HABEAS CORPUS
Ashraf Kunting (Kunting) was turned over to the PNP-IG
In Re: Datukan Malang Salibo
Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) learned that police officers of
Datu Hofer Police Station suspected him to be Butukan S.
Malang (Butukan. The latter was one of the accused for
allegedly participating in the Maguindanao Massacre. To clear
his name, Salibo went to the Datu Hofer Police Station and
explained that he could not have participated in the
November 23, 2009 Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia
at that time. He supported his allegations with his passport.
However, Salibo was apprehended and was detained in the
Datu Hofer Police Station for three days. He was transferred
to the CIDG of Cotabato and was detained for 10 days. Then
finally transferred to the QC Jail Annex.
Salibo filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA. The
CA issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the Writ
returnable to the RTC of Pasig City.
The RTC ruled that the Information and Warrant of Arrest did
not charge Salibo as an accused since he is not Butukan. On
appeal, the CA reversed the decision stating that even
assuming that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang, the
orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual
remedies exhausted before the writ of habeas corpus be
invoked. Thus, the property remedy was a Motion to Quash
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.
Ruling:
If a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge,
and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process or make the order, or if such person is charged before
any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. In
such cases, the persons restrained must pursue the orderly
course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies, that is, to file a
motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest.
Here, the Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest were issued
on the premise that Butukan S. Malang and Datukan Malang
Salibo are the same person. The evidence, however, shows
that the person detained by virtue of these processes is not
Butukan S. Malang but another person named Datukan
Malang Salibo.
Check full-text for minor issues
Memorize Grounds for Motion to Quash and
Warrantless Arrest
In Re: Ashraf Kunting
pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the RTC of
Isabela City, Basilan. He was charged with four counts of
Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention.
On Sept. 15, 2003, the RTC issued an Order directing Atty.
Danipog to immediately turn over Kunting to the trial court
since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation.
On Nov. 5, 2003, PNP-IG Director Lomibao wrote a letter to
the DOJ requesting for a transfer of the venue of the trial from
Isabela to Pasig City because (1) intelligence reports state that
the ASG will exert effort in recovering Kunting since he is an
important member thereof, and (2) Kunting may be recovered
by the ASG due to the inadequate security facility in the
municipal jail.
On Feb. 11, 2005, the RTC denied Kuntings Motion to Set
Case for Preliminary Investigation since the PNP-IG has not
turned over Kunting. The PNP-IG filed a Motion to Defer
Implementation of the Order citing the existence of a pending
motion to transfer the venue of trial.
Kunting filed a Petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus stating that he has been restrained of his liberty since
June 12, 2003 by the PNP-IG.
Ruling:
Sec. 4, Rule 102 provides that if it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge... the writ
shall not be allowed. Nothing in the rule shall also be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted
of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.
Here, Kuntings detention by the PNP-IG was under a process
issued by the RTC. He was issued by virtue of an order of
arrest issued by the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan. Thus, his
temporary detention in Camp Crame was authorized.
Morever, he was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for
Ransom and Illegal Detention. Therefore, he cannot be
discharged.
The PNP-IG has delayed the turn over because it is
waiting for the DOJ to request for the transfer of
venue of the trial of the case from Isabela to Pasig. In
the absence of evidence that the DOJ has indeed
filed a motion for the transfer of venue, In its
Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General stated
that the PNP-IG is presently awaiting the resolution
of the Motion for Transfer of Venue it requested
from the DOJ. In this regard, the Police Chief
Superintendent is, therefore, directed to take
positive steps towards action on said motion.

