Professional Documents
Culture Documents
February 2017
Dont tell The Donald, but the stock market doesnt take him seriously.
The market took JFK seriously. In April 1962, Kennedy clashed with steel companies after U.S. Steel
hiked prices 3.5%, an increase the president called, a wholly unjustifiable and irresponsible defiance of
the public interest. The S&P 500, already down several percentage points from its fall 1961 high,
plummeted 24% over the next two months as the confrontation continued.
Trump, of course, has attacked the pricing of presidential aircraft, military aircraft, and prescription
drugs, while threatening to ignite trade wars on multiple frontsand all in just the last six weeks! But
theres no sign of a 1962-like panic. To the contrary, Twitter-trolling investors have bid the S&P 500
and practically every major index to new bull market highs. Either they see some mysterious silver lin-
ing to price caps, tariffs, and trade wars, or they simply dont believe Trump will succeed in implement-
ing the more anti-business elements of his pro-business agenda.
The market recovered quickly following the 1962 Kennedy debacle, with the S&P 500 rising 80% into a
February 1966 cyclical top. We doubt the market will fare quite as well under Trump. But thats not
because were skeptical of his policy agenda or at least the version of the agenda as it exists in early
February (which may be very different from mid- or late-Februarys).
No, our skepticism stems from the conditions Trump inherits. Theyre too good: a nearly full-
employment economy, inflated market valuations, and relatively high corporate profit margins. While
there are mitigating factors in the short run that have kept us bullish, our expectations on a four-year
horizon are restrained by these initial conditions. Trump should be restrained, too.
Yes, Donald Trump may have been born with a silver spoon in his mouth. But from a cyclical (and con-
trarian) perspective, it might instead have been Barack Obama who was born on third basewith the
S&P 500 in January 2009 trading at 11.4x Normalized EPS and the U.S. unemployment rate headed to-
ward 10%. Obama certainly capitalized on these fortuitous birthrights: the S&P 500 gains of +85%
and +53% during his two terms rank second and eighth in performance among the 22 presidential terms
dating back to 1928. He didnt love Wall Street, but Wall Street loved him (as well as Ben and Janet).
We think that stocks in Trumps current term will fall short of Obamas gains, mostly reflecting a valua-
tion starting point thats almost twice as high as Obamas wasan S&P 500 Normalized P/E of 22.5x.
The scatterplot (Chart 1) shows the extent to which the Normalized P/E on inauguration day influences
S&P 500 returns over the subsequent four years. While the optimal forecast horizon for most of our val-
uation tools is somewhat longer (seven to 10 years), a single presidential term is still enough for us to
observe a powerful, inverse relationshipwith a solid correlation coefficient of 0.63.
If this relationship between initial valuation and full-term returns holds tight, one can expect a cumula-
tive, price-only S&P 500 return of less than 10% by inauguration day of 2021. But theres plenty of vari-
ation around the fitted regression lineincluding an upside surprise in Obamas second term, when
the market rose more than 50% despite an initial Normalized P/E of 20.4x in January 2013. The best
Trump can hope for is a similar, outlier result. Then again, he thrives on low expectations.
