G.R. No.
82027 March 29, 1990
ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA FAUSTINO-
CORONA, respondents.
Rufino B. Javier Law Office for petitioner.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court 1 involving the probate of
the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New York, U. S.A., on
November 10, 1980, naming private respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In
our said decision, we upheld the appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-special
administrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate with her (Mrs. Vitug's) widower, petitioner Romarico
G. Vitug, pending probate.
On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the
probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to
cover allegedly his advances to the estate in the sum of P667,731.66, plus interests,
which he claimed were personal funds. As found by the Court of Appeals, 2 the alleged
advances consisted of P58,147.40 spent for the payment of estate tax, P518,834.27 as
deficiency estate tax, and P90,749.99 as "increment thereto." 3 According to Mr. Vitug, he
withdrew the sums of P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from savings account No. 35342-038
of the Bank of America, Makati, Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the
same funds withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal partnership
properties and part of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for
reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for failure to include the sums in question for
inventory and for "concealment of funds belonging to the estate." 4
Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same
through a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank on June 19,
1970. The agreement provides:
We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF AMERICAN
NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (hereinafter
referred to as the BANK), that all money now or hereafter deposited by
us or any or either of us with the BANK in our joint savings current
account shall be the property of all or both of us and shall be payable
to and collectible or withdrawable by either or any of us during our
lifetime, and after the death of either or any of us shall belong to and
be the sole property of the survivor or survivors, and shall be payable
to and collectible or withdrawable by such survivor or survivors.
We further agree with each other and the BANK that the receipt or
check of either, any or all of us during our lifetime, or the receipt or
check of the survivor or survivors, for any payment or withdrawal made
for our above-mentioned account shall be valid and sufficient release
and discharge of the BANK for such payment or withdrawal. 5
The trial courts 6 upheld the validity of this agreement and granted "the motion to sell
some of the estate of Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of which shall be used to pay the
personal funds of Romarico Vitug in the total sum of P667,731.66 ... ." 7
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in the petition for certiorari filed by the herein
private respondent, held that the above-quoted survivorship agreement constitutes a
conveyance mortis causa which "did not comply with the formalities of a valid will as
prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code," 8 and secondly, assuming that it is a mere
donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under the provisions of Article 133 of the
Civil Code. 9
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Judge dated November 26,
1985 (Annex II, petition) is hereby set aside insofar as it granted
private respondent's motion to sell certain properties of the estate of
Dolores L. Vitug for reimbursement of his alleged advances to the
estate, but the same order is sustained in all other respects. In
addition, respondent Judge is directed to include provisionally the
deposits in Savings Account No. 35342-038 with the Bank of America,
Makati, in the inventory of actual properties possessed by the spouses
at the time of the decedent's death. With costs against private
respondent. 10
In his petition, Vitug, the surviving spouse, assails the appellate court's ruling on the
strength of our decisions in Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co. 11 and Macam v.
Gatmaitan 12 in which we sustained the validity of "survivorship agreements" and
considering them as aleatory contracts. 13
The petition is meritorious.
The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be
embodied in a will. A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free
act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or
complies with duties to take effect after his death." 14 In other words, the bequest or
device must pertain to the testator. 15 In this case, the monies subject of savings account
No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds In the case relied on, Rivera v.
People's Bank and Trust Co., 16 we rejected claims that a survivorship agreement
purports to deliver one party's separate properties in favor of the other, but simply, their
joint holdings:
 xxx xxx xxx
... Such conclusion is evidently predicated on the assumption that
Stephenson was the exclusive owner of the funds-deposited in the
bank, which assumption was in turn based on the facts (1) that the
account was originally opened in the name of Stephenson alone and
(2) that Ana Rivera "served only as housemaid of the deceased." But it
not infrequently happens that a person deposits money in the bank in
the name of another; and in the instant case it also appears that Ana
Rivera served her master for about nineteen years without actually
receiving her salary from him. The fact that subsequently Stephenson
transferred the account to the name of himself and/or Ana Rivera and
executed with the latter the survivorship agreement in question
although there was no relation of kinship between them but only that of
master and servant, nullifies the assumption that Stephenson was the
exclusive owner of the bank account. In the absence, then, of clear
proof to the contrary, we must give full faith and credit to the certificate
of deposit which recites in effect that the funds in question belonged to
Edgar Stephenson and Ana Rivera; that they were joint (and several)
owners thereof; and that either of them could withdraw any part or the
whole of said account during the lifetime of both, and the balance, if
any, upon the death of either, belonged to the survivor. 17
xxx xxx xxx
In Macam v. Gatmaitan, 18 it was held:
xxx xxx xxx
This Court is of the opinion that Exhibit C is an aleatory contract
whereby, according to article 1790 of the Civil Code, one of the parties
or both reciprocally bind themselves to give or do something as an
equivalent for that which the other party is to give or do in case of the
occurrence of an event which is uncertain or will happen at an
indeterminate time. As already stated, Leonarda was the owner of the
house and Juana of the Buick automobile and most of the furniture. By
virtue of Exhibit C, Juana would become the owner of the house in
case Leonarda died first, and Leonarda would become the owner of
the automobile and the furniture if Juana were to die first. In this
manner Leonarda and Juana reciprocally assigned their respective
property to one another conditioned upon who might die first, the time
of death determining the event upon which the acquisition of such right
by the one or the other depended. This contract, as any other contract,
is binding upon the parties thereto. Inasmuch as Leonarda had died
before Juana, the latter thereupon acquired the ownership of the
house, in the same manner as Leonarda would have acquired the
ownership of the automobile and of the furniture if Juana had died
first. 19
xxx xxx xxx
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must
be presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marita.
relations. 20
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons,
because it was to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation
between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse's own properties to
the other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal
partnership, as held by the Court of Appeals, 21 by "mere stipulation" 22 and that it is no
"cloak" 23 to circumvent the law on conjugal property relations. Certainly, the spouses are
not prohibited by law to invest conjugal property, say, by way of a joint and several bank
account, more commonly denominated in banking parlance as an "and/or" account. In
the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings account No. 35342-038, they
merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not
dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have arguably been sanctionable as a
prohibited donation. And since the funds were conjugal, it can not be said that one
spouse could have pressured the other in placing his or her deposits in the money pool.
The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-all" feature,
but in reality, that contract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term being death.
Such agreements are permitted by the Civil Code. 24
Under Article 2010 of the Code:
ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both
reciprocally bind themselves to give or to do something in
consideration of what the other shall give or do upon the happening of
an event which is uncertain, or which is to occur at an indeterminate
time.
Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an aleatory contract depends on either
the happening of an event which is (1) "uncertain," (2) "which is to occur at an
indeterminate time." A survivorship agreement, the sale of a sweepstake ticket, a
transaction stipulating on the value of currency, and insurance have been held to fall
under the first category, while a contract for life annuity or pension under Article 2021, et
sequentia, has been categorized under the second. 25 In either case, the element of risk
is present. In the case at bar, the risk was the death of one party and survivorship of the
other.
However, as we have warned:
xxx xxx xxx
But although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law
its operation or effect may be violative of the law. For instance, if it be
shown in a given case that such agreement is a mere cloak to hide an
inofficious donation, to transfer property in fraud of creditors, or to
defeat the legitime of a forced heir, it may be assailed and annulled
 upon such grounds. No such vice has been imputed and established Maria[3] covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin. The
against the agreement involved in this case. 26 Deed of Donation provided:

xxx xxx xxx
There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been executed for
such unlawful purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in order to frustrate our laws
on wills, donations, and conjugal partnership.
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her
husband, the latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under
savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court
ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court
was in error. Being the separate property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate
of the deceased.
