Deadly Energy

DEADLY ENERGY
ENERGY FOR THAILAND, POWER FOR THE SLORC 1

GASFIELD DEVELOPMENTS 2
THAI SCHEMING 2
MARTABAN. THE BIGGEST DEAL EVER 3
THE YETAGUN FIELD 3
THE GAS PIPELINE: WHICH WAY? 4
NAT El TAUNG 4
RANONG 6
TWO PIPELINES? 6
MEGADAMS AND MINIDAMS 7
THE UPPER SALWEEN DAM 8
THE SLORC'S VERY OFFENSIVE CEASEFIRE 9
FLOODING AND SILTATION 9
THE GREATEST FLUSH TOILET IN THE WORLD ] 0
THE OTHER SEVEN MORE DAMS 11
THE LOWER SALWEEN DAM: TWO POSSIBILITIES 1 2
THE GORGE 12
THE FALLS 1 2
THE KLONG KRA BURI DAM 13
THE NAM MAE SAI HYDRO POWER PLANT 13
THE MAE KOK DAM I4
MAE NAM MOEI 1.2 AND 3 PROJECTS 1 5
ENVIRONMENTAL DEVASTATION 17
UNTHINKABLE SUMS... ' 19
MORE TIES FOR THE THAIS 20
COLLABORATION. COERCION AND ANNIHILATION 21
WHAT'S IN IT FOR THE SLORC 22
...FOR THE THAIS 24
ROOM FOR HOPE 25
SUMMING UP 27
Acknowledgements; AncbApologies
Many thanks to the selfless and committed friends who have helped us to prepare this report.
Under the prevailing circumstances publically honouring them may jeopardise their work, none the
less we wish to express our sincere gratitude to those who have supported us.
We apologise for any shortcomings in this work, particularly in regard to its objectivity and
clarity. Lack of reference materials, time, financial resources and skill has made it less than perfect. We
hope it will serve anyway, and its flaws be forgiven.
DEADLY ENERGY
ENERGY FOR THAILAND, POWER FOR THE SLORC
Officials of the Thai government and the SLORC military regime have for some years n o w
been planning a series of huge energy joint ventures to be undertaken in some of the most
fought over territory in Burma. The energy projects, if they are endorsed by the Thai Govern-
ment - and implemented with the participation of Japanese and Western corporations - will have
extremely serious, possibly even terminal repercussions for the Burmese pro-democracy move-
ment which is based in these same areas of the Burma -Thai border. Indeed, this seems to be
w h a t a number of the proponents of the development projects intend to achieve, particularly
the generals in Rangoon. The SLORC, as well as politicians, military men and businessmen in
Thailand and abroad would garner great benefit from the destruction of the Burmese opposition
groups along the border, and the opening of the w a y to even more unrestrained natural re-
source exploitation than is currently taking place.
There are ten planned energy development joint ventures, comprising t w o offshore natu-
ral gasfield developments and eight hydro electric dams. These are:
T h e Martaban Gasfield developments led by Total CFP of France
T h e Yetagun Gasfield exploratory program led by Texaco of the US
T h e Upper Salween Dam,
T h e Lower Salween Dam
T h e Nam Kok Project
T h e Nam Moei 3 Project
T h e Nam Moei 2 Project
T h e Klong Kra Project
T h e N a m Moei 1 Project, and
T h e Nam M a e Sai Project
The energy projects will lead to environmental and social havoc on a scale comparable to
the largest development projects in the world. Indeed, the Upper Salween Dam will be among
the largest in the world. Altogether the projects will directly result in the flooding a n d deforest-
ing of thousands of square kilometers of the forests bordering Burma and Thailand. The projects
will displace many thousands of indigenous peoples, some of them already refugees from the
forty-five years of bloody civil w a r in Burma. Many have already been affected by military opera-
tions of the SLORC and Thai armies, operations which can easily be seen in the context of
clearing the w a y for the development of the 820-1,000 kilometre gas pipeline or the construc-
tion of the eight dams.
The energy projects will put billions of dollars into the control of an ultra-nationalist
military regime that is one of the worlds worst human rights violators and that is rapidly building
up a large and extraordinarily aggressive army which poses a significant threat to the stability of
the region. The massive input of funds from the Western and Japanese multinational oil and
energy development companies, combined with t h e cheap sale and presents of Chinese weap-
onry, and the profits from the heroin traffic that the SLORC is alleged to control, has funded this
huge expansion of the SLORC armed forces.
The energy joint ventures will, if signed, mark the second and higher level of engage-
ment in the much criticised A S E A N policy of "constructive engagement" towards the SLORC
regime, which through the activities of the logging, oil and fishing companies have already
caused untold damage to Burma's environment. The multinational corporations, the Keidanrens
GREEN NOVEMBER 32 MYA YADANA REPORT
and the Thai state oil and electricity institutes PTT and EGAT are therefore amongst the most
powerful influences supporting the SLORC in its brutal and undemocratic suppression of the
peoples of Burma.
GASFIELD DEVELOPMENTS
Texaco Inc, Premier Consolidated Oilfields. Total Cie Franaise Petroles, Unocal Corp., and Nippon Oil Explora-
tion (Nihon Seikiyu KK) are among the few remaining multinational oil corporations (MNC's) operating in Burma after a
mass exodus of oil companies that had held onshore concessions there since 1989. These companies hold between
them five offshore concession blocks in the Andaman Sea that have proven ability to produce trillions of cubic feet of
natural gas. They have already invested hundreds of millions of dollars (none but they and the SLORC really know how
much) in securing the concessions, in analysis of data, in equipment, and in oil and gas exploration in Burmese waters.
A considerable portion of this money has found its way into the coffers of the military regime - again, nobody knows
exactly how much, but it is likely to be in excess of several hundred million dollars when fifty million dollar signature
bonuses, the price of the concessions themselves, security charges, and various other expenses and 'tea money" contri-
butions are added up. Oil company investments are by far the biggest input into Burma's economy1, with the notable
exception of the income from the booming heroin export business. The SLORC, to put it in the words used in their
propaganda mouthpiece 'The New Light of Myanmar', is "jubilant", "exhilarated" and very much "gratified" by this
massive technological and financial support from the West2.
THAI SCHEMING
Senior Thai officials are currently in the process of advanced negotiations with SLORC, Myanma Oil and Gas
Enterprise (MOGE) officials, and oil company executives to buy the natural gas from Burma3. Luen Krisnakri, Director of
the state owned Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT), has announced that his company expects to strike a deal on joint
venture contracts by the end of the year4. Thai officials have been seeking to secure gas supplies from the Martaban field
since at least early 1991s, and have been "allowed" by the SLORC to take a 30 percent equity stake in the venture6.
At least three rounds of talks in Rangoon have been held between PTTEP (PTT Exploration and Production,
formerly a subsidiary of the 100% state owned Petroleum Authority of Thailand, recently listed as a public limited com-
pany), SLORC, MOGE officials and oil company executives. These reportedly covered investment, pricing of the gas, the
sensitive issue of piping it to Thailand, and other aspects of the deal7. They have been urged on by various Thai govern-
ment ministers, who in September 1992 endorsed a power development program that involves securing at least 350
million cubic feet per day (350 MMcfd) of natural gas from the Burma8.
This program was given even greater priority by the new Democrat led Thai coalition government after the
discovery of the Yetagun gasfields a few months after. PTT officials have made it clear to the Texaco led consortium that
discovered the new field that they are very interested in "an equity participation in the American company's oil conces-
sion in Burma"9. The consortium members, apparently afraid of being justly criticized, have been exceptionally tight
lipped about their plans to sell the gas to Thailand10.
Selling the gas to Thailand is quite obviously their intention, as there is no indication that the gas is to be sold
anywhere else, or even could economically be sold elsewhere. The military dictators of Burma, having bankrupted the
country with their corruption, ineptitude and excessive spending on the military acquisitions and campaigns, are cer-
tainly in no position to provide a return on the companies investments. Thailand is the most logical and profitable market
for the Burmese gas due to its close proximity to the fields, the value of its currency, its governments' easy access to credit,
its adherence to the much criticized so- called "constructive engagement" policy, its. growing demand for energy sources
to fuel its 6 - 10% annual GDP growth, and the expected 9-10% annual growth in energy demand11.
There are suspicions that PTTEP has already secretly committed itself to the joint venture. It is possible that Total
and Unocal, which are partners of PTTEP in the large scale Bongkot and adjoining Unocal 3 Gasfields, are buying on
behalf of PTTEP which due to the sensitive political situation between Thailand and Burma and the companys being
largely government owned, cannot commit itself publically to such a national security sensitive investment too quickly.
This is not to say that PTTEP has not committed itself privately - indeed it seems highly unlikely that five large Western
multinational oil companies would invest billions in a country such as Burma without having a secure market.
Khun Luen Krisnakri's announcement was the first time a mention of a signing date had been made, and is
therefore a significant step along the way to ratification of the constructive engagement policy and the venture. It was
also a significant departure from their previous publically noncommittal stance towards the SLORC. Even more urgent,
the Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, chairing a meeting with Thai officials and SLORC Energy Minister Khin Maung
AUG-SEPT 1993
Thein on the 8th of September reportedly urged the quick signing of the transaction.
Interestingly it comes during a period when the SLORC has announced that it will stop issuing new logging
concessions, has engaged in a larger than usual number of armed attacks by their soldiers on Thai citizens and territory,
and has been less than responsive towards the ever-so-accommodating Thais12. Thai leaders have responded to these
insults with reaffirmation of the controversial policy of 'constructive engagement' with the junta and a spate of visits by
senior leaders to Rangoon.
Speculation is rife that the SLORC is demanding that the Thais abandon once and for all their 'dual approach'
policy of tolerance towards the pro-democracy groups on one hand and the SLORC on the other and that they blockade
the dissidents and indigenous groups in return for the reward of renewed natural resource concessions and energy
supply13. Some observers of political and related developments in Burma are of the opinion that if the Thai government
does sign the gas supply agreement, the other more environmentally devastating dam development projects would
inevitably soon follow. The gas pipeline talks could be taken as being the critical indicator of the complete abandonment
of what little support for democracy in Burma Thailand and its ASEAN partners were prepared to give. The ratification of
the deal could also be taken as a wedding ceremony between the sadistic SLORC and an avaricious Thailand.
MARTABAN, THE BIGGEST DEAL EVER

Total CFP a 34% French Government owned and 40% state controlled concern, signed a production sharing
concession for the Martaban (Mottama) gasfield on the 9th of July 199214.
The Martaban Field holds an estimated 2 to 5 trillion cubic feet of gas, more than enough for current and
medium term demands in Burma, although if the real energy needs of the Burmese peoples were efficiently serviced by
the public sector - instead of the desires of the military - the supply would be only sufficient for Burma's medium and long
term development requirements.
The Martaban field was discovered in 1983, but at that time the Japanese consortium led by Japan National Oil
Corp pNOC) which financed the exploration program was not interested in developing it15, and the Burmese regime did
not have the billions required to do so. The field is covered by two concession blocks named M-5 and M-6 with a surface
area of 26,140 kilometers, and is located 70 kilometers south of the mangrove swamps of the Irrawaddy Delta16.
Unocal Corp., which previously had held an onshore block with the Thai state oil company PTTEP secretively
became a partner in the Total venture early on, acquiring a very considerable 47.5% of the shares. This was only made
public in late April 199317. Interestingly enough to activists planning boycotts of oil companies investing in Burma, the
company was paranoid enough to conceal this investment behind its closure of its US$29 million onshore operation, the
Unocal chief Russell Small reportedly saying "three years, three wells, you're out", and apparently pretending to pull out
of the country in February '9318. The reason for this given later by a company official was that the company wanted to
avoid the negative publicity its investing with the Burmese military dictatorship would receive.
THE YETAGUN FIELD

The Yetagun Field was discovered by a consortium of US, British and Japanese oil companies on the 25th of
October 199219, significantly increasing the chances of Thailand's buying in on the deal with the SLORC. Test drilling in a
block 420 kilometers south of Rangoon resulted in a strike that produced a flow of 75 million cubic feet of gas per day (75
MMcfd in the standard oil industry abbreviation) and an additional 1,800 barrels of crude oil (47.5o API condensate in
industry jargon). A second testwell was non commercial but a third testwell. two miles south-east of the previous strike
produced 63 MMcfd of gas and 1,922 barrels of 53o API condensate20. This was the largest single gas strike in Burma for
many years, if not the largest ever.
The consortium which found the new field comprises of Texaco Exploration Myanmar Inc., Premier Petroleum
Myanmar Ltd., and Nippon Oil (Myanmar) Exploration Ltd. They hold the M-12, M-13 and M-14 offshore concession
blocks which cover 50,000 km off the Tenasserim Coast. The gas wells are 125 KM directly west of Mali Kyun (Mali Island)
on which the Burmese navy has an important base.
The discovery of the Yetagun No.#l gasfield was announced on the 10th of December, 1992 by Premier
chairman Dr Roland Shaw21. Premier, which signed a production sharing contract with the military regime on the 3rd of
May 1990 at the same time that the so-called "free and fair" elections were being staged in Rangoon, had been joined in
its concession by the long term partners Texaco and Nippon in a 30% / 50% / 20% joint venture in 1991. The three
testwells were drilled by the Deep Sea Ice, a ship belonging to the Odjfell Drilling and Consulting Co., and captained by
a Capt. Ragnar Illenberg22. The companies are carrying out more tests, claiming that they are needed to accurately
appraise the size and viability of the discovery.
The two Yetagun wells are significant in other respects as well. All the existing gas wells in Burma together were
probably producing no more than 70 MMcfd at the time of the strike, although SLORC officials claim they are producing
85 million cubic feet per day of gas. Official claims such as this are the subject of considerable mirth in Burma. The
AUG-SEPT 1993
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, a reputable oil industry magazine, stated that as of May 1991 "natural gas output has
lunged to less than half of 1990's average of 82 MMcfd, necessitating partial closure of... methanol and power plants"23.
It can therefore be said that the 75 MMcfd of gas and the condensate from the single testwell was more than Burma's
entire national production at the time. The Yetagun discoveries were also nearly double the initial flows of the vast
Martaban gasfield, which was first tested at 39 MMcfd24.
The Martaban Field, is now believed to be in the beginning stages of being developed by Total CFP and Unocal
who reportedly plan to construct four drilling platforms and lay a pipeline to Tavoy (sic)25. When the field is fully devel-
oped for exploitation it is estimated to be capable of producing in excess of 500 million cubic feet of gas each day. far
more than Burma's decrepit infrastructure can deal with in a forseeable future under the SLORC26. No estimates of the
capacity of the Yetagun field have yet been made public as the companies involved, particularly Texaco and Nippon,
seem to wish to keep as low a profile as possible until the agreements between Thailand. SLORC, Total and Unocal are
signed and sealed and the furor has died down. From the size of the initial and third strikes however, it can be assumed
that the Yetagun field could initially produce at least 200 MMcfd for direct and extremely profitable sale to Thailand. It is
possible that the Yetagun Field may prove to be larger than even the vast Martaban Field, with the entire production
going straight to Thailand's power stations to feed the hungry and polluting multinational corporative industries operat-
ing in the Kingdom.
THE GAS PIPELINE: WHICH WAY?