Chart 1
Stock Market Valuation On Inauguration Day Versus
Subsequent S&P 500 Return During Presidential Term
200
Cumulative
S&P 500 Price Obama
50 first term Obama
Return During Trump
Presidential predicted second term
Term return =
< 10%
0
Trump
starting
point =
-50 22.5x
Table 1
The heated, partisan bickering that followed the presi-
dential election seems to have finally simmered down. The Stock Market By Presidential Term:
Allow us, then, to rekindle the flames. Weve just re- Initial Valuations &
vised a market study that appeared in the November Subsequent Returns
Green Book, deciding that split presidential terms Initial
S&P 500 S&P 500
(i.e., Kennedy/Johnson, Nixon/Ford) should be consid- Norm alized Price
ered a single term when tallying market returns, rather President P/E* Return*
than two (as in our original work). This minor revision Herbert C. Hoover 22.0 x -73.3 %
had a significant impact on the results, which now Franklin D. Roosevelt 6.9 162.0
Franklin D. Roosevelt 29.7 -41.3
clearly show that Democratic administrations have Franklin D. Roosevelt 11.0 27.5
experienced (caused??) much better stock market Franklin D. Roosevelt/Harry S. Truman 13.0 16.1
performance than Republican ones. The median, Harry S. Truman 11.4 68.6
Dw ight D. Eisenhow er 10.7 69.9
cumulative S&P 500 price gain during Democratic Dw ight D. Eisenhow er 15.1 35.0
presidential terms is +48.6%, about double the 24.7% John F. Kennedy/Lyndon B. Johnson 18.3 44.4
gain generated during Republican terms (Table 1). Lyndon B. Johnson 23.2 17.4
Richard M. Nixon 19.3 16.2
Richard M. Nixon/Gerald Ford 20.6 -12.9
The revised study puts bragging rights in the hands of Jimmy Carter 12.5 27.9
the Democrats, butonce againits the initial condi- Ronald Reagan 10.5 33.1
tions that seem to be mostly responsible for the dispari- Ronald Reagan 11.9 63.6
George H. W. Bush 16.5 51.2
ty. Democrats have had the good fortune to enter office Bill Clinton 19.6 79.2
with stock market valuations at much lower levels: the Bill Clinton 23.9 72.9
median S&P 500 Normalized P/E on inauguration day George W. Bush 27.6 -12.5
George W. Bush 21.3 -31.5
is 15.6x, far lower than the 19.3x median for Republi- Barack Obama 11.4 84.5
cans. Obviously, theres plenty of room for one to put a Barack Obama 20.4 52.8
partisan spin on these results (i.e., Democrats setting Donald Trump 22.5 ?
up the Republicans to fail). Managing expectations Median For Dem ocrats: 15.6 x 48.6 %
doesnt seem like Trumps style, but in the case of the Median For Republicans: 19.3 24.7
stock market it might not be a bad idea. Median For All Term s: 18.3 34.1
*M easured fro m inauguratio n day.
2 0 17 T h e L e u t h o l d Gr o u p
44000
x10 2016
2017 The Leuthold Group 44000
x10
2016 Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 2017
*Equal-w eighted composite of Consumer Discretionary, Industrials &
Materials sectors.
Chart 2 Chart 3
2300 2300 7000
S&P 500 100
Market Breadth
2200 (Weekly) 2200 90 6000
80 Leads EPS Growth 12-Mo. Pct. Chg.,
S&P 500 12-Mo.
2100 2100 70 By Nine Months Operating EPS
5000
60 (left scale)
2000 2000 4000
50
The stock market liquidity environment remains difficult for us to measure, since this is the first-ever
Fed tightening cycle following the QE experiment. But, in the Major Trend Index we monitor a variety
of policy tools and other liquidity surrogates that have lately been showing steady deterioration. These
measures are part of the MTIs Economic/Interest Rates/Inflation category, which fell to a 2 1/2-year
low in early February.
by grain &
(which was immediately prior energy
500
45
has doubled from the multi- 2017 The Leuthold Group 350
2017 The Leuthold Group
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
30
year low of early 2016. 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Chart 6
The current Liquidity Index 2400
S&P 500 & 2400
It goes without saying that the stock market remains pricey on the basis of our venerable S&P 500 Five-
Year Normalized P/E, which closed the week of February 3rd at a 90th percentile 22.5x reading. In
Chart 1, the S&P 500 12-month trailing P/E serves as a reminder as to why we normalize: the best time
to buy stocks in the last 20 years occurred with the trailing P/E literally off the chart, thanks to the Great
Recession collapse in earnings.
The S&P 500 trailing P/E has just climbed above 25xlower than in March 2009but incredibly high
for any period in which earnings werent tainted by recession. Weve highlighted the three recent occa-
sions when the trailing P/E falsely overstated market valuation on the basis of a cyclically depressed
E. They include 1992, 2001-2003, and 2009. That leaves the February 1998-November 2000 period as
the only one in history with a P/E higher than todays.
Chart 1
40
1936 To Date 40
Technology 2007-09
bubble recession
35 drop in earnings 35
(1990-91
recession)
30 30
70th percentile =
20 18.6x 20
15 Median = 15
16.5x
30th percentile = 12.5x
10 10
Yes, we recognize that results in the Energy sector have pulled down recent S&P 500 results. But
theres always a sector or two operating under less-than-ideal conditions even in the best of economic
times thats capitalism. The latest S&P 500 trailing four-quarter net profit margin is still a solid 7.8%
(Chart 2), whichprior to this unusual cyclehad only been achieved in a few quarters surrounding the
2007 peak. (We dont remember any estimates from that era which excluded the then-inflated results of
the S&P Financial sector.) Well say it one more time: earnings arent depressed, and the often-ignored
trailing P/E today offers a reasonably accurate assessment of the markets true overvaluation.