That, for and in consideration of the love and affection of the
DONOR [Matilde] for the DONEE [Maria], the latter being adopted and
hav[ing] been brought up by the former the DONOR, by these
presents, transfer and convey, BY WAY OF DONATION, unto
the DONEE the property above-described, to become effective upon
the death of the DONOR, but in the event that the DONEE should
die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
rescinded and [of] no further force and effect; Provided, however,
that anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who
should survive, they could use[,] encumber or even dispose of any or
even all of the parcels of land herein donated.[4] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court, dated June 29, 1987, and On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674 and 676
its resolution, dated February 9, 1988, are SET ASIDE. were issued in Matildes name.

On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to respondent by a Deed of
No costs. Absolute Sale of Real Property.[5]

SO ORDERED. Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and
testament,[6] devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her remaining
properties including Lot No. 674 to respondent.
DANILO ALUAD, LEONORA ALUAD, DIVINA G.R. No. 176943
ALUAD, PROSPERO ALUAD, and CONNIE
Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the
ALUAD, Present:
same year.[7]
Petitioners,
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
On August 21, 1995, Marias heirs-herein petitioners filed before the Regional
CARPIO MORALES,
Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint,[8] for declaration and recovery of ownership
TINGA,
and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages against respondent, alleging:
- versus - VELASCO, JR., and
That in 1978, plaintiff[s] possessed the two (2) parcels of land
BRION, JJ.
above-described until January 1991 when defendant entered and
possessed the two (2) parcels of land claiming as the adopted son of
Crispin Aluad who refused to give back possession until Matilde Aluad
ZENAIDO ALUAD, Promulgated:
died in [1994] and then retained the possession thereof up to and until
Respondent. October 17, 2008
the present time, thus, depriving the plaintiffs of the enjoyment of said
parcels of land x x x;
x--------------------------------------------------x
That after the death of Matilde R. Aluad, the plaintiffs
DECISION
succeeded by inheritance by right of representation from their
deceased mother, Maria Aluad who is the sole and only daughter of
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Matilde Aluad[.][9]
Petitioners mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were
raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin).
To the complaint respondent alleged in his Answer.[10]
Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680,
and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the
That Lot 674 is owned by the defendant as this lot was
lots to herself.[1]
adjudicated to him in the Last Will and Testament of Matilde Aluad x x x
while Lot 676 was purchased by him from Matilde Aluad. These two
On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled Deed of
lots are in his possession as true owners thereof.[11] (Underscoring
Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos[2] (Deed of Donation) in favor of petitioners mother
supplied)

Petitioners later filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint Already Filed to
Conform to Evidence[12] to which it annexed an Amended Complaint[13]which cited the
donation of the six lots via Deed of Donation in favor of their mother Maria. Branch 15 of
the RTC granted the motion and admitted the Amended Complaint.[14]
Respondent filed an Amended Answer[15] contending, inter alia, that the Deed of
Donation is forged and falsified and petitioners change of theory showed that said
document was not existing at the time they filed their complaint and was concocted by
them after realizing that their false claim that their mother was the only daughter of
Matild[e] Aluad cannot in anyway be established by them;[16] and that if ever said
document does exist, the same was already revoked by Matilde when [she] exercised all
acts of dominion over said properties until she sold Lot 676 to defendant and until her
death with respect to the other lots without any opposition from Maria Aluad.[17]
The trial court, by Decision[18] of September 20, 1996, held that Matilde could not
have transmitted any right over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she having
previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Declaring the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the
subject Lots Nos. 674 and 676, Pilar Cadastre;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver the possession of the
subject lots to the plaintiffs;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs:
a. Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorneys
fees;
b. Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), representing
the income from subject Lot 676, a year from 1991
up to the time said lot is delivered to the plaintiffs,
together with the interest thereof at the legal rate
until fully paid;
c. Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), representing
the income from the subject Lot No. 674, a year from
1991 up to the time said lot is delivered to the
plaintiffs, plus legal interest thereof at the legal rate
until fully paid; and
d. The costs of the suit.
Defendants counterclaim is ordered dismissed for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.[19]
On petitioners motion, the trial court directed the issuance of a writ of execution
pending appeal.[20] Possession of the subject lots appears to have in fact been taken by
petitioners.
By Decision[21] of August 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts
decision, it holding that the Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis causa,
not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a
will. Thus, it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses and
had no attestation clause which is not in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code,
reading:
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testators
name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name
and the instrumental witnesses of the will shall, also sign, as aforesaid,
each and every page thereof, except the last on the left margin and all
the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the
upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written, and the fact that that testator signed the will
and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the
pages thereof in the presence of the testator, and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the
witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
While the appellate court declared respondent as the rightful owner of Lot
No. 676, it did not so declare with respect to Lot No. 674, as Matildes last will and
testament had not yet been probated. Thus the Court of Appeals disposed:
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition worthy of merit, the
same is hereby GRANTED and the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 15, dated 20 September
1996, in Civil Case No. V-6686 for declaration of ownership, recovery
of ownership and possession, and damages is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
A new one is entered in its stead declaring defendant-
appellant as the lawful owner of Lot [No.] 676 of the Pilar
Cadastre. Accordingly, plaintiffs-appellees are directed to return the
possession of the said lot to the defendant-appellant.
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to pay P40,000.00
to defendant-appellant as attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.
 SO ORDERED.[22] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)
Their Motion for Reconsideration[23] having been denied,[24] petitioners filed the
present Petition for Review,[25] contending that the Court of Appeals erred
I dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated[29] means that Matilde
X X X WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE COURT
BELOW (RTC, Branch 15, Roxas City) HOLDING THAT THE DEED
OF DONATION INTER VIVOS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS
MOTHER IS IN FACT A DONATION MORTIS CAUSA.
II
X X X WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT IS THE RIGHTFUL
OWNER OF LOT NO. 676 AS LOT BUYER ON THE BASIS OF A
DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE DONOR WHO HAD NO MORE
RIGHT TO SELL THE SAME.
III
X X X WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE PETITIONERS THE
RIGHTFUL OWNER OF LOT NO. 674 AFTER HAVING RULED
WHEN IT HELD THAT RESPONDENT CANNOT BE DECLARED
OWNER THEREOF.
IV
X X X WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL IS IN VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH
(a) SECTION 2, RULE 39, OF THE RULES OF COURT (AND
ORDERING PETITIONERS TO RETURN POSSESSION OF LOT 676
TO RESPONDENT) AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PAY
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COST[S] OF SUIT.[26]
As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to petitioners mother one
of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the
death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that
the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
(2) That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability
may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in
the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive
the transferee.[27] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation to become effective upon the
death of the DONOR admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not
intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners mother during her (Matildes)
lifetime.[28]
The statement in the Deed of Donation reading anytime during the lifetime of
the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even
retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the right
to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is an attribute
of ownership.[30] The phrase in the Deed of Donation or anyone of them who should
survive is of course out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it would take
effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the
donor Matilde. Petitioners themselves concede that such phrase does not refer to the
donee, thus:
x x x [I]t is well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in
the disputed paragraph should only refer to Matilde Aluad, the donor,
because she was the only surviving spouse at the time the donation
was executed on 14 November 1981, as her husband Crispin Aluad []
had long been dead as early as 1975.[31]
The trial court, in holding that the donation was inter vivos, reasoned:
x x x The donation in question is subject to a resolutory
term or period when the donor provides in the aforequoted
provisions, but in the event that the DONEE should die before the
DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of]
no further force and effect. When the donor provides that should
the DONEE xxx die before the DONOR, the present donation shall
be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect the logical
construction thereof is that after the execution of the subject
donation, the same became effective immediately and shall be
deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect upon the
arrival of a resolutory term or period, i.e., the death of the donee
which shall occur before that of the donor. Understandably, the
arrival of this resolutory term or period cannot rescind and render of
no further force and effect a donation which has never become
effective, because, certainly what donation is there to be rescinded
and rendered of no further force and effect upon the arrival of said
resolutory term or period if there was no donation which was
already effective at the time when the donee died?[32] (Underscoring
supplied)
A similar ratio in a case had been brushed aside by this Court, however, thus:
x x x [P]etitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in
case petitioners [donee] die ahead of [donor] Cabatingan is a
resolutory condition that confirms the nature of the donation as inter
vivos.