Piping highly volatile gas to Thailand through territories controlled by pro-democracy and indigenous groups -
and billions of dollars of investment capital back the other way to the SLORC - is politically as explosive as the gas in the
pipeline would be. The route that the gas pipe is to take is therefore an extremely sensitive issue. Being well aware of this
reality. Thai authorities have shown what seems to be deliberate deceptiveness in regard to which direction they are
planning to lay the pipes, claiming that the route has not been chosen, even at this late stage. First they talked about
laying it through Three Pagodas Pass, then later suggested that it may go to Prachuab Khiri Khan or by an undersea route
to Ranong in the far south27. The SLORC has helped to obfuscate, the issue with Gen. Khin Nyunt making a televised
official tour of the Thanbyuzayat area at the coast end of the Three Pagodas Pass road ostensibly to inspect the potential
"gas pipeline" route.
However, both the Three Pagodas Pass route and the Prachuab Khirikhan route have important shortcomings
being expensively long and excessively vulnerable to sabotage. They would have around 95 Kilometers and 120 Kms
respectively of vulnerable onshore pipe to protect from sabotage, pipeline that would pass through territory that in spite
of many years of fighting is still only tenuously held by the SLORC. The Ranong route is feasible, but could be more
expensive in terms of the length of costly undersea pipeline28, and possibly in power transmission infrastructure to distant
industrial centers. There is another potential route for the pipeline, one that has not been publicly mentioned by either
Thai or Burmese officials - a pass some 50 km south of Three Pagodas Pass named Nat Ei Taung (Ban I Tong to the Thais).
NAT El TAUNG
Nat Ei Taung is logical in many respects. It is located on the narrowest section of the Burmese Tenasserim
division, the distance from the sea to the border being only 45 km. A shorter overland pipeline would be far easier to
defend from sabotage attacks than the longer Three Pagodas Pass and Prachuab Khirikhan routes which also have many
miles of forested hills either side of them29. Most of the way distance to the border is reasonably level on the Burmese
side, although it rises close to the border and on the Thai side before dropping down towards the town of Thong Pa
Phum nearby30. The pass is conveniently located midway between the Martaban and Yetagun gas fields which would
mean a markedly shorter and therefore cheaper, pipeline than through Three Pagodas Pass. It is also in a straighter line
to the gas fired combined cycle power generators and industrial centers located not far from Bangkok.
The route from Martaban to Nat Ei Taung is only 20 kilometers shorter than to Three Pagodas Pass, Martaban to
Three Pagodas being around 370 KM and to Nat Ei Taung 350 KM31. However, if the pipeline has to be laid to the power
generating plants in the south of Bangkok the difference in the two routes is greater with the former being around 690
KM and the latter around 620 KM. If there are eventually two pipelines, one from Martaban and the other from Yetagun,
and they were to meet and take a single route through Three Pagodas to South Bangkok the amount of pipe that would
have to be laid would be close to 1,000 kilometers. A joint route through Nat Ei Taung would be around 820 KM, a
difference of 180 KM32. This would result in a cost differential of between US$ 100- 200 million dollars33. Making the Three
Pagodas Pass route even more implausible is that it would be flanked by mountains occupied by ethnic Karen and Mon
guerrillas for at least 80 kilometers of its overland path through Burmese territory, whereas the Nat Ei Taung route would
pass through no more than 20 km of mountainous territory34.
For approximately a year contractors have been making what one observer said looked like "a four lane highway
AUG-SEPT 1993
up to Nat Ei Taung". The rea-

son given for this by a Thai army
officer to a curious aid worker
was that there was going to be
a "commercial center" devel-
oped there - an implausible,
claim given that the area is par-
ticularly remote. The only pre-
vious trade through the pass to
date has apparently been in
goods that could be carried on
the backs of porters, and there
is still dense mine strewn
roadless forest on the Tavoyan-
Karen side of the border.
If the route is to
be used for a gas pipeline, hav-
ing a heavy duty road already
built through the steeper lands
on the Thai side of the border
to the pass would mean that
as soon as the Burmese more
One of the refugee villages torched by the Thai 9th Army troops. securely occupy the area,
equipment could be brought in
easily and construction work could begin immediately. Logging companies could move straight in with their bulldozers
and start stripping the forests from alongside the pipeline route and making roads as they go. This pattern of forest
destroying activity has been previously demonstrated at Three-Pagodas Pass by the timber company of the notorious
Siahuk, a logger said to have close connections with the Thai and Burmese armies, as well as General Chavalit the Thai
Interior Minister. Incidentally, but undoubtedly not coincidentally, Siahuks brother holds a logging concession at Nat Ei
Taung15.
Nat Ei Taung was fully under the control of the Karen National Union up until December 1991. At that time
during sharp fighting SLORC troops seized several hills on the northern side of the pass and up to the border. These
troops were recently replaced by soldiers from the 409th Infantry regiment, described as a 'Special Task Force', one of 10
such regiments (a full strength Burmese regiment is said to be around 600 men.) deployed in the Tavoy area since
February. Previously there were only two light infantry regiments in the whole district. According to the Karen District
Chairman Brigadier Oliver, and independently by Mon sources, another eight regiments have been moved further south
to the Mergui area, ostensibly to provide onshore security for the Texaco led oil exploration activities, and possibly to
launch a diversionary attack on Karen rear positions in the event of an offensive against Nat Ei Taung. The SLORC troops
have reportedly been rounding up villagers and forcing them into camps close to the army controlled road, a move that
commonly presages ammunition porter duties and military offensives. It is quite conceivable that the Rangoon military
wish to clear the indigenous occupiers out of the area, along with the clearing the forest, in the approaching dry season.
A further indication that the pipeline may be routed through Nat Ei Taung is that on the 7 th of April 1993 a
border police patrol unit of the Thai 9th army took the unprecedented step of burning down two refugee villages, on
extremely short notice36. A report issued by eyewitnesses and backed up with photographs held that a high ranking
officer commanding the squad ordered the refugees to gather their possessions within 15 minutes. They were then
reportedly told This is Thailand. Only Thai people can live here. If you come here, you will be shot."37 Several hundred
refugees, most of them of Burman and Tavoyan ethnicity, fled back over the border into Burma, to take what protection
they could get from the revolutionary groups there, while others hid in the forests as they would from SLORC troops38.
Another refugee camp in the vicinity named Phat Thein was also burnt down, and several others ordered to shift
away to other sites by the Thai authorities. These include the largest ethnic Mon refugee camp named Loh Loe which
holds over 7,000 refugees. Pa Mark, Ah Lae Hsto and Ha Hloc Ka Nee39. Leaders of the affected peoples, aid workers and
a number of independent observers have expressed the opinion that the moves are related to the gas pipeline plans.
Similar activities have been taking place in the Three Pagodas Pass area. The road to the pass has also been
upgraded, and the refugee camps nearby have all been moved away to sites to the north east and south west. This has
been viewed variously as preparation for expanded trade, the pipeline, rebuilding of the old "Death Railway" and as a
diversion by the Thais and the SLORC.
AUG-SEPT 1993
RANONG
Piping the gas down to Ranong in the south of Thailand is perhaps the least sensitive option and would work
out to be only about the same length as the Nat Ei Taung route. A pipeline connecting the Martaban developments to
the Yetagun development and on down through Ranong to planned or existing combined cycle or thermal power
plants on the Southern Seaboard of Thailand would be around 850-870 KM. Several such multi billion dollar projects are
on the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand's (EGAT) drawing boards, notably a 4000 MW thermal power plant
that is likely to be built around Bang Saphan in the south of Prachuab Khirikhan Province40.
If an undersea pipeline could be laid to a plant at Bang Saphan or the Khanom generators near Surat Thani via
Ranong, the Thais and the multinationals could avoid the ethnic peoples territories altogether. These plants are designed
to take gas from the 'Joint Development Area' with Malaysia, Aceh in Northern Sumatra, and the Bongkot Field in the
Gulf of Siam. However, judging from the actions of the SLORC and the Thais in the areas of the more northerly routes it
seems likely that the route has already been chosen.
TWO PIPELINES?
It is possible that the two groups of companies would not wish to mix the gas. or join in an even more complex
supply agreement. It is also quite conceivable that EGAT, the purchaser of the gas, would want the huge gas supply to be
sent to different power generating plants so as not to concentrate too much investment in one area. From a security
angle also it would not be wise for the Thais too invest all their resources in one huge and vulnerable installation. This
could mean that two separate gas pipelines would be built, the Total/ MOGE/ Unocal/ PTTEP group pipeline going
through Nat Ei Taung or Three Pagodas Pass, and the Texaco/ MOGE/ Premier/ Nippon/ PTTEP group pipeline taking the
more southerly route. If this was the case, a total of nearly 1180 kilometres of pipeline would be laid to two widely spaced
power plants.
1. Manager magazine, April 1993: Awaiting the Third Wave'.

2. The New Light of Myanmar, 29th April 1993: 'Most Exhilarating".
3. Bangkok Post, 4 June 1993: Talks Underway to Exploit Burmese Gas'.
4. The Nation, 13 April 1993:' PTT Closer to Natural Gas Supply from Burma'.
5. The Nation, 8 March 1991: 'Junta Helps Thais in Burma Gas Deal'.
6. Manager, Sept 1991: 'Stepping on the Gas'.
7. The Nation, 3 February 1993: 'Rangoon Talks Set on Gas Line'.
8. EGAT Systems Planning Dept. Sept 1992: 'General Information; EGAT Power Development Plan PDP 92 01 (I)'.
9. The Nation. 3 June 1993: 'PTTEP Takes Oil/ Gas Fields From BP\
10. Responses to telephone calls to Texaco (K.L), Texaco (Bangkok), Premier (Bangkok); various articles.
1I. The Nation, 2 November 1992: 'Energy: Issue of Demand Vs. Supply'.
12 The Nation, 28 August 1993: 'Over40 Thai Firms Face Halt to Logging in Burma'; Bangkok Post, 31 July 1993: 'Protest
Over Border Shooting By Burmese'.
13. The Nation, 2 July 1993: 'Rangoon Slams Door on Thai Logging Deals'.
14. Financial Times Oil and Gas Yearbook, 1991. Page 296.
15. Petroleum Economist, Sepember 1981.
16 Bangkok Post, 21 July 1992: 'Burma Signs Natural Gas Exploitation Deal'.
17. Bangkok Post 21 April 1993: 'Unocal Buys Stake in Burma Gas Tracts'.
18. Manager, April 1993: 'Awaiting the Third Wave'.
19. Ibid.
20. Texaco Public Relations. 26 April 1993. Texaco Announces Second Gas/ Condensate Discovery'.
21. South East Asia Mining Letter, 11 December 1992: 'Martaban Discovery as Others Drop Eploration Rights'.
22. The Mirror, 8 October 1992: (Burmese language daily).
23. Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 6 May 1991: 'Moment of Truth Nears for Firms on Burma Oil Road'.
24. Petroleum Economist, November 1983.
25. Bangkok Post, 10 January 1993.
26. Bangkok Post, 4 March 1992,: 'PTT Studying Routes for Gas Pipeline from Burma to Thailand'.
27. Ibid
28. Ibid.
29. 1:500,000 Scale Tactical Pilotage Chart, TPC ONC K-9B, Burma, Thailand, Kampuchea. Defence Mapping Agency.
30. 1:250,000 Scale Topographical Map: Tavoy, Union of Burma; Thailand. ND 47-6, Royal Thai Survey Dept.
AUG-SEPT 1993
31.1:500,000 Scale Tactical Pilotage Chart TPC ONC K-9B, Burma, Thailand, Kampuchea. Defence Mapping Agency.
32. Ibid.
33. Bangkok Post, 4 March: 'PTT Studying Routes for Gas Pipeline from Burma to Thailand'
34. 1:250,000 Topographical Map; Ve, Union of Burma.
35. Various sources: Karen National Union officials. Thai environment movement, aid workers. Karen and Mon villagers.
Sources wished to remain anonymous; 'Mons Claim Thais Sold Them Out', The Nation, 19 Feb 1992.
36. The Nation, 18 April 1993: Thai Army Blamed as Burmese refugees Claim Villages Razed'.
37. All Burma Student Democratic Front (ABSDF) Sources.
38. The Nation, 4 May: 'Burma Refugees Make Way for Pipeline?'.
39. PPSM Newsletter, March 1993: Thai Governments Policy Drives Away Mon Refugees'; ABSDF sources, April 10-16;
New Mon State Party Official, August 25; aid workers 13 May 1993 .
40. EGAT Systems Planning Dept, September 1992: 'General Information; EGAT Power Development Plan PDP 92 01 (1).
MEGADAMS AND MINIDAMS

The eight hydro electric dams, according to the energy planners calculations, would have a power production
capacity of around 6400 megawatts, and an average annual energy output of 37,000 gigawatt hours1. The Thai energy
planners are promoting the dams as being capable of providing more than two thirds of Thailand's current energy
requirements2. They would also provide far more electricity than as Burma could currently use as well.
Involved in the planning of these projects are a variety of institutions, including on the Burmese side the SLORC
generals and the Myanma Electric Power Enterprize (MOGE), and on the Thai side the Electricity Generating Authority of
Thailand (EGAT), the National Energy Administration (NEA now called the Department of Energy Affairs) and the Thai
Prime Ministers Office. A 'Joint Working Group for the Development of Hydropower Projects on Bordering Rivers' was
established in mid 1989 after the initial approaches made to the SLORC by the then Thai Supreme Commander (now
Interior Minister in the supposedly democratic Thai government) General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh3. Others with presumed
vital interests in the developments are Thai and Burmese regional military commanders, the Japanese who have already
funded work on the projects, the Asian Development Bank who are busily advocating regional development plans and
are funding one feasibility study, and the Thai Interior Ministry's Civil Disaster Relief Centre which has created plans to
access water from the Salween River4.
Currently, the dam projects are still being discussed and studied, and no actual construction work has been
begun. None the less both countries have made agreements "to cooperate to develop the projects for mutual benefit"5,
joint working groups have been established, millions of dollars have already been spent on them, and significant stages
of the planning, study and negotiation process have been passed6. Preliminary studies for all of the dams have been
completed, along with prefeasibility and feasibility studies for a few. Feasibility studies are still underway for others, but
due to the lack of information available it is not known as yet for which ones or how far the dam plans have progressed.
The preliminary studies for all but one of the seven hydro power development projects were carried out by a
highly influential and secretive Japanese consultancy group called the Electric Power Development Corporation. This is
a "special corporation", largely funded by the Japanese government and closely connected to the self serving Japanese
Overseas Development Aid (ODA) machinery7. EPDC did the studies at the specific request of the Thai Government and
the SLORC, who asked that EPDC should "undertake the studies, without the financial input of the clients, except for
counterpart assistance"- that is that EPDC should pay for the opportunity to advocate the project plans8.
EPDC has extraordinary influence due to its direct links with the Japanese government, Keidanren, bilateral and
multilateral development banks, and the governments in the host countries. It also owns and operates a large number of
the largest power generation facilities in Japan, and is very active in engineering consulting, technical training and the
securing of large development contracts for Japanese multinational corporations such as Mitsubishi, Nissho Iwai and
Sumitomo9. The latter role, combined with it's suspicious secretiveness, indicates that EPDC operates in the same scandal-
ous manner that has led to the downfall of a third Japanese prime minister and the long reigning Liberal Democratic
Party.
The final stages of planning are the feasibility studies, during which social and environmental impart assess-
ments are carried out for some of the dams10. The results of social and environmental impart assessments ( S I A s and
EIAs), coming so late in the planning process have very little chance of influence the outcome of the projects, especially
where the studies are not made public (as in Thailand and Burma) and the decision making bodies are determined to
bypass the EIA process altogether11. To date there has been no evidence - certainly none that is available to the public -
that there has been any official and responsible analysis of the impacts of the border dams on the people who inhabit the
project areas; of their political and military implications; or of the projects environmental consequences, even though
these will plainly be of dramatic as the area is still a war zone. These concerns are apparently given lowest priority by
AUG-SEPT 1993
engineers, multilateral development investment bankers, profit seeking multinationals, and politicians who stand to gain
substantial corporate political or personal benefits from the implementation of the projects. Previous examples of large
dam projects such as the Namada Dams in India and the Tucurui Dam in Brazil, have shown that by the time ElAs and
SIAs are completed, decision-makers vested interests have developed to the point that they commonly prevail over any
objective considerations of social or environmental impact, or even simple cost benefit analysis of economic viability.
I. International Water Power and Dam Construction, October 1992: Thai-Myanmar Joint Hydro Schemes'. S. Boonpiraks,
Assistant General Manager, Project Feasibility Division. Hydro Power Engineering Department. EGAT.
2 Bangkok Post, 23 June 1992: 'EGAT Studies Building Dams On Burma Border'
3. Bangkok Post, 18 December 1989: Thai-Burmese Hydro Elec
tricity Project Agreed'; The Nation, 26 October 1991: 'Dam ming
Burma For Thailand?'
4. The Nation, 25 September 1992: 'EGATTo Have More Talks On
Burma Water"
5. International Water Power and Dam Construction, October
1992: Thai-Myanmar Joint Hydro Schemes'. S. Boonpiraks, Assis -
tant General Manager, Project Feasibility Division, Hydro Power
Engineering Department, EGAT.
6. The Nation, 13 October 1992: 'EGAT Studies Hydro Plant'
7. EPDC Promotional Literature, 1983. Electric Power Develop
ment Co., Ltd.
8. International Water Power and Dam Construction. October
1992: Thai-Myanmar Joint Hydro Schemes'. S. Boonpiraks, As
sistant General Manager, Project Feasibility Division, Hydro
Power Engineering Department, EGAT.
9. EPDC Promotional Literature, 1983. Electric Power Develop
ment Co., Ltd.
10.The Nation, 13 October 1992: 'EGAT Studies Hydro Plant'
11.The Nation, 8 June 1993: 'EGAT Plans Boost In Reserve'
THE UPPER SALWEEN

