Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14534 February 28, 1962

MERARDO L. ZAPANTA, petitioner,

vs.

THE HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

Pedro M. Santos and Jorge C. Salonga for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General, Romulo L. Chua and Dewey G. Soriano for respondents.

DIZON, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition filed by Merardo L. Zapanta against the Hon. Agustin P. Montesa,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fernando A. Cruz, Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan,
and Olimpia A. Yco, to enjoin the former from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No.
3405 pending the final determination of Civil Case No. 1446 of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga.

Upon complaint filed by respondent Olimpia A. Yco on May 20, 1958, an information for Bigamy
was filed by respondent Provincial Fiscal against petitioner in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan (Criminal Case No. 3405), alleging that the latter, having previously married one Estrella
Guarin, and without said marriage having been dissolved, contracted a second marriage with
said complainant.
On June 16, 1958, petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga Civil Case No. 1446
against respondent Olimpia A. Yco for the annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress,
force and intimidation. On the 30th of the same month respondent Yco, as defendant in said
case, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that it stated no cause of action,
but the same was denied on July 7 of the same year. 1wph1.t

On September 2, 1958, petitioner, in turn, filed a motion in Criminal Case No. 3405 to suspend
proceedings therein, on the ground that the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No.
1446 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga was a prejudicial question. Respondent judge
denied the motion on September 20, 1958 as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
and ordered his arraignment. After entering a plea of not guilty, petitioner filed the present
action.

We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal (People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L-5930, February 17, 1954). The
prejudicial question we further said must be determinative of the case before the court,
and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court (People vs. Aragon, supra).
These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question for annulment of the second
marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that,
according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force
and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the basis of his
conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan. Thus, the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is
determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. On the other hand, there
can be no question that the annulment of petitioner's marriage with respondent Yco on the
grounds relied upon in the complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga is within
the jurisdiction of said court.

In the Aragon case already mentioned (supra) we held that if the defendant in a case for bigamy
claims that the first marriage is void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another
court, the civil action for annulment must first be decided before the action for bigamy can
proceed. There is no reason not to apply the same rule when the contention of the accused is
that the second marriage is void on the ground that he entered into it because of duress, force
and intimidation.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in the petition is hereby granted. Without costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-48157 March 16, 1988

RICARDO QUIAMBAO, petitioner,

vs.

HON. ADRIANO OSORIO, ZENAIDA GAZA BUENSUCERO, JUSTINA GAZA BERNARDO, and FELIPE
GAZA, respondents-appellees, LAND AUTHORITY, intervenor-appellant.

FERNAN, J.:

This case was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals as one involving pure questions of law
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The antecedents are as follows:

In a complaint for forcible entry filed by herein private respondents Zenaida Gaza Buensucero,
Justina Gaza Bernardo and Felipe Gaza against herein petitioner Ricardo Quiambao before the
then Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 2526, it was alleged
that private respondents were the legitimate possessors of a 30,835 sq. m. lot known as Lot No.
4, Block 12, Bca 2039 of the Longos Estate situated at Barrio Longos, Malabon Rizal, by virtue of
the Agreement to Sell No. 3482 executed in their favor by the former Land Tenure
Administration [which later became the Land Authority, then the Department of Agrarian
Reform]; that under cover of darkness, petitioner surreptitiously and by force, intimidation,
strategy and stealth, entered into a 400 sq. m. portion thereof, placed bamboo posts "staka"
over said portion and thereafter began the construction of a house thereon; and that these acts
of petitioner, which were unlawful per se, entitled private respondents to a writ of preliminary
injunction and to the ejectment of petitioner from the lot in question.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and upon denial thereof, filed his Answer to
the complaint, specifically denying the material allegations therein and averring that the
Agreement upon which private respondents base their prior possession over the questioned lot
had already been cancelled by the Land Authority in an Order signed by its Governor, Conrado
Estrella. By way of affirmative defense and as a ground for dismissing the case, petitioner alleged
the pendency of L.A. Case No. 968, an administrative case before the Office of the Land
Authority between the same parties and involving the same piece of land. In said administrative
case, petitioner disputed private respondents' right of possession over the property in question
by reason of the latter's default in the installment payments for the purchase of said lot.
Petitioner asserted that his administrative case was determinative of private respondents' right
to eject petitioner from the lot in question; hence a prejudicial question which bars a judicial
action until after its termination.