Chart 2
S&P 500 Profit Margins based on Operating EPS 10
7
based on
Reported EPS 6
latest data
through Q3: 5
Operating = 8.9% 4
Reported = 7.8%
3
1
2017 The Leuthold Group
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
How does recent earnings performance look in relation to the historical record? The regression analysis
shown in Chart 3 puts the latest trailing 12-month reported EPS figure of $89.09 right in the middle of
an eighty-year trend channelone that rises at an approximate 6% annualized clip. The superficial im-
plication might be that theres plenty of room left for EPS to rise to the top of the channel. Then again,
note that EPS fell well short of that upper band even when net profit margins reached an all-time record
of 9.2% in the third quarter of 2014.
500 since late 2011 (right about the time the obses- The Aristocrats
are now
sion with this group kicked into high gear). Our val- 45
merely market
45
tility, and economic insensitivity together as traits 2011 2012 2013 2014
2017 The Leuthold Group
2015 2016 2017
that are especially overvalued in an overvalued mar-
Chart 2
ket. The Utilities sector, which ranks #9 in this
months Group Selection Scoring System, provides S&P 500 Utilities - 22
Median Trailing P/E
an ideal mix of generous dividends, low price vol- (monthly) 20.1x 20
10
2017 The Leuthold Group
1.75
Total: 789
1.50
0.25
83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
With about half of the S&P 500 reporting, were on pace for 5% YOY growth. This will be the second
consecutive quarter of positive returns after slogging through six quarters of decline.
Looking at estimated operating earnings for 2017 (table), Small Caps are trading with a forward premi-
um of 11%.
All three market cap tiers chugged higher in January. Despite some volatility, quarterly losses have
been almost non-existent among the three indexes.
In the past five quarters, only the Russell 2000 has experienced a quarterly loss (Q1 of 2016).
After a precipitous slide to end 2016, Large Cap Theres been little action in the Growth/Cyclical
Growth stocks garnered a win over Value. dynamic since Cyclicals yuuuge win in Novem-
ber.
Mid Cap Growth ended a six month losing streak Small Cap Value (2016s big winner) was our
to Value in January. only segment in the red for the month. Since Au-
gust 2015: Growth +2%; Value +24% (in this
space).
The median valuation for our L3000 Small Cap Value stocks last hit these levels in the late 1990s.
3
10-Year Yield
The U.S. 10-year yield was largely range- 10-Year 50-D SMA
bound and ended unchanged at 245 bps at
the end of January. After relentlessly bid-
2.5
ding on the Trump trade, which typically
means long risky assets, short Treasuries,
and long the dollar, the market seemed hes-
2
itant to push this trade any farther. Obvi-
ously, Trumps first couple weeks in the
White House have been quite eventful; the 1.5 The Leuthold Group 2017
Oct-16
Mar-14
Apr-14
May-14
Jun-14
Jul-14
Aug-14
Sep-14
Oct-14
Nov-14
Dec-14
Jan-15
Feb-15
Mar-15
Apr-15
May-15
Jun-15
Jul-15
Aug-15
Sep-15
Oct-15
Nov-15
Dec-15
Jan-16
Feb-16
Mar-16
Apr-16
May-16
Jun-16
Jul-16
Aug-16
Sep-16
Nov-16
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Jan-17
and immigration (the less positive part of
his policy), instead of tax cuts and fiscal Chart 2
stimulus (the pro-growth part of his poli-
cy). Citi Economic Surprise Index (US) vs U.S. 10-Year 3-Month Change
1.2
Citi ESI US (LHS)
10-year yield didnt lose any ground and
90
0.8
60
0.4
rection. Chart 1 shows previous breaks be-
30
0
0
-0.4
hand, recent economic data has been
-30
-0.8
-60
-1.2
the Citi Economic Surprise Index is at the
-90
-1.6
The Leuthold Group 2017
Apr-12
Jul-12
Oct-12
Jan-13
Apr-13
Jul-13
Oct-13
Jan-14
Apr-14
Jul-14
Oct-14
Jan-15
Apr-15
Jul-15
Oct-15
Jan-16
Apr-16
Jul-16
Oct-16
Jan-17
1
the hawkish stance than the market had
hoped. Having already priced in about
0.8
two hikes for 2017, the market saw no
reason to extend that bet at this moment
0.6
(Chart 4).
