Resident Marine Mammals vs Secretary of Department of Energy

Case Digest GR 180771 April 21 2015

Facts:
In 2002, the Department of Energy entered into a Geophysical Survey and
Exploration Contract with JAPEX, a 100% Japanese corporation, which was later
converted to a service contract, known as SC-46, for the exploration,
development and utilization of petroleum resources in an area that basically
affects the Tanon Strait. The President at that time was not a signatory to the
SC-46 and such contract was not submitted to the Congress for review.

Tanon Strait is a narrow passage of water in Cebu which harbors a biodiversity of

marine life and is declared by laws as a protected seascape. When JAPEX
started its seismic surveys and drilling activities over the area, petitions were
filed assailing the constitutionality of SC-46. One petition protesting the
activities for its ecological impact was in the name of Resident Marine
Mammals which are literally toothed whales, turtles and such, joined in by
human petitioners referred to as Stewards, in their representative as well as
personal capacity. Pres. Arroyo was also impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner,
purportedly because of her express declaration and undertaking under the
ASEAN Charter to protect habitats and other environmental concerns.

FIDEC, an organization committed to the welfare of marginal fisherfolk in the

area, also questioned the SC-46 on the ground that service contracts are no
longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution, and that if it were, SC-46 is still null
and void because it did not comply with the Constitution, most especially the
safeguards that the Court laid down in La Bugal Blaan case.

Remedial Law
Issue 1: W/N the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, have
standing as the real party-in-interests in this suit
Yes. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizens
suit. A citizens suit under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for
the enforcement of environmental law on behalf of minors or generations yet
unborn. It is essentially a representative suit that allows persons who
are not real parties in interest to institute actions on behalf of the real party in
interest.

Dissent
Issue 2: W/N the name of former President Arroyo impleaded in the petition as
an unwilling co-plaintiff is proper
No. The name of Pres Arroyo as an unwilling plaintiff impleaded in the petition
should be stricken from the title of the case.

First, under Rule 3, Sec 10 of the ROC, when the consent of a party who should
be joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a
party defendant. This will put the unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the
court, which may properly implead him or her through its processes. The
unwilling partys name cannot be simply included in the petition without her
knowledge or consent, as this would be a denial of due process.

Second, impleading the former President for an act she made in performance of
the functions of her office is contrary to the public policy against embroiling
Presidents in suits.

Political Law
Issue 3: W/N service contracts are no longer allowed by the 1987 Constitution
No. As settled in the La Bugal case, the deletion of the words service contracts
in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, the
deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission show that in
deliberating on Art XII Sec 2(4), they were actually referring to service contracts
as understood in the 1973 Constitution. The framers, in short, used the term
service contracts in referring to agreements involving technical or financial
assistance.

Issue 4: W/N SC-46 is valid

No. The SC-46 is not valid because it did not comply with the Art XII, Sec 2 (4) of
the Constitution. First, it was not crafted in accordance with a general law that
provides standards, terms and conditions; second, it was not signed by the
President for and on behalf of the Philippine government; and third, it was not
reported by the President to the Congress within 30 days of execution.

Relevant La
 Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape

Taon Strait v. Secretary Angelo Reyes

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Taon Strait v.
Secretary Angelo Reyes, G.R. No. 180771 (April 21, 2015)
Supreme Court of the Philippines

Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the legality

of Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) awarded to Japan Petroleum
Exploration Co. (JAPEX). The service contract allowed JAPEX to
conduct oil exploration in the Taon Strait during which it performed
seismic surveys and drilled one exploration well. The first petition
was brought on behalf of resident marine mammals in the Taon
Strait by two individuals acting as legal guardians and stewards of
the marine mammals. The second petition was filed by a non-
governmental organization representing the interests of fisherfolk,
along with individual representatives from fishing communities
impacted by the oil exploration activities. The petitioners filed their
cases in 2007, shortly after JAPEX began drilling in the strait. In
2008, JAPEX and the government of the Philippines mutually
terminated the service contract and oil exploration activities
ceased. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases for the purpose
of review.

In its decision, the Supreme Court first addressed the important

procedural point of whether the case was moot because the service
contract had been terminated. The Court declared that mootness is
not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in
resolving a case. Id., p. 12. Due to the alleged grave constitutional
violations and paramount public interest in the case, not to mention
the fact that the actions complained of could be repeated, the Court
found it necessary to reach the merits of the case even though the
particular service contract had been terminated. Id.

Reviewing the numerous claims filed by the petitioners, the

Supreme Court narrowed them down to two: 1) whether marine
mammals, through their stewards, have legal standing to pursue the
case; and 2) whether the service contract violated the Philippine
Constitution or other domestic laws. Id., p. 11.
As to standing, the Court declined to extend the principle of
standing beyond natural and juridical persons, even though it
recognized that the current trend in Philippine jurisprudence moves
towards simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in
environmental cases. Id., p. 15. Instead, the Court explained, the
need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been
eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a
steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental
laws. Id., p. 16-17.

The Court then held that while SC-46 was authorized Presidential
Decree No. 87 on oil extraction, the contract did not fulfill two
additional constitutional requirements. Section 2 Article XII of the
1987 Constitution requires a service contract for oil exploration and
extraction to be signed by the president and reported to congress.
Because the JAPEX contract was executed solely by the Energy
Secretary, and not reported to the Philippine congress, the Court
held that it was unconstitutional. Id., pp. 24-25.

In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract violated the
National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act),
which generally prohibits exploitation of natural resources in
protected areas. In order to explore for resources in a protected
area, the exploration must be performed in accordance with an
environmental impact assessment (EIA). The Court noted that JAPEX
started the seismic surveys before any EIA was performed; therefore
its activity was unlawful. Id., pp. 33-34. Furthermore, the Tanon
Strait is a NIPAS area, and exploration and utilization of energy
resources can only be authorized through a law passed by the
Philippine Congress. Because Congress had not specifically
authorized the activity in Taon Strait, the Court declared that no
energy exploration should be permitted in that area. Id., p. 34.