Petitioners arguments are bereft of merit.[33]
 xxxx
x x x The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the
donation shall be rescinded in case [donees] the petitioners
predecease [the donor] Conchita Cabatingan. As stated in Reyes v.
Mosqueda, one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis
causa is that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should
survive the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan provided for in her
donations. If she really intended that the donation should take effect
during her lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated to
the donee or independently of, and not by reason of her death, she
would not have expressed such proviso in the subject deeds.
[34]
(Underscoring supplied)
As the Court of Appeals observed, x x x [t]hat the donation is mortis causa is
fortified by Matildes acts of possession as she continued to pay the taxes for the said
properties which remained under her name; appropriated the produce; and applied for
free patents for which OCTs were issued under her name.[35]
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been
observed[36] but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more
witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.[37]
Further, the witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause[38] the execution of
which clause is a requirement separate from the subscription of the will and the affixing of
signatures on the left-hand margins of the pages of the will. So the Court has
emphasized:
x x x Article 805 particularly segregates the requirement that
the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will from the requisite
that the will be attested and subscribedby [the instrumental
witnesses]. The respective intents behind these two classes of
signature[s] are distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-
hand corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses
are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the
other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that
the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the
attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and
apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause
results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses
signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned
attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these
witnesses undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do
appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.
x x x It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are
required under Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will
and every page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will
and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these
elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.
[39]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Furthermore, the witnesses did not acknowledge the will before the notary
public,[40] which is not in accordance with the requirement of Article 806 of the Civil Code
that every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses.
More. The requirement that all the pages of the will must be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page was not also followed.[41]
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not
having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to petitioners
mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not
probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria.[42] Matilde thus
validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of
course to the qualification that her (Matildes) will must be probated. With respect to Lot
No. 676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on
August 26, 1991.
Petitioners nevertheless argue that assuming that the donation of Lot No. 674 in
favor of their mother is indeed mortis causa, hence, Matilde could devise it to
respondent, the lot should nevertheless have been awarded to them because they had
acquired it by acquisitive prescription, they having been in continuous, uninterrupted,
adverse, open, and public possession of it in good faith and in the concept of an owner
since 1978.[43]
Petitioners failed to raise the issue of acquisitive prescription before the lower
courts, however, they having laid their claim on the basis of inheritance from their
mother. As a general rule, points of law, theories, and issues not brought to the attention
of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[44] For a contrary rule would
be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence
material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of
the hearing before the trial court.[45]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000]
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,[1] petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND
MARIA MARLENA[2] COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,[3] dated
December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of
Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the
 defendants-appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and
interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S.
Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel
of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil,
which was duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before
the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, contained the following
provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in my
name according to the records of the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned
property and the rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be
inherited and acknowledged by the children and spouse of Jorge
Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I
die and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of
the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time that the
lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge
Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to
Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export
sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said
Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No.
1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the
sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the
event that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir
shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee,
mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly
ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of
Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina
shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot,
not have respected my command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No.
1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my
near desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to
give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall
die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his
heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should
they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others
than my near descendants and my sister."[4]
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his
name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and
children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed
Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional
Trial Court in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged
that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and
the Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific
instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and
sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one
hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs
domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from
sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by
the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil
which provided that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the
property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the
obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private
respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to
reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the
cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the
surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on
March 28, 1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant
Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer, accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan
Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and
acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement
and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one
hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074
of TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not later than January of 1989,
more specifically, to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or
then existing in any of our names, Mary Rose
Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December
of each sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central;
and, this is considered compliance of the annuity as
mentioned, and in the same manner will compliance
of the annuity be in the next succeeding crop years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and
1987-88, will be complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as
mentioned therein and which is as herein agreed upon, taking into
consideration the composite price of sugar during each sugar crop
year, which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash
installment, payable on or before the end of December of every sugar crop year,
to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00)
Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1988-89;
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00)
Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1989-90;
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00)
Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1990-91; and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00)
Pesos, payable on or before December of crop year 1991-92."[5]
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of
Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding
to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing
the complaint and disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds
that the action is prematurely filed as no cause of action against the
defendants has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff. While there maybe the
non-performance of the command as mandated exaction from them
simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title
holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the
present complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in
the category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may
initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge
Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance to her claim
under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely
filed is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED."[6]
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-
appellant's right to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the
produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja
Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver
such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's
admitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985; and, the
punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code,
of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja
Belleza in case of such non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to
order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from the estates of
Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-
appellant must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja
Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an administrator, and
distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce
her right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100
piculs of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she
dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another
one entered ordering defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge
 Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits
and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."[7]
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner
found his way to this Court via the present petition, contending that the Court of
Appeals erred in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix
Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that the
testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the
purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in
accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in
deviating from the sole issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of the
cause of action. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as
there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple
substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by
the testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to
herein private respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died
single and without issue, there can be no valid substitution and such
testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the
reason that the substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are
merely referred to as "near descendants" without a definite identity or reference
as to who are the "near descendants" and therefore, under Articles 843[8] and
845[9] of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be deemed as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the
Court of Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the
propriety of the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause
of action, there was no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the
private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The disquisition
made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent
had a legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject
Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent[10] and compulsory heirs
are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and
descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower,
are compulsory heirs.[11] Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as
compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter
by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional
rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property,
rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably,
whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were
transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily,
the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered
to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said
property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits
of the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted
heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct,
the fulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by the latter
through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a
cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal
institutions is not applicable because what the testatrix intended was a
substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near
descendants should there be noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the
piculs of sugar to private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the
place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the
testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the
property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce
the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution,[12] or (2)
leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be
transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary
substitution.[13] The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the
first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.[14] In the case
under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the
testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is
that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in
the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the
testatrix's near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner
is correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to
preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir.[15] In
the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the
Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near
descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a
fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the
first heir the preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir.
"Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will,
there is no fideicommissary substitution."[16] Also, the near descendants' right to
inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them
should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of
the usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing
here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the
property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the
fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not
related by first degree to the second heir.[17] In the case under scrutiny, the near
descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article
882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883
of the New Civil Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application
of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall
not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such was his
intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once
provided that the instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance
with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or they
may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should
disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in
the preceding article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by
the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most analogous to
and in conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is
known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal
institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the
institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or
(3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.[18] A "mode" imposes an
obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights
to the succession.[19] On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary
disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be
entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate;
and the mode obligates but does not suspend.[20] To some extent, it is similar to
a resolutory condition.[21]
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly
that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation
on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred
piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza,
during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee,
dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that
should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to
the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes
a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such
institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an
obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it
clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In
case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not
conditional.[22]
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private
respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property
itself from the instituted heir because the right to seize was expressly limited to
violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will,
as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be
ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made.[23] Such construction as will sustain
and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted.[24]
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One
Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such
obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and
their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise
negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event
that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza
Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near
descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is thus with the
sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's near
descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not
only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction
imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should
equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable
settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the
lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the
lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive
compliance of his obligation through the consummated settlement between the
lessee and the private respondent, and having consummated a settlement with
the petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the
obligation under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by
which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death.[25] Since
 the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be
disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus,
a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby
defeat the very purpose of making a Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D.
SEANGIO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO,
ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO,
ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and
JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated
August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21
(the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate on the ground of preterition, in the
consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396,
and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D.
Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy
Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 9890870 of the
RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. SeangioSantos as
special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition.