Wounded being evacuated from Saw Hta- during
the SLORC's "ceasefire". November 1992
DAM
The Salween River rises in the cold high Tibetan Plateau sev-
eral hundred of kilometers north of Lhasa, and runs a turbulent course down through deep and rugged gorges to the
Andaman Sea at Moulmein. The river is one of the five major rivers that run down from the mountains of Tibet, the others
being the better known Yangtse, Mekong, Brahmaputra and Yellow Rivers. According to the plans of the Thais, the
SLORC, and the multinational institutions that are collaborating with them, the Salween is slated to have two dams
blocking its flow, one of them the colossal Upper Salween Dam.
According to the desk study carried out by EGAT this giant construction would have an installed generating
capacity of 4,540 megawatts and an estimated annual energy production around 30,000 gigawatt hours'. This is more
than double the 2,250 megawatts of electricity produced by all of the 21 existing hydro electric dams in Thailand put
together and is nearly five times the size of the largest dam in Thailand in terms of power generation2 It would be
among the largest dams in the world, and would be the largest in South East Asia(?J.
It would be located 76 kilometers upstream from the confluence of the Salween and Moei Rivers3. The 166
metre high dam4 will be fed by a 2,000 kilometer long river with a catchment area of nearly 300,000 square kilometers,
only 17,920 km2 of which is Thai territory5. Almost the entire flood zone of the dam would be in Burmese territory,
covering probably more than 1,000 km2 of the little flat and fertile riperian land that exists in the Karenni and Shan
States6 According to Thai plans, a large proportion of the water from the high dam is to be channeled off to dams in
Thailand7. Some of these features and what they imply, even without the realities of the Burmese civil war, make the dam
an unacceptable venture.
AUG-SEPT 1993
THE SLORC'S VERY OFFENSIVE CEASEFIRE

rs to have been overlooked by the Thais - seemingly as a deliberate part of its so-called
One reality that appear:
'constructive engagement'
policy approach - is that coop-
erating with the SLORC in de-
velopment projects will make
them accessories to whatever
human rights abuses and other
crimes the SLORC perpetrates in
the process of "developing" the
area.
At present it looks as
though by the time the dam
construction begins, the Karen
and Karenni people from the re-
gion surrounding the Salween
Dam site will have all been ei-
ther driven into refugee camps
in Thailand, forced into the re-
location villages or concentra-
tion camps set up by the
SLORC, forced to take shelter in
the remaining 'Liberated Areas'
controlled by the revolutionary Laying waste to the forests. Teak offcuts thrown into the river by a Thai company.
groups - or "eliminated"8. Massive deforestation promises massive erosion and siitation.
In October 1992 the
SLORC army launched a large
military operation against the Democratic Alliance of Burma forces to occupy areas including the site of the planned
dam9. The offensive involved thousands of troops from four light infantry battalions, some 2.000 plus enslaved ammuni-
tion porters, and bombings by the Burmese airforce. After months of bloody fighting the SLORC managed to capture Hti
Mu Ki and Saw Hta, but had not managed to either cut off the Karens access to the two Karen districts further north or to
occupy the gorge that runs down from Kyauk Hnga to Wei Gyi, at the lower end of which the dam is presumably to be
constructed.
At the time of writing this report there are some 70,000 "displaced people" from various Burmese ethnic nation-
ality groups housed in flimsy temporary shelters in refugee camps scattered along the Thai - Burmese border10. Several
thousand of these come from the Saw Ha, Hti Mu Ki, and Pasawng townships which are now occupied by the soldiers
of the regime. It is probable that there are thousands more internally displaced people hiding in the forests near their
former villages and cultivations as is usual elsewhere throughout the border regions the SLORC tenuously controls.
It is ironic that it was in the middle of this offensive that the SLORC Foreign Minister, U Ohn Gyaw, swore to the
gathered representatives to the United Nations General Assembly that all offensive operations in the Karen State had
been suspended, and that SLORC troops were observing a unilateral ceasefire11.
FLOODING AND SILTATI0N

The great majority of the flood zone of the planned dam is to be in Burma, covering part of northern Kawthoolei
(Karen State), splitting Kayah (Karenni) State in two and stretching up into the Shan State12. The floodwaters will also
inundate parts of the Salawin Wildlife Sanctuary, the only part of Thailand that will go under the waters.
With a high and low water level variation of 57 metres, and a dam wall height of 166 metres13, the flood zone
for the dam will be vast. It is reasonable to assume that over a thousand square kilometers - give or take a hundred
depending on the exact location of the dam - of some of the richest riparian and forest land in Karenni State will be
submerged beneath more than 140 metres of water and silt. Along with the forests will go the lands, homes and
cultivations of the already or soon to be displaced - or annihilated - indigenous Karen and Karenni peoples. In the flood
zone and surrounding hills live many different tribes, including some whom anthropologists have hardly any knowledge
of at all.
In addition to the hundreds of square kilometers of land submerged at the high water level under what would
AUG-SEPT 1993
THE UPPER SALWEEN FLOOD ZONE
WATERFALL
MAJOR TOWN
VILLAGE
MOUNTAIN PEAK
INTERNATIONAL
BOUNDARY
MAJOR ROAD
WILDLIFE SANCTUARY
BOUNDARY
RIVER
DAM FLOOD AREA
DAM WALL
CANALS AND TUNNELS

(POSSIBLE)
GAS FIELDS, DAMS AND
POSSIBLE PIPELINE'
ROUTES i
1. MAESAI
2. MAE NAM KOK
3. UPPER SALWEEN
4. LOWER SALWEEN
5. MAE NAM 1
6. MAE NAM 2
7. MAE NAM 3
8. KLONG KRA BURI
OIL CONCESSION AREA

POSSIBLE PIPELINE
ROUTE
EXISTING PIPELINE
GASFIELD/OILFIELD
POWER STATION
HYDRO ELECTRIC DAM
POSSIBLE WATER
DIVERSION ROUTE
SLORC BASE
WILDLIFE SANCTUARY
be normal conditions after the dam was built, low lying lands for many kilometers upstream are likely to be subjected to
worsening periodic flooding as the massive silt load the Salween carries settles as it comes to the stilled waters14.
The amount of sediment suspended in the particularly fast flowing and turbulent waters of the Salween River
can only be guessed at without a scientific analysis. However; judging by the massive sand dunes that build at the
backswirls and the few sheltered sections of the river every year when the river is high - and that gradually crumble into
and disappear down the river when it is low, the amount would be in the millions of tons The Salween remains muddy
brown with suspended particles even through most of the six month long dry season during which most other rivers
along the border or in Thailand become clear. The river presumably collects most of this load in the high and denuded
watersheds of the Himalayas, a load that is probably now being greatly supplemented by the rapid defoliation of the
Tibetan and Shan Plateaus and the mountain ranges of Yunnan by Chinese loggers15. The vigorous roadmaking efforts of
the Chinese as they try to open up routes to the south for their economic invasion of South East Asia may also add to the
rivers burden16. The large scale logging by Thai timber companies in the Shan, Karen and Karenni States will certainly
have resulted in an increase in erosion and the amount of silt born by the river as well.
The huge and doubtlessly increasing quantity of sediments coming down the river would drastically shorten the
life span of the dam and its machinery, possibly to the point that its useful life will be shorter than the time required to
repay the loans taken out for its construction17. The silt would cause technical complications for the hydrological engi-
neers, rapidly abrading turbines and other moving parts of machinery, and generally clogging up the works. More
importantly, up to the present there appears to be no efficient cost effective and environmentally sound way to clear
dams of the millions of tons of sediment that they inevitably collect.
The methods currently being employed to clear dams that have become clogged with silt at the 'delta' end
i.e. the end where the water enters the dam reservoir at which a delta -like formation comprised of the heavier sediments
usually forms) is to use fossil fuel powered dredges to physically remove the sediment, or to lower the water levels to
achieve an effect called 'retrogressive scouring'. In this process the water flowing faster from the higher level to the lower
level in the dam erodes the accumulated silt deeper into the dam reservoir18. This may partially clear the blockage at the
mouth of the dam, but it naturally contributes to the filling of the reservoir with more silt.
It is quite conceivable that as a result of the silting up and other factors, the development project would end up
being a massive financial burden on both Thailand and Burma as well as being a social and environmental catastrophe.
It is not difficult to envision the dam being choked up by silt well before the huge cost of building it is repaid.
THE GREATEST FLUSH TOILET IN THE WORLD

One of the more incredible features of the dam plans is the stated intention of some of the Thai politicians to
divert huge amounts of water from the Salween to the Chaophraya River. According to one newspaper report, they
apparently wish the dam to be built high enough that they will be able to divert up to 30 percent of the water in the
Salween - i.e. potentially some 40 billion cubic meters per year - through and around two mountain ranges to the Ping
River, a major tributary of the Chaophraya19. This would require a system of massive tunnels and canals over 100 kilome-
ters long20. The greater part of the distance would presumably be underground as the first series of mountain ranges the
water would have to be taken through is well over two thousand feet high at the lowest point while the second massive
set of mountains is no less than 3,500 feet high21. Such is the logic of the planners that pumping the massive amount of
water over the mountain ranges has also been considered as an option22.
There are two primary reasons for this seemingly ridiculous and expensive engineering feat. The first is to supply
water to a large multi purpose dam called the Bhumiphol Dam23. This dam is facing perennial water shortages, clearly a
result of the massive deforestation of the watersheds in Thailand24. This has been caused mostly by the rapacious logging
industry, the increased cultivation of sloping lands for cash crops, and the unchecked and largely ignored annual forest
fires. The Bhumiphol Dam, which is named after the Thai king, is the second biggest in Thailand, providing 535 MW of
electricity to the national grid, and water to the central plains for paddy cultivation25. The energy authorities are therefore
presumably trebly anxious to keep it running - undoubtedly prompted by the desire to preserve the less than shiny image
of their expensive and often controversial dams.
The second major reason for the plans to divert water from the Salween to the Ping River is that the Chaophraya
River, "the River of Kings", has become so badly polluted with the filth of the industrial society they have developed that
the Thai authorities wish to have enough water be able to periodically flush it out - like a huge latrine. At a 1990
workshop on the quality of the river, Thai scientists and public health officials revealed that an almost unbelievable 800
million cubic metres of household waste and 800,000 tons of hazardous industrial waste is dumped into the river every
year26. Somewhat ironically, the construction of the Salween Dam and the diversion of the water from it to wash the
poisons into the seas - which would cause huge damage to the ecosystems of the Salween River and no good to the Gulf
of Siam - was referred to as a 'conservation measure' by one of the Thai Ministers27.
It appears that Thai technocrats would rather spend billions of dollars on high tech and morally deficient rem-
AUG-SEPT 1993
edies to their country's environmental and energy problems instead of effectively addressing their root causes. If they
could:
Control the corruption ridden, politically connected and military affiliated logging industry,
Give secure land title and income security to the rural peoples including the hill peoples while helping them imple-
ment ecologically sound agro-horticultural and silvicultural practises,
Seriously implement a program to prevent, control and educate about the destructiveness of the largely ignored
annual forest fires, and
Adopt - or readopt - life styles and development models that are not based solely on assumptions of limitless growth of
profits, endless consumption and heedless waste, the forests would heal themselves rapidly, the rains would fall more
reliably, and the rivers would be restored to life. These relatively simple steps however, would undoubtedly not be
considered "progressive" enough....
1. International Water Power and Dam Construction, October 1992: Thai-MyanmarJointHydroSchemes'. S. Boonpiraks,
Assistant General Manager, Project Feasibility Division, Hydro Power Engineering Department, EGAT.
2. Introduction to EGAT's Hydro Power Development. April 1989. Public Relations Department.EGAT.
3. International Water Power and Dam Construction, October 1992: Thai-MyanmarJointHydroSchemes'. S. Boonpiraks,
Assistant General Manager, Project Feasibility Division, Hydro Power Engineering Department, EGAT; Bangkok Post. 23
June 1992.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.; Introduction to EGAT's Hydro Power Development, April 1989.
6. 1:500,000 Scale, Tactical Pilotage Chart, TPC J-l 0C. Burma, Laos, Thailand. Defense mapping Agency.
7. The Nation, 26 October 1991; The Nation, 8 July 1992: Thailand Looking To Burma For Water'; The Nation, 25
September 1992: 'EGAT To Have More Talks On Burma Water"
8. The Nation, 21 May 1993: 'Clinton Urges Burma to Free Suu Kyi, Others"
9. The Nation, 9 November 1992: 'SLORC Rebuts Amnesty Report'
10. Burmese Border Consortium, December 1992. Burmese Border Camp Locations with Population Figures (Map)
12.1:500,000 Scale Tactical Pilotage Chart, TPC J-10C. Burma, Laos, Thailand. Defense mapping Agency.
13. International Water Power and Dam Construction, October 1992: Thai-Myanmar Joint Hydro Schemes'. S. Boonpiraks,
14. Damming The Three Gorges: What the Dam Planners Don't Want You To Know. A Critique of the Three Gorges
Prefeasibility Study 1990. Edited By Grainne Ryder. Probe International, 1990.
15. Draft Report, John McKinnon, Tribal Research Institute.9 June 1993.
16. Burma Alert, June 1993, No.6, Vol.4.
17. Damming the Three Gorges: What the Dam Planners Don't Want You To Know. A Critique of the Three Gorges
18. Ibid.
19. The Nation. 26 October 1991:' Damming Burma for Thailand'
20. 1:500,000 Scale Tactical Pilotage Chart. TPC J-10C. Burma, Laos, Thailand. Defense mapping Agency.
21. Ibid
22. The Nation, 8 July 1992: Thailand Looking To Burma For Water'
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Introduction to EGAT's Hydro Power Development, April 1989
26. Asia Pacific Environment Newsletter APEN Vol.7, No. 1, February 1992: The River of Kings Flows To Its Death'
27. The Nation, 8 July 1992.
THE OTHER SEVEN MORE DAMS