In Re: David Cruz
David Cruz was charged with a violation of the 1972
Dangerous Drugs Act for selling 2.70g of Marijuana. He was
sentenced to life imprisonment. David Cruz filed seasonable
filed an appeal to the Supreme Court. The latter referred the
appeal to the CA in view of the effectivity of RA 7659 and the
ruling in People vs Sunga. The imposable penalty was no
longer reclusion perpetua but within the range of prision
correccional to reclusion temporal.
The CA subsequently issued a Resolution declaring David
Cruzs appeal as abandoned and dismissed for failure of his
counsel to repeatedly file an appellants brief, despite receipt
of notice to do so.
Maria Cruz mother subsequently filed a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus since there is no lawful
writ or process, which justifies David Cruzs restraint of liberty.
Ruling:
RA 7659 amended the 1972 Dangerous Drug Act. RA 7659
reduced the penalty for the sale of less than 750g of
Marijuana to a range of prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua, while the sale of 750g or more is punishable by
reclusion perpetua.
In People vs Sunga, it was held that reclusion perpetua cannot
be imposed twice. Thus, prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua was construed to mean prision correccional to
reclusion temporal. If the drug weighs less than 250g, the
penalty imposed is prision correccional; from 250g to 499g,
prision mayor; and from 500g to 749g, reclusion temporal.
Here, David Cruz was convicted for 2.70g, thus the imposable
penalty is prision correcional (6 months and 1 day to 6 years).
Since David Cruz was already served 6 years and 3 months of
his sentence, which is beyond the last day of prision
correcional, the continued detention of David Cruz is already
illege.
The application for the writ of habeas corpus was granted.
In Re: Lagran
Pete Lagran was convicted of three counts of violation of BP
22. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one year for
each count. He served his sentence in the New Bilibid Prison.
On March 19, 2001, he filed a petition for habeas corpus
alleging that he already completed the service of his
sentence. He cited Art. 70 of the RPC. He argued that if the
penalties or sentences imposed are identical, and emanated
from one court and one complaint, then the accused shall
serve them simultaneously.
He said that he has been in prison for 2 years and 4 days,
counted from Feb. 28, 2001. Therefore, his detention is now
without legal basis.
Ruling:
Art. 70 of the RPC allows simultaneous service of two or more
penalties only if the nature of the penalties so permit. The
penalties that can be simultaneously served are: (1) perpetual
absolute disqualification, (2) perpetual special
disqualification, (3) temporary absolute disqualification, (4)
temporary special disqualification, (5) suspension,
(6) destierro, (7) public censure, (8) fine and bond to keep the
peace, (9) civil interdiction, and (10) confiscation and payment
of costs.
These penalties, except destierro, can be served
simultaneously with imprisonment. The penalties consisting
in deprivation of liberty cannot be served simultaneously by
reason of the nature of such penalties. Where the accused is
sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment, the terms
should be served successively.
Here, Lagran was sentenced to suffer 1 year imprisonment for
every count of the offense committed. The nature of the
sentence does not allow petitioner to serve all the prison
terms simultaneously. Applying the rule on successive service
of sentence, we find that petitioner has not yet completed the
service of his sentence as he commenced serving his sentence
only on February 24, 1999.
In Re: Gonzales and Mesa
321 personnel of the AFP entered and took over the premises
of the Oakwood aparments in Makati City to air their
grievances against the administration of President Arroyo.
Among involved were Cezari Gonzales and Julius Mesa,
personal of the Philippine Navy. They were charged before the
RTC of Makati with the crime of Coup Detat.
On Dec. 8, 2003, they were discharged from military service.
On July 8, 2004, the RTC admitted Gonzales and Mesa to bail.
Thus, it issued Orders directing the Commanding Officer of
the Marine Corps to release Gonzales and Mesa from his
custody. Despite the Orders, Gonzales and Mesa were not
released.
A Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed arguing that Gonzales
and Mesa are no longer subject to Military Law since they
have been discharged from the service. Also, since they are
not charged before a court martial, the military authorities
have no jurisdiction to detain them, and that there is no legal
ground to detain them further because of the court order for
their release.
In the Respondents Return, it prayed for the dismissal of the
petition stating that the detention is justified because of the
pending petition for certiorari questioning the order granting
bail, and that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping because
he failed to state in the petition that the order granting bail
has been elevated to the CA and pending therein.
On Sept. 12, 2005, the CA dismissed the Petition for Habeas
Corpus for violation of the rule against forum shopping.
Subsequently, petitioner informed the Court that the
Commanding General of the Philippine Marines had ordered
the release of Gonzales and Mesa. They are now enjoying
temporary liberty by virtue of the release orders issued by the
RTC.
Ruling:
When the release of the persons in whose behalf the
application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed is effected,
the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and
academic. With the release of both Mesa and Gonzales, the
Petition for Habeas Corpus has, indeed, been rendered
moot. Courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial
rights will not consider questions where no actual interests
are involved. Thus, the well-settled rule that courts will not
determine a moot question. Where the issues have become
moot and academic, there ceases to be
any justiciable controversy, thus rendering the resolution of
the same of no practical value. The Court will therefore
abstain from expressing its opinion in a case where no legal
relief is needed or called for.
Read full-text on the issue of forum shopping
Ampatuan vs Macaraig
PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the killing of two COMOELEC
Officials. He was detained at the Police Jail in UN Ave., Manila.
On April 21, 2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva
ordered the release of PO1 Ampatuan for further
investigation. The Order was approved by the City Prosecutor
of Manila but Police Superintendent Co Yee Co and Chief
Inspector Quimson refused to release PO1 Ampatuan.
On April 18, 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Guinto
rendered a Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against PO1
Ampatuan, finding probably cause to charge the latter with
Grave Misconduct (Murder). Police Director General Razon
thus directed the Regional Director of the NCRPO to place
PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody.
The wife of PO1 Ampatuan filed a petition for the issuance fo
a writ of habeas corpus before the RTC of Manila. The RTC
ruled that it cannot simply ignore the filing of an
administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan.
Ruling:
The writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been
illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. It,
however, should not be issued when the custoduy over the
person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment. If
an individuals liberty is restrain via some legal process, the
writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.
In the case of Manalo v Calderon, the SC held that a petition
for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows
that petitioner is being detained or restrained of his liberty
unlawfully, but a restrictive custody and monitoring of
movements or whereabouts of police officers under
investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal
detention or restraint of liberty.
Here, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive
Custody. Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine
National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998),
clearly provides that members of the police force are subject
to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the
PNP. Section 41(b) of the said law enumerates the disciplinary
actions, including restrictive custody that may be imposed by
duly designated supervisors and equivalent officers of the
PNP as a matter of internal discipline.
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive
custody, such constitutes a valid argument for his continued
detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and
monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers
under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal
detention or restraint of liberty.
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is
beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor
effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy
prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure
the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are
always accounted for.
In Re: Reynaldo De Villa
In People v Reynaldo de Villa, petitioner was found guilty of
the rape of Aileen Mendoza. He was sentenced to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Petitioner-related in this case is June de Villa, son of Reynaldo.
The former was only informed during the pendency of the
automatic review of the case that DNA testing could resolve
the issue of paternity. Thus, petitioners sought the conduct of
a blood and DNA test to determine the paternity of the child
allegedly conceived as a result of the rape.
In essence, petitioner invokes the remedy of the writ
of habeas corpus to collaterally attack the 2001 Decision. The
ancillary remedy of a motion for new trial is resorted to solely
to allow the presentation of what is alleged to be newly-
discovered evidence. This Court is thus tasked to
determine, first, the propriety of the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus to release an individual already convicted
and serving sentence by virtue of a final and executory
judgment; and second, the propriety of granting a new trial
under the same factual scenario.
Ruling:
The writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Concomitant to this
principle, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to directly
assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal
which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or
ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the
conduct of the proceedings. Thus, the writ of habeas
corpus has very limited availability as a post-conviction
remedy.
We ruled that review of a judgment of conviction is allowed in
a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in
very specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a
judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b)
the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an
excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void
as to such excess.
Here, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to assail a
final judgment of conviction, without, however, providing a
legal ground on which to anchor his petition. In fine,
petitioner alleges neither the deprivation of a constitutional
right, the absence of jurisdiction of the court imposing the
sentence, or that an excessive penalty has been imposed
upon him.
In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in
order to seek the review of findings of fact long passed upon
with finality. This relief is far outside the scope of habeas
corpus proceedings.
The writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, and should
not be thus used.
WRIT OF AMPARO
Canlas vs NAPICO Homeowners Association
Petitioners sought the issuance of a Writ of Amparo because
they were allegedly deprived of their liberty, freedom and
right to shelter enshrined in the Constitution. Petitioners are
settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay
Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwellings/houses have either
been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is
about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.
Ruling:
The writ covers extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, or threats thereof.
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final
judgment of the court is not included among the enumeration
of rights as stated for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is
made available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they
still have any despite the final and executory judgment
adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and
security. There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of
the writ of amparo.
Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the
writ upon the filing of the petition, only if on its face, the
court ought to issue said writ. Considering that there is no
legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will not be
issued and the petition will be dismissed outright.
Tapuz vs Del Rosario
HABEAS DATA
Roxas vs Macapagal-Arroyo
Petitioner volunteered to join members of the BAYAN-Tarlac in
conducting an initial health survey for a medical mission. After
doing survey work, petitioner and her companions decided to
rest in the house of a Mr. Jesus Paolo. Suddenly, 15 armed
men forcibly opened the door and barged inside the house.
Petitioner and her companions were dragged towards a
nearby van and then they sped away.