They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her
faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of
Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his
business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as
the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant;
and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of
the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic
will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the
intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the
proceedings for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed
as SP. Proc. No. 9993396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise
reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 98
90870 because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings.2
The document that petitioners refer to as Segundos holographic will is quoted, as
follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita,
Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang
inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio
dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama
harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at
sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako
nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para
makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China
Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay
nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China
Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng
Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong
inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya
anak at hindi siya makoha mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng
tatlong saksi. 3
(signed)
Segundo Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners motion, SP. Proc. No. 9890870 and SP. Proc. No.
9993396 were consolidated.4
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings5 primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic
will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus
does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to
private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent
of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not
named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would
result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while
procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is
not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal
of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no
testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the
authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of
the will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the
will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the
rule on preterition does not apply because Segundos will does not constitute a universal
heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.6
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for
probate proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et
al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo
and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus
applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does
not apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to
an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate
Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position clear: "for respondents to have
tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the
will appears to be intrinsically void would have been an exercise in futility. It would
have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have
denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved(underscoring
supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 9993396 is hereby DISMISSED
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October
14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10
AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF)
CONSIDERING THAT:
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND
4 OF RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR
SETTING THE CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED
GROUND THAT THE TESTATORS WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE
EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF
THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY
OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE
EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE
TESTATORS TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE
AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE
TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATORS WILL THAT
NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND
EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN
THE INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE
PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of
Court which respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the
will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice
of such time and place to be published three weeks successively previous to the
appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said
notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its
title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a
compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedents will and the holographic
will on its face is not intrinsically void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents
alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was
no institution of an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both
intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the
hearing of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to
petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated,
signed and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition,
private respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed
Segundos intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the
reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must
be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard
to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the
Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of
maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient
cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the
life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which
the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has
been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage
with the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue
influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who
disinherit such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;8
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo
can be considered as a holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other
form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is
written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis
causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not
make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo,
nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in
the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would
succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed
in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme
law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to
that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or
public policy that it cannot be given effect.11
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law,
as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones
drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of
the instrument and the intention of the testator.12 In this regard, the Court is convinced
that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended
by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with
law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated,13 the disinheritance
cannot be given effect.14
With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in
the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last
expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of
Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory
heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document
did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a
witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.1wphi1
Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the
law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article
838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the
will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered
nugatory.17
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic
will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside.
Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the
allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc.
No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid testate
proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24561 June 30, 1970
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON,
ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
Punzalan, Yabut & Eusebio for executrix-appellee.
Leonardo Abola for oppositors-appellants.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Appeal from orders of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga approving the Executrix-
appellee's project of partition instead of Oppositors-Appellants' proposed counter-project
of partition.1
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles,
Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children
named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-
appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named
Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased
legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina
Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the
Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory
heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr.,
Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and
Laureano Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties appraised at
P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60, household
furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of
Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her above-named
heirs.
Testate proceedings were in due course commenced2 and by order dated March 13,
1961, the last will and testament of the decedent was duly allowed and admitted to
probate, and the appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was appointed executrix of the testatrix'
estate, and upon her filing her bond and oath of office, letters testamentary were duly
issued to her.
After the executrix filed her inventory of the estate, Dr. Adelaido Bernardo of Angeles,
Pampanga was appointed commissioner to appraise the properties of the estate. He filed
in due course his report of appraisal and the same was approved in toto by the lower
court on December 12, 1963 upon joint petition of the parties.
The real and personal properties of the testatrix at the time of her death thus had a total
appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory
heirs amounted to P129,362.11.3 (/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime of
legitimate children and descendants).4 In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her
property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary disposition, whereby she
devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of
her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren. The appraised values of the
real properties thus respectively devised by the testatrix to the beneficiaries named in her
will, are as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ....................................... P 98,474.80
2. Angelina Dizon .................................. 106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon .................................. 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon ...................................... 52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon ....................................... 131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon .............................................. 72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon ..................................... 1,148,063.71
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ...................................... 69,280.00
9. Lilia Dizon, Gilbert Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Dioli or Jolly
Jimenez, Laureano Tiamzon ................. 72,540.00
Total Value ...................... P1,801,960.01
The executrix filed her project of partition dated February 5, 1964, in substance
adjudicating the estate as follows:
(1) with the figure of P129,254.96 as legitime for a basis Marina
(exacultrix-appellee) and Tomas (appellant) are admittedly considered
to have received in the will more than their respective legitime, while
the rest of the appellants, namely, Estela, Bernardita, Angelina,
Josefina and Lilia received less than their respective legitime;
(2) thus, to each of the latter are adjudicated the properties
respectively given them in the will, plus cash and/or properties, to
 complete their respective legitimes to P129,254.96; (3) on the other
hand, Marina and Tomas are adjudicated the properties that they
received in the will less the cash and/or properties necessary to
complete the prejudiced legitime mentioned in number 2 above;
(4) the adjudications made in the will in favor of the grandchildren
remain untouched.<re||an1w>
On the other hand oppositors submitted their own counter-project of
partition dated February 14, 1964, wherein they proposed the
distribution of the estate on the following basis:
(a) all the testamentary dispositions were proportionally reduced to the
value of one-half () of the entire estate, the value of the said one-half
() amounting to P905,534.78; (b) the shares of the Oppositors-
Appellants should consist of their legitime, plus the devises in their
favor proportionally reduced; (c) in payment of the total shares of the
appellants in the entire estate, the properties devised to them plus
other properties left by the Testatrix and/or cash are adjudicated to
them; and (d) to the grandchildren who are not compulsory heirs are
adjudicated the properties respectively devised to them subject to
reimbursement by Gilbert D. Garcia, et al., of the sums by which the
devise in their favor should be proportionally reduced.
The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of
intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the
testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be
doubted. This is legally permissible within the limitation of the law, as aforecited." With
reference to the payment in cash of some P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as
the largest beneficiary of the will to be paid to her five co-heirs, the oppositors (excluding
Tomas Dizon), to complete their impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled that "(T)he
payment in cash so as to make the proper adjustment to meet with the requirements of
the law in respect to legitimes which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical
and valid solution in order to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix."
From the lower court's orders of approval, oppositors-appellants have filed this appeal,
and raise anew the following issues: .
1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the
nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to
reduction;
2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article 1063,
or merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code; and
3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account of
their legitime, instead of some of the real properties left by the Testatrix;

Under the oppositors' counter-project of partition, the testamentary disposition made by
the testatrix of practically her whole estate of P1,801,960.01, as above stated, were
proposed to be reduced to the amounts set forth after the names of the respective heirs
and devisees totalling one-half thereof as follows:
1. Estela Dizon ........................................... P 49,485.56
2. Angelina Dizon ......................................... 53,421.42
3. Bernardita Dizon ....................................... 26,115.04
4. Josefina Dizon .......................................... 26,159.38
5. Tomas V. Dizon ......................................... 65,874.04
6. Lilia Dizon .................................................. 36,273.13
7. Marina Dizon ........................................... 576,938.82
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. ......................................... 34,814.50
9. Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al .......... 36,452.80
T o t a l ................................................... P905,534.78
while the other half of the estate (P905,534.78) would be deemed as constituting the
legitime of the executrix-appellee and oppositors-appellants, to be divided among them
in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.
The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition,
ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when
the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it
is true that this process has been followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition,
it is observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the source from
which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime.
which were adversely decided against them in the proceedings below.
The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the testatrix
which is "the life and soul of a will."5 In consonance therewith, our Civil Code included the
new provisions found in Articles 788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a testamentary disposition
admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which the
disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "(T)he words of a will are to receive
an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which
will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will,
that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In Villanueva vs. Juico6 for violation of
these rules of interpretation as well as of Rule 123, section 59 of the old Rules of
Court, 7 the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, overturned the lower
court's decision and stressed that "the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly
expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at
the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith,
following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears
that his intention was otherwise." 8
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, 9 when
expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose mandate
must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and
devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute
their own criterion for the testator's will. Guided and restricted by these fundamental
premises, the Court finds for the appellee.
