Prof. Dr.

Liudmila Okuneva,
Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University)
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,
Vice-President of the Center for Ibero-American Studies of the MGIMO-University,
Leading Research Fellow (Institute of Latin American Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences).

Democratic Transition in Brazil and Russia:

Criteria and Possibilities of Comparative Study (Several Considerations).

An analysis of the specifics of the modernization process and transition to

democratic forms of governance in Brazil and Russia is fertile ground for researchers to
work on.
A breakthrough to modernization and a desire for democracy is a force that brought
together Brazil and Russia, otherwise two completely different countries, at the turn of the
1990s.
A logical question that pops up immediately is: Do Brazil and Russia so
uncommon in culture, religion, and civilization roots, in fact, absolutely different countries
stand comparison at all? The two countries are set on different paths in their history and
belong to different civilizations. An important difference also lies in the field of interethnic
relations. The Brazilian nation arose on the basis of a sort of external factors, the
Portuguese and later a very strong African component (both were imposed on the native
Indian component). In the former U.S.S.R. and now in Russia, too, ethnic issues are utterly
different. Besides, the Brazilian nation (and the Brazilian national spirit) evolved in an
environment free from conflicts, differently from what was happening in Russia.
In our own day, realities do not appear to invite comparisons. The two countries
development types and vectors are so different today that a comparative analysis is
difficult to make. The impression is that Russia and Brazil are going each their own way.
Russia is only making its first steps down the road Brazil has traveled for decades, if not
centuries. Russia is just trying to join in the globalization movement, while Brazil has been
part of it for five centuries.
The results of political democratization and modernization in Russia/post-U.S.S.R.
territories, for that matter, and in Brazil today are vastly dissimilar as well. For example, an
analysis of political development in Russia and other post-U.S.S.R. countries shows that
it can follow a great many ways along divergent paths toward either stronger democratic
institutions and practices or a hybrid mix with undemocratic legacies, or end up in a

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situation in which there is a very strong possibility of one variety of undemocratic regime
transmuting into another and, at times, culminating in consolidation of a new autocracy 1 .
But as to Brazil, this country has advanced far in the way of democracy, as is evidenced
by a succession (six, after two decades of military dictatorship) of direct democratic
presidential elections, including the election of the Left oppositions leader, twice, in 2002
and 2006, supported by over 60% of the electorate (lately, in 2010, the electorate threw its
support behind his successor, a woman, Dilma Rousseff, demonstrating its adherence to
his course).
All these considerations apply to a period that may conventionally be called our
day.
But we see a completely different picture if we turn to events and social phenomena
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a period of democratic transition. The place this period
takes in history can be described as the starting points, a start of transition to democracy
and economic and political modernization of society. Briefly, it was a start of reforms, a
point in time whence begins movement that actually gives the researcher great
opportunities for a really broad comparative historical analysis. Originated in Brazil, the
democratization ripples gained the nature of characteristic patterns of the post-
authoritarian period that shortly reached Russia and East European countries.
When it comes to the start of transition to societys economic and political
modernization and comparison of modernization projects and starting points of
democratization, in the first place, it is fully appropriate, in the case of Brazil and Russia, to
speak of similarity of the historical situations rooted in the purpose of transformations,
rather than random analogies or coincidences, or more exactly, a typological parallel of
processes developing in these two countries and across the enormous geopolitical
expanses of Latin America, the former Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe. Typological
comparability of many development parameters, a transitional nature of societies that
shook off the legacy of authoritarianism and totalitarianism are an aggregate of
commonalities that allows comparison to be made between the realities of post-
authoritarian societies at the starting line and a thought to be given to the undercurrents of
these comparisons.
This typological comparability of development options is a solid reason for argument
that transition from authoritarianism to democracy gives rise to essentially close
socioeconomic and, particularly, political and socio-psychological phenomena and brings
out similar sides of the public mindset.