After hearing, the municipal court denied the motion to dismiss contained in petitioner's
affirmative defenses. It ruled that inasmuch as the issue involved in the case was the recovery of
physical possession, the court had jurisdiction to try and hear the case.

Dissatisfied with this ruling, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XII, Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-1576 a petition for certiorari with injunction against
public respondent Judge Adriano Osorio of the Municipal Court of Malabon and private
respondents, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent
judge to suspend the hearing in the ejectment case until after the resolution of said petition. As
prayed for, the then CFI of Rizal issued a restraining order enjoining further proceedings in the
ejectment case.

In his answer, respondent municipal judge submitted himself to the sound discretion of the CFI
in the disposition of the petition for certiorari. Private respondents, on the other hand, filed a
motion to dismiss the petition, maintaining that the administrative case did not constitute a
prejudicial question as it involved the question of ownership, unlike the ejectment case which
involved merely the question of possession.

Meanwhile, the Land Authority filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No. C-
1576 alleging the pendency of an administrative case between the same parties on the same
subject matter in L.A. Case No. 968 and praying that the petition for certiorari be granted, the
ejectment complaint be dismissed and the Office of the Land Authority be allowed to decide the
matter exclusively.

Finding the issue involved in the ejectment case to be one of prior possession, the CFI dismissed
the petition for certiorari and lifted the restraining order previously issued. Petitioner's motion
for reconsideration of the dismissal order, adopted in toto by Intervenor Land Authority was
denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal filed by petitioner Quiambao and intervenor Land
Authority with the Court of Appeals, and certified to Us as aforesaid.

The instant controversy boils down to the sole question of whether or not the administrative
case between the private parties involving the lot subject matter of the ejectment case
constitutes a prejudicial question which would operate as a bar to said ejectment case.

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. 1 The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally in a
situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved in both cases are
similar or so closely related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before
the criminal action can proceed. Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is
alleged in the criminal case to cause the suspension of the latter pending final determination of
the former.

The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court are: [a] the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue in the criminal action; and [b] the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and administrative in character, it
is obvious that technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak of. Equally apparent,
however, is the intimate correlation between said two [2] proceedings, stemming from the fact
that the right of private respondents to eject petitioner from the disputed portion depends
primarily on the resolution of the pending administrative case. For while it may be true that
private respondents had prior possession of the lot in question, at the time of the institution of
the ejectment case, such right of possession had been terminated, or at the very least,
suspended by the cancellation by the Land Authority of the Agreement to Sell executed in their
favor. Whether or not private respondents can continue to exercise their right of possession is
but a necessary, logical consequence of the issue involved in the pending administrative case
assailing the validity of the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award of
the disputed portion to petitioner. If the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the
subsequent award to petitioner are voided, then private respondents would have every right to
eject petitioner from the disputed area. Otherwise, private respondent's light of possession is
lost and so would their right to eject petitioner from said portion.

Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for the trial court to have taken
is to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a determination of the
administrative case. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such move. To
allow the parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's right of
possession being upheld in the pending administrative case is to needlessly require not only the
parties but the court as well to expend time, effort and money in what may turn out to be a
sheer exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d tells us:

The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper
application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of
another pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for
there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes on its dockets with
economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights parties to
the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are
settled the second action should be stayed. 2

While this rule is properly applicable to instances involving two [2] court actions, the existence in
the instant case of the same considerations of Identity of parties and issues, economy of time
and effort for the court, the counsels and the parties as well as the need to resolve the parties'
right of possession before the ejectment case may be properly determined, justifies the rule's
analogous application to the case at bar.