Seven other dams ranging in size from 12.5 MW up to 792 MW have been studied and discussed at length by
the SLORC and the Thais. The planned dams include a 130 MW project for the Kra River in the southernmost tip of Burma
that flows into the Andaman Sea at Ranong; three dams on the curiously north flowing Moei (Than Lwin) River sized 110
MW, 231 MW, and 288 MW the closer they are to the rivers confluence with the Salween River; one of 294 MW on the
Nam Hkok River in the far north above Chiang Rai; a small 12.5 MW dam on the Mae Sai River that runs into the Mekong
River; and the second largest dam on the turbulent Salween1.
AUG-SEPT 1993
THE LOWER SALWEEN DAM: TWO POSSIBILITIES

The 49 metre high, 379 metre wide Lower Salween Dam, while dwarfed by the collosal dam planned for Wei
Gyi (or possibly above), would itself dwarf the largest dams existing in Thailand in terms of power generation2.
Although EGAT officials have indicated that this dam is to be located 30 kilometers upstream from Thu Mwei Hta,
the Karen name for the junction of the Salween and Moei rivers, this seems to be a case of deliberate dissembling3. In the
area indicated by the officials there appear to be no suitable sites for a dam, let alone one of the width and height
described in the EGAT releases. In addition to this obvious point, the Upper Salween Dam would only be a mere 46
kilometers up the river on a relatively slow moving stretch of the river that has no marked drop in elevation4. This would
mean that water from the lower dam could easily reach back to the generating rooms of the upper dam. According to
the figures given by EGATs Assistant General Manager, the high water level of the lower dam has been calculated at
having an elevation of 85 metres (above sea level) while the high water level of the 166 metre high upper dam is only
135 metres higher at 220 metres5. There is something very obviously wrong with this as it means that the top of the dam
wall would never be less than 31 metres (100 feet) above the water level, making the dam much higher than necessary.
The 220 metre maximum elevation for the flood waters is a very understandable limit - if it is higher than this the flood
waters of the Upper Salween dam would back right up into the Mae Hong Son valley6, flooding out the provincial
capital. This would naturally not be politically acceptable to the Thais, although they think nothing of flooding out the
Karen peoples. It is therefore much more plausible that the Lower Salween Dam will be much further down the Salween
River, at a location where the river is narrow, where there is plenty of room for a water storage reservoir; and where there
is room to raise the water level as high as possible.
There are two other potential sites for the lower dam that make much more sense. One is some eleven kilome-
ters up from the confluence of the two rivers, while the other is approximately 25 km downstream.
THE GORGE
The upstream location, as with the Upper Salween Dam site near Wei Gyi, is a gorge flanked by steep slopes on
either bank of the river. The water flows rapidly through here, particularly in the 6-7 month long dry season when the
water levels are lowered by up to 12 metres to reveal remarkable water- carved rocks, some of which are limestone while
others are of a harder bedrock. These create a set of rapids with a roughly estimated elevational drop of 5-8 metres over
a two kilometer distance - a factor dam makers would no doubt find hard to ignore. The natural beauty of the gorge is
considerable.
According to Bomu Wa Hein. a retired Karen officer who said he had been keeping track of such plans for many
years, the United Nations Development Program had evaluated this site for a dam as long ago as the mid 1950's7. It is
widely believed by the Karens that a wire cable strung across the river at the top of this gorge was put there to indicate
the flood height of the dam and to take measurements of the water levels during the dry and monsoon seasons.
There would be numerous negative impacts from locating a dam on this stretch of the river. As with other dams
it would be cut off trade and communication routes for the local people. It would also flood out Mae Sam Laep (Saw Lei
Hta). a border trading town with a majority Karen population that serves villages for many miles up and downstream,
including up into the Karenni State. The cutting of the Karen lines of supply and communication by the installation of a
dam on the river would be a great military advantage to the SLORC army, fulfilling one of the objectives of the notorious
"Four Cuts" counter insurgency policy8 (It is presumed however that the Thais will wait until the rapidly growing SLORC
armed forces have already annihilated opposition in the area before beginning construction).
This dam would also flood many square kilometers of previously exceptionally fertile teak forest land (now
heavily logged over) and a considerable area of the little level farm land in the border area. A very large number of
indigenous Karen people would be displaced from here, and as at the other dam sites in Burma would almost certainly
receive absolutely no compensation from the Burmese government. Thousands of refugees would also be forced to
move again.
THE FALLS
The second potential dam site is a truly extraordinary place. It is also only a few kilometers away from one of the
most fiercely fought over pieces of land in all of Burma, the internationally known HtiPaWiKyo (Sleeping Dog Hill), now
occupied by SLORC troops9.
The river down from Thu Mwei Hta drops dramatically, passing over one set of powerful rapids, past a wide and
fertile stretch of paddyfields and lowland forest overlooked by HtiPaWiKyo, and down a second set of extremely danger-
ous rapids that only two or three of the most skilful Karen boat drivers in their powerful longtail boats can negotiate. The
water drops at least ten meters in a space of less than 500 metres, a fearful sight even from the river bank, and an
exhilarating experience for those few who have been down it by boat. During the dry season of 1991-1992 the rocks
AUG-SEPT 1993
beside the rapids were very noticably embellished with the wreckage of one of the brightly coloured longtail boats, a
grim reminder of the price paid for lack of skill.
The dam would not be on this section of river however, some ten kilometres down from the second rapid is the
waterfall, and it is the strength of this that the powermongers would like to harness.
The waterfall on the Salween River is awesome. Located at the edge of the old Kahilu Wildlife Sanctuary that was
established during the colonial era, the falls are flanked by steep forest covered ridges that tower up to 1,000 metres
above the river Huge teak trees remain along the banks, protected from loggers by the minefields further down the river
and the sheer inaccessibility of the site. The waterfall itself is not so high, dropping around 15-18 metres. Never-the-less,
the sight and sound of more than 4,000 cubic metres of water per second shooting over the edge and smashing into
froth below is unforgettable.
If the SLORC, the Thais and the Japanese are planning to make the dam here, the reasons for secrecy regarding
the site would be abundantly clear. Memories of the hundreds who died for HtiPaWiKyo and associations with the
intense fighting for control of this area would not look good on the public relations record, and would certainly stir great
bitterness for the Karens. Indeed, the dam planners could very well look forward to bearing very strong - and very much
justified - international condemnation.
A dam here would flood the lower parts of the Kahilu Wildlife Sanctuary, all the Mae Pru and Mae Pa plains, and
the town of Mae Le Hta. The wildlife sanctuary is one of the few areas throughout the where wildlife has any effective
protection due to illegal and legal wildlife trading, hunting, deforestation and other factors. Protected areas cover only
1.25% of Burma's landmass, one of the smallest proportions in Asia10. Even in the few wildlife sanctuaries that do exist in
Burma logging is officially permitted and is carried out by the Myanmar Forest Dept11. Kahilu, being in one of the the
most fought over areas of the border has been spared the loggers, but wildlife has suffered from landmines and the fierce
clashes between Karen and Burmese commandos within the sanctuary.
THE KLONG KRA BURI DAM

The one of the two most advanced of the projects is that planned for the Klong Kra Buri stream, for which a
detailed two year feasibility study is now half completed. The study was paid for with 35 million baht (USS 1.4 million)
provided by the Asian Development Bank, a grant that may have violated the sanctions on new funding for projects in
Burma12 Prior to the latest study five years of analyses had been carried out13. The Klong Kra Buri dam is the only one of
the eight that the Japanese EPDC group did not prepare the preliminary studies for14.
The dam, which according to a brief article in The Nation newspaper would be paid for entirely by Thai tax and
electricity bill payers, is expected to be completed by 199915. Electricity from the dam would be supplied both to Victoria
Point (Kawthaung) in Burma which currently relies on diesel generators, and to Thai cities in the area.
The bulk of the flood zone, as with the Upper Salween Dam, would be in Burma, covering what was formerly
part of the Pakchan Permanent Reserve Forest16. This area was until recently one of the best preserved areas of moist
tropical evergreen rainforest in Burma, the most species diverse type of forest in the world. This was pointed out by a
group of wildlife specialists who were working under the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) to
survey areas suitable for inclusion into a system of wildlife sanctuaries and national parks17. The creation of the proposed
Pakchan Wildlife Sanctuary on the western side of the watershed was recommended as being of highest priority by the
IUCN in 1990, due to the rarity of this kind of forest in Burma, its wealth of highly endangered wildlife and remarkable
landscape features18. Regretably, the SLORC granted logging concessions to several Thai logging companies in the
Pakchan forest19, and the area has now been severely deforested.
Karen National Liberation Army commandos are active throughout the areas to be inundated and on the seas
and islands off the coast. The SLORC has gained significant military advantage by destroying their refuges in the forested
hills with the help of the Thai timber companies, and would gain even further advantage by having a large part of the
remaining area flooded out.
The proposed dam site is also near to the disputed "Hill 491" over which Thai and Burmese troops apparently
came close to war in late 1992 after Burmese troops refused to leave the hilltop which was claimed by the Thais as being
in their territory20. This was one of a great many incidents in which the SLORC troops violated Thai territorial integrity, but
is one of the few in which the Thai army showed an eagerness to defend their soil against them.
THE NAM MAE SAI HYDRO POWER PLANT

The small Nam Mae Sai (Nam Ruak) project will possibly be the first of the dams to be implemented The
feasibility study for this small dam has already been completed by the Myanma Electric Power Enterprise (MEPF). the first
of the eight to be ready. This would supply a limited amount of power to the border towns of Tachilek and Mae Sai.
possibly also Keng Tung, a supply that would be greatly boosted when (and if) the nearby Nam Mae Kok Hydro Power
AUG-SEPT 1993
project is completed. Tachilek in the "Golden Triangle" was fairly recently opened to tourists, and is expected to be
opened up further as and when the "Asia Highway" routes up to Yunnan are completed, and if the proposed new four
nation free trade area agreements involving Burma, China. Thailand and Laos called the "Growth Rectangle" are imple-
mented21 . The demand for electricity in the previously neglected and underdeveloped Shan States is likely to rise dramati-
cally with the influx of tourists and traders.
A number of the former revolutionary groups in the Shan State have for the present accepted the SLORC's Pax
Burmanica ceasefire terms (having had little alternative), along with the SLORC's UNDP backed 'Border Area Develop-
ment' program22. (The SLORC has a way with
acronyms - first its own suitably goblinesque
name, and then the 'BAD' program!). The small
Mae Sai hydro power scheme fits into BAD well,
so it is therefore likely given high priority by the
regime.
The future of the project is not cer-
tain however, some of the indigenous groups in
the region have shown signs of intense dissatis-
faction with the junta. The powerful Wa ethnic
group may not remain quiescent for long, the
SLORC's ongoing excesses and broken promises
have angered their leaders, and other ethnic
nationalities such as the Palaung, Lahu, Akha and
Pa-oh are chafing at being confined, in strategic
hamlets, having their sons forced into the SLORC
army, forced labour programs and the seizure of
villagers for forced porter service in the border
combat zones23. It is quite possible that the re-
gion, in spite of its present relative peacefulness,
will explode back into violence, forcing the
postphonement of the project.
THE MAE KOK DAM

The Mae Kok Dam is to built across
the Nam Hkok river, a tributary of the Mae Nam
Kok river The Nam Hkok is the only river that
flows out of Burmese territory and into Thailand.
The probable location for the 294 MW Mae Kok
scheme is right on the border of the two coun-
tries in the narrow pass between two massive
peaks, one of them being Doi Phahunpook,
which reaches up 2.3 kilometers (7,497') to be
the second highest mountain in Thailand. The
Nam Hkok flows off the cold ridges around into
a high valley before pouring through the nar-
row pass and down 5 km into the valley to join
A beautiful Karenni woman. Karenni State will be cut in half by the the larger Mae Kok River in Chiang Rai Province
dams and much of the most fertile land flooded. How many will of Thailand21. The Nam Hkok River like the bet-
lose their ancestral lands? ter known Moei River, can be waded across with
some difficulty during the six month long dry sea-
son, but swells into a deep, wild and muddy torrent during the monsoon rains.
The occupants of the valley floor are presently Shan affiliated with Mong Tai Army led by the Khun Sa of interna-
tional repute. The MTA currently controls the pass which is reputedly one of many heroin smuggling routes. Most of the
hills around are controlled by the fierce Wa people, who intermittently clash with the Shan MTA. The Wa share the hills
with yet another ethnic group called the Lahu. The impoverished villagers make taungya (slash and burn) farms on the
steep hillsides to grow hill paddy and opium poppies as a means of subsistence.
The United Wa State Party, fielding an army estimated at 20,000 strong, formerly comprised most of the com-
mon soldiery of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) is one of the largest opium producing groups in Burma. The Wa split
AUG-SEPT 1993
from the CPB in 1989, and suffering from a severe lack of food and ammunition, subsequently signed a ceasefire agree-
ment with the opportunistic SLORC on the basis of virtual bribes in the form of promises of recognition of a Wa State,
food, ammunition, and United Nations backed development of the isolated area. There was also a crucial arrangement
made relating to the production and trafficking of heroin. Interestingly, the leader of the UWSP recently accused the
SLORC military intelligence chief Gen. Khin Nyunt of manipulating them and of being heavily involved in the drug
traffic25.
Damming the Nam Hkok would mean the construction of all weather service roads through the pass, effectively
putting permanent control of the route (and with it the opportunity to secure a massive income) in the hands of the
SLORC. It would also require the removal of the Shans from the valley, many of whom are civilians, and much greater
SLORC control over the unhappy Wa. This would not happen easily, the Wa have already indicated the end to their
cooperation with the SLORC, and the MTA would almost certainly fight to retain control of the pass.
MAE NAM MOEI 1, 2 AND 3 PROJECTS