1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition was
in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will,
after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her
last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will and for the
administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided
that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the
dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in
her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and
seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid
partition 10 of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article
1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his estate by
an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his
estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code
thus provides the safeguard for the right of such compulsory heirs:
ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any
title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the same
be fully satisfied.
ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the
legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of the
same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive.
This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of
partition, wherein the five oppositors-appellants namely Estela,
Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the
properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the
testatrix in her will, and the differential to complete their respective
legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or
properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-
appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were favored by the testatrix and
received in the partition by will more than their respective legitimes.
2. This right of a testator to partition his estate by will was recognized even in Article
1056 of the old Civil Code which has been reproduced now as Article 1080 of the present
Civil Code. The only amendment in the provision was that Article 1080 "now permits
any person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by act inter
vivos." 11 This was intended to repeal the then prevailing doctrine 12 that for a testator to
partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities
provided by law. Authoritative commentators doubt the efficacy of the amendment 13 but
the question does not here concern us, for this is a clear case of partition by will, duly
admitted to probate, which perforce must be given full validity and effect. Aside from the
provisions of Articles 906 and 907 above quoted, other codal provisions support the
executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than the
counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they would
reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit
the same, which they would consider as mere devises or legacies, to one-half of the
estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of
the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount
substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix' will, contrary
to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It would further run counter to the provisions of Article
1091 of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made confers upon each heir the
exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him."
3. In Habana vs. Imbo, 14 the Court upheld the distribution made in the will of the
deceased testator Pedro Teves of two large coconut plantations in favor of his daughter,
Concepcion, as against adverse claims of other compulsory heirs, as being a partition by
will, which should be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
compulsory heirs, in accordance with Article 1080 of the Civil Code. In upholding the sale
made by Concepcion to a stranger of the plantations thus partitioned in her favor in the
deceased's will which was being questioned by the other compulsory heirs, the Court
ruled that "Concepcion Teves by operation of law, became the absolute owner of said
lots because 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of
the property adjudicated to him' (Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her
ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she can not be deprived of
her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661,
Civil Code). 15 Concepcion Teves could, as she did, sell the lots in question as part of her
share of the proposed partition of the properties, especially when, as in the present case,
the sale has been expressly recognized by herself and her co-heirs ..."
4. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their favor
are in the nature of devises of real property, citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words
"I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her real properties to the respective
heirs. From this erroneous premise, they proceed to the equally erroneous conclusion
that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to them by operation of law and that the
testator can only dispose of the free portion, that is, the remainder of the estate after
deducting the legitime of the compulsory heirs ... and all testamentary dispositions, either
in the nature of institution of heirs or of devises or legacies, have to be taken from the
remainder of the testator's estate constituting the free portion." 16
Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix'
will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly
appear from the whole context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole
estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of
this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her will.
The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions acquire no
legal significance, such as to convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the
free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent that her
testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and
not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the
respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth
paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third
paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I named
as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the
law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said
deceased." 17
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the
testatrix, being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only
from the free portion of the estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842
of the Civil Code precisely provides that "(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may dispose
of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to
the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory of bequests, the
second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of the executrix-
appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in
providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire
property, provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the
share pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason
for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate." 18
Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the testatrix constituted a partition by will,
which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions
upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be respected
insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' invoking of Article 1063 of the Civil Code that "(P)roperty left by will is not
deemed subject to collation, if the testator has not otherwise provided, but the legitime
shall in any case remain unimpaired" and invoking of the construction thereof given by
some authorities that "'not deemed subject to collation' in this article really means not
imputable to or chargeable against the legitime", while it may have some plausibility 19 in
an appropriate case, has no application in the present case. Here, we have a case of a
distribution and partition of the entire estate by the testatrix, without her having made any
previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to determine the
legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call for
the application of Articles 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation. The amount of the
legitime of the heirs is here determined and undisputed.
5. With this resolution of the decisive issue raised by oppositors-appellants, the
secondary issues are likewise necessarily resolved. Their right was merely to demand
completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been
complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no longer demand a
further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by
the testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real
properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of
partition. The properties are not available for the purpose, as the testatrix had specifically
partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as
feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix as solemnized in
her will, by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real properties intact to her
named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The appraisal report of the
properties of the estate as filed by the commissioner appointed by the lower court was
approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and hence, there cannot be said to be
any question and none is presented as to fairness of the valuation thereof or that
the legitime of the heirs in terms of cash has been understated. The plaint of oppositors
that the purchasing value of the Philippine peso has greatly declined since the testatrix'
death in January, 1961 provides no legal basis or justification for overturning the wishes
and intent of the testatrix. The transmission of rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code) and accordingly, the
value thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would never be settled
if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of the
currency and properties of the estate. There is evidence in the record that prior to
November 25, 1964, one of the oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the sum of P50,000.00
on account of her inheritance, which, per the parties' manifestation, 20 "does not in any
way affect the adjudication made to her in the projects of partition of either party as the
same is a mere advance of the cash that she should receive in both projects of partition."
The payment in cash by way of making the proper adjustments in order to meet the
requirements of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect to the
last will of the testatrix has invariably been availed of and sanctioned. 21That her co-
oppositors would receive their cash differentials only now when the value of the currency
has declined further, whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at
the time of approval of the project of partition and when the peso's purchasing value was
higher, is due to their own decision of pursuing the present appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed. Without cost.
G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula for appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a
document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident
of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan,
Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On
October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition
for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who
would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified
without contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father
Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke and
understood; that he (testator) signed on he left hand margin of the front page of each of
the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same
with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last
page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his
last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the
attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did
not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was
in the handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the
time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at
the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was
already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal
view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the
controlling factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court by order dated
January 24, 1952, admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and Testament of
Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealing from that decision; and because
only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to us by the Court
of Appeals.
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a
person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed
by the testator himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the time
that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943,
holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain
requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not
folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the
three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A"
because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not
even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were
signed only by the testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate of
Saguinsin, 41 Phil., 875, 879, referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses to
sign on the left hand margin of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that
the signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or
leaves; three pages having been written on, the authenticity of all three of them
should be guaranteed by the signature of the alleged testatrix and her
witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same requirement, this
Court declared:
From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left
margins of the six pages of the document are signed only by Ventura Prieto.
The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by the attesting witnesses
who omitted to sign with the testator at the left margin of each of the five pages
of the document alleged to be the will of Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect that
constitutes an obstacle to its probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of the
new Civil Code which not allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions were
invoked by the appellee-petitioner and applied by the lower court? But article 795 of this
same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends
upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is
but an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a
will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time
the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the
court but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is
that although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the
testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is
given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or
bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid down by this court in
the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should be
followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and
controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted
to in order to carry out said intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution
of the will and after the death of the testator lessen the formalities required by law for the
execution of wills, said subsequent statutes should be applied so as to validate wills
defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of execution. However, we
should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title
of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due
process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding
new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity
of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow
the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be
regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate
succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses
with such requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and
thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The
general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec.
231, pp. 192-193).
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied
probate. With costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion and Reyes J.B.L., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-14074 November 7, 1918
In the matter of the probation of the will of Jose Riosa.
MARCELINO CASAS, applicant-appellant,
Vicente de Vera for petitioner-appellant.
MALCOLM, J.:
The issue which this appeal presents is whether in the Philippine Islands the law existing
on the date of the execution of a will, or the law existing at the death of the testator,
controls.
Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, 1908, in
which he disposed of an estate valued at more than P35,000. The will was duly executed
in accordance with the law then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The will was not executed in accordance with Act No. 2645, amendatory of
said section 618, prescribing certain additional formalities for the signing and attestation
of wills, in force on and after July 1, 1916. In other words, the will was in writing, signed
by the testator, and attested and subscribed by three credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of each other; but was not signed by the testator and the witnesses on
the left margin of each and every page, nor did the attestation state these facts. The new
law, therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the
testator, without the testator having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:
 No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any
estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing
and signed by the testator, or by the testator's name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of each other. The attestation shall state the fact that the testator signed the
will, or caused it to be signed by some other person, at his express direction, in
the presence of three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his
presence and in the presence of each other. But the absence of such form of
attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact
signed and attested as in this section provided.
Act No. 2645 has amended section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to make
said section read as follows:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. No will, except as provided in the preceding
section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect
the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator
and signed by him, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each, and every page
thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in
letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the
number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that
the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other
person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in
the presence of the testator and of each other.
This court has heretofore held in a decision handed down by the Chief Justice, as to a
will made after the date Act No. 2645 went into effect, that it must comply with the
provisions of this law. (Caraig vs Tatlonghari, R. G. No. 12558, dated March 23, 1918 [not
published].) The court has further held in a decision handed down by Justice Torres, as
to will executed by a testator whose death took place prior to the operative date of Act
No. 2645, that the amendatory act is inapplicable. (Bona vs. Briones, [1918], 38 Phil.,
276.) The instant appeal presents an entirely different question. The will was execute
prior to the enactment of Act No. 2645 and the death occurred after the enactment of this
law.
There is a clear cleavage of authority among the cases and the text-writers, as to the
effect of a change in the statutes prescribing the formalities necessary to be observed in
the execution of a will, when such change is made intermediate to the execution of a will
and the death of a testator. (See generally 40 Cyc., 1076. and any textbook on Wills, and
Lane's Appeal from Probate [1889], 57 Conn., 182.) The rule laid down by the courts in
many jurisdictions is that the statutes in force at the testator's death are controlling, and
that a will not executed in conformity with such statutes is invalid, although its execution
was sufficient at the time it was made. The reasons assigned for applying the later
statute are the following: "As until the death of the testator the paper executed by him,
expressing his wishes, is not a will, but a mere inchoate act which may or may not be a
will, the law in force at the testator's death applies and controls the proof of the will."
(Sutton vs. Chenault [1855], 18 Ga., 1.) Were we to accept the foregoing proposition and
the reasons assigned for it, it would logically result that the will of Jose Riosa would have
to be held invalid.
The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will
must be tested by the statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes
subsequently enacted have no retrospective effect. This doctrine is believed to be
supported by the weight of authority. It was the old English view; in Downs (or
Downing) vs. Townsend (Ambler, 280), Lord Hardwicke is reported to have said that "the
general rule as to testaments is, that the time of the testament, and not the testator's
death, is regarded." It is also the modern view, including among other decisions one of
the Supreme Court of Vermont from which State many of the sections of the Code if Civil
Procedure of the Philippine Islands relating to wills are taken. (Giddings vs. Turgeon
[1886], 58 Vt., 103.)
Of the numerous decisions of divergent tendencies, the opinion by the learned Justice
Sharswood (Taylor vs.Mitchell [1868], 57 Pa. St., 209) is regarded to be the best
considered. In this opinion is found the following:
Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so
construed only when the mandate of the legislature is imperative. When a
testator makes a will, formally executed according to the requirements of the
law existing at the time of its execution, it would unjustly disappoint his lawful
right of disposition to apply to it a rule subsequently enacted, though before his
death.
While it is true that every one is presumed to know the law, the maxim in fact is
inapplicable to such a case; for he would have an equal right to presume that no
new law would affect his past act, and rest satisfied in security on that
presumption. . . . It is true, that every will is ambulatory until the death of the
testator, and the disposition made by it does not actually take effect until then.
General words apply to the property of which the testator dies possessed, and
he retains the power of revocation as long as he lives. The act of bequeathing
or devising, however, takes place when the will is executed, though to go into
effect at a future time.
A third view, somewhat larger in conception than the preceding one, finding support in
the States of Alabama and New York, is that statutes relating to the execution of wills,
when they increase the necessary formalities, should be construed so as not to impair
the validity of a will already made and, when they lessen the formalities required, should
be construed so as to aid wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the
time of their making (Hoffman vs. Hoffman, [1855], 26 Ala., 535; Price vs. Brown, 1
Bradf., Surr. N.Y., 252.)
This court is given the opportunity to choose between the three rules above described.
Our selection, under such circumstances, should naturally depend more on reason than
on technicality. Above all, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the testator has provided in
detail for the disposition of his property and that his desires should be respected by the
courts. Justice is a powerful pleader for the second and third rules on the subject.
The plausible reasoning of the authorities which back the first proposition is, we think,
fallacious. The act of bequeathing or devising is something more than inchoate or
ambulatory. In reality, it becomes a completed act when the will is executed and attested
according to the law, although it does not take effect on the property until a future time.
It is, of course, a general rule of statutory construction, as this court has said, that "all
statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose
and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared
or is necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must
be resolved against the restrospective effect." (Montilla vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos
[1913], 24 Phil., 220. See also Chew Heong vs. U.S. [1884], 112 U.S., 536; U.S. vs
American Sugar Ref. Co. [1906], 202 U.S., 563.) Statute law, as found in the Civil Code,
is corroborative; article 3 thereof provides that "laws shall not have a retroactive effect,
unless therein otherwise prescribed." The language of Act No. 2645 gives no indication
of retrospective effect. Such, likewise, has been the uniform tendency of the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands on cases having special application to testamentary
succession. (Abello vs. Kock de Monaterio [1904], 3 Phil., 558; Timbol vs. Manalo [1906],
6 Phil., 254; Bona vs. Briones, supra; In the Matter of the Probation of the Will of Bibiana
Diquia [1918], R. G. No. 13176, 1 concerning the language of the Will. See also section
617, Code of Civil Procedure.)
The strongest argument against our accepting the first two rules comes out of section
634 of the Code of Civil Procedure which, in negative terms, provides that a will shall be
disallowed in either of five cases, the first being "if not executed and attested as in this
Act provided." Act No. 2645 has, of course, become part and parcel of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The will in question is admittedly not executed and attested as provided by
the Code of Civil Procedure as amended. Nevertheless, it is proper to observe that the
general principle in the law of wills inserts itself even within the provisions of said section
634. Our statute announces a positive rule for the transference of property which must
be complied with as completed act at the time of the execution, so far as the act of the
testator is concerned, as to all testaments made subsequent to the enactment of Act No.
2645, but is not effective as to testaments made antecedent to that date.
To answer the question with which we began this decision, we adopt as our own the
second rule, particularly as established by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The will
of Jose Riosa is valid.
The order of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Albay of December 29, 1917,
disallowing the will of Jose Riosa, is reversed, and the record shall be returned to the
lower court with direction to admit the said will to probate, without special findings as to
costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of
First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by
the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United
States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate
children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A.
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who
survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and
Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he
directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a)
$240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each
and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his
seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry
A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and
Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1wph1.t
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas,
U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on
September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests
therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E.
Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their
respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time
according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed
by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and
filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition"
wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the
delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00
each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the
"Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament divided the residuary estate
into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his
first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which
is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the
lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving
the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying
upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this
case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on
June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which
law must apply Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of
renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963.
Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a
domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming
Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile)
should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law,
but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the
situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the
properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found
in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not
rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in
their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of
the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the
order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature
of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating
that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not
correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this
and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as
Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second
paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their
purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must
be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative
intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to
succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over
general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his
Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended
Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's
intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this
Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the
effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not
with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard
to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national
law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-46364 April 6, 1990
SULPICIA JIMENEZ and TORIBIO MATIAS, petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE FERNANDEZ alias HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ and TEODORA
GRADO, respondents.
