
killed a dentist. He recalled one instance when a patient boxed him after he
unintentionally hurt the patient while pulling a tooth.
These were the evidence before the trial court which merited
CHRISTOPHERs conviction. CHRISTOPHER urges us to modify the
judgment by (1) convicting him of the crime of homicide, and not of robbery
with homicide, and (2) appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstances
of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, sufficient
provocation, passion and obfuscation, voluntary surrender, and voluntary
confession.
CHRISTOPHER claims that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
are fraught with inconsistencies and contradictions, and are therefore obvious
concoctions and manufactured evidence. He points out that Baquilod failed to
mention in his sworn statement, given to the police immediately after the
incident, that he retrieved a Titus wristwatch and P900 worth of peso bills from
CHRISTOPHER. Baquilod likewise testified that Dr. Tarlengco shouted for
help because she was stabbed; she made no mention of having been
robbed. Then, too, SPO1 Galeno stated in his sworn statement that Dr.
Tarlengco was only stabbed.
CHRISTOPHER contends further that the testimonies of Baquilod,
Galeno, Interia, Sumalbar, and Yu Guray that he admitted to them on separate
occasions his commission of the offense charged are inadmissible because
the admission was not in writing, was not made with the assistance of a
counsel, and was not preceded by a warning as to the consequences of the
admission. In any event, their testimonies are hearsay evidence. Additionally,
he stresses the possible bias of Yu Guray considering that she caused the
filing against him of the information for robbery with homicide.
In the Appellees Brief, the Solicitor General refutes CHRISTOPHERs
claims, asserting that the robbery was duly and satisfactorily established by
the dying declaration of Dr. Tarlengco to her father, corroborated by the
testimonies of Baquilod and Galeno. That Dr. Tarlengco failed to exclaim that
she was robbed when she shouted for help from her clinics balcony is of no
moment, since she later told Dr. Franco and her father of the complete events
that transpired. Galenos failure to mention in his sworn statement that money
and a wristwatch were retrieved from CHRISTOPHER does not negate his
claim to that effect, because he later stated that fact in his testimony. The
settled rule is that testimonies in open court are superior to affidavits taken ex
parte. That Interia inserted the stolen items in the Police Referral does not
diminish the truth of the allegation of robbery, since it appears that the
intercalation was intended to make the Referral accurate.
The core issues raised involve the credibility of witnesses. One of the
highly revered dicta in our jurisdiction is that this Court will not interfere with
the judgment of the trial court in passing on the credibility of opposing
witnesses unless there appears in the record some facts or circumstances of
weight and influence that have been overlooked which, if considered, will affect
the result of the case. The reason therefor is founded on practical and
empirical considerations. The trial judge is in a better position to decide
questions of credibility, since he has personally heard the witnesses and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying.[21] Nevertheless, in view
of the gravity of the charge and the penalty imposed, we spared no effort to
meticulously review the evidence to determine whether CHRISTOPHER had
indeed committed the offense charged and the prosecutions evidence proved
it beyond reasonable doubt.
CHRISTOPHER admitted that he stabbed Dr. Tarlengco. The burden of
evidence, therefore, shifted to him; he had to prove a justifying[22] or
exempting[23]circumstance to avoid criminal liability. He miserably failed to do
so.
The remaining factual issue is whether CHRISTOPHER killed Dr.
Tarlengco by reason or on the occasion of a robbery[24] with the use of violence
against or intimidation of a person. One could be convicted of robbery with
homicide only if the robbery itself was proved as conclusively as any other
essential element of the crime. The taking with intent to gain of personal
property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of
any person or by using force upon things, constitutes robbery.[25]
Geraldine Tarlengco and Joseph Sumalbar identified the items recovered
from CHRISTOPHER as belonging to Dr. Tarlengco. These testimonies
indicate that CHRISTOPHER stole personal property belonging to Dr.
Tarlengco, consistent with the disputable presumption that a person found in
possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker
and the doer of the whole act.[26] While CHRISTOPHER denied that Dr.
Tarlengcos watch and money were recovered from him, the independent and
corroborative testimonies of police officer Galeno and guard Baquilod prove
otherwise. The trial court found the testimonies of these two witnesses more
credible, and we see no reason to depart from its conclusion. CHRISTOPHER
also pointed out that the intercalation of stolen items in Interias referral report
to the Prosecutor indicated the fabrication of robbery charges against him. But
the intercalation was sufficiently explained as an honest mistake, especially
considering that Interia had specified in the report, in an entry appearing before
the intercalation, that the charge against CHRISTOPHER was robbery with
homicide.
It is undisputable then that CHRISTOPHER took Dr. Tarlengcos
belongings. The unexplained possession of stolen articles gives rise to a
presumption of theft unless it is proved that the owner of the articles was
deprived of her possessions by violence or intimidation, in which case, the
presumption becomes one of robbery. [27] The prosecution proved in this case
that there was violence and intimidation in the taking of Dr. Tarlengcos
property.
Most crucial for the prosecution is the testimony of Mr. Fernando
Tarlengco, the victims father, because he stated the most incriminating piece
of evidence the dying declaration of Dr. Tarlengco. While, generally, a witness
can testify only to those facts which are derived from his own perception,[28] a
recognized exception thereto is the reportage in open court of the declaration
of a dying person made under the consciousness of an impending death where
that persons death is the subject of inquiry in the case.[29] To be admissible, a
dying declaration must (1) refer to the cause and circumstances surrounding
the declarants death; (2) be made under the consciousness of an impending
death; (3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestion of
improper influence; (4) be offered in a criminal case in which the death of the
declarant is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the declarant must have been
competent to testify as a witness had he been called upon to testify.
Dr. Tarlengcos dying declaration complied with the above requisites. She
talked about the incident which led to her condition. The declaration was a first-
hand account of the incident, bereft of opinion or conjecture. The account was
made in a criminal case where her death was part of the subject of
inquiry. And, most important, she was convinced that she was about to die;
thus:
Atty. Revilla:
Q Could you tell this Court what was her condition when you saw her inside
the operating room?
Witness Tarlengco:
A I asked her how she was and she said, Dad, I have a feeling I can no
longer endure this.
Atty. Revilla:
Q So, what else happened in the operating room while you were talking to
her, Mr. Tarlengco?
A I told her to fight for her life. I asked her to open her eyes, keep herself
awake, and in my desire to help her awake, I asked her what
happened.
Atty. Revilla:
Q Then what else happened while you were in the operating room, after
that, Mr. Tarlengco?
Witness Tarlengco:
A On that condition, she was really very very cold and gasping and
complaining of pain and gasping for breath.[30]
Dr. Tarlengco narrated to her father that a man who pretended to be her
patient demanded money from her. After she surrendered her money to him,
the latter stabbed her and took her watch as she lay injured.
The dying declaration thus established not only that a robbery was
committed, there being violence and intimidation against Dr. Tarlengco, but
that homicide was perpetrated on the occasion of said robbery.
Lastly, we find no mitigating circumstance in this case. CHRISTOPHER
claims that he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as the act committed;
that there was sufficient provocation by the offended party immediately
preceding the offense; that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have
produced in him passion and obfuscation; that he voluntarily surrendered to a
person in authority; and that he voluntarily confessed having committed
homicide.
Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong does not mitigate in homicide
cases where the accused used a deadly weapon in inflicting mortal wounds on
vital organs of the victim,[31] as in this case.
The provocation sufficient to mitigate an offense must be proportionate to
the gravity of the retaliatory act.[32] The events which led to the stabbing were
described by CHRISTOPHER as follows:
Q Mr. Leonor, you said, while she was about to inject anaesthesia, you said
Dra. Tarlengco changed the price from P100.00 to P150.00. Then you
parried her hand. Is that correct?