The exact planned locations of the three dams on the Moei River are very unclear. This is because the EGAT
officials seem to have been deliberately vague as to where they are supposed to be, as with the Lower Salween Dam,
and doubtless for the same reasons26. This dissembling is not limited to EGAT officials, it is also noticeable that PTTEP and
Foreign Ministry officials dealing with the gas pipeline route have been similarly unclear27. In the case of the dams along
the Moei/ Thaungyin River the reasons for this are not difficult to guess: along its banks are the most important bastions
of the pro democracy armed forces and the Karen revolution - a revolution which is by no means overyet.The stretches
of river likely to be impacted are densely populated with the original indigenous inhabitants of the Moei River valley, as
well as some 30,000 thousand of those who have been displaced to the 'Liberated Areas' and to Thailand over the long
years of struggle28. Resistance to the "development" of the area would be better organised and more intense if the
people who were to be most directly affected were aware of the impacts and implications.
The two lower dams on the Moei and the Lower Salween Dam would effectively flood out most of the heart-
land of the Karen revolutionaries territory. Among the places that may be inundated is Manerplaw, the headquarters of
the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) and the seat of the parallel government called the NCGUB. Several successive
military offensives by the far superior SLORC forces have failed to take Manerplaw due to the dogged resistance of the
DAB forces. The whole greater Manerplaw area, which can be said to encompass the areas that will be impacted by the
three dams, is extremely important to the aims of the wide variety of pro-democracy groups who rely on it as a stable
base area and as a place where they can organize unified opposition to the dictatorship. They can therefore be expected
to fight bitterly against the proposed projects which can be considered a direct threat to their existences, homes and
cause.
For those living on the Thai side of the border there would be significant dispossession of lands. Not surprisingly,
most of the people to be affected will be Karen, who make up by far the largest proportion of owners and occupants of
lands in this section of the border. The Thai government does not have a good record on compensation issues - as Thai
Karens in the way of the dams built in the Sangklaburi - Kanchanaburi areas can relate. For the many refugees who have
fled to the safety of Thailand over the past eight years the situation will be worse. They will probably be forced to move
again if they have not already been sent back by the time construction begins - possibly they will be forcibly repatriated.
The environmental impacts of the three Moei river dams and the Lower Salween dam would be different in
some respects from those caused by the Upper Salween dam. In these areas there are more people, and the locations are
more highly developed. The forests here have been more heavily logged by the large number of Thai logging companies
who have been very active in the area since the SLORC sold them concessions in 198929. The areas that would be
flooded are of relatively little wildlife conservation value due to deforestation, hunting, population pressure and pro-
longed fighting. However, they are home to large numbers of indigenous people who to a large degree still depend on
what forests remain, collecting forest products such as bamboo shoots, honey, medicinal plants and a wide variety of
wild foods. Much of the fertile riverside land with its abundance of edible and saleable plants will be lost with the rising
waters, depriving many of the indigenous peoples remaining in the area of their means of subsistence.
Pollution and siltation are minor and long term considerations weighed against the ongoing human disaster,
but are never the less factors to be considered. The rapid deforestation in the border area, combined with the careless
construction of logging roads and the heavy monsoon rains, has inevitably resulted in increased erosion. There has not
yet been a significant build up of silt along the river, but with the stopping of its flow what silt it bears will surely be
deposited in the dams. The soil in much of the Moei River valley is of an easily erodible sandy texture which is easily
AUG-SEPT 1993
washed away in the tropical downpours. During the rainy season the river is deep brown with suspended soil particles
In the relatively extensive flat lands around Mae Sot and Mae Ramat, Thai farmers make liberal use of the same
agricultural chemicals that have contributed to the near death of the Chaophraya River.
The risk of poisons collecting in the dammed waters is height-
ened by the presence of a number of old tin mines which may be
partially submerged by the floodwaters, with the potential of heavy
metals leaching out and entering into the food chain30. These
factors, combined with the anaerobic decomposing of plant ma-
terial in the flood zones, could also lead to a short useful life for
the dams, and a long baneful one as monolithic edifices to the
callous myopia of modern man if they become silted up, poison-
ous and fetid swamps.
1992: Thai-Myanmar Joint Hydro Schemes'. S. Boonpiraks, Assis-
Engineering Department, EGAT.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. 1:250.000 Topographical Map, Amphoe Li, Thailand; Burma.
Royal Thai Survewy Dept. ND 46-4; 1:500,000 Scale Tactical Pilot-
age Chart TPC J-IOC: Burma, Thailand, Laos. Defense Mapping
Agency.
1992: Thai-Myanmar Joint Hydro Schemes'. S. Boonpiraks, Assis-
Engineering Department. EGAT.
6.1:100,000 Scale Tactical Topographical Map, Ywathit E-47-28,
Chinese Military Map.
7. Interview with Major Wa Hein, March 1992
Texaco's Yetagon No. 2 Testwell spewing hundreds 8. Mya Yadana, August 1992: War; Logging and Development'
of tons of pollutants into the air dally. 9. The Nation, 16 March 1992,: 'Burmese Capture Karen Strong-
hold'
10. Forestry Situation In Myanmar, October 1989. Forestry Department, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Union of
Myanmar,
11. FAO, 1983. Nature Conservation and National Parks. Interim Report.
12. The Nation. 13 October. 1992: 'EGAT Studies Burma Dams'.
13. Ibid.
14. Bangkok Post, 23 June 1992: 'EGAT Studies Building Dams On the Burma Border'.
15. The Nation, 13 October 1992,'EGAT Studies Burma Dams'.
16. National Energy Administration. Klong Kra Buri Project Preliminary Study Report, 1989.
17. FAO, 1983. Nature Conservation and National Parks. Interim Report.
18. The Conservation Atlas of Tropical Forests, Asia and the Pacific. World Conservation Monitoring Centre, IUCN, BP
Macmillan 1991
19. List of Sale Contracts Signed Between Forest Dept of the Union of Myanmar and Thai Timber Companies. December
1989. Embassy of the Union of Myanmar: Poo Jad Karn Magazine, 18-24 December 1989.
20. The Nation, 4 December 1992: 'Gun Pledges Affirmative Air Force Action On Hill'; Bangkok Post, 20 November
1992:Talks Fail To Decide Who Owns Hill 492'
21 Bangkok Post, 4 July 1993: 'Rangoon Approves International Road Studies'; The Nation, 11 April 1993: 'New Fron
tiers Opening To Business'
22. 'Measures Taken For the Development of the Border Areas and National Races', 1989-1992. Ministry of Border
Areas and National races
23. Far Eastern Economic Review, I July 1993: 'Opium Growers Offer to Stop Growing Opium'
24. 1:500,000 Scale Tactical Pilotage Chart, TPC J-I0C. Burma, Laos, Thailand. Defense Mapping Agency.
25. USIS, 4 March 1992. Official text. Burma Chapter. US State Departments 1992 International Narcotics Strategy Report;
Asian Wall Street Journal, 12 December 1989: 'Burma: Getting Drug policy Right'
AUG-SEPT 1993
27. The Nation. 4 May 1993: 'Burma Refugees Make Way For Pipeline?'
28. Map, Burmese Border Camps with Population Figures, December 1992. Burmese Boder Consortium
29. Embassy of The Union of Myanmar, December 1989. Map Showing Timber Concession Areas. Burmese-Thai Border
30. Damming The Three Gorges: What the Dam builders Don't Want You To Know. Ed. Grainne Ryder, 1990
ENVIRONMENTAL DEVASTATION
The massive scale and the nature of the proposed development projects would ensure very considerable negative
environmental impact if they are allowed to proceed as planned. Vast tracts of forest land, and land used by the local
villagers for their homes and cultivations would be flooded by the dams. The natural ecosystems of these areas would be
irrevocably altered causing widespread disruption to numerous lifeforms. Road making, and the legal or illegal logging
that accompanies or precedes it, will inevitably result in the rapid degradation of other formerly remote and pristine forest
areas.
Logging has already been especially intensive at several of the known locations of the dams and through one
area. Three Pagodas Pass, that was previously announced as a planned route for the gas pipeline. New roads into virgin
forest areas such as the one to Nat Ei Taung, the presumed new route for the gas pipeline, will contribute significantly to
Burma's exceptionally high deforestation rate. This was said to the 3rd highest in the world at around 8,000 square
kilometers per year (Myers 1989)1 but which is now, with the Chinese, Thai, Burmese and other concessions, conceivably
up to 10,000 square kilometers per year. Much of the deforestation and erosion in Burma goes hand in hand with road
making, both as a direct impact of road construction activities themselves; "legal" or "illegal" logging; increases in the
number of deliberate, accidental or incidentally caused forest fires as a result of the opening and drying up of the forest-
encroachment for cultivation; by making firewood collection easier; and because of strategic clearance for security
reasons. In relation to the latter it is reported to be common for forest cover either side of militarily useful road and river
access routes in Burma to be stripped away (sometimes by forced labourers) for up to a mile either side of the route to
prevent surprise attacks from saboteurs. This is reported to have happened along much of the 90 kilometers from Three
Pagodas Pass to Thanbyuzayat, with up to 200 square kilometers having been devastated by the one company, Patumthani
Tangkakorn, as part of an agreement made with the Burmese military commander2.
The piping of hundreds of millions of cubic feet of highly volatile natural gas each day through an area in which
numerous guerrilla organizations operate raises the spectre of major ruptures to the pipeline. Large quantities of gas or
oil released into watercourses or remaining rainforest areas would cause massive pollution. Highly destructive fires would
probably accompany any explosion and gas leakage. Attempts to sabotage such an obvious and explosive target are
almost inevitable considering the amount of revenue and the political benefits accruing to the SLORC.
Oil and gas spillages from numerous points in the exploration, development, production and transport pro-
cesses are high possibilities. The burning off (flaring) of thousands of tons of uncleaned natural gas from the oil rigs before
the pipeline and refining facilities are built results in substantial air pollution, as well as contributing to the "greenhouse
effect"3. Furthermore, there is the possibility of undersea pipeline breakage; oil well "blowouts" such as nearly happened
at Kyaukpyu and at one of Yukong's drill sites4; accidents or deliberate sabotage on ships, at refining installations and oil
rigs; and the careless production and disposal of toxic wastes and pollutants such as drilling muds, thick sulphurous crude
oils and heavy metal-laden formation waters. The various processes for refining the gas prior to export or use also
produce numerous waste products, much of which is likely to become some form of pollution in some part of the
environment5.
In addition to the threat to the pipeline (or other installations) from sabotage, there is the possibility of breakage
resulting from earthquakes, which are not uncommon in the region6. There have been several significant tremors in the
general vicinity the past few years, some of them possibly worsened by the construction of what are currently the largest
dams in Thailand and Burma. Large dams are known to increase the possibility and intensity of earthquakes7. This factor
calls into question the wisdom of making even more dams, especially mega-dams, in the area. The biggest of the dams,
the one planned for the Salween, would be located in the same geographical area as the Lawpita and Baluchaung
Dams - not far from which in 1992 a large quake damaged numerous buildings in the major town of Toungoo. The
region is in a belt of mountains that runs parallel to the edge of the Indian Ocean -and the same fault line that spawned
the ancient super-volcano of Krakatoa and the many earthquakes and tidal waves that regularly shake Java and Sumatra
The havoc that would be wrought by an earthquake caused failure of the Salween Dam, let alone any of the other
smaller dams, is unthinkable.
Some of the areas to be flooded by the dams are of great scenic beauty and significant ecological value. The
border areas in which the pipeline and the dams are to be located are still mostly clothed with tropical rainforests which
cover river banks, the sides of steep gorges and the edges of dramatic limestone peaks and cliffs The unpolluted (though
during the monsoon season heavily silted) rivers run fast through rapids caused by elevation drops and curiously carved
AUG-SEPT 1993
rocks of different kinds of stone, or slowly and deeply past wild landscapes dotted with brilliantly flowering Lagerstroemias
and orchid-clad ancient trees. Trees found in the area include some of the famous hardwoods the country is known for:
Teak (Tectona grandis), Burmese rosewood (Pterocarpus macrocarpus or padauk), red ironwood (Xylia dolabriformis or
pyingado), and Dipterocarpus spp. (kanyin). Although most of the best of these have fallen to the Thai loggers in their
four year plundering of the border forests, some imperfect but none the less impressive trees remain to grace the
landscape and to provide homes to wildlife, along with other large but less economically attractive species.
Wildlife in the area will naturally be severely affected, if not decimated, by these developments. There are 289
listed species of mammals, up to 1000 species of birds, and 366 reptile and amphibian species recorded as existing in
Burma7. What proportion of them live in the border areas and will be affected by the dams and the gas pipeline is
unknowable, but considering the distribution and scale of the projects it is likely to be a significant amount. The forests
along the rivers and the proposed gas pipeline route give shelter to a variety of these wild creatures. These range from
the lovable lar gibbons and slow lorises to two species of bears, macaque monkeys, a number of species of large felines
reportedly including a few surviving tigers, two endangered species of wild ox, goat antelopes, deer, black giant flying
squirrels and numerous other mammals8. There have even been repeated but unverified accounts of sightings of the
Sumatran rhinoceros near the Salween by the Karens and Karenni, one village headman spoke of the finding of a baby
rhino crushed beneath a. fallen tree, while a Karenni student told of one standing by the banks of the Salween in clear
view of a boatload of people.
The rivers are also home to some strange and impressive forms of life. The Salween River is said to contain some
unique varieties of fish. One called Nga Dahn by the local people commonly weighs around 30 kilograms and is excep-
tionally delicious to eat. According to the reputable ithycologist Dr Tyson Roberts9, the river also contains a kind of ray that
can grow up to 500 kilograms in weight. Rivers along the Burmese border, with the exception of the Moei, are almost
completely unpolluted by agricultural chemicals or the industrial activities of man (other than the logging) and therefore
have healthy and diverse fish populations which include, amongst numerous others; different types of carp, catfish and
serpent-head fish. Although relatively little is known about the breeding habits of the fish in the rivers, especially in the
deep, murky and dangerous Salween, the spawning and movement of various species will undoubtedly be seriously
disrupted by the construction of dams on them.
Little is believed to be known about the various kinds of birds resident or stopping over in the areas to be
affected, but the birds present in Burma and possibly along the border include numerous species of hawks, egrets,
kingfishers, flycatchers, ducks, and the green peacock, as well as possibly hornbills, storks, spoonbills, pheasants, tragopans,
and more10.
Reptiles are plentiful along the border. Lizards of various shapes and sizes can be seen everywhere, and snakes,
frogs and turtles are also common. Among the lizards are monitor lizards that grow up to 6 feet long.
As with other wildlife, partly due to the forty five unbroken years of war in the border regions there has been very
little research done on their populations and distribution. If the projects are implemented we will never know what has
been lost forever in terms of unique or rare species of wildlife.
The environmental consequences of at least five of the eight planned dams will extend downstream to the
mouths of the rivers as well as in the immediate area and upstream of the dams. This is because the movement of silt
downstream will be very much affected, a factor that will impact agriculture and fisheries for much of the length of the
rivers. Changes in the estuarine, marine and riverine ecology of the Salween and Kra rivers due to the blocking of the silt
flow will influence the breeding of fish that form a vital source of protein for the Burmese peoples. The effect of this on
fisheries-dependent local economies, particularly coming on top of the invasion of offshore fishing grounds by concessioned
and illegal foreign fishing trawlers, and the widespread stripping of mangrove forests for charcoal making and tiger
prawn culture, is likely to be considerable. Water supplies in Moulmein, the capital of the Mon State, could become more
saline as the reduced flows of silt into the estuary leads to erosion of farmlands around the coast and saltwater intrusion
into groundwater supplies. The fertility of the annually flooded rice farming lands stretching from around Moulmein back
up to Pa-an Township will almost certainly drop as a consequence of reduced silt deposition, an effect that has been
catastrophic for agriculture where major rivers around the world such as the Nile River in Egypt have been dammed.
One of the worst of environmental impacts that could arise from the damming of any of the five rivers would be
the water becoming stagnant. More than a few dams in Thailand and in other tropical countries have stagnated when
their flow has been blocked.. This happens when the organic matter carried down by the rivers or flooded by the rising
water levels decays in oxygen-poor environments. Floating plants and algae can also consume the free oxygen in the
water that would normally be available for fish, creating conditions for anaerobic bacteria to thrive. When these condi-
tions develop fish populations can crash, and the water, stinking with rotting plant matter can be unsuitable even for
washing in.
Stagnant waters are also prime breeding places for disease vectors such as malaria-carrying mosquitoes and the
snails that host schistosomiasis.
AUG-SEPT 1993
1. Deforestation in Tropical Forest Countries. Norman Myers. 1989. Global Panel on Climate Change
2. PPSM Newsletter, May 1993. Vol. I.. No.2.; The Nation, 13 February 1990: 'Burmese Troops Seize Major Mon Camp'.
3. Oxfam America News, Summer 1991: 'Indigenous People Move to Outflank Oil Companies'.
4. Far Eastern Economic Review. 8 August 1991 /Licenced To Drill'.
5. Oil Industry Operating Guidelines For Tropical Forests, April 1989. E & P Forum, Report No.2. 49/170.
6. New Scientist, 2 November 1991: (Reprinted in APEN Vol.7 No. I as 'Himalayan Earthquake Confirms Worst Fears
Over Dam').
7. Nature Conservation and National Parks, Interim Report. FAO 1983.
8. Salawin Wildlife Reserve. Wilflife Fund Thailand (In Thai).
9. Telephone conversation with Dr Tyson Roberts, March 1993.
10.Nature Conservation and National Parks, FAO 1983. Interim Report.
UNTHINKABLE SUMS...
Proponents of the joint ventures variously claim that the projects would cost just over six billion dollars, a
stupendous sum in the context of Burma where even the privileged Burmans are exceedingly fortunate to earn the
equivalent of a dollar a day1. These sums, vast as they are. appear to be greatly understated. They are not likely to include
the almost standard cost overruns which commonly double or even treble the construction costs of large development
projects, or the real costs to the nation of major debt repayment. They almost certainly will not include the very consid-
erable social and environmental costs.
Executives of Total CFP and PTTEP claim that the investment on the Martaban Gasfield will be around US$ 800
million to one billion including the gas pipeline to Thailand2. However, this low figure contradicts initial estimates of "over
US$2 billion"3, and other overall costs estimates of US$ 2-3 billion for the development of the gasfield, the main pipeline
to Thailand, and related infrastructure. Pipeline would also have to be laid to connect up with the World Bank sponsored
Payagon Gasfield pipeline in the Irrawaddy Delta for supplying fuel to the starved Myanmar Electric Power Enterprize gas
turbines4. Total says it will build four well platforms - which do not come cheaply. Furthermore, the Total CFP cost estimate
is based on a pipeline length of 350 km, only enough to carry the gas to Nat Ei Taung, and not the hundreds of
kilometers further on to the power stations.
Officials claim that the pipeline would only cost US$250-300 million. However, gas pipeline of the diameter
required to transport the expected quantity of gas from the two fields can exceed a million dollars per kilometer. An
example of the costs involved can be seen in the new 535 km qas pipeline that PTT is having laid from the offshore
Erawan gasfield in the Gulf of
Siam to the large gas generator
at Bang Pakong. A contract
worth US$ 718 million dollars has
been awarded to a US multina-
tional to design and build it5. It is
probable that the companies are
downplaying their investment as
much as possible, as they have
been made the target of an in-
ternational boycott campaign
partcipated in by at least one
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate.
No figures have been
released at all relating to the
amount of money that the
Texaco led consortium is commit-
ted to spending in Burma, or will
have to pay to get things done.
Indeed, the company has been Gas pipeline: A milllion dollars a kilometre ?
singularly reluctant to let the
amount of its investment be known, simply saying "We do not disclose the terms of our contracts"6. Despite the consortiums'
reticence, it can be reasonably assumed that it will pay around the same amount as will be paid for the Martaban venture
- around one to two billion dollars.
The cost of the two dams on the Salween River, according to the EGAT officials, who in turn are believed to have
AUG-SEPT 1993
based their estimate on the figures given by the EPDC. has been put at US$3,860 billion. This represents US$3,002 billion
for the Upper Salween Dam and US$858 million for the Lower Salween Dam which has a dam wall less than a third as
high as the upper dam7.
This cost estimate contrasts somewhat starkly with the US$7-8 billion estimate given by SLORC officials to the
Asian Development Bank Conference on Sub-Regional Economic Cooperation for the development of the Salween
River's hydro potential8. Given the scale of two projects and the example of the costs involved in building megadams
elsewhere in Asia, the SLORC's figure is likely to be closer to reality than the EGAT/ EPDC one. A good example of these
underestimations is the 45 metre, high Gezhouba Dam on the Yangtse River which took six years longer than planned to
complete, and cost "up to four times as much as originally estimated"9. The Gezhouba Dam is not even as high as the
Lower Salween Dam would be.
The six other smaller dams along the border, again according to EGATs disputable figures, are expected to cost
a total of US$ 1,260 million. These include US$375 million for the 294 MW Mae Kok Project, US$ 698 million for the three
Mae Nam Moei dams which total 629 MW US$ 113 for the 130 MW Klong Kra dam and US$74.5 million for the small
12.5 MW Mae Sai dam10. These, being smaller projects would probably not be subject to such huge cost overruns, but
may still cost in excess of US$ 1.5 billion when completed.
In addition to the construction costs would be payments to the SLORC for the hydro-electricity and the gas itself,
assuming the military dictatorship still remains in power by that time. Thailand would consume the vast bulk of the 450
-1,000 million cubic feet per day of gas produced by the two projects and the large majority share of the 6,400 mega-
watts of electricity. This would mean that above and beyond its multi-billion dollar equity investment, Thailand would
have to pay in the order of hundreds of thousands of dollars per day to the SLORC for the electricity and gas. Adding all
these up. if the projects go ahead it is not inconceivable that the eventual costs of the ten projects will exceed US$ 14
billion dollars. It is sure that a substantial proportion of this will find its way into the pockets of corrupt military officers,
politicians and businessmen, and into the war chests of the SLORC military dictatorship.
MORE TIES FOR THE THAIS