0.4
All these disappointments, albeit minor,
led to a weaker dollar in January. Make
0.2
no mistake, Trump does not want a
strong dollar either and this is actually The Leuthold Group 2017
0
quite consistent with his policy direc-
tion. After all, if Trumps policies aim to
Jan-16
Feb-16
Mar-16
Apr-16
May-16
Jun-16
Aug-16
Sep-16
Oct-16
Nov-16
Dec-16
Jan-17
increase exports and bring manufacturing
back to the U.S., a weaker dollar will
Chart 5
certainly make it easier. Besides, capping
the upside on the dollar also alleviates U.S. Monetary Condition Proxies
financial conditions in the U.S. (Chart 5).
As we have mentioned numerous times
1.5
before (see December report Trump US Dollar Real Effective Exchange Rate (LHS)
130
1
quickly, the reflation theme is likely to
120
be short-lived.
0.5
So far, higher inflation lives in the realm
110
0
of expectations. Actual CPI was mostly
in line while wage growth was still a bit
100
-0.5
short of expectations. Nonetheless, infla-
tion breakeven rates have held up well
and this would help lower real yields and The Leuthold Group 2017
90
-1
keep financial conditions from getting
too tight. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Chart 6
Higher inflation (from the current benign
level) is credit positive as it improves US 10-Year Breakeven Rates vs. Credit Spreads
borrowers ability to pay back debt.
Credits, along with inflation breakeven
2.2
2.5
Feb-16
Mar-16
Apr-16
May-16
Jun-16
Jul-16
Aug-16
Sep-16
Oct-16
Nov-16
Dec-16
Jan-17
1.5
Global Consumer Confidence indexes
have seen sharp upturns in recent
1
months (Chart 7). Although we typi-
cally dont put as much weight on
0.5
survey-based indicators as we would
0
on price-based market indicators, it
-0.5
would be a mistake to underestimate
the power of animal spirits at this par-
-1
ticular juncture. If confidence can
-1.5
lead to real action, a lot of wonder- Business Confidence
ful things could happen. Consumer Confidence
-2
-2.5
The Leuthold Group 2017
A good example is the U.S. ISM in-
dex, a component of our Global Busi- 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
ness Confidence Index. Historically,
Chart 8
there is a strong relationship between
the ISM index and banks lending
standards for small businesses (Chart Net % Banks Tightening Standards for Small Business Loans vs. ISM Index
8). The recent surge in the ISM index
bodes well for businesses looking for Looser
70
SLOS Lending Standards - Small Biz Loans(LHS Inverted)
credit access. Standards
-30
ISM Index(RHS)
60
Needless to say, banks have to be in
good shape to make credit growth
0
50
est rates and the steepening of global
30
40
sighs of relief and bank stocks have
60
30
stock performance and overall loan The Leuthold Group 2017
90
300
-50
200
100
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
The Major Trend Index stabilized in a moderately bullish range during the past several weeks, and
closed the week of February 3rd with the ratio of positive to negative points at 1.14.
While we emphasize the importance of the weight of the evidence over periodic extremes in the indi-
vidual MTI categories, we cant help but note that the Momentum/Breadth/Divergence category is al-
most the sole carrier of the bullish torch. The Attitudinal work has dropped more than 100 points since
December 30th, while the Economic category has dropped 60 points. Theres no way to spin this mix
of MTI figures as anything other than a late-cycle configuration, and the implication is that (all
else being equal) only a moderate pullback in the Momentum work will pull the MTI into neutral
or negative territory.
The month-over-month drop in the Economic category reflects small downgrades in some of the leading
inflation indicators, along with a bearish flip in our Dollar Stability Model.
The Momentum category has recovered most of its minor stumble from the fall, closing February 3rd at
a very bullish +924. The latest weekly reading was boosted by the new bull market high in the NYSE
Weekly Advance/Decline measure, which (unlike all of the daily A/D measures) had previously been
unable to better its early September high. The technical negatives are very trivial, and include chart and
moving average analyses on the Utilities stocks and metric negative divergences in the Weekly New
figures. All in all, the technical picture is so good that weve become increasingly worried about a sud-
den whipsaw thats not signaled by the technical work. But, as already noted, if the deterioration in other
MTI elements continues at its recent pace, well have a disciplined reason to act on that worry.