Fortich-Celdran, et al. vs. Celdran, et al., 19 SCRA 502, provides another analogous situation. In
sustaining the assailed order of the then Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental ordering the
suspension of the criminal case for falsification of public document against several persons,
among them the subscribing officer Santiago Catane until the civil case involving the issue of the
genuineness of the alleged forged document shall have been decided, this Court cited as a
reason therefor its own action on the administrative charges against said Santiago Catane, as
follows:

It should be mentioned here also that an administrative case filed in this Court against Santiago
Catane upon the same charge was held by Us in abeyance, thus:

"As it appears that the genuineness of the document allegedly forged by respondent attorneys in
Administrative Case No. 77 [Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago Catane, etc., et al.] is
necessarily involved in Civil Case No. R-3397 of the Cebu Court of First Instance, action on the
herein complaint is withheld until that litigation has finally been decided. Complainant Celdran
shall inform the Court about such decision." 3

If a pending civil case may be considered to be in the nature of a prejudicial question to an

administrative case, We see no reason why the reverse may not be so considered in the proper
case, such as in the petition at bar. Finally, events occuring during the pendency of this petition
attest to the wisdom of the conclusion herein reached. For in the Manifestation filed by counsel
for petitioner, it was stated that the intervenor Land Authority which later became the
Department of Agrarian Reform had promulgated a decision in the administrative case, L.A. Case
No. 968 affiriming the cancellation of Agreement to Sell No. 3482 issued in favor of private
respondents. With this development, the folly of allowing the ejectment case to proceed is too
evident to need further elaboration.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Civil Case No. 2526 of the then Municipal
Court of Malabon, Rizal is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No Costs.

MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS
July 28, 2012 Leave a comment

MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS

July 31, 2000 (G.R. No. 138509)

PARTIES:

Petitioner: IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS

Respondent: ISAGANI D. BOBIS

FACTS:

October 21, 1985, first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Not annulled, nullified or
terminated

January 25, 1996, second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis

Third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez

February 25, 1998, Imelda Bobis filed bigamy

Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license

Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of
his first marriage before entering into the second marriage

*After petitioner sued for bigamy, its just when the respondent filed a declaration of absolute
nullity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy
HELD:

A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein.3It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of
the accused. Its two essential elements are:7

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed

In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second
marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration
of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void.
The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to
be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.

Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a
second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is
not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question

*Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the
first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy (Landicho v. Relova)

Case Digest: G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995

Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and Leonilo Jacalan, petitioners, vs. Hon. Rumoldo R. Fernandez, Hon.
Celso V. Espinosa, And Sps. Felixberto Tigol, Jr. And Rosita Taghoy Tigol, respondents
Facts: This is a special civil action of certiorari to set aside orders of respondent Judge Romuldo
Fernandez of RTC, Branch 54 of Lapu-Lapu City denying petitioners motion for suspension of
arraignment and motion for reconsideration in a criminal case filed against them. Petitioners
anchor their claim on a prior case regarding ownership. Petitioners allege that the civil case filed
in 1990 seeking declaration for nullity of land title of the owner which had been filed three years
before May 27, 1993 when the criminal case for squatting was filed against them constitutes a
prejudicial question.

Issue: Whether the question of ownership is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of
the criminal case against petitioners.

Ruling: Petition to suspend Criminal Case No. 012489 based on the prejudicial question
presented was granted on basis that;

the prejudicial question is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.

elements of prejudicial question - (1) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

the criminal case alleges that petitioners squatted without the knowledge and consent of the
owner, which, in 1994 the civil case rendered the nullity of the title of the owner and declared
both petitioners and respondents as co-owners of the land.

respondents argue that owners can be ejected from his property only if for some reason, that is,
he has let it to some other person. However, both case of respondents and petitioners are based
on ownership.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22677 February 28, 1967

PEDRO III FORTICH-CELDRAN, JESUS, MANUEL, MIGUEL and VICENTE, all surnamed FORTICH-
CELDRAN;

SANTIAGO CATANE and ABELARDO CECILIO, petitioners,

vs.

IGNACIO A. CELDRAN and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

San Juan, Africa & Benedicto and Eduardo B. Sinense for petitioners.

Casiano U. Laput for respondents.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

A suit for annulment of an extrajudicial partition of properties and for accounting was filed on
February 3, 1954 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civil Case No. 3397-R).