A Opo. Tinabig ko po. [Yes, sir. I pushed it aside.]
 Q What hand of Dra. Tarlengco did you parry?
A The one handling the rounded instrument. Right hand, Sir.
Q When you parried her right hand, you were already sitting at the dental
chair? Right?
A Opo.
Q After you parried the hand of Dra. Tarlengco, she cursed you, right?
A No, sir. I just said why did you change the price? and I stood up. That
was the time she cursed me.
Q When she cursed you, did Dra. Tarlengco hit you with an instrument?
Neither was there voluntary confession in the instant case. The mitigating
circumstance contemplated by law is a plea of guilty made spontaneously and
unconditionally in open court before the presentation of evidence for the
prosecution.[36] CHRISTOPHER made no such plea.
What remains to be resolved is the penalty to be imposed. The penalty
for robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death.[37] There being no
evidence of aggravating or mitigating circumstance against or in favor of
CHRISTOPHER, the lower of the two indivisible penalties shall be
imposed,[38] without the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[39] We
likewise believe that the awards in favor of Dr. Tarlengcos family of moral
damages of P2 million and attorneys fees of P500,000 are excessive. We
reduce them to P50,000 and P25,000, respectively.

A No, Sir. She just got mad. WHEREFORE, the decision of Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque in Criminal Case No. 95-212 is hereby MODIFIED. As modified,
Q Did she slap you on your face? accused-appellant CHRISTOPHER CAA LEONOR is found guilty beyond
A No Sir. She just pushed me. reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of robbery with homicide, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
Q And she did not box you anywhere in any portion of your body? heirs of the victim, Dr. Teresa Tarlengco, P50,000 as indemnity for
death; P44,318 as actual damages; P50,000 as moral damages; and P25,000
A No, Sir. as attorneys fees, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Q And she likewise did not kick you in any part of your body? Costs against accused-appellant.
A She just told me bad words.[33] SO ORDERED.
CHRISTOPHER is thus claiming that a push and bad words justify retaliation
with a knife. Such claim is undeserving of belief and does not entitle
CHRISTOPHER to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance prior provocation
by the offended party.
CHRISTOPHER could not have been provoked by passion or obfuscation
as, according to him, he momentarily blacked out and instantly found his fan
knife embedded in Dr. Tarlengcos chest. To be blinded by passion and
obfuscation is to lose self-control,[34] not consciousness. Moreover, courts
cannot appreciate passion and obfuscation unless there is a clear showing that
there were causes naturally tending to produce such powerful excitement as
to deprive the accused of reason and self-control.[35] As we discussed earlier,
the events leading to the stabbing precluded any natural tendency to produce
a powerful excitement in CHRISTOPHER.
CHRISTOPHER did not voluntarily surrender either to a person in
authority or to any other person. While he was being pursued by Security
Guard Baquilod, he intentionally went to where there were many people,
presumably to confuse Baquilod. Fortunately, Police Officer Galeno was able
to grab him by the hand and prevented him from further eluding justice. There
is nothing in the record which can lead us to conclude that he surrendered to
anyone.
G.R. No. L-12883 November 26, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CLEMENTE AMPAR, defendant-appellant.
A fiesta was in progress in the barrio of Magbaboy, municipality of San
Carlos, Province of Occidental Negros. Roast pig was being served. The
accused Clemente Ampar, a man of three score and ten, proceeded to the
kitchen and asked Modesto Patobo for some of the delicacy. Patobo's
answer was; "There is no more. Come here and I will make roast pig of you."
The effect of this on the accused as explained by him in his confession was,
"Why was he doing like that, I am not a child." With this as the provocation, a
little later while the said Modesto Patobo was squatting down, the accused
came up behind him and struck him on the head with an ax, causing death
the following day.
As the case turns entirely on the credibility of witnesses, we should of course
not interfere with the findings of the trial court. In ascertaining the penalty, the
court, naturally, took into consideration the qualifying circumstance of
alevosia. The court, however, gave the accused the benefit of a mitigating
circumstance which on cursory examination would not appear to be justified.
This mitigating circumstance was that the act was committed in the
immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony.
The authorities give us little assistance in arriving at a conclusion as to
whether this circumstance was rightly applied. That there was immediate
vindication of whatever one may term the remarks of Patobo to the accused
is admitted. Whether these remarks can properly be classed as "a grave
offense" is more uncertain. The Supreme court of Spain has held the words
"gato que araaba a todo el mundo," "landrones," and "era tonto, como toda
su familia" as not sufficient to justify a finding of this mitigating circumstance.
(Decisions of January 4, 1876; May 17, 1877; May 13, 1886.) But the same
court has held the words "tan landron eres tu como tu padre" to be a grave
offense. (Decision of October 22, 1894.) We consider that these authorities
hardly put the facts of the present case in the proper light. The offense which
the defendant was endeavoring to vindicate would to the average person be
considered as a mere trifle. But to this defendant, an old man, it evidently
was a serious matter to be made the butt of a joke in the presence of so
many guests. Hence, it is believed that the lower court very properly gave
defendant the benefit of a mitigating circumstance, and correctly sentenced
him to the minimum degree of the penalty provided for the crime of
murder. lawph!1.net
Judgment of the trial court sentencing the defendant and appellant to
seventeen years four months and one day of cadena temporal, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased,
Modesto Patobo, in the amount of one thousand pesos, and to pay the costs
is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. 96444 June 23, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEANDRO PAJARES y FLORENTINO, accused-appellant.
This is an appeal from the decision * of the Regional Trial Court, NCJR,
Branch VIII, Manila dated October 25, 1990 in Criminal Case No. 85-40579
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Leandro Pajares y Florentino" convicting
herein appellant Pajares of the crime of Murder.
Herein appellant was charged with the aforementioned crime in an
Information which reads as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of October, 1985, at night
time, purposely sought to insure and better accomplish his
criminal design, in the City of Manila. Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together with five (5)
others whose true names, real Identities, and present
whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent
to kill, evident premeditation, and treachery, attack, assault.
and use personal violence upon one DIOSDADO VIOJAN Y
SABAYAN, by then and there mauling him and hitting him
with a baseball bat at the back of the head, a vital part of the
body, thereby inflicting upon the said DIOSDADO VIOJAN Y
SABAYAN a club wound on the head which was the direct
and immediate cause of his death.
Contrary to law. (Original Records of Criminal Case No, 85-
40579, p. 1)
He was likewise charged with the crime of Frustrated Homicide in an
Information which reads as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of October, 1985, at night
time, purposely sought to insure and better accomplish his
criminal design, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together with five (5)
 others whose true names, real identities, and present
whereabouts are still unknown, and helping one another,
with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon
one RENATO PEREZ Y RUIDERA, by mauling and hitting
him with a baseball bat at the back, a vital part of the body,
thereby inflicting upon him a club wound at the back which is
necessarily mortal and fatal, thus performing all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of homicide,
as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that
is, because of the timely and able medical attendance
rendered upon the said RENATO PEREZ RUIDERA which
prevented his death.
Contrary to law (Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-
40580, p. 1)
Appellant Pajares pleaded not guilty to both charges (Original Records of
Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 5; Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-
40580, p. 8). Upon the petition of herein appellant that the two (2) cases be
consolidated, a joint trial ensued.
The prosecution presented Renato R. Perez, Cpl. Benigno Dong, Salud
Manguba, Pat. Conrado Bustillos, Dr. Norman Torres, Dr. Prospero
Cabanayan, Rosita Viojan and Arlene Viojan as witnesses while only
appellant Leandro Pajares took the witness stand for the defense.