The Major Trend Index is designed to recognize major market trends rather than intermediate moves, combining
over 130 individual components to assess the overall health of the stock market. Revisions and weighting adjust-
ments are made from time to time.
Major defensive market strategy moves are made when this composite reading, combining all five major indicator
groupings, turns negative on balance by a 5% margin. A positive long term view is usually appropriate when the
positives exceed the negatives by at least 5%. Ratios of positives to negatives of 0.95-1.05 are viewed as neutral
territory.
$20,000
Asset Allocation1 as of 12.31.16
$10,000
LCORX S&P 500 Lipper Flexible Fund Index Morningstar Tactical Allocation
$0
Cash 15%
Select
Industries
Fixed Income 20% Equities 59%
Dev. Mkt. Sov. Debt
Corp. Bonds
MBS Bonds
Leuthold Core Investment Fund
Emerg. Mkt. Sov. Debt Average Annual Total Returns as of December 31, 2016*
High Yield Bonds Lipper MSTAR
Munis LCORX LCRIX S&P 5003 Flexible3 Tactical3
December 2016 0.99% 0.94% 1.98% 1.17% 1.33%
Emerging Market Equities 6% Q4 2016 1.85 1.85 3.82 0.22 0.35
1-Year 4.51 4.62 11.96 7.16 6.16
3-Year 3.96 4.06 8.87 2.90 0.88
Estimated Return Statistics 5 5-Year 7.72 7.82 14.66 7.37 4.00
10-Year
FUND S&P 500 4.58 4.69 6.95 4.66 2.40
Alpha 0.31 15-Year 7.32 NA 6.69 5.31 3.55
Beta 0.52 20-Year 8.18 NA 7.68 5.72 4.31
R-Squared 51.79
Standard Dev. (annualized) 10.82 15.05 Since Inception (LCORX)4 8.31 NA 8.49 6.19 4.99
Sharpe Ratio 0.55 0.40 Since Inception (LCRIX)4 NA 5.11 7.53 5.11 2.86
*Returns for periods less than 1-year are not annualized. Per Prospectus dated 1.29.16, excluding dividends on short positions and acquired fund fees, annual
net operating expenses for LCORX/LCRIX were 1.16%/1.06%; gross operating expenses including dividends on short positions and acquired fund fees were
1.35%/1.25%. There were no fee waivers or expense reimbursements.
Performance data shown represents past performance and is no guarantee of future results. Investment return and principal will fluctuate so
shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Current performance may be lower or higher than that shown.
For performance current to the most recent month-end, visit LeutholdFunds.com or call 800-273-6886.
1 Non-U.S. Equities and Foreign Bonds have additional risks, including but not limited to: higher volatility, political instability, and changes in currency rates.
For additional information, please see the Prospectus. 2 Performance through quarter-end. Chart assumes initial gross investment of $10,000 made on 11.20.95
LCORX. Returns include reinvestment of dividends, but do not reflect deduction of taxes one would pay on distributions or redemption of shares. The Funds past
performance is not necessarily an indication of future performance. 3 S&P 500 is a capitalization-weighted index of 500 stocks designed to measure performance
of the broad domestic economy. Lipper Flexible Fund Index is composed of funds that allocate investments across various asset classes, with a focus on total return.
MSTAR Tactical Allocation Average measures performance of funds in the Morningstar Tactical Allocation category. These indexes cannot be invested in directly.
Performance return figures are historical and reflect the change in share price, reinvested distributions, change in net asset value, and capital gains distributions,
if any. 4 LCORX inception date 11.20.95; minimum investment $10,000 or $1,000 for an IRA. LCRIX inception date 1.31.06; minimum investment for all accounts
is $1 million. 5 See next page for definitions of return statistics.
Investors should consider the investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses of the investment company carefully before investing. The
Prospectus contains this and other information about the Fund. For current Prospectus, call 800-273-6886, or visit LeutholdFunds.com.
Please read the Prospectus carefully before investing.