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 The lessons of democratization in Brazil and Russia are also related to how
democracy matured in their authoritarian/totalitarian societies and how the new ruling
elites came to be, how economics and politics were correlated for the efficiency of the
democratic system to depend on its ability to meet major, indeed critical, socioeconomic
challenges and achieve national consent and promote development in the interests of the
nations majority.
New Elites. The uncompleted rise of the elites to match the new round of economic
reforms in Brazil was evidence that the going was really hard. The old political elites (the
leftovers of the Vargas regime) faded into the past, while new ones were yet to take
shape 2 .
In Russia, the old system of elite recruitment fell into ruin at the opening stage of
reforms, while a new one was emerging slowly and spontaneously 3 . At that time as well,
Russia had neither a modern management elite nor with a single party still a political
monopoly parallel opposition elites 4 . Transition in Russia was like nowhere else
because the key groups of the Soviet ruling class remained in power. The phase at which
public consensus and a pact between representatives of parties competing with one
another during the democratic transition, neither of which Russia had, was in many cases
a guarantee of political and economic security for the old ruling class and incorporated it
into the new political system as a legitimate player in the democratic process 5 . For this
reason, the new elites that burst upon the political scene were extremely controversial
the old nomenklatura core untouched, they had a sizable share of new career
professionals drawn from the democratic ranks 6 . Attempts made in the early 1990s to
replace the nomenklatura elite with business representatives resulted in big business
wielding an influence unprecedented in Russian history on the political process 7 (with
detrimental implications).
Brazils experience threw a spotlight on the special role of the state at the stage of
radical reforms. In particular, the Brazilian model demonstrated the states corporatist and
patrimonial behavior that took on an extreme form in Russia years later. From the Colony
and Empire, and then the Republic, the bureaucratic state forced its hegemony on the
economy and private business, until hegemony became a decisive factor underlying liberal
democracy that came about at a later time 8 . The state in Brazil was fated by history to
dominate strongly over civil society fed by the historical tradition of regionalist and
oligarchic parties, rural clientage, and absence of a politically organized middle class.
In Russia, the state had always played a central role in the life of society at any
point of its history, a role that grew in significance in the absence of a multiparty system

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and effective parliamentary institutions. The political system that existed in the U.S.S.R. in
the period of totalitarianism was patterned on the party-state formula, The state extended
its paternalism over society that had in both Brazil and Russia a significant effect on
social psychology as consumerist moods rose and confidence grew that the state could,
and ought to, solve all problems.

Unique material for a comparative study is provided by sociopolitical and

sociopsychological phenomena generated by radical reforms in both countries.
And again, we have to begin with differences. Really, the general political
background for democratization to proceed was very different. To repeat, the destruction
of state-run economic system and formation of free-market mechanisms, and
disintegration of existing economic and social ties were totally uncommon for Brazil where
transition from the military dictatorship to democracy was not intended to alter the existing
economic system. Political struggle in Brazil, particularly during the presidential election
campaign in 1989 that split the country into two opposing camps certainly had nothing
resembling what was happening in Russia in 1990 and 1991, particularly the highlights of
the presidential election in June 1991, with forces at one side of the divide clamoring for
state ownership primacy, planned economy, and the ruling partys control over government
- and exactly the reverse championed by forces on the other side that called for a quick
transition to the free market and introduction of private property. Brazil was absolutely
unfamiliar with yet another divisive issue of the key political forces in the former U.S.S.R.,
in particular, opposition by the union institutions, or center, to the sovereignty of the
republics (even though the interests of the federal center in Brazil are not always the same
as those of the states, trends toward political separatism threatening the countrys integrity
are nonexistent).
Lets go back to the parallelism we wrote about above that produced a similarity.
Lets analyze the rise of a party system in Brazil and Russia. The arrival of
democracy in Brazil spawned a multitude of parties (a majority of them called
contemptuously pet or pocket parties) claiming, alongside really big and influential
parties, a place under the political sun. Some of them were only created to put up a
particular politician as a presidential candidate (as required by the Brazilian Constitution)
and quietly fade from the political scene once their mission had been fulfilled (Fernando
Collors National Reconstruction Party, or PRN, was the best example of this party type).
In Russia, the breakup of the one-party system triggered the emergence of a huge number
of parties that had practically no weight in politics or solid grassroots support (except for