Renato R. Perez, a resident of 1386-K Burgos St., Paco, Manila, is the same
Renato Perez who is the victim in Criminal Case No. 85-40580 for Frustrated
Homicide. He testified that at about 11:30 p.m. on October 11, 1985, he and
the deceased Diosdado Viojan were on their way to a store located at
Gomez St., Paco, Manila to buy something. They were walking abreast with
each other, the deceased was at his right side and was a bit ahead of him,
when appellant Pajares suddenly appeared from behind and hit Viojan with a
baseball bat at the back of his head. The latter ran a short distance and fell
down near the store of one Alex Blas. When Perez tried to help Viojan. he,
too, was attacked by Pajares with the baseball bat hitting him at the back
below the left shoulder. He then grappled with the appellant for the
possession of the baseball bat but the latter's companions, namely: Rudy
Dokling, Popoy, Inggo and Lauro Duado mauled him until he lost
consciousness. He was brought to the Philippine General Hospital by
Eugene Panibit and Joselito Perez where he was treated for the injuries he
sustained (TSN, Hearing of January 7, 1986, pp. 4-23). He identified in court
the baseball bat used by Pajares (TSN, Hearing of September 16, 1986, p.
36).
On cross examination, he averred that he has known appellant Pajares for
less than a year and that although they both live in Zone 89, he and the
deceased belonged to a group which is an adversary of the group of the
accused (Ibid., pp. 39-41).
Cpl. Benigno Dong, of the Zamora Police Department Station No. 6, WPD,
testified that he was on duty on October 12, 1985 when one Napoleon
Gabawa sought their assistance regarding a killing incident that happened in
Gomez Street, Paco, Manila. They went to the house of appellant Leandro
Pajares at 1453 Gomez St., Paco, Manila and invited the latter and his
brother to the station for questioning regarding the aforementioned incident.
Pajares verbally admitted his participation in the incident (TSN, Hearing of
March 11, 1986, p. 26). The incident was registered in the Police Blotter
Entry (Exhibits "A" to "A-3", Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579.
pp. 30-33)
On cross examination, he admitted that he placed appellant Pajares under
arrest after he verbally admitted that he was responsible for the death of
Diosdado Viojan, but the booking sheet and arrest report has not been
accomplished yet (TSN, Hearing of March 11, 1986, p 27).
Salud Manguba, Forensic Chemist of the National, Bureau of Investigation,
testified that she examined a baseball bat for the presence of blood upon the
written request of Pat. Conrado Bustillos (Exhibit "C-1", Original Records of
Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 69). In connection with the study she made,
she submitted Biology Report No. B-85-1342 (Exhibit "C". Original Records
of Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 68) that shows the absence of blood on
the baseball bat (TSN, Hearing of June 23, 1986, pp. 30-32).
Pat. Conrado G. Bustillos, testified that relative to a telephone call he
received from the Philippine General Hospital on October 12 1985 he went to
the morgue of the said hospital to investigate a dead on arrival case of one
Diosdado Viojan. A close examination of the body of the latter showed that
he suffered a fracture at the back of the skull. Thereafter, he proceeded to
the scene of the crime to make an ocular inspection where he was informed
that there was another victim by the name Renato Perez. Pat. Bustillos
further testified that Renato Perez was investigated at the Homicide Section
and that the latter executed a sworn statement (Exhibit "F" Original Records
of Criminal Case No, 85-40579, p 208) in relation to the incident. In the same
manner, Roberto Pajares. brother of herein appellant was also investigated
and who also executed a sworn statement (Exhibit "G", Ibid., p. 219) The
alleged murder weapon, a baseball bat, was turned over to him by Cpl. Ben
Macalindog (TSN, November 18, 1986, p. 46).
Dr. Norman Torres, a resident physician at the Philippine General Hospital,
testified that on October 12, 1985, a certain Diosdado Viojan was brought to
the emergency room of the Philippine General Hospital for head injury, left
occipital region. The victim was in critical condition necessitating immediate
surgery. He did not personally attend the operation but learned that the victim
died while undergoing the surgery. Witness further averred that the injury
could have been caused by a blunt instrument like a baseball bat (TSN,
Hearing of December 2, 1986, p. 46).
Dr. Prospero Cabanayan, Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of Diosdado
Viojan and in connection therewith submitted Autopsy Report No. N-85-2161
(Exhibit "L", Original Records on Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 224)
indicating that the cause of death was "Hemorrhage, meningeal, severe,
traumatic". He further testified that a single forceful blow against the head
using a blunt instrument like a baseball bat could have caused the injury
(TSN, Hearing of June 15, 1987, pp. 58-60).
Rosita S. Viojan, mother of the deceased Diosdado Viojan, testified that
when her son died, she hired the services of Tree Amigos Funeral Parlor for
P12,000.00 as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 10511 (Exhibits "P" and
"Q", Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579, pp. 228-229) (TSN,
Hearing of February 23. 1988, p. 66).
Arlene Viojan, widow of Diosdado Viojan. testified that prior to the incident
her husband was working with PEMCO earning about P500.00 a week. At
the time of the incident, she was three (3) months on the family way. She
gave birth to a baby girl and it was her parents-in-law who paid for the
expenses during her delivery. At the moment, she is living with her parents
(TSN, Hearing of April 4, 1988, p. 67).
Appellant Leandro Pajares y Florentino denied the allegations of the
prosecution. He asserts that he knew the deceased Diosdado Viojan by the
name Dado, having met him once at the store, and Renato Perez by the
name Balat. At the time of the incident, he was inside the store of Alex Blas
with about eight (8) other People watching television. Hence, he did not see
who hit Diosdado Viojan and Renato Perez. After the commotion, upon the
advise of Alex Blas, he went home and slept. At about 3:30 in the morning of
October 12, 1985, he was arrested inside their house. Without asking any
question, he went with the arresting officers to the police station (TSN,
Hearing of August 1, 1988, pp. 72-76).
At the police detachment, he was coerced to admit his participation in the
crime since a gun was poked at him. He identified his signature at the
Booking Sheet and Arrest Report (Exhibit "J", Original Records of Criminal
Case No 85-40579, p. 222) but alleged that he signed the same without
being allowed to read the contents thereof without the assistance of counsel
and while being held at the collar at the back of his shirt. He likewise averred
that during investigation the investigating policemen molested him like
"pinipitik-pitik" his ears with rubber band or chopping his neck with karate
chops (Ibid., pp. .77-78). He, however, admitted that even after several days
he did not complain about what were done to him (Ibid., p. 128).
On cross examination, he testified that his house is about five (5) houses
away from the store of Alex Blas, the scene of the crime (TSN, Hearing of
August 22, 1983, pp. 90-91). He likewise denied any knowledge about any
quarrel between his brother, Roberto Pajares and the deceased Diosdado
Viojan (TSN, Hearing of September 19, 1988, p. 108).
As aforementioned, the trial court rendered a decision on October 25, 1990,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered finding herein accused
LEANDRO PAJARES y FLORENTINO of 1433-B, Gomez
St., Paco, Manila, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
charges against him, as follows:
CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40579:
The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized by Art. 248,
par, 1, Rev. Penal Code, and there being no modifying
circumstance to consider, hereby sentences him to suffer
imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA with the
accessory penalties of the law; to pay Arlene Viojan and her
child the sum of: P30,000,00; P12,000.00 as funeral
expenses; P15,000.00 as moral damages; and P10,000.00
as litigation expenses and attorney's fees; and finally the
costs of the suit.
CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40580:
The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Slight Physical Injuries as defined in par. 1,
Art. 266 and penalized by Art. 27, both of the Rev. Penal
Code, hereby sentencing him to an imprisonment of ONE (1)
MONTH; and to pay the cost of suit.