Not FDIC Insured ~ No Bank Guarantee ~ May Lose Value Distributor: Rafferty Capital Markets, LLC, Garden City, NY 11530
Leuthold Weeden Capital Management
Leuthold Core Investment Fund Q4 2016 Report
9
ROE 17.0% 15.2%
Operating Margin 18.7% 21.1%
8
Number of Holdings 132 500
1 S&P 500 is a capitalization-weighted index of 500 stocks designed to measure performance of the broad domestic economy based on the changing aggregate market value of these
500 stocks. 2 Median Market Cap is the median total dollar value of all outstanding shares computed as shares times current market price; Wtd. Median P/E is the weighted
median of the current stock price divided by trailing annual earnings per share or expected annual earnings per share; Price/Cash Flow is calculated by dividing the share price
by the cash flow per share; "Price/Sales" is determined by dividing current stock price by revenue per share; "ROE" is Return on Equity which is calculated by dividing net income
for the past 12 months by common stockholder equity; "Operating Margin" is calculated by dividing operating income by net sales.
Standard Deviation Chart: Source FactSet Research Systems as of quarter-end. Estimated Return Statistics (p.1): Calculated by FactSet Research Systems as of quarter-end, return
statistics use monthly total returns calculated since inception against the benchmark cited. Standard Deviation measures historical volatility; R-squared measures funds perfor-
mance correlation (0=no correlation, 100=perfect correlation); Alpha measures risk adjusted performance: higher alpha indicates better performance than expected given its
beta; Beta measures volatility: beta <1, fund is less volatile and beta >1 indicates fund is more volatile; Sharpe Ratio measures risk vs. reward (higher ratio = better risk-adjusted
performance).
Risks: Short Selling RiskFund will suffer a loss if it sells a security short and the value of the security rises rather than falls; short selling could result in unlimited loss. Foreign
Securities Riskcompanies may be less liquid and more volatile than U.S. securities and may involve risks such as fluctuation in currency rate, differences in financial standards,
and instability of foreign governments and economies. Credit Riskissuers of debt securities may not be able to make interest or principal payments and/or may suffer adverse
changes in financial condition that would lower the credit quality, leading to greater price volatility. Asset Allocation RiskAdvisers may not correctly anticipate the relative returns
and risks of the asset classes in which the Fund invests.
Morningstar Ratings: Overall Rating derived from a weighted average of the 3-, 5-, and 10-year ratings. Within the Tactical Allocation category, for the 3-, 5-, and 10-year periods,
respectively, LCORX (LCRIX) are rated 4 (4), 5(5), and 3 (4) stars, among 251, 169, and 67 funds. For funds with at least 3 years of history, Morningstar calculates a risk-adjusted
return score that accounts for variation in monthly performance, placing more emphasis on downward variations and rewarding consistency. The top 10% of funds in each category
receive 5 stars, next 22.5% 4 stars, next 35% 3 stars, next 22.5% 2 stars, and bottom 10% 1 star. 2016 Morningstar, Inc. All Rights Reserved. The information contained herein:
(1) is proprietary to Morningstar; (2) may not be copied or distributed; and (3) is not warranted to be accurate, complete or timely. Neither Morningstar nor its content providers
are responsible for any damages or losses arising from any use of this information. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. DOFU: 1.27.17
Overall Morningstar Rating as of 12.31.16
As U.S. stocks rallied, foreign market performance was mixed;
the Fund's long-stock exposure outperformed the MSCI ACWI
and contributed nearly 2% to return.
among 409 funds in the World Allocation catego-
ry. Portfolio holdings in cyclical groups again drove equity
See full details of rating calculation on page 2. performance, with particularly strong results from Trading
Cos. & Distributors, Road & Rail, Commodity Chemicals, and
Investment Objective Construction Materials.
The Leuthold Global Fund seeks capital
appreciation and income while maintaining Fourth Quarter Performance Detractors
prudence in terms of managing exposure to risk. Fixed Income allocations combined to detract from perfor-
The investment guidelines of the Fund follow a mance by nearly 1.5%. Of the portfolio holdings, Sovereign
30%-70% Equity Exposure and 30%-70% Fixed Market Developed Debt had the worst results.
Income Exposure. A minimum 40% of assets is
invested in foreign securities. Exposure to securities from Emerging Market countries hurt
performance following the U.S. election, and lack of exposure
Fund Information to the Energy sector was a negative.
