PEOPLE v.

PAMON

Doctrine: If the counsel is appointed by the investigators, generally, admissions made before said counsel are
inadmissible unless the appointment was made with the conformity of the confessor. Pamon never signified that
he had a lawyer of choice, hence he was merely provided without one and he clearly acquiesced thereto.

Recit Ready (from Jech Tiu):

PAMON asserted that ATTY. LIGORIO was not his choice of counsel and that he was forced to sign a paper, which
turned out to be a letter to LIGORIO. LIGORIO, however, was present during the time when PAMONs confession
was made and sworn to and has participated during the investigation. The SC held that the Constitutional mandate is
that, as a general rule, the counsel present must not be just any counsel, but one who has been chosen by the
accused. No in custody investigation shall be conducted, unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested. By any person in his behalf. Appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or
by someone in his behalf
The SC also held that where investigators provide for counsel, the confession taken in the presence of such
counsel is inadmissible as evidence because it fails to satisfy the Constitutional guarantee. However, there are
exceptions to the said doctrine. Where the counsel has been appointed by the investigators with the
conformity of the confessant, the latters confession is considered as valid and binding upon him. In other
words, the rule is otherwise if the accused acquiesced to the choice of Counsel. In this case, PAMON never signified
that he had a lawyer of choice and, hence, he was merely provided with one and he clearly acquiesced thereto.

Facts:
In the morning of July 26, 1985, Robert Te drove his 3/4-ton cargo truck from his residence in Sta.
Filomena to Sindutan, Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte to buy copra.
While they were negotiating a road in Lipakan, the truck got stuck in the mud.
As a result, the trucks of Lily Wong and Gerson Dulang which were following his truck were blocked and
could not proceed. In order to pull the truck from the mud, Robert Te ordered his companions to tie the
wrench of the truck to a coconut tree with a cable.
Robert Te remained behind the wheel to maneuver the truck. While in that position, a man approached
Robert Te and shot him on the bridge of his nose. The latter died instantly. Another shot was fired and
Cesar Siga was hit. Thereafter, the truck was burned by another man. The gunman escaped and boarded
the last truck which was the one owned by Gerson Dulang.
Initial investigations by the police and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) pointed to the New
People's Army (NPA) as the killers. However, subsequent investigations by the Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS) yielded Fortunato Pamon as the one responsible for Robert Te's death.
Fortunato Pamon was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest for a murder charge. He admitted that he shot
and killed Robert Te.
o He said in the affidavit that he shot Te because of an order from Mayor Inocencio Feras.
o He said that he was promised P15,000.00 by Inocencio Feras as payment for the job. The money
will be given by one Gerson Dulang
o The extrajudicial was subscribed and sworn and was reaffirmed during the preliminiary
investigations.
an information for murder was filed against Fortunato Pamon, as principal by direct participation,
Inocencio Feras and Gerson Dulang as principals by inducemet, and John Doe, alias "Dodo" as accomplice.
Inocencio Feras died at the course of the trial.
During the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Evangeline Te, the widow of Robert Te,
Rolando Salatandre, Judge Vicente Aseniero, Victoriano Jauculan and Hipolito Andig.
Evangeline Te testified that at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning of July 25, 1985, she received a call from
Gerson Dulang.
o Gerson Dulang invited Robert Te to a birthday party in his house. Te accepted the invitation and
went to Dulangs house. When he returned to the house at 2 in the afternoon, he disclosed to his
wife that he (Te) and Dulang will be meeting in the mountain to find who is the better man among
them.
 Rolando Salatandre testified that the extrajudicial Confession of Fortunato Pamon was voluntary and
that it was in accordance with the constitutional mandate. This was reaffirmed by Judge Vicente
Aseniero in his testimony. (There were several other witnesses, which pointed Pamon as the gunman).
Defense:
o The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Gerson Dulang who professed
ignorance of the crime; of Raul Curativo, a neighbor of Fortunato Pamon, who described the
killer as "short, dark in complexion, with curly hair and was bearded", and who said that
Fortunato Pamon was not the killer;
The trial court convicted Fortunato Pamon, Dalang, and one John Doe
o The defense alleged that Pamon was forced to sign a paper during the custodial investigation
which forced him to take responsibility of the crime.
o In upholding the voluntariness of the extrajudicial Confession, the trial court also observed that
only Fortunato Pamon could have known the identities of his co-conspirators and that he did not
present evidence that the CIS knew them beforehand.
o the court also said that assuming that the Confession was inadmissible, there were other evidences
which proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused Fortunato Pamon, among which was
the positive identification by witnesses pointing to him as the killer.
Dulang claimed that the trial court erred in adminitting the Confession as it was violative of Article
III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution, which guarantees a person under investigation the right to be
assisted by an independent counsel of his own choice and the right against torture and violence. Any
violation of said guarantees renders an extrajudicial confession inadmissible.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of Fortunato Pamon is inadmissible as evidence for conviction.

RULING: NO. The court upheld the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession.

A confession constitutes an evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that
no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by
truth and his conscience.
o This presumption of spontaneity and voluntariness stands unless the defense proves otherwise.
o It is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence,
intimidation, threat, or promise of reward of leniency.
The Court believed that Fortunato Pamon did not present enough proof to overcome the
presumption.
o Apart from his testimony that he was maltreated, Fortunato Pamon presented no other substantial
proof to buttress his claim. He did not submit any medical certificate which would attest to his
allegation that he was mauled and was hit on the head.
o The examining physician also found no sign of physical maltreatment in Pamons body.
o Neither did he file any complaint against his manhandlers with the proper authorities.
In People v. Damaso the Court held that: where the defendants did not present evidence
of compulsion, or duress nor violence on their person; where they failed to complain
to the officer who administered their oaths; where they did not institute any
criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for
maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and
where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress
their claim, all these were considered by this Court as factors indicating
voluntariness.
Fortunato Pamon had several chances to deny the voluntariness of his Confession.
1. when he and Atty. Rubencio Ligorio conferred;
2. when he subscribed the Confession before Judge Vicente Aseniero on March 20, 1987; and
 3. when he was before the investigating officer on March 23, 1987. In the last instance, instead of
repudiating his Confession, he reaffirmed it.
Aside from holding that the extrajudicial Confession of Fortunato Pamon had been voluntarily given, We
also hold that it was given in the presence and with the assistance of counsel.
o However, Pamon claimed that Atty. Ligorio was not the counsel of his choice.
o We are well aware of the constitutional mandate that the counsel present must not be just any
counsel, but one who has been chosen by the accused.
o The Court already ruled in the previous cases that where the counsel is provided by investigators,
the confession taken in the presence of such counsel is inadmissibile as evidence because it fails to
satisfy the constitutional guarantee.
o But this doctrine recognizes certain exceptions. Where the counsel has been appointed by the
investigators with the conformity of the confessant, the latter's confession is considered as valid
and binding upon him
The Court upheld the validity of confession only against Pamon but not against Dulang because of
insufficiency of evidence of the participation of the latter to the crime.
o Also, Fortunato Pamon had no personal knowledge of Gerson Dulang's participation. He only
heard from alias "Dodo" that Gerson Dulang hired him to kill Robert Te.
o An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his
co-accused.
o the confession of Fortunato Pamon vis-a-vis Gerson Dulang was, as the appellant called it, double
hearsay.