Done in Manila, this 25th day of October, 1990.
 SO ORDERED. (RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 38)
Hence this appeal.
Appellant Pajares asserts that the trial court gravely erred in imposing the
penalty ofreclusion perpetua upon him. He avers that such a penalty is
tantamount to a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment which is prohibited
by the Constitution. Appellant points out that hours before the clubbing
incident, Roberto Pajares, appellant's younger brother, was mauled by the
group of Diosdado Viojan as cited by the lower court referring to the entry in
the Police Blotter and the sworn statement of Roberto Pajares. The mauling
of the latter is a big insult and truly offending to the appellant and his family.
Hence, the clubbing of Diosdado Viojan by herein appellant was a vindication
of the grave offense committed against his family. a mitigating circumstance
under paragraph 5 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering
further that the appellant was just nineteen (19) years old at the time he
committed the offense the penalty imposed by the court a quo should have
been seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day (Brief for the
Appellant, Rollo, pp. 52-58).
The appeal is devoid of merit.
In convicting herein appellant of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery,
the trial court relied heavily on the testimony of prosecution witness Renato
Perez which it found to be credible. According to the lower court, the latter
"gave his account on what was done to them by the accused and his
companions in a simple, candid, straightforward manner" (RTC
Decision. Rollo, p. 36).
It is doctrinally entrenched that the evaluation of the testimony of witnesses
by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect because it is
the trial court that has the opportunity to observe them on the stand and
detect if they are telling the truth or lying in their teeth (People v. Santito, Jr.,
G.R. No. 91628, August 22, 1991 [201 SCRA 87]). The appellate court can
only read in cold print the testimony of the witnesses which commonly is
translated from the local dialect into English. In the process of converting into
written form the statement of living human beings, not only fine nuances but
a world of meaning apparent to the judge present, watching and listening,
may escape the reader of the written translated words (People v. Arroyo,
G.R. No. 99258, September 13, 1991 [201 SCRA 616]).
Appellant's sole defense is alibi. According to him, he was inside the store of
Alex Blas, watching television, when the incident occurred, Alex Blas even
advised him to go home so as not to be involved in the incident. However,
the latter was not presented to corroborate appellant's testimony. Alibi is the
weakest defense an accused can concoct. In order to prosper, it must be so
convincing as to preclude any doubt that the accused could have been
physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of the
commission (People v. Lacao, Sr., G.R. No. 94320, September 4. 1991 (201
SCRA 317]). In the case at bar, appellant was within the vicinity of the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission.
Furthermore, appellant was Positively identified by Renato Perez as the
perpetrator of the crime. In the face of the clear and positive testimony of the
prosecution witness regarding the participation of the accused in the crime,
the accused's alibi dwindles into nothingness. The Positive identification of
the accused by the witness as the perpetrator of the crime cannot be
overcome by the mere denial of the accused. Such positive identification of
the accused that he killed the victim establishes the guilt of the accused
beyond moral certainty (People v Arroyo, supra).
The trial court correctly ruled that the crime was attended by treachery. There
is treachery, the law says, when the offender adopts means, methods or
forms in the execution of the felony which ensure its commission without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make
(People v. Cuyo, G.R. No. 76211, April 30, 1991 [196 SCRA 447]). As found
by the trial court, appellant Pajares hit Diosdado Viojan with a baseball bat
from behind without any warning thereby precluding any possible retaliation
from the victim.
Having established the guilt of herein appellant. the next question is whether
or not the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave
offense can be appreciated in his favor. While it may be true that appellant's
brother Roberto Pajares was mauled by the companions of the deceased at
about 11:30 a.m. of October 11, 1985 as show in the entry in the Police
Blotter (Exhibits "A" to "A-3", Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-
40579. pp. 30-33) and by appellant's brother himself (Exhibits "G", "Q" and
"A" Nos. 7-9, Ibid., p. 219), it must be emphasized that there is a lapse of
about ten (10) hours between said incident and the killing of Diosdado
Viojan. Such interval of time was more than sufficient to enable appellant to
recover his serenity (People v. Benito, G.R. No. L-32042, December 17,
1976 [74 SCRA 271]). Hence, the mitigating circumstance of immediate
vindication of a grave offense cannot be appreciated in his favor.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED
with modification that the indemnity is increased to P50,000.00 in accordance
with the policy of this Court on the matter.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 4971 September 23, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,
vs.
AUGUSTUS HICKS, defendant.
For about five years, from September, 1902, to November, 1907, Augustus
Hicks, an Afro-American, and Agustina Sola, a Christian Moro woman, illicitly
lived together in the municipality of Parang, Cotabato, Moro Province, until
trouble arising between them in the last-mentioned month of 1907, Agustina
quitted Hick's house, and, separation from him, went to live with her brother-
in-law, Luis Corrales. A few days later she contracted new relations with
another negro named Wallace Current, a corporal in the Army who then went
to live in the said house.
On the 21st of December following, at about 7:30 p. m., Augustus Hicks
together with a soldier named Lloyd Nickens called at said house, and from
the sala called out to his old mistress who was in her room with Corporal
Current, and after conversing with her in the Moro dialect for a few minutes,
asked the corporal to come out of said room; in response thereto the corporal
appeared at the door of the room, and after a short conversation, Current
approached Hicks and they shook hands, when Hicks asked him the
following question: "Did I not tell you to leave this woman alone?," to which
Current replied: "That is all right, she told me that she did not want to live with
you any longer, but if she wishes, she may quit me, and you can live with
her." The accused then replied: "God damn, I have made up my mind;" and
as Corporal Current saw that Hicks, when, he said this, was drawing a
revolver from his trousers' pocket, he caught him by the hand, but the latter,
snatching his hand roughly away, said: "Don't do that," whereupon Current
jumped into the room, hiding himself behind the partition, just as Hicks drew
his revolver and fired at Agustina Sola who was close by in the sala of the
house. The bullet struck her in the left side of the breast; she fell to the
ground, and died in a little more than an hour later.
Upon hearing the shot Edward Robinson, who was also in the house, went to
render assistance and wrested the weapon from the hand of the accused.
The latter immediately fled from the house and gave himself up to the chief of
police of the town, H. L. Martin, asking him to lock him up in jail; and, when a
few minutes later a policeman came running in and reported that Hicks had
fired a shot at Agustina, the said chief of police caused Hicks to be arrested.
The latter, when once in jail, threw eight revolver cartridges out of the
window; these were picked up by a policeman who reported the occurrence
and delivered the cartridges to his chief.
In view of the foregoing the provincial fiscal on the 8th of February, 1908,
filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of said province charging
Augustus Hicks with the crime of murder. Proceedings were instituted, the
trial court, after hearing the evidence adduced, entered judgment on the 10th
of September of the same year, sentencing the accused to the penalty of
death, to be executed according to the law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The case has been
submitted to this court for review.
The above-stated facts, which have been fully proven in the present case,
constitute the crime of murder, defined and punished by article 403 of the
Penal Code, in that the woman Agustina Sola met a violent death, with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia), she being suddenly and
roughly attacked and unexpectedly fired upon with a 45-caliber revolver, at
close, if not point blank range, while the injured woman was unarmed and
unprepared, and at a time when she was listening to a conversation, in which
she was concerned, between her aggressor and third person, and after usual
and customary words had passed between her and her aggressor. From all
of the foregoing it is logically inferred that means, manners, and forms were
employed in attack that directly and specially insured the consummation of
the crime without such risk to the author thereof as might have been offered
by the victim who, owing to the suddenness of the attack, was doubtless
unable to flee from the place where she was standing, or even escape or
divert the weapon.