An important factor in the real costing of the projects as a whole is how much EGAT and PTT will spend on
infrastructure in Thailand dependent on the gas or electricity supplies from Burma. Anywhere between 180 and 550 km
of gas pipeline would have to be laid in Thailand alone to the power station(s), depending on the route or routes taken.
Gas pipeline in Thailand could therefore cost anywhere between US$ 100-720 million.
More to the point, additional gas-powered generating facilities would have to be built to accommodate the
increased supply - these can be hugely expensive. Thermal generators such as the planned 1,800 MW "Lower Central
Combined Cycle Power Plant Project Blocks 1-3" which may take gas from Burma, would cost around US$5 billion, or a
billion dollars per 350 megawatts11. 350 MMcfd of gas from Burma could fully supply a plants of this size with more to
spare. It is possible that when both fields are fully producing, some 450 -1,000 MMcfd of gas would be piped to Thailand,
potentially requiring infrastucture development worth in excess of another US$ 14 billion than that spent on the Burmese
side of the border.
All in all the amount that will be invested by the multinational corporations, the overseas "aid" donors like the
Japanese government and the Thai government institutions like the FTT and EGAT may come to US$28 billion. This is a
high-side figure, so the costs may be less. It is however conceivable that they may even be more - planned offshore
gasfield development in Indonesian waters have been estimated at US$ 17 billion12, while the Narmada River dam and
irrigation developments costs have been set at US$ 11.4 billion13, figures that only partially show the extraordinarily high
costs of large scale energy development projects.
Many of the true costs will not be counted in hard currency, but could or will be a very heavy burden in the
future. The consequences of disasters such as earthquakes and dam breakage; the costs of reforestation to restore
devastated watersheds; the social and environmental costs of relocation and resettlement of large numbers of people in
less fertile lands (or concentration camps); the cost of restoring the environment polluted by the industries that will use
the power: the price of decommissioning the projects when their useful life is over, and a host of other hidden factors.
Altogether the ventures in Burma are certainly fraught with risk: from revolutionary groups to an unstable and
belligerent dictatorship, from internal opposition in Thailand to international sanctions. Taking all the costs into account it
may well be wise for Thai leaders to reconsider their investment decisions before it is too late.
1 Bangkok Post, 23 June 1992, Bangkok Post 23 March 1993: Total Begins B500 Million Drilling Campaign In Burmese
Waters, Manager. April 1993: 'Awaiting the Third Wave'.
2 Asian Wall Street Journal, 5 March 1993: 'Oil Firms Pay High Price For Scant Results In Burma'.
3 Bangkok Post, 21 July 1992: Burma Signs Natural gas Exploitation Deal'.
4 Gas Development and Utilisation Project, 30 June 1987. International Development Association .
AUG-SEPT 1993
5. Bangkok Post, 4 March 1992: 'PTT Studying Routes For Gas Pipeline From Burma To Thailand'; The Nation. 2 April
1993: 'Bechtel Picked For Pipeline'; ADB Conference on Sub-Regional Economic Cooperation, Manila, 21-22 October
1992.
6. News From Texaco. Texaco PR. Dept., 28 May 1993: 'Texaco Announces Second Gas/ Condensate Discovery Off
shore Peninsular Myanmar'.
Assistant General Manager Project Feasibility Division, Hydro Power Engineering Department EGAT.
8. ADB Conference on Sub-Regional Economic Cooperation, Manila, 21-22 October 1992.
9. Damming the Three Gorges: What the Dam Planners Don't Want You To Know. A Critique of the .Three Gorges
10. Bangkok Post. 23 June 1992.
11. Calculated from figures given for proposed new gas generator plants. The Nation, 3 September 1992: 'Central Power
Project Planned'.
12. Newsweek, (July?) 1992: 'Asias Oil Boom'.
13. Asian Pacific Environment - APEN Newsletter December 1992, Vol 7, No 2: 'One Third Of World Bank Projects Fail'.
COLLABORATION, COERCION AND

ANNIHILATION
For Thailand to access the energy from Burma - and for the multinationals and the SLORC to gain the kind
of profits they seek - those who are considered to pose a threat to the developments must first be removed as a threat, and
a stable investment climate created. Unfortunately, the kind of "peace and stability" sought by the proponents of the
energy joint ventures as being conducive to the beginning of development work, is most likely to come over the dead
bodies of those who stand for democracy, the lands they were born on and for the basic rights of themselves and their
people.
Those who come into the threatening category include almost all of the major ethnic groups of Burma. Most of
these have been in constant political or armed conflict with the neo-colonialist Burmese military regime since General Ne
Win seized power more than three decades ago1. The Karens, Mons and Karennis have been resisting the hegemony of
the Burmans for well over forty years. These ethnic groups were joined at the border after the 1988 massacres by
thousands from pro -democracy groups including students, monks, dissident military personnel and civilians.
These groups clearly stand in the way of the energy developments. There has already been substantial secret, as
well as overt assistance given to the SLORC in its efforts to subjugate or at least neutralize them. With the signing of the
power-development contracts it is predictable that there would be greatly increased collaboration between the SLORC
and those sectors of the Thai government military and business communities who wish to see the energy developments
go ahead.
A good example of this kind of dealing was stopped by Anand Pancharayun, the caretaker Prime Minister of
Thailand during the 1991 post military coup period, who exposed the planned supply to the SLORC of high-tech
American weaponry by the Thai military under the now deposed General Suchinda2.
Logging companies have also been major collaborators with the junta, sometimes supplying weapons, food
and transport for SLORC troops (Though they in some cases also supply the revolutionary groups). Logging companies
have greatly helped the SLORC in its military offensives against Three Pagodas Pass and Nat Ei Taung (and elsewhere)3.
Direct pressure has been put on Mon and Karen leaders by senior Thai officials in the form of threats that if they
touch any Thai government projects (let alone blow up logging company trucksl) they will be in very serious trouble. The
officials issuing the threats include the Interior Minister and the powerful governor of Kanchanaburi Province1. Burmese
groups have also come under heavy pressure to not even voice opposition to the projects, especially those who, like the
NCGUB parallel government, have offices in Thailand.
In addition to threats, there have allegedly been offerings of vast sums of money to various influential leaders of
the ethnic groups in return for promises not to attack the projects or speak out against them. Massive corruption in both
Burma and Thailand combined with extreme poverty, black market trading and the large scale natural resource exploita-
tion has spread the taint of corruption to even the basically honest and unsophisticated peoples of the border. Some
leaders may have accepted the bribes, leading to non-opposition or even advocacy of the projects. Corruption is an
insidious tool the Burmese military hierarchies are infamous for their skill in using, one which breeds distrust and weak-
ness.
AUG-SEPT 1993
DEADLY ENERGY:-'COLLABORATION. COERCION A N D ANNIHILATION
PLEASE INSERT AFTER PAGE 21 (PROOF READING ERROR)
Other forms of collaboration between the SLORC and the Thais have been: the burning down or
forced relocation of refugee camps by the Thai army, presumably on the orders of the Interior
Ministry; the threat (also made by the interior minister) of enforced closure of the border other than
official border trade routes controlled by the SLORC (depriving the indigenous groups of their income
and food supplies); the threat of blockades against Karen strongholds on the border such as
Kawmoora (a threat carried out early in the SLORC's tenure)5; the harrassment, arrest and
incarceration of Burmese dissidents in Thailand; and a variety of pressures on ethnic refugees6 etc.
It is unfortunate, but unlike Nobel Peace Winner Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the 1990 election
winning NLD party that was denied the reins of power by the SLORC, the junta has shown no
believable interest in acheiving a peacefully negotiated settlement with the ethnic groups w h o still
continue their struggle. Instead, the SLORC has reiterated its pledge to "annihilate the insurgents", a
genocidal program it has squandered much of the country's resources to carry out.
The SLORC has adamantly refused to talk with the united ethnic and pro-democracy
organisations. Instead, it has tried repeatedly to single out those groups w h o occupy territory rich in
natural resources in order to strike separate - and divisive - ceasefire terms with them, thus splitting
them away from the united strength of the umbrella group the Democratic Alliance of Burma7. They
have also been trying to create divisions between the autonomy minded indigenous groups on one
hand and the mostly Burman pro-democracy groups such as the election winning NLD ( L A )
members, students and monks groups w h o are allied with or part of the DAB. The SLORC has
declared the Burman groups to be "traitors" and has condemned them to death or long
imprisonment, while to most of the former it has offered what are tantamount to surrender terms - or
annihilation.
Many outside parties have been trying to broker peace talks between the ethnic groups and the
SLORC, including the likes of the German government, the Chinese, Thais such as the widely
distrusted Interior Minister General Chavalit, and even the Jimmy Carter Foundation. To date these
efforts have been fruitless at best, and at worst have been very much to the advantage of the
dictatorship, which has managed to impose "ceasefires" on some of the more fragmented or
biddable groups such as the drug trafficking Kokang, or the surrounded Palaung (almost the entire
civilian population of whom were virtually taken hostage). In this it has ironically been abetted by UN
agencies and the DEA, whose apparent efforts to maintain a foothold in the worlds most productive
opium growing area have led to programs like B A D . 8 and US$80 million aerial spraying programs of
herbicides similar to Agent Orange9 over the food crops of ethnic civilians.
While the supposedly well meaning peace brokers have been trying to push the indigenous
groups to the SLORC's table, the SLORC has been acquiring huge quantities of arms from its Chinese
backers10, doubling the numbers of the already bloated armed forces, pressuring its neighbours to
squeeze the opposition groups from behind, and stepping up the forced relocations of villagers11.
These actions plainly indicate an intent to launch a heavy offensive. This will probably come after it
has gained whatever fruit it hoped to get from its one and a half year political offensive that has
been exemplefied by its delegations sent around the globe12, its engagement of a US public relations
firm, and its orchestration of the so called "National Convention". These have already gained it
investments from all over the world, including India; visits by bought American congressmen 13 ; and
some easing of Western pressure. O n e particularly ripe fruit that may be offered is that of the dams
and gas pipeline deals.
Without the effective backing of international pressure such as economic sanctions and a UN
backed arms embargo against the brutal and insensitive dictatorship, to expect the ethnic a n d pro-
democracy groups to go to the table to negotiate is to expect them to do so from a position of
relative weakness. In view of the political and military support the SLORC has been getting from the
Chinese, the Thai and Indian constructive engagement approaches, the hundreds of millions of
dollars from Western investors, and with its buildup of armed strength, the SLORC is in a powerful
position to dictate terms.
The pro-democracy and indigenous groups, lacking tangible political, financial a n d military
support from those w h o should be their natural allies, ruthlessly exploited by former allies w h o have
turned to befriend those w h o murder, rape and maim them, and lacking protection from the United
Nations the founding mandate of which was to uphold human rights, are not in a confidence
inspiring situation. If they - and the vast majority of the 42 million Burmese people w h o m they
represent in spirit - do not get a greater level of credible and relevant support from those w h o
purport to stand for them and the issues they represent, they would be able to gain little more than
thinly veiled surrender terms from any such talks. They would also attain virtually none of the political
objectives for which at least t w o generations of the indigenous peoples have been fighting, for
which many thousands of Burmese have been massacred, and for which thousands more, including
Nobel Laureate A u n g San Suu Kyi have been imprisoned.
Certainly, if the same amount of pressure as has been put on the ethnic and pro democracy
groups was applied against the SLORC dictatorship the situation would be very different today.
1. 'Burma; The Politics Of Ethnicity'. Martin Smith. Zed Press, 1990.