Symbol (Retail/Inst.) GLBLX / GLBIX $16,000
Inception (Retail/Inst.) 7.1.08 / 4.30.08 Growth Of $10,000 Since Inception2
Cusip (Retail/Inst.) 527289888 / 527289870 $14,000
Initial Inv. (Retail/Inst.) $10,000 / $1MM
Net Assets $116 million $12,000
Portfolio Managers
Douglas Ramsey, CFA, CMT $10,000
Chun Wang, CFA, PRM
Greg Swenson, CFA
$8,000
Cash 9%
$4,000
*Returns for periods less than 1-year are not annualized. Per Prospectus dated 1.29.16, excluding dividends on short positions and acquired fund fees, annual
net operating expenses for GLBLX/GLBIX were 1.54%/1.33%; gross operating expenses including dividends on short positions and acquired fund fees were
1.76%/1.55%. There were no fee waivers or expense reimbursements.
Performance data shown represents past performance and is no guarantee of future results. Investment return and principal will fluctuate
so shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Current performance may be lower or higher than that
shown. For performance current to the most recent month-end, visit LeutholdFunds.com or call 800-273-6886.
1 Non-U.S. Equities and Foreign Bonds have additional risks, including but not limited to: higher volatility, political instability, and changes in currency
rates. For additional information, please see the Prospectus. 2 Performance through quarter end. Chart assumes initial gross investment of $10,000 made on
4/30/08 in GLBIX. Returns include reinvestment of dividends, but do not reflect deduction of taxes one would pay on distributions or redemption of shares.
The Funds past performance is not necessarily an indication of future performance. 3 MSCI ACWI is designed to measure equity market performance of De-
veloped and Emerging Markets. Barclays Global Aggregate provides a broad based measure of global investment grade fixed-rate debt markets. MSTAR World
Allocation Average measures performance of funds in the Morningstar World Allocation category. These indexes cannot be invested in directly. Performance
return figures are historical and reflect the change in share price, reinvested distributions, change in net asset value, and capital gains distributions, if any. 4
GLBLX inception date 7.1.08; minimum investment $10,000 or $1,000 for an IRA. GLBIX inception date 4.30.08; minimum investment for all accounts is $1
million. 5 See next page for definitions of return statistics.
Investors should consider the investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses of the investment company carefully before investing.
The Prospectus contains this and other information about the Fund. For current Prospectus, call 800-273-6886, or visit LeutholdFunds.
com. Please read the Prospectus carefully before investing.
Not FDIC Insured ~ No Bank Guarantee ~ May Lose Value Distributor: Rafferty Capital Markets, LLC, Garden City, NY 11530
Leuthold Weeden Capital Management
Leuthold Global Fund Q4 2016 Report
Standard Deviation Global Industries Characteristics2 Vs. MSCI ACWI
Leuthold Global Fund (GLBIX) Vs. MSCI ACWI1 FUND MSCI ACWI
Median Market Cap $6,115MM $8,802MM
5
More Return
Less Risk
More Return
More Risk Wtd. Median P/E 12.7x 20.9x
Price/Cash Flow 7.8x 12.9x
Price/Book 1.5x 2.8x
RATE OF RETURN
4
Price/Sales 1.1x 2.5x
ROA 5.4% 5.3%
3
ROE 13.0% 13.4%
Operating Margin 11.6% 17.0%
LT Debt/Capital 31.8% 36.2%
2 Number of Holdings 162 2,468
Less Return Less Return
Less Risk More Risk
12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Top Country Equity Weights Vs. MSCI ACWI
STANDARD DEVIATION
FUND MSCI ACWI
GLBIX MSCI ACWI Total Developed Market Exposure 78% 90%
United States 40% 52%
Top Ten Equity Holdings (12.31.16) Japan 8% 8%
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Cl B 1.0% United Kingdom 5% 5%
SoftBank Corp. 1.0% Germany 4% 3%
KDDI Corp. 0.9% Hong Kong 3% 2%
LyondellBasell Ind. NV Cl A 0.9% Australia 3% 2%
Lear Corp. 0.8% France 3% 3%
Tosoh Corp. 0.8% Sweden 3% 1%
Delta Air Lines Inc. 0.8% Canada 2% 3%
Lotte Chemical Corp. 0.8%
EXOR Holding N.V. 0.7% Total Emerging Market Exposure 20% 10%
Thomson Reuters Corp. 0.7% South Korea 4% 2%
China 3% 2%
Taiwan 3% 1%
Top Equity Industry Group Weights
Diversified Financial Services 8%
Auto Components 7% Equity Weights By Sector
Trading Companies & Distrib. 6% FUND MSCI ACWI
Construction & Engineering 6% Financials 30% 19%
Commodity Chemicals 6% Industrials 19% 11%
Electronic Equip. Instr. & Cmpnts. 6% Materials 14% 5%