After an hour of travelling, the van stopped. Petitioner was

informed that she is being detained for being a member of
the CPP-NPA. From there, she could hear sounds of gunfire,
noise of planes taking off and landing, and construction
bustle. She inferred that she was taken to the military camp of
Fort Magsaysay, Nueva Ecija.

She was tortured and interrogated for 5 days.

Petitioner was released and returned to her uncles house in

QC. However, she was sternly warned not to report the
incident to Karapatan or something untoward will happen to
her and her family.

Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm and the

suppression of any existing government files linking her to the
communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs
of Amparo and Habeas Data.

The CA found the existence of records from a photograph and

video file presented in a press conference by Jovito Palparan
and Pastor Alcover, which allegedly show petitioner
participating in rebel exercises. The CA said that such photo
and video insinuating that the petitioner is part of the CPP-
NPA constitutes a violation of the right to privacy of petitioner
and further strains her volatile security. The CA granted the
writ of habeas data mandating respondents to refrain from
distributing to the public any records relative to petitioners
alleged ties with the CPP-NPA.

Ruling:

The writ of habeas data operates to protect a persons right to

control information regarding himself, particularly in instances
where such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends. An indispensible
requirement before it may be extended is the showing by
substantial evidence of an actual or threatened violation of
the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.

Here, there is no evidence on record that shows that any of

the public respondents had violated or threatened to violate
the right to privacy of petitioner. The act ascribed to the
respondents was not adequately proven since the origin of
such records were virtually unexplained and its existence was
only inferred from the video and photograph released by
Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press
conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of
the public respondents had access to such video or
photograph.

The respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from

distributing something that, in the first place, it was not
proven to have.

Tapuz vs Del Rosario