Antonio E. Bengzon III for petitioners.
Agustin U. Cruz for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
1
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the following Decision and
Resolution 2 of the Honorable Court of Appeals: (1) Decision, dated March 1, 1977 in
C.A.-G.R. No. 49178-R entitled "Sulpicia Jimenez, et al., v. Vicente Fernandez, et al."
affirming in toto the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial
District in Civil Case No. 14802-I between the same parties and (2) Resolution dated
June 3, 1977 denying plaintiffs-appellants' motion for reconsideration.
As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case is as follows:
The land in question is the Eastern portion with an area of Four Hundred Thirty Six (436)
square meters of that parcel of residential land situated in Barrio Dulig (now Magsaysay),
Municipality of Labrador, Pangasinan actually covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
82275 (Exhibit A) issued in the name of Sulpicia Jimenez.
The entire parcel of land with an area of 2,932 square meters, formerly belonged to
Fermin Jimenez. Fermin Jimenez has two (2) sons named Fortunato and Carlos
Jimenez. This Fortunato Jimenez who predeceased his father has only one child, the
petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez. After the death of Fermin Jimenez, the entire parcel of land
was registered under Act 496 in the name of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle
and niece) in equal shares pro-indiviso. As a result of the registration case Original
Certificate of Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued on February 28, 1933, in the names
of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez, in equal shares pro-indiviso.
Carlos Jimenez died on July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate daughter, Melecia Cayabyab,
also known as Melecia Jimenez, took possession of the eastern portion of the property
consisting of 436 square meters.
On January 20, 1944, Melecia Jimenez sold said 436 square meter-portion of the
property to Edilberto Cagampan and defendant Teodora Grado executed a contract
entitled "Exchange of Real Properties" whereby the former transferred said 436 square
meter-portion to the latter, who has been in occupation since.
On August 29, 1969, plaintiff Sulpicia Jimenez executed an affidavit adjudicating unto
herself the other half of the property appertaining to Carlos Jimenez, upon manifestation
that she is the only heir of her deceased uncle. Consequently Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 82275 was issued on October 1, 1969 in petitioner's name alone over the entire
2,932 square meter property.
On April 1, 1970, Sulpicia Jimenez, joined by her husband, instituted the present action
for the recovery of the eastern portion of the property consisting of 436 square meters
occupied by defendant Teodora Grado and her son.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and
holding the defendant, Teodora Grado, the absolute owner of the land in
question; ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendant the amount of P500.00
as damages, as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 20)
Petitioner appealed the above judgment to the respondent Court of Appeals and on
March 1, 1977, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the same in
toto. Said decision was rendered by a special division of five (5) justices, with the Hon.
Lourdes San Diego, dissenting.
Petitioners within the reglementary period granted by the Honorable Court of Appeals,
filed therewith a motion for reconsideration. But said motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated June 3, 1977.
In their appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals from the aforequoted decision of the
trial court, herein petitioner raised the following assignments of error to wit:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT MELECIA
CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA JIMENEZ, IS NOT THE DAUGHTER
OF CARLOS JIMENEZ.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT MELECIA
CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA JIMENEZ, HAS NO RIGHT TO SELL
THE LAND IN QUESTION TO EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT EDILBERTO
CAGAMPAN DID NOT BECOME THE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION
BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED OF SALE (EXH. "1") EXECUTED BY MELECIA
CAYABYAB, ALIAS MELECIA JIMENEZ, IN HIS FAVOR.
IV
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT TEODORA GRADO
DID NOT BECOME THE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE
OF THE DEED OF EXCHANGE (EXH. "7") EXECUTED BY HER AND
EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.
V Citing the case of Cid v. Burnaman (24 SCRA 434) wherein this Court categorically held
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF
APPELLANT SULPICIA JIMENEZ OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION CAN NOT
BE DEFEATED BY THE ADVERSE OPEN AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION
OF APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE APPELLEE
TEODORA GRADO IS THE ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE LAND IN
QUESTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
THE CASE OF LOURDES ARCUINO, ET AL., V. RUFINA APARIS AND
CASIANO PURAY, G.R. NO. L-23424, PROMULGATED JANUARY 31, 1968,
WHICH CASE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
VII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND
ORDERING THE APPELLANTS TO PAY THE APPELLEES THE SUM OF
P500.00 AS ATTORNEYS FEES PLUS THE COSTS.
From the foregoing, this petition for review was filed.
We find merit in the petition.
From the start the respondent court erred in not declaring that Melecia Jimenez
Cayabyab also known as Melecia Jimenez, is not the daughter of Carlos Jimenez and
therefore, had no right over the property in question. Respondents failed to present
concrete evidence to prove that Melecia Cayabyab was really the daughter of Carlos
Jimenez. Nonetheless, assuming for the sake of argument that Melecia Cayabyab was
the illegitimate daughter of Carlos Jimenez there can be no question that Melecia
Cayabyab had no right to succeed to the estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not have
validly acquired, nor legally transferred to Edilberto Cagampan that portion of the
property subject of this petition.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code). Moreover, Art. 2263 of
the Civil Code provides as follows:
Rights to the inheritance of a person who died with or without a will, before the
effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other
previous laws, and by the Rules of Court . . . (Rollo, p. 17)
Thus, since Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-half pro-indiviso portion of that parcel of land
then covered by Original Certificate of title No. 50933, died on July 9, 1936 (Exhibit "F")
way before the effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the successional rights
pertaining to his estate must be determined in accordance with the Civil Code of 1889.
that:
To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of 1889 (which was the law in force
when Carlos Jimenez died and which should be the governing law in so far as
the right to inherit from his estate was concerned), a child must be either a child
legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an acknowledged natural child for
illegitimate not natural are disqualified to inherit. (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 807,
935)
Even assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was born out of the common-law-relationship
between her mother (Maria Cayabyab) and Carlos Jimenez, she could not even be
considered an acknowledged natural child because Carlos Jimenez was then legally
married to Susana Abalos and therefore not qualified to marry Maria Cayabyab and
consequently Melecia Cayabyab was an illegitimate spurious child and not entitled to any
successional rights in so far as the estate of Carlos Jimenez was concerned.
Melecia Cayabyab in the absence of any voluntary conveyance to her by Carlos Jimenez
or Sulpicia Jimenez of the litigated portion of the land could not even legally transfer the
parcel of land to Edilberto Cagampan who accordingly, could not also legally transfer the
same to herein private respondents.
Analyzing the case before Us in this manner, We can immediately discern another error
in the decision of the respondent court, which is that the said court sustained and made
applicable to the case at bar the ruling in the case of Arcuino, et al., v. Aparis and Puray,
No. L-23424, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 407, wherein We held that:
. . . it is true that the lands registered under the Torrens System may not be
acquired by prescription but plaintiffs herein are not the registered owners. They
merely claim to have acquired by succession, their alleged title or interest in lot
No. 355. At any rate plaintiffs herein are guilty of laches.
The respondent court relying on the Arcuino case, concluded that respondents had
acquired the property under litigation by prescription. We cannot agree with such
conclusion, because there is one very marked and important difference between the
case at bar and that of the Arcuino case, and that is, that since 1933 petitioner Sulpicia
Jimenez was a title holder, the property then being registered in her and her uncle Carlos
Jimenez' name. In the Arcuino case, this Supreme Court held. "(I)t is true that lands
registered under the Torrens System may not be acquired by prescription but plaintiffs
herein are not the registered owners." (Rollo, p. 38) Even in the said cited case the
principle of imprescriptibility of Torrens Titles was respected.
Melecia Cayabyab's possession or of her predecessors-in-interest would be unavailing
against the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez who was the holder pro-indiviso with Carlos
Jimenez of the Torrens Certificate of Title covering a tract of land which includes the
portion now in question, from February 28, 1933, when the Original Certificate of Title No.