The accused, Augustus Hicks, pleaded not guilty, but notwithstanding his
exculpatory allegations which were certainly not borne out at the trial, the
evidence in the case is absolutely at variance therewith and conclusively
establishes, beyond peradventure of doubt, his culpability as the sole fully
convicted author of the violent and treacherous death of his former mistress,
Agustina Sola.
It is alleged by the accused that when he withdrew his hand from that of
Current, who had seized him, he fell backward but managed to support
himself on his two hands, and when he got up again the said corporal
threatened him with a revolver thrust into his face; whereupon he also drew
his revolver, just as Edward Robinson caught him from behind, when his
revolver went off, the bullet striking the deceased.
This allegation appears to be at variance with the testimony of the witnesses
Wallace Current, Edward Robinson, Luis Corrales, and Lloyd Nickens in their
respective declaration, especially with that of the second and third, who
witnessed the actual firing of the shot by the aggressor at the deceased, as
shown by the fact that Robinson immediately approached the accused in
order to take his weapon away from him which he succeeded in doing after a
brief struggle, whereupon the aggressor ran out of the house. Thus, the shot
that struck the deceased in the breast and caused her death was not due to
an accident but to a willful and premeditated act on the part of the aggressor
with intent to deprive the victim of her life.
In addition to the qualifying circumstance of treachery, as above referred to,
the presence of other aggravating circumstances, such as premeditation, and
the fact that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the deceased should
be taken into consideration. The last-mentioned circumstances appears
proven from the testimony of several witnesses who were examined at the
trial of the case.
Inasmuch as in the present case the crime has already been qualified as
committed with treachery, the circumstance of premeditation should only be
considered as a merely generic one. Premeditation is, however, manifest and
evident by reason of the open acts executed by the accused. According to
the testimony of Charles Gatchery and Eugenio R. Whited, Hicks asked
leave from the former to be absent from the canteen where he was working
on the morning of the day when the affray occurred, alleging that his mind
was unsettled and that he feared getting into trouble. It is also shown by the
fact that Whited, who was in Hicks' house about noon upon the latter's
invitation, and while both where drinking gin, and while the revolver, the
instrument of the crime, was lying on the table on which were also several
loaded cartridges, heard the accused repeatedly say, referring to the
deceased, that her time had come, adding that he would rather see her dead
than in the arms of another man, and when the accused went to bed
apparently very much worried, and refusing to answer when called, the
witness left him. On the day after the crime the police found on a table in the
cuprit's house several loaded cartridges, a bottle of oil and a piece of cloth
used undoubtedly for cleaning the revolver.
All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused,
deliberately and after due reflection had resolved to kill the woman who had
left him for another man, and in order to accomplish his perverse intention
with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was already provided with a
clean and well-prepared weapon and carried other loaded cartridges besides
those already in his revolver, he entered the house, greeting everyone
courteously and conversed with his victim, in what appeared to be a proper
manner, disguising his intention and claiming her by his apparent repose and
tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully accomplish his criminal design,
behaving himself properly as he had planed to do beforehand.
As against the two foregoing aggravating circumstances no mitigating
circumstances is present, not even that mentioned in paragraph 7 of article 9
of the Penal Code, to wit loss of reason and self-control produced by
jealousy as alleged by the defense, inasmuch as the only causes which
mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as
originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious,
unworthy, and immoral passions.
From the foregoing considerations, and as the judgment appealed from is in
accordance with the law, it is our opinion that the same should be affirmed,
as we do hereby affirm it with costs, provided, however, that the death
penalty shall be executed according to the law in force, and that in the event
of a pardon being granted, the culprit shall suffer the accessory penalties of
article 53 of the Penal Code unless the same be expressly remitted in the
pardon. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-7094 March 29, 1912
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HILARIO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
The guilt of the defendant and appellant of the crime of homicide of which he
was convicted in the court below is conclusively established by the
evidenced of record.
The trial court was of opinion that its commission was not marked by either
aggravating or extenuating circumstances, and sentenced the convict to
fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, the medium
degree of the penalty prescribed by the code. Burt we are of opinion that the
extenuating circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article 9 should have
been taken into consideration, and that the prescribed penalty should have
been imposed in its minimum degree. Subsection 7 of article 9 is as follows:
The following are extenuating circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to
have produced passion and obfuscation.
The evidence clearly discloses that the convict, in the heat of passion, killed
the deceased, who had theretofore been his querida (concubine or lover)
upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual
acquaintance. We think that under the circumstances the convict was entitled
to have this fact taken into consideration in extenuation of his offense under
the provisions of the above-cited article.
This was the view taken by the Court of Spain upon a similar state of facts as
set forth in its sentence of July 4, 1892, which is summarized by Viada (p. 69,
in question 19, art. 9 of vol. 6) as follows:
Shall he who kills a woman with whom he is living in concubinage for
having caught her in her underclothes with another party and
afterwards shoots himself, inflicting a serious wound, be responsible
for that crime with the extenuating circumstance of having acted with
violent passion and obfuscation? The Audiencia of Santiago de Cuba
did not so hold and its judgment was reversed by the supreme court
for the improper disregard of article 9, number 8, of the Penal Code
for Cuba and Puerto Rico: "The facts held to be true by the trial
court, and which were the immediate cause of the crime by
producing in the accused strong emotion which impelled him to the
criminal act and even to attempt his own life, were a sufficient
impulse in the natural and ordinary course to produce the violent
passion and obfuscation which the law regards as a special reason
for extenuation, and as the judgment did not take into consideration
the 8th circumstance of article 9 of the code, the Audienciarendering
it seems to have violated this legal provision."
live with another man. In the present case however, the impulse upon which
defendant acted and which naturally "produced passion and obfuscation"
was not that the woman declined to have illicit relations with him, but the
sudden revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in
flagrante in the arms of another. As said by the supreme court of Spain in the
above-cited decision, this was a "sufficient impulse" in the ordinary and
natural course of things to produce the passion and obfuscation which the
law declares to be one of the extenuating circumstances to be taken into
consideration by the court.
Modified by a finding that the commission of the crime was marked with the
extenuating circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article 9, and by the
reduction of the penalty of fourteen years eight months and one day
of reclusion temporal to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, the
judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be
and are hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant.

It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Hicks (14 Phil. Rep.., 217), we held that
the "causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-
control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise
from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions," and declined to give the
benefit of the provisions of this article to the convict in that case on the
ground that the alleged causes for his loss of self-control did not "originate
from legitimate feelings." But in that case we found as facts that:

All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused,

deliberately and after due reflection had resolved to kill the woman
who had left him for another man, and in order to accomplish his
perverse intention with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was
already provided with a clean and well-prepared weapon and carried
other loaded cartridges besides those already in his revolver, he
entered the house, greeting everyone courteously and conversed
with his victim, in what appeared to be in a proper manner, disguising
his intention and calming her by his apparent repose and tranquility,
doubtless in order to successfully accomplish his criminal design,
behaving himself properly as he had planned to do beforehand.

In the former case the cause alleged "passion and obfuscation" of the
aggressor was the convict's vexation, disappointment and deliberate anger
engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to live in illicit relations
with him, which she had a perfect right to do; his reason for killing her being
merely that he had elected to leave him and with his full knowledge to go and
 [G.R. No. 130654. July 28, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO BASIN
JAVIER, accused-appellant.
Before us on automatic review is the Decision[1] dated April 15, 1997 of
the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32,[2] in Criminal Case No.
A-3155, convicting accused-appellant Eduardo Javier of the crime of parricide
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of
the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P21,730.00 as
actual expenses.