Appearing therein as plaintiffs were: Jose, Francisco, Pedro, Jr., Ignacio, all surnamed Abuton-
Celdran (children of the deceased Pedro Celdran by the first nuptial) and, as the administratrix of
Francisco Celdran (another brother), Modesta Rodriguez. Defendants were: Pablo Celdran (child
of the deceased by the first marriage who refused to join as plaintiff), Josefa Vda. de Celdran
(spouse of the deceased by the second marriage), Manuel, Antonio, Pedro III, Jesus, Vicente and
Miguel, all surnamed Fortich Celdran (children of the deceased by the second nuptial.

After the defendants answered on May 28, 1954, a motion to withdraw as co-plaintiff was filed
on May 24, 1957. It was signed "Ignacio Celdran. This motion has been marked as Exhibit B-
Josefa.1wph1.t

Subsequently, with leave of court, the plaintiffs (excluding Ignacio) filed an amended complaint
impleading Ignacio Celdran as defendant. Ignacio Celdran filed an answer with counterclaim and
cross-claim.

After trial but before judgment, Ignacio Celdran had the document Exh. B-Josefa (the motion to
withdraw) examined by the Police Department of Cebu City. The police were of the view that the
same (signature therein) was falsified. Alleging newly discovered evidence, Ignacio Celdran asked
for new trial, which the court denied.

All the parties, except Ignacio Celdran, thereafter entered on May 6, 1959 into an amicable
settlement, recognizing as valid the aforementioned extrajudicial partition. Regarding Ignacio
Celdran, the court rendered judgment on July 19, 1961, declaring the same extrajudicial
partition as valid for having been ratified by him (Ignacio). Specifically, the court found among
other things that Ignacio signed the motion to withdraw (Exh. B-Josefa) after he received
P10,000 of the agreed P20,000 and two residential lots to be given to him in return for his
aforesaid ratification of the partition.

Said decision was later amended to require Pedro III, Antonio, Jesus, Miguel and Vicente, all
surnamed Fortich-Celdran, to pay Ignacio the balance of P20,000 aforestated and to deliver to
him the promised two parcels of land.

Ignacio Celdran appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals. And said appeal was docketed as
CA-G.R. No. 30499-R, shown in the record before Us as still pending.

Now on March 22, 1963, at the instance of Ignacio Celdran, an information for falsification of a
public document that is, Exh. B-Josefa or the abovementioned motion to withdraw in the civil
case was filed by the City Fiscal of Ozamis in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental.
Accused therein were: Pedro III, Antonio, Manuel, Vicente, Miguel, and Jesus, all surnamed
Celdran (defendants in the civil case); Santiago Catane, as subscribing officer; Abelardo Cecilio,
as the person who filed the motion.

As private complainant, however, Ignacio Celdran on December 12, 1962, moved before trial to
suspend the proceedings in the criminal case on the ground of prejudicial question. The reason
given in support thereof was that the alleged falsification of the same document is at issue in the
civil case pending in the Court of Appeals.
Declaring that there was no pre-judicial question, the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental denied on January 28, 1963 the motion to suspend the prosecution. It ruled that the
alleged forgery was not an issue in the civil case.

Assailing the above ruling, Ignacio Celdran filed in the Court of Appeals on February 21, 1963, a
petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. No. 31909-R) to enjoin the CFI of
Misamis Occidental and the City Fiscal of Ozamis from proceeding with the prosecution of the
criminal case.

On February 18, 1964 the Court of Appeals decided said petition for certiorari, ordering the
suspension of the criminal case due to pre-judicial question.

Pedro III, Jesus, Manuel, Miguel and Vicente, all surnamed Fortich-Celdran; Santiago Catane and
Abelardo Cecilio accused in the criminal suit and respondents in the petition for certiorari
appealed to Us from the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 18, 1964.

Appellants would contend that there is no pre-judicial question involved. The record shows that,
as aforestated, the Court of First Instance ruled that Ignacio Celdran ratified the partition
agreement; among the reasons cited by the trial court for said ruling is that Ignacio Celdran
received P10,000 and signed the motion to withdraw as plaintiff in the suit. Disputing this,
Celdran assigned as error in his appeal the finding that he signed the aforementioned motion
(Exh. B-Josefa) and maintains that the same is a forgery. Since ratification is principal issue in the
civil action pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, and the falsification or genuineness of the
motion to withdraw presented and marked as evidence in said civil case is among the
questions involved in said issue, it follows that the civil action poses a pre-judicial question to the
criminal prosecution for alleged falsification of the same document, the motion to withdraw
(Exh. B-Josefa).