50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued.
No possession by any person of any portion of the land covered by said original
certificate of titles, could defeat the title of the registered owner of the land covered by
the certificate of title. (Benin v. Tuason, L-26127, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531)
Sulpicia's title over her one-half undivided property remained good and continued to be
good when she segregated it into a new title (T.C.T No. 82275, Exhibit "A") in 1969.
Sulpicia's ownership over her one-half of the land and which is the land in dispute was
always covered by a Torrens title, and therefore, no amount of possession thereof by the
respondents, could ever defeat her proprietary rights thereon. It is apparent, that the right
of plaintiff (now petitioner) to institute this action to recover possession of the portion of
the land in question based on the Torrens Title of Sulpicia Jimenez, T.C.T. No. 82275
(Exhibit "A") is imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine of laches. (J.M. Tuason
& Co. v. Macalindong, L-15398, December 29, 1962, Francisco v. Cruz, et al., 43 O.G.
5105) Rollo, p. 39)
The respondent Court of Appeals declared the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez guilty of
laches and citing the ruling in the case of Heirs of Lacamen v. Heirs of Laruan (65 SCRA
605), held that, since petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez executed her Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication only in 1969, she lost the right to recover possession of the parcel of land
subject of the litigation.
In this instance, again We rule for the petitioner. There is no absolute rule as to what
constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to
its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court and since laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by
equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and
injustice. It would be rank injustice and patently inequitous to deprive the lawful heirs of
their rightful inheritance.
Petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez is entitled to the relief prayed for, declaring her to be the sole
and absolute owner of the land in question with right to its possession and enjoyment.
Since her uncle Carlos Jimenez died in 1936, his pro-indiviso share in the properties
then owned in co-ownership with his niece Sulpicia descended by intestacy to Sulpicia
Jimenez alone because Carlos died without any issue or other heirs.
After all, the professed objective of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act or the law which established the Torrens System of Land Registration in
the Philippines is that the stability of the landholding system in the Philippines depends
on the confidence of the people in the titles covering the properties. And to this end, this
Court has invariably upheld the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title and in, among others,
J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Macalindong (6 SCRA 938), held that "the right of the
appellee to file an action to recover possession based on its Torrens Title
is imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine of laches.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution dated March 1, 1977 and June 3, 1977 in CA G.R. No. L-49178-R are SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-
appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this
case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of
the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the
inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the
partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's
business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the
Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of
the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until
the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into
effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws
of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10
of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or
the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not
in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence
showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on
such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and
Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself,
acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this
point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the
approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested
regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not
constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration
that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we
find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is, therefore,
no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was
violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws
in force, must be complied with and executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein
appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will,
it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the
second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this
citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice,
nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable
length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the
property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property
and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in
accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my
relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand
whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who
fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted
legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with
the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply
with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not
respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792
of the civil Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be
considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any
manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national
law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the
testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered
unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently
valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall
govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being
contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are
perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the
testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of
this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as
one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is
approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch
XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS
PAGUIA, respondents.
Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.
Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the respondent
judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which admitted to and
allowed the probate of the last will and testament of Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-
parte presentation of evidence by herein private respondent.
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner
Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios
C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the
only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of
the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire
estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the
reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in
the United States and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased
testatrix.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her
death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing
with her sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix
made her last wig and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after
the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and
registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement
L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and
waived his appointment as executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of
Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of
an administratrix to administer and eventually distribute the properties of the estate
located in the Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein
petitioner alleging among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in
question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that
even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not
apply inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him.
On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola,
filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he
"has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be
truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-partepresentation of
evidence for the reprobate of the questioned will was made.
On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:
At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion C.
Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America
with a permanent residence at 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA
19124, (Exhibit D) that when alive, Adoracion C. Campos executed a
Last Will and Testament in the county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., according to the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b) that while
in temporary sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in
the City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property both in the Philippines
and in the United States of America; that the Last Will and Testament
of the late Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and granted probate by
the Orphan's Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas, the
probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of
Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in favor
of Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of the said
foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-
10); and that the petitioner is not suffering from any disqualification
which would render her unfit as administratrix of the estate in the
Philippines of the late Adoracion C. Campos.
WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C.
Campos is hereby admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines,
and Nenita Campos Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix of the
estate of said decedent; let Letters of Administration with the Will
annexed issue in favor of said Administratrix upon her filing of a bond
in the amount of P5,000.00 conditioned under the provisions of Section
I, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming the
withdrawal of his opposition, acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the order
allowing the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the
same was secured through fraudulent means. According to him, the "Motion to Dismiss
Opposition" was inserted among the papers which he signed in connection with two
Deeds of Conditional Sales which he executed with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also alleged that the lawyer who filed the
withdrawal of the opposition was not his counsel-of-record in the special proceedings
case.
The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear. He made
several motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May 29, 1980.
On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set
Aside the Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. In
this motion, the notice of hearing provided:
Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29,
1980 at 8:30 in the morning for submission for reconsideration and
resolution of the Honorable Court. Until this Motion is resolved, may I
also request for the future setting of the case for hearing on the
Oppositor's motion to set aside previously filed.
The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When the case
was called for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his motion to
vacate instead of adducing evidence in support of the petition for relief. Thus, the
respondent judge issued an order dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present
evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same
was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also denied the motion to vacate for
lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will, which,
incidentally has been questioned by the respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on
its face, patently null and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the
executrix of his last will and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute
herself as petitioner in the instant case which was granted by the court on September 13,
1982.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner
Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and her
sisters, only remaining children and forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.
Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted without
or in excess of his jurisdiction when:
1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the Right
to Notice (sic) upon the filing of the Motion to Dismiss opposition with
waiver of rights or interests against the estate of deceased Adoracion
C. Campos, thus, paving the way for the hearing ex-parte of the
petition for the probate of decedent will.
2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not made
in a public or authenticated instrument), or by way of a petition
presented to the court but by way of a motion presented prior to an
order for the distribution of the estate-the law especially providing that
repudiation of an inheritance must be presented, within 30 days after it
has issued an order for the distribution of the estate in accordance with
the rules of Court.
3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested
by a decree admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made
for the forced heir in complete disregard of Law of Succession
4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground that no
evidence was adduced to support the Petition for Relief when no
Notice nor hearing was set to afford petitioner to prove the merit of his
petition a denial of the due process and a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the
Testator at the time of death was a usual resident of Dasmarias,
Cavite, consequently Cavite Court of First Instance has exclusive
jurisdiction over the case (De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July
1955).
The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation that the
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the withdrawal
of the petitioner's opposition to the reprobate of the will.
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No proof was
adduced to support petitioner's contention that the motion to withdraw was secured
through fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record.
The records show that after the firing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later
date, filed a manifestation wherein he confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition
was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the motion was filed, the
petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and
had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present
petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old man's attorney of record was Atty.
Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the
respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the will ex-parte, there being
no other opposition to the same.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general
rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due
execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally
comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.
However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang vs.
Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the
reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which
was reserved by the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the
respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents
have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American
citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under
Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to
the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and
to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent.
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which
is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law
does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix
to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it
would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to
the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as
provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent
must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358)
wherein we ruled:
 It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may
be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has
specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional
rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail
over general ones.
xxx xxx xxx
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc.
vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4, 1984).
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of
the State of Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are no
forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law on legitimes cannot be
applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the records
wig bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until
June 19, 1980 was the petitioner's petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the
order of January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the petitioner should have been led to
believe otherwise. The court even admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence
when his petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due
process. The fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for hearing . . ." did
not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given
preference in lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request should be
embodied in a motion and not in a mere notice of hearing.

Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid
of merit. Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the

decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in
a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and
proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged
by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to