The Information filed before the trial court which charged accused-
appellant with the crime of parricide reads as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in the Municipality of Santo
Tomas, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with the intent to and being then
armed with a bolo, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and use of personal violence, by hacking with the said
weapon one FLORENTINA JAVIER Y LACESTE, his legitimate spouse, and
as a result of which his said wife suffered fatal injuries which directly caused
her death immediately thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
the victim.
Contrary to law."[3]
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty and trial
ensued.
The prosecution evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Consolacion
Javier Panit and Alma Javier, daughters of the victim and accused-appellant,
and SPO1 Rotelio Pacho are detailed as follows:
Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier and the victim Florentina Laceste
Javier were legally married on December 18, 1954.[4] In their forty-one years
of marriage, they begotten children. Accused-appellant and Florentina lived at
Tubod, Sto. Tomas, La Union with one of their daughters, Alma Javier. [5]
On June 15, 1996 between two o'clock and three oclock in the morning,
Consolacion Javier Panit, who lives near her parent's house about ten to fifteen
meters away, heard her mother, Florentina shouting "Arayatan dac ta
papatayen nac ni Tatangyo" (Your father is going to kill me). After she heard
her mother scream for help, Consolacion rushed out of her house and met her
sister, Alma who, weeping, told her that their parents were quarrelling. Alma,
at the time of the incident was living in her parents' house. Consolacion and
Alma then proceeded to their brother Manuel's house, which is located about
seventy to eighty meters away from their parents' house. The three then
proceeded to their parents' house. Manuel, who entered first, found the lifeless
body of his mother and his father, accused-appellant, wounded in the
abdomen. Manuel then ordered Consolacion to get a tricycle to bring their
father to the hospital. At this point, Manuel informed her sisters that their
mother was dead and that their father confessed to him that he killed his wife
and thereafter allegedly stabbed himself. Florentina was found dead in their
bedroom, drenched in her own blood.[6]
Accused-appellant was brought to the hospital by Consolacion's
husband, Fernando, and her son, Jefferson, while Manuel went out to get
help.[7]
SPO1 Rotelio Pacho, assigned as desk investigator at the Sto. Tomas
Police Station in La Union, testified in the investigation he conducted with
SPO4 Manuel Zarate and SPO1 Agaton Laroza regarding the incident of June
15, 1996. He stated that he received a call for assistance from the barangay
captain of Tugod, Sto. Tomas because accused-appellant allegedly killed his
wife. The police authorities then proceeded to accused-appellant's house in
Brgy. Tugod, Sto. Tomas, where they saw Florentina lying in the bedroom floor
covered with blood. Upon interviewing the victim's children, Pacho testified
that Manuel told him that his father confessed to killing his wife. Manuel then
surrendered to him the bolo covered with blood which was found in the
bedroom. The bolo was allegedly used by accused-appellant in assaulting his
wife.[8] The medical findings indicated that the victim suffered from multiple
injuries and her neck was almost cut off from her body. [9]
Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier, in his testimony, admitted killing his
wife in their bedroom with the use of a sharp bolo. He identified the bolo as the
same one presented by the prosecution as Exhibit "A" and which he used in
wounding himself. Accused-appellant told the court that he killed his wife
because he could not sleep for almost a month. He claimed that when the
killing took place, his mind went totally blank and he did not know what he was
doing.[10] He claims that he was insane at the time of the incident.
The trial court rejected accused-appellant's defense of insanity and on
April 15, 1997 rendered a decision finding him guilty of parricide and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of death. The dispositive portion of the decision reads
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration, the accused,
Eduardo Javier y Basin is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death; to
pay the heirs of the victims the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for
the death of the victim and P21,730.00 as actual expenses; and to pay the
cost of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED."[11]
 In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that the trial court erred in
imposing the death penalty, considering the presence of two mitigating
circumstances of illness of the offender and passion and obfuscation. [12] While
accused-appellant does not question the decision of the trial court in rejecting
his defense of insanity, he argues that he should be meted a lower penalty
because at the time of the incident, he was suffering from loss of sleep for a
prolonged period of time, which would have caused him to commit the crime.
He further contends that his suspicion that his wife was having an illicit
relationship with another man, aggravated by his illness, goaded him to commit
the crime.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that
accused-appellant cannot claim the mitigating circumstance of illness in the
absence of a medical finding to support his claim. Accused-appellant cannot
likewise be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation
in the absence of sufficient evidence.
We find the appeal bereft of merit.
Accused-appellant, during trial, admitted killing his wife, but interposed as
defense the exempting circumstance of insanity. However, the trial court
rejected this defense of insanity for failure of the defense to prove that
accused-appellant was indeed insane at the time of the incident. The defense
never presented any medical record of the accused-appellant, nor was a
psychiatrist ever presented to validate the defense of insanity. Equally
important, the defense, during trial, never alleged the above-claimed mitigating
circumstances of illness and passion and obfuscation, thus weakening the
case of accused-appellant.
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that prior to the incident, he had
been suffering from insomnia for around a month, thus leading him to commit
an act beyond his control, the killing of his wife, Florentina. The defense went
on to cite medical literature on the effects of total and partial sleep loss to
support his contentions.[13]
For the mitigating circumstance of illness of the offender to be
appreciated, the law requires the presence of the following requisites: (1)
illness must diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender; and (2)
such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts. [14]
Since accused-appellant has already admitted to the killing, it is
incumbent upon him to prove the claimed mitigating circumstance of illness. In
this case, however, aside from the testimony of the accused that his mind went
blank when he killed his wife due to loss of sleep, no medical finding was
presented regarding his mental condition at the time of killing. This Court can
hardly rely on the bare allegations of accused-appellant, nor on mere
presumptions and conjectures. No clear and convincing evidence was shown
that accused-appellant was suffering an illness which diminished his exercise
of will-power at the time of the killing.
On the other hand, it is clear that accused-appellant was aware of the
acts he committed. First, he remembered killing his wife in their bedroom with
the use of a bolo, where he mangled her neck twice; he remembered trying to
commit suicide, by wounding himself with the same bolo he used in killing his
wife; and he remembered being brought to the hospital. Since he remembered
the vital circumstances surrounding the ghastly incident, from the time of the
killing up to the time he was brought to the hospital, it shows that he was in full
control of his mental faculties. This negates his claim that he was suffering
from an illness that diminished the exercise of his will-power. On the basis of
the foregoing, we cannot appreciate the mitigating circumstance alleged by
accused-appellant.
Neither can we appreciate the circumstance of passion and obfuscation
to mitigate his criminal liability.
In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation, the following elements should concur: (1) there should be an act
both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) said act
which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of
the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his moral equanimity.[15] The foregoing elements were not proved to
be present in instant case. In fact, during accused-appellant's testimony, he
even stated that he was not jealous of his wife.
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General:
"In the case of appellant, there is lack of proof of the cause which produced
the alleged passion and obfuscation. Appellant, in his testimony, did not
account how he killed his wife nor did he explain the cause why he was
prompted to kill his wife. Verily, there exists no justifiable basis for applying to
him this mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation as the cause
which produced it has not been established."[16]
All told, the allegations propounded by accused-appellant that his
suspicions regarding his wife, aggravated by his illness made it possible for
him to kill his own wife, is but a mere afterthought to whittle down his criminal
liability.
Additionally, it is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts will
generally not be disturbed by the appellate court because it is in the best
position to properly evaluate testimonial evidence considering that it observes
the demeanor, conduct and attitude of witnesses during the trial. In the case
at bar, the trial court was able to observe the behaviour of accused-appellant
and it stated that his recollection of the details surrounding the killing is so
impeccable that only a person in his right mind can make it.