4
the Russian Communist Party that replaced the defunct Communist Party of the Soviet
Union and had a stable electorate in the early 1990s), more fragments than real parties.
The political credentials of those parties were prevalently clientage and corporatism, and in
many respects they looked like political clubs. Understandably enough, most Russians
were suspicious of political parties in general no more than 10% of the Russians put their
faith in the parties at the time 9 .
Distrust of parties and paternalist (or tsarist, in Russian political language)
psychology that made a majority of the Russian population by tradition going back to the
times of autocracy look to a strong centralized governance in the person of an autocratic
monarch, secretary general, or president 10 , in fact, a charismatic leader. Brazils example
showed that periods of transition produce a new type of political leadership. Attachment to
populism, closely linked to the superficially structured system of political parties, , and
influence of charismatic leaders are typical of the political culture and social mentality
revealed in full measure in post-authoritarian countries, specifically, at the outset of
democratization in Brazil and Russia. Personification of power and politics, expectation of
a charismatic leader to turn up, and hope for a miracle to happen were typical of both the
Brazilian and Russian case studies: in both instances, realization of the need to modernize
the outdated economic systems came from the very top, or brewed within the party-
controlled state machinery in the former U.S.S.R. and within the top military elite that was
in power in Brazil. Aside from the circumstances just listed (the role of the leviathan state,
public mindset imbued with paternalism in Brazil or the absence in Russia of
democratic practices and skill or habits to live in the absence of such practices, and so
on), with the previous development models and living principles crashing down, this
approach certainly helps charismatic and populist leaders come up on the political top.
The meteoric rise of a virtually unknown politician, Fernando Collor, to the
presidency in Brazil was largely explained by his campaign on the issue of destitute
Brazilians plight, his skillful use of such sides of their public mindset as faith in the
charismatic leaders omnipotence, expectations of quick improvements at the will of the
supreme ruler, and an end he would put at one fell swoop to the socioeconomic crisis
growing worse. He presented a populist program of giving priority to the poor at the
expense of the rich: he pressed for the need to have a new leader having no
connections to the previous corrupted and incompetent political establishment and, in
consequence, capable of working off a decades-long backlog of problems quickly. Getting
into politics in early 1989, Collor, a member of the provincial elite led by the spirit of

5
adventure 11 , was elected president of a giant country, the biggest on the continent, at
year-end.
In a chaotic period of transition when the social system is knocked off balance,
the role of charismatic leaders is magnified and the savior myth 12 revived.
The widespread faith in a heroic savior of the nation and expectation of a miracle
he would work were strongest ever at the presidential election on June 12, 1991, a sharp
turn in Russian history. The paternalistic psychology, hope put in a kind tsar, and
supplication to the number one, all a part of the public mindset, deriving from absence or
invalidation of democratic standards of law in the Russian historical tradition played their
role in the convolutions of political struggle.
The crack-up of traditional sociopolitical molds, change in an established
configuration of social relations, collapse of existing lifestyles, and rise of new views,
behavioral patterns, values, lifestyles, and conceptions of whats good and whats bad,
previously unknown and strange to the popular masses led to the emergence of new
politicians with a bright sheen of populism, a variety of political leadership in the period of
transition in post-authoritarian societies. These new leaders sprang on the political scene
on a wave of great public expectations when society was fired by a desire to have critical
economic, social, and political problems, at times building up over decades, resolved here
and now, and made promises to deliver economic and political fruits the very next day.
Those were all attributes of populism in action. To remind, the overriding idea of the
classical Brazilian populist, Fernando Collor, was to implant in the public mindset a
realization that the country needed a new political figure who was not associated with the
traditional parties, nor affiliated with the old establishment steeped in incompetence,
corruption, and clientage, and for this reason alone unable to deal with societys urgent
problems.
The Zhirinovsky phenomenon that arose during the campaign for election of the
first Russian president in June 1991 to become a subject of sociological studies, and made
its way into monographs and textbooks in political science as a notable example of a
carefully conceived populist project fits into this pattern. There is a direct parallel between
it and Brazilian realities. Vladimir Zhirinovskys pronouncements (that were nearly verbatim
calls coming from Collor he knew nothing about) in that period were the best illustration of
the common truth that a new leaders behavior in situations just described turn into sort
of a general pattern of a period of transition. Truly a new political figure in Russia at the
time, Zhirinovsky carried this message in his election campaign interview on TV: All other
contenders come from the old team, and you have nothing to expect from them because