Presented as evidence of ratification in the civil action is the motion to withdraw; its authenticity
is assailed in the same civil action. The resolution of this point in the civil case will in a sense be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal suit pending in another
tribunal. As such, it is a prejudicial question which should first be decided before the prosecution
can proceed in the criminal case.
A pre-judicial question is one that arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
to the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal; that is, it
is determinative of the case before the court and jurisdiction to pass upon the same is lodged in
another tribunal.1

It should be mentioned here also that an administrative case filed in this Court against Santiago
Catane upon the same charge was held by Us in abeyance, thus:

As it appears that the genuineness of the document allegedly forged by respondent attorneys in
Administrative Case No. 77 (Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago Catane, etc., et al.) is
necessarily involved in Civil Case No. R-3397 of the Cebu Court of First Instance, action on the
herein complaint is withheld until that litigation has finally been decided. Complainant Celdran
shall inform the Court about such decision. (Supreme Court minute resolution of April 27, 1962
in Adm. Case No. 77, Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago Catane, etc., et al.) .

Regarding the procedural question on Ignacio Celdran's right as private offended party to file
through counsel a motion to suspend the criminal case, the same exists where, as herein, the
Fiscal, who had direction and control of the prosecution, did not object to the filing of said
motion. And its filing in this case complied with Sec. 5 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which
provides:

SEC. 5. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for the suspension of the
criminal action based upon the pendency of a pre-judicial question in a civil case, may only be
presented by any party before or during the trial of the criminal action.

Denial of the motion to suspend the prosecution was therefore attended with grave abuse of
discretion; and the issue having been squarely and definitely presented before the trial court, a
motion for reconsideration, which would but raise the same points, was not necessary. Neither
was appeal the remedy available, since the order denying suspension is interlocutory and thus
not yet appealable.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review ordering suspension of Criminal
CASE No. 5719, People vs. Pedro Fortich-Celdran, et al., pending before the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Occidental, until after Civil Case, CA-G.R. No. 30499-R, Pedro A. Celdran, et
al. vs. Pedro Fortich-Celdran III, et al., shall have been decided is hereby affirmed, with costs
against appellant. So ordered.

JIMENEZ v AVERIAPonente: J. DizonMarch 29, 1968RATIO DECIDENDI: Proceedings on a criminal

case for estafa may proceed without first resolving the prejudicial question, it not being
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.QUICK FACTS: Jimenez paid Tang and
Olanday P20,000 plus P240 agents fee for a fishing boat. They agreed to return the money
should they fail to purchase the said boat. They misappropriated the money and were charged
with estafa. The accused filed a civil case against Jimenez contesting the validity of the receipt
allegedly signed by them, and later they filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the ground
that the issue involved was a prejudicial question. Court decided that the determination of the
issue raised in the civil case is not necessary for the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa to
proceed.FACTS:Name of Accused: Ofelia Tang and Estefania de la Cruz OlandayName of victim (if
any): Manuel Jimenez Ofelia Tang and Estefania Olanday received P20,000 from Jimenez with
which to purchase for him a fishing boat known as Basnig. They agreed to return the money in
case they should fail to buy the fishing boat. The two misappropriated the amount to the
damage and prejudice of Jimenez. They were charged with estafa by the CFI of Cavite.
Procedural:o Before arraignment, the accused filed a case against Jimenez in the CFI of Quezon
contesting the validity of a receipt signed by them on Oct. 26, 1962 wherein they acknowledged
having received P20,000 from him, with which to purchase for him a fishing boat and its
accessories, and the further sum of P240 as agents commission, along with the obligation to
return the amount if they fail to buy the boat. They allege that they had never received any
amount from him and that the signatures on the receipt were secured by means of fraud, deceit
and intimidation employed by him.o Several days later, they filed a motion to suspend
proceedings on the ground that the determination of the issue involved was a prejudicial
question. Respondent judge granted the motion.o Hence, this petition for certiorari, for the
issuance of a writ of mandamus praying for this Court to order the CFI Cavite to proceed with the
case and to order CFI Quezon to dismiss the civil case.ISSUE: WON the determination of the
issue raised in the civil case mentioned is a prejudicial question, in the sense that it must first be
resolved before the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa may proceed - NODECISION:
Offended party (Jimenez) won. Court ordered respondent CFI Cavite to proceed without undue
delay the trial of the Criminal case.HELD: The alleged prejudicial question is not determinative
of the guilt or innocence of the parties chargedwith estafa, because even on the assumption that
the execution of the receipt whose annulment they sought in the civil case was vitiated by fraud,
duress or intimidation, their guilt could still be established by other evidence showing, to the
degree required by law, that they had actually received from the complainant the sum of
P20,000 with which to buy for him a fishing boat, and that, instead of doing so, they
misappropriated the money and refused or otherwise failed to return it to him upon demand.
If the Court sanctioned the theory advanced by the accused and adopted by the respondent
judge, estafa cases would no longer be prosecuted speedily as the accused would just resort to
blocking the proceedings through the filing of an independent civil action against the
complainant, raising therein the issue that he had not received from the latter the amount
alleged to have been misappropriated. A claim to this effect is properly a matter of defense to be
interposed by the party charged in the criminal proceeding.