 Thus, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the
crime of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 5) which provides that:
"Any person who shall kill his father, mother or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be
guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death."
The crime of parricide, not being a capital crime per se as it is not
punishable by mandatory death penalty but by the flexible penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death, two indivisible penalties, the application of the lesser or the
greater penalty depends on the presence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances.[17]
In this case, the information for parricide against accused-appellant did
not allege any aggravating circumstance. Nor did the evidence show that the
prosecution was able to prove any aggravating circumstance.[18] Likewise, no
mitigating circumstance is appreciated by this Court in favor of the accused-
appellant. Thus, in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance
for the accused-appellant, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed.
As regards the monetary liability, the Court takes the amount of
P50,000.00 imposed by the trial court as one of civil indemnity instead of as
moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La
Union, Branch 32, in Criminal Case No. A-3155 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Eduardo Javier y Basin should suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 140937. February 28, 2001]
EXUPERANCIO CANTA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated August 31,
1999, and resolution, dated November 22, 1999, of the Court of
Appeals,[1] which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
Maasin, Southern Leyte,[2] finding petitioner Exuperancio Canta guilty of
violation of P.D. No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of
1974, and sentencing him to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5) months, and eleven (11) days
of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
The information against petitioner alleged:
That on or about March 14, 1986, in the municipality of Malitbog, province of
Southern Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with intent to gain, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away one (1) black
female cow belonging to Narciso Gabriel valued at Three Thousand Pesos
(P3,000.00) without the knowledge and consent of the aforesaid owner, to
his damage and prejudice in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The prosecution established the following facts:
Narciso Gabriel acquired from his half-sister Erlinda Monter a
cow, subject of the case, upon its birth on March 10, 1984. The cow remained
under the care of Erlinda Monter for sometime. Subsequently, Narciso gave
the care and custody of the animal, first, to Generoso Cabonce, from October
24, 1984 to March 17, 1985; then to Maria Tura, from May 17, 1985 to March
2, 1986; and lastly, to Gardenio Agapay, from March 3, 1986 until March 14,
1986 when it was lost.[4] It appears that at 5 oclock in the afternoon of March
13, 1986, Agapay took the cow to graze in the mountain of Pilipogan in
Barangay Candatag, about 40 meters from his hut. However, when he came
back for it at past 9 oclock in the morning of March 14, 1986, Agapay found
the cow gone. He found hoof prints which led to the house of Filomeno
Vallejos. He was told that petitioner Exuperancio Canta had taken the
animal.[5]
Upon instructions of the owner, Gardenio and Maria Tura went to recover
the animal from petitioners wife, but they were informed that petitioner had
delivered the cow to his father, Florentino Canta, who was at that time
barangay captain of Laca, Padre Burgos, Southern Leyte. Accordingly, the two
went to Florentinos house. On their way, they met petitioner who told them that
if Narciso was the owner, he should claim the cow
himself. Nevertheless, petitioner accompanied the two to his fathers house,
where Maria recognized the cow. As petitioners father was not in the house,
petitioner told Gardenio and Maria he would call them the next day so that they
could talk the matter over with his father.
However, petitioner never called them. Hence, Narciso Gabriel reported
the matter to the police of Malitbog, Southern Leyte.[6] As a result, Narciso and
petitioner Exuperancio were called to an investigation. Petitioner admitted
taking the cow but claimed that it was his and that it was lost on December 3,
1985. He presented two certificates of ownership, one dated March 17, 1986
and another dated February 27, 1985, to support his claim (Exh. B). [7]
Narciso presented a certificate of ownership issued on March 9, 1986,
signed by the municipal treasurer, in which the cow was described as two
years old and female. On the reverse side of the certificate is the drawing of a
cow with cowlicks in the middle of the forehead, between the ears, on the right
and left back, and at the base of the forelegs and hindlegs (Exhs. C, C-1 to
4).[8] All four caretakers of the cow identified the cow as the same one they had
taken care of, based on the location of its cowlicks, its sex, and its
color. Gardenio described the cow as black in color, with a small portion of its
abdomen containing a brownish cowlick, a cowlick in the middle of the
forehead, another at the back portion between the two ears, and four cowlicks
located near the base of its forelegs and the hindlegs.[9]
On the other hand, petitioner claimed he acquired the animal under an
agreement which he had with Pat. Diosdado Villanueva, that petitioner take
care of a female cow of Pat. Villanueva in consideration for which petitioner
would get a calf if the cow produced two offsprings. Petitioner claimed that the
cow in question was his share and that it was born on December 5, 1984. This
cow, however, was lost on December 2, 1985. Petitioner said he reported the
loss to the police of Macrohon, Padre Burgos, and Malitbog, on December 3,
1985 (Exh. A and Exh. 1).[10]
Petitioner said that on March 14, 1986, his uncle Meno told him that he
had seen the cow at Pilipogan, under the care of Gardenio Agapay. He,
therefore, went to Pilipogan with the mother cow on March 14, 1986 to see
whether the cow would suckle the mother cow. As the cow did, petitioner took
it with him and brought it, together with the mother cow, to his father Florentino
Canta.[11]Maria Tura tried to get the cow, but Florentino refused to give it to her
and instead told her to call Narciso so that they could determine the ownership
of the cow.[12] As Narciso did not come the following day, although Maria did,
Florentino said he told his son to take the cow to the Municipal Hall of Padre
Burgos. Petitioner did as he was told. Three days later, Florentino and
Exuperancio were called to the police station for investigation.[13]
Petitioner presented a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle dated
February 27, 1985[14] and a statement executed by Franklin Telen, janitor at
the treasurers office of the municipality of Padre Burgos, to the effect that he
issued a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle in the name of petitioner
Exuperancio Canta on February 27, 1985 (Exh. 5).[15] The statement was
executed at the preliminary investigation of the complaint filed by petitioner
against Narciso.[16]
Petitioners Certificate of Ownership was, however, denied by the
municipal treasurer, who stated that petitioner Exuperancio Canta had no
Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle in the municipality of Padre Burgos
(Exhs. E, E-1 and 2).[17] On the other hand, Telen testified that he issued the
Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle to petitioner on March 24, 1986 but,
at the instance of petitioner, he (Telen) antedated it to February 27, 1985. [18]
On January 24, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision finding petitioner
guilty of the offense charged. In giving credence to the evidence for the
prosecution, the trial court stated:
From the affidavits and testimonies of the complainant and his witnesses, it is
indubitable that it was accused Exuperancio Canta who actually took the cow
away without the knowledge and consent of either the owner/raiser/caretaker
Gardenio Agapay.
That the taking of the cow by the accused was done with strategy and stealth
considering that it was made at the time when Gardenio Agapay was at his
shelter-hut forty (40) meters away tethered to a coconut tree but separated
by a hill.
The accused in his defense tried to justify his taking away of the cow by
claiming ownership. He, however, failed to prove such ownership. Accused
alleged that on February 27, 1985 he was issued a Certificate of Ownership
of Large Cattle (Exh. 2-A) for his cow by Franklin Telen, a janitor at the Office
of the Municipal Treasurer of Padre Burgos, a neighboring town. On rebuttal
Franklin Telen denied in Court the testimony of the accused and even
categorically declared that it was only on March 24, 1986 that the accused
brought the cow to the Municipal Hall of Padre Burgos, when he issued a
Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle for the cow, and not on February 27,
1985. Franklin Telen testified thus:
Q. According to the defense, this Certificate of Ownership of Large
Cattle was issued by you on February 27, 1985. Is that correct?
A. Based on the request of Exuperancio, I antedated this.
(TSN, June 3, 1992, p. 7)
The testimony of Franklin Telen was confirmed in open court by no less than
the Municipal Treasurer of Padre Burgos, Mr. Feliciano Salva. (TSN,
September 29, 1992, pp. 5-8).