6
they have exhausted their potential, while I am a new man, fresh with new ideas. I have no
links to the old power institutions, have not been corrupted by them, and do not carry any
responsibility for past errors. You have seen the results of the rule of the people who are
running for presidency today. Armed with the broadest powers possible, they have not
used their authority and led the country to a dead end. I am bringing new ideas, a new
government conception, and will follow a new home and a new foreign policies.
Zhirinovskys trump card was that he was like anyone else: I am like you, of the middle
class, earning 200 rubles a month, and living in a two-room apartment. I am just the
candidate for you 13 . It was far from happenstance, still less a surprise, that for all his
sensational success, Zhirinovsky picked up six million votes and placed third after two
heavyweights well known to the electorate and ranking high in the political hierarchy of
contenders. Never in the history of Europe and America has a politician collected six
million votes in twenty days, the contender himself said about the election results 14 .
Zhirinovsky has fashioned his own image a virtual unknown, from the middle of
nowhere, without a stain on his reputation, commentators wrote about him 15 .
Zhirinovskys conception had the backing of assorted, yet broadly represented social
segments and groups, each offered an attractive and comprehensible goal a promise to
shake out the rich to the poor and sick, a secure life to the rich, protection against
waxing bourgeoisie to manual workers, opportunities and an environment for doing
business to entrepreneurs, restitution of the armys honor and dignity to the military, bread
to the poor, and an unworried old age to pensioners 16 .
Russias experience, though, throws light on yet another side of the new populist
politician phenomenon (here, too, there is analogy with Brazils Collor phenomenon):
radiating the idea of transition, a new politician of this sort in the early 1990s, when
brought to power in a democratic process, carried the germs of authoritarianism,
voluntarism, inability to work toward, and find, social consensus (the Yeltsin
phenomenon). This phenomenon so typical of Latin America and thoroughly researched
in Latin American political science is otherwise termed populism, with the new
authoritarianism as its reverse side. The populism versus authoritarianism phenomenon in