Building Products 5% Consumer Discretionary 11% 12%
Developed Wireless Telecom Srvs. 5% Information Technology 9% 16%
Life & Health Ins. & Brokers 5% Telecommunications 7% 4%
Reinsurance 4% Real Estate 4% 3%
Automobiles 4% Utilities 3% 3%
Construction Materials 4% Energy 1% 7%
Regional Banks 4% Consumer Staples 0% 9%
Emerging Diversified Banks 4% Health Care 0% 11%
Direct Shareholder Services/Account Inquiries: Questions On Investment Disciplines:
(800) 273.6886 (612) 332.9141 Info@LWCM.com
Leuthold Funds Paula Mikl Marty Owens, CFA
c/o U.S. Bancorp Fund Services, LLC Hilary Sweeney, CFP
P.O. Box 701
Milwaukee WI 53201-0701 Leuthold Weeden Capital Management serves as
adviser to Leuthold Funds
1 MSCI ACWI is designed to measure the equity market performance of developed and emerging markets. 2 Median Market Cap is the median total dollar value of all outstanding
shares computed as shares times current market price; Wtd. Median P/E is the weighted median of the current stock price divided by trailing annual earnings per share or expected
annual earnings per share; Price/Cash Flow is calculated by dividing the share price by the cash flow per share; Price/Book compares a stocks market value to the value of total assets
less total liabilities (book value); "Price/Sales" is determined by dividing current stock price by revenue per share; "ROA" is Return on Assets which is calculated by dividing net income
for the past 12 months by total average assets; "ROE" is Return on Equity which is calculated by dividing net income for the past 12 months by common stockholder equity; "Operating
Margin" is calculated by dividing operating income by net sales; "LT Debt/Capital" is calculated by dividing long-term debt by the sum of long-term debt, preferred stock and common
stockholder's equity.
Standard Deviation Chart: Source FactSet Research Systems as of quarter-end. Estimated Return Statistics (p.1): Calculated by FactSet Research Systems as of quarter-end, return statistics
use monthly total returns calculated since inception against the benchmark cited. Standard Deviation measures historical volatility; R-squared measures funds performance correla-
tion (0=no correlation, 100=perfect correlation); Alpha measures risk adjusted performance: higher alpha indicates better performance than expected given its beta; Beta measures
volatility: beta <1, fund is less volatile and beta >1 indicates fund is more volatile; Sharpe Ratio measures risk vs. reward (higher ratio = better risk-adjusted performance).
Risks: Short Selling Riskshort sales involve selling a security in anticipation that the price will decline. Fund will suffer a loss if the value of the security rises rather than falls. In theory,
short selling could result in unlimited loss. Foreign Securities Riskforeign companies may be less liquid and more volatile than U.S. securities and may involve risks such as fluctuations
in currency rates, differences in financial standards, and instability of governments and economies. Credit Riskissuers of debt securities may not be able to make interest or principal
payments and/or could suffer adverse changes in financial condition that would lower the credit quality, leading to greater price volatility. Asset Allocation RiskAdviser may not correctly
anticipate the relative returns and risks of the asset classes in which the Fund invests.
Morningstar Ratings: Overall Rating derived from a weighted average of the 3-, 5-, and 10-year (if applicable) ratings. Within the World Allocation category, for the 3-, 5-, and 10-year
periods, respectively, GLBLX/GLBIX rated 3, 3, and NA stars among 409, 322, and NA funds. For funds with at least 3 years of history, Morningstar calculates a risk-adjusted return score
that accounts for variation in monthly performance, placing more emphasis on downward variations and rewarding consistency. The top 10% of funds in each category receive 5 stars,
next 22.5% 4 stars, next 35% 3 stars, next 22.5% 2 stars, and bottom 10% 1 star. 2016 Morningstar, Inc. All Rights Reserved. The information contained herein: (1) is proprietary to
Morningstar; (2) may not be copied or distributed; and (3) is not warranted to be accurate, complete or timely. Neither Morningstar nor its content providers are responsible for any
damages or losses arising from any use of this information. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. DOFU: 1.27.17
Leuthold Weeden Capital Management