If accused Exuperancio Canta were the owner of the cow in question, why
would he lie on its registration? And why would he have to ask Mr. Franklin
Telen to antedate its registry? It is clear that accused secured a Certificate of
Ownership of Large Cattle (Exh. 2-A) by feigning and manipulation (Exhs. A
& B) only after the act complained of in the instant case was committed on
March 14, 1986. His claim of ownership upon which he justifies his taking
away of the cow has no leg to stand on. Upon the other hand, the
complainant has shown all the regular and necessary proofs of ownership of
the cow in question.[19]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision and denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition. It is contended that
the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt his criminal intent in
taking the disputed cow.
First. Petitioner claims good faith and honest belief in taking the cow. He
cites the following circumstances to prove his claim:
1. He brought the mother cow to Pilipogan to see if the cow in
question would suckle to the mother cow, thus proving his
ownership of it;
2. He compared the cowlicks of the subject cow to that indicated in
the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle issued on February
27, 1985 in his name, and found that they tally;
3. He immediately turned over the cow to the barangay captain, after
taking it, and later to the police authorities, after a dispute arose
as to its ownership; and
4. He filed a criminal complaint against Narciso Gabriel for violation
of P. D. No. 533.
These contentions are without merit.
P.D. No. 533, 2(c) defines cattle-rustling as
. . . the taking away by any means, methods or scheme, without the consent
of the owner/raiser, of any of the abovementioned animals whether or not for
profit or gain, or whether committed with or without violence against or
intimidation of any person or force upon things.
The crime is committed if the following elements concur: (1) a large cattle
is taken; (2) it belongs to another; (3) the taking is done without the consent of
the owner; (4) the taking is done by any means, methods or scheme; (5) the
taking is with or without intent to gain; and (6) the taking is accomplished with
or without violence or intimidation against person or force upon things.[20]
These requisites are present in this case. First, there is no question that
the cow belongs to Narciso Gabriel. Petitioners only defense is that in taking
the animal he acted in good faith and in the honest belief that it was the cow
which he had lost. Second, petitioner, without the consent of the owner, took
the cow from the custody of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, despite the fact
that he knew all along that the latter was holding the animal for the owner,
Narciso. Third, petitioner falsified his Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle
by asking Telen to antedate it prior to the taking to make it appear that he
owned the cow in question. Fourth, petitioner adopted means, methods, or
schemes to deprive Narciso of his possession of his cow, thus manifesting his
intent to gain. Fifth, no violence or intimidation against persons or force upon
things attended the commission of the crime.
Indeed, the evidence shows that the Certificate of Ownership of Large
Cattle which petitioner presented to prove his ownership was falsified. Franklin
Telen, the janitor in the municipal treasurers office, admitted that he issued the
certificate to petitioner 10 days after Narcisos cow had been stolen. Although
Telen has previously executed a sworn statement claiming that he issued the
certificate on February 27, 1985, he later admitted that he antedated it at the
instance of petitioner Exuperancio Canta, his friend, who assured him that the
cow was his.[21]
Telens testimony was corroborated by the certification of the municipal
treasurer of Padre Burgos that no registration in the name of petitioner was
recorded in the municipal records. Thus, petitioners claim that the cowlicks
found on the cow tally with that indicated on the Certificate of Ownership of
Large Cattle has no value, as this same certificate was issued after the cow
had been taken by petitioner from Gardenio Agapay. Obviously, he had every
opportunity to make sure that the drawings on the certificate would tally with
that existing on the cow in question.
The fact that petitioner took the cow to the barangay captain and later to
the police authorities does not prove his good faith. He had already committed
the crime, and the barangay captain to whom he delivered the cow after taking
it from its owner is his own father. While the records show that he filed on April
30, 1986 a criminal complaint against Narciso Gabriel, the complaint was
dismissed after it was shown that it was filed as a countercharge to a complaint
earlier filed on April 16, 1986 against him by Narciso Gabriel.
Petitioner says that he brought a mother cow to see if the cow in question
would suckle to the mother cow. But cows frequently attempt to suckle to alien
cows.[22] Hence, the fact that the cow suckled to the mother cow brought by
petitioner is not conclusive proof that it was the offspring of the mother cow.
 Second. Petitioner contends that even assuming that his Certificate of
Ownership is not in order, it does not necessarily follow that he did not believe
in good faith that the cow was his. If it turned out later that he was mistaken,
he argues that he committed only a mistake of fact but he is not criminally
liable.
Petitioners Certificate of Ownership is not only not in order. It is
fraudulent, having been antedated to make it appear it had been issued to him
before he allegedly took the cow in question. That he obtained such fraudulent
certificate and made use of it negates his claim of good faith and honest
mistake. That he took the cow despite the fact that he knew it was in the
custody of its caretaker cannot save him from the consequences of his
act.[23] As the Solicitor General states in his Comment:
If petitioner had been responsible and careful he would have first verified the
identity and/or ownership of the cow from either Narciso Gabriel or Gardenio
Agapay, who is petitioners cousin (TSN, 9/12/91, p. 26). Petitioner, however,
did not do so despite the opportunity and instead rushed to take the
cow. Thus, even if petitioner had committed a mistake of fact he is not
exempted from criminal liability due to his negligence.[24]
In any event, petitioner was not justified in taking the cow without the
knowledge and permission of its owner. If he thought it was the cow he had
allegedly lost, he should have resorted to the court for the settlement of his
claim. Art. 433 of the Civil Code provides that The true owner must resort to
judicial process for the recovery of the property. What petitioner did in this case
was to take the law in his own hands.[25] He surreptitiously took the cow from
the custody of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, which act belies his claim of
good faith.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the evidence fully supports the
finding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant
is guilty as charged. There is therefore no reason to disturb their findings.
However, the decision of the Court of Appeals should be modified in two
respects.
First, accused-appellant should be given the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender. The circumstance of voluntary
surrender has the following elements: (1) the offender has not actually been
arrested; (2) the offender surrenders to a person in authority or to the latters
agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary.[26] In the present case, petitioner
Exuperancio Canta had not actually been arrested. In fact, no complaint had
yet been filed against him when he surrendered the cow to the authorities. It
has been repeatedly held that for surrender to be voluntary, there must be an
intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the authorities, showing an
intention to save the authorities the trouble and expense that his search and
capture would require.[27] In petitioners case, he voluntarily took the cow to the
municipal hall of Padre Burgos to place it unconditionally in the custody of the
authorities and thus saved them the trouble of having to recover the cow from
him. This circumstance can be considered analogous to voluntary surrender
and should be considered in favor of petitioner.
Second, the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty of violation of 2(c)
of P. D. No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of
1974. However, it erred in imposing the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 12 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum. The trial court apparently considered P. D.
No. 533 as a special law and applied 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
which provides that if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall
not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. However, as held
in People v. Macatanda,[28] P. D. No. 533 is not a special law. The penalty for
its violation is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties prescribed
in the Revised Penal Code, thus indicating that the intent of the lawmaker was
to amend the Revised Penal Code with respect to the offense of theft of large
cattle. In fact, 10 of the law provides:
The provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, pertinent provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended, all laws, decrees, orders, instructions,
rules and regulations which are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
There being one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating
circumstance in the commission of the crime, the penalty to be imposed in this
case should be fixed in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, in relation to Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner
should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is
within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i. e., prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor medium, and the maximum of which
is prision mayor in its maximum period.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with
the modification that petitioner Exuperancio Canta is hereby SENTENCED to
suffer a prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor maximum, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.