This is what Fernando Collor called for and promised during his election campaign: The previous rulers
robbed the nation. Their incompetent rule brought the country to a dead end, they are corrupted and
bound by countless links to the old order. They have led the country into a crisis. I am a newcomer who
can bring about rejuvenation to you; If elected president, I will move against inflation and corruption, and
follow a social policy to improve peoples situation cardinally; I am very much like you. I know what
worries a housewife, an entrepreneur, a student. What matters, of course, is not so much the surprising
similarity between the political discourses (even that in itself is striking; it is clear, of course, that analogies
drawn from identical phraseology only may never cover all) as resemblance of historical and
sociopsychological situations that bred identical sloganeering and politicking.
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Russia in the period of democratic transition had further specifics bound up with the
countrys history. Even though Russian history is familiar with all types of political leaders
democratic (elected by popular assembly), aristocratic (dynastic), and authoritarian
known to modern political science, the authoritarian type has been predominant 17 .
A paradox of the authoritarian type of populist leader, most apparent in the shock
plan in Brazil and encountered in Russia, too, is in the authoritarian style of neoliberal and
free-market reforms, and also reforms to advance political democracy. A florid
authoritarian style was very much in the nature of Collors policies. Collors unwillingness
to cooperate with the parliament was yet another hallmark of his authoritarian style.
In the Russian context, this style was a logical follow-up to the administrative way
of carrying through political and economic reforms in an environment in which social
groups and segments are under full control of the paternalist government at every level,
in which the authorities have used their administrative power to shape social relationships
and social groups that emerged as the bureaucrats creation rather than articulation of
budding socioeconomic interests 18 . The new government approach (in the early 1990s)
remained, because of its genetic bond to the old ruling class of nomenklatura, the
traditional apparat administration, and hence the traditional Russian approach by
exercising the will 19 . The authoritarian tendencies of President Yeltsin himself were
revealed in his directive and voluntaristic style of rule 20 .
To emphasize once again, these and other factors of post-authoritarian
democratization first demonstrated in Brazil and validated in Russia were only typical of
the initial period when political modernization was starting off.
A very important subject to compare is the political culture. But it is another
research issue which well not analyze just in this paper.
To conclude, the Russian and Brazilian realities examined in the context of a
comparative analysis add new knowledge to an understanding of radical social reforms
and a new vision in research of the key aspects of the concept period of transition per se,
and its transformations and paradoxes 21 .

NOTES

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1
A.Yu. Melville. The Trajectories of Post-Communist Transformations. // Polis, No. 2, 2004, pp. 64, 71,
and 74.
2
S. Abranches. O dilema poltico-institucional brasileiro. // Modernizao poltica e desenvolvimento, Rio
de Janeiro, 1990, p. 182.
3
E.B. Shestopal. A Psychological Profile of Russian Politics in the 1990s. Theoretical and Applied Issues of
Political Psychology, Moscow, 2000, p. 331.
4
Izvestia, July 21, 1992.
5
A.Yu. Melville. External and Internal Factors of Democratic Transitions. Issue 1, Moscow, 1999, p. 32.
6
Ibid.
7
O.V. Gaman-Golutvina. Russias Political Elites. Milestones in Historical Evolution, Moscow, 2006,
pp. 316 and 318.
8
H. Trindade. The Background of Democracy: State Building in Brazil and Argentina. // The Paradoxes of
Democracy, G. Hermet, H. Trindade (dir.), New Delhi, 1988, p. 6.
9
See: Round Table Results of 20 Years of Russian Reforms. // World Economy and International
Relations, No. 2, 2006, p. 36.
10
Ibid.; Ye.B. Shestopal. Op. cit., p. 222; Ye.B. Shestopal. Political Psychology, Moscow, 2002, p. 371.
11
Veja, September 30, 1992.
12
Ya. Shimov. The Savior Myth and Social Evolution. Why do We Love Worshiping Idols? // International
Journal of History, No. 9, 2000 (quoted in: D.Ye. Slizovsky, N.V. Shulenina. Political Leadership in Russia:
History, Experience, Problems, Moscow, 2006, p. 138).
13
See: Sovetskaya Rossiya, June 6, 1991.
14
See: Ibid., June 15, 1991.
15
V. Todres. The Zhirinovsky Phenomenon. // Nezavisimaya gazeta, June 15, 1991.
16
N. Andreyev. Zhirinovsky Waiting for His Hour to Strike. // Izvestia, December 5, 1991.
17
D.Ye. Slizovsky, N.V. Shulenina. Op. cit., pp. 12-13.
18
A.Yu. Melville. Op. cit., p. 36; I.M. Klyamkin. Post-Communist Democracy and Its Historical Specifics in
Russia. // Polis, No. 2, 1993.
19
A.Yu. Melville. Op. cit., p. 37.
20
Ibid., p. 41.
21
See: L. Okuneva. Brazil: Particularities of the Democratic Project. Great Items of the Contemporary
Political History of the Latin American Giant (from 1960s up to 2006). Moscow, 2008, pp. 380-415.