2. Thai Military Officers Try To Sell US Arms To Burma', AFP. The Nation, 10 January, 1992; (Reprint
-ed in the Burma Affairs Monitor, January 1992).
3. 'Mons Claim Thais Sold Them Out', The Nation, 19 February 1990.
4. Thai Army Blamed as Burmese Refugee Claim Villages Razed'. The Nation 18 April 1993,'Burma
Refugees Make W a y For Pipeline?' The Nation, 4 May 1993 .
5. 'Chavalit Dismisses Karen Log Threat', Bangkok Post 15 February 1989.
6. PPSM Newsletter, May 1993, Vol. 1, No.2.: 'Plight of M o n People, As Far As Thailand Being Con-
cerned'; B . U . R . M A , April 1993: 'Refugees'.
7. Bangkok Post, 25 February 1993: 'Opposition Wary Of Kachin Peace Talks'.
8. Burma-UNDP: 'Burma's Junta Received US$ 18 Million Grant', Burma Focus. J u n e 1993 Vol.4,
No. I.
9. Earth Island Journal, Summer 1988.
I O.Burma Alert, J u n e 1993, No 6, Vol 4.
I 1 .Far East Economic Review, 15 July 1993: 'Refugees Exodus'. (Republished In Burma Focus);
B . U . R . M A , August 1993, Vol 3, No 8.
12.'Burma Army officer In Delegation To Australia', Bangkok Post, 31 July, 1993.
13. 'US Policy Towards Burma', Testimony of Maureen A u n g Thwin, Sub-committee on Asian a n d
Pacific. US House of Representatives Hearing. 25 March 1993.
WHAT'S IN IT FOR THE SLORC

Burma is in the throes of an energy crisis that parallels the human rights, social, environmental, economic,
refugee and political crises brought on by military rule1. Electricity shortages and blackouts are reported by new arrivals
at the border to be everyday occurrences. Installed electricity generating equipment for the whole nation in 1990 was
only 808 MW, a figure that has increased by no more than 40 MW since. In the same year actual electricity production
was down to a pathetic 356 MW2, not even enough to light up a 60 watt bulb per family throughout the country.
Due to this chronic power deficit, factories have been operating at a fraction of their capacity, and the country's
decrepit manufacturing growth charts have long since plunged off whatever dusty charts that may exist. Even the largely
manufactured statistics of the Ministry of Planning and Finance cannot disguise this very much evident fact3. Gasoline fuel
for generators, when available, is priced exorbitantly, a reflection of its black market origins. In the country towns a gallon
of gas can cost in excess of kyat 170 - at the official exchange rate an outrageous US$254.
The vast majority of the population depends completely on firewood or charcoal for cooking, commodities that
are increasingly scarce and expensive. The dependency on wood for fuel has also led to considerable deforestation5, with
the UNDP even going to the extent of claiming that fuelwood consumption is the greatest cause of deforestation in the
country, exceeding the rapacious logging industry (a factor UNDP officials like to ignore) and the taungya (slash and
burn) cultivation which the SLORC likes to blame for the devastation. With the deforestation rate in Burma said to be
among the highest in the world6, this is no small matter.
Considering this dismal state of affairs it would plainly improve the image of the SLORC significantly if it could get
even one of the projects onstream quickly. If the deals were signed the regime would, at hardly any expense to itself, gain
a solution to most of the crippled nation's energy requirements. The amount of gas and hydro electricity produced by the
ten development projects would far exceed the pitiful production of the inefficiently managed, corruption-plagued and
material-starved MOGE and MEPE.
The SLORC has even more to gain from the projects if it can extract concessions from the Thais in return for them
getting the gas and electricity they so desire. The Thais apparently want to seal the deals more than the SLORC, which is
playing 'hard to get' in its own inimitable way. The regime would be able to force the Thais to put more pressure on pro
democracy dissidents living in Thailand, and on ethnic minorities along the border7. The SLORC may demand a complete
blockade of the "Liberated Areas" as one of the conditions. Extraditions, greater cooperation with SLORC M.I. (military
intelligence) agents, forced repatriations and other forms of increased collaboration are all possibilities.
The regime would gain access to sums of money on the scale of that disbursed by multilateral banks and aid
agencies prior to the suspension of aid in 1988. Most of the financial cost burden of these would be assumed by Thailand
or by foreign investors, leaving only the environmental and social cost burden on Burma. Although it makes a pretense
of being concerned about the environmental impacts it is abundantly clear from the way they have been selling off the
A sign for the tourists... and the reality.
AUG-SEPT 1993
country's natural resources to the worst of environmental predators that these are totally insignificant to the SLORC. Even
more clear is the juntas utter lack of care about negative social impacts arising from the projects, if not intention to create
them.
When and if any joint energy production agreement is signed, the institutions and countries with a vested
interest in the projects may well be able to bring about a lifting of the international aid embargo that is still in place.
Several of the multilateral banks, particularly the Asian Development Bank, but also the World Bank have interests in the
dam and gas development projects. The ADB, as pointed out, has already violated the sanctions by funding the Klong
Kra feasibility study, while the World Bank in 1987 approved US$63 million for the development of a gas pipeline from
the Irrawaddy Delta to Rangoon (close to the Martaban Field) and to improve distribution infrastructure in Rangoon. The
World Bank has reportedly been approached by PTTEP to help fund the Martaban project8. The involvement of EPDC,
which accesses Japanese development aid and multilateral bank funding may be instrumental in such an attempt9.
Lifting of the sanctions would be a major victory for the military dictatorship.
The amounts of money the SLORC could gain from the ventures could enable it to complete its massive build-up
of the armed forces and its programs to acquire huge quantities of relatively modern powerful weaponry10. To what use
an extremely aggressive, half million strong, well armed force aligned with an increasingly influential, arrogant and well-
armed China would be put is a very serious matter for regional stability11. It is clear that China is giving to the SLORC all
the backing it requires to make it behave offensively towards Bangladesh, and even Thailand and the rest of the world.
China itself has been causing great worries in the region with its aggressive stance over the Spratley Islands - which,
perhaps not coincidentally, are very rich in fossil fuels.
The regime would gain considerable leverage over the Thais as they would ultimately control the supply. Thai
officials have themselves expressed the concern that Thailand will be vulnerable to unilateral pressure from the SLORC.
EGAT sources were reported as saying "as a buyer we have more obligations to fulfill; we have to undertake downstream
investment in the power plant. We have much less bargaining power in the case the supply is not delivered."12 This
concern is well founded as the SLORC is well known for its giving and withholding in the case of the timber concessions13
- in much the same way that a heroin dealer manipulates an addict.
The regime will gain a variety of military benefits. As noted, almost all the areas that will be affected by the
projects are strategically sensitive. If by the time the projects go ahead there is still fighting, supply and communication
routes for the revolutionary groups would be cut, access roads the SLORC troops could use would be made with interna-
tional development assistance, and key opposition towns and headquarters areas submerged. Forest cover would be
cleared away and large contingents of guards posted. The heart of the revolutionaries' operation area would be occupied
and a large proportion of it flooded.
Perhaps most critical of the benefits to the regime is the political legitimacy it gains as the various countries woo
the SLORC to secure a stake in Burma's resource cake. This endorsement may extend to recognition of the constitution
produced by the "National Convention" the SLORC has been (none too successfully) orchestrating, and which it has
loaded with hand-picked, non-elected delegates. If the new constitution is recognized by the international community,
then the dictatorship may be able to maintain the UN seat unquestioned, have its genocide recognized as merely
counter- insurgency, and gain full resumption of aid.
1. Asian Development Bank; 'Conference on Subregional Economic Cooperation', 21-22 October 1992, Manila.
2. Manager, June ! 992: 'Light in the Head...and Groping in the Dark'.
3. Ministry of Planning and Finance, Union of Myanmar, 'Review of the Financial, Aconomic and Social Conditions for
1990-1991'.
4. Sources recently arrived from Toungoo District.
5. Union of Myanmar, Forest Research Institute, Forest Dept: 'Country Status Papers for Expert Consultation'. By Saw
YAC.Doo, October 1991.
6. Allen PE.T., 1984. National Forest Survey and Inventory, FAO/UNEP Technical Note 11. Bur/79/011.
7. 'Rangoon Slams Door On Thai Logging Deals', The Nation, 2 July 1993; 'New Twists In Thai-Burma Policy', The
Nation, 5 August 1993 (reprinted in The Burma Focus', Vol.4, No.4, 15 August 1993.
8. Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 February 1992: 'Slick Set Up'.
9. EPDC Promotional Literature. 1983.
10 .Economist intelligence Unit: Thailand-Burma Country Report No.4, 1990: 'Sizeable Increase In Army'; Economist
Intelligence Unit, Thai-Burma Country Report No. 1, 1991: 'Huge Arms Purchase Bolsters Army's Strength'.
11. Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 November 1992: 'China Building New Naval Base In Irrawaddy Delta'; 'Fear Voiced
at Growing China Ties With Burma', Bangkok Post, 9 February 1993.
12.'EGAT Plans To Purchase Burmese Gas From PTT, The Nation 13 November 1991.
13. As evidenced by the number of times the SLORC has threatened to stop the concessions on various pretexts, includ-
ing that of being concerned about the environment!
AUG-SEPT 1993
...FOR THE THAIS

Benefits accruing to Thailand and Thai officials from the signing of the agreements would also be considerable.
They would be able to siphon off the majority of the production of the Martaban gasfield, probably all of the production
of the Yetagun Field, and the bulk of the 6,400 MW of electricity produced by the dams. EGAT would be able to at least
double the Kingdom's current output of electricity which in 1991 was 8,045 megawatts1.
Thailand has few exploitable energy resources left that are acceptable to the public, but plans to increase its
installed power production capacity from the 9,610 MW it had in 1991 to 30,951 MW by the year 20 062. This it intends
to do to feed the energy hunger of the local and multinational industries based on its soil, and to boost its "minimum
electricity reserve of 15% of total consumption to between 20 and 25 percent"3 to sustain its expected 9-10% annual
energy demand growth4. This it will either have to do through the use of the publically unpalatable nuclear option or by
"helping other less fortunate countries develop their resources". It has made extensive plans to do both.
One of the major benefits as far as EGAT and some of the Thai ministers are concerned is that most of the
environmental and social impacts of the dams and the gas projects will be in Burmas.
In Thailand environmentalists, academics, journalists and people's organizations have built strong unity in oppos-
ing projects that cause displacement of farmers, flooding of the few remaining wild areas and the plethora of other
problems such developments generate. The environmental movement has managed to stop or halt several large projects
including the large Nam Choan Dam and the Ao Phai Lignite Power Station, and have forced the government and its
backers to implement some measures to protect the environment and the people affected by the projects The Thai
government, concerned about the strength of this movement, may hope for fairly little opposition from these groups
since most of the impacts will be on foreigners and on foreign soil.
In Burma, journalists, academics, students and the few peoples groups that are allowed to exist are very closely
watched and controlled. Draconian censorship laws, rigid government suppression of the media, "re-education" pro-
grams, rapid retribution or imprisonment for "subversive" actvities, mysterious dissappearances, armies of paid informers,
and the existence and pervasiveness of the numerous secret service branches are not conducive to the growth of
consumer rights, environment, human rights or other organisations that might take up the issues involved6. There is no
environment organisation in Burma outside of the 'liberated areas' except the except the SLORC's propaganda unit set up
on the advise of the UNDP7. Furthermore, environmental concerns are dwarfed by the multitude of life threatening
miseries the people have to face.
As noted, Thailand may be able to siphon off up to a third of the waters of the Salween to further boost electricity
production from the Bhumiphol Dam and to flush the national latrine. They would therefore be able to solve two of their
environmental headaches at once - one being swept into the sea and the other exported to Burma.
Government ministers
and bureaucrats pushing the projects or
involved in the granting of the multi-
million dollar construction and supply
contracts would be in a position to ex-
tract very substantial 'personal benefits'.
Some Thai businesses would gain lu-
crative contracts, and logging compa-
nies in particular would benefit from
government collaboration with the re-
gime.
Other than the direct benefits
of the development projects, the Thais
are hoping to get what they can claim
is a successful outcome of their contro-
versial constructive engagement policy8.
This they and their ASEAN partners claim
is a better approach in dealing with the
repressive regime than Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi's tactic of calling for UN backed
Very Cosy.... Siahuk. Thai logging company owner with his arm around arms and trade sanctions. The projects
Lt. Col. Kyaw Win Mya, SLORC army commander at Three Pagodas Pass. are an intrinsic part of this policy, which
Feasting with Nai Subat Natphrahom, the Governor of Sangk/aburi. while ostensibly designed to encourage
AUG-SEPT 1993
the SLORC towards democratization and openness, quite obviously in practice has more to do with opening up Burma
to further exploitation of the country's human and natural resources.
Despite the optimistic perception of Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai that "changes have taken place" in
Burma9, there has been little positive change of any significance. Many changes have been for the worse, even to the
increased number of border incidents caused by Burmese troops, also in the increased costs of living10, and the in lives of
the people in the remoter areas. With the SLORC's massive build up of weaponry and doubling in size of the armed forces
they could easily get worse still.
None the less the Thais, who have quite possibly already committed themselves to the energy joint ventures,
seem to be preparing to sign anyway11. At the present time it appears that they may wait until the SLORC has finished
with the National Convention and its manipulation of a new constitution, although they may not even wait that long.
Once that is completed and the regime announces plans for a second set of "free and fair" elections, the Thai Foreign
Minister may announce something to the effect of important steps in the process of the democratization of the country
have taken place. The PTT officials, doing their 'democratic' governments bidding, would then take the opportunity to
sign into the gasfield venture with their unprincipled multinational corporative friends.
Four things are certain in this scenario. These are that the SLORC will not surrender their stranglehold on power
to a government that they do not control in all significant ways12, the roots of the economic, political and social problems
in Burma will not be dug out, the rape of the environment will continue and worsen, and the great sufferings of the
people, in particular the indigenous nationalities, will not end.
1. Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand: General Information, EGAT Power Development Plan PDP92 01 (0),
September 1992.
2. Ibid.
3. 'EGAT Plans Boost in Reserve', The Nation, 8 June 1993.
4. 'Energy: Issue of Demand Vs Supply'. The Nation, 2 October 1992.
5. National Energy Administration. Klong Kra Buri Project Preliminary Study, 1989. Map showing proposed flood area;
Thailand Looking to Burma for Water", The Nation, 8 July 1992.
6. United Nations, AP 24 November; 1993. UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Report. {Also see reports from Amnesty
International, Asia Watch, Anti-Slavery Society, International Commission of Jurists, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
Article 19 and others. All of the numerous accounts of human rights violations have of course been routinely and repeated
denied by the SLORC- except by Saw Maung in his declining days...).
7. ESCAP Environment News, Vol 8,No I, Jan -Mar 1990. "...U Ohn Gyaw, Chairman of the National Commission for
Environmental Affairs...").
8. Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 August, 1993.
9. Ibid.
10. Economist Intelligence Unit. Thailand-Burma Country Profile 1990-1991, Annual Survey of Political and Economic
Background.
11. 'Burma Gas Deal in Pipeline', The Nation, 8 September 1993.
12.'New Burma Charter to Favour Junta' AFP Bangkok Post, 8 September 1993.
ROOM FOR HOPE