Te v. Choa, G.R. No. 126446, Nov. 29, 2000 (346 SCRA 327

FACTS: In 1988, Arthur Te and Lilian Choa married in civil rites. Although they did not live
together, they would usually see each other. In 1989, Liliana gave birth to their daughter.
Thereafter, Arthur stopped visiting her. In 1990, Arthur contracted another marriage while still
married to Liliana. Hence, Liliana filed a bigamy case against Te and administrative case for the
revocation of his and his mistress engineering license. Te filed a petition for nullity of marriage.
RTC rendered a decision on the bigamy case even the petition for annulment was pending.

ISSUE: W/N the annulment should be resolved first before the criminal and administrative case
be decided upon.

HELD: NO. Outcome The annulment case had no bearing on Tes guilt in the bigamy case. The
ground cited by Te for the annulment was for voidable marriage. Hence, he was still validly
married when he committed bigamy.

civil actions

Limjoco v. Intestate of Pedro O. Fragante80 Phil. 777Hilado, J. :FACTS: The Public Service
Commission rendered a certificate of public convenience to theestate of the deceased Pedro
Fragante to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan,Rizal. Petitioner alleged that
the granting of the certificate to the estate of Pedro Fragante whois now dead was a
contravention of law.ISSUE: Whether or not the granting of the certificate is in contrary to
law.HELD: No. The certificate of public convenience once granted as a rule, should descend to
hisestate as an asset. Such certificate would certainly be property, and the right to acquire such
acertificate, by complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the descendants in
hislifetime and survived to his estate and judicial administration after his death. In the case at
bar,Pedro O. Fragantes undoubted right to apply for and acquire the desired certificate of
publicconvenience- the evidence established that the public needed the ice plant- was under the
lawconditioned only upon requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain and
operateservice.It is also stated that unless otherwise provided by law, any action affecting the
property or rightsof a deceased person which may be brought by or against him if he were alive,
may likewise beinstituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator, unless the action
for recovery ofmoney, debt or interest thereon, unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive
because deathextinguishes the right.Furthermore, a proceeding upon the application for a
certificate of public convenience beforethe Public Service Commission is not an action. The
foregoing provisions and citations go toprove that the descendants rights which by their nature
are not extinguished by death go tomake up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which,
being placed under the control andmanagement of the executor or administrator, cannot be
exercised but by him in representationof the estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or
legatees, if any, and the heirs of thedecedent. And if the right involved happens to consist
in the prosecution of an unfinishedproceeding upon an application for a certificate of public
convenience of the deceased beforethe Public Commission, it is but logical that the legal
representative be empowered and entitledin behalf of the estate to make the right effective in
that proceeding.