There is still the possibility of great change in the situation. The SLORC has not yet gained international accep-
tance. although it is five whole years since the bloody coup d'etat of 1988, remarkable in a world of notoriously short
memories. The characteristic corruption, incompetence and brutality of the military regime itself, is the main reason for
this, combined with the unflagging efforts of those who have consistently worked to reveal the reality the SLORC tries to
conceal behind its flawed facade of blatant lies.
The Thais have had serious problems dealing with the SLORC, which has been true to its irredeemably obnox-
ious nature. Over the years in which the ASEAN countries have been defending the SLORC from outside pressure there
have been a remarkable number of ugly border incidents, which inflicted on any other country except Thailand would
have led to war several time over. Amongst numerous similar incidents have been the kidnapping of senior Thai officials
(Mae Hong Son; September, 19921); the destruction of several Thai villages and markets by marauding SLORC troops
(Mae Salit, 1989; Baan Huay Hai, July 19892; Ban Wangkeow, 1990); the shooting and kidnapping for ransom of several
Thai villagers all of whom were well inside Thai territory (Walei; July 19933); and the summary execution of two Thais
captured by the SLORC troops and accused of helping the revolutionary groups (May 1993). These, combined with the
AUG-SEPT 1993
SLORC's arbitrary opening and closing of border trade points such as Mae Sot, arrests and occasional shooting of villag-
ers. fishermen and timber workers4, the announcement of the stopping of fishing and logging concessions to Thai
companies (while issuing new logging concessions to the Chinese who have been carrying out vast scale logging in the
north of the country5), together with a long history of antagonism between the two countries, have increased anti
SLORC sentiments amongst many Thai people who have themselves only recently thrown off the yoke of military dicta-
torship.
Against this background of events Thai authorities may have difficulty selling the idea of closer collaboration with
the SLORC to their public. Thai officials, probably because they are uncertain of what the real opposition could be and
prefer to deal with it before rather than after the contracts are signed, have given plenty of notice of their intention to cut
the deal with the SLORC, thereby inviting comment or criticism from the Thai or international communities. There has
been relatively little open response to this as yet, but pressure is certainly building.
Public awareness in Thailand is still relatively low in regard to the full implications of the impending marriage
between the Thai government and the SLORC. The opposition is still quite disorganised. This however is changing quite
rapidly, the Thai English language media has been vocal in its criticism of the governments ingratiating itself with the
SLORC dictatorship; local and international groups have started to mobilise; and the indigenous groups that will be
affected by the projects are quietly organising themselves.
How the PTT, EGAT and government decision makers will deal with this is less than clear. Combined with the
ongoing aggression of the SLORC; pressure from the international community; the tangible threat of later disruption of
the supply; disappointed with the lack of tangible results from their years of constructive engagement; and being forced
to acknowledge the evident fact that the SLORC's National Convention is patently undemocratic; the Thai government
may finally decide that it is too risky a venture. It is not impossible that really strong negative public opinion may even lead
to a shelving of some of the more controversial projects, if not all.
The multinational corporations, although they have invested many millions in their ventures with the SLORC, are
still not really securely entrenched. Many things can still go wrong for them, as has been the experience of other oil
companies who engaged in business adventures with the SLORC6.
A good example of this is Shell Oil, the worlds largest multinational oil company, which pulled out of Burma even
after being the only one of the eight corporations that invested in onshore oil exploration with the SLORC. Shell made
what their media relations division termed "a major gas discovery'" at Aphyauk in the Central Plains by the Irrawaddy
River. After spending a minimum of US$60 million on its exploration as set out in its contract with the regime, the
company moved out of Burma on the 17th of February 1993. The reason given by a senior Shell official was they
"decided to relinquish it purely due to disappointing results"8 from test drilling, adding that they had tried but failed to
negotiate new exploration blocks with the SLORC. Shell however had been thoroughly embarrassed by a British docu-
mentary alleging the use of 40,000 villagers for forced labour in the construction of a service road for a gas pipeline to
the Shell well site9. This had come out on top of a widely viewed expose of the massacre of 70 demonstrators in Nigeria
after Shell had called out the riot police there.
Other companies had also pulled out of Burma under boycott pressure (notably the state owned Petro Canada)
or due to embittering experiences with the regime. An example of the latter was Texaco's former partner Clyde Petroleum
Plc. whose chairman responded to a campaign letter saying they "...entered into oil exploration in Myanmar during the
brief democratic spring and were encouraged to do so by the British Government....however, since then there has been
a marked deterioration and Clyde is now in the process of withdrawing completely from the country"10.
It is conceivable that the oil companies may decide not to develop the gasfields if PTT decides to pull out, or if
public boycott pressure gets too strong for them. Significantly the companies' work in developing the gasfields is still
believed to be centred around appraisal of the potential of the two fields11, appraisals that will take possibly several years
to fully complete.
Although the companies have invested a considerable amount of money already, it is still possible that a number
of factors could make their investment more costly than worthwhile. These include, the SLORC's possible dishonouring of
contract terms with the companies, and its further abuses of the population, the actions of the Western Governments -
especially the US government which has ordered a review of its Burma policy; the acts of the Chinese; United Nations
moves to protect human rights as mandated; the success of the various boycotts launched against the oil companies for
their support of the dictatorship; the possible need to find another market if Thailand pulls out of the deal; and the
resistance of the millions of indigenous peoples and Burmans who wish to be rid of the regime that continues to oppress
them.
While not being an unusual event, the MNCs have weakened their own position by violating the standards of
behaviour they themselves have publically set. Although some of the ethnic leaders have been approached with threats
or bribes to leave the projects alone, it would not be true to say that they have been "consulted" as to their will in regards
AUG-SEPT 1993
to the wellbeing of their people.
Ethnic and pro-democracy group leaders have stressed their opposition to the development projects, criticizing
the Thais foi both their constructive engagement policy and the environmental and social damage the projects will
cause12. Both Karen and Mon leaders have announced their intention to destroy the pipeline and the dams.
This reality does not sit well with the self proclaimed principles of oil industry leaders as expressed in the E & P
Forum publication titled "Oil Industry Operating Guideline For Tropical Rainforests". The production task force for this
publication, which is presumably supposed to impress the impressionable with the reponsible attitude of the oil compa-
nies towards the cultures of others, included representatives from both Total and Texaco. This document proclaims that
"The rights of the indigenous population should be identified and respected throughout the operation. These
people should not be exposed to any influence that threatens their health, safety, or long term welfare. The integrity of
the traditional native lands should be maintained ... Local labour should only be used with the advice or consent of the
local government, where it exists. However it must be recognized that local government will not in all cases exist, be
effective, or have priorities consistent with those of the local populace and indigenous peoples. Where the operating
company believes that this may be the case, the company should take steps to ensure that appropriate consultation will
occur directly with the local population regarding aspects of the project that will potentially affect their interests."
Not one of the oil companies operating in Burma has even approached, let alone consulted with either the
ethnic peoples or their representatives. It would be interesting to hear what sophistries they would justify their activities
with.
1. Thailand, Burma Must Find Ways To Solve the Border Problems', Bangkok Post, 18 October 1992.
2. 'Burmese Troops Remain Entrenched in Thai Soil', The Nation, 12 July 1989.
3. 'Protest Over Border Shooting By Burmese', Bangkok Post, 31 July 1993.
4. Thai Hunters "Hunted" By Burmese Troops. 4 Missing', Bangkok Post, 23 May 1993; 'Officials Act on Burmese Killing
of Fisherman', Bangkok Post, 8 April 1993; Burmese Silent on 16 Arrested Thais', Bangkok Post, 26 May 1993.
5. 'Burma. China Ink Logging and Hotel Construction Deals', AP The Nation, 11 July 1993.
6. 'Risks Seen In Total's Burmese Gas Venture', Bangkok Post, 17 October 1992; 'Burmese Drills Grinding To a Halt', The
Financial Times, 4 November 1992; 'Awaiting the Third Wave', Manager, April 1993.
7. SIPC Media Relations, 10 October 92: 'Myanmar (Burma) Actual Situation In The Country/ Shell Activities Oil/Gas'.
8. Bangkok Post, 25 November 92: 'Shell Pulling Out of Burma Oil Industry'.
9. 'Blood, Sweat and The Number Nine', Channel Four Documentary. Directed by M.Smith (not Martin Smith).
10. Letter from Dr. Colin Phipps, Chairman, Clyde Petroleum Pic., to Mr Gergory Holm, dated 23 November 1992.
I I . 'Martaban Gas Signs Positive', Bangkok Post, 8 September 1993; Texaco PR.. News From Texaco, 28 June 1993.
12. 'Burma's Dissident Government Asks French Government to delay Gas Project', Bangkok Post, 18 December 1992;
Interview with Dr Em Marta, DAB and KNU Foreign Secretary, March 1993; Dawn Magazine, (ABSDF); Campaign Flyers
Issued by ABSDF
SUMMING UP
There are many issues tied up in the Thai/ SLORC/ MNC energy joint ventures, including those of the environ-
ment, indigenous peoples rights, democracy, basic human rights, militarism and civil war, narcotics, regional and global
power politics, poverty, resource exploitation, economics, refugees and the need for different forms of development. All
of these make the evaluating the benefits and costs of the ventures a particularly difficult task.
For this job to be left in the hands of politicians, engineers, development consultants and military officers - who
have vested and highly questionable interests in seeing the projects go ahead - is a singularly dangerous, unbalanced and
inappropriate approach. It is also very dangerous that there has been no publically available analysis of the social or
ecological impacts of the projects, even though these will be far greater than for development projects done under
normal circumstances in countries that are open and peaceful.
The projects will have very significant long and short term implications in the political arena, both in Burma and
Thailand. Not the least of these are the issues of national security and energy security which will be compromised by
investing such a large proportion of the country's future energy producing capacity with a regime that has shown itself
on many occasions to be belligerent towards Thailand. The heritage of ill will against Thailand that has been developing
in the hearts of those future leaders of Burma who are in the Burmese pro-democracy movement is also a factor to be
counted.
It is also very much worth noting that the military forces under the Democratic Alliance of Burma are by no
means defeated. They have shown remarkable ability to resist the numerically and logistically superior Tatmadaw (Bur-
mese army). The sites of most of the important energy projects are still strongly under their control, and will not be
AUG-SEPT 1993
occupied without bloodshed Therefore statements or people like ex-Prime Ministers Office Minister Dr Anuwat
VVattanapongsiri. one of those who initiated the discussions with the SLORC about the dams, may say that he "did not
expect any opposition from Burmese 'rebels' because everybody would benefit from the joint development projects" are
both deceptive and mistaken (See 'Thai-Burmese Electricity Project Agreed', Bangkok Post, 16 December 2532).
The collaboration of the Thai authorities with the SLORC in its attempts to "eliminate" those who oppose them -
and even the simple indigenous villagers who oppose no one - will continue to be brought to light. The human rights
violations perpetrated by the Thais themselves in their attempts to secure the energy (and other resources) from Burma
will continue to befoul the image of Thailand internationally. The signing of the gas and hydro development deals will
inevitably bring intensified criticism and international condemnation, possibly to the point that it will affect tourism and
other investments. Furthermore, evidence concerning US and other Western companies abetting of these brutalities
could result in court cases being brought against the multinationals in US courts, resulting in their being forced to
abandon their investments, which could mean Thailand would have to undertake the projects alone or abandon them
altogether.
Several trends have become very clear in recent years:
Environmental movements, impelled by the growing global awareness of impending ecological catastrophy.have
gained or are gaining the power to make the great changes that are necessary in the flawed development
models;
Human rights issues have gained even greater prominence in political developments; and
Dictatorships have been falling all over the world in favour of democratic institutions.
AUG-SEPT 1993
Mya Yadana Report
Deadly Energy
Green November 32
August-September 1993
Reprint December 1993
in cooperation with the -

Heinrich-Boll-Foundation and Burma Biiro
Number of copies: 2.000
Burma Biiro
Josephinenstr. 71
44807 Bochum
Germany

Deadly Energy

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DEADLY ENERGY

ENERGY FOR THAILAND, POWER FOR THE SLORC 1

MARTABAN, THE BIGGEST DEAL EVER

THE YETAGUN FIELD

THE GAS PIPELINE: WHICH WAY?

up to Nat Ei Taung". The rea-

1. Manager magazine, April 1993: Awaiting the Third Wave'.

MEGADAMS AND MINIDAMS

THE UPPER SALWEEN

THE SLORC'S VERY OFFENSIVE CEASEFIRE

FLOODING AND SILTATI0N

DAM FLOOD AREA

CANALS AND TUNNELS

OIL CONCESSION AREA

THE GREATEST FLUSH TOILET IN THE WORLD

THE OTHER SEVEN MORE DAMS

THE LOWER SALWEEN DAM: TWO POSSIBILITIES

THE KLONG KRA BURI DAM

THE NAM MAE SAI HYDRO POWER PLANT

THE MAE KOK DAM

MAE NAM MOEI 1, 2 AND 3 PROJECTS

MORE TIES FOR THE THAIS

COLLABORATION, COERCION AND

PLEASE INSERT AFTER PAGE 21 (PROOF READING ERROR)

1. 'Burma; The Politics Of Ethnicity'. Martin Smith. Zed Press, 1990.

WHAT'S IN IT FOR THE SLORC

A sign for the tourists... and the reality.

...FOR THE THAIS

ROOM FOR HOPE

Reprint December 1993

in cooperation with the -

Number of copies: 2.000

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