Geluz vs CA

TITLE: Geluz vs CA

CITATION: 2 SCRA 801

FACTS:

Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner
and physician, through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before
she and Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents,
she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953
since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC. After two years, on February
21, 1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the
latters daughter Lucida at Geluz clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was
in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesnt have
any idea nor given his consent on the abortion.

ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover
damages from the physician who caused the same.

HELD:

The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person
does not cover cases of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which trial court
and Court of Appeals predicated.

Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis for an award of moral damages evidently
because Oscars indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates he was
unconcerned with the frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative or
criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wifes indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil
action for damages of which not only he but, including his wife would be the beneficiaries. It
shows that hes after obtaining a large money payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000 damages
and P3,000 attorneys fees that serves as indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was
clearly exaggerated.

Quimiguing vs Icao

TITLE: Quimiguing vs Icao

CITATION: 34 SCRA 132

FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City
and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded
to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and without
her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant and as a
consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month,
damages and attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del
Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a
result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that no amendment
was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by
those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article
742.

Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn
violates article 40 aforementioned.

Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not
his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is
entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee
Felix Icao. So ordered.

CASE DIGEST ON JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO

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CASE DIGEST ON JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO [93 P 257] - F: On 2/6/45, while the battle for the
liberation of Mla. was raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. (JN, Sr.) and Angela Joaquin (AJ),
together w/ their 3 daughters and their son Joaquin, Jr. (JN, Jr.) and the latter's wife, sought
refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the German Club. During their stay, the bldg.
was packed w/ refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club was set on fire.
Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people inside the bldg, especially those
who were trying to escape. the 3 daughters were hit and fell on the ground near the entrance;
and JN, Sr. and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer haven. They could not
convince AJ, who refused to join them, and so JN, Sr. and his son, JN, Jr. and the latter's wife
dashed out of the burning edifice. As they came out, JN, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese
soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises
to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people,
presumably including AJ. JN, Sr., Mrs. JN, Jr. managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby and
stayed there for about 3 days, until they were forced to leave bec. the shelling tore it open. They
fled but unfortunately met Japanese patrols who fired at them, killing the two.

The trial court found the deaths to have occurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls; 2nd. JN, Jr.;
3rd. AJ; 4th. JN, Sr. The CA found that the deaths occurred in the following order: 1st. The
Navarro girls; 2nd. AJ; 3rd. JN, Jr.; 4th JN, Sr.

HELD: Where there are facts, known or knowable, from w/c a rational conclusion can be made,
the presumption (in the Rules of Court) does not step in, and the rules of preponderance of
evidence controls.

Are there particular circumstances on record from w/c reasonable inference of survivorship bet.
AJ and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' (the sole witness) testimony competent and
sufficient for the purpose?

It is our opinion that the testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of
survivorship bet. AJ and JN, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed
that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be
arrived at, namely: that JN, Jr. died before his mother.

While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it must be noted
that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from
proven facts that it was the other way around. JN, Jr., was killed, while running, in front of, and
15 meters from the Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in 5
seconds or less, and so died w/in that interval from the time he dashed out of the bldg. AJ could
have perished w/in those 5 or fewer seconds, but the probabilities that she did seem very
remote.

According to Lopez' testimony, the collapse of the club occurred about 40 minutes after JN, Jr.
died, and it was the collapse that killed AJ. The CA said that the interval bet. JN, Jr.'s death and
the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes." Even so, it was much longer than 5 seconds,
long enough to warrant the inference that AJ was still alive when her son expired.

The CA mentioned several causes, besides the bldg's collapse, by which AJ could have been
killed. All these causes are speculative. xxx Nor was AJ likely to have been killed by falling beams
bec. the bldg. was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to
fumes, these do not cause instantaneous death; certainly, not w/in the brief space of 5 seconds
bet. her son's departure and his death.

It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Sec. 69 (ii) of R 123
does not require that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein provided be
certain. It is the "particular circumstances from w/c it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are
required to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can
not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but it may be plain enough to justify a
finding of fact."

In conclusion, the presumption that AJ died before her son is based purely on surmises,
speculations, or conjectures w/o any sure foundation in evidence. The opposite theory is
deduced from established facts w/c, weighed by common experience, engender the inference as
a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by w/